J. Scott Jordan
Department of Psychology
Illinois State University http://www.ilstu.edu/~jsjorda jsjorda@ilstu.edu

Special thanks to…

Issues to Address
current approaches and their problems
Wild Systems theory (WST) a framework for a science of consciousness
consciousness and the natural sciences

Consciousness and Science
Consciousness was intentional, in that it was directed. It always has some ‘object’. Consciousness was a psychological act.
“…all experience involves directedness toward an object…Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself”
(Ash, 1995, p. 28)

Consciousness and Science
Cognitive
System
Perception
input: Sensation
organism
environment output:
Response
environmental event: Stimulus

Consciousness and Science
Cognitive
Psychology
Attention Perception
(Consciousness) input: Sensation
Cognitive
System
Intention organism
Psychophysics environment output:
Response
Behaviorism environmental event: Stimulus
Psychological functions are modeled servo-mechanistically within one loop that controls behavior.
“When we attend to something, we consciously experience sensory input; when we intend output; and when we
, we consciously anticipate a motor think , we ruminate our memories.” Pribram
(1999, p. 204)

Consciousness and Science
Consequences of Mechanization
(1)Mind-is-brain materialism (Churchland, 1995)
All conscious phenomena are actually physical brain phenomena
(2)Mind-is-information processing (Clark, 1997)
The meat doesn’t matter. It’s the transformations in the meat that constitute mind and consciousness.

Consciousness and Science
Implications for Science of Consciousness
Mind-is-brain materialism (Churchland, 1995)
1. A complete physical description of the brain will never yield a conscious state, nor explain why a particular brain state necessarily yields a particular conscious state (Chalmers, 1996).
2. Science of Consciousness = Brain Science
3. All statements in terms of ‘neural correlates’
4. Consciousness is potentially epiphenomenal.

Consciousness and Science
Implications for Science of Consciousness
Mind-is-information processing (Clark, 1997)
1. If consciousness experience derives from information garnered by the senses, we can never be certain of what it is that causes changes in our senses. (Hume, 1748).
2. Information-driven internal representations are necessarily inaccurate because inherently incomplete (Sekular & Blake, 1994).
3. Science of Consciousness = Science of Illusions

Consciousness and Science
Implications for Science of Consciousness
The point is...
1. Both positions accept a mechanistic view of mind and consciousness.
2. This leads them to speak of the relationship between biology and consciousness in terms of:
(a) neural correlates
(b) illusions
3. Due its exile from intentionality, consciousness is potentially epiphenomenal.

The Wild Systems Approach

The Wild Systems Approach
Self-organizing
Hierarchy
Energy-transformers, not physical/mental systems

The Wild Systems Approach
Who else talks this way?
Boltzmann (1905) and Lotka (1945) described evolution as the struggle for available energy.
Wiener (1948) conceptualized organisms as thermodynamically open energy transformation systems in order to distinguish purposive systems from non-purposive systems.
Schrödinger (1945), Varella et al. (1991) and
Kauffman (1995) did so while attempting to conceptualize life .
Odum (1988) and Vandervert (1995) conceptualized nature as a self-organizing energytransformation hierarchy, and even applied this notion to the emergence of human knowledge.

The Wild Systems Approach
Cognitive systems as ‘ wild ’ systems
(Jaeger, 1998)
First, DST principles like attractors and bifurcations are not of much help in wild systems with fast stochastic input varying on the system’s own characteristic time scale. Second…DST handles high-dimensional domains by reducing them to low-dimensional descriptions…this reduction to some collective parameters is helpful in some respects but still poses a limit to the study of high-dimensional systems.

The Wild Systems Approach
The ‘Wild Systems’ Metaphor
Outcome production via neurons, brains, and bodies.
Each scale has its own intrinsic dynamics.
Correct outcome requires coordination of multi-scale dynamics.
Bio-dynamics at each scale change in time due to history and open environment.
The time it takes to achieve the necessary coordinations will be influenced by these multi-scale fluctuations.
Since each pattern of fluctuations is unique, each level of scale must address its own fluctuations. Successful cognitive agents are systems that can address these multi-scale perturbations.
In short, successful cognitive systems are wild systems.

The Wild Systems Approach
Sustainment Within a Transformation Hierarchy
Living systems are self metabolizing systems
Chemical interactions produce their own catalysts
The work produces products that actually sustain the work
(self-sustaining work)

The Wild Systems Approach
Thermodynamically open:
Intake, transform, and dissipate energy to stay whole.
Self-organizing control systems:
Offset perturbation to input states via micro-macro synergy
Represents the introduction into the natural order of ‘directed’ systems
(Natural Intentionality)

The Wild Systems Approach
Embodiment (world in world)
Microlevel work is necessarily ‘for’ the macro-level whole its sustains
(i.e., content--Bickhard, 2001)
Micromacro synergy necessarily ‘about’ energy-transformation hierarchy from which it emerged
(i.e., content is sustained ‘aboutness”)

The Wild Systems Approach
Addresses directedness (i.e., control) via micro-macro control of input
Address phenomenology via sustained aboutness
But how do we get from content to consciousness ?

Contextual Emergence (Atmanspacher, 2007)
The emergence of self-sustaining systems required the contingent, larger-scale context of a stable fuel source (i.e., the chemical conditions of the pre-biotic soup) coupled with the lower-level autocatalytic properties of certain chemical systems.
Single-cell systems constitute embodiments of these contingent contexts .

Contextual Emergence
Emergent systems give rise to new contingent contexts that afford emergence of new systems
(i.e., plants, herbivores, carnivores)
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Newly-emerging systems are self-sustaining:
Neurons (Hebb, 1949)
Brains (Edelman, 1989)
Behaviors (Skinner, 1954)
Recursion (Bickhard, 2001)

Contextual Emergence
-evolution ‘packs’ structure into self-sustaining systems-

ASSN
CX
Contextual Emergence
Embedding Constraints Autocatalytically
Cerebro-
CBM &
Parvo RN anticipatory motor error ( Kawato et al. 1987 ) virtual feedback ( Clark, 1997 ) dynamic state estimation ( Paulin, 1993 )
Motor
CX
Musculo
Skeletal
System
Environment
Main descending pathways and transcortical loop
Spino-CBM
& MGN RN after Kawato et al. 1987

Contextual Emergence
Creating Sustainment Contexts via Externalization
-self-sustaining systems ‘unpack’ and generate contexts-
One ant leads another from the nest to a food source by using signals that control the speed and route of the journey.
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Teaching in tandem-running ants.
Nigel Franks, Tom Richardson,
Nature , January 12, 2006
Tandem running is an example of teaching via bidirectional feedback between teacher and pupil.
Ants are coupled due to generation of external chemical context.

Contextual Emergence
Creating Sustainment Contexts via Externalization
-self-sustaining systems ‘unpack’ and generate contexts-
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Allometry of Alarm Calls:
Blackcapped Chickadees Encode
Information About Predator
Size. Christopher N. Templeton,
Erick Greene, Kate Davis.
Science , June 23, 2005
Chickadees’ alarm calls warn other chickadees not only if a predator is moving rapidly, but also transmit information on the degree of threat posed by stationary predators of different sizes.
Chickadees are coupled via the generation and sustainment of
‘aboutness’ external auditory contexts that afford an increased sphere of

Contextual Emergence
Primate Coupling via Externalization
Rizzolatti, G., Luciano, F., Fogassi, L., &
Gallese, V. (2002).
Neurons in area F5 of the macaque become active both during the planning observation of a distal goal.
and
Observing a goal automatically puts the plan for that goal in one’s own brain.
Macaques are coupled at the level of distal goals.

Contextual Emergence
Human Coupling via Externalization
Neurons in the human homologue of macaque F5 become active both during the planning and observation of a distal goal.
Its depends upon the degree to which the observed goal is part of one’s repetoire.
Observing a goal automatically puts the plan for that goal in one’s own brain.
Humans are coupled at the level of distal goals.
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Calvo-Merino, B., Glaser, D. E., Grèzes, J. ,
Passingham, R. E. & Haggard, P. (2005).

Contextual Emergence
Human Coupling via the Generation and Sustainment of
Multi-Scale Intentional Contexts
Meaningful versus meaningless actions and activity in inferior and superior parietal lobe, as well as cerebellum.
Grezes, Costes, and Decety (1998).
Iacoboni’s (2005) theory of imitation.
Rizzolatti et al. (2002) and multi-scale resonance .
Kinsbourne (2002) resonance as the default in human interaction. Cortical inhibition.
Humans generate and sustain multi-scale intentional contexts .

Contextual Emergence
Human Coupling via Externalization
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Coupling is automatic
Non-coupling requires inhibition
Eco-ethnographic perspective
Hide yourself in the mirroring systems of another
Shakespeare wins the day!
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ALLWOOD, AHLSEN, GRAMMER & KOPP (2006)

The Wild Systems Approach
Coupled Intentional Contexts become Increasingly Virtual
(i.e., external simulation)
Neurodynamics coupled to repetitive body-world dynamics
ASSN
CX
Cerebro-
CBM &
Parvo RN
Motor
CX anticipatory Kawato et al. 1987 ) virtual Clark, 1997 ) dynamic state estimation ( Paulin, 1993 )
Musculo
Skeletal
System
Environment
Thoughts generated and sustained via cerebellarcortical loops (Ito, 1993)
Main descending pathways and transcortical loop
Spino-CBM
& MGN RN after Kawato et al. 1987
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Externalized virtual content coupled to group intentional contexts

The Wild Systems Approach
Coupled Intentional Contexts become Increasingly Virtual
(i.e., external simulation)
Recursively embedded scales of embodied self-sustainment
ASSN
CX
Cerebro-
CBM &
Parvo RN
Motor
CX anticipatory Kawato et al. 1987 ) virtual Clark, 1997 ) dynamic state estimation ( Paulin, 1993 )
Environment
Neural scale
Musculo
Skeletal
System
Main descending pathways and transcortical loop
Spino-CBM
& MGN RN after Kawato et al. 1987
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Social Scale
Unpacked virtual scale
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Behavioral scale

Self-sustaining systems naturally and necessarily constitute embodiments of the contingent contexts in which they had to phylogenetically and ontogenetically sustain themselves, at all levels of scale (i.e., neural, behavioral, and social).
These self-sustaining embodiments are naturally and necessarily
‘about’ the contingent contexts they have embodied (at all levels of scale).
Such systems do not gain their ‘meaning’ by being ‘informed’.
They do not need to be ‘informed’ about their immediate context
(i.e., environment) to be ‘about’ their immediate context. What they need to do is control the manner in which their ‘aboutness’ is modulated by the contexts in which they are embedded.

…from the control of behavior…
Perception
input: Sensation
Cognitive System
organism environment
output: Response
environmental event: Stimulus

…to sustainment at multiple scales simultaneously
Phylogenetic increase in the distality of controllable effects
Environment
Virtual-effect Systems
(Cognition: Episodic and Symbolic)
Intention
The inherent ability of biological systems to offset perturbation to system states via the intake, transformation, and dissipation of energy
Distal-effect Systems
(Perception)
Proximal-effect Systems
(Action)
Organism
Attention
The inherent ability of biological systems to constrain the functioning of nested sub-systems.

…to sustainment at multiple scales simultaneously
Effect-Control Hierarchy
Phylogenetic increase in the distality of controllable effects
Environment
Virtual-effect Systems
(Cognition: Episodic and Symbolic)
Distal-effect Systems
(Perception)
Proximal-effect Systems
(Action)
Organism
Cognition: Virtual relationships
Action: Body relationships
Intention
The inherent ability of biological systems to offset perturbation to system states via the intake, transformation, and dissipation of energy
Attention
The inherent ability of biological systems to constrain the functioning of nested sub-systems.
Man, I ’ ’ m glad the ref didn ’ ’ t see that!
Perception: Body-world relationships

Advantages of WST
New answer to ‘what is consciousness?’
Consciousness is not so much an act of ‘seeing’ or ‘imagining’ as it is an act of sustaining relation with that in which a system is embedded, within the context of the scales of constraint it has embodied.
Avoids ephiphenomenalism:
Micro-level work is ‘for’ the macro-whole it sustains.
An exact copy of a self-sustaining system will have content
(i.e., no zombies allowed).
Provides sound grounding for embodiment:
It explains what a body is.
It explains why a body is necessary for consciousness.
It explains why nested coordinations are necessary.

…and finally…
WST indicates that contextual emergence is the proper way to understand the relationship between consciousness and the natural sciences.
As new self-sustaining systems emerge, they alter the constraints
(i.e., context) all other energy-transformation systems have to address (i.e., embody) to sustain themselves.
That is, self-sustaining systems continuously alter their own contingent contexts and must be able to sustain themselves within every-varying contextual dimensions.
In short, life and living systems are wild .