January 20, 2011
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Liberalism
Social Contract Theory
Locke, Liberalims Social Contract and Natural
Law
Locke on Property
Utilitarianism and Intuitionism
Justice as Fairness – general conception
Principles of Justice, Rules of Priority
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John Locke, John Rawls and Robert Nozick are liberal
theorists, they thus present liberal theories of justice.
Liberalism describes a continuum of views ranging from
libertarianism to welfare liberalism.
Liberalism is a political philosophy, it is connected to a
moral outlook and a particular take on justice.
In its common or every day use the term means different
things in different contexts – many in Australia think about
the Liberal Party (the right of our political spectrum), in the
US they often associate liberal outlooks with the Democrat
party, the Left of the political spectrum.
We are using it in a technical sense, it describes a broad
political theory that has been central to mainstream politics
in the US, Britain and Australia since (at least) the
Declaration of Independence.
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Liberalism, as the name implies, is a political view based
around liberty or freedom (N.B. here freedom does not imply metaphysical
freedom but rather liberty).
The good/just society is one that maximises freedom,
unnecessary infringements on liberty are always require
moral justification – political acts have a moral limit.
For many the political negation of freedom is only ever
justified if it is done in the name of a greater freedom
than that which is negated (e.g., hate speech).
Liberalism is also concerned with equality: freedom is
something all are equally entitled to.
There is an intersection between the values of freedom
and equality in liberal philosophy (N.B., Dworkin puts
great emphasis on equality)
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But both values, liberty and equality, can be understood
in different ways:
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Is liberty a freedom from oppression, in which case the state might
have no duty to ensure liberty can be meaningfully used (such as a
society with freedom of press but where the majority of people are
illiterate due to a lack of public education). Or is there a duty for
the state to provide both freedom from oppression and facilitate its
meaningful use (such as a society with both freedom of press and
good public education ensuring the literacy through which people
could meaningfully benefit from it).
What about equality, is this equality of opportunity, establishing
the ground rules for fair competition, without correcting for
disadvantages within the competition or worrying about its
outcomes; or does equality require some consideration, over and
above rules, of the resources the players have at their disposal and
of the way the outcomes impact on the players?
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How can political authority be seen as compatible with
the fundamental value of freedom and equality?
Any legitimate political authority must derive from the
free consent of the governed, such consent is best
understood as being derived from the idea of a contract
or mutual agreement between free and equal
contractors, whereby the governed freely surrender
certain freedoms so as to gain the benefits of mutual
cooperation.
We restrict a volatile natural freedom in the name of a
more stable civil and political freedom.
Political authority is born of the contract, it is the
authority to compel us to do as we have already
rationally agreed we ought to do in order to enjoy a
more stable form of freedom and equality.
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There are two elements to social contract theories:
1. they begin with an account of an ‘initial situation’,
this is a description of a pre-contract situation, this
situation is generally either overtly hostile (such as
with Hobbes) or fraught with various inconveniences
(such as with Locke), these constitute a problem that
will be resolved through a contract. The type of
institutional structures that appear justified will
depend on the features of the initial situation that we
seek to alleviate:
2. social contract theories offer a description of the
contractors which emphasises that these contractors
are: a) self-interested and b) rational. So, we start with
rational and self-interested agents in a position, the
initial situation, that is either hostile or inconvenient.
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a)
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Political authority legitimately curtails freedom
because:
Such curtailment is the product of consent - we
freely agree to it;
It is rationally limited to what is necessary to
alleviate us from the problems of the ‘initial
situation’ and
there is reciprocity between the contractors, no
sacrifices more than their peers and no one
gains any more than their peers.
Thus the coercive authority of the state is just.
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Locke is a liberal thinker whose political theory is
based in social contract theory.
Locke understands political power as the power of
making laws (regulations that limit freedom) and
executing penalties. This is done to preserve the
life, liberty and property of the members of the
polity.
Thus political power is used for the public good.
Locke begins with a conception of an ‘initial
condition’ a pre-contract condition out of which
the ‘social contract’ emerges. Locke terms this the
“state of nature”.
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The earth has been given to all mankind, it is a common
good that, in its untouched state, all of us have an equal
claim on (equality 1).
In this condition there exists a perfect equality (equality 2)
derived from our freedom to do as we please without
reference to the will of any other person (liberty 1) – note
our equality is based in our equal freedom to do what we
please.
We are all equally endowed with reason (equality 3) and
from this we derive the rational understanding not only that
we have a right to life, liberty and property but that we may
not harm our neighbours, we may not deprive them of
liberty nor interfere with their possessions.
Furthermore we understand that we have a right or liberty
to punish (liberty 2) those who transgress our life, liberty or
possessions
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In the state of nature we might be pre-political but we are
not pre-moral – what would the status of law be in such a
state?
Well, if we are positivists we might suggest that without
political authority there can be no law, we might say being
pre-political the state of nature is also pre-legal.
On the other hand, and from the perspective of a natural
lawyer (closer to Locke) we might say that because the
condition is not pre-moral, because we can identify clear
moral imperatives vis-à-vis liberty, life and property, then
there is a natural law in such a condition.
Locke realises that in the state of nature law is a difficult
matter – we can recognise a natural law but how do we
implement it, how do we hold one another to it, who judges
its breach and the penalties for its breach.
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The state of nature is a state of inconvenience: without
an impartial arbiter (magistrate) disputes can never
really be settled and so become a source of social
discord.
This means that our life, liberty and property are never
secure.
Thus we are inclined to form into political societies and
institutional structures with the power to make laws
and settle matters where there is some contestation
over issues of right – particularly as regards life, liberty
and property – in a manner that is fair to both parties.
Our natural rights might be based on moral principles
that are pre-political, but the fair application of those
moral principles requires political institutions.
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The exact nature of Locke’s position in regard to
property is subject to debate. Here I will initially
stick with the general account found in the work of
James Tully.
If, as Locke claims, the earth and all things on it
have been given by God to all equally, then this
would seem to require that all property should be
held in common. Private property seems to deny
equal access to a good that is held in common.
The question is: how does Locke move from the
assertion that the earth is given to all equally to a
justified claim to private property?
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While the earth is given to all in common there is a
certain class of objects that are subject to an exemption
- the rational human being.
Locke argues that “every man has a Property in his
own Person” each human being is a self-proprietor,
they own themselves.
Furthermore each human being not only owns their
body but also, because they own their bodies, they own
the productive capacities of their body (labour).
When a person mixes their productive capacities, or
labour, which they own, with things that are un-owned
(common) these things become their property – e.g.
picking an apple.
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There are some rational limits to this process: I can only
proceed to appropriate nature (the great common) to
myself as properly “at least where there is enough, and as
good left in common for others”.
Robert Nozick rejects Tully’s interpretation of Locke on
property, he rejects the idea that property is had by mixing.
When we mix what we own with what we do not, why
should we think we gain property instead of losing it?
For Nozick this model is not the right way to understand
Locke, the proper understanding or Lockean property must
be based on a “workmanship model.”
We gain property because we transform nature in
accordance with a rational plan. Damaging my property
damages my plan and frustrates my goal.
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Utilitarianism: justice is best served by taking
that course of action which creates the greatest
overall utility or the greatest sum of utility.
Intuitionism: for properly constituted human
beings their intuitions tell them where the
moral good lies.
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“all social primary goods – liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases
of self-respect – are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of
these goods is to the advantage of the least
favoured”.
Has the structure of an imperative
Links justice to fair distribution of social goods
Systematic conception of priorities.
Principle 1: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Principle 2: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both –
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.
Priority rule 1 (The Priority of Liberty): The principles of justice are to be ranked in
lexical order (that is, the first principle takes priority over the second principle) and
therefore liberty can only be restricted for the sake of liberty.
Priority rule 2 (The Priority of Justice Over Efficiency and Welfare): The second
principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of
maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference
principle.