Prof. Alexander Sergunin
Department of International Relations
Theory & History
St. Petersburg State University
Russia
Sergunin60@mail.ru

 To examine the main theories of regionalism and regionalization,
 To analyze the basic types of regionalism in the EU and Russia;
 To study the main trends in interregional cooperation in contemporary Europe.





To know the countries of the regions and basic information about their politics and economy;
To operate with macro-, mezo- and micro-levels of regional studies, as well theories of integration, functionalism and neo-functionalism, interdependency;
To be aware of the cases of regionalism in the Baltic Sea area, Arctic Area, Russia.
To understand the problems of contemporary regionalism, the balance of cooperation and competition.






Domestically-oriented approaches:
The same as regional planning (economic geography): socio-economic and political development of a region
Region as a historical-cultural entity
(antropological/socio-historical approach)
Region as a legal entity/sub-national unit
(administrative unit, autonomy, member of a federation, overseas territory, etc.)
Political science: complex approach (combination of the above approaches; any kind of a region with a clearly identifiable centre of political power)

 2. Internationally-oriented approaches:
 International region in political geography
 International region in economic geography
 International region in International
Relations Theory (IRT)

 Inter-disciplinary prs

 Autonomous discipline with the subject and methods of its own
PRS

 Part of political science (PS) with a specific subject
PS
PRS





 Macro-level: meta-theories (paradigms) - political realism; liberalism/globalism; post-positivism/social constructivism
Mezo-level: middle-range theories: institutional approach
(legal studies, comparativism); rational choice; behavioural studies; structural-functional approach; discourse analysis
Micro-level: specific research methods and techniques
(applied, empirical)

Political realists and geopoliticians: the emergence of regions (both domestic and international), the world-wide process of regionalisation are the results of powers politics, struggle for re-distribution of spheres of influence. Regionalism is not valuable as such, it is a dependent variable

 The liberal institutionalists: regionalism is a natural and useful process, the way to enhance international co-operation; geoeconomics, instead of geopolitics.
Importance of “gate-way” and pilot regions for the success of world’s regionalisation

 Globalists: regionalism is another side of globalisation; regionalisation and globalisation should be harmonised; they both should be even and beneficial for all international actors; regionalisation and globalisation as instruments of desovereignisation, erosion of state and creation of a global civil society

Social constructivists: identity-oriented approach to regionalisation; multi-level regionalisation as a way to nonconfronting identities; focus on regions-inthe-making (the Baltic Sea, Barents Sea,
Black Sea, Asia-Pacific regions, etc.)

 1. Legal Basis:
 Contractual/treaty-based (USSR, RSFSR, the Federative Treaty of 1992)
 Constitutional/constitution-based (the
Russian Constitution of 1993)





2. Nature of a unit:
Ethnic-based (USSR, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, etc.)
Administrative-territorial (USA, FRG, etc.)
Mixed (the Russian Federation)







Regions ( oblasts ) - 46
Provinces ( krays ) - 9
National republic – 21
Autonomous region ( oblast ) - 1
Autonomous districts ( okrugs ) - 4
Cities of federal subordination (Moscow and St.
Petersburg)
+
 Eight Federal Districts

Domestic:
 the weakness of the federal centre

 the collapse of the old vertical structure of political control decentralization as a result of democratization



 the lack of proper legal basis for separation of powers between centre and regions the economic challenges of a period of transition
(economic crisis, disruption of economic ties between different regions, the tendency to self-reliance of the regions) the rise of regional elites
Russia's ethnic, religious, cultural and spatial diversity

External:
 Global developments
 New geopolitical situation
 Strategic-military determinants
 Economic considerations
 Territorial and ethnic disputes
 Migration
 Cultural and religious factors

Specialists distinguish two main forms of the regions’ paradiplomacies–direct
(developing external relations of their own) and indirect (influencing federal foreign policies).



Creating a regional legislative base.
Negative experiences:
Constitutions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan of 1992. Positive experiences: Novgorod legislation on taxation and protection of investment (1994), Nizhny Novgorod legislation on international agreem -making . In the 1990s, the Russian regions concluded more than 300 international agreements. They used to be prepared with the Foreign Ministry’s assistance. However, some agreements were signed bypassing Moscow. For example, the
Foreign Ministry expressed its concerns about the agreement between Kabardino-Balkariya and Abkhazia that formally is a part of Georgia. In 1995 Moscow even annulled the trade treaty between Kaliningrad and Lithuania because it came into collision with the federal legislation.ents of members of the Russian
Federation. (1995).
‘ Making international treaties




Attracting foreign investment . Most successful regions: Moscow, St
Petersburg, Novgorod, Samara. For example, Novgorod the Great: 49% of oblast's GDP is derived from foreign investment. In investment dollars per capita Novgorod is second only to Moscow, and is rated third for its economic development over the past six years. There are about 200 foreign or joint-venture enterprises in Novgorod which play a major economic role. They provide 20,000 with jobs and account for 62 per cent of the regional industrial output. Firms with foreign capital provide half the taxes paid to the region.
Creating a region’s positive image . To attract foreign investors many regions launch dynamic PR campaigns.
Co-operation with international organisations . For example, Tatarstan co-operates with UNESCO, UNIDO, the European Congress of Municipal and Regional Governments, and Council of Europe. The north-west regions of Russia co-operate with the Council of the Baltic Sea States
(CBSS), the Hanseatic League and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council
(BEAC). It should be noted that co-operation with international organisations is important for regions not only in terms of getting an additional leverage in the power-struggle with Moscow but also in terms of opening up them for the world-wide processes of globalisation and regionalisation.



Influencing the federal legislation . The local legislation not only legitimises the external relations of the regions but also affects the federal legislation. For example, the comments made by the
Nizhny Novgorod regional legislature on the drafts of the federal laws on international treaties of the Russian Federation (1995), state regulation of foreign trade (1995), visa regime (1997), foreign policy powers of the Federation and its members (1999) have been taken into account by the State Duma.
Taking part in the federal diplomacy . Since the federal law envisages regions’ participation in international treaty-making their representatives used to be included into official delegations and consulted as regards the content of agreements. For example, the representatives of Karelia and the Krasnodar province assisted the Foreign Ministry in preparing treaties with
Finland and Cyprus, respectively. The representatives of the Far
Eastern regions attended Sino-Russian summits and took part in talks on demarcating the border between the two states. This was quite helpful for harmonising federal and regional interests.

 Conflict prevention and resolution . With time, the federal authorities realised that regionalisation can serve as an instrument for problem-solving with respect to Russia's relations with neighbouring countries. For example, Kaliningrad's close cooperation with Lithuania, Poland and Germany prevented the rise of territorial claims on their part, and dampened their concerns over excessive militarisation of the region. Co-operation between
Finland and Karelia also eased Finnish-Russian tensions on the Karelia issue. The cross-border cooperation between the Kuriles, Sakhalin and Japan led to a quiet Russia-Japan dialogue on the disputed territory.


‘Verbal diplomacy’ . To influence federal foreign policies the regional leaders often make statements on particular international issues. For example, in the 1990s Yevgeny
Nazdratenko, the Governor of the Maritime Province, vigorously objected the transfer of some Russian lands to China in accordance with the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1991. Yuri Luzhkov, the Moscow mayor, protested against the division of the Black
Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine and insisted on the
Russian jurisdiction over Sevastopol and Crimea. This became less possible under the Putin’s rule.
Unfortunately, the ‘verbal diplomacy’ has often demonstrated not only the growing influence of the regions over Russia’s international strategy but also the lack of political culture among the regional elites. In other words, this ‘diplomacy’ had rather contradictory implications for to the Russian national interests.



Exploiting the parliament . The regions use the legislature to lobby their foreign policy interests at the federal level. The Council of the
Federation, the upper chamber of the parliament, made up of the regional representatives is the most popular vehicle for the regional lobbying. For example, the Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, being in the 1990s a chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of the Federation and the Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, often used his official position to promote
Novgorod’s interests.
Capitalising upon the federal infrastructure . To influence federal foreign policy the regions use the institutional structure created by Moscow in the periphery. For example, the Foreign Ministry has established a special unit on inter-regional affairs. The Foreign Ministry, Ministry of
Commerce, Customs Committee, Federal Border Service have offices in those regions engaged in intensive international co-operation.
Theoretically, these agencies should coordinate and control regions’ international contacts. However, they often serve as a regions’ instrument of pressure upon Moscow rather than the centre’s leverage.
The problem is that these agencies are dependent on local authorities in terms of housing, salaries and professional career. They are usually staffed by the locals with close connections to the regional elites.

 Exploiting international organisations . To put pressure on
Moscow the regions managed to use not only federal institutions but also international organisations. For instance, to get a more privileged status (special economic zone, visafree regime with Lithuania and Poland) Kaliningrad quite skilfully exploited venues such as the CBSS (Council of the
Baltic Sea States) and the EU Northern Dimension. The northern areas of Russia are represented at the Regional
Council of the BEAC (Barents-Euro-Arctic Council) and develop direct ties with the neighbouring regions of Finland,
Norway and Sweden. With the help of the OSCE, Council of
Europe and the Red Cross, Ingushetiya managed to increase the flow of the humanitarian assistance to the refugees from
Chechnya.
It should be noted that in the real life the regions combine both direct and indirect methods because they are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive.



Operationally, there are three main levels of regions’ international activities: bilateral co-operation with foreign countries; co-operation between the inter-regional associations and foreign partners; and cross-border and trans-regional co-operation.
Bilateral (sistership) co-operation between sub-national units of foreign countries: ranges from economic, social, environmental and cultural matters to security issues.
For example, Nizhny Novgorod has rather close relations with North Rhine-Westphalia, Italian Lombardy, and the French Buche-du-Rhone, the regions that have much in common with the profile of the Nizhny Novgorod economy.

 The second level of international co-operation (in case of Russia) are external relations of the Russian inter-regional associations .
There is a number of inter-regional associations or blocs such as the
Northwest Association, Greater Volga Association, Chernozem
Association, Ural Association, and the Siberian Accords Association which mainly deal with economic and social issues. The members of these associations meet several times each year to discuss issues of common interest which need co-ordination, such as transport, communication, food and fuel supplies, and joint projects. However, along with domestic affairs, these blocs are increasingly engaged in international relations. For example, the Northwest Association led by
St Petersburg co-ordinates foreign economic relations of its members with the Baltic/Nordic countries. At its February 2000 meeting, the
Siberian Accords Association (19 members) discussed the prospects for constructing a highway to China and improving border controls on the Russian-Mongolian frontier. The association is a driving force for the Russian-Byelorussian integration. Its members account for 20% of the Russian trade with Minsk. Moreover, the association initiated a
Siberian youth movement ‘Russian-Byelorussian Union’.

 The third level of international cooperation, used to be cross-border (i.e., co-operative projects between regions in neighbouring countries) and transregional (i.e., collaboration with and within multilateral organisations).
 In case of Russia, the coordination role can be played by the system of Federal
Districts



THE MAP OF THE KALININGRAD REGION

LEVELS OF COOPERATION ON
KALININGRAD
 Country-to-supranational organisation (Russia-EU)
 Country-to-international organisation (Russia-CBSS,
Nordic Council, etc.)
 Country-to-country
(bilateral)
 Local government-to-local government
(Pilau – Baltijsk – Klaipeda)






The Baltic Euroregion (1998): local governments from
Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia and the
Kaliningrad Region
The Saule Euroregion (1999): local governments from
Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and the Kaliningrad Region
The Neman Euroregion (2002): local governments from
Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and the Kaliningrad Region
Lyna-Lava Euroregion (2003): local governments from
Poland and the Kaliningrad Region
Šešupė Euroregion (2004): local governments from
Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the Kaliningrad Region

PRIORITIES FOR THE BALTIC EUROREGION





Development of a comprehensive and long-term strategy for the Euroregion.
Water resources: monitoring of the current situation and further reduction of water pollution.
Establishing of innovation centers to support small and medium-size businesses.
Development of rural areas, including introduction of new technologies and development of the transport infrastructure.
Introduction of information technologies and improvement of communication systems. Under this subproject TACIS provides the local authorities with equipment, software and expert assistance. For example, with the TACIS help a new website was developed for the Baltiysk national secretariat.

The administrative structure of the Baltic Euroregion
PRESIDENT
VICE-PRESIDENT
COUNCIL
CHIEF SECRETARIATE
EXECUTIVE
BOARD
NATIONAL SECRETARIATES
WORKING GROUPS
NATIONAL SECRETARIATES







With exception of the Baltic and Karelia Euroregions they are semi-dormant, do not work properly
Basically reduced to the ‘bureaucratic tourism’
A lot of overlapping, the lack of coordination and a proper division of labor
It is unclear: whether each Euroregion should specialize on particular freedoms or cover all 4Fs?
Unhealthy competition for funds/sponsors
Are the Euroregions sustainable without or with a minimal support (financial, administrative, moral) of
Moscow, EU, IFIs, etc.?




The existing and future Euroregions with Russia’s participation should become one of the locomotives of the EU-Russia co-operation on CES/FTA business.
While general rules are established at the national/supranational level the implementation of concrete projects should be done by local companies and governments. It is advisable that the creation of the CES and promotion of the
4Fs should become the main priority for the Euroregions.
The Euroregions also can contribute to facilitation of the movement of people and goods in the sub-region by building new and developing the existing border crossings and the transport infrastructure in the area. Currently, local governments prefer to shoulder this responsibility on the federal budget.
However, with providing local government with more powers in taxation the local authorities will feel themselves more responsible for this business (on the one hand) and get more funds for implementing projects (on the other).
A better division of labour should be established between the Euroregions. While the Baltic and Karelia Euroregion could keep its current specialisation on subregional economic planning, support of private entrepreneurship, environment protection and home and justice affairs (particularly, fighting organised crime),
Saule Euroregions could focus on cross-border trade and developing the transportation infrastructure. The Neman, Lyna-Lava and Sesupe Euroregions could pay more attention to development of people-to-people contacts, education, culture and cooperation between NGOs. In addition, the Neman
Euroregion could focus on engaging Belarus (which is becoming an important priority for the ENP) in sub-regional co-operation. Border crossings development could be a joint sphere of responsibility for all Euroregions.



To support Euroregion activities the interoperability of various EU cooperative programs and instruments should be improved in the new institutional framework of the EU-Russia common spaces. In short, it is essential that flexibility remains a central tenet of the EU approach. Some steps have already been taken by the European Commission over the last five years to ensure better co-ordination between the different programs such as PHARE, TACIS and INTERREG. The ENPI seemingly aims at the same direction. This work should be completed in the process of implementation of the four roadmaps.
The very nature of the existing (semi-dormant) Euroregions should be changed. Not only municipal officials should be participants of exchange programs, other actors such as local businessmen, NGOs, journalists, students and teachers should be involved. To strengthen cooperation within the Euroregions and its institutional basis joint structures – ventures, chambers of commerce, professional associations, NGOs, education institutions, etc. – should be developed. The local actors should not wait for
Moscow’s permission and should be more proactive and initiative-minded.
By the way, even the current Russian legislation allows local actors to establish links to the similar actors in the foreign countries (the Russian
Foreign Ministry only asks for information about these contacts, visits and joint projects). The main problems are the lack of finance and psychological inertia that was inherited from the Soviet time. However, with coming of a more sustainable economy and increase in living standards as well as overcoming the Soviet-type mentality (through civic activism and growing international contacts) these problems could be successfully solved.



Establishment of a proper legal basis for the Euroregions should also be an important priority for Russia. Moscow ratified the European convention on border co-operation as late as in 2003. Russia does not have border treaties with Latvia and Estonia. There is a clear need in passing a federal law on Euroregions because several Russian regions experience difficulties in this area.
On the organisational/administrative note both Russian and EU representative bodies in the Russian northwestern regions should initiate a series of meetings, expert seminars and workshops (with participation of local governments from countries and regions concerned) to discuss the future of the existing
Euroregions and the prospects for the creation of other
Euroregions.

Related concepts:







‘connected cities’
‘border-crossing cities’
‘trans-border cities’
‘partnership cities’
‘bi-national cities’
‘sister cities’
‘sputnik-cities’







They should harbour a joint history as cities that have existed as administrative units in the past, prior to national borders separating them.
Although previously separated by borders, this delimiting should have been traded for open borders.
A preferable case consists of cities where a river both separates and connects the cities facing each other across the river (and, for this reason, they are called bridge towns).
There should be connecting factors and features conducive to cooperation such as ethnic minorities as well as command of the neighbour’s language.
There should be a certain level of institutionalization of cooperation between the twins in terms of unified administrative structures and common urban planning.
The most advanced twin towns purport themselves as ‘Euro-cities’ in emphasizing their European rather than national identity.

 Imatra-Svetogorsk
 Narva-Ivangorod
 Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice

Görlitz-Zgorzelec
 Tornio-Haparanda
 Valga-Valka
 Ciezyn-Cesky Tiesin
 Candidates: Kirkenes-Nikel

(aerial photo)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• joint rescue and ambulance service joint tourist service joint employment information agencies joint schools and educational facilities common circle bus line joint postal service common library
Provincia Bothniensis (joint development body) joint city core (including shopping centre)

 Baltic Welcome Centre (tourism, recreation)
 SuPortNet
 City Twin
 Narva River Water Routes (water tourism)
 Est Rus Fort Tour (joint tourist route covering the two fortresses on the Narva River)
 Historical promenade

Imatra hydroelectric plant Svetogorsk Paper Combine

•
•
•
•
•
•
«Air quality in the Imatra-Svetogorsk region»
«Development of fisheries in the Vuoksi River,
Svetogorsk » (Phare/Tacis СВС TSP 36/97)
«Program for the development of the Svetogorsk energy system and cooperation with Imatra » (СВС
TSP 29/97)
«Developing tourism in Svetogorsk (Russia) and
Imatra (Finland) » (СВС TSP/RL/9803/037).
«Centre for Business Partnership in Svetogorsk»
«Twin-Cities Day»

In the left part of the picture is the Estonian-Latvian boundary post no. 190H-2.
The number is actual 190H, and "-2" is actually telling the number of meters to the position of the actual boundary, namely 2 metres. The actual boundary here is the ditch north of where it stands, at the traffic sign. 120 Võru street is located in the middle of this photo.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
spatial planning cross-border bus line tourism education healthcare culture sports joint secretariat

Kirkenes
Nikel

The areas of cooperation:












Support for small and medium-size business
Establishment of a joint Business Cooperation Centre in Nikel
Environment protection
Health care (including direct cooperative schemes between municipal hospitals)
Education (direct links between elementary and secondary schools)
Training programs for municipal officials
Tourism
Cultural festivals and exhibitions
Library and museum cooperation
Mass media cooperation
Women and youth cooperation
Sports

•
•
•
Although the legacies tend to pertain to the existence of rather divisive borders and despite a number of other obstacles, city twinning has more recently turned into an established form of crossing and doing away with the divisive effects of borders.
The model of cities re-imagining their borders and pooling resources does not merely impact the local landscapes but has broader consequences as well.
Moreover, it does not seem to be restricted to some cases located at the edges of Europe but is, instead, conducive to the creation of cooperative borderlands in
Europe at large (City Twins Association).

 Regionalisation of (unstable) federative states does have negative consequences: further disintegration of the single economic, financial and cultural space; degradation of the party system and the rise of interest group politics answering to parochial interests; regionalisation and privatisation of security services and armed forces; inconsistency of the international strategy caused by the regional elites’ intervening the decision-making process; and the rise of separatism and secessionism, which could result in disintegration of the country.






First and foremost, regionalisation encourages further democratisation of the political system, including managing the external relations of the regions.
Regionalisation has also helped to discredit the “topdown” model of federalism and replace it with the
“bottoms-up” process with very lively grass-roots.
Moreover, international co-operation has helped many regions-particularly remote and border regions-to survive the transition period in many post-
Socialist countries.
Devolution of power in post-Socialist countries boosted foreign relations of the regions and made them real international actors.
Finally, regionalisation serves as an instrument for problem-solving with neighbouring countries.











EU Strategy for the BSR (2009)
Northern Dimension (1997; reorganized 2007)
Nordic Council of Ministers (1971)
Nordic Council (1952)
Council of the Baltic Sea States (1992)
HELCOM (Helsinki Commission)
BSSSC (Baltic Sea States Subregional Co-operation)
(1993)
Union of the Baltic Cities
The Baltic Development Forum (1998)
International Financial Institutions (EIB, EBRD, NIB, etc/)







Priorities for the Russian CBSS Presidency,
2012-2013 (according to Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov):
1. Development of cooperation in the field of modernization and innovation with a focus on clusters of growth
2. Establishment of a network of public-private partnerships as a platform for sustainable growth and setting up a regional private equity fund
3. Promotion of the traditions of tolerance as a means of combating tendencies of radicalism and extremism.
4. Promotion of people-to-people contacts, facilitating the visa regime

















 Arctic Council (1996)
 Barents-Euro-Arctic Council (1993)
 Nordic organizations (Nordic Council of
Ministers, Nordic Council, NEFCO, NIB, etc.)

‘Newcomers’: EU, NATO
 UN and its specialized units (Commission on Continental Shelf, etc.)

The Arctic Region: Problematic Areas:
 Degradation of environment
 Climate change
 Challenges to indigenous people
 Maritime safety
 Growth of competition between different nations because of the Arctic natural resources and sea routes

Climate Change: Positive Implications:
 Fisheries.
Climate change might bring increased productivity in some fish stocks and changes in spatial distributions of others. New areas may become attractive for fishing with increased access due to reduced sea ice coverage.

Climate Change: Positive Implications:
 Hydrocarbons.
Retreating ice opens up new commercial opportunities for gas and petroleum activities. New industrial development in the High North will not only take place offshore. There is a huge potential also for new onshore activity in connection with the gas/petroleum industry.

Climate Change: Positive Implications:
 Transport.
Retreating ice opens up new opportunities for shipping as well with a more intensive use of the Northern Sea
Route (NSR) and North-West Passage
(NWP).

Two conflicting approaches to the Northern Sea
Route in the Russian geopolitical thinking:

1. NSR is Russia’s possession and valuable asset, part of the Russian Arctic
Zone (RAZ). Russia should resist any
‘foreign encroachments’ on the NSR
 2. NSR (as a part of Arctic) belongs to the humankind at large. Russia is responsible for its ‘smart exploitation’, protection and sustainable development

Pluses:
 Shorter than the route via Suez canal by distance (by 34%) and time (two weeks)
 May become the main way for shipping energy resources from the Russian Arctic
Zone
 May become the main way for supplying the Russian RAZ territories (coastal and inland) by fuel, equipment, consumer goods and services
 Safer than the southern routes (no pirates)

Southern and Northern Routes: a Comparison

The Polarcus Alima 3D seismic X-bow vessel first to travel the Northern Sea Route in 2011

Minuses (for international partners):







Tanker speed is problematic: 21-24 nautical miles p/h for southern routes and 14 nautical miles p/h for the NSR
(because of the drifting ice and - potentially - icebergs)
Fuel consumption and savings are not calculated properly
Dependence on the Russian ice-breaker escort
The lack of experienced crews to navigate in Arctic
The lack of proper port, navigation, communication, search and rescue infrastructure
International insurance companies are unfamiliar with the nature of risks in the region and may increase fees
The risk of environmental hazards

Some preliminary recommendations on the revival of the NSR







To develop the port, navigation and communication infrastructure
To build liquid-gas production plants
To build further the ice-breaker fleet (3 nuclear powered and 5 diesel ice-breakers by 2020)
To develop ice-class tanker fleet (some 60 vessels by
2020)
To develop the Arctic search and rescue system (10
S&R centres by 2015)
To train crews for the Arctic conditions
To increase language skills of both vessel crews and coastal services

 Tourism.
Climate change could expand opportunities for development of the tourist/recreation industry which is a relatively new business in the region.

Climate Change: Negative Implications:
 Fisheries. For some of the Arctic high seas waters there is not yet an international conservation and management regime in place. This might lead to unregulated fisheries and, hence, conflicts because of that.

Climate Change: Negative Implications:

‘Hydrocarbons race’ may increase competition between the five coastal states for control over continental shelf and maritime zones as well as invite another conflict – between the Arctic-5 and non-coastal states (such as Finland, Sweden, UK,
China, Japan, South Korea, India, etc.) who would like to participate in exploitation of the Arctic natural resources. The role of international legal regimes
(especially UNCLOS) and bodies (UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) are particularly important in this regard.

Delimitation of the Norwegian-Russian maritime border in the Barents Sea (2010)

Climate Change: Negative Implications:
 The growing availability of the Arctic sea routes may increase competition between coastal and noncoastal states for the control of these passages and, at the same time, emphasize the need for new legal regimes and transport and search/rescue infrastructures. China, Japan and South Korea (the nations that are most interested in exploitation of these sea routes) insist that the NSR and NWP are the humankind’s assets or commons and should be available for everyone and – hence internationalized.

Climate Change: Negative Implications:
 Migration.
Climate change leads towards migration of both indigenous population because of the radical restructuring of its economy and way of life and work force which is occupied in the gas/petroleum industries, transport and military sectors.
These developments dictate the need for large-scale socio-economic programs to adapt the local population to such a radical change.

Climate Change: Negative Implications:
 Remilitarization.
The increasing competition for trade routes, maritime zones and natural resources has already led and continues to lead to a military build-up of particular coastal states and intensification of NATO military activities in the region. In contrast with the Cold war era, the current military efforts aim at protection of economic interests of the Arctic states and assertion of their national sovereignty over the maritime zones and trade routes rather than global confrontation between two superpowers or politico-military blocs.

 Environment protection
 Climate change monitoring
 Joint exploration and exploitation of vast
Arctic natural resources
 Search and rescue operations
 Fighting oil spills
 Preservation of traditional cultures and economies of indigenous people



 Browning C., Joenniemi P. Regionality Beyond Security? The Baltic Sea Region after Enlargement. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003.
 Henningsen B., Etzold T. (eds.). The Political State of the Region Report 2012.
— Copenhagen: Baltic Development Fund, 2012.
 Joenniemi P., Sergunin A. Laboratories of European Integration: City-Twinning in Northern Europe. — Tartu: Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation, 2012.
 Kaliningrad in Europa: Nachbarcchaftliche Perspektiven nach dem Ende des
Kalten Krieges. — Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010.
 Konyshev V., Sergunin A. The Arctic at the crossroads of geopolitical interests //
Russian Politics and Law, 2012. — Vol. 50, — № 2. — P. 34-54
 Oldberg, Ingmar. Soft Security in the Baltic Sea Region . Stockholm: Swedish
Institute of International Affairs, 2012.
 Sergounin A. External Determinants of Russia’s Regionalization. Working Paper
No. 3. Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, 2001. http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_319_290_en.pdf
 Sergunin A. Russia’s Baltic policy – new horizons? // Baltic Rim Economies,
2012. — № 2. — P. 34
 Zagorsky A. (ed.). The Arctic: A Space of Cooperation and Common Security
— Moscow, — 2010.


Арктика: зона мира и сотрудничества. / Отв. ред. А.В. Загорский. (Коллективная монография). — Москва: Издательство Института мировой экономики и международных отношений РАН, 2011.


Барыгин И.Н. Регионоведение. М.: Аспект-Пресс, 2007.
Гладкий Ю.Н., Чистобаев А.И. Регионоведение. Москва: Гардарики, 2002.

Ланко Д.А. Процессы глобализации, регионализации и локализации вокруг
Балтийского моря. – СПб., 2008.

Конышев В.Н., Сергунин А.А. Арктика в международной политике: сотрудничество или соперничество? — Москва: Российский институт стратегических исследований, 2011.

Конышев В.Н., Сергунин А.А. Канадская стратегия в Арктике и Россия: возможно ли взаимопонимание? // Арктика и Север, 2012. — № 8. — С. 4-26

Макарычев А.С. Федерализм эпохи глобализма: вызовы для региональной
России // Полис (Политические исследования). 2000. № 5. С. 81 – 97.

Медведев Н.П. Политическая регионалистика. Москва: Гардарики, 2002.

Прозрачные границы. Безопасность и трансграничное сотрудничество в зонах новых пограничных территорий России. Москва: Научно-образовательный форум по международным отношениям , 2002.

Регион как субъект политики и общественных отношений / Под ред.
Н.B.Зубаревич. М: МОНФ, 2000.

Туровский Р.Ф. Субнациональные регионы в глобальной политике (на примере
России) // Полис (Политические исследования). 2011. № 2. С. 99 – 117.