Europe’s North: Historical Geopolitics and International
Institutional Dynamics, 2-5 ECTS
1. Historical geopolitics in Europe’s north: is it still relevant?
Autumn 2011
Pami Aalto
Jean Monnet Professor/Director, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on
European Politics and European-Russian Relations, University of
Tampere pami.aalto@uta.fi
<http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/index.html>
Course objectives
1.
To provide conceptual and
theoretical tools that shed
light on how the interaction of
great and small powers has
historically shaped the
Northern European region;
2.
To apply the conceptual and
theoretical tools to the
contemporary context where
supranational integration and
regionalization both at the
interstate and substate level
challenge traditional great and
small power dynamics;
3.
To provide necessary
prerequisites for the students
for assessing and examining
international dynamics in
Europe’s north independently
Map source: "Septrionales region", a Dutch map of
Northern Europe (1601).Author: Johannes Vrients,
Netherlands;
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Septentrionales.jpg>
Course structure
-Lectures:
1. Mon 31.10 10-12, Linna 4013
Historical geopolitics in Europe’s north: is it still relevant?
2. Mon 31.10 14-16, Linna 4013
Regionalization since the 1990s: How important?
3. Tue 1.11.2011, 10-12 Linna K109
European integration in the North: is the EU the leading power?
4. Tue 1.11 14-16, Linna 5026: Russian and Atlantic influence: limits of
integration?
-Further programme
5. Thu 3.11.2011 9-14 Linna K113
Student workshop, CBU-ERS students only
6. Fri 4.11 12-15, Pinni B1096
Public seminar, with Ambassador Anttonen and visiting speakers
What multilateral institutions, and how much, does Northern Europe need?
-Attendance requirement min. 80%
Compensation
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ERS2/KVPO A3
1) 2 ECTS: lectures (8hrs); and participation in a public seminar on ‘What multilateral
institutions, and how much, does Northern Europe need? (Fri 4.11, 3 hrs); plus a
learning diary (8-10pp).
1b) If ‘regular’ or visiting UTA students (not part of the CBU-ERS programme) wish to
take the course in the 5 ECTS format, they also write an essay of 8-9pp. on a topic
chosen by themselves and approved by the course teacher, by using relevant
academic literature compiled independently
2) 5 ECTS (CBU-ERS students only) lectures (8hrs); workshop based on group work
during the duration of the course (workshop on 3.11, 9-14); and participation in a
public seminar on ‘What multilateral institutions, and how much, does Northern
Europe need?’ (Fri 4.11); plus a learning diary (8-10pp).
In the learning diary the students summarise their learning process during the
lectures and show good understanding of the main concepts, theories and themes
used therein and in course literature to analyse northern Europe’s historical and
contemporary developments (1-1.5pp./lecture); and use the concepts, theories and
themes discussed in the lectures and course literature to discuss and analyse
independently the phenomena and problems taken up by one or more of the
speakers in the public seminar (3-4pp.)
Lecture diaries to be sent in to pami.aalto@uta.fi by Fri 18.11.2011, in one MS Word
file AND in printed format to postbox outside Aalto’s office Linna 5. floor. Essays in by
Fri 25.11, same method. For students normally outside UTA electronic submission is
enough.
‘Historical Geopolitics’: what do we mean by it?
1.
2.
Traditional or formal geopolitics
studies how geography
determines politics
-Location, size and resources
-Kjellen, Haushofer, Schmitt,
Mackinder, Spykman, today
Kissinger, Brzezinsky, Karaganov,
Dugin, Zyuganov, etc.
-Key authors mainly represent
great powers
-Not as linked with Nazi power as
it is often thought of!
New geopolitics continues the old
geopolitical tradition
-In addition to ‘pure’ geographical
factors, economic, cultural and
environmental factors
determining politics
-Influenced by the liberal IR
‘interdependence’ literature of
1970s
-Key authors include e.g. Luttwak
(environment), Agnew (economy,
world systems analysis,
dependency theory), Tuomi
3. In the popular sense, the term
geopolitics is often equated with
superpower or great power rivalry,
and realist approaches to
international politics
4. Critical geopolitics was introduced
by IR scholars and political
geographers in the early 1990s to
examine critically the production of
geopolitical knowledge that its
producers often think is “objective”
and “true”
-Draws upon the Frankfurt School
and critical theory in trying to
argue that “the production of
geopolitical knowledge is an
essentially contested political
activity” (Ó Tuathail 1998)
-Ideas of political space; territorial
and symbolic boundaries
-Key authors include Toal, Dalby,
Paasi, Newman; Identities, Borders
and Orders –network (Lapid,
Albert); in the north and east
Aalto, Browning, Joenniemi, Berg,
Kolossov
Historical great powers in northern Europe
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The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (not very
active within the whole region; oriented
towards the Black Sea, present UKR, BLR area)
Denmark (in Napoleonic wars against Sweden;
colonial power in ICE, NOR and Greenland;
history in the present Baltic states’ territory)
Sweden (one of Europe’s great powers
throughout much of past millennium; in decline
vis-à-vis RUS/SU since early 18th century with
Russia’s conscious expansion into this region)
Germany (e.g. Teutonic Order during 13-15th
centuries; Baltic German nobility ruling
Estonian, Latvian territories for centuries until
the Russian revolution; Nazi occupation of the
Baltics in WWII; revived GER as a key power in
the EU; some, not major NE ambitions)
Russia (defeat of Sweden and takeover of the
Baltic lands, FIN-SU relations during the CW,
RUS ‘near abroad’ –policy during the postSoviet era, Russia-EU relations, Russia as a
nuclear, major military and energy power)
UK, US (NE involvement subjected to wider
considerations, e.g. major wars originating in
other regions; NATO during and after CW; US
has been more prominent within the region
during the post-Cold War era)
The Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth
(1569-1795), pictured 1648 before its
gradual waning after the thirty years’
war; Map source:
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File
:PolishLithuanian_Commonwealth_in_1648.PNG
German—
Russian rivalry
 German—Russian historical rivalry
classical example of great power
relations shaping up northern Europe’s
geopolitics and changing borders
 Several separate occupations of
the Baltic states during WWII
 Finland deliberating over a
German Prince to govern the
country after its secession from
the Russian empire in around
1917, and to tie the country into
Germany in order to counter
Russian and Swedish influence
 The Kaliningrad question).
 The German—Russian rivalry was the
determining factor for northern
Europe’s geopolitical arrangements
early in the twentieth century and
between the world wars, and all other
geopolitical ideas and arrangements
were made and proposed against that
background factor
Above: MRP 1939-40; below: Northern Europe overlaid by
great power rivalry during the interwar era (1918-1945)
DENMARK,
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
BALTIC
STATES
GERMANY
POLAND
SOVIET UNION
Baltic League as a response to
German—Russian rivalry (I)
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Several ideas for an alternative geopolitical arrangements were proposed and worked
on by policy makers of the time, mainly to create a counter-weight to the intense
German-Russian rivalry within and influence on the region
The idea of a Baltic league:
• Was made possible by the collapse of the Russian empire and the opening up of
new political space
• Was first put forth by the influential Estonian politician Jaan Tõnisson, former PM
of the country, who argued in 1917 for the unification of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Finland, and the Scandinavian countries into a federation
• 1918 the idea was picked up by the Latvians, Lithuanians and even the British
• Two representatives of the Estonian foreign delegation in the negotiations
leading to the end of WWI presented a plan to the British Foreign Office
portraying a unity of these ‘Baltic’ countries based on different political, military
and economic ties. This proposal was quite different from traditional inter-state
alliances: to secure Estonian independence by creating a wider territorial unit of
which it would be part! Not the usual insistence on the institution of national
sovereignty in the early stages of state-building
In the Baltics, usually the term ‘Baltic League’ or ‘Baltic cooperation’; ‘Baltic Sea
Union’, ‘border-state alliance’ in the Finnish debate (the geopolitical implication of
being located in-between greater powers); ‘diagonal alliance’.
Debates in newspapers, journals and political elite especially in Estonia, Latvia and
Finland
Lithuania tried to take the lead in this discussion, but preferred a narrow idea of
limited co-operation between the three Baltic states or a Lithuanian-Latvian union,
and were at odds with Poland due to their territorial dispute on the Vilnius area.
Baltic League as a response to
German—Russian rivalry (II)
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The Poles did not see
themselves as a Baltic nation
primarily but rather as a great
power, thus unreceptive to the
idea although they would have Figure 2: Ideas of a Baltic League overcoming Russobeen needed them to properly German rivalry and securing the independence of the
realise the idea
Baltic states within a larger territorial framework
During 1919-1926, some 40 big
conferences arranged between
foreign ministers of the thus
constructed region, state bank
leaders, railway officials, etc.
• “Therefore, the law of
SWEDEN
DENMARK,
NORWAY
history is the following: if
FINLAND
the nations inhabiting the
SOVIET UNION
shores of the Baltic Sea are
not able to create between
themselves a stronger
organisation, they are
doomed to inevitably
BALTIC
STATES
submit to a stronger
GERMANY
European power of the
respective period” (Ants
Piip, Estonian foreign
POLAND
minister, 1934, in Lehti
1999, 11)
The Cold War era ’Nordic balance’ (I)
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Operated on the basis of the balance of power institution
Compared to interwar era, diminished number of state actors and the whole setting is
again overlaid by greater powers, as it was during the interwar era; but this time the
rivalry is between the superpowers US and Soviet Union
Not much room for alternative geopolitical ideas, although Sweden and Finland tried
to practice neutrality; mixed record and results
However, relatively low tension in the Nordic area compared to the very direct
east/west confrontation in mainland Europe
Denmark and Norway kept a low profile in NATO, not allowing the stationing of
foreign troops or nuclear weapons on their mainland territories, or the arranging of
military exercises in the vicinity of Bornholm island or the Norwegian-Russian border
Sweden stayed mostly neutral in its publicly presented policies, although later on the
fairly close, covert military-political ties of Sweden with the west and NATO have
been made public
Finland tried to maintain its independence by declaring neutrality + Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual assistance (FCMA) treaty with the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union abstained from invoking the military consultation paragraphs in the
FCMA Treaty
The strictly security political nature of the Nordic balance at the same time connoted
a north European region mostly lacking the involvement of the EU, which at the time
lacked an explicit security policy, with its overall foreign policy also being at its early
stages of development
The Cold War era ’Nordic balance’ (II)
Figure 3: The Cold War era ‘Nordic balance’
West
NOR
DEN
SWE
Soviet Union
FIN
EU
Finland is depicted as partly falling into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence
due to the FCMA treaty that limited its external sovereignty.
The end of the Cold War
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Tremendously important consequences for northern Europe’s geopolitical
arrangements: from great power overlay and balance of power the region moved into
a new phase and was looking for a new direction.
Critical juncture (constructivism): new political space opened up for other regional
level actors to shape the region’s development from the inside, not from the outside
as was historically the dominant pattern!
Baltic sates as new actors after the resistance to Soviets had faded in the 1950s and
autonomy/independence movements started in embryonic form in the 1970s
End of Cold War both an interest evolvement and identity question
Why the Cold war ended? (Reuveny & Prakash 1999):
• inefficient central planning and consequent economic and technological gap
• Fukuyama (1992): inherent superiority of Western democracy and market
capitalism
• Soviet economy could not meet consumers’ demands, result legitimacy crisis
• perestroika as a Frankenstein (false saviour)
• too extensive Cold War militarisation unsustainable for the Soviet Union (% of
GDP)
• Soviet empire overstreched in relation to resources (third world, Eastern Europe)
• ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union (still rather popular explanation among
ordinary Russians ‘the Balts started this misery’)
• Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policy, and his GRIT tactics (leadership
based explanation)
• Reagan’s arms race attack on the weak and stagnant Soviet economy
(conservative/right-wing explanation)
• Afghanistan
Contemporary ’Great power geopolitics’ in
northern Europe: room of manouvre for small
states
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The 1990s vision of ’post-international politics’ (e.g. Rosenau)
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vs. return to traditional geopolitics (post-911, Afganistan, Iraq)
1 + 4 (+ BRICs) –structure:
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1 superpower and 2 great powers in northern Europe (EU, RUS);
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the rest middle/small/minor powers; superpower and great power
definitions
Changes in the international structure that influence northern Europe
affect the opportunities opening up for other actors whose material
resources only allow them to exercise a decisive impact at regional
level, not in global geopolitics
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For example, with the end of the Cold War superpower ‘overlay’ on
northern Europe, there opened up a new opportunity to develop
new institutions like Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which were both created in the early
1990s. Finland’s Northern Dimension (ND) initiative was conceived
in 1997, accepted by the EU in 1998, and renewed in 2006
‘Marginality’: some constructivist researchers argues in the 2000s that
margins are more important in northern Europe than elsewhere, and
that the centres of power also need margins in order to establish
themselves as centres in relation to something else
Historical geopolitics: both change and continuity
From northern to wider Europe and beyond: geopolitics on
different levels and constellations
’Northern/Baltic
Europe’: energy,
frozen/open
conflicts, borders
USA
Western
CIS/NIS:
energy
transit, open
and frozen
conflicts
EU ’empire’
Russia:
energy,
competing
empire?
China
Uzbekistan
Turkey:
Cyprus, energy
transit
Central Asia:
energy,
’matrioshka’
nationalisms and
hegemonies
Middle East: Mashrek,
Israeli-Palestinian conflict
North Africa: Maghreb,
energy, immigration,
smuggling
USA