Further Research
1.
American deportation policies that have contributed to violence in El
Salvador
2.
Salvadorian ‘death squads’ as a response to youth gangs
El Salvador
R. Bunker and J. Sullivan (2002), ‘Drug Cartels, Street
Gangs, and Warlords,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 13,
No. 2.
Transnational crime is a threat to political, economic, environmental, social systems worldwide – creates major fraud, corruption, manipulation in political, financial systems
Networks are based on risk reduction, market extension, product exchange – expands capabilities of individual criminal entities and minimises conflict, competition
El Salvadorian gangs operating in Los Angeles are Third Generation Gangs
– they have evolved political aims, operations, aspirations at the global end of the spectrum and have sophisticates power, financial, violence systems o Are capable of carrying out assassinations, drive-by shootings, enforcement slayings, even terrorist acts on behalf of other governments (example of Chicago gang working with Muammar
Gaddafi)
C. McIlwaine (1998), ‘Contesting civil society: reflections from El Salvador,’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4.
1996: More violent deaths in El Salvador than there were during many years of the war; most took place in the capital, involved murder, assaults, and robberies carries our by organised gangs or maras
Most gang members are young, male; a majority were former migrants to Los
Angeles who have since been deported and continued to wage US-style warfare in El Salvador using arms still circulating from the war
One of the main gangs in EL Salvador is Maras 18, which is actually named after 18 th Street in Los Angeles
O. Pérez (2004), ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Public
Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and
Guatemala,’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 4.

Peace agreement that ended civil conflict in El Salvador called for abolition of existing security, intelligence organisations and the creation of the Policia
Nacional Civil (PNC)
Implementation of the doctrine for this force has been almost impossible; need for expediency has compromised the success of the police force  lack of accountability within police force  corruption and crime, high number of complaints for abuses
P. Peetz (2008), ‘Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua: Laws and the Construction of
Drug- and Gender-Related Violence,’ GIGA Working Paper
No. 78.
Ley anti maras (Anti-Mara Law) passed in El Salvador in 2003 – was controversial because implies connection between legal, illegal drugs to any given social group, which perpetuates negative images of that group o Basically ‘others’ delinquent youth by means of penal legislation
Implies that drug, alcohol use are fundamental parts of the mara lifestyle and that maras are connected to the drugs trade
M. Home (2007), ‘Mano Dura: El Salvador responds to gangs,’ Development in Practice, Vol. 17, No. 6.
Mano Dura (‘Iron Fist’) implemented in 2003, reflected similar initiatives of anti-gang movements across Central America
Advocates immediate imprisonment of gang members who can be arrested for having gang-related tattoos or flashing signs
Widespread availability of guns, high rates of unemployment, structural problems, legacy of authoritarianism have contributed to climate of fear, violence that undermine peace efforts
State responses to violence have been inconsistent, led to increased tensions, conflict among certain groups
Issue is that government treats youth gangs as though they were a new problem, although they’ve actually been part of politics in the country for decades to ensure elite interests
Murder rate was around 80 per 100,000 in years following peace accords in
El Salvador (1994 – 1997), but homicide rates climbed since implementation of Mano Dura in 2003 o In 2005 was 55.5 murders / 100,000, which made El Salvador the most violent country in the region
 PNC blame gangs for around 60 per cent of those murders
Easy access to firearms in El Salvador means gangs are better armed, more deadly than their US counterparts

Youth gangs seen as a greater threat to US homeland security since 9/11
State responses to criminality have been inconsistent and focused on repression of criminal acts rather than the prevention of crime o Ignores historic issues of uneven development, exclusion linked to high levels of violence, represents the government’s failure to address the roots of the problems and displace attention from other areas of attention (democratic institution, political polarisation, corruption, etc)
“Criminal gangs have descended into dangerous levels of moral degradation and barbarism. We have all known cases of decapitations, mutilations, satanic acts and dismembering committed against minors, old people and defenceless women. It is time we freed ourselves from this plague” – expresident Francisco Flores in 2003 (p. 745)
Mano Dura was upgradesd to Super Mano Dura by the incoming president
Tony Saca o Led to more imprisonments of young people, despite claims of unconstitutionality, human rights abuses o Also included specialised military anti-gang units, extradition treaties signed with neighbouring countries, and heavy US involvement in promoting this security agenda
2004: FBI set up special task force to combat gang activity in the region; El
Salvador is its centre of operations
M. Hume (2004), ‘”It’s as if you don’t know, because you don’t do anything about it”: gender violence in El
Salvador,’ Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 16, No. 2.
Mano Dura advocated trying all gang members as adults regardless of age, forced internment of anyone suspected of being a gang member without due process
Had a major impact on the way Salvadorians saw problems in their country; by October 2003 20.8 per cent of Salvadorians said they thought gang violence was a major problem in their country; prior to the laws that figure had not reached 1 per cent
D. Rogers (2009), ‘Slum Wars of the 21 st Century: Gangs,
Mano Dura and the New Urban Geography of Conflict in
Central America,’ Development and Change, Vol. 40, No. 5.
Together with Guatemala and Honduras, El Salvador received 90 percent of the deportations from the USA

Rejoining gangs is as much a social practice as one for personal security and assurance; deportees from US share a common language, reference points; gangs therefore represent a move into the familiar o “The ties that exist are more akin to a sense of identity, founded organically on individuals’ common experience of gangsterism in the
US, deportation and stigmatization in Central America” (p. 957)
Original Mano Dura was delacred unconstitutional by the Salvadoran
Supreme Court for violating the UNCRC; the Super Mano Dura replaced the original except that is respected the UNCRC and stiffened penalties for gang membership and leadership
Los Angeles
A. Arana (2005), ‘How the Street Gangs Took Central
America,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3.
Gang violence policies in LA changed drastically after 1992 race riots (gangs had been heavily implemented in looting activities during the riots) o Policy changes included trying young gang members as adults, three strikes you’re out, ‘get tough’ approach
1996: Congress implemented stricter immigration laws; noncitizens sentences to a year or more in prison would be repatriated to their countries of origin and foreign-born American felons could be stripped of their citizenship, expelled after prison term finished
List of deportable crimes also increased to include drunk-driving, petty theft
 20,000 young Central American criminals being deported back to their countries of origin; their families had fled those countries in the first place to escape civil wars during the 1980s o Deportees had few prospects other than gang connections once they returned to Central America  increase in gang members in Central
American gangs; median age is around 19 years old
“The result, predictably, was a disaster.” (p. 101) – Returnees integrated into local gangs, drug trafficking increased (especially crack cocaine usage in El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala)
‘Mano dura’ policies began in El Salvador with election of Ricardo Maduro
(gave government ‘zero tolerance’ power that means people could be imprisoned for up to 12 years on suspicion of gang violence, usually determined by presence of distinctive tattoos on necks, arms or legs) o Soon implemented by Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, though led to huge swelling of prisons
Programmes initially successful, but human rights groups criticised the hardline approach and soon faced same problems U.S. had faced in early 1990s: taking a hard-line stand on violence won’t solve the problem o Problem was that programmes didn’t address the cause or the violence (lack of social or education programmes)

Gangs now making their way back into the U.S. via Mexico, moving into
Massachusetts, New York, Maryland o Groups have grown more sophisticated and more able to use weapons because of the proliferation of small arms post-civil war Central
America o Also increasingly have connections to terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda
”For the last 15 years, U.S. policy toward Central America has essentially been limited to immigration and drugs, and thus the gang problem has fallen through the administrative cracks” (p. 105)
National gang intelligence centre headed by FBI created 2006, but has to coordinate information across Central America
Different cities are taking different approaches, but they all have to focus on suppression, intervention and prevention to be successful o Most successful approach comes from LA (maras originated here);
LAPD very experienced working with anti-gang efforts
LAPD works with everybody in affected communities; in 2003, implemented
Community Impact Action Teams (paired state, local, federal law enforcement agencies with citizen watch groups and clergymen who know neighbourhoods best o Also include probation, parole officers, local school district representatives, state prosecutors
 Impact: Crime statistics in January 2005 were down 14% from a year earlier o Central America has yet to adopt such an approach; mano dura seemed to be preferable approach
Focus on drug gangs takes focus away from democratisation
FBI works with one notorious Central American gang based out of Honduras
(MS-13) coordinating activities with Federal Bureau of Prisons, Drug
Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, immigration, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Marshals Service
Among primary policy practices should be addressing corrupt cops, separating out gangs during incarceration (this is very common practice in
Los Angeles)
D. Heath (1992), ‘US Drug Control Policy: A Cultural
Perspective,’ Daedalus, Vol. 121, No. 3.
1989: Bush Sr. declares a ‘war on drugs’ in his first televised speech to the country; anti-drug campaigns consequently become one of the major rallying points for public policy
At first, policy was directed almost exclusively at the supply side – keep drugs out of the country and keep them away from the public

o This favoured over demand-side approach) decrease interest in drugs through education programmes, providing rehab and treatment facilities)
 “As if often the case in time of war, the continuing needs of public health and social welfare were pre-empted by militant gestures and hardware” (p. 270)
70 percent of drug budget was aimed at military, paramilitary police approaches aimed at interdiction, eradication, disruption of sales o Was basically a very aggressive approach
Has created friction in Latin America where locals would complain about
States’ military presence – are very visible in support of local armed forces that are implicated in invasions of privacy, acts of violence, accepting bribes from drug kingpins
Early anti-drug policy included sending large numbers of planes, ships to monitor air and sea drug trafficking efforts, but has been minimally effective because smugglers would abandon ships / planes and they hadn’t stopped the drugs at the source, only on the journey
Policy also included massive incarceration (by 1992, 70 percent of incarcerations were for drug related offenses) but has had little effect on reducing crime
J. Wilson (1990), ‘Drugs and Crime,’ Crime and Justice, Vol.
13.
Los Angeles carries our street sweeps, gang suppression efforts and Project
DARE (a demand reduction programme involving police officers in schools) o Schools programmes also address “resistance skills training” – basically learning how to say no and address peer pressure
S. Johnson and D. Muhlhausen (2005), ‘North American
Transnational Youth Gangs: Breaking the Chain of
Violence,’ Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 9, No. 1.
Two most prominent gangs in Los Angeles: Calle 18 (18 th Street), Mara
Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13)
Began operating in LA in 1960s, now have fraternal links to between 130,000 and 300,000 members in Mexico and Central America
Deal in armed robbery, extortion, alien smuggling, arms / drug trafficking
Transnational thanks to fluid migration across porous national borders, incarceration with experiences youth criminals in US prisons, weak rule of law in Mexico, Central America
MS-13 originated in El Salvador, but spread elsewhere, particularly
Washington DC

Deportations began once El Salvador, Nicaragua were peaceful (around
1992)
US Immigration and Naturalisation Service deported around 4,000 – 5,000 people per year to El Salvador, Guatemala Honduras o Around 1/3 of these individuals had criminal records and had spent time in American prisons
Upon return, jails in El Salvador were packed with ex-soldiers, demobilised guerrillas that had tuned to crime once they faced unemployment after the war
According to Salvadorian police, 90 per cent of deported gang members try to return to the US as fast as they can; LA is the major hub of their activity
Federal programmes have also been put in place to promote negative perceptions of gangs and encourage young people to stay in school (most significant programme is Gang Resistance Education and Training – GREAT) o This programme hasn’t really had much of an impact, however
US could help Mexico and Central America with their gang problem by: o Opening market economies – especially because remittances could go a long way in the domestic sphere o Strengthen rule of law – ensure law enforcement, fund court facilities, etc o Promote family-friendly policies abroad – Encourage better schooling for Central American youth, fund schools o Support intelligence sharing among US, Mexico, Central American lawenforcement agencies o Enhance border security
A. Campo-Flores and A. Romano (2005), ‘The Most
Dangerous Gang in America,’ Newsweek, Vol. 45, No. 13.
MS-13 is FBI’s top priority; task force has been specifically created to target their activities o Task force includes Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – idea is to take on drug crime the way they once took on the Mafia
 Issue is the task force, and the individual groups that investigate DEA and ICE operations don’t always work together or coordinate operations, which creates difficulties for the other
MS-13 has around 8,000 – 10,000 active members in 33 states in the US
Funding shortfall occurred post 9/11 because more money was being devoted to domestic terrorist threats and connections
FBI agents are stationed in local embassies in Central America to coordinate with the FBI headquarters about gang movements, associates

On deportations to El Salvador: “Those deportations are a time bomb. When a gang member is deported from the United States, it destroys in one month what we’ve achieved in a year of [gang-prevention work].” – Oscar Bonilla, director of the National Council for Public Security in El Salvador