PO377 ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Week 14: Internal Frameworks for
Managing Conflict
Lecture Outline

Methods of Ethnic Conflict Regulation

Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict


Why should we be interested in the relationship between political institutions and
ethnic conflict?

Defining political institutions

Institutionalism: institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence

Problems with majoritarian democracy

Power-sharing and consociational democracy
Consociational Democracy

Lijphart’s four characteristics of consociational democracy

Favourable conditions for consociational democracy

Problems with consociationalism

Alternatives to Consociationalism

Evidence?

Summary
Methods of Ethnic Conflict Regulation
I.
Methods of eliminating differences:
(a)
genocide;
(b)
forced mass-population transfers;
(c)
partition and/or secession;
(d)
integration and/or assimilation.
II. Methods of managing differences:
(a)
hegemonic control;
(b)
arbitration (third-party intervention);
(c)
cantonisation and/or federalisation;
(d)
consociationalism or power-sharing [focus of today].
(McGarry and O’Leary, 1997)
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict
Why should we be interested in the relationship between
political institutions and ethnic violence?


Political institutions are comparatively easy to
manipulate;
political institutions shape political behaviour and are
“political actors in their own right” (March and Olsen
1984: 738).
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (2)
Defining political institutions


formal institutions – such as electoral systems or federal
arrangements – are openly codified (laid down in writing
and guaranteed through sanctioning mechanisms of state
agencies);
informal institutions, such as corruption, clientelism or
structures of civic life, are known publicly and
safeguarded through entrenched social mechanisms, but
not formally codified by the state (Lauth 2000).
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (3)
Institutionalism: institutional incentives approach to ethnic
violence
1.
2.

There is a clearly identifiable relationship between
institutional design and ethnopolitical (in)stability;
ethnically diverse societies require different political
institutions than comparatively homogeneous ones (Varshney
2002).
According to this approach, ethnic violence is an outcome of the
establishment of institutions which are not suitable for the
degree of ethnic diversity in a society.
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (4)
Institutionalism: institutional incentives approach to ethnic
violence


… goes as far back as to J S Mill. In “Considerations on
Representative Government”, Mill argues that democratic
institutions are not suitable for societies in which several ethnic
or national groups co-exist, as they would deepen tensions
between different parts of the population.
The (inconclusive) debate about the utility of consociationalism
(or power-sharing more generally) as a strategy for managing
ethnic conflict is one of the most prominent debates within the
institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence.
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (5)
Institutionalism: institutional incentives approach to ethnic
violence

Can democracy work in multiethnic societies?
“Is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in the
[deeply divided] society manageable in a democratic
framework? We think not” (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 217,
quoted in Sisk 1996: 29).

Lijphart’s reply: “it may be difficult, but it is not at all impossible
to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a
plural society” (Lijphart 1977: 1) .
Pop Quiz

What do you see as being a problem/problems
with majoritarian democracy in the kinds of
societies we have been discussing?
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (6)
Problems with majoritarian democracy


Majoritarian democracies are based on “winner-takes-all”
principles. Typified by the Westminster style of democracy, they
are governed by and responsive to the majority of people
(Lijphart 1999).
The core problem of majoritarianism is its potential for
“majority dictatorship” (Lijphart 1985: 102) and the permanent
exclusion of minorities: “simple majority rule results in minimum
winning coalitions that tend to exclude a significant minority;
when minority preferences are intense and there is little chance
of the minority becoming a majority, a recipe for conflict exists”
(Sisk 1996: 32).
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (7)
Problems with majoritarian democracy
Examples:


Under the plurality system for parliamentary elections, Unionists
representing the Protestant majority (approx. two-thirds of the
population at the time of partition) in Northern Ireland were able
to form a one-party government from 1921 to 1972.
According to Sisk (1996: 31), the “primary trigger in the onset of
the war in Bosnia” was the decision by the predominantly Muslim
and Croat government in early 1992 to hold a referendum on
independence from Yugoslavia, to be conducted under simple
majority rule. Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum.
Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (8)
Power-sharing and consociational democracy


Definitions of power-sharing are contested. “Narrowly”
defined, power-sharing strategies aim to ensure the
representatives of all major ethnic groups are included in the
political decision-making process (Rothchild and Roeder 2005).
More broadly, power-sharing includes all practices “that
promote meaningful inclusivity and balanced influence for all
major groups in a multiethnic society” (Sisk 1996: 9).
Lijphart’s (1977) model of consociational democracy offers one
particular strategy of power-sharing.
Consociational Democracy




Arend Lijphart: Democracy in Plural Societies (1977). Plural
society is one divided by ‘segmental cleavages’; political
divisions follow social divisions of religious, ideological,
linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature.
Consociational democracy is both an empirical and a normative
model.
Consociational democracy relies on political cooperation of the
elites of each segment.
Assumption: ethnopolitical instability can be prevented through
the institutionalised guarantee of political representation for all
major ethnic groups in a society.
Consociational Democracy (2)
‘It is in the nature of consociational
democracy, at least initially, to make plural
societies more thoroughly plural. Its
approach is not to abolish or weaken
segmental cleavages but to recognize them
explicitly and to turn the segments into
constructive elements of stable democracy.’
(Lijphart 1977)
Consociational Democracy (3)
Lijphart’s four characteristics of consociational
democracy:
1.
Grand coalition [sharing of executive power]
2.
Mutual veto
3.
Proportionality
4.
Segmental [group] autonomy
Consociational Democracy (4)
Favourable conditions for consociational democracy:
1.
Multiple balance of power among segments of society;
2.
small size of country;
3.
overarching loyalties;
4.
segmental isolation;
5.
prior traditions of elite accommodation;
6.
cross-cutting cleavages (weaker importance).

Ultimately, however, the success of consociationalism depends
on statesmanship and the political leaders’ “desire to avert
the danger of mutual destruction” (Horowitz 2002: 20).
Consociational Democracy (5)
Problems with consociationalism:
1.
2.
3.
Problem of generalizing from European models to
severely divided societies affected by ethnic conflict
(Barry 1975; Horowitz 2000: chpt. 14);
lack of overarching loyalties in ethnically divided
societies and often conflict over whether a country
should exist at all, rather than how it should be run
(Barry and Horowitz vs. Lijphart);
leaders in severely divided societies are often very
constrained in terms of their freedom to act, and also
may lack genuine goodwill (Horowitz);
Consociational Democracy (6)
Problems with consociationalism:
4.
5.
6.
problem of assuming unitary leadership of ethnic
groups; intra-group competition constrains moves to
accommodation. ‘Only rarely does any single set of
leaders speak for an entire ethnic group, if those
leaders speak in conciliatory terms’ (Horowitz 2000:
574);
question of cause and effect: consociational theory as
circular (Horowitz);
consociationalism contributes to entrenchment of ethnic
divisions. Freezes group boundaries in the political
system and cements ethnic cleavages (Horowitz 2000;
Reilly 2002; Sisk 1996);
Consociational Democracy (7)
Problems with consociationalism:
7.
8.
9.
10.
too elite-centred (Daalder 1974, Horowitz 2002 etc.);
lacks incentives for inter-ethnic compromise (Horowitz
2000; Reilly 2002; Sisk 1996 etc.);
doubtful whether case studies chosen by proponents of
consociationalism really fit the consociational model
(Barry 1975);
neglects relevant factors such as interaction of internal
and external conflicts (Daalder 1974);
Consociational Democracy (8)
Problems with consociationalism:
11.
12.

not a strongly democratic system (no strong opposition;
homogenous and conformist segments with lack of
individual liberty and equality; elitist, top-down model);
potentially incapable of achieving stable and efficient
government (indecisive and inefficient; expensive).
(Lijphart acknowledges these two weaknesses himself)
Alternatives to Consociationalism

1.
2.
For instance: Integrative power-sharing according to
Horowitz (2000). This model consists of five elements
aimed at reducing ethnic conflict (Sisk 1996):
The dispersion of power “to take the heat off a single focal
point” (Sisk 1996: 598), e.g. by dividing power among
institutions at the centre or (through territorial dispersion) by
creating lower-level units with important policy functions;
territorial devolution or reserved offices to emphasise intraethnic conflict/competition;
Alternatives to Consociationalism (2)
3.
4.
5.

institutions that create incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation
such as electoral laws that create incentives for pre-electoral
inter-ethnic coalition by means of vote pooling (see also
Reilly 2002);
policies that encourage alignments based on alternative
social configurations;
redistribution of resources to reduce disparities between
groups.
Assumption: vote-pooling electoral systems offer more effective
incentives for inter-ethnic coalitions and the reduction of
ethnopolitical tensions than the political security offered to
ethnic minorities in consociational power-sharing arrangements
because of the self-interest of political elites to win elections.
Evidence?

The debate about the virtues and perils of
consociationalism has remained inconclusive. There is no
clear evidence whether consociational or integrative powersharing provide better means of ethnic conflict management
and we suffer from insufficient empirical examples to
examine and compare.
[I consider Northern Ireland here but you might want to
consider the “complex consociation” of Bosnia-Herzegovina
as well.]
Evidence? (2) Northern Ireland


1998 Agreement establishes a “complex consociation”
(O’Leary 2001; 2005): there is cross-community executive
power-sharing; proportionality rules throughout the
governmental and public sectors; autonomy/community selfgovernment; veto rights for minorities.
But: early crisis over executive formation; Assembly’s electoral
system is not list-PR (as recommended by Lijphart) but Single
Transferable Vote; “Others” less well protected in Assembly
than nationalists or unionists; several suspensions of the
Assembly; frequent deadlock... Has the “complex
consociation” worked?
Summary


Institutional design may be a means to manage ethnic
conflict; political institutions are comparatively easy to
manipulate, shape political behaviour and are political
actors in their own right.
According to the institutional incentives approach, ethnic
violence is an outcome of institutions which are not
suitable for the degree of ethnic diversity in a society,
e.g. if they exclude minorities from the political decisionmaking process, as this creates incentives for often
violent extra-institutional action strategies.
Summary (2)


In contrast to majoritarianism, power-sharing arrangements
aim to increase the inclusivity of the political system.
Consociationalism is a specific type that relies on executive
power-sharing and group autonomy as primary
characteristics, and proportionality and mutual veto as
secondary characteristics.
Consociationalism as a means to manage ethnic conflict
remains highly contested. However, it remains equally
contested whether other arrangements like integrative
power-sharing represent viable alternatives.
Summary (3)



Consociational democracy explicitly recognises segmental
cleavages in deeply divided societies and tries to manage
them into a stable political system.
Some form of political power-sharing, usually involving
consociational elements, is today the standard approach to
most peace settlements.
However, there are problems with as well as positive
elements to consociationalism – e.g. does it merely entrench
ethnic division?
Summary (4)

Focusing less on political elites, considering the relevance of
interaction effects between political institutions and
between internal and external dimensions to conflicts, and
taking greater account of informal political institutions might
help overcome the apparent deadlock between those in
favour and those sceptical of consociationalism.