NASPL 2015 – Information Security in the Lottery Sector

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Information Security
Protecting the Player and the Lottery
Gus Fritschie
July 22, 2015
Presentation Overview
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Introduction
Past/Future Lottery Attacks
Recent Cyber Security Attacks
Threat Sources (Internal/External)
Compliance and Security Controls
Security Testing
Top 10 Security Weaknesses
Emerging Technologies and Risk
How to Build Security Into New Projects
Examples
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Company Overview – SeNet
International
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Who I Am – Gus Fritschie
• CTO of SeNet International
• Subject Matter Expert in Gaming
and iGaming security
• Presented at multiple conferences,
including Defcon on iGaming issues
• Written multiple articles on gaming
security for both print and online
publications
• Most importantly I want sites and
organizations to be safe and secure
because I am also a player
• Follow on Twitter @gfritschie
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Gaming Customers
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Past Lottery Attack Vectors
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Future/Present Lottery Attacks
• More technical of nature involving computer “hacking” or some other
form of cyber intrusion.
• Good example with the current Hot Lotto trial that is in the news
currently.
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Houston, We Have a Problem
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
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OPM
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Target
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Sony
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Las Vegas Sands Hacked
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New Jersey DDOS Attacks
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Barcelona Laptop Issue
http://pokerfuse.com/news/live-and-online/confirmed-ept-barcelonalaptop-infected-with-screen-sharing-trojan-11-12/
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Ashley Madison
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Risk Assessment
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Threat Sources
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30-rev1/sp800_30_r1.pdf
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Internal Threats
Internal users often have the most knowledge about an organization
and can cause the most harm.
Types of internal threats:
• Rogue/disgruntled employee
• Insider as part of external attack
• Accidental user mistakes
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External Threats
• Script Kiddies
• Corporate Espionage
• Hacktivist
• State Sponsored
• APT
• Worms/Viruses
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Compliance
Compliance != Security, but if you are Secure you will be Compliant
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Security Controls and Standards
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Similarities in Standards
• What is different about these standards?
• Have you ever had to do a cross-walk between them?
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800-53 Management Controls
• Planning
• Program Management
• Risk Assessment
• Security Assessment and Authorization
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
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800-53 Operational Controls
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Awareness and Training
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
Incident Response
Maintenance
Media Protection
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Protection
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800-53 Technical Controls
• Access Control
• Audit and Accountability
• Identification and Authentication
• System and Communication Protection
• System and Information Integrity
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800-53 Control Example
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Continuous Monitoring
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How to Test Controls
• 800-53A
• Interviews
• Examinations
• Testing
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Penetration Testing vs. Vulnerability
Assessment
Vulnerability Assessment
Penetration Testing
Typically is general in scope and
includes a large assessment
Focused in scope and may include
targeted attempts to exploit specific
vectors
Predictable
Unpredictable by the recipient
Unreliable at times and high rate of
false positives
Highly accurate and reliable
Often invites debate among system
administrators
Penetration Test = Proof of Concept
against vulnerabilities
Produces a report with mitigation
guidelines and action items
Produces a binary result (either the
team owned you, or they didn’t)
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Penetration Testing vs. Vulnerability
Assessment (Cont.)
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Vulnerability Assessment:
• Goal = list of vulnerabilities
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Penetration testing:
• Goal = bypassing security controls to obtain network resources
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The maturity of the organization’s security program should
determine which type of test to perform. Little value in
performing a penetration test if organization does not have an
implemented security patching program for example.
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Testing Non-technical Controls
• Most often assessed via interviews and document collection.
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Security Architecture Review
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Sample Project Plan/Schedule
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Top 10 Security Weaknesses
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#10 Lack of Commitment/Buy-in
From Management
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#9 Weak Configuration Management
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#7 Weak/Default Passwords
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#6 Vulnerable Web Applications
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#5 Network/Data
Inventory/Classification
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#4 Unnecessary/Dangerous Services
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#3 Missing Patches
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#2 Lack of Audit Log
Review/Monitoring
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#1 Users
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Emerging Technologies and Risk
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Mobile
• MDM
• BYOD
• Gaming
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Cloud
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iGaming
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How to Build Security into New
Projects
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Built into the SDLC
Security integration to system development
is critical to front-end design (not to confuse
the term "front-end" with network design
terms).
Align the application design to your
corporate information security program
initiatives (you have one, right??).
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Built into the SDLC (Cont.)
Examples:
• Audit logging design
• possibly include redundancy, retention, and reliability
(unintentional 3 r's there);
• Session design
• possibly include concurrency control, lock, identification, replay
• Access, authentication, and authorization (intentional 3 a's there)
• Error handling design
• Unit test automation by check-in gates
• Code coverage
• Design for functional testing
• Information input restriction
• RBAC
• Partitioning
• Information validation
• Rules engine/input validation, app firewall
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IV&V
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Examples
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Security Configuration Issues
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DFS Mobile Password Disclosure
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Authentication Weaknesses
http://www.onlinepokerreport.com/9529/authenticationcomparison-two-nj-igaming-sites/
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Backend Password and Username
Exposed in Request
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Password Stored in Clear-text in
Database
Using the forgot password function the password is sent via
email and is the same password as initially set. This indicates
passwords are stored in clear-text.
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Weak Password Policy
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Questions
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