RUNNING HEAD: NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP WORD COUNT: 3,902 Needs for Certainty and Security and Partisanship: Individual and Contextual Heterogeneity Christopher D. Johnston Department of Political Science Duke University christopher.johnston@duke.edu NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Abstract Research and theorizing in political psychology strongly connects a cluster of psychological dispositions related to needs for security and certainty to right-wing political identifications and preferences. Few theoretical or empirical examinations have posited or shown that these same dispositions may predict left-wing orientations. The present research note reports empirical results obtained from modeling the 2008 American National Elections Study which contains measures of both needs for certainty and security and political partisanship. I find that such needs differentially predict Republican (versus Democratic) identification conditional on levels of political engagement. For engaged citizens, such needs increase Republican identification, while for the unengaged, they increase Democratic identification. I compare these findings to two other years of the ANES, utilizing largely identical models, and find the pattern is isolated to 2008. I conclude by considering the relationship of these results to a broader research program linking epistemic and existential needs to economic preferences. 2 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP INTRODUCTION Research and theorizing in political psychology strongly connects a cluster of psychological dispositions related to needs for security and certainty to right-wing political identifications and preferences (e.g. Amodio et al. 2007; Federico and Goren 2009; Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009; Mondak 2010; Thorisdottir and Jost 2011). From this perspective, the conservative focus on maintaining the normative and institutional status quo is palliative for citizens particularly high in chronic needs for security and certainty. In other words, conservative policies constitute a “functional match” to the underlying psychology of a large subset of citizens, thus providing a “bottom-up” foundation for political identity and ideology (Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). But are such needs always and only predictive of right-wing proclivities? The present research note reports empirical results obtained from modeling the 2008 American National Elections Study which contains measures of both needs for certainty and security and political partisanship. I find that such needs differentially predict Republican (versus Democratic) identification conditional on levels of political engagement among White Americans. For engaged citizens, such needs increase Republican identification, while for the unengaged they increase Democratic identification. These results are of a substantial magnitude in both directions. Moreover, I compare these results to two other years of the ANES, utilizing largely identical models, and find the pattern is isolated to 2008. The present findings contribute to an ongoing effort to understand heterogeneity in the translation of psychological dispositions into political preferences; more specifically, to understand how the same dispositions can predict different political orientations conditional on how citizens represent political conflict (Johnston 2011; see also Gerber et al. 2010). On the 3 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP basis of the findings above, I offer a speculative account of the patterns uncovered, placing them in the context of a broader research program which displays similar dynamics with distinct dependent variables. Generally speaking, well-executed empirical models of high-quality data form the foundation upon which a field is built. It is my hope that the present note makes such a contribution to the literature on the psychological foundations of political orientation, and stimulates discussion regarding heterogeneity in the dynamics of dispositional influence across people and context. THE LOGIC OF PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICAL ORIENTATION While a massive literature exists on the psychological foundations of political orientations and ideology, this work largely converges with respect to the key factors underlying liberal and conservative preferences in the mass public. In their meta-analysis of over eighty previous studies on the topic, Jost et al. (2003) argue that political conservatism is a form of motivated social cognition in that conservative values and policies serve the psychological needs of existential security and epistemic certainty (see also Jost, Federico and Napier 2009; e.g. Federico and Goren 2009; Van Hiel, Pandelaere and Duriez 2004). Conservatism, from this view, through its support for traditional values, institutions, and socioeconomic arrangements, constitutes a functional match for citizens particularly high in needs for certainty and security. The “tried and true” will typically feel more certain, and less risky, than difficult to imagine, untested alternatives. Conversely, citizens comfortable with uncertainty and risk will be more likely, on average, to find liberalism appealing in its focus on institutional evolution and change in the name of equality and diversity. For the former citizens, losses likely loom larger than gains, and vice versa for the latter group (e.g. Cesario et al. 2004; Higgins 1998). 4 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Recent research in political science also supports these claims. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) find that needs for security and certainty have become increasingly related to Republican Party identification over the last decade. Mondak (2010) and Gerber et al. (2010) demonstrate associations between openness to experience and conscientiousness, and liberalism and conservatism, respectively. These two traits are strongly related to the more basic psychological needs discussed by Jost and colleagues. Openness to experience taps an affinity for diversity and novelty, while conscientiousness involves “socially prescribed impulse control” and rule and norm-following (Gerber et al. 2010; see also Carney et al. 2008). Oxley et al. (2008) find that conservatives are more sensitive to threatening stimuli than liberals, evidenced by greater galvanic skin response and startle-blink response to threatening images. Settle et al. (2010) find that liberalism is associated with a gene variant known to predict novelty-seeking. Amodio et al. (2007) find that liberals show a greater tendency to adjust habitual response patterns to changing circumstances via enhanced sensitivity in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, an area implicated in the detection of response conflict and the recruitment of attentional resources to the resolution of such conflict (e.g. Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter 2004; Cunningham et al. 2003). There is thus substantial empirical support for the association of needs for security and certainty with right-wing affiliations. With few exceptions, such needs are hypothesized and found to predict right-wing and not left-wing orientations.1 In the next section, I report the results of a model of political orientation from the 2008 American National Elections Study which shows a substantial relationship of such needs to left-wing affiliations among those who pay little attention to politics, but right-wing affiliations for those who pay much attention to politics. I 1 Thorisdottir et al. (2007) argue that needs for certainty and security could potentially be related to left-wing orientations in Eastern Europe. Despite claims to the contrary (Greenberg and Jonas 2003), there is little extant evidence for the “extremity” hypothesis that such needs are merely related to the holding of extreme positions on the ideological continuum (Jost et al. 2007). 5 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP then replicate this model using the 2000 and 2004 ANES, and find the reversal pattern to be limited to 2008. In the final section of the paper, I speculate on these findings, and suggest they may be one manifestation of a more general theoretical model linking these dispositions to political preferences. DATA AND VARIABLES The data for the first analysis comes from the 2008 American National Elections Study, consisting of approximately 2,300 respondents interviewed face-to-face prior to election day, and about 2,100 respondents interviewed both prior to and after the election. The 2008 study also consisted of an oversample of Black and Latino Americans. About 90% of Black Americans interviewed for this study identified with the Democratic Party, leaving little meaningful variation, and insufficient analytical power, for similar tests for this group of citizens. About 70% of Latinos identified with the Democratic Party, leaving enough variation for a reasonable, if moderately powered test. The focus of my analyses below will be on White Americans, but I include models for Latino Americans in Appendix A (Table A2). As seen, there is some suggestion that needs for certainty and security increase Republican identification among Latinos, but the effect is not conditional on political engagement. These results should be treated carefully given the inefficiency of the estimates. Heterogeneity in the influence of dispositional variables across race and ethnicity is consistent with other recent research, and more work is needed on this topic (Gerber et al. 2010; Johnston 2011). I measure party identification with the traditional ANES 7-point branching scale, which allows respondents to self-categorize as independent, while still acknowledging that they “lean” toward one party or the other. In addition, this scale distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” 6 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP partisan identifiers. The overall scale ranges from “Strong Democrat” to “pure” independent to “Strong Republican.” I trichotomized the variable such that “leaners” were coded in their respective partisan categories. I operationalize dispositional needs for certainty and security with four items utilized by recent work to measure the construct of “authoritarianism.” The items are structured as pairwise comparisons of values, and respondents are asked which value is more important for a child to possess. The comparisons include: “Independent or Respect for Elders,” “Curiosity or Good Manners,” “Obedience or Self-Reliance,” and “Considerate or Well-Behaved.” Some respondents volunteer “Both,” and these are coded at an intermediate point. The four items were then summed to create a single measure. A great deal of research suggests that “authoritarianism” as a general disposition is rooted in more basic needs for certainty and security (see Jost et al. 2003; Duckitt 2001; Feldman 2003; Lavine et al. 1999; Lavine et al. 2002; Stenner 2005). More recently, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) demonstrated the convergent validity of this operationalization. These particular items are also face valid with respect to tapping the underlying needs of interest to the present study. Each item considers potential solutions to dealing with a dangerous or uncertain world, more specifically, by adhering to established norms, rules and institutions, and respecting legitimate authorities (Duckitt 2001). Political engagement was measured as the average of two items: the interviewer’s subjective rating of the respondent’s knowledge of politics, and the respondent’s self-reported interest in politics (r=.42).2 Recent theorizing and research suggests that the association of dispositional variables to political orientations is conditional on various forms of political 2 At the time of this writing, the more commonly used, objective knowledge operationalization of engagement had yet to be coded for the 2008 study. An identical subjective operationalization of engagement in the 2004 ANES was highly correlated with objective knowledge, indicating that the former provides a reasonable proxy for the latter (r=.57). 7 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP “sophistication” (e.g. Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011; Federico and Goren 2009; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). Consistent with this work, the analyses below allow for variation in the influence of needs for certainty and security across engagement. Finally, I control for several additional variables exogenous to needs for certainty and security, but potentially related to both needs and partisanship, including age, gender (male=1), educational attainment (treated as a nominal variable to allow for non-linearity), income, and employment status (1=unemployed). DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS I begin by considering descriptive statistics regarding the bivariate relationship between needs for certainty and security and partisanship. I then turn to a fully specified regression model. I divided needs for certainty and security into “Low” and “High” groups, each consisting of approximately 20% of the sample (lower and upper 20%, respectively). I created a three-point measure of partisanship which treats “leaners” as members of their respective parties, thus leaving only “pure” independents as non-partisans. Figure 1A shows the relationship between needs for certainty and security and partisan identification for the entire White sample. Each line represents the percentage of respondents identifying with the respective group at either low or high levels of needs for security or certainty. Moving from left to right on the x-axis gives a sense of how the distribution of partisan affiliation in the White population changes as needs for certainty and security increase from low to high. First, we see that relatively few White Americans consider themselves independents in the “pure” sense of the term. Second, this graph demonstrates changes in partisan affiliation as a function of needs expected by past theorizing and empirical research. About 62% of low needs citizens identify with the Democrats, while only 43% of high needs citizens identify with this 8 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP party. Conversely, while only 32% of low needs citizens identify with the Republicans, over 50% of high needs citizens do so. These changes strongly support past theorizing, and are of a substantial magnitude. Recent research, however, suggests that the association between psychological dispositions and political orientations should be conditional on political engagement (e.g. “expertise”; Federico and Goren 2009; Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). I thus break these patterns down further by levels of political engagement. In Figures 1B and 1C I replicate the descriptive analysis above for the bottom 20% and top 26% of political engagement, respectively. The results of this partition are striking, as the patterns are largely opposite across the two groups. For the politically unengaged, a change from low to high needs for certainty and security is associated with a change in the percentage of Democratic identifiers from about 43% to about 62%, and a decline in independents from about 29% to about 9%. Thus, for the politically unengaged, increases in needs for certainty and security are associated with movements out of independence and in support of the Democratic Party. This “leftward” movement as a function of such needs is contrary to most of the recent literature on this topic. In contrast, for the politically engaged subset of White respondents, the patterns of identification are not only in line with recent theorizing, but exceptionally strong in terms of substantive magnitude. At low levels of these needs, about 68% of citizens identify with the Democrats, but only about 28% identify with the Republicans. Conversely, for citizens high in these needs, about 26% identify with the Democrats and 68% identify with the Republicans. 9 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS Does this basic “reversal” pattern across levels of political engagement persist in the context of a more fully specified regression model? I estimated a multinomial logit regression of the three-point partisanship variable on needs for certainty and security, their interaction with political engagement, and all controls specified above.3 These estimates are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. As multinomial logit estimates are very difficult to interpret, I report the key substantive results in Figure 2 below. Each bar represents the estimated marginal effect of needs for certainty and security on the probability of identification with each of the three partisan groups. I report these estimates separately for the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of political engagement. The patterns can thus be interpreted as the expected change in the distribution of partisanship for each engagement group as needs for certainty and security change from low to high levels. The extended spikes represent 95% confidence bounds on these estimates. First, for low engaged citizens, a change from low to high needs for certainty and security predicts a substantively large and statistically significant increase in the probability of Democratic identification (B=.45), and a corresponding decrease in both Independent (B=-.34) and Republican (B=-.12) identification, although the latter change is not statistically significant. These results correspond very closely to the descriptive results above. For the highly engaged, by contrast, a change from low to high needs corresponds with a large and significant increase in Republican identification (B=.61), and a large and significant decrease in Democratic identification (B=-.62), with no expected change in Independent identification. This also corresponds closely with the descriptive results. Finally, as would be expected, the moderately 3 Treating partisanship as a 7-point scale and estimating an ordered probit does not change the key substantive results, i.e., a strong increase in Democratic identification among low engaged citizens, and a strong increase in Republican identification among high engaged citizens. 10 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP engaged fall in-between, but the dynamics are closer in substance to the politically engaged. Moving from low to high on needs is associated with a significant increase in Republican identification (B=.24), a significant decrease in Democratic identification (-.19), and a marginally significant decrease in Independent identification (B=-.05). In summary, both descriptive and model-based approaches indicate that the association of needs for security and certainty with partisan identification is exactly opposite across levels of political engagement for White Americans in 2008. REPLICATIONS IN 2000 AND 2004 I turn now to largely identical models of partisan identification in the 2000 and 2004 American National Elections Studies. The only difference across these three models is the measurement of political engagement. In 2000 and 2004 I take advantage of the inclusion of objective knowledge items. In 2004 the knowledge items consisted of four office identifications, and two items concerning party control of the House and Senate. In 2000, there were four office identification items, four items concerning the states from which the Presidential and VicePresidential candidates come, and the two questions concerning party control. Except for these differences, I estimated identical models of partisanship. All variable were again recoded to range from zero to one prior to analysis. The model estimates are shown in Table A1 of the Appendix. The key findings for the marginal effect of needs for certainty and security, across percentiles of political engagement, are shown in Figures 3A and 3B below. They are structured identically to that of Figure 2 above. Looking first at the results from the 2000 ANES, I find no significant changes in partisanship for citizens at the low end of political engagement, although there is some suggestion of an increase 11 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP in Democratic identification, and a corresponding decrease in Republican identification. Even if we ignore significance levels, however, the magnitudes of the changes are only about one-third of those seen in 2008. Similar to 2008, however, I find significant decreases in Democratic identification, and significant increases in Republican identification, for both moderately and highly engaged citizens. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of needs for certainty and security increases substantially from moderate to high. A nearly identical pattern is seen in the 2004 results. Once again, there is no significant change in the distribution of partisanship as a function of needs among citizens at the lower end of political engagement, and the direction of the observed change in point estimates is opposite to that of 2008. Moreover, replicating both 2000 and 2008, there is a significant decrease in the probability of Democratic identification, and a significant increase in the probability of Republican identification, for both the moderately and highly engaged as needs moves from low to high. In summary, 2000 and 2004 look very distinct from 2008 when examining citizens at the low end of political engagement. In 2008, needs for certainty and security among these citizens dramatically increased the probability of Democratic identification. In contrast, I find no significant changes in the distribution of partisanship for these citizens in 2000 and 2004. In 2004, the observed estimates were in the opposite direction to 2008. Conversely, the moderately and highly engaged in 2000 and 2004 look very similar to their counterparts in 2008. For both groups, needs for certainty and security increase the probability of Republican identification at the expense of Democratic identification, and these distributional changes in partisanship are more pronounced for the highly engaged relative to the moderately engaged. 12 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL SPECULATIONS The present paper began as a modeling exercise with expectations for similarly conditional relationships of needs for certainty and security to partisan identification across three years of American politics. Prior to analysis, it was expected that political engagement would strongly moderate the strength of the relationship of needs to Republican identification, but not the qualitative nature of the relationship. In 2008, however, the pattern which emerged indicated that the relationship of needs for certainty and security to partisanship was exactly opposite across levels of engagement. In other words, rather than simply limiting the relationship of needs to identity, political engagement reversed the relationship. At low levels of engagement, citizens higher in these needs were about 45 percentage points more likely to identify as a Democrat than those low in needs for certainty and security. To my knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a substantively meaningful relationship of these psychological dispositions to left-wing political orientations in the United States. Indeed, while there have been suggestions that such dispositions might be related to left-wing orientations in other regions of the world (Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Thorisdottir et al. 2007), the expectation for Western industrialized nations in general remains consistently right-leaning. The obvious question, then, is why such a pattern emerges at all in the United States, and why it is restricted to 2008. Given the lack of theoretical foresight, all theorizing herein must be treated carefully. Nonetheless, I find it worthwhile to relate this finding to a more general research program which seeks heterogeneity in the relationship of needs for certainty and security, and their related dispositions, to political preferences. In several other sets of analyses, I have theorized and found that these needs are related in qualitatively distinct ways to economic preferences and ideology conditional on both citizen and context (see Johnston 2011). More 13 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP specifically, I have found that needs for certainty and security predict economic liberalism for the unengaged, and economic conservatism for the engaged. The logic underlying this dynamic is straightforward. Previous theorizing which expects these needs to be associated with economic conservatism relies on the notion that citizens will understand economic conflict in symbolic terms related to institutional stability and change. In other words, those seeking to minimize uncertainty and threat are drawn to economic conservatism for its support of traditional economic values and socioeconomic hierarchies (Jost et al. 2003). The standard assumption in political science, however, is that citizens differ in the level of abstraction through which they understand politics, with politically engaged citizens more readily assimilating the ideological content of policies through attention to elite discourse (e.g. Converse 1964; Pollock, Lilie and Vittes 1993; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). On the other hand, citizens without exposure to elite discourse should draw on considerations which are available to them, namely those of personal or familial interests. As Converse (1964) notes, “moving from top to bottom of this information dimension, the character of objects that are central in a belief system undergoes systematic change. These objects shift from the remote, generic, and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or ‘close to home.’ Where potential political objects are concerned, this progression tends to be from abstract, ‘ideological’ principles to the more obviously recognizable social groupings or charismatic leaders and finally to such objects of immediate experience as family, job, and immediate associates” (p. 213). If economic issues are viewed in more concrete terms, however, we should expect security and certainty needs to promote economic liberalism for its role in providing social protection and insurance against the vagaries of free market capitalism. Stated a different way, we should expect that citizens who are risk averse will see government provided social welfare 14 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP as uncertainty-decreasing and security-enhancing (see, e.g., Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Rhem 2009). Consider, for example, Tomasi’s (2012) description of the ideal world of classical (i.e. free market) liberalism: Within the stable frame of strong but limited government, however, all else is change. Social order – the character and orientation of human commitments, expectations, and desires – is constantly recreating itself from within. Patterns of distribution within the social world are not a reflection of anyone’s intention or design, but emerge as the unplanned and ever-changing product of choices individuals make in pursuit of their goals and ends…order would be the ever-changing product of human freedom under conditions of economic freedom and formal legal equality. From such a perspective, it is quite straightforward to expect heightened needs for certainty and security to enhance the appeal of government intervention in the free market. Beyond my own work on domestic economic policy, there is recent empirical evidence that this is indeed the case in other policy arenas such as immigration and free trade (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Johnston forthcoming; see also Kam and Simas 2010). Viewed from this perspective, the unique dynamic of 2008 may be less mysterious. This survey took place in a time period of immense economic uncertainty. The politically unengaged, inattentive to the symbolic conflicts occurring at the elite level, are more likely to view partisan divides through the lens of the personal and concrete. If this is indeed the case, then it makes good sense that unengaged citizens high in needs for certainty and security would flock to the Democratic Party in 2008, whose long-term imagery is associated with government intervention in the economic sphere, and away from the Republican Party, whose leader in the second Bush had just presided over the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. 15 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP APPENDIX A. FULL MODEL RESULTS Table A1. Multinomial Regression Results, White Americans ______________________________________________________________________________ 2008 ANES 2000 ANES 2004 ANES Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p ______________________________________________________________________________ As Democrat NCS NCS X Engage Engagement Age Male Education 2 Education 3 Education 4 Education 5 Education 6 Income Unemployed Constant 3.55 -5.40 5.49 .26 -.72 -.33 -.54 .24 .09 -.52 -.32 -1.12 1.19 1.90 1.31 .56 .26 .44 .46 .59 .62 .57 .53 .93 .00 .00 .00 .65 .01 .46 .24 .69 .89 .37 .54 .23 .25 -1.25 3.46 1.24 -.53 -.74 -.64 -.75 -.72 -.06 -.41 -.53 .67 .71 1.75 1.13 .70 .24 .45 .49 .55 .53 .72 .76 .47 .73 .73 .47 .00 .08 .03 .10 .19 .17 .18 .93 .58 .27 .36 -.28 -.07 2.31 -.42 -.73 .11 .23 .18 .56 .19 -.53 -.01 1.28 .99 1.84 1.19 .64 .32 .49 .55 .69 .66 .71 .63 .52 .85 .77 .97 .05 .50 .02 .82 .68 .80 .40 .79 .40 .98 .13 As Republican NCS NCS X Engage Engagement Age Male Education 2 Education 3 Education 4 Education 5 Education 6 Income Unemployed Constant 1.03 .17 2.51 .65 -.51 .18 .14 .94 .49 1.37 -.25 -1.60 1.21 1.92 1.31 .57 .26 .47 .48 .61 .64 .58 .55 .95 .39 .93 .06 .25 .05 .70 .77 .12 .44 .02 .64 .09 -.66 2.96 1.15 .84 -.20 -.23 .15 .09 .25 .75 1.02 -.62 .12 .73 1.78 1.15 .72 .24 .48 .52 .58 .55 .74 .74 .50 .76 .37 .10 .32 .24 .40 .63 .78 .88 .65 .31 .17 .21 .87 .32 2.14 1.47 -.77 -.61 .10 .68 .58 1.14 .43 -.11 -.14 .65 1.00 1.86 1.22 .63 .32 .50 .55 .68 .66 .71 .63 .52 .87 .75 .25 .23 .23 .06 .85 .21 .39 .08 .55 .87 .79 .46 N 947 1025 754 Pseudo-R^2 .09 .07 .07 ______________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates and standard errors. The base category is independent. 16 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Table A2. Replication for Latino Americans, 2008 ANES ___________________________________________________________ Variable B SE p B SE p ___________________________________________________________ As Democrat NCS NCS X Engage Engagement Age Male Education 2 Education 3 Education 4 Education 5 Income Unemployed Constant 1.01 1.40 2.68 -.72 1.67 .85 .86 .32 .76 -.30 -.92 .97 .89 1.04 .43 .64 .56 .89 .94 .98 .73 1.02 .30 .12 .01 .09 .01 .13 .33 .74 .44 .68 .37 1.67 -1.10 2.17 2.65 -.72 1.67 .86 .85 .32 .74 -.30 -1.39 2.22 3.47 2.57 1.05 .43 .64 .56 .89 .94 .98 .72 1.72 .45 .75 .40 .01 .09 .01 .13 .34 .74 .45 .68 .42 As Republican NCS NCS X Engage Engagement Age Male Education 2 Education 3 Education 4 Education 5 Income Unemployed Constant 1.98 .94 1.55 -.57 1.64 .66 .84 .76 2.36 -1.92 -3.07 1.09 1.03 1.18 .48 .71 .66 .99 1.04 1.13 1.23 1.19 .07 .36 .19 .24 .02 .32 .40 .47 .04 .12 .01 1.95 -.07 .93 1.53 -.57 1.64 .66 .83 .75 2.35 -1.93 -3.00 2.58 3.97 3.01 1.18 .48 .71 .66 .99 1.04 1.13 1.23 2.06 .45 .99 .76 .19 .24 .02 .32 .40 .47 .04 .12 .15 N 331 331 Pseudo-R^2 .08 .08 ___________________________________________________________ Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates and standard errors. The base category is independent. 17 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP REFERENCES Amodio, David M., John T. Jost, Sarah L. Master, and Cindy M. Yee. 2007. “Neurocognitive Correlates of Liberalism and Conservatism.” Nature Neuroscience 10: 1246-1247. Botvinick, M.M., Cohen, J.D., & Carter, C.S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: An update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 539-546. Carney, Dana R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeff Potter. 2008. “The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind.” Political Psychology 29 (6): 807-840. Cesario, Joseph, Heidi Grant, and E. Tory Higgins. 2004. “Regulatory Fit and Persuasion: Transfer from ‘Feeling Right’.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86 (3): 388-404. Converse, Philip. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter. New York: Free Press, pp. 206-261. Cunningham, W.A., Johnson, M.K., Gatenby, J.C., Gore, J.C., and Banaji, M.R. (2003). Neural components of social evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 639649. Duckitt, John. 2001. “A Dual-Process Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Ideology and Prejudice.” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (vol. 33), ed. Mark P. Zanna. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 41-112. Ehrlich, Sean, and Cherie Maestas. 2010. “Risk Orientation, Risk Exposure, and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade.” Political Psychology 31 (5): 657-684. Federico, Christopher M., Emily L. Fisher, and Grace Deason. 2011. “Expertise and the Ideological Consequences of the Authoritarian Predisposition.” Public Opinion Quarterly 75(4): 686–708. Federico, Christopher M., and Paul Goren. 2009. “Motivated Social Cognition and Ideology: Is Attention to Elite Discourse a Prerequisite for Epistemically Motivated Political Affinities?” In Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification, eds. John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feldman, Stanley. 2003. “Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism.” Political Psychology 24 (1): 41-74. Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Higgins, E. Tory. 1998. “Promotion and Prevention: Regulatory Focus as a Motivational Principle.” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 30: 1-46. 18 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Shang E. Ha. 2010. “Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts.” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 111-133. Greenberg, Jeff, and Eva Jonas. 2003. “Psychological Motives and Political Orientation – The Left, the Right, and the Rigid: Comment on Jost et al. (2003).” Psychological Bulletin 129 (3): 376-382. Iversen, Torben. 2005. Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare. New York: Cambridge University Press. Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2001. “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences.” American Political Science Review 95 (4): 875-893. Johnston, Christopher D. 2011. The Motivated Formation of Economic Preferences. State University of New York at Stony Brook. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/897963495?accountid=10598 Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. “Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities.” Annual Review of Psychology 60(1): 307– 337. Jost, John T., Jaime L Napier, Hulda Thorisdottir, Samuel D. Gosling, Tibor P. Palfai, and Brian Ostafin. 2007. “Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated with Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity?” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33 (7): 989-1007. Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. “Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition.” Psychological Bulletin 129 (3): 339-375. Kam, Cindy D., and Elizabeth N. Simas. 2010. “Risk Orientations and Policy Frames.” Journal of Politics 72 (2): 381-396. Lavine, Howard, Diana Burgess, Mark Snyder, John Transue, John L. Sullivan, Beth Haney, and Stephen H. Wagner. 1999. “Threat, Authoritarianism, and Voting: An Investigation of Personality and Persuasion.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25 (3): 337-347. Lavine, Howard, Milton Lodge, James Polichak, and Charles Taber. 2002. “Explicating the Black Box Through Experimentation: Studies of Authoritarianism and Threat.” Political Analysis 10 (4): 343-361. Moene, Karl Ove, and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. “Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution.” American Political Science Review 95 (4): 859-874. Mondak, Jeffery J. 2010. Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. 19 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Oxley, Douglas R., Kevin B. Smith, John R. Alford, Matthew V. Hibbing, and Jennifer L. Miller, Mario Scalora, Peter K. Hatemi, and John R. Hibbing. 2008. “Political Attitudes Vary with Physiological Traits.” Science 321: 1667-1670. Pollock, Philip H. III, Stuart A. Lilie, and M. Elliot Vittes. 1993. “Hard Issues, Core Values and Vertical Constraint: The Case of Nuclear Power.” British Journal of Political Science 23(01): 29–50. Rehm, Philipp. 2009. “Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies 42: 855-881. Settle, Jaime E., Christopher T. Dawes, Nicholas A. Christakis, and James H. Fowler. 2010. “Friendships Moderate an Association between a Dopamine Gene Variant and Political Ideology.” Journal of Politics 72 (4): 1189-1198. Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thorisdottir, Hulda, and John T. Jost. 2011. “Motivated Closed-Mindedness Mediates the Effect of Threat on Political Conservatism.” Political Psychology 32 (5):785-811. Thorisdottir, Hulda, John T. Jost, Ido Liviatan, and Patrick E. Shrout. 2007. “Psychological Needs and Values Underlying Left-Right Political Orientation: Cross-National Evidence From Eastern and Western Europe.” Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (2): 175-203. Tomasi, John. 2012. Free Market Fairness. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Van Hiel, Alain, Mario Pandelaere, and Bart Duriez. 2004. “The Impact of Need for Closure on Conservative Beliefs and Racism: Differential Mediation by Authoritarian Submission and Authoritarian Dominance.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30(7): 824– 837. 20 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Figure 1. Descriptive Analysis of Needs for Certainty and Security and Partisanship, 2008 ANES A. All Whites % Republican % Independent 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 % Democrat Bottom 20% Needs Top 20% Needs B. Bottom 20% of Political Engagement % Republican % Independent 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 % Democrat Bottom 20% Needs Top 20% Needs C. Top 20% of Political Engagement % Republican % Independent 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 % Democrat Bottom 20% Needs Top 20% Needs 21 NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Figure 2. Estimated Marginal Effects of Needs on Partisanship, 2008 ANES Med Engagement High Engagement -1 -.5 0 .5 1 Low Engagement D I R D I Notes: Spikes are 95% confidence intervals 22 R D I R NEEDS AND PARTISANSHIP Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Effects of Needs on Partisanship A. 2000 ANES Med Engagement High Engagement -1 -.5 0 .5 1 Low Engagement D I R D I R D I R Notes: Spikes are 95% confidence intervals B. 2004 ANES Med Engagement High Engagement -1 -.5 0 .5 1 Low Engagement D I R D I Notes: Spikes are 95% confidence intervals 23 R D I R