Guilty and Giving: Premise Analysis of and Vagueness in Peter Singer’s The Life You Can Save
Peter Singer gives an ethical twist to the idea of charitable giving in his book The Life
You Can Save. In his assessment, giving aid in the form of donations to aid agencies is more than
something that you “ought” to do or something that good people do; instead, Singer argues that it
is ethically mandated and morally obligatory (18). In analyzing the set of premises that Peter
Singer uses to support this conclusion, I will argue that his argument for the moral obligation of
giving turns on vague premises 2 and 3 that utilize an openness of rhetoric that can be used to
morally obligate a sweeping set of actions that even go beyond the radical level of what Singer
already advocates and will show that his argument, although stemming from a legitimate concern
for the poor and doubt over the way the middle and upper classes spend money, cannot—and
should not—be morally obligatory.
Critics and Premise 2
Singer’s argument, drawn from page 15 of his book and included in the appendix of this
paper, begins with the premise that “Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical
care are bad.” Although Garrett Hardin’s argument that keeping the poor out of the “lifeboat” of
rich nations’ resources provides population control and a check on consumption of common
resources may be applied to deny the validity of this premise, we are going to assume (in the
interest of time) that Singer is claiming that “suffering and death…” are bad for the individuals
that suffer and die (786). In this case, and as Singer mentions on page 17, the situation would
indeed seem “bad” to someone who is within it (just as someone outside of the lifeboat would be
in a “bad” situation). So, we are going to grant the validity of this premise and move on to
premise 2. Singer bases this premise off of the results of the “drowning child” thought
experiment on page 3, which concludes that a desire to save your shoes from becoming ruined or
a hesitancy to arrive at work late would not justify letting a child drown when you could have
saved him or her. This result, as Singer argues, proves that we have a moral duty to help those in
“bad” situations, leading to the premise: “If it is in your power to prevent something bad from
happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, then it is wrong not to do so.” This
premise is a source of controversy and of revisions. John Kekes, for example, modifies this
“Prevention Principle” with the requirements that the “bad” something is not the result of the
subject’s fault and that your action must have long-term benefits (514). Richard Miller also
modifies premise 2, or what he calls the “Principle of Sacrifice,” with the “Principle of
Sympathy.” This principle is less radical than Singer’s and focuses upon the “underlying
disposition” of giving as a barometer for whether or not you are giving enough. In this view, you
can indulge in some luxuries as long as you show concern for the poor at a level where to
“express greater underlying concern would impose a significant risk of worsening one’s life”
(359)
Futurity
Now that I have explained Singer’s premise 2 in terms of these critics’ responses, I will
offer my own response that centers upon the idea of “futurity,” or participating in actions that
may benefit individuals in the future. As Singer explains on page 26 by citing Herbert Simon,
90% of what people in wealthy societies earn is based on social capital alone. Thus, how hard
someone works has no bearing on the amount that he or she makes. If this is indeed the case,
then people in poorer countries that lack social capital will never have enough wealth and
income no matter how much aid is given, unless efforts can be made to establish a higher amount
of social capital. Yet, Singer places emphasis on donating to aid agencies that mitigate right
away rather than plan for the later mitigation of death and suffering as a result of inaccessibility
to food, shelter, and medicine. It is these sorts of mitigating aid agencies that Singer has in mind
when he explains the drowning child thought experiment that drives much of his argument; the
drowning child is in danger right now, and this presence of suffering is what necessitates action.
If social capital is so important, however, there needs to be some aspect of future mitigation, or
what I have called “futurity,” to our giving of aid. For example, while donating to an agency that
works to promote better internal road infrastructure may not be alleviating the hunger of the
nation’s poor, it is contributing to better transportation routes which in turn can lead to higher
efficiency of travel and more potential for commerce and business.
While the “drowning child” thought experiment clearly shows that we should act to save
a child, granted that the cost of acting is not as great as the life of the child, it is not as clear that
acting is as obligated when futurity is involved. Say that you, a middle-class individual who lives
comfortably, are driving to work and pass by a pond where a child recently fell in and drowned
after a potential rescuer realized the bank of the pond was muddy and would hence ruin his new
designer shoes. As you recall that day, you remember that, invariably, many children drown in
this pond each year because of particularly steep and slippery surrounding banks. You lament
that a fence has not been planned for yet, and continue on to work. Given this correlation
between the lack of a fence surrounding the pond, the past deaths, and the strong likelihood of
future deaths if a fence is not built, are you obligated to build a fence? I would argue that many
would be inclined to say no; the pond, although dangerous, is not currently imposing on you the
necessity of action.
This thought experiment calls into question the legitimacy of premise 2 of Singer’s
argument, for it would indeed be in “your power to prevent something bad from happening,
without sacrificing anything nearly as important,” and it would be “wrong not to do so.” In this
case, then, you would be “wrong” not to “prevent” future drowning incidents by building a fence
with the obligation that nothing nearly as important as a child’s life can stop you. Thus fatigue,
your time, your money, and being late to work should not stop you from, right at that instant,
constructing a fence. This does not seem right, however, as the implication of this would mean
that you are obligated to act at the moment that you can conceivably think acting would prevent
something bad from happening anytime in the future, despite whether or not something is
happening right then.1 This would obligate such things as stockpiling food so as to prevent
starvation in your family in case of natural disaster or food shortage, which diametrically
opposes Singer’s argument that we have to give our surplus away. However, the vagueness of
the timeframe of this premise and its assertion that it is wrong not to act within your power to
prevent bad things from happening allows such action. The possible implications of this premise,
then, fail to support Singer’s overall purpose.
Conditionality and Premise 3
Now that I have shown responses to premise 2 and have raised objection to its
implications with the application of futurity, I am going to move on to analyzing premise 3.
Premise 3 states that “By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack
of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important.” My key
argument here centers on the openness that the word “can” entails, which creates vagueness in
1
Singer himself rejects this when he concedes on page 37 that in some cases, like that of Warren Buffett,
the global poor will be better helped if an individual holds onto his or her money and is able to gain more that can
then be donated later.
the link between action and reaction. Singer treats this briefly on page 14 when he recognizes
that there are arguments against giving due to insecurity in whether or not aid money “is really
helping the people it’s intended to help.” While Singer argues that uncertainty does not alleviate
your obligation to give, I would argue that this vagueness and uncertainty makes it difficult to
reject his premise at face-value. The word “can” allows much, as it is difficult to deny that
donating to aid agencies can prevent suffering and death. I am sure that my donation to an aid
agency has the potential to prevent suffering and death; I am also sure that it can promote world
peace by, say, keeping alive a future Nobel Peace Prize recipient.
Now, I am not saying that donating to aid agencies has a small chance of actually making
a difference or of preventing suffering and death. Instead, I am arguing that the word “can”
indicates looseness of rhetoric that allows a wide variety of implications and act-reaction
scenarios. For example, the format of this premise could also argue that “distributing pamphlets
about the global poor can help prevent suffering and death.” Nothing in the preceding premises
would have to change, yet this valid change in premise three would give the conclusion that
“Therefore, if you do not distribute pamphlets about the global poor, you are doing something
wrong.” Thus, this premise’s format and language support almost any sort of claim that has a
chance of impacting the global poor positively. The looseness that Singer’s premise 3 indicates,
then, weakens the argument in that it allows for obligation of any of these actions that can help
the global poor. Is it plausible that distributing pamphlets can help the global poor? I argue that
yes, it is: information presents facts, figures, and stories that give faces behind words like “global
poor.” However, is it plausible that because such an act can help the global poor you are
obligated to perform it? In other words, is it plausible that distributing pamphlets is morally
obligated? Perhaps, but I would argue that it is difficult to claim that someone is “doing
something wrong” unless they spend time handing out pamphlets.
Efficiently and Variability in Donating
Now that we have seen the ways in which premise 3’s conditionality contributes to a
broader understanding of what can plausibly be required by Singer’s argument, we will move on
to understanding the implications of this in the context of the ways that Singer argues that we
should help. Singer concentrates on monetary donations as the way to contribute to aid agencies
and briefly mentions the possibility of other actions as ways to contribute to aid on page 36,
when he says that “finding a form of aid that will really help people is crucial.” I would argue,
though, that the kind of aid that will help most may be aid that gives to the development of
infrastructure and institutions; aid that takes a longer view of how donations can help. However,
as I will show, the “drowning child” thought experiment that Singer bases his argument on
assumes that aid is giving direct, current relief. Yet, as Singer argues on page 36, this aid is
ineffective in that it begets dependency. Instead, he explains, forms of agency that contribute to
independency and moving forward should be emphasized. However, the nature of these
programs, such as programs that build infrastructure or begin preparing land for farms, involves
apportioning aid to a resource that does not have any direct, present benefits, thus going against
the assumptions that Singer bases his argument upon. Let us proceed and exemplify this by using
another thought experiment that revisits the idea of futurity.
I will concede in this manipulation of Singer’s thought experiment that the case of the
global poor is probably more similar in its futurity to a man who, coming upon a particularly
well disguised pond bordered on one side by a small hill that blocks vision of the pond from the
other side of the hill, sees a small girl crest the hill and, unable to see the pond, fall into it and
begin drowning. As he prepares to save her, other children run over the same hill and fall in, too.
While the man can continue saving the children as long as only one or two are in the water at one
time, he would encounter difficulty if a steady stream of children kept falling in. In this case,
children need to be saved presently as well as in the future. Other rescuers may happen upon the
scene, but, according to Singer’s thought experiment and argument, they would have a duty to
save the children before being able to construct a barrier or sign to deter the children from
coming across the hill, as constructing a sign would be ignoring the drowning children, and, by
premise 2, it would be wrong not to save the currently drowning child if you were there and able
to do so. In the case of the global poor, though, “saving” everyone before turning to preventing
poverty and suffering would be impossible. However, in order to be most efficient in giving, as
demonstrated by the dual needs of both the drowning children and of the children about to crest
the hill, we need to be able to both give to aid agencies that alleviate present suffering and work
towards giving everyone within a poor community a brighter future. The application of the
premises of Singer’s argument fails to support such a stance when there are poor individuals that
can directly and currently be saved by donating to food aid agencies. In this case, Singer’s
argument then supports only a partial and arguably ineffective way to help the global poor.
Aid and Pathos
Obligating giving only or mostly to agencies that mitigate present conditions means that
aid and support will be concentrated away from agencies that concentrate on futurity. Thus,
emphasis is kept away from future gains that could help to alleviate suffering in the long-term. In
this sense, I share the view of Kekes when he claims the importance of long-term improvement
in evaluating giving. However, Kekes and I differ in that I still believe that aid should be
contributed even if its more significant long-term effect is negligible or uncertain, for I do think
that there is a strong case to be made that charitable giving should occupy a more prominent
place in the lives of those who live comfortably; a place that is more engrained than what
someone “ought to” do. If nothing else, Singer’s stories of the experiences of the poor are
convincing of this.
As I hope to have shown here, however, Singer’s moral argument, though indicative of
the increased importance that giving aid should have, is ineffective in actually proving that
people have to give aid. His premises are too vague, implicate too much, and yet allow too
narrow of a view on what kind of aid should be emphasized. In this view, while Singer’s
argument in The Life You Can Save admirably advocates for increased giving and aid, I would
argue that obligating people to give is not the most effective way to encourage people to give. As
Singer includes in his book, many feel that action taken toward giving to aid agencies should
stem from free will and, as Miller would cite, a disposition to give (25-26). Perhaps focus should
instead be placed on how to help and the faces that you can help, appeals that deal more with the
heart than Singer’s ethical argument does, but that hold pathos-laden power. People may not, and
almost certainly will not, give as much or sacrifice as much as Singer requires, but they may be
more moved by the stories of the poor than by an ethical code that not only dictates giving, but
dictates giving until you no longer can.
Appendix
Peter Singer’s Argument
Taken from The Life You Can Save, page 15
1.) Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
2.) If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing
anything nearly as important, then it is wrong not to do so.
3.) By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of food,
shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important.
4.) Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing something wrong.
Works Cited
Hardin, Garrett. “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor.” Psychology Today
(1974):778-789.
Kekes, John. “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine.” Philosophy 77 (2002): 503-517.
Miller, Richard W. “Beneficence, Duty, and Distance.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32.4
(2004): 357- 383.
Singer, Peter. The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty. Random House: New
York, 2009.