Business Case and Intervention Summary (Humanitarian Format).
Title: Emergency Preparedness for the Continued Influx of Refugees from the
Democratic Republic of Congo into Rwanda
What support will the UK provide?
1. The UK will provide up to £1.93 million for a project to support the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to ensure that Rwanda is prepared, in terms of
professional capacity and pre-positioned supplies, to respond to the needs of an
anticipated influx of a further 20,000 Congolese refugees over the next year. The
project will last 12 months, although monitoring and evaluation will continue for six
months beyond that to assess the situation and use of supplies.
Why is UK support required?
2. Conflict has been on-going in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since
1994, with two wars that drew in many of the surrounding countries and caused an
estimated five million deaths, hundreds of thousands of displacements and violence
against civilians, from massacres and rape to forced recruitment of civilians into rebel
armies. Renewed fighting since April 2012 has resulted in an estimated 400,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Eastern DRC, with tens of thousands fleeing
into neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda (over 26,000 refugees so far in Rwanda and
upwards of 50,000 in Uganda). DFID are already responding to the significant
numbers in Uganda through an emergency response, supporting UNHCR and the
World Food Programme (WFP) in-country.
3. Given the unstable situation in eastern DRC, the Rwandan Ministry of Disaster
Management and Refugee Affairs together with the UN system in Rwanda have
developed a draft contingency plan for Mass Population Movement (Refugees) which
operates with two scenarios: a Most Likely Scenario (20,000 people) and a Worst
Case Scenario (100,000 people). Although there has been some progress in peace
talks, those arriving over the border continue to explain that they are fleeing targeted
violence, and so the need for an upstream intervention remains strong.
4. UNICEF and UNHCR have begun to characterize the situation in Rwanda as a “slow
drip silent emergency” which requires a standing level of preparedness so that when
new arrivals come into Rwanda their immediate needs can be met within 72 hours.
The number of arrivals per day fluctuates between 30 and 350 (at its peak in 2012).
5. Therefore, while the current humanitarian emergency has yet to escalate to acute
levels, there is a very real risk that the number of refugees arriving will continue,
leading to an unmanageable situation should the right preparations not be
1
undertaken. In order to prepare for a scenario of 20,000 additional refugees it is
critical that the current efforts of actors – particularly UNHCR and UNICEF – are
sustained to avoid a rapid deterioration in conditions in the camps and settlements.
UNHCR and UNICEF are seeking the cooperation of DFID to preposition emergency
supplies and services for the cumulative influx of an additional 20,000 refugees, and
to augment the capacity of the Nkamira Transit Centre to receive the new arrivals.
Experience to date has indicated that the majority of refugees would be characterised
by the most vulnerable groups – women and children.
6. UK support will ensure that UNHCR and UNICEF are able to reach the state of
preparedness required to care for an additional 20,000 refugees within 72 hours of
their arrival.
What are the expected results?
7. UNICEF and UNHCR, have approached the UK seeking support in four key areas to
build standing preparedness:
1) Essential supplies1;
2) Upgrading the sanitation facilities at Nkamira Transit Centre;
3) Warehousing capacity to preposition supplies; and
4) Co-ordination & capacity building to support 20,000 refugees for a one year
period.
8. The impact of the UK’s humanitarian response to the ‘slow drip’ refugee crisis will be
that refugees fleeing DRC have their immediate needs addressed within 72 hours of
arrival at a Rwandan refugee camp or transit centre, and the capacity of Rwanda to
respond to such instances is strengthened.
9. Outcome – Rwanda is prepared, in terms of professional capacity and pre-positioned
supplies, to respond within 72 hours to the influx of up to 20,000 additional refugees
from DRC in 2013/14.
10. Outputs - There will be four outputs related to the specific elements of the
intervention as outlined by the UN in their request for funding and a fifth on how the
standing preparedness is delivered, focusing on value for money and monitoring and
evaluation:
Output 1: Supplies for 20,000 additional refugees are procured and stored, ready for
immediate dispatch;
Output 2: Upgraded sanitation facilities at Nkamira camp to support sustained hygiene
of refugees and reduce risk of disease;
Output 3: Dedicated warehouse space located and secured for supplies for up to
20,000 new refugees;
Output 4: A strategy is in place and training completed for UN and partners to respond
to the arrival of up to 20,000 additional refugees, including sector coordination, supply
management, monitoring and reporting and ensuring access to Gender Based Violence
1
Essential supplies include Sleeping mats, blankets, kitchen sets, hygiene times, Early Childhood
Development Kits, School in a Box, Recreation Kits, Tents, Tarpaulin, Water Kits, Pumps,
Therapeutic Food, Mebendazole etc
2
counselling for all women and children refugees coming into the camps;
Output 5: Plans in place and implemented to ensure intervention delivers value for
money (vfm) and measures are in place to monitor and evaluate the effect.
11. A logical framework is attached at Annex A.
3
Strategic Case
Context of the proposed intervention
12. Conflict has been on-going in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since
1994, with two wars that drew in many of the surrounding countries and caused an
estimated five million deaths, hundreds of thousands of displacements and violence
against civilians, from massacres and rape to forced recruitment of local civilians
(including children) into rebel armies.
13. Escalating violence following the formation of the M232 in March/ April 2012 has led
to a steady increase in the number of Congolese refugees pouring into bordering
Rwanda and Uganda. Following a brief campaign against government and UN
forces, the M23 was able to capture a large area spanning North Kivu, Orientale,
Katanga and South Kivu provinces, resulting in mass displacement of civilian
populations both within and across DRC’s borders with Rwanda, as well as with
Uganda. This renewed fighting since April 2012 has resulted in an estimated
400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern DRC, over 26,000 refugees
so far in Rwanda and upwards of 50,000 in Uganda. The UK is already responding
to the significant numbers in Uganda, supporting the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP)
in an emergency response.
14. The refugees are fleeing generalised poverty and lawlessness, as well as rampant
abuse of human rights. In North and South Kivu alone, more than 15,000 incidents,
including murder, rape and forced recruitment of civilians, including children, into
rebel groups, have been reported since April. Recent arrivals in the Nkamira Transit
Centre (TC) (the first port of call for those arriving in Rwanda from North Kivu) claim
to have fled Masisi, a region in North Kivu, to escape targeted attacks including
beatings, sexual violence against women and men, and confiscation of property and
livestock. Some reported having to pay bribes at roadblocks to get to the
border3. Although there has been progress made at regional peace talks in Kampala
and in Addis Ababa, including the signing of a regional peace framework on 24
February 2013, it cannot be presumed that the arrival of new refugees into Rwanda
will cease, especially given the history of instability in the region and the current
outbreak of conflict between militia in eastern DRC.
15. Since April 2012, over 26,000 refugees have arrived in Rwanda, although not all at
once. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UNHCR characterize the
situation as a “slow drip silent emergency” which requires a standing level of
preparedness so that when new arrivals come into Rwanda, their immediate needs
can be met within 72 hours. The number of arrivals per day fluctuates between 30
and 350 (at its peak in 2012). Over 6,000 new refugees have entered Rwanda since
November. The following table shows the numbers of arrivals since April 2012:
2
M23 is a rebel military group who mutinied from the DRC army in March/April 2012, alleging a failure
by the DRC Government to honour the terms of the 23 March 2009 peace deal which brought a
formal end to the previous cycle of conflict.
3 Source: visit of UK officials to Nkamira Transit Centre, January 2013
4
UNHCR Field Office Gisenyi- Nkamira TC and Kigeme Camp
Influx from DRC
as of Tuesday 26th February, 2013
New Arrivals
Month
Date
Families
Individuals
Opted to
Return
New Born
Babies
Death
Transfers to Kigeme
Family Reunification
TC
Population
Individuals
Individuals
Individuals
Families Individuals
Kiziba Gihembe Nyabiheke
Individuals
New arrivals in First Wave Emergency from April to october 2012.
April
27 to 30
783
2,078
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
May
1 to 31
4,680
8,630
512
27
0
0
0
0
0
0
June
1 to 30
2,536
6,788
0
25
5
1,534
5,918
11
34
25
July
1 to 31
909
2,132
0
30
7
1,640
5,514
17
40
40
August
1 to 31
129
281
0
3
0
959
2,511
0
4
17
September
1 to 30
31
80
0
1
0
65
179
0
0
0
October
1 to 31
-
0
0
0
9
31
0
0
0
19,989
512
86
12
4,207
14,153
28
78
82
Total
9,068
0
New arrivals in Second Wave Emergency from November 2012 to date.
November
1 to 30
88
292
December
1 to 31
1,527
3,813
202
1
0
35
116
0
1
0
0
3
0
34
135
0
0
0
3,655
-
26
January
1 to 31
1051
2965
0
0
1
610
1610
5
25
7
4,972
February
01 to 8
180
452
0
0
0
98
445
4
18
27
4,930
February
09 to 17
657
1196
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6,126
February
18 to 24
231
529
0
0
0
465
624
6
5
0
6,020
February
25-Feb
35
113
0
0
0
59
77
0
0
0
6,056
February
26-Feb
34
111
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6,167
February
27-Feb
February
28-Feb
202
4
1
15
49
34
6,167
Total
Grand Total
3,803
9,471
12,871
29,460
714
90
13
1,301
3,007
5,508
17,160
43
127
116
N.B: The "-26" individuals is explained by the fact that these individuals were already present in Nkamira TC since
September. They were transferred to Kigeme camp along with the new arrivals in November 2012.
16. Presently, Kigeme camp, a former camp for Burundian refugees in southern
Rwanda that has been overhauled to accommodate the current caseload from
DRC, is home to more than 16,500 individuals. Similarly, more than 4,500 refugees
are living in Nkamira Transit Centre, where refugees are first sent when entering
Rwanda. About 88 per cent of those refugees in both places are women and
children (22.5% of whom are children under the age of five). Both centres have
reached their intended capacity, although the UN is working with the Government of
Rwanda to expand the Kigeme camp. Based on what has happened thus far, it is
expected that, as the need arises, the Government of Rwanda will open up yet
further space in which refugees can be sheltered. It is expected that this will be built
into the Government of Rwanda’s contingency plan.
17. Given the unstable situation in eastern DRC, the Ministry of Disaster Management
and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR), together with the UN system in Rwanda, have
developed a draft contingency plan for Mass Population Movement (Refugees)
which operates with two scenarios for the numbers of refugees crossing into
Rwanda across the Rwanda-DRC border at Gisenyi-Goma (the border towns for the
two countries) over the next 12 months. The most likely scenario predicts 20,000
5
new refugees4 and a worst case scenario predicts 100,000. Although there has
been some progress in peace talks, those arriving over the border continue to
explain that they are fleeing targeted violence, and so the case for an upstream
intervention remains strong.
18. Therefore, the UN in Rwanda, through UNHCR and UNICEF, is seeking the
cooperation of DFID to preposition emergency supplies and services for the
cumulative influx of an additional 20,000 refugees, and to augment the capacity of
Nkamira Transit Centre to receive the new arrivals. It is expected that the majority of
refugees would continue to be characterised by the most vulnerable groups –
women and children. An on-going influx, or sudden increase in numbers, is likely to
lead to a significant deterioration in conditions. UNICEF and UNHCR have
underlined that they do not have the required resources to manage the on-going
‘slow drip’ arrival of refugees from DRC.
19. At Nkamira Transit Centre, experience has shown that, with the staggered influx of
refugees to Nkamira Transit Centre, pit-latrines, which regularly need to be emptied
or re-dug, are not a sustainable solution. In order to have the requisite facilities to
support dignity, safety and hygiene, UNHCR, UNICEF and MIDIMAR have agreed
that it is necessary to construct semi-permanent toilets and sanitation facilities. This
should mitigate the risk of outbreak of disease in the centre.
20. The UN is well placed to assess what the needs for this intervention are based on
their experience of supporting refugees from the same region since April 2012, and
the proposed support follows internationally accepted humanitarian standards and
norms such as SPHERE5 and UNICEF Core Commitments for Children (CCCs).
21. In terms of sustainability, funds are required immediately given the on-going influx
of refugees from DRC. This is therefore the focus of this intervention – however, for
the mid and longer term, UNICEF and UNHCR have underlined that they will
continue to fulfil their respective commitments in humanitarian response with their
core funds and/or funding from other donors as is required. This short-term project,
by its very nature, supports immediate, preparedness needs.
22. This proposal does not include specific support to WFP in Rwanda. WFP, through
the One UN approach, will work very closely with UNHCR and UNICEF, and will be
responsible for food provision to refugees.
Why is the UK best placed to intervene?
23. The UK is well placed to support the UN in this intervention due to the UK’s strong
track record in the humanitarian field, a policy commitment to strengthen
4 ‘Most likely ‘scenario - a manageable influx of some 20,000 refugees from a neighbouring country
(averaging less than 200 refugees a day for no more than four months). This scenario was, to some
degree, tested by the April and May 2012 influx of refugees from the DRC. While a formal evaluation
had not yet been undertaken, MIDIMAR, the One UN and participating NGOs are satisfied with the
response that had been mounted following the first influx starting in April 2012, and would replicate
this response for Scenario 1.
5
SPHERE are internationally agreed minimum standards in humanitarian action.
6
anticipatory interventions and the UK’s regional support to those impacted by the
conflict in eastern DRC. It has demonstrated leadership in working to prepare for
and respond to humanitarian crises, supporting those affected and building
resilience against future disasters6.
24. A key policy commitment of the UK, in response to the Humanitarian Emergency
Response Review (HERR), is to ‘work with others to find new ways of acting quickly
in ‘slow onset’ disasters to stop them becoming major emergencies.’7 The HERR
itself underlines the importance of anticipation and, where possible, acting before
humanitarian issues become full scale emergencies.
25. Furthermore, the UK’s Building Resilience Overseas Strategy8 sets out three
mutually-supporting pillars on which the UK will focus:
-
early warning: improving our ability to anticipate instability and potential triggers for conflict;
rapid crisis prevention and response: improving our ability to take fast, appropriate and
effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating;
investing in upstream prevention: helping to build strong, legitimate institutions and robust
societies in fragile countries that are capable of managing tensions and shocks so there is a
lower likelihood of instability and conflict.
26. This intervention is proposed in response to an early warning assessment of the
most likely scenario of refugees fleeing into Rwanda over the next year, enabling a
rapid response should refugees continue to arrive in small groups each day or
should there be a sudden mass influx of up to 20,000 people.
27. More broadly in the region, DFID is funding support to refugees that have fled DRC
and are now based in Uganda, as well as those suffering in DRC itself. The UK
continues to urge all parties involved in the conflict to reach a stable peace, but in
the meantime is playing a leading role in supporting those adversely affected by the
crisis.
28. This intervention, therefore, aligns with DFID humanitarian policy in seeking to avoid
humanitarian crises through improved anticipation, working with partners with a
comparative advantage in the field, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, as demonstrated
through the UK’s Multilateral Aid Review (MAR).
Why through the UN?
29. The UN clearly has a comparative advantage in managing a crisis of this nature,
and in Rwanda they are already positioned to respond (as they have been to this
latest crisis since it began in April 2012). It is not possible to respond directly
through Government of Rwanda systems as they have commissioned UNHCR to
lead this work. An option of working through NGOs instead is less feasible given
UNHCR’s leadership and management role in the camps and transit centres. This
intervention, however, will support the UN’s capacity building and co-ordination of
key NGO partners.
6
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, DFID (2011)
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review: UK Government response (2011)
8 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, DFID (2011)
7
7
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
30. The impact of the UK’s humanitarian response to the ‘slow drip’ refugee crisis will
be that refugees fleeing DRC have their immediate needs addressed within 72
hours of arrival at a Rwandan refugee camp or transit centre, and the capacity of
Rwanda to respond to such instances is strengthened.
31. The outcome for this intervention is that Rwanda is prepared, in terms of
professional capacity and pre-positioned supplies, to respond within 72 hours to the
influx of up to 20,000 additional refugees from DRC in 2013/14.
32. The UN have approached the UK seeking support against four aspects of
developing standing preparedness to support 20,000 additional refugees (the ‘most
likely’ scenario) for one year:
 the procurement of essential supplies9;
 the upgrading of the sanitation facilities in Nkamira Transit centre;
 the establishment of a dedicated warehouse space to preposition supplies; and,
 coordination and capacity building of humanitarian groups present in the camp to
ensure a rapid and effective response can be delivered for the arrival of up to
20,000 new refugees.
33. Outputs - There will be four outputs related to the specific elements of the
intervention as outlined by the UN in their request for funding (supplies,
warehousing, coordination) and a fifth on how the standing preparedness is
delivered, focusing on value for money and monitoring and evaluation:
 Output 1: Supplies for 20,000 additional refugees are procured and stored, ready for
immediate dispatch
 Output 2: Upgraded sanitation facilities at Nkamira camp
 Output 3: Dedicated warehouse space located and secured for supplies for up to
20,000 new refugees
 Output 4: A strategy is in place and training completed for UN and partners to respond
to respond to the arrival of up to 20,000 additional refugees, including sector
coordination, supply management, monitoring and reporting and ensuring access to
Gender Based Violence counselling will be provided for all women and children
refugees coming into the camps.
 Output 5: Plans in place and implemented to ensure intervention delivers value for
money and measures are in place to monitor and evaluate the effect.
34. A logical framework is attached at Annex A.
9
Essential supplies include Sleeping mats, blankets, kitchen sets, hygiene times, Early Childhood
Development Kits, School in a Box, Recreation Kits, Tents, Tarpaulin, Water Kits, Pumps,
Therapeutic Food, Mebendazole etc.
8
Appraisal Case
A. Proposal that addresses the need in the Strategic Case.
35. The ‘most likely’ scenario regarding refugee influx from eastern DRC over 2013/14
predicts the arrival of an additional 20,000 individuals, the majority of whom are
women and children. To respond, there are two feasible options that the UK could
take:
36. Option 1: Do nothing – This includes responding to the crisis if/ when the
refugees actually arrive, given that the UK is likely to fund a rapid response
to a humanitarian situation. This is classified as a late humanitarian response,
meaning a response to emergencies once the crisis point has already been
reached, rather than early interventions to prevent the crisis from taking place.
37. Option 2: Up to £1.93m to support standing preparedness, in advance of
(and to avert) a humanitarian crisis in Rwanda’s refugee camps and transit
centres (RECOMMENDED)
38. The Theory of Change for Option 2 is set out below.
9
Theory of Change
10
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
Option
Evidence rating
1
–
do
Limited – there is some evidence from other situations that
nothing now
waiting to deliver an emergency response means that refugees
will not receive support as quickly and the costs are higher.
2- emergency
preparedness
Medium – the UN have been working in the region, supporting
refugees fleeing the same region in eastern DRC since April
2012 (for this cycle of violence). They are also following
international standardised guidelines and procedures to assess
what needs there are. Furthermore, this approach follows the
UK’s HERR recommendations and the Building Stability
Overseas Strategy.
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and
environment for each feasible option?
39. A climate and environment assessment has been undertaken for the two options
around this intervention and is available in full at Annex B. In summary, the
assessment found the likely risks and impacts to be low for both options (provision
of essential supplies poses low environmental risk) although required camp
expansion may add additional environmental pressures. In terms of opportunities,
an emergency response (option 1) would provide limited (low) opportunities for
addressing environmental risks as the approach would be more reactive, with fewer
opportunities for dialogue and influence over camp planning and management.
40. Option 2, the recommended option, provides a ‘medium’ opportunity for addressing
environmental risks. Supporting advanced preparedness provides greater scope for
using the influence that comes with our financial contribution to encourage the UN
to give due consideration to environmental issues as part of their wider
planning/management of the camp. This could help reduce the possibility of higher
costs in the future resulting from e.g. avoidable land degradation. We will therefore
work with the UN to ensure that within the Memoranda of Understanding it is set out
that where additional land is being made ready for refugees, the UN team
encourage an environmental assessment to be undertaken. Furthermore, it is a
positive sign that the UK Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) found that UNHCR, who
would lead from the UN side in working with MIDIMAR on future land issues, are
experienced in environmental management and it is a policy priority in all operations
and phases of the agency’s work10.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
Costs
41. In this section we only consider the costs of option 2: emergency preparedness.
10
UK Multilateral Aid Review 2011
11
Due to the humanitarian nature of this Business Case which takes into account
international best practice, option one, emergency response (the counterfactual),
has been ruled out at an early stage. Therefore detailed costs for option one have
not been drawn up. There is however, theoretical argument outlined below,
suggesting that early preparedness is likely to deliver a set of given benefits at
lower cost than emergency response.



42. Possible areas for cost savings as a result of early preparedness include:
Buying when prices are low
Bulk buying
Lower transport costs
Buying when prices are low
43. Preparedness provides the opportunity to buy when prices are low, as compared
with emergency response in which products must be bought immediately, and a
sudden increase in demand is likely to drive up prices.
44. The extent to which these benefits can be realised will depend on a number of
factors including the size of the relevant market. For example, the market for
specific products to treat malnutrition is likely to be relatively small and less
competitive, meaning that the extent of price savings coming from purchasing in
advance might be limited.
Bulk buying
45. Preparedness may allow opportunities for bulk buying, driving down prices, which
are not available in emergency response. However, this incurs storage costs, which
when combined with uncertainty around demand and access can quickly diminish
the cost effectiveness of such an approach11.
Transportation
46. The longer lead time associated with preparedness might allow for transport of
freight by road or sea, which is much cheaper, as compared to air, which is likely to
be used in an emergency response.
47. It is difficult to tell, on balance, how these theoretical arguments will apply to the
case of refugees from the DRC in Rwanda. Since this is not a food security crisis,
the purchase of specialised malnutrition products is not likely to be as necessary as
elsewhere, suggesting that food can be purchased from relatively large markets,
presenting opportunities for buying when prices are low, as well as for bulk buying.
Moreover, the fact that the influx of refugees has already begun suggests that
products may not have to be stored for significant amounts of time, so that storage
costs should not outweigh the benefits from price savings. On the other hand, the
fact that the refugees have already started arriving means that the lead times in this
scenario may not be significant. This may limit opportunities to make savings
related to transport, as well as other areas.
11
For example, in Somalia, cash transfers using the Halawa system have been assessed as more
appropriate than in-kind transfers to meet food need given constraints on access in much of the
country. In Ethiopia on the other hand, effective storage facilities and distribution networks makes it
possible to procure food items when prices are low for future disbursement.
12
48. However, it is the opinion of the UN that the early preparedness scenario would be
more cost effective than the emergency response scenario.
Table 1: Overall costs
Output 1: Supplies
Output 2: Sanitation upgrade
2012/13 (£ million)
1.15
0.15
Output 3: Warehousing
0.17
Output 4: Coordination
0.32
Programme costs
Output 5: VFM and M and E strategy
Cost recovery
TOTAL COSTS
1.79
0.01
0.13
1.93
49. Given that delivery is through the UN, DFID staff costs associated with the
programme are expected to be limited and so have not been included in the table
above. Further details of costs can be found in the Financial Case. With the
majority of spend occurring this year, the difference between costs outlined in the
table above and the present value of costs when incurred will be minimal.
50. The figure below provides a summary of the outputs and services that will be
provided to beneficiaries under this intervention including respective unit costs12.
12
Reported costs do not include cost of freight or costs associated with storage, staff, or coordination.
13
Opportunity cost
51. The opportunity cost of using these resources for early preparedness in Rwanda is
the fact that the same resources could be used elsewhere in the country or region
where needs are great. The extent of this opportunity cost is determined by the
degree to which: (1) the expected influx of refugees occurs; and (2) the goods and
services that have been procured are suitable considering those refugees’ needs
(and, if they are not suitable, they would be suitable at other refugee camps in the
region).
52. These are genuine risks, but are mitigated by past UN experience of addressing the
needs of refugees, including those arriving at the relevant camp. Moreover, the
water and sanitation facilities included in the project have been designed to address
the needs of the current population of the camp, (4,500) as well as new arrivals, so
to a degree demand is already known.
53. Moreover, the non-food items which will be purchased with our funds are nonperishable, making it possible to redirect them at a later date to other permanent
refugee camps in Rwanda or the region if needed. For example, Kigeme camp in
Nyamagabe District, Southern Province is home to more than 16,500 individuals
with a similar demographic profile to those residing in the Nkamira Transit Camp 88 per cent of those refugees in both places are women and children, 22.5% of
whom are children under the age of five.
54. Therefore, although there is likely to be some opportunity cost associated with the
programme, we expect this to be minimal.
Benefits
i.
Benefits attached to proposed outputs
55. The non-food items which will be provided by this project are basic necessities.
Trying to assess the “value” attached to such items by beneficiaries is almost
impossible. Rather a more useful approach is to ascertain whether such items are
indeed needed by beneficiaries and offer value for money from a procurement
perspective. Based on the need assessment undertaken by the UN in conjunction
with the discussion in the Commercial Case regarding procurement, this is judged
to be the case.
56. There is strong evidence that poor water, sanitation and hygiene practices can lead
to significant social and economic costs13. Therefore the benefits of this project with
respect to the provision of water and sanitation services is the avoidance of those
costs. However, attempting to quantify these costs is beyond the scope of this
appraisal. Therefore, using the same reasoning as the discussion around the
provision of non-food items, in order to determine the benefits associated with the
provision of these outputs, we ask whether the technical specifications of the
proposed facilities are deemed appropriate given the population that they are
expected to serve. We also ask whether or not they have been procured at
13
Caincross, S. et al (2013) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Evidence Paper soon to be available from
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/
14
acceptable cost, and whether they are balanced between water, sanitation and
hygiene facilities. Based on the needs assessment and best practice this is judged
to be the case.
57. The remaining outputs cover education, child protection, health and nutrition
activities, which by their very nature will only serve a subset of the population of
refugees. Benefits are likely to be significant, although difficult to quantify at this
stage. For example, treating malnutrition can reduce/prevent suffering as well
deliver cost savings: evidence shows that the cost of treating Severe Acute
Malnutrition (SAM) is significantly more than that of treating Moderate Acute
Malnutrition (MAM)14.
58. Similarly, failure to provide services such as early/basic education that supports
cognitive development can adversely affect the development of human capital,
which can result in a high level of dependency in the future. The timing of provision
is important, therefore not providing refugee children with access to education
services can be detrimental to their future.
ii.
The incremental benefits of a preparedness response versus a reactive
response
59. Much of the literature on early preparedness has been around the benefits of multiyear financing relative to ad-hoc appeals. Some of the benefits of multi-year
financing, in addition to lower costs (which are covered in the costs section, above)
are also likely to be relevant to early preparedness. These include: better design
due to lower staff turnover; more participatory programmes; targeted support that
both addresses immediate need and increases the level of resilience15; the adoption
of innovative approaches; and a monitoring and evaluation framework to learn what
works and to improve programme design16.
60. However, although there are similarities between multi-year financing and early
preparedness (in that both are responses to the recurring criticism that humanitarian
aid arrives too late) there are significant differences between the two. Therefore the
expected benefits of early preparedness over and above emergency response are
significantly narrower than the list of benefits outlined above.
61. The additional benefits of preparedness are based on the assertion that the type of
outputs and services provided, including how they are provided, are somewhat
different, and preferential, under a preparedness scenario compared to emergency
response.
14
Actual costs are likely to vary by location, but Wimpenny, J, Anne Bush and Lyndsay Mountford
(2011) Value for Money in Humanitarian Aid to Kenya and Somalia Coffey International, report (page
22) that based on DFID experience of Humanitarian operations in the Horn of Africa, it cost USD230
to treat a case of SAM compared to USD100 to treat a case of MAM.
15 Cabot Venton, Courtenay, Catherine Fitzgibbon, Tenna Shitarek, Lorraine Coulter & Olivia Dooley
(2012) The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and
Ethiopia,
study
commissioned
by
DFID
and
available
at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/Econ-Ear-Rec-Res-Full-Report%20.pdf.
16 See soon to be published: Venton, C (2013) Value for Money of Multi-year Approaches to
Humanitarian Funding
15
62. This is expected to hold true in the context of the proposed intervention, since the
logistics involved with procuring and delivering outputs are such that there will be
differences in those outputs17. However, it has not been possible to explicitly state
how they will differ. Although there is evidence that timely, early action supported by
early warning systems and needs assessments can save lives 18, that is not directly
relevant to this Business Case, since it requires adequate provision for refugees at
their eventual permanent camps: this Business Case is primarily concerned with a
transit camp, and so cannot say anything about the longer term welfare of the
refugees concerned.
Balance of Costs and Benefits
63. It is not possible to undertake a Cost-Benefit Analysis of the intervention proposed
in the Business Case, since it has not been possible to quantify and monetise the
benefits. An alternative approach considered was undertaking a cost effectiveness
analysis of the two options (emergency response and early preparedness) so that
we could see which option delivered the same benefits at the lowest cost.
However, this too has proved impossible for two reasons: (i) the two options do not
deliver identical benefits; and (ii) the UN has not been able to provide costs for the
emergency response option.
D. Value for Money Assessment
64. Based on the narrative assessment above, which outlines the possible lower costs
associated with the second option, as well as its potentially higher benefits, it is
judged that option two (early preparedness) is preferable to the counterfactual
(emergency response).
65. The project will address the shortcomings outlined in this economic appraisal
through the monitoring, evaluation and reporting work stream. This will closely
follow the status of supplies in warehouses and the utilisation of distributed supplies
to beneficiaries to inform best practices. However, this will only allow us to
understand the costs and benefits of the preferred option compared to the
counterfactual if actual needs are found to be significantly different to those
predicted, leading to an emergency response in addition to the early preparedness
response, allowing for a direct comparison between the two.
Commercial Case
17
Supplies are transported by air, the supplies can arrive within 3 weeks and if the supplies are
transported through sea or land, it could take 3 months
18 Slim, Hugo (2012) IASC Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa
Drought Crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya: Synthesis Report, available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RTE_HoA_SynthesisReport_FINAL.pdf
16
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for
this intervention, with this development partner?
66. Funding will be channelled through two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), one
with UNICEF, one with UNHCR, in line with DFID’s Standard Administrative
Arrangements.
67. UNHCR is leading and coordinating the response to the refugee situation originating
from the DRC. UNHCR and UNICEF are working to provide all refugees with a wide
range of multi sectoral support through collaboration with other UN partners through
the One UN programme that exists in Rwanda.
B. Value for money through procurement
68. The MAR found that UNHCR generally performs well on value for money issues. It
records that UNHCR challenges and supports partners to think about value for
of systems and processes that require
senior management to take account of return and cost effectiveness. The MAR
records UNHCR’s procurement as being driven by VFM with spending tracked,
analysed and reported on. Where implementing partners are involved with
purchases, this is done in accordance with signed partner Agreement and
Implementing Partner (IP) Procurement Guidelines. All planned purchases by
implementing partners are vetted in advance by UNHCR.
69. A DFID assessment of UNICEF’s procurement19 was undertaken in 2012 which
found that ‘there is a clear recognition within UNICEF of the importance of effective
procurement to achieving its overall aims and objectives.’ However, the review
found that ‘concerns have been raised about the capacity and expertise of
(UNICEF) field offices to deal effectively in emergency and humanitarian
operations’. For this reason an international logistics expert with significant regional
and professional expertise will be engaged for six months in this particular project to
oversee the procurement activities. The UNICEF office has a strong internal control
system in place with clear segregation of duties for authorising, approving and
certifying functions of the procurement cycle.
70. The UNICEF office also has a Contract Review Committee (CRC) which verifies
that the required processes are followed transparently to ensure the value of money
spent on operations. UNICEF also conducts micro assessments of any sub-partners
prior to engaging them in operations.
71. By procuring supplies and warehouse space in a timely manner, and not subject to
the immediate deadlines that characterise a rapid response, it should be possible to
negotiate improved costs and fee rates.
72. During the project life cycle UNICEF and UNHCR will need to implement a value for
money strategy. A significant part of this will be on procurement, and the UN
19
Procurement Capability Review: UNICEF – conducted by DFID (October, 2012)
17
agencies will be assessed on their performance against this indicator.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
73. See below for a summary of the costs.
Table 1: Budget Summary
Agency
UNICEF
UNHCR
UNICEF &
UNHCR
Description
Total Budget (GBP)
Supplies for Multi-sectors (Education, Child
Protection, Nutrition, Health & WASH)
Coordination/Monitoring, Capacity Building &
Staffing
Sub-total
Recovery Cost (7%)
Total (direct + recovery cost)
Non-food items (NFIs)/ core relief items
Warehousing (staff, supplies, maintenance,
security, etc.)
Sub-total
Recovery Cost (7%)
Total (direct + recovery cost)
Grand Total
Project M&E
Full Cost of Proposal
Business Case Budget
475,317.00
315,520.00
790,837.00
55,358.59
846,195.59
828,262.00
173,500.00
1,001,761.00
70,123.00
1,071,884.00
1,918,081.00
10,000.00
1,928,081.00
1,930,000.00
74. This Business Case proposes up to £1.93 million (allowing for any minor
adjustments to the budget as the situation develops).
75. UNHCR and UNICEF have provided the justification for the need for payment in
advance (which is in any case standard practice in humanitarian emergencies). The
funding will be spent over a 12 month period, with the vast majority in the first 6
months. Given the immediate need, all UNICEF and UNHCR contributions will be
provided up front as a payment into the UN’s bank accounts at UNICEF and
UNHCR headquarters.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
76. The £1,918,081 funding will come from DFID Rwanda’s 2012/13 programme
18
resource budget. Funds are required to procure the stock as quickly as possible and
establish warehousing and coordination activities to respond to the on-going
refugee influx. Up to £10,000 for monitoring will come from the 2013/14 programme
resource budget. These funds are available for this project.
C. How will funds be paid out?
77. The contribution is to UNICEF and UNHCR for a humanitarian intervention and as
such, funds will be paid out as a payment into UNICEF and UNHCR’s HQ bank
accounts, and in accordance with DFID’s Standard Administrative Arrangements.
The funds will then be transferred to the Agency country offices. All funds will have
to be fully accounted for through project reports and Annual Audited Statements.
78. The split will be £846,195.59 to UNICEF and £1,071,884.00 to UNHCR.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
79. Financial and fraud risk of contributing to multilateral organisations was assessed
through the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR).
80. Both UNHCR and UNICEF scored well in the MAR on financial accountability. It was
recorded that UNHCR is strong on financial accountability with a range of internal
and external oversight processes. For UNICEF the MAR recorded that it has a
financial disclosure policy and there are good processes in place for audit, risk and
accountability20. All potential sub-partners will be assessed by the UN agencies in
advance of any potential cooperation. Overall, the financial risk and risk of fraud is
therefore assessed as low.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
81. UNHCR and UNICEF will provide accountability for all expenditure as set out in the
Memoranda of Understanding agreements. At least five reports will be expected –
this will include a final report at the end of the project as well as one every quarter,
or on a schedule agreed between the UK and UNICEF and UNHCR based on
project milestones. UNHCR and UNICEF will also send regular situation reports to
provide updates on progress. In addition, DFID will conduct a mid-term review of
progress in September/ October 2013 using the Annual Review format.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
82. Funds will be disbursed to UNHCR and UNICEF as per the outlined budget. UNHCR
and UNICEF are responsible for management of funds from DFID, including the day
to day management of the project funds over the implementation period. UNICEF will
coordinate and lead the implementation of the procurement, prepositioning and
20
UK Multilateral Aid Review 2011
19
dispatching of supplies for multi-sectoral activities (education, health, nutrition, water
and sanitation, child protection and HIV AIDS) and also for the second focus area of
the project i.e. strengthening the coordination, capacity building and monitoring
mechanisms.
83. UNHCR will provide the overall coordination and will be responsible for prepositioning the core relief Non Food Items (NFIs) and managing the major
components of the project i.e. warehousing and storage facility issues. Both UNICEF
and UNHCR will be technically responsible for ensuring the project is implemented as
defined by the agreed project proposal and Logical Framework.
84. A DFID programme and policy adviser will manage the intervention (10% FTE);
technical advice and support will be provided by Africa Regional Department’s
humanitarian adviser as required, including during project monitoring.
85. B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
Abuse of supplies
Impact
High
Probability
Low
Non-genuine refugees
arrive (i.e. not in need
but aware of free
support)
Less than 20,000
refugees arrive and
stock therefore goes
to waste
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
More than 20,000
refugees arrive (e.g.
100,000 worst case
scenario)
High
Medium
Mitigation
Supplies and the supply chain will be
closely monitored, and those handling
stock will be vetted. Regular reports
(including photographs) will be provided to
show stock in warehouses etc. in addition
to visits by UK staff.
Refugees arriving are assessed on entry
according to criteria established by
UNHCR.
Arrangements are in place so that all
stock will be used for existing refugees if
the current influx ends – no stock will go
to waste. If needed, stock could be
redistributed to other areas in need in the
region. DFID authority will be required in
advance of any redistribution.
Having preparedness for 20,000 will
enable better coping with this scenario.
UK will conduct an assessment in
September/ October 2013, which will
include consideration of likely numbers
arriving over the 12 months, following
which the UK can consider any additional
actions.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
86. N/A
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
87. The project reporting cycle still has to be agreed with UNHCR and UNICEF. The two
options are for either quarterly progress and financial reporting or reporting against
project milestones. The measurement indicators are included in the logical
framework. A mid-term review in September/ October 2013 will be carried out using
DFID’s Annual Review format.
88. In addition the project activities will be monitored at both national (Kigali) and project
20
site (Kigeme camp & Nkamira transition centre) levels. Monitoring of this project will
involve tracking the implementation of the procurement, prepositioning and delivery of
supplies and other services, the upgrading of Nkamira Transit Centre and
coordination and capacity building related activities. Joint UNICEF/UNHCR/DFID field
visits will be conducted to examine the status of supplies in the warehouse and
utilisation of those supplies by refugees.
89. A final Project Completion Report will include lessons learned and best practices that
can be shared within DFID and with humanitarian partners.
21
Annex B – Climate and Environment Assessment
Context
1.
Rwanda is highly vulnerable to environmental shocks. For example, regular
floods already impose significant economic costs on the country21 and are likely to
become more frequent and more severe as a result of climate change. This, combined
with the steep hillsides that are a classic feature of the Rwandan landscape, particularly
in the regions where project sites (Kigeme camp and Nkamira transition centre) are
located, mean that camp facilities are already vulnerable to damage and this risk is likely
to increase over time.
2.
Camps themselves can also exacerbate existing environmental problems, with
long-term consequences. Displaced populations need access to basic supplies. If these
are not provided in time, displaced people often have no choice but to look to the
surrounding environment to cover their basic needs. For example, if fuel is not provided,
displaced people most often turn to wood as their main means of cooking. Removing
trees and other vegetation can then worsen problems of soil erosion, formation of gullies
and damage to infrastructure. Accumulated waste can not only encourage disease and
vermin, it can also lead to localised pollution of groundwater, worsening pressure on
local water resources. As well as putting unsustainable pressure on the local
environment, this can also lead to conflict with surrounding communities.
Risks and opportunities of the different options
3.
Most camps for displaced people are likely to have an environmental impact. The
scale and duration of that impact is influenced by a number of factors, some of which
(e.g. the initial choice of site) are not under the control of this programme but others (e.g.
the manner in which it is operated) could benefit from additional scrutiny in order to
minimise environmental risks and maximise opportunities.
4.
Two feasible options are presented in the Appraisal Case: (1) do nothing (the
counterfactual), which includes responding only if and/or when extra refugees arrive; and
(2) respond in advance through the UN. Table 1 summarises the climate and
environment risks and opportunities of options 1 and 2.
Table 1: Summary of climate change and environment risks and opportunities
Option Climate change and environment
Climate change and environment
risks and impacts
opportunities
Category B/C: provision of essential
Category C: Low opportunity for addressing
1
supplies poses low environmental risk.
environmental risks as approach would be
However, supporting camp expansion may
more reactive, with fewer opportunities for
add additional environmental pressures that dialogue and influence over camp planning
could exacerbate existing problems (e.g.
and management.
soil erosion, waste management and
pressure on natural resources)
Category B/C: provision of essential
Category B: Medium opportunity for
2
supplies poses low environmental risk.
addressing environmental risks. Supporting
However, supporting camp expansion may
advanced preparedness provides greater
21
For example, Stockholm Environment Institute (2009) references a CGIS-NUR study which
estimates that direct measurable economic costs of a 2007 flood event were $4 to $22 million
(around 0.1 – 0.6% of GDP) for two districts alone. More recent (2011/12) flood events have also
caused substantial damage to infrastructure and loss of life, although economic costs have not
yet been estimated.
22
add additional environmental pressures that
could exacerbate existing problems (e.g.
soil erosion, waste management and
pressure on natural resources)
scope for using the influence that comes
with our financial contribution to encourage
the UN to give due consideration to
environmental issues as part of their wider
planning/management of the camp. This
could help reduce the possibility of higher
costs in the future resulting from e.g.
avoidable land degradation.
Key: A = high potential risk / opportunity; B = medium / manageable potential risk /
opportunity; C = low or no potential risk / opportunity
5.
On the basis of this assessment, we propose the following recommendations in
relation to the preferred option (option 2):



Encourage the UN to undertake an assessment of the carrying capacity of the
surrounding environment before finalising plans to expand the existing camp.
Ensure that routine assessments (such as shelter requirements and water and
sanitation provision) identify potential sources of unsustainable pressure on natural
resources.
Identify where special environmental measures might be necessary and incorporate
these into management plans. Measures might include the establishment of drainage
channels, terracing, ensuring effective implementation of a camp waste management
plan, informing displaced people of local and national environmental laws and
practices and actively involving them in the process of identifying problems,
developing responses and monitoring results.
6.
These recommendations may be best pursued through dialogue associated with
Output 4 of the programme: developing and putting in place a strategy for the UN and
partners to respond to the arrival of up to 20,000 additional refugees, and so in this
context we will look to include on-going discussion of these considerations. Monitoring of
environmental impacts could also be included under Output 5, within the overall
monitoring and evaluation of the programme.
Source documents
Government of Rwanda (2011) Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy
Stockholm Environment Institute (2009) Economics of Climate Change in Rwanda
UNEP (2006) Environmental considerations of human displacement in Liberia
23