Capacity Enhancement, Governance, and Evidence-Based Diagnostics and Assessments www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance Background handout for discussion at the EILT— WBI’s Leadership Team DK -- WBIGG WBI, February 4th, 2004 1 Institutions &Governance Matters • • • • • Missing Link in Washington Consensus First Summers’ Lesson from Experience Governance as the weak link in CB/CE ‘Data Power’: governance key for development Yet 5 main challenges about institutions: i) which ones? (prioritizing among institutions & vulnerabilities Diagnostics); ii) how to? (Implementation Expertise); iii) where to? (Sectoral Mainstreaming) iv) measure, monitor, research Lessons v) Localize Know-how and Action Programs 2 Governance World Map : Control of Corruption, 2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Map downloaded from : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/govmap.asp 3 Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse ( bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90% Where is Financial Aid Well Used, Where Wasted? Global Poll (% firms rating satisfactory [6-10]) % firms rating satisfactory 75 Government Respondents Non Government Respondents 50 25 0 High Corruption Medium Low Corruption Extent of Corruption in Country (KK 2002 Indicator) 4 Listening to Stakeholders: Analysis of Responses on Donor Aid and Anti-Corruption Figure 9d : Most Important Role for Donors in Helping Country on Anti-Corruption (A-C) Pre-Conditionality Work w/ Country A-C Awareness/Education Control corruption in Donor projects Collaborate w/ NGOs Donors out of A-C 0% 10% 20% 30% Percentage of Responses selected as Most Important Role for Donors Source: World Bank Institute Governance WebSurvey, http://www.wbigf.org/hague/hague_survey.php3. 5 Based on 2,427 responses. Anti-Corruption Focus and Quality Assessment by the World Bank Global Poll Respondents, by extent of Corruption in Country (% firms rating satisfactory [6-10]) % firms rating satisfactory 100 World Bank priority to Corruption in Country Work 75 Quality job on anti-corruption by World Bank in country 50 25 0 High Corruption Medium Low Corruption Extent of Corruption in Country (KK 2002 Indicator) 6 Sources: Global Poll 2003 and KK02. Gl obal Poll questions: How much of a priority does the WB gi ve to hel ping your country re duce corruption (1 =none, 10=top) ; How good of a job does the WB do in hel ping your c ountr y re duce corr uption (1=bad, 10=e xcellent) Figure 8a: Firms evaluate World Bank’s effectiveness in PSD: Governance does matter (Survey, Emerging Economy sample) Net WB Effectiveness 30 as Rated by Firms (%) Poor Governance Good Governance 0 Good Poor -30 Quality of Parliament Protection Financial Assets Quality of Capture (Grand Corrupt Financial Audit Corruption) Procurement Corporate Ethics Labor Market Flexibility Note: The vertical axis depicts the firms’ net effectiveness evaluation of World Bank’s performance in supporting private-sector development (PSD) in their country. Net effectiveness is calculated as the difference between the percent of respondents reporting the institution to be effective minus the percent of respondents reporting it to be ineffective. Each set of two columns displays the net effectiveness ratings provided by countries with a good record in given constraint (in blue) versus those provided by countries with a poor performance in such constraint (in black). Calculations are based on country averages. 7 Source: Executive Opinion Survey (GCR) 2002. Corporate Governance and Corporate Ethics % firms rate satisfactory 100 75 2002 2003 Corporate Governance Corporate Ethics 50 25 0 NON OECD NON OECD 8 Source: EOS 2002-03. Soundness of Banks vs. Control of Corruption Sound 6.5 Soundness of Banks Simple average OLS 'controlled' estimate 4.5 2.5 Relatively Poor Control of Corruption Unsound Average Control of Corruption Good Control of Corruption Source: Executive Opinon Survey 2002; KKZ 2000/01Governance Indicators, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm The Sample of 80 countries has been divided into 3 sub-samples according to their rating in Control of Corruption. The 3 columns therefore represent the average ratings for Soundness of Banks within each sub-sample. The fitted line instead represents the predicted value of Bank Soundness controlling for the effects of GDP per capita and Regulatory Quality through an OLS regression. Each fitted value is computed as the sum of the estimated constant plus the value of Control of Corruption within each group times the estimated9 coefficient plus the mean values of Regulatory Quality and GDP per capita times their respective estimated coefficients. Transparency, Parliaments, Corporate Ethics, and GDP Growth Annual GDP Growth (%) 5 Transparent Information by Government Effective Parliamentary Oversight Corporate Ethics 3 1 Low Middle High Extent of Transparency 10 Source: Annual GDP growth over 1999-2001 WDI 2002; GDP is computed in PPP terms. The various transparency / governance variables drawn from Executive Opinion Survey, 2002. or p. A n Re tiC o sp ns rru pt ib io / G D ov n ec r en tr nnc Fi al e na nc En izat i ia l S viro on ec F nm G inan tor en ov C c ia ap t er l nm ac G en ove ity tE r ffe nan c c G e n tive e de ne M r ss ul til Hu Equ m at a e an lity r Q a C l ua lit Org api ta y of ani l za In t L fr as ions Q ega tr ua l lit effe uct u y of ctiv re en la b e o r m ss Pa Pol it rli am ic al ark et F en t E ina s n Po f lic fec cing e E tiv en f es Po fect s iv lit e i R ne eg c al In s s ul at f or lue nc y C ap e Te aci ty ch T a no lo x g ef fic y V U oi no ie n ce cy ffi & Ac cial d co un om ta bi lit y C Percentile Rank (0-100) Kenya – the ‘Mezzo’ Level of CE Assessment – 22 clusters 100 50 0 11 Source: EOS 2003 WEF, preliminary. Percentile ranks based on comparative performance among the 103 countries in the sample. All variables rated from 0 (very bad) to 100 Health Gap vs. ‘Active’ Capture (High Level Corruption) Large Gap 7 ZWE Rich-Poor Health Gap CHL JOR BRA CM R M AR PER TZA ETH COL LTU LKA VNM CHN PRY M LI HTI ARG ROM LVA 4 TUN HKG AUS SGP FRA SVK CZE SWE NOR DNK ISL Small r = 0.83 1 1 Low Source: EOS 2003 4 Bribery to Affect Laws, Regulations.. High Bribery 12 7 Romania: Disproportionally Negative Impact on the Poor % Dissuaded from Medical Services % of Income in bribes 15% 50% 40% 10% 30% 20% 5% 10% 0% low income medium income high income 0% low income medium income high income Institutional Capacity: From revisiting ‘Capacity Building’ to Measuring and Diagnosing Capacity Enhancement Institutional Capacity (IC) unbundling into 3 dimensions: 1. Physical capital and hardware (physical infrastructure, computers, etc.) (K); 2. Human and knowledge capital (including organizational & administrative capital, i.e. the ‘institutional software’) (HK), and, 3. Governance and political capital (GPK). IC = f (K, HK, GPK) Capacity Enhancement = Changed capacity over time14 Empirical Approach to Institutional and Governance Assessments and Diagnostics 1. 2. 3. ‘Macro’: Worldwide Aggregate Governance Indicators: 200 countries, 6 components, periodic – it permits broad proxy of governance and capacity enhancement ‘Mezzo’ (Middle): Cross-Country Surveys of Enterprises ‘Micro’: Specialized, in-depth, in-country Governance and Institutional Capacity Diagnostics: Includes surveys of: i) user of public services (citizens); ii) firms, and iii) public officials Item #1 above is central for comparative monitoring worldwide and to ‘flag’ a country’s institutional vulnerabilities. On other extreme, item #3 is in-depth input to concrete capacity enhancement strategy at country level. Due to improvements in cross-country enterprise surveys, item #2 provides a relatively detailed quantitative sense of institutional vulnerabilities, complementary to the other 2. 15 Overall Evidence is Sobering: Progress on Governance is modest at best, so far • Evidence points to slow, if any, average progress worldwide on key dimensions of governance • This contrasts with some other developmental dimensions (e.g. quality of infrastructure; quality of math/science education; effective absorption of new technologies), where progress is apparent • At the same time, substantial variation 16 cross-country, even within a region. Some Capacity Enhancement Assessment, Level I: The ‘Macro’ or Aggregate Governance Indicators+ • Some Illustrations from updated Governance Indicators database: 200 countries, 1996-2002, to be continued 17 Governance: A working definition – which contains much of what is relevant for CE • Governance is the process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised: (1) S -- the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) E -- the capacity of gov’t to manage resources and provide services efficiently, and to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations; and, (3) R -- the respect for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them 18 Operationalizing Governance: Unbundling its Definition into Components that can be measured, analyzed, and worked on Each of the 3 main components of Governance Definition is unbundled into 2 subcomponents: • Voice and External Accountability • Political Stability and lack of Violence&Terror • Quality Regulatory Framework • Government Effectiveness • Control of Corruption • Rule of Law We measure these six governance components… 19 Inputs for Governance Indicators 2002 Publisher Publication Source Country Coverage •Wefa’s DRI/McGraw-Hill Country Risk Review Poll 117 developed and developing •Business Env. Risk Intelligence BERI Survey 50/115 developed and developing •Columbia University Columbia U. State Failure Poll 84 developed and developing •World Bank Country Policy & Institution Assmnt Poll 136 developing •Gallup International Voice of the People Survey 47 developed and developing •Business Env. Risk Intelligence BERI Survey 50/115 developed and developing •EBRD Transition Report Poll 27 transition economies •Economist Intelligence Unit Country Indicators Poll 115 developed and developing •Freedom House Freedom in the World Poll 192 developed and developing •Freedom House Nations in Transit Poll 27 transition economies •World Economic Forum/CID Global Competitiveness Survey 80 developed and developing •Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index Poll 156 developed and developing •Latino-barometro LBO Survey 17 developing •Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide Poll 140 developed and developing •Reporters Without Borders Reporters sans frontieres (RSF) Survey 138 developed and developing •World Bank/EBRD BEEPS Survey 27 transition economies •IMD, Lausanne World Competitiveness Yearbook Survey 49 developed and developing 21 •Binghamton Univ. Human Rights Violations Research Survey 140 developed and developing -2.5 POOR Source: KKZ 2000/01 NEW ZEALAND CHILE NAMIBIA CYPRUS BOTSWANA COSTA RICA TUNISIA URUGUAY MALAYSIA MOZAMBIQUE CROATIA Corruption Level BULGARIA MEXICO CHINA INDIA ALBANIA BANGLADESH IVORY COAST VIETNAM ARMENIA MOLDOVA HAITI KOREA, NORTH TANZANIA INDONESIA ZIMBABWE Good 2.5 Corruption Control KENYA Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) Control of Corruption: one Aggregate Indicator (selected countries, for illustration, based on 2000/01 research data) Margin of Error 0 22 GOOD Governance World Map : Voice and Accountability, 2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Map downloaded from : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/govmap.asp 23 Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse ( bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90% Governance World Map : Government Effectiveness, 2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Map downloaded from : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/govmap.asp 24 Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse ( bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90% Governance World Map: Regulatory Quality, 2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Map downloaded from : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/govmap.asp 25 Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse ( bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90% Governance World Map : Rule of Law, 2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Map downloaded from : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/govmap.asp 26 Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse ( bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90% Governance Indicators: Chile 1998 vs. 2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th 27 percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th. Governance Indicators: Kenya, 1996-2002 Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th 28 percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th. Another ‘Macro’ Evidence-Based approach at WBI—KAM Kenya : Knowledge Economy Indexes and Pillars Source: KAM website (www.worldbank.org/kam) – Basic Scorecard mode 29 Knowledge Economy Index and pillar contribution Souce: KAM website (www.worldbank.org/kam) – Cross country comparison mode 30 2nd Level: The ‘Mezzo’ Empirical Assessment • More detailed institutional vulnerability assessment possible • Comparative across over 100 countries • Annually • Cluster Comparative Analysis permits identification of (relative) vulnerabilities • Illustrating Kenya and Chile 31 or p. A n Re tiC o sp ns rru pt ib io / G D ov n ec r en tr nnc Fi al e na nc En izat i ia l S viro on ec F nm G inan tor en ov C c ia ap t er l nm ac G en ove ity tE r ffe nan c c G e n tive e de ne M r ss ul til Hu Equ m at a e an lity r Q a C l ua lit Org api ta y of ani l za In t L fr as ions Q ega tr ua l lit effe uct u y of ctiv re en la b e o r m ss Pa Pol it rli am ic al ark et F en t E ina s n Po f lic fec cing e E tiv en f es Po fect s iv lit e i R ne eg c al In s s ul at f or lue nc y C ap e Te aci ty ch T a no lo x g ef fic y V U oi no ie n ce cy ffi & Ac cial d co un om ta bi lit y C Percentile Rank (0-100) Kenya – the ‘Mezzo’ Level of CE Assessment – 22 clusters 100 50 0 32 Source: EOS 2003 WEF, preliminary. Percentile ranks based on comparative performance among the 103 countries in the sample. All variables rated from 0 (very bad) to 100 C C ra te ont r R es ol o po f ns cor ib /G rup D ove tion ec en r na Fi n tr na al ce nc En izat ia io vi l n Fi Sec ron n t m G ov anc or C en t er i nm al G apa en ov city t E er ff na G ect nc e en i de ven M es r ul til Hu Eq s at m ua Q era an lity ua l lit Or Cap g y of ani ital L Inf zat Q ega ras ion ua s t l lit eff ruc e t y of ctiv ure la en b Pa Po or ess m rli liti am c a ark e en l Fi na ts t Po E f n lic fec cin e E tiv g e Po ffec nes ti s l R itic ven a eg ul l In es s at or flue y nc C ap e Te ac it c T a hno y l x ef ogy V f i oi ce Uno cie n cy ff & Ac icia co ldo un m ta bi lit y or po Percentile Rank (0-100) Chile – the ‘Mezzo’ Level of CE Assessment; 22 clusters 100 50 0 33 in the Source: EOS 2003 WEF, preliminary. Percentile ranks based on comparative performance among the 103 countries sample. All variables rated from 0 (very bad) to 100 (excellent). Politics Can be Measured as Well, and it Matters Inequality of Influence: a major governance challenge % of Firms that report extent of: Illegal Political Financing (Legal) Political Financing Influences Policy 100 Firms' Capture of laws/Policy/Regulation Pervasive 55 Not a problem 10 OECD East Asia Industrialized East Asia Developing Former Soviet Union Eastern Europe Latin America 34 3rd Level: Country Diagnostics • Key to Localize Know-how • Key Input to Action program, Monitoring • One country at the time; staff and resource intensive 37 Key Features of 3-survey Governance, Anticorruption and Institutional Diagnostics • Three surveys: households, firms, and public officials [‘triangulation’] • Questions can be chosen to focus on experience and/or perceptions • Specially designed and tested closed questions, thoroughly piloted and adapted to local realities • Rigorous technical requirements in implementation • Local institution implements, with World Bank guidance • Recognizes multidimensionality of governance Type of information elicited (1) • Households – Experience on interactions with state bodies for health care, education, driver’s licence, police, courts, social benefits, and other agencies – Payments solicited, where, how much and how frequently – Clarification of what people consider to be corruption, perceptions of levels, their sources of information on corruption, extent of knowledge of their rights, duties, and possible recourse 39 Type of information elicited (2) • Enterprises – Experience with customs, tax, procurement, courts, inspections, licences and permits – Payments solicited, where, how frequently, how much paid – Quality of govt. services, level of red tape – Ways in which firms make their views known (e.g. through business associations) – Private sector perspectives on state initiatives 40 Type of information elicited (3) • Public officials – How hiring and firing decisions are made – How “mission-oriented” the body is – What complaint mechanisms or public consultations exist – What types of problem and risks officials perceive as the worst affecting their organizations 41 Implementation steps (1) • Define objectives, scope, terms of reference • Issue tender for work by local firm/institution • Review existing standard questionnaires and adapt to local objectives and conditions, commission review by local experts before questionnaire finalized • Determine size of sample relative to degree of stratification desired: e.g. by region, sector, size/type of firm, income level; for public officials, level of govt., 42 Implementation steps (2) • Sample size: usually a minimum of 1000 households, 400 enterprises, 400 officials • Pilot in variety of situations (e.g. urban/rural, high income/low income) and review results, discuss quality of results with focus groups • Be prepared to revise radically or abandon if data quality too poor • Launch surveys (face-to-face more effective than mail or telephone) • Respondents must feel confident of 43 anonymity if results are to be reliable Implementation steps (3) • Code data, produce statistical transformations, graphs • Analyze and write up for draft report • Usually discuss with focus groups to bring out underlying issues • Resources needed ? Depends on local costs, size of survey (was $60,000 in several ECA countries) • Time taken: 6-9 months 44 The power of diagnostic data and key dimensions for analysis • • Unbundle corruption by type – administrative level corruption, capture of the state, bidding, theft of goods and public resources, purchase of licenses and regulations Identify both weak institutions (in need of reform) and strong institutions (example of good governance) The power of diagnostic data and key dimensions for analysis (con’t) • • • Assess the cost of each type of corruption on different social and economic groups Identify key determinants of good governance Help to develop policy recommendations The reality of institutional vulnerabilities vary greatly from country to country… some illustrations from diagnostics... The “Bribe Fee List” Unofficial Payments by Enterprises for Official Licenses and Services, Ukraine and Russia 1996 Average "unofficial" fee required for “favor” Russia Ukraine "Unofficial fee": type of license/"favor" Enterprise registration Each visit by fire/health inspector Tax inspector (each regular visit) Each phone line installation Lease in state space (sq. meter per month) Each export registration/consignment Each import registration/consignment Domestic currency loan from bank (preferential terms) Hard currency loan (preferential terms) $ 288 $ 67 $ 176 $ 42 $ 250 $ 1,071 $ 87 $ 894 $ $ 26 7 $ 643 $ 123 $ 133 $ 278 8% 4% 23% 4% Romania: Disproportionally Negative Impact on the Poor % Dissuaded from Medical Services % of Income in bribes 15% 50% 40% 10% 30% 20% 5% 10% 0% low income medium income high income 0% low income medium income high income Misgoverned vs. well Governed Agencies in Ecuador (as ranked by public officials, 2000 diagnostic) The Transit Commission of Guayas Congress Transit Council Customs Police Petroecuador The President of the Republic Ombudsman NGOs Army The Church Professional Oranizations 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 % reporting that the agency is very corrupt 70 80 Understanding Causal Factors in CE and Governance Underperformance • Illustrating the extent to which political determinants, meritocracy, transparency, and voice and accountability matters 51 New Diagnostic Tools permit measuring important dimensions of capacity – illustration #1 from Bolivia diagnostics: How Politicized Agencies exhibit Budgetary Leakages Yellow columns depict the unconditional average for each category. Blue line depicts the controlled causal effect 52 from X to Y variables. Dotted red lines depict the confidence ranges around the causal effect depicted by the blue line. Illustration of empirical analysis based on diagnostic: Users’ Feedback to Public Agencies Helps Control Bribery 50 Bribery 40 30 20 10 Low Moderate_Low Moderate_High High Voice / External Accountability Simple Average Association Control Causal Link Margin of Error Based on 90 national, departmental, and municipal agencies covered in the Bolivia Public Officials Survey. Citizen Voice Improves Accessibility of Public Services to the Poor Accessibility to the Poor 100 r = 0.54 80 60 Controlled Causal Link 40 20 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Voice / External Accountability Based on Public Officials Survey. The sample of institutions includes 44 national, departmental, and municipal agencies which are a prior anticipated to be accessible to the poor 54 Transparency within Government Agencies Prevents Purchase of Public Positions 18 Job Purchase 15 12 9 6 3 Low Moderately Low Moderately High High Internal Transparency Simple Average Association Control Causal Link Margin of Error Based on 90 national, departmental, and municipal agencies covered in the Public Officials Survey. 55 Evidence-Based: it has contributed some 1. Institutions Matter Enormously – but major challenge to identify the how, which, where… 2. Debunked Myths and popular misconceptions 3. Suggested new approaches and strategic focus 4. Donor rethinking on aid effectiveness; aid allocation; capacity enhancement 5. De-emotionalize/De-personalize/De-verbosize 6. Dialogue with state leaders 7. New field of rigorous empirical research -- But still tough ‘tradeoffs’ within the Bank… 56 The ‘Dividend’ of Good Governance Infant Mortality and Corruption Per Capita Income and Regulatory Burden 90 80 12,000 70 10,000 60 8,000 50 40 6,000 30 20 4,000 10 2,000 0 0 Weak Development Dividend x Average Good Control of Corruption Weak x Average Regulatory Burden Development Dividend Literacy and Rule of Law Good Per Capita Income and Voice and Accountability 100 10000 9000 75 8000 7000 6000 50 5000 4000 25 3000 2000 1000 0 0 Weak x Development Dividend Average Rule of Law Good Weak x Development Dividend Average Strong Voice and Accountability Note: The bars depict the simple correlation between good governance and development outcomes. The line depicts the predicted value when taking into account the causality effects (“Development Dividend”) from improved governance to better development outcomes. For data and methodological details visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. 57 Transparency, Parliaments, Corporate Ethics, and GDP Growth Annual GDP Growth (%) 5 Transparent Information by Government Effective Parliamentary Oversight Corporate Ethics 3 1 Low Middle High Extent of Transparency 58 Source: Annual GDP growth over 1999-2001 WDI 2002; GDP is computed in PPP terms. The various transparency / governance variables drawn from Executive Opinion Survey, 2002. No Evidence to support some ‘popular’ notions 1. Constant drafting of new A-C laws/regulations 2. Creating many new Commissions & Agencies 3. Blaming Globalization 4. Blaming (or stopping) Privatization 5. Cultural Relativism (Corruption is ‘culturally-determined’) 6. Blaming History or Regional Characteristics… by contrast, what may be particularly important (cont…) 59 In sum, strategies that can work 1. Transparency Mechanisms (e*governance, data) 2. Democratic Accountability & Collective Action (Judcry, Legislative, Exec, Private, CS) 3. Judicial Independence (& good rule of law institutions) 4. Budgetary Reforms & Meritocracy in Public Sector 5. Addressing the challenge of State Capture 6. Decrease Regulatory Burden on Firms 7. Focus on Prevention & Incentives 8. Political Finance Reform 9. Private Firms, Multinationals, Corporate Ethics 10. IFI, G-7, OECD Responsibility (Global Compact) 60 Challenges for us at WBI Scaling up in some key dimensions, across all activities: 1. Evidence-based activities: from 4% to 25% in a year, then to 50% in 2 years? [& lessening PCC…] 2. Action Program/Action Plan content: from 9% to 20% in a year, then to one-third in 2 years? 3. Substantive Institution-Building Content: …%…% 4. Mainstreaming Governance in thematic learning 5. Evidence-based input to ROC/OC/CASes [++] 6. The Web as central tool 7. Substantive/tough input to Bank policy formulation 8. OECD, G-7, UN, NATO, WEF – [non-governance..] 61