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2012
EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
Written by Emmi Maaranen and
Marie Louise Gammelgård Larsen
7th semester
Aalborg University
12/21/2012December 21, 2012
EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1
1.
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................ 3
2.
Methodological remarks .................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Limitations ............................................................................................................................................................................ 4
2.2 Literature ............................................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.3 Relevance............................................................................................................................................................................... 4
3.
Democratization theory ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 Defining and measuring democracy........................................................................................................................... 5
3.2 Facilitators and hindrances to democratization.................................................................................................... 5
3.3 External influence and democratization .................................................................................................................. 6
3.4 Mass opposition and democratization ...................................................................................................................... 6
4.
Modernization theory ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
4.1 Revised modernization theory ..................................................................................................................................... 7
4.2 The idea of human development ................................................................................................................................. 7
4.3 Value change as the key concept leading to modernization and democratization ................................. 7
4.4 Cultural background and economic growth ............................................................................................................ 8
4.5 A concluding note on modernization and democracy ........................................................................................ 9
5.
Neo-functionalism ............................................................................................................................................................. 10
5.1 The theory of neo-functionalism .............................................................................................................................. 10
5.2 Historical and intergovernmentalist challenges to neo-functionalist theory ........................................ 11
6.
Socio-historical overview of Tunisia.......................................................................................................................... 13
6.1 Demography and socio-economic indicators ...................................................................................................... 13
6.2 Politics in Tunisia ............................................................................................................................................................ 13
6.3 Tunisia and Europe ........................................................................................................................................................ 13
6.4 The economy of Tunisia................................................................................................................................................ 14
6.5 The service sector in Tunisia ...................................................................................................................................... 14
6.6 Security issues .................................................................................................................................................................. 15
6.7 Access to information and media ............................................................................................................................. 15
6.8 The role of women .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
7.
EU relations and policies towards Tunisia .............................................................................................................. 17
7.1 The Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Association Agreements ................................................. 17
7.2 The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) .......................................................................................................... 18
7.3 The Association Agreement and ENP policies in Tunisia ............................................................................... 19
Table of Contents
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7.3.1 Trade ............................................................................................................................................................................ 20
7.3.2 Education ................................................................................................................................................................... 20
7.3.3 Sectoral support ...................................................................................................................................................... 21
7.3.4 Health .......................................................................................................................................................................... 21
7.3.5 Women ........................................................................................................................................................................ 22
7.3.6 Security ....................................................................................................................................................................... 22
7.3.7 Democratic institutions........................................................................................................................................ 22
7.3.8 Media ........................................................................................................................................................................... 23
7.4 Reviews on policy implementations ....................................................................................................................... 23
8.
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia? ...................... 25
8.1 Developments in Tunisia seen from a modernization theory perspective.............................................. 25
8.2 Can neo-functionalism explain EU-Tunisian integration ................................................................................ 27
8.3 Do EU policies support democratization in Tunisia? ....................................................................................... 28
8.3.1 What does the strategy of the EU theoretically imply for the democratization process of
Tunisia .................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
8.3.2 Does theory and practice match up? .............................................................................................................. 29
9.
10.
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................ 34
References....................................................................................................................................................................... 35
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1. Introduction
The cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Tunisia began in 1969 when the first
cooperation agreement between the EU and Tunisia was signed. The EU-Tunisia relationship has since
then been strengthened and Tunisia is now an important partner of the union. Today, policymakers
find themselves facing new challenges as Tunisia is starting its transition towards democracy.
The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia on December 17th, 2010, has transformed the political
landscape of Tunisia and the surrounding Arab region. Authoritarian rule became challenged and
created a revolution in the fight for democracy. Today, the authoritarian ruler Ben Ali has fled the
country and a new government has just taken office. There are many debates on whether Tunisia will
be able to establish sound democratic institutions. Nevertheless, Tunisia has often been proclaimed the
best hope for achieving democracy in the region.
Democratization and modernization theories argue that there are many factors, which should be
considered when establishing whether a country is on its path towards democratization. The EU has
sought to promote democracy in many of its policies towards Tunisia, especially through the
Association Agreement (AA) and the European Neighborhood Policies (ENP). As Tunisia is increasingly
integrating with the EU and is in the midst of political change, it was found particular interesting to
examine the following:
Can EU-Tunisia integration be explained by neo-functionalism and has EU policies contributed to the
democratization process of Tunisia?
In order to build a framework for understanding how the EU has affected the democratization process
of Tunisia, the project will open with a description of democratization and modernization theory. In
order to understand EU-Tunisia integration, the project will discuss the theory of neo-functionalism
with the criticism offered by intergovernmentalist theory. An overview of the political, social and
economic situation in Tunisia will be provided. Likewise, an overview of EU-Tunisia relations will be
provided together with a description of the agreements and policy devices.
The analysis will assess the social, economic and political developments in Tunisia from the
modernization theory perspective of Inglehart and Welzel. Next, it will be discussed whether the
theory of neo-functionalism is sufficient in explaining EU-Tunisia integration. From the modernization
and democratization perspective, it will be discussed whether the policy strategy of the EU is
supportive of these processes. Lastly, the strategy of the EU will be examined in practice, in order to
evaluate on whether EU policies have been successful in supporting the democratization process of
Tunisia.
Introduction
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2. Methodological remarks
2.1 Limitations
This project provides a qualitative study of EU policies in Tunisia and their effects on democracy.
The qualitative approach has been chosen as the scope of the project has not allowed it to consider all
aspects of EU policy objectives and results. During the making of this project, a large amount of data
had been collected and it proved to be a difficult task to comprehend all findings in 35 pages. If the
scope had allowed it, the project would have offered an additional discussion of the EU’s use of
conditionality or lack thereof and the possible effects of EU double standards and policy inconsistency
on the democratization process of Tunisia. Furthermore, the project could have assessed a wider range
of EU policies and their contribution to the democratization process of Tunisia and provided a larger
discussion part on the theoretical framework.
2.2 Literature
Prior to writing this project, it was found important to achieve an in-depth understanding of the
developments leading to the Arab Spring. An understanding of Tunisia’s economic and political
situation and its historical background has been valued. A particular attention has been paid to the
foreign relations of Tunisia, especially with the EU.
The theories on modernization and democratization relies heavily on the works of Welzel and
Inglehart as they have offered an excellent framework for understanding these processes. Their
research relies on a wide spectrum of authors in the field. In order to provide an outline of neo
functionalism, the theoretical approach of Haas has been chosen. The description of EU policies in
Tunisia relies on EU official statements and documents. In this context, it must be noted that many EU
reports on policy progress in Tunisia have only been published in French, which has limited the
transparency towards assessing the concrete results of EU policies to the democratization process of
Tunisia.
2.3 Relevance
This project seeks to offer an important contribution in terms of understanding the underlying
objectives and effectiveness of EU policies in Tunisia. Tunisia is perhaps the strongest partner of the
EU in the Middle East and ensuring its democratization process should be a top priority for EU foreign
relation policies in the region. Furthermore, updated research on this topic remains limited, and this
project therefore aims to offer important new insights.
Methodological remarks
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3. Democratization theory
3.1 Defining and measuring democracy
In order to be able to do a project concerning the effect of EU policies on the democratization process
of Tunisia, it is necessary to understand what the concept of democracy and democratization implies.
Christian Welzel argues that:
In its literal meaning, ‘government by the people’, democracy is about the
institutionalization of people power. Democratization is the process by which this
happens (Welzel, 2009, p. 75).
Power can be institutionalized through a realization of civic freedoms which entitles people to govern
their lives and to follow their personal preferences in governing their private life while also being able
to make political preferences count in governing public life (Welzel, 2009, p. 75).
3.2 Facilitators and hindrances to democratization
Welzel argues that democracy can only come about when the people gain some resources of power,
whether they are economic, political or social. For Welzel, “the absence versus presence of democracy
is about the absence versus presence of centralized control over resources” (Welzel, 2009, p. 76).
Welzel further argues that cultural segregation can hinder democratization. Societies can be
segregated into group enmities due to differences in religion, language and ethnicity. A larger middle
class, which implies smaller economic differences, helps ease group hostility and increases the
acceptance of democratic power transfers between groups (Welzel, 2009, p. 79).
An argument often made is that capitalism is necessary for democracy and that Protestantism created
capitalism, making democracy work better in protestant countries. A similarly known argument is that
Islamic traditions are unfavorable to democratization, an argument first put forward in Huntingtons
”Class of civilizations”. It is true that the Islamic countries from North-West Africa to South-East Asia
constitute the least democratic region in the world. However, scholars have pointed out that this might
not be due to the influence of Islam per se. Instead, democracy is absent, because a very large
proportion of Islamic countries have based their economies on the export of oil, which places revenues
in the hands of the rulers without requiring consent from the people (Welzel, 2009, p. 80) (Malone,
2011, p. 69). Finally, when considering the prospects of democratization, it is relevant to look at the
institutional settings of a regime. Some regimes are more vulnerable than others and therefore create a
more prominent opportunity to challenge the system (Welzel, 2009).
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3.3 External influence and democratization
In the 1980s, the ”Washington Consensus” gained support as the preferred foreign policy. The
Washington Consensus stressed the need for ”good governance” and paved the way for the use of both
positive and negative conditionality by International Institutions, such as the EU, in aid and trade
programs. This in turn has meant, that since the 1980s, democracies have used their economic power
to press countries depending on Western resources to adopt electoral democracy (Welzel, 2009). The
entertainment industry has also had an influence in the spreading of democracy, as images of living
conditions in Western democracies have spread around the globe (Zank, 2012, p. 100) (Welzel, 2009, p.
82).
It is therefore plausible to assume that democratization is to some extent triggered by external
influences. External influences can only lead to democracy when democratic forces already exist
because only then will democracy be desirable for the people. As Welzel notes:
It is only when people come to find appeal in the freedoms that define democracy that
they begin to consider dictatorial powers as illegitimate (Welzel, 2009, p. 83).
If people do not find appeal in the freedoms which democracy provides for, then there is no opposition
to the ruling elite (Welzel, 2009, p. 83). Threats of repression may hinder democratization processes,
but in recent times, there have been many examples of mass opposition despite threats of repression.
These mass mobilizations have been especially characterizing for the development of the Arab Spring.
3.4 Mass opposition and democratization
Earlier democratization theories have argued that for a transition towards democracy to emerge, there
had to be a split in the elite, creating an elite opposition to the status quo. Recently, this theory has
been contested as developments have shown the power of non-violent mass opposition in challenging
authoritarian regimes and establishing democracy. Recent studies have supported these findings and
showed that in most cases, democracy is achieved when ordinary people revolt against reluctant elites.
Furthermore democratization processes have proven to be most successful where masses have
mobilized in such large numbers that authorities have been unable to suppress them (Welzel, 2009, p.
83). Processes of modernization are seen as facilitators and driving forces of democratization. The
following section will therefore provide a discussion of modernization theory.
Democratization theory
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4. Modernization theory
Today, there is a general consensus that modernization operates in favor of democracy. In social
sciences, the term “modernization” refers to “the transition from a traditional, rural, agrarian society to
a secular, urban, industrial society” (Inglehart, 2001, p. 9965). Modernization includes social, political,
cultural and economic changes, and the main force behind modernization is usually defined to be the
progress of industrialization. Industrialization can make the country richer, which then again can lead
to rising levels on bureaucratization, education, more specialized professions and a more technological
society (Inglehart, 2001, p. 9965).
Welzel and Inglehart have made an excellent contribution to the theoretical field of modernization, and
in the following section, a discussion of the theory will be provided.
4.1 Revised modernization theory
According to Inglehart and Welzel, economic development does indeed change the society, but
attention should also be paid to other matters. Their revised modernization theory presents that
modernization progress is very much linked with the process of human development. Democracy,
gender equality and individual autonomy become easier when socioeconomic development has
brought certain cultural changes. Democracy does not automatically start to work when established;
the people of the society make it function (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 1-2) (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009,
pp. 4-5).
4.2 The idea of human development
Inglehart and Welzel argue that modernization progress goes hand in hand with human development
which is connected to the enlargement of human choice and autonomy. Economic growth, better access
to education and information and diverse human interactions increase the resources of the people.
Increasing resources make people more independent on many levels: materially, intellectually and
socially. People start to put more emphasis on matters such as freedom and self-expression values
when the feelings of security and autonomy are rising. This socio-economic modernization progress
gives people the possibility to make autonomous choices. According to Inglehart and Welzel, selfexpression values are more linked with democracy than any other factor. In a nutshell, Inglehart and
Welzel describe modernization to be a combination of industrialization and social changes (Inglehart &
Welzel, 2005, pp. 2-4) (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 1).
4.3 Value change as the key concept leading to modernization and democratization
One of the main themes of modernization theory is the role of the worldview in a society. If
modernization is going to lead to democratization, the values of the society must have changed to value
Modernization theory
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individual freedom and self-expression values instead of traditional values. In traditional societies,
people tend to appreciate family over independency and people also tend not to question authority.
People emphasize economic and physical security before everything else, and therefore they prefer to
stick to traditional norms and rules. This brings a feeling of predictability into a world that is
otherwise so insecure. In secular-rational societies people do not have to worry about security and
they appreciate the opposite values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 49-54) (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p.
13).
Socio-economic development is one of the key concepts in leading a value change from traditional to
secular-rational values. According to the research of Inglehart and Welzel, high income countries tend
to value self-expression values and the low-income countries survival values. The rising selfexpression values follow industrialization and especially the rise of post-industrial society. Selfexpression values grow, when the society first moves from agricultural to industrial society and after
this from industrial to a more service based economy. The move towards a service based economy is
important, because industrialization itself does not bring the value change needed for democracy.
Higher education, growth in income and employability in the service sector tend to lead to higher selfexpression values. A cultural shift happens among the younger generations, who have been able to
grow up without worries of surviving. When the self-expression values rise, matters such as gender
equality, political activism and tolerance against minorities tend to increase (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005,
pp. 57-61) (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 7).
Welzel argues that when examining if a country is supportive of democracy, it is irrelevant to examine
how many people openly declare their support for democracy. What matters is what the reasons
behind their support are (Welzel, 2009, p. 85).
4.4 Cultural background and economic growth
Inglehart and Welzel emphasize the role of culture. The religious and historical heritage of a society
has an effect on the modernization progress. The cultural heritages do not necessarily disappear as
easily as some early modernization theorists expected. Inglehart and Welzel also argue that some
countries with colonial ties show cultural similarities to their former conqueror country. Nevertheless,
Inglehart and Welzel argue that over time, modernization brings changes to traditions such as gender
roles and sexual norms, even when the cultural heritage still has an effect on the society (Inglehart &
Welzel, 2005, pp. 5, 8, 64) (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, pp. 4, ).
When it comes to economic growth, Inglehart and Welzel underline the importance of export-oriented
strategies, they argue:
Modernization theory
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Producing for the world market brings economic growth; investing in the returns in
human capital and upgrading the workforce to produce high-tech goods brings higher
returns and enlarges the educated middle-class; once the middle class becomes
sufficiently large and articulate, it presses for liberal democracy (Inglehart & Welzel,
2009, p. 4).
Thus, according to Inglehart and Welzel, developed open-market economies are more supportive of
democratic processes.
4.5 A concluding note on modernization and democracy
The theory of Welzel and Inglehart differs from the classical modernization theory, which claims that it
is the diminishing income disparity, which makes democracy more desirable to elites. They argue that
the main force of modernization is that it advances peoples resources and enables them to make
democratic demands (Welzel, 2009, p. 85). Some scholars (e.g. Dankwart Rustow, 1970) have argued
that people can only learn to appreciate democratic freedoms if they have gathered experience with
the practice of these freedoms, which in turn means that democratic institutions need to be in place for
democratic values to emerge. This has led them to argue that modernization cannot provide for prodemocratic values unless they advance under democratic institutions. Welzel and Inglehart oppose this
argument, and argue instead that the desire of democratic freedoms depends on the utility the people
can see in these freedoms. They argue that perceived utility is not dependent on previous experience
with the practice of these freedoms, rather it is dependent on the resources which people command
(Welzel, 2009, p. 84). Following this argument, it is therefore entirely possible for democracy to
emerge from authoritarian regimes.
It can also be discussed whether the modernization theories and ideas of development are constructed
on a certain kind of cultural reality and how well these concepts can be applied in different cultures
(Graham, 2001, pp. 9963-9965).
Having examined the theoretical framework of Inglehart and Welzel it is evident that their revised
modernization theory provides a description of many of the processes that can be seen as driving
forces of democratization. However, the theory does not provide any framework for understanding
how much modernization is needed in order to reach democratization, and value change is difficult to
measure. While underlining the importance of a service-based economy, the theory gives no answers
as to how large this sector needs to be. Nevertheless, the theory is found useful in order to examine
whether EU policies have contributed to some of these modernization processes.
Modernization theory
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5. Neo-functionalism
In this section, the theory of neo-functionalism, its application and its critiques will be discussed in
order to later be able to determine if the theory can be applied to explain EU-Tunisian integration.
5.1 The theory of neo-functionalism
Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional integration, which has often been used to explain European
integration processes. The theory was first developed by Ernst B. Haas in the mid-1950s. Neofunctionalism presented the first comprehensive theory of regional integration and sought to derive
propositions about the underlying nature of the integration process. It aims to construct a predictive
theory of international political integration. The theory argues that regional integration is an
inevitable effect of growing economic interdependence (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, pp. 89-90). As
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni observes:
The central focus of neo-functionalism is the relationship between economic and
political integration. Simplified, the premise is that integration in economic and
functional sectors will lead to pressure for political integration due to spill-overs and
unintended consequences that occur when states discover that integration on one
functional area impacts upon their interdependent activities in other related areas
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 90).
The logic behind neo-functionalism is that spillover effects from economic integration will lead to
political integration. To relate this logic with early studies of European integration, early neofunctionalist theory therefore assumes that as economic sectors increase the volume of trade and the
number of transactions across borders, these transactions will eventually create disputes, which can
only be solved at a supranational level. This will eventually lead to the creation of supranational
institutions, which will again meet pressure from a range of interest groups and this will again lead to
a pressure for further integration and eventually create a new political union (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni,
2006, p. 90).
In sum, early neo-functionalist theory assumes a decline in the importance of the nation-state. It
assumes that interest groups, officials and large commercial interests within states will increasingly
find it in their interests to pursue the objectives offered by a modern welfare state and that this
objective is best achieved by political integration and market integration at a supranational level. Haas
describes three types of spillover effects accommodating this integration. The first is a functional
Neo-functionalism
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spillover effect, which implies that integration between states in an economic sector will create strong
incentives for further integration in related sectors in order to capture the full benefits of integration.
The second is the political spillover effect, which surrounds the transfer in domestic allegiances
towards supranational institutions, as interest groups find that the newly formed supranational
institutions can better protect their material interests than pre-existing national institutions. This, in
turn, calls for a greater regulatory complexity and institutions on a regional level often need to adapt
to new regulations, transferring integration to higher levels in the decision-making processes. The
third is a cultivated spillover effect, and refers to the way supranational institutions will take the lead
in facilitating further integration as they become more powerful and autonomous of the member
states. In the end, political integration then becomes an inevitable side effect of integration in
economic sectors (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, pp. 92-95).
5.2 Historical and intergovernmentalist challenges to neo-functionalist theory
Neo-functionalism has been challenged due to difficulties with its application to integration patterns
different from the ones experienced by the EU. Early research on European integration patterns
seemed to support the neo-functional integration theory but it did not match with the experiences
outside of Europe and attempts to connect theory with these practices were therefore seldom
successful. This realization has contributed to the development of a more realistic version of neofunctionalism, which stresses the importance of background conditions such as high levels of social
pluralism, industrial and economic development, compatibility of elite values and regional relations
(Zank, 2010, p. 114) (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 96).
Early neo-functionalist theory was further challenged by the slowdown in European integration in the
1960s and after the Charles De Gaulle’s “empty chair” crisis in the 1960’s, Haas declared the theory of
neo-functionalism obsolete, as the crisis stalled the decision-making process in the European Coal and
Steel Community, the European Economic Community and in the European Atomic Energy. The
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s spurred national protectionism, which also
undercut expectations regarding spillover effects from the Common Market. This slowdown triggered
widespread self-criticism among neo-functionalist scholars and gave rise to an upsurge in statecentered or intergovernmentalist scholarship (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, pp. 95-97).
Intergovenmentalists stress the importance of the role of the nation state and of national interests.
They insist that states remain the sole arbiters of their external policies and reject the pluralist
conception in favor of the assumption of national decision-making taking place before initiating
negotiations internationally. Intergovernmentalists further rejected the notion of spillovers. They do
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not believe in integration as a result of unintended consequences, rather, they argue, states do only
enter into international agreements after judging the likely results of alternative agreements and only
if they seem to serve long-term interests. Hoffman, one of the main criticizers of neo-functionalism,
argued that neo-functionalists had been focusing too narrowly on the internal dynamics of integration
and that they had ignored the surrounding context of integration. He argued that states were subject
to pressures from many external forces and that states respond differently to these pressures. The
theory of intergovernmentalism builds on the realist school of thought and conceives the EU as an
international regime designed to reduce transaction costs of cooperation among its members whereas
neo-functionalists conceive the EU as a new political community which will supersede the existing
nation-states (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 100).
The analysis will assess whether or not neo-functionalism can explain EU-Tunisia integration.
However, for a moment, the theories of modernization, democratization and neo-functionalism will be
put aside and empirical data will be presented in order to understand the social, political and
economic situation and development in Tunisia.
Neo-functionalism
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6. Socio-historical overview of Tunisia
In this chapter, an overview of the most important socio-historical, political and economic
developments in Tunisia will be provided.
6.1 Demography and socio-economic indicators
The population of Tunisia is around 10.7 million. 67% of the population lives in the urban areas and
98% are Muslims. The official language is Tunisian but French is also used. Tunisians are rather highly
educated and the literacy rate was 74.3% in 2010. The life expectancy is 75.24 years, which is higher
than that of Bulgaria of 73.83 years, which gives evidence of Tunisia being more developed than some
parts of Europe, at least in some areas. The fertility rate of Tunisian women is 2.02, which is low in
comparison with many of its neighbors. Tunisia also has a high youth unemployment rate of 30.7%
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).
6.2 Politics in Tunisia
After gaining independence from France in 1956, Tunisia has been led by two authoritarian presidents:
Habib Bourguiba from 1957 to 1987 and Ben Ali from 1987 to 2011. Bourguiba made it seem like he
made a state corporatist system, which brought together the representatives of the government and
official organizations for women, students, and workers, when in reality a large degree of nepotism
was present (Alexander, 2010, pp. 6-7).
Ben Ali continued with the authoritarian rule, but his politics were less concentrated on nepotism than
Bourguibas. Ben Ali focused on political changes that gave the country some aspects of a liberal
democracy. He gave the possibility for new parties to win seats in the elections, but in reality, the
possibilities for the opposition were restricted (Alexander, 2010, pp. 6-7). It has been claimed that Ben
Ali was going in the right direction with his policies that were more concentrated on the economic
progress than democratization (Murphy, 1999, p. 7).
In 2010, when the Arab revolutions began, there were still some serious problems in Tunisia.
Especially the educated young were jobless. Unemployment rates were higher in the southern and
interior parts of the country than in the coastal parts. The revolutions began in the poorer areas
(Noueihed & Warren , 2012, pp. 66-67).
6.3 Tunisia and Europe
Tunisia has a close relationship with Europe. Especially the relationship with France has been
important. Even though Tunisia gained its independence from the French protectorate in 1956, France
has had a large influence on Tunisia both politically and economically for a long time (Alexander, 2010,
p. 89). The close relation with Europe might have had an effect on the culture of the country. According
Socio-historical overview of Tunisia
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to Alexander, Tunisia seems to be culturally different to the rest of the Arab world. European culture
has had a rather strong influence on the Tunisian post-independence elite and the main Tunisian cities
(Alexander, 2010, p. 1) (Powel & Sadiki, 2010, ss. 1-3).
6.4 The economy of Tunisia
Wolfgang Zank notes that for decades it seemed that the countries of North Africa, including Tunisia,
followed the “Chinese solution” of authoritarian leadership combined with modernization processes
and transitions towards a market economy (Zank, 2012, p. 97). For many years, the economy of Tunisia
has therefore also been market-oriented. The most important sectors of the economy are
manufacturing, tourism, agriculture and mining (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).
The EU is the main trading partner of Tunisia, around 80% of total exports go to the EU. When it
comes to specific countries, the main export and import partners in 2011 were France, Italy and
Germany (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Therefore, Tunisian trade is more concentrated on
European countries than the other Arab countries. In 2011, the EU imported for 9.9 billion euros from
Tunisia, while it exported for 10.9 billion, making Tunisia a net importer in trade with the EU
(European Commission, 2012). The GDP of Tunisia in US millions was 39,562 in 2009 (United Nations,
2012). Tunisia does not have large amounts of important natural resources such as oil or natural gas
(Alexander, 2010, p. 1). If we look beyond the trade relationship with the EU, Tunisia has also taken
steps to promote trade with its regional partner. In 2007, the Agadir Free Trade Agreement was
therefore signed between Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. In this respect, the EU contributed with
an assistance program. Moreover, Tunisia has signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey (ENPI, 2011).
Compared to the other countries of the region, Tunisia has been seen as an economic success story
(Zank, 2010, p. 121). President Bourguiba managed to lead the country to a speedy economic
modernization progress. In the 1970s, Tunisia adapted an export-oriented development strategy and it
became the first country in the Arab world to adapt liberal reforms. In the times of Ben Ali, the
Tunisian government opened the economy for more imports, and the country became more integrated
in to the world economy. The most important global economic step was in 1995 when Tunisia signed
an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU (Alexander, 2010, pp. 75,82). In 2010, the International
Monetary fund reported that the economy of Tunisia had been growing an average of 5% every year
for the past two decades (Noueihed & Warren , 2012, pp. 66-67).
6.5 The service sector in Tunisia
In 2009, the amount of people working in the service sector in Tunisia was 49.8 % (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2012). When it comes to the amount of GDP based on the service sector, there has not been
big growth between the years 2006 and 2010. The GDP percentage in wholesale and retail trade, hotels
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2012
and restaurants sank from 14.6% to 14.4%. Transport, storage and communication experienced
growth in GDP from 12.9% to 14%. GDP in financial intermediation, real estate services, business and
other service actors sank from 15.8% to 15.3%. However, the Tunisian report from the African
Economic Outlook states that the percentage of the service sector in GDP is now 42%, but that it could
rise to 50% within a relatively short time span if policies were to be restructured. The information
technology and the telecommunications sector, which makes 5% of GDP, experienced a large growth of
12.5% in 2011 because of infrastructural strengthening (African Economic Outlook, 2012).
6.6 Security issues
A poll conducted on the basis of 1,308 interviews on public opinion in Tunisia has shown that, in 2012,
84% of Tunisians trust the national army in protecting their neighborhood while 56% trust the citizen
security groups. Only 43% trust the national police to provide security to their neighborhood.
However, the numbers have been increasing significantly for the national army and the national police
since 2011, where the numbers were 80 and 30% respectively (The International Republican Institute
(IRI), 2012). When asked whether the situation improved after the election, more than 70% of
respondents said it had gotten better both in their neighborhood and in Tunisia in general. The polls
further show that there is a general trust that the new government is able to address the challenges
facing Tunisia (The International Republican Institute (IRI), 2012). When asked about whether or not
Tunisians preferred a secularist government, 11% of the respondents said they preferred a strong
Islamist leadership while 68% preferred a moderate Islamist leadership. Only 21% of the respondents
preferred a secular government (The International Republican Institute (IRI), 2012, p. 40).
6.7 Access to information and media
In the times of the authoritarian rulers, the media was much restricted in Tunisia. However, in 2003,
Ben Ali allowed some private media to enter the market. Earlier, all TV channels and radio stations
were owned by the state. It is possible that EU policies had an indirect effect for broadening the media
landscape in this matter.
According to Rikke Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, Tunisia was
internationally seen as a “good pupil” in launching liberal and economic reforms. However, criticism
started to arise amongst the European policy makers about the Tunisian human rights situation. It is
therefore possible that Ben Ali had to make some media reforms in order to show commitment to
political pluralism and market reforms. Haugbølle and Cavatorta argue that the private media sectors
made it possible for Tunisians to follow and discuss sensitive matters that could not be discussed in
the state owned media. This gave unexpected freedom for Tunisian masses (Haugbølle & Cavatorta,
2011, ss. 6,14). Compared to many other countries in the region, Tunisia has better access to Internet
and social media. In 2009, 3, 5 million people had access to the Internet (Central Intelligence Agency,
2012).
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6.8 The role of women
The promotion of the role of women began already in 1957 when Bourguiba took office. Bourguiba
made some significant law changes in order to improve gender equality. Since that time, the situation
for women has improved due to a value change in the mentalities of Tunisians (Arfaoui, 2012).
Tunisian women were shortly after independence in 1956 among the first in the Arab World to obtain
the right to vote (Bennhold, 2011).
Having examined the social, economic and political situation in Tunisia, it has become evident that
many developments have been taking place in Tunisia. It will later be discussed whether the
developments in Tunisia seem to have followed the modernization pattern as presented by Inglehart
and Welzel. First, however, empirical data on EU-Tunisia relations and policies will be presented.
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2012
7. EU relations and policies towards Tunisia
The cooperation between the EU and Tunisia goes back to 1969, when the first cooperation agreement
was signed between Tunisia and the European Economic Community (EEC). This first agreement was
mostly commercial but in 1976, new bilateral agreements, which included economic and financial aid,
were concluded with the Maghreb countries of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco under the “Global
Mediterranean Policy”. Since then, several agreements have been put in place to extend the scope of
cooperation. In the following section, the Association Agreement (AA), which provides the legal basis
for EU-Tunisia relations, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which constitutes the more
recent development in EU-Tunisia relations, will be discussed.
7.1 The Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Association Agreements
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership between the EU and the countries of the Southern
Mediterranean started in 1995 with the Barcelona process. The EU proclaims that this partnership is
based on political, economic and social cooperation on the principles of exchange, solidarity and
shared development. Under the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, AA’s have been
launched between the EU and the Mediterranean country partners. These agreements have replaced
the cooperation agreements of the 1970s (Europe Direct, 2011).
Central to the AAs are the principles of the United Nations Charter, in particular the observance of
democratic principles, economic freedom and fundamental human rights (European External Action
Service). Even though individual agreements are made for all country partners, all AAs are similar in
structure and intend to promote regular dialogue on political and security issues, economic trade and
financial cooperation. They also intend to promote social and cultural cooperation and cooperation on
educational matters. They seek to advance intra-regional cooperation and provide for a gradual
establishment of a Mediterranean free trade area which should be in accordance with the rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, the AAs seek to provide for the free movement of
goods between the EU and the Mediterranean. This should be achieved by a gradual removal of
customs duties, prohibition of quantitative restrictions of exports and imports and any other
discriminatory measure between the parties (Europe Direct, 2011).
The parties reaffirm their commitments to the rights of establishment and the supply of services under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Partner countries must promote the full
liberalization of the capital sector as soon as the necessary conditions are in place. The AAs call for
establishing a mechanism for regulating trade disputes and institutional structures for the AAs are set
up under each agreement. An Association Council, which is organized at the ministerial level, is taking
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2012
decisions and making recommendations so that the agreed objectives can be reached. An Association
Committee manages the agreement and functions to settle possible differences regarding the
application and interpretation of the agreement (Europe Direct, 2011).
On the 17th of July 1995, Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country to sign an AA with the EU. Since
March 1st 1998, when the agreement came into force, this AA has governed bilateral relations between
the European Union and Tunisia (European External Action Service).
7.2 The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
Since 2004, relations with Tunisia have been developed in the framework of the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Europa.eu, 2011). The ENP was launched in 2004 with the objective of
avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and aims to
strengthen the prosperity, stability and security for all (The European Commission, 2010).
The ENP builds upon existing agreements between the EU and its partner countries. Since its birth,
reports have been published regarding the implementation of the ENP with policy recommendations
for further engagement in the countries (The European Commission, 2010).
Through the ENP, the EU seeks to offer their neighbors a privileged partnership building upon a
“mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance,
market economy principles and sustainable development)” (The European Commission, 2010) (Powel
& Sadiki, 2010, pp. 38-40). The ENP was launched to provide for deeper economic integration,
increased mobility and to move beyond existing relationships for political association (The European
Commission, 2010). The EU argues that ENP partner countries will benefit from closer relations with
the EU, the opportunity to take part in certain European programs, a direct stake in the single market
and assistance with political and economic reform (Zank, 2010, p. 118) (European Neighborhood and
Partnership Instrument, 2007). The ENP does however not offer prospects for EU membership (The
European Commission, 2010).
The main policy instruments of the ENP are the bilateral Action Plans (APs) between the EU and the
individual ENP partner countries. These APs constitute an agenda of political and economic reforms,
which are given short and medium term priorities from three to five years. After the motives of the
APs are reached, succession documents are being implemented. According to the European Council
(EC), the speed and intensity of the process will depend on the will and capability of each partner
country to engage in this broad agenda (The European Commission, 2010).
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2012
7.3 The Association Agreement and ENP policies in Tunisia
The AA is a binding legal text with 96 articles providing obligations and policy objectives for both the
EU and the Tunisian government (EuroMed, 1995). The AA has provided for the long term objective of
a free trade area (FTA) between the two parties and it constitutes the framework for EU-Tunisia
political, economic, social, scientific and cultural cooperation (European Neighborhood and
Partnership Instrument, 2007). The objectives put forward in the AA have been sought summarized in
Figure 1.
To strengthen and expand the commitments and objectives of the AA, specific objectives were laid
down in a European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan (NAP1), which has been in force since the 4th of
July 2005 (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, 2007). Priority is given to the
objectives stated in Figure 2 (European Commision, 2005).
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2012
In order to reach the objectives in the AA and the ENP, the EU supports Tunisia both in policy-making
and with financial assistance. Often, financial assistance is bound to principles of negative and positive
conditionality and support relies on the implementation of policy objectives.
7.3.1 Trade
Article 6 to 30 of the AA between the EU and Tunisia is concerned with the free movement of goods
between the two parties. Reducing trade barriers such as customs duties and tariffs and ensuring
equal procedures constitutes the essence of these articles. However, some of these articles give the
right to protectionist mechanisms, such as in the case of infant industries or in industries where
liberalization highly threatens the security of one or both parties. Articles 31 and 32 deal with the right
of establishment and services across borders under the regulations of GATT, while articles 33-35 deal
with current payments and the free movement of capital. Articles 36-41 are concerned with increasing
the level of competition, transparency of aid which may hinder competition and the protection of
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights (EuroMed, 1995).
It should be clear from the above that increasing and liberalizing trade between Tunisia and the EU is
of the highest priority in the AA as 41 out of 96 articles are directly concerned with this matter. Many
more articles are indirectly related to this, namely articles calling for increasing standardization of
legislature, education and product quality but also articles, which intend to promote the financial and
transportation infrastructure of Tunisia.
The AA puts forward a number of legal articles which specifies the terms of trade between the EU and
Tunisia. The AP also stresses the importance of increasing trade and removing barriers. It also focuses
on the protection of property rights, increasing competition and increasing quality standards and is
thus supporting the legal articles of the AA. Furthermore, the NIP from 2007-2010, has earmarked 23
million euros in support of Tunisian enterprises in order to improve qualities and create better access
to the European Market. Another 50 million euros were granted under the integration program in
support of integration into the world economy and reinforcement of the competitiveness of Tunisian
enterprises. These are ongoing projects (EuropeAid, 2012).
7.3.2 Education
One of the priorities stated in the AP is social and cultural cooperation on the educational matters. In
the AA from 1995, it is stated that the co-operation between Tunisia and the EU should include
significant improvement in the Tunisian education and a special emphasis is put on including female
candidates in the education system. In the National Indicative Program (NIP) for 2007-2010, a special
emphasis was put on advancing education and scientific research in order to build a knowledge-based
economy and reduce unemployment. The NIP states that in 2009, budgetary support of 65 million
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euros were given to reforms ensuring that education is relevant to employment and 12 million to
innovation in research (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, 2007).
From the ENP progress report from May 2012, it is apparent that 282 Tunisian university students
have taken part in European mobility programs between 2007 and 2010. Erasmus Mundus is the main
European mobility program for university students outside the EU, and in 2011, the budget of Erasmus
Mundus was increased with 20 million euros for the Southern Neighborhood (EuropeAid, 2012)
(European Commission, 2012). The report states further that 14 research institutions and 18
researches benefited from the European Marie Curie Actions Program, which makes it possible for
researches to receive training abroad. The report mentions an increase in the number of young
Tunisians participating in the EU’s “Youth in Action” programs which aim to enhance solidarity and
tolerance among young Europeans. According to the report, 181 young Tunisians benefited from 54
projects in 2011. Lastly, in 2011, the “Programme d’appui au systeme de l’Education/Formation –
Enseigment Superieur et Employabilite des displomes” (PEFESE) was launched to improve the
employability of young university graduates (European Commission, 2012).
7.3.3 Sectoral support
The ENP strategy paper for 2007 to 2013 states that the ENP aims to build up a knowledge-based
society and to develop the information technology in Tunisia (European Commission, 2007). This, in
turn, shall be realized through a liberalization of telecommunications, services and energy (European
Commission, 2012).
In 2008, the EU supported the economic governance and competitiveness in Tunisia with 50 million
euros and in 2010 with 77 million euros. These investments were also conducted in order to develop a
business-friendly competitive financial sector and in order to create jobs (European Commission,
2007). In 2011, the EU had a budget of 20 million euros to strengthen competitiveness in Tunisian
services (European Commission, 2011) and in 2012, a contract, providing 27 million euros in support
of programs for civil society and the improvement of the competitiveness of the service sector, was
signed (The European Commission, 2012). The ENP progress report from 2012 states that the Tunisian
government continues to rely on the growth in the service sector, especially within fields of
telecommunications and tourism (European Commission, 2012).
7.3.4 Health
In terms of healthcare, the European Council has, under the ENP in 2012, adopted a new project worth
12 million euros aiming to reduce inequalities in access to health care in some of the most deprived
areas in the west and south of Tunisia. The project is believed to benefit 40% of the Tunisian
population. This program is a new initiative aiming at strengthening current actions such as the
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initiative by the EU and the World Health Organization (WTO) deployed in 2011 to rehabilitate health
centers (Action Global Communications, 2012). Promoting living conditions and health care is also one
of the priorities put forward in the AA.
Moreover, in terms of food security, the EU has through its AA and AP for Tunisia paid much attention
to sustainable development, to increasing product standards and to general advancements in the
production of agricultural products (European Commision, 2005) (EuroMed, 1995).
7.3.5 Women
One of the objectives put forward in the AA is the promotion of the role of women in Tunisian society
(Article 71). In 2011, 300,000 euros have been given to promote female participation in the democratic
transition (EuropeAid, 2012). The program “Enhancing Equality between Men & Women in the
Euromed Region” (EGEP), which ran from the 15th of May 2008 to the 15th of May 2011, was funded
through the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and is implemented in Tunisia. This
program was implemented to report on the process of the promotion of the role of women in Tunisia
and to make sure that policies were followed.
7.3.6 Security
The EU has sought to promote the rule of law and thereby also security in Tunisia. Cross-border,
transnational and inter-regional cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention, conflict
resolution and disaster management form part of the new ENP for Tunisia (European Commision,
2005). The ENP further states that Tunisia should strengthen the efficiency of judicial procedures and
the right to defense, consolidate existing initiatives in the area of penal reform, improve detention and
prison conditions and support reforms to the justice system (European Neighborhood and Partnership
Instrument, 2007).
To protect human rights, the EU and Tunisia should ensure that national legislation complies with
international law on human rights. The AP also sets priorities for promoting the freedom of expression,
to protect personal data, to combat discrimination against women and to promote the rights of
children. In order to prevent conflict, the AP aspires to strengthen coordination in combating security
threats and in preventing terrorism and weapons of mass-destruction (European Commision, 2005).
7.3.7 Democratic institutions
Prior to the revolution, Tunisia received virtually no democracy aid (Bush, 2012). This has changed
since the revolution and in 2011, the EU has given 9.7 million euros in support of civil society, nonstate actors and to the preparation and observation of the election. This support is in line with the new
policy objectives in the “The New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” which puts an increased
focus on democracy promotion and respect for human rights. Tunisia was also the first country to
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benefit from “The Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth Program” (SPRING), which
offers financial support on a more-for-more basis to its partner countries showing a sustained
commitment to, and progress in, reforms. 20 million euros were made available for Tunisia in 2011
and half of this was used to increase the contribution of the EU to economic recovery, whereas the
remaining 10 million euros were made available to help Tunisia address priorities. The focus of 2012
is on employment, justice and civil society. Tunisia has also gained 2 million euros in support through
the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Another 2 million euros have been given through ‘The European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights’ (EIDHR) in support of the electoral process, training
political parties and in supporting freedom of expression and democratic values. Lastly, 3.2 million
euros have been given to finance an election observation mission. These contributions sum up to
nearly 27 million euros (EuropeAid, 2012).
7.3.8 Media
The AP states that there should be “respect for the freedom of association, freedom of expression and
for media pluralism in accordance with the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”
(European Commision, 2005).
The information society within the Southern Mediterranean has been supported by the “Euromed
Information Society” program (European Commission, 2011). Of the Euro Mediterranean program
(MEDA), 3% of the budget from 1995-2005 was used for media and justice matters in order to
modernize the Tunisian society (European Commission, 2007). Besides the “Euromed Information
Society”, “The New Approaches in Telecommunication Policy“ (NATP) has been implemented in order
to liberalize the telecommunications market in the years 2005 to 2008 (ENPI info).
After the Arab Spring, the EU has given more money in order to support freedom of expression.
Through the EIDHR, around 500,000 euros were given to support the media and 249,500 euros were
given to raise democratic awareness through channels, such as the media, in Tunisia (European
Commission, 2011). Tunisia has established a positioning element for taking care of the competition
and ethics in the media. Five new TV channels and twelve new radio channels got a broadcasting
license in 2011 (European Commission, 2012). Furthermore, a new code for the press, printing and
publishing took force in 2011. After the Arab Spring, the EU has further offered training for the
Tunisian journalists within the European Neighborhood Journalism Network (European Commission,
2011).
7.4 Reviews on policy implementations
In 2010, a midterm review on ENP policies in Tunisia was published. This report gave attention to the
need for more sustainable development due to climate changes and a need of more efficient control of
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
migration flows through better education. It also states that tariffs had gone down as an effect of the
agreement and that free trade agreements had been advanced. Interestingly, it proclaimed good sociopolitical developments and gave credits to “a stable regime” while also acknowledging that the
unemployment rates of the country remained an issue of concern (European Commission, 2012).
In March 2012, the newest progress report on the ENP was released. This report naturally gives much
attention to the developments under the Arab Spring and addresses some of the socio-economic
challenges facing Tunisia. The EC expresses a positive attitude towards the democratic developments
and is not reluctant to mention the corrupt and antidemocratic rule of Ben Ali. The focus of the report
is then on democracy promotion and overcoming the challenges of the transition. The report also
states that the EU has doubled its economic support for Tunisia from 80 to 160 million euros in 2011.
If the contribution of humanitarian assistance is considered, total support for 2011 sums up to 240
million euros (EuropeAid, 2012).
In the previous sections, a theoretical framework for understanding the processes of modernization
leading to democratization and for understanding EU-Tunisian integration has been presented. The
latest two chapters have presented empirical data on the socio-economic and political situation in
Tunisia and on the EU-Tunisian partnership and policies. In the next section, theory and empirical data
will be gathered and it will be examined if the theories are useful in explaining the developments of
Tunisia and EU-Tunisian integration. Furthermore, it will be examined whether EU policies have
supported the democratization process of Tunisia.
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
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8. Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the
democratization process of Tunisia?
In this section, the developments in Tunisia will be discussed from a modernization theory perspective
and it will be assessed where Tunisia is in the democratization process. Next, it will be analyzed
whether neo-functionalism can explain EU-Tunisian integration. It will be examined what the strategy
behind EU-policies implies for modernization theory and the democratization process of Tunisia.
Lastly, it will be examined what the actual effect of EU policies has been on the democratization
process of Tunisia.
8.1 Developments in Tunisia seen from a modernization theory perspective
When the Arab Spring began in 2010, Tunisia already had many of the factors that should predict
democratization such as a strong middle class, liberal economic policies, economic growth, education
and cultural and economic openness. Furthermore, resources were not concentrated in the hands of
the rulers, as Tunisia does not have a large amount of natural resources such as oil. The institutional
setting of the regime was not strong either, as it did not have strong military capabilities. Tunisians
further have a high life expectancy age and the fertility rate is low resulting in more women in
education and employment. Nevertheless, Tunisia has just started its democratization process and still
needs to make important transitions in order to become a liberal democracy. In the following section, it
will be examined if the modernization and democratization theory as proposed by Inglehart and
Welzel is sufficient in explaining processes in Tunisia.
It can be wondered why Tunisia did not reach democracy before. The long authoritarian rule may be
explained due to the modernization processes which Borguiba and Ben Ali sought through different
strategies. Since the independence of Tunisia, both of the authoritarian leaders had their ways to
modernize the country. Bourguiba industrialized the Tunisian society and made reforms that
developed the Tunisian educational system. He also emphasized gender equality and changed the
Tunisian economy to be based on open markets. Ben Ali made some changes that gave the country
some aspects of a liberal democracy. For instance, he allowed some private media firms to enter the
market, and changed the economy to be more open for imports. Tunisia became more integrated into
the world economy. Tunisians have also enjoyed relatively high living standards compared with their
neighbors which might have created a support for the regime. Arguably, Tunisians have had a
preference for stability rather than protest. Furthermore, there may have been a fear, not only in the
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
international society but also in Tunisia, that popular support for Islamist parties would turn into
Islamist rule.
Before the Arab Revolutions started, Tunisia had a rather high level of education and access to
information compared to the other countries of the region. Furthermore, almost half of the Tunisian
population was working in the service sector. All of these developments fit quite well together with the
modernization theory of Inglehart and Welzel. The economic reforms have offered growth in income
and different human interactions. Education and communication reforms have increased the personal
resources of people. However, the idea of a service based economy leaves some open questions. The
service sector in Tunisia has not been growing significantly between the years 2006 and 2010 apart
from in the information technology and the telecommunications sector. In this regard, some issues
with the theory of Inglehart and Welzel become apparent, as their theory does not give an answer as to
how big the service sector should be in order to lead to modernization and democratization. It could
also be asked whether the type of service-sector matters in the modernization progress. For instance,
it could be asked if it makes a difference whether the service sector is highly knowledge-based or is a
less demanding one, such as one concentrated on tourism.
If the theory of Inglehart and Welzel, is to explain modernization in Tunisia, one of the most crucial
aspects would be to know whether there has been a value change amongst Tunisians. According to
Inglehart and Welzel, democratization becomes more possible when a value change happens and
people start to put more emphasis on personal choice. However, according to Welzel, social movements
do not emerge only because of growing (personal) resources. There also has to be a common cause
that motivates people to rise to action. In Tunisia, the high youth unemployment, especially amongst
the educated people, was one of the main forces that lead to demonstrations. One could even argue
that from the modernization theory perspective, Ben Ali had accidentally built a powerful opponent in
a game in the shape of highly educated young people, rich in personal resources, who were driven by a
common cause (lack of jobs). According to Inglehart and Welzel the value change tends to happen
amongst younger generations, so it must be expected that a value change among the young
unemployed Tunisians has taken place.
After the Arab revolutions, the Islamic parties have gained rather strong support (The International
Republican Institute (IRI), 2012). Inglehart and Welzel argue that cultural norms do not disappear as
easily as some of the early modernization theorists expected, and this could explain the support for
Islamic parties persistent even after the will for democracy has emerged. However, the close
connection between Tunisia and Europe can possibly explain the rather progressive developments in
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
Tunisia and may support the emergence of more secular values in the future, as countries tend to show
cultural similarities to their former conqueror countries.
Inglehart and Welzel argue that democratization is not dependent on previous experience with
democratic institutions. However, in the case of Tunisia, under Ben Ali, Tunisia gained some aspects of
a liberal democracy, such as an open market economy and some private media institutions besides the
state owned media. It can therefore be questioned if the argument by Dankwart Rustow, which is that
democratic institutions need to be in place, is correct, as the democratization process of Tunisia may
have been spurred by earlier experiences with democratic freedoms.
As a conclusion, it is argued that Tunisia has undergone many of the changes which according to
modernization theory should lead to democracy. Also, it is argued modernization theory can explain
some of the reasons why Tunisia has not yet reached democracy. The support for Islamic parties can be
explained with the persistence of cultural and religious history, and a general lack of security. However,
value changes are difficult to measure, and it is therefore difficult to estimate how far Tunisia is in this
modernization process. Hence, only time will show whether the Tunisians will be able to build an
efficient democracy.
8.2 Can neo-functionalism explain EU-Tunisian integration
In this project, the theory of neo-functionalism and its criticism has been discussed. In the following
part, it will be examined whether neo-functionalism can explain EU-Tunisia integration processes.
Intergovernmentalists would conceivably argue that the neo-functionalist theory is too positive in
explaining EU-Tunisia relations. They would argue that the theory of neo-functionalism
underestimates the power of Tunisia as a nation-state and that EU-Tunisia relations are only created
to lower the transaction cost of cooperation. Ultimately, they would argue, the level of integration
between Tunisia and the EU will depend on a cost-benefit analysis on the part of both parties, and the
will of Tunisia as a nation-state to engage. The ENP itself recognizes that:
The level of ambition of the future relationship will depend on the degree of
commitment of both parties to common values and their capacity to implement
undertakings made (European Commision, 2005).
This statement goes against the tenants of neo-functionalism in saying that the integration process
depends on the level of commitment of both parties and hence also the nation-state.
While it is recognized that the nation-state of Tunisia has a role in deciding how deep a level of
integration it wants to participate in, it will be argued that the role of the nation-state is limited as
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
much of the Tunisian GDP relies on trade with EU countries. As has been seen, trade has increased
considerably alongside the integration with the EU. Ultimately then, it would be harmful for Tunisia to
choose not to deepen the integration. In reality, the choice of the nation-state is therefore near nonexistent. Both the EU and Tunisia benefit from increasing trade relations and a functional spillover
from economic interdependence is evident in the AA as it provides a framework for cooperation.
Therefore, it is in many ways possible to conceive the developments in EU-Tunisia relations in a neofunctionalist perspective as growing trade (and hence economic interdependence) has made it
necessary to create a legal framework of customs, trade barriers etc., creating a functional spillover
effect. Zank notes that Tunisia having a market economy and complying with EU norms and
regulations may be seen as a political conditionality or a functional requirement (Zank, 2010, p. 122).
The political spillover can be seen as interest groups in both Tunisia and in its trade partner countries
have supported a larger degree of supranational decision-making from the EU and this has further
deepened the level of integration. Lastly one could argue to see a cultivated spillover effect in the ENP
as it is a supranational initiative aimed at furthering integration into existing fields while ‘upgrading
common interest’ in a quest of shared values and a respect for human rights. As Zank, we therefore
find that Tunisia and the EU is now at some level of “deep integration” (Zank, 2010, p. 1).
In conclusion, it is found that neo-functionalism has much merit in explaining EU-Tunisia integration.
The criticism offered to the earliest theories of neo-functionalism is recognized and it is argued that
when considering the drivers behind the integration process, it is necessary to acknowledge historical
developments and relations as supplementary drivers or hindrances for integration. In the case of
Tunisia, the strong relationship with France is perceived as a supplementary force in the EU-Tunisia
integration process. Likewise, the authoritarian leadership that Tunisia has been under can be
perceived as having hindered the integration process. The lack of EU membership prospects for
Tunisia is further perceived to hinder a deeper level of integration. Lastly it is argued that if Tunisia
can reach liberal democracy, this can contribute to a strengthening of its relationship with the EU.
8.3 Do EU policies support democratization in Tunisia?
8.3.1 What does the strategy of the EU theoretically imply for the democratization process of
Tunisia
In order to examine whether or not the EU has contributed to the modernization and thence
democratization process of Tunisia, it is necessary to examine whether the policies of the EU have
corresponded with the advocacies of modernization theory. This will be the subject of the following
section.
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia?
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
In the modernization theory as presented by Inglehart and Welzel, it was argued that human
development was the most important force in leading the democratization process. The drivers behind
human development are economic growth (particularly through increasing export oriented strategies),
better access to education and information and increasing human interactions. Their revised
modernization theory further considers value change, specifically a rise in self-expression values, as
particular important for reaching democracy. The driving forces behind a rise in self-expression values
are again economic growth and better education but also advancements in the service sector.
Increasing economic growth for both Tunisia and the EU is among the top priorities in both the AA and
the ENP. The tool that is implemented in this relation, is increasing trade. As mentioned earlier, the EU
aims to advance standards of education. Through the ENP, Tunisian students benefit from EU social
programs aiming at promoting tolerance and interaction across borders. The AA and ENP also call for
cooperation and dialogue in several fields which can all be seen to foster the level of human
interactions. In terms of increasing information, liberalizing the media is also part of the ENP and
programs have been put in place in order to advance the media landscape and promote ethics. It is
evident, therefore, that all of the driving forces behind the concept of human development in the
modernization theory of Inglehart and Welzel are being considered in the AA and in the ENP.
According to Inglehart and Welzel, democratic forces and appeal need to be present before external
influences can trigger democratization. Therefore the EU can only support democratization if the
people of Tunisia value the freedoms that define it. In the case of Tunisia, it is evident that there is a
quest for these values.
Therefore, the strategy of the EU, as presented in the AA, the ENP and in specific policy programs can
be concluded to support the modernization process of Tunisia. Increasing export-oriented strategies
leading to economic growth, advances in high-technological productions and the service sector, a focus
on bettering education and a focus on liberalizing the media are all policies which should support a
value change in Tunisia. Furthermore, geographical spillover effects from EU-Tunisia integration are
considered to support the modernization process. This should all lead to a rise in self-expression
values and a larger middle-class which can eventually press for liberal democracy. However, it must be
noted that the fact that the EU does not offer Tunisia any prospects of EU membership is presumably
weakening the incentives for Tunisia to adhere to policy objectives.
8.3.2 Does theory and practice match up?
The analysis above found that the strategy in EU policies does support the modernization process of
Tunisia. In order to examine more specifically if theory and practice match up, these supposedly
supportive policies of the EU need to be considered.
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia?
29
EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
Increasing access to education and information are important aspects of modernization theory. The
objectives in the ENP and the AP in relation to education were to strengthen people-to-people
contacts, to make education better and to strengthen employability of candidates. However, it is
difficult to say whether the proposals in these documents are being implemented, as the AP, in the end
of the day, is just a plan and specific statistics on the implementation and improvement are difficult to
find. However, attention should be paid to the willingness of the EU to make sure that education is
compatible with the demands of the labor market. The youth in Tunisia are rather highly educated, but
the youth unemployment is over 30% and especially the educated young are unemployed. The PEFESE
program aimed to foster a basis of education more compatible with the labor market. However, the
progress report of May 2012 states that the PEFESE-program has faced some serious problems
because of the Tunisian revolution and the lack of institutional monitoring of the various ministries
involved (European Commission, 2012). Considering the information that is available, it is therefore
very difficult to say whether this program has actually had any effect on improving the situation of
young graduates so far. The Erasmus Mundus, Marie Curie Action and the Youth in Action programs
should increase human interaction and thence human development. However, the number of
Tunisians participating in these programs is rather low considering the population of Tunisia of 10.7
million. As mentioned, only 282 Tunisians participated in the Erasmus Mundus Program from 2007 to
2010. From the modernization perspective, it is nevertheless a positive phenomenon when young
students interact globally, as it increases human interaction. Therefore, it is expected that the effect of
these programs has been positive.
Growth in the service sector is another important aspect of the modernization process. The EU has
supported the Tunisian service sector with 50 million euros in 2008 in order to develop a businessfriendly competitive financial sector (in goods and services) and in order to create jobs. However,
according to African Economic Outlook, there has not been growth in the Tunisian service sector
between the years 2006-2010 in other areas than in information technology and in the
telecommunications sector. African Economic Outlook also predicts that the Tunisian service sector
could grow from 42 to 50% (in GDP) within a few years if the policies were to be restructured. In 2012,
the EU signed a contract of 27 million euros to support programs for civil society and for the
competitiveness in the service sector. The EU reports do not provide clear information about the
effects of the investments and if it is included, it is rather unclear. For instance the progress report only
states that Tunisia continues to rely on growth in the service sectors, especially in the fields of
telecommunications and tourism. The EU has clearly supported the Tunisian service sector, but again
more transparency is needed to estimate the concrete results (European Commission, 2012).
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia?
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
According to the modernization theory, economic growth and increasing export-oriented strategies is
of outmost importance when it comes to enhancing the economic growth which is necessary to create
a larger educated middle-class, which in the end will ease group hostility and push for liberal
democracy. As Tunisia is a net importer from the EU, one could assume that increasing trade would
result in a larger deficit as the net beneficiary of the relationship is presumably the EU. However, the
increased trade has proven beneficiary for both the EU and Tunisia as the Tunisian economy has
grown considerably due to an overall increase in exports. Thus, contrary to initial beliefs, an evaluation
report of implemented EU initiatives in Tunisia from 1996 to 2008 shows that the dismantling of tariffs
has not had a negative effect on the Tunisian economy. In fact, the report shows that even though the
first period from 1995 contributed to an increase in the Tunisian trade deficit, the later period from
2001 to 2008 shows a gradual rebalance of trade with the EU and a significant reduction in this trade
deficit. Moreover, the report shows that EU-Tunisia trade has more than quadrupled in nominal value
since the signing of the AA and the rate of coverage of Tunisian imports by exports has improved from
76.5% in 1995 to 98.2% in 2008 (DRN, 2011, p. 60). However, the economic crisis, beginning in 2008,
has increased the deficit in favor of the EU and time will show whether Tunisia will be able to stop this
latest trend.
The legal protection, which the AA provides, is important to foster a secure trade relationship and the
protection of interests of both parties is governing the trade relations. This has arguably played a
central role in promoting exports from both sides. Considering the crucial importance of the trade
relations with the EU for Tunisia, it is clear that EU policies have had a large effect on stimulating
exports. However, protectionist barriers still hinder Tunisian exports to the European market,
especially within agriculture, as many Tunisian products can not comply with EU standards (Zank,
2010, p. 119). Nevertheless, barriers to trade have been largely removed and legal documents have
been put in place to secure a strong trade relationship. Policies have also contributed to an increase in
standardization and integration into the European Single Market. It has further improved basic
infrastructure facilitating trade and it has spurred privatization and upgraded the quality of
manufactured goods (DRN, 2011, p. 4). The AA and the ENP have worked extensively to promote trade
between the EU and Tunisia. Therefore, the EU has significantly contributed to economic growth in
Tunisia. The trade relationship with the EU has therefore given Tunisians more resources, which
according to Inglehart and Welzel is a key driver of democratization. It also contributes to a value
change as people shift their focus from basic needs to a focus on individual values and human rights.
The trade relation with the EU has also contributed to dialogue and cultural openness, as the country
has needed to cooperate across borders. This, in turn, has increased the attention around the EU and
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia?
31
EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
the wider international society and arguably exposed Tunisians to an insight into how democratic
institutions can function.
Modernization theory ascribes much emphasis to the importance of people feeling secure and
autonomous, as this is one of the main drivers behind a social value change. In the ENP, aims are to
combat crime, advance the judiciary and prison conditions and to advance human rights. While
meeting the priorities put forward in the AP all could be seen to strengthen a sense of security in
Tunisia, it is doubtful how much the EU has actually achieved. The results of ENP policies on combating
economic crimes such as corruption and money laundering have been disappointing (European
Neighborhood Instrument, 2012) (DRN, 2011, p. 54). Furthermore, progress data on many of these
priorities are lacking and it has not been possible to find any figures presenting a budget for security
promotion. Therefore, it seems that financial support from the EU has been nonexistent in this area.
The sense of security in Tunisia is relatively low. However, since the revolution, people have expressed
a higher sense of security and they seem to believe that the new government is able to improve the
situation. The EU has sought to promote the rule of law, to combat corruption and other crimes but we
have not been able to find any evidence of how influential EU policies have been in promoting security.
The analysis gives merits to the argument of Inglehart and Welzel that when people feel insecure they
tend to stick to traditional values such as religion and this could explain the large support for Islamic
leadership. If Tunisia are to move on the path towards a liberal democracy, a greater sense of security
needs to be ensured.
Another important aspect of modernization theory is the rise of self-expression values. Modernization
can change into democratization if the values of the society have changed to value individual freedom
and self-expression instead of traditional values. The role of liberal media can be seen to be connected
to both of these matters. The pressure from the EU policy makers might have been one of the reasons
leading Ben Ali to allow some private media firms to enter the market in 2003. The EU has supported
the information society and the media in Tunisia through the “Euromed Information Society”, the
MEDA programs and the NATP. In 2011, 3.5 million Tunisians had access to Internet. After the Arab
revolutions, the EU gave monetary support to Tunisia in order to support the media and the EU offered
training for the Tunisian journalists. After the Arab revolutions, the media freedom has gotten better
in Tunisia, but it is again difficult to estimate the exact effect of EU policies. The ENP progress report
for Tunisia from 2012 informs about the development in Tunisia. New TV-channels have received
licenses and a new code for the press has been established since the revolutions. However, the report
does not give exact information on where the EU monetary support has been used. Therefore, it can be
said that the EU has had a positive effect on liberalizing the media with its actions, but more
transparency would be needed to estimate concrete results.
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia?
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EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
As mentioned earlier, a range of programs has been put in place to support the democratic transition of
Tunisia. The SPRING program, the EIDHR, the IfS and electoral support have provided financial aid of
27 million euros to support democratic and self-expression values (EuropeAid, 2012). This has meant
that from receiving virtually no democracy aid, Tunisia now receives a significant amount from the EU
to build democratic institutions. While democracy aid has sometimes proven to be counterproductive,
because civil society organizations become donor-driven in the search for international funding, it
seems that democracy aid from the EU has provided necessary technical assistance for the monitoring
and management of the election. Furthermore, the EU has proven itself willing to support the
democratic transition and given flexibility to democracy assisters with no demands of quick qualitative
outputs (Bush, 2012). According to Inglehart and Welzel, the building of democratic institutions is a
natural byproduct of the modernization process as people start to value democratic processes.
Although it is difficult to estimate the concrete results of EU policies, it is found that they have worked
in accordance with many of the advocacies of modernization theory. It is therefore assumed that EU
policies must have had a positive effect on the democratization process of Tunisia.
Analysis: What effect has EU policies had on the democratization process of Tunisia?
33
EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
2012
9. Conclusion
In this project, it has been considered what the effect of EU policies has been on the democratization
process of Tunisia. It was found that the modernization and democratization theories proposed by
Inglehart and Welzel were efficient in examining the socio-economic developments in Tunisia.
However, specific requirements as to how much modernization is needed in order to achieve efficient
democracy is non-existent in the theoretical framework, as no country can be claimed to follow
identical paths due to cultural and historical differences. Tunisia has undergone substantial changes
both socially, politically and economically since its independence in 1956. Tunisia has a high level of
education, a strong middle class, a rather open economy and the political situation is stable in
comparison with its regional neighbors. Tunisians also enjoy rather high living standards. Due to the
close relationship between Tunisia and France and later between Tunisia and the EU, Tunisia has had
higher level of cultural openness than many of its neighbors. All of these trends have supported the
democratization process of Tunisia. However, a lack of sense of security and the cultural and historical
background of Tunisia continues to pose challenges for the democratization process.
Neo-functional theory is able to account for many of the circumstances leading the EU-Tunisia
integration process, due to functional, political and cultivated spillover effects. However, it is argued
that it is necessary to acknowledge historical developments as supplementary drivers or hindrances
for integration. In the case of Tunisia, it was argued that the transition towards democracy could
strengthen EU-Tunisia integration, while the lack of EU membership prospects hinders a very deep
level of integration.
The strategy of EU policies corresponds well with the advocacies of modernization theory. The policy
objectives of the EU is to strengthen education, trade and economic growth, cultural openness and
access to information etc., and these are all objectives, which according to the theoretical framework
of Inglehart and Welzel, should support the democratization process in Tunisia. It was found that
concrete policy results were difficult to measure. Transparency in EU progress reports is lacking and
information is spread in different reports, which made it difficult to gather and estimate the effect of
EU policies on the democratization process in Tunisia. Nevertheless, a positive correlation was found
with progress in economic growth, media liberalization, cultural openness, education and in the
transition towards a service-based economy. Progress in these areas should will lead to increased
modernization and make democratization more likely. Therefore, it was found that even though results
were difficult to estimate, the programs and support given by the EU must be considered to have
supported the modernization and democratization process of Tunisia.
Conclusion
34
EU Policies and Democracy in Tunisia
10.
2012
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