Chapter Nine Human Capital Theory: Applications to Education and Training Created by: Erica Morrill, M.Ed Fanshawe College © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-1 Chapter Focus Factors that determine the market rate of return to education Is education economically worthwhile? Is education a predictor of greater productivity? Market signaling and screening Government-funded training programs © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-2 Human Capital Theory Investments are made to improve productivity and earnings Costs incurred with the expectation of future benefits Benefits must exceed costs by a significant amount © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-3 Costs Direct costs books, tuition Opportunity cost income forgone Private Costs/Social Costs Real Costs/Pecuniary or transfer costs © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-4 Figure 9.1 Alternative Income Streams Earnings Stream C f Stream B e b Stream A c a Direct costs d 16 18 22 © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-5 Age-Earnings Profiles Increase with age but at a decreasing rate Higher for those with more education © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-6 Choosing an Income Stream Simplifying assumptions no direct utility or disutility from education hours of work are fixed income streams associated with education amounts are known individuals can borrow and lend at the real interest rates © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-7 Human Capital Investment Decision Quantity of education Human capital wealth maximizes the net present value of lifetime earnings can be distributed by borrowing and lending Increase education until… present value of benefits of additional year equals present value of additional costs © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-8 Implications of Theory Investment should be made early in one’s life Little incentive for individuals experiencing discontinuity in workforce © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-9 Factors Influencing Education Income tax increase in progressivity of taxes reduce demand for education Student loans alter marginal cost of education and levels of educational attainment © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-10 Optimal Human Capital Investment Expressed in terms of…. Costs and benefits Marginal costs and benefits Rate of return on investment © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-11 Education and Market Equilibrium Interaction between individuals’ preferences employers’ preferences Human capital positively affects productivity of workers © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-12 Figure 9.3 Education and Market Equilibrium UA Wage EA UB I EB I Years of Education © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-13 Education as a Filter Education acts as a signal of the productivity of employees Higher wages are offered if employers believe that education increases productivity © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-14 Figure 9.4 Offered Wage and Signaling Cost Schedules Cost of education C(y) CL(y) Wages W(y) 2 W(y) CH(y) 1 1 y* 2 Education © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-15 Empirical Evidence Education and Earnings Earnings increase with age experience Increase is most rapid to age 45 or 55 for individuals with the most education Differential is wider between groups at ages 45-50 than 20-30 © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-16 Human Capital Earnings Function Estimates the rate of return to education Least-squares regression of earnings on education Controls for other factors that may affect earnings © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-17 Signaling, Screening and Ability Determinants innate difficult to control ability Signaling/screening Private return on education Social return on education © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-18 Addressing Ability Bias Natural experiments isolate the influence of education from unobserved ability factors research on twins compulsory school attendance laws proximity to college findings © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-19 Increased Returns to Education and Inequality Variation of returns to schooling over time Increased returns have coincided with increases in income inequality © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-20 Training Specific Training General Training Skills used in various firms Training useful to the firm that provides the training Firms will offer higher wage Trainee is unwilling to bear for this training the cost because no higher Trainee willing to bear the earnings cost since higher wages Firm does not have to pay offered for these skills higher wages because other firms are not competing for such trainees © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-21 Costs, Benefits and Financing of Training Figure 9.7 a Costs and Benefits of Training Wages VMP VMP* benefits costs Wa=VMPa VMPt 0 training t* Time © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-22 Costs, Benefits and Financing of Training Figure 9.7 b Specific training as a shared investment VMP* Wages VMP Employer’s benefits Employee’s benefits W* Wa=VMPa Employee’s costs Wt Employer’s costs VMPt 0 training t* Time © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-23 Costs, Benefits and Financing of Training Figure 9.7 c Earnings growth with gradual training Wages VMP VMP* Employee’s costs Employer’s benefits Employee’s benefits Wt W* Wa=VMPa Employer’s costs VMP0 0 Time © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-24 Appropriate Role of Government Private markets may not provide socially optimal amounts of training imperfect information regulatory restrictions contract problems Training subsidies to disadvantaged could increase working hours raise wages above the poverty line © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-25 Evaluation of Government Training Programs Difficulties in evaluation no opportunity to observe earnings in the absence of training no control group many variables © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-26 End of Chapter Nine © 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. Chapter 9-27