Jevgenia Viktorova
University of St Andrews
E-mail: jv2 [ät] st-and.ac.uk
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Critical theory
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Post-structuralist IR
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Philosophical underpinnings:
◦
◦
positivism vs. anti-/post-positivism;
foundationalism vs. anti-foundationalism
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Marxism and structuralism
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Feminist IR
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Defining characteristics of critical and poststructuralist theories:
(1) do not consider IR as a free-standing discipline in
its own right, but rather seek to place it into a
broader context of social thought;
(2) hold that the purpose of theory is to ‘unsettle’
established categories and ‘disconcert the reader’
(Brown 2005)
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Robert Cox (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and
World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory’:
◦ a distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and
‘critical’ theory
◦ theory is ‘always for someone and for some
purpose’
◦ it is always an expression of a perspective
◦ and situated in space and time (historically specific)
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Theory can serve two distinct purposes:
(1) to offer a ‘direct response’ to help solve problems
posed within the terms of a particular perspective
(2) to reflect upon the process of theorising itself:
 on the perspective which gave rise to it and its
relations with other perspectives
 on possibilities of ‘choosing a different valid
perspective from which the problematic becomes one
of creating an alternative world’ (Cox 1981)
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The first purpose gives rise to conventional,
‘problem-solving’ theory:
◦ accepts the prevailing definition of a particular
situation as ‘given’
◦ is geared towards solving the problem that this
particular definition generates
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The majority of IR theories (such as liberalism
and realism)
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The second purpose leads to critical theory:
◦ does not view the definitions of social reality as given;
◦ always seeks to elucidate:
 how a particular definition serves certain interests
 how it closes down particular sorts of arguments
◦ ‘directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for
action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory
accepts as its parameters’ (Cox 1981)
◦ concerned with the process of historical change:
 its object is continually changing
 critical theorising is never complete
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Critical theory lacks precision of problemsolving theory
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The precision of problem-solving theories is
‘costly’:
◦ by representing the social and political orders as
fixed they are ideologically biased to ignore
evidence (and possibility) of change
◦ serve particular interests (e.g. national, class etc.)
invested in the status quo.
◦ conservative orientation
◦  not value-free
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Critical theory is emancipatory:
◦ ‘approaches practice from a perspective
that transcends that of existing order’ and
‘allows for a normative choice in favour’ of
a different political order (Cox 1981)
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Antonio Gramsci; Frankfurt School
Horkheimer’s inaugural lecture on ‘Traditional
vs. Critical theory’
Critical theory:
◦ should investigate how the world in which the
theorist finds him- or herself has got to be this way
◦ asks historical questions
◦ emancipatory:
 exposes the existing world order as non-arbitrary
 enquires into interests and forces that shaped its movement
along a particular historical trajectory
 uncovers other possible routes
◦ ‘constructivist’ since it views the given reality as a
construct – a result of human action in all its guises
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Richard Ashley: ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’
in Robert Keohane, Neorealism and Its
Critics (1986)
Based on:
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A Foucauldian account of social process:
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R.B.J. Walker; James Der Derian; David
Campbell
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◦ Habermas’s critical account of social sciences
◦ French post-structuralism (Foucault, Derrida
◦ a focus on power-knowledge nexus (interplay
between ‘systems of power’ and ‘systems of
knowledge’)
◦ different historical periods are characterised by
different structures of power-knowledge
relations
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Habermas – a successor of Frankfurt School
◦ Adorno’s PhD student
◦ inherited Horkheimer’s chair
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Habermas’s works include:
◦ Knowledge and Human Interest
◦ Legitimation Crisis
◦ Theory of Communicative Action (a rethinking of social
sciences in 2 vols., 1981-2):
 A mission to re-energise an independent public sphere to
counterbalance spoon-fed ‘truths’ about reality from
those in power
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Critical theory’s boarder intellectual origins in
Marxism
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Marx formulated the global-level
‘emancipation project’:
◦ political emancipation
◦ elimination of economic inequality
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Historical emphasis:
◦ ‘historical materialism’
◦ mostly, historic change has been un-emancipatory
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Recognition that a given order serves
particular interests
◦ e.g. class; or the ‘developed countries of the
West’
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Representation of the existing order as
‘natural’:
◦ Gramsci: ‘hegemony’
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John Ruggie in IPE
A reaction to Waltz:
◦ Neorealist view of international system does not
account for historic change
◦ Realism as a mode of reasoning is not genuinely
historical even where its ‘material’ is derived from
history
◦ Dictates that with regard to the ‘essentials’, the
future will always be like the past:
◦ Realist IR theory is a status quo theory: not
‘emancipatory’
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Liberalism was originally seen as
emancipatory:
◦ In the context of the Enlightenment, its function was
to free humanity ‘from self-imposed immaturity’
(Kant)
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Liberalism ceased to be emancipatory 
Critical theorists: there is need for a different
kind of theorising to ‘rescue’ the
emancipation project
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Post-structuralists (drawing on Nietzsche,
Foucault, Derrida): emancipation project is
doomed
Possibility of emancipation premised on
ontological and epistemological assumptions:
◦ Positivism vs. anti- or post-positivism;
◦ Foundationalism vs. anti-foundationalism
the ‘scientific’ = positivist method for social
sciences:
1. make a conjecture about causality;
2. formulate that conjecture as a hypothesis
consistent with established theory;
3. specify the observable implications of the
hypothesis;
4. test for whether those implications obtain in
the real world;
5. and report one’s findings, ensuring that one’s
procedures are publicly known and hence
replicable to other members of a particular
scientific community that he identified as the IR
community of scholars (e.g. Keohane)
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Following this method, one will
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a positivist methodological framework
assumes that:
◦ attain ‘objective’ truth about the social reality?
◦ contribute to a wider agreement on descriptive
facts and causal relationships, based on
transparent and replicable methods
◦ the social world is amenable to the kinds of
regularities that can be explained by using causal
analysis with tools borrowed from the natural
sciences
◦ the way to determine the truth of statements is
by appealing to neutral facts
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established by Hume; summarised, e.g., by
Kolakowski (Positivist Philosophy (1972)):
(1) the rule of phenomenalism: only phenomena that
can be directly experienced can generate
knowledge of the real nature of the world
(2) the rule of nominalism: proposes that general
statements about the world that do not have their
reference in independent, observable, atomized
objects should not be afforded real knowledge
status
3) value judgements are not part of science: values
cannot be observed or verified and thus are
‘metaphysical’ categories, not facts;
(4) unity of scientific method: the methods of
natural sciences are applicable to social and
political analysis
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Observance of positivist rules restricts
possible objects for scientific enquiry
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Enticement of ‘scientific’ status?
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One can question
◦ possibility of adhering to the rules of positivism
◦ the validity of the rules themselves
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 Critique of positivism
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How to account for differences in direct
sensory experiences?
Natural sciences:
◦ objective verifiable measurements, repeated
experimentation etc.
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Social sciences: problematic
◦ Observable reality does not neatly fall into
predefined clear categories
◦  e.g. assigning a case to a category involves a
value judgement
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Hume’s philosophical position is predicated on
the distinction between:
◦ an objectively existing sphere of reality ‘out there’
◦ a thinking subject who (passively) receives:
 sense ‘impressions’ and
 constructs ‘theoretical’ images of the facts (‘ideas’)
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Sense ‘impressions’ are fundamentally
different from the retrospective/theoretical
realm of ‘ideas’:
◦ ‘idea’ realm does not correspond with reality per
se
◦ because an abstract category does not
correspond with what actually (physically) exists
in the universe
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Hume’s conclusion:
◦ because we never directly experience external
bodies
◦ we cannot experience a correlation between those
bodies and the impressions they cause
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Therefore, empiricist based claims for real
knowledge cannot be defended except in
metaphysical terms (i.e. something beyond the
immediate physical reality):
◦ ‘The implication of this position is clear enough: there
is no logical basis, even in positivism’s own terms, for
the proposition that knowledge of reality is directly
derived from an independent world “out there”.’
(George, 1994)
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Has to make use of language:
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This potentially introduces:
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Does not ask the question of ends of theorising:
◦ Natural language is imprecise, open to multiple
understandings
◦ Positivism counters this with establishing special
languages of science and abstract terminologies, but:
◦ Terms still need to be defined through natural language
◦ uncontrollable variance in understandings of what one or
another term implies and value-laden connotations
◦ does not problematise its impact on the world
◦  irresponsible: ‘Treating the feelings as mere effects of
causal processes takes them out of our hands, and
relieves us of responsibility’ (Toulmin 1990)
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The foundation of positivist science rests on
infallibility of logico-mathematical
procedures of thought:
◦ Universal and unbiased by sensory input
◦ Descartes: ‘cogito ergo sum’
◦ Belief that whoever follows these procedures of
reasoning is bound to arrive at the same
conclusions about what is knowable in the world:
◦ Oakeshott (1962): a rationalist finds ‘it difficult to
believe that anyone who can think honestly and
clearly will think differently from himself’
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The rational dichotomy of reason vs. sensual
experience
 a separation into subjects that can be
studied scientifically and those that cannot:
◦ Despite the alleged universality and timelessness of
the rational method, it deliberately confines itself to
a narrow selection of subjects and kinds of
knowledge that can be achieved with regard to them
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‘Certainty’ of science is achieved at the
expense of a vast expanse of the unknown
beyond its limits
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Embrace Wittgenstein’s realisation that
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This position is called anti-foundationalism:
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◦ ‘no independent or objective sources of support’
can exist ‘outside of our language and actions’
◦ ‘the facts of the world (e.g., historical, political,
social) are always intrinsically bound up with the
way we give meaning to them and accord them
“real” status. This is an interpretive process
grounded in historico-philosophical, cultural, and
linguistic complexity, not in some Archimedean
point of ultimate reference beyond history and
society’ (George 1994)
Deny the possibility of an independent,
value-free perspective that could produce
universally valid knowledge
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Positivist social theory insists that
◦ unless there is certain knowledge there can be no
real knowledge at all
◦ ‘either there is some support for our being, a fixed
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape
the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness,
with intellectual and moral chaos’ (Bernstein)
◦ any approach that refuses to privilege a single
perspective (as corresponding to reality) is guilty of
relativism and is unable to make judgements about
everyday life and political conflict
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Post-positivists argue that although there
may be no ‘absolute’ knowledge, this does
not undermine one’s ability to make
decisions in the world:
◦ this ‘allows for a decision-making regime based
on personal and social responsibility’ which is not
relegated ‘to objectified sources “out there” (e.g.,
the system, the government, science, the party,
the state, history, human nature)’ (George, 1994)
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Post-positivist methods:
◦ Discourse analysis - a ‘language turn’ (e.g. Foucault;
Milliken)
◦ Analysis of practices (Neumann 2002)
◦ Shift from ‘mimetic’ approaches (that attempt to
model reality) to aesthetic ones (aimed to relive
reality in unique creative ways (Bleiker 2001)
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Natural sciences also have moved on:
◦ New approaches: chaos theory, complexity
theory, quantum theory, discoveries in life
sciences
◦ This changed the outlook of natural sciences and
affected their methodology
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Social science positivists out of touch with
these developments?
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Constructivist scholars differ in the extent to
which they view their approach as antithetic to
positivism
Predominantly, do not emphasise their antipositivistic stance
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Most IR constructivists share following
features:
◦ Interpretive understanding as an intrinsic (albeit
not necessarily exclusive) part of any causal
explanation
◦ Preference for middle-range theorising as
opposed to ‘grand theory’
◦ Recognition that social scientists are part of the
social world which they are trying to analyse
(‘double hermeneutics’)

Thomas Risse: ‘is anybody still a positivist?’
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Although positivist scholars reject normative
issues, they agree with critical theorists on
this:
◦ theory has a direct impact on the world:
◦ ‘good theory’ should inform (and change) practice
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Post-structural theorists are doubtful of this
impact
◦ do not purport to create emancipatory theories
◦ that would simply substitute one view of reality
informed by particular interests with another view
– or one discourse with another
◦ concerned with exposing the terms on which one
or another description of reality hangs together
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IR structuralism:
◦ IPE (International Political Economy): e.g. Wallenstein's
world-systems approach (cores, peripheries and semiperipheries); dependency relations between North and
South (e.g. Dependencia theory)
◦ peace studies (the view of structural inequalities as a
major source of conflict and unrest (e.g. Johan Galtung)

structuralism in semiotics and linguistics:
◦ influenced the development of French post-structuralist
philosophy (Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari etc.)
◦ and through it the more ‘radical’ IR post-structuralists
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impact on social theory at large
viewed the structure of language (‘alphabet’
and ‘grammar’ broadly defined) as the
generator of meaning

The 1968 political unrest (student
demonstrations etc.) in France signified a
major turn in this thinking:
◦ exposed its etatisme and excessive stress on
continuity
◦ failure to account for the dynamics of change
◦ questioned the Saussurean emphasis on ‘langue’
(language) as opposed to ‘parole’ (‘speech’) - i.e.
the uses of language produced from the deeprooted structures of language
◦ speech – or rather writing – came into a spotlight
(e.g. Derrida)
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Discourse analysis and genealogical enquiries
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Deconstruction: seeks to unsettle stable
concepts and demonstrate the effects and
costs of the settled concepts and oppositions,
to disclose the ‘parasitical relationships
between opposed terms and to attempt a
displacement of them
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Double reading:
◦ The first reading is a commentary on the dominant
interpretation demonstrating how it achieves its
stability.
◦ The second reading applies pressure to the points of
instability within a text, with the purpose of exposing
how any story depends on suppression of internal
tensions in order to achieve homogeneity and
continuity.
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David Campbell (1992) Writing Security:
◦ a critique of the US foreign policy
◦ its reliance on radical ‘othering’
◦ Search for a new ‘enemy’ image after the Cold War
William Connolly’s work on ‘Culture Wars’ of
the present-day US
◦ its categorising and alienating effects.
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Neither has abandoned ‘critical’ emancipation
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James Der Derian:
◦ Foucault-inspired analyses of diplomatic practice
◦ Paul Virilio-inspired post-modern enquiries
about how the virtual reality, increased speed of
life and interactions are affecting our
understanding of the international
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IR represents a gendered view of reality,
that is premised on ‘masculine’ interests
Not necessarily ‘post-structural’ or ‘critical’
in their methods; nor is feminism confined
to IR
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Issues:
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In Gramsci’s terms:
◦ Women’s equality and greater visibility in politics
◦ Critique of the Enlightenment as premised on a
voice that is ‘European, rationalist and male’ (and
‘white’).
◦ the ‘hegemony’ of the existing world order and
the bulk of IR theorising has naturalised
masculine interests
◦ women’s voices are consistently marginalised and
silenced
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to challenge the often unseen androcentric/ masculine biases in the way that
knowledge is constructed
to develop accounts of the social world that
trace the influence of gender in all our
discursive categories, and especially ‘the
international’
to question/ ‘dislocate’ what we accept as
normal:
E.g. Cynthia Weber (1999) Faking It: US
Hegemony in a ‘Post-Phallic’ Era
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reject commitment to ‘scientific’ methodology
claim no single standard of methodological
correctness
feminist knowledge has emerged from a deep
scepticism about the claims of ‘universal’
knowledge, which, in reality, are based primarily
on masculine experiences and perspectives
regard knowledge-building is an ongoing process
describe knowledge-building as emerging
through ‘conversation’ with texts, research
subjects, or data
research focus is not only on the subordination of
women, but also other disempowered people
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agree with positivists that research should
pose questions that are ‘important’ in the
‘real world’ (King et al. 1994; Van Evera,
1997)
disagree with the positivist definitions of
‘important’ and the ‘real world’
◦ Conventionally, scientific progress is judged not
on the merit of the questions that are asked but
on how questions are answered
◦ Feminists find that the questions that are asked –
and also questions that are not asked – are more
important for judging knowledge.
◦ The questions that feminists ask
 are typically not answerable within a conventional social
‘science’
 challenge the core assumptions of the discipline and
deconstruct its central concepts
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E.g. ‘Why have wars predominantly been
fought by men and how do gendered
structures of masculinity and femininity
legitimate war and militarism for both
women and men?
To answer such a question:
◦ challenge the separation of ‘public’ and ‘private’
◦ seek to uncover continuities between
disempowerment of women in the domestic
sphere and in the public – political and
international – life
◦ E.g. investigate military prostitution and rape as
tools of war and instruments of state policy
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Knowledge based on the standpoint of
women’s lives leads to more robust
objectivity:
◦ broadens the base from which we derive
knowledge
◦ the perspectives of marginalised people may reveal
aspects of reality obscured by more orthodox
approaches to knowledge-building
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Emphasis on sociological analyses that
begin with individuals and the hierarchical
social relations in which their lives are
situated
Reject the conventional separation between
subject and object of research:
◦ acknowledging the subjective element in one’s
analysis increases the objectivity of research
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Cynthia Enloe (2000) Bananas, Beaches and
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Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987) Women and War
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Base: Making Feminist Sense of International
Politics
Jill Steans (1998) Gender and International
Relations: An Introduction (a textbook)