The Ethics of War”

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”The Ethics of War”
5.forelesning
Summary of discussion
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1)
2)
The Discrimination Principle
Civilians and soldiers have different legal
standing
Do they also have different moral standing?
To alternative answers:
Yes, because soldiers are threats
No, because what matters is whether the
cause is just or unjust
Different approaches
(1)
Symmetry thesis: Moral standing depends
on physical threateningness. Soldiers are
physical threats. Civilians are not. Equality
of soldiers on just and unjust side.
(2)
Asymmetry thesis: Moral standing depends
on (a) collective guilt , or (b) responsiblity.
Soldiers are guilty/responsible for the wars
they fight. No equality of soldiers on just
and unjust side.
Civilians and asymmetry
thesis
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Responsibility doctrine: Threat +
responsibility. Both necessary, neither
sufficient conditions for loss of immunity.
Can maintain civilian immunity on both
sides.
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Guilt doctrine: Threat indication of guilt, guilt
necessary and sufficient condition for loss
of immunity. Cannot maintain civilian
immunity on both sides (with exceptions)
The orthodox/conventionalist
view
1)
2)
3)
4)
it is always wrong to kill the innocent
non-innocence is an upshot of being
‘engaged in harming’
the relevant harming is material, not
culpable
non-innocence implies a loss of
immunity (McMahan 1994).
Paradigmatic case of justified
self-defence
When one is
attacked by
someone who is
culpably
responsible for
creating the
situation of forced
choice between
lives
Self-defence against innocent
threats
According to the conventionalist view:
- Soldiers are innocent threats
- Soldiers have forfeited their right not to
be attacked in virtue of being threats
- Soldiers have a right to kill each other
because they are threats
- How do we justify killing innocent
threats?
Gruppearbeid
Innocent aggressor
A psychotic man comes
towards you with an axe.
Voices in his head tell him that
your are Satan incarnated and
he believes it to be his duty to
annihilate you. He aims at you
with the intention to kill you.
Are you permitted to kill him in
self-defence? Is he permitted
to counter-defend himself
against you? Why/not?
Innocent threat
You are laying on your deck,
sunbathing. A fat man is sitting in
the cliff-top park above your
house. Suddenly he rolls of his
chair and falls toward you. If he
hits you he will crush and you will
die, but by falling on you he will
save his life. Your only chance to
save yourself is to change the
direction of your awning and
deflect him down to the road
where he will die.
Are you permitted to change the
direction of your awning? If the fat
man had a remote control to your
awning, would he be permitted to
use it? Why/not?
Two approaches to selfdefence
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Self-defence as a symmetrical right
Self-defence as an asymmetrical right
Self-defence as symmetrical
right
” When our bodies are violently
attacked with danger to our lives, and
there is no other way of escape, it is
lawful to fight the aggressor, and even
to kill him … we must note that this
right of self-defence derives its origin
primarily from the instinct of selfpreservation, which nature has given to
every creature, and not from the
injustice or misconduct of the
aggressor. Wherefore, even though my
assailant be guiltless, as for instance a
soldier fighting in good faith, or one
who mistakes me for someone else, or
a man frantic with insanity or
sleeplessness (…) in none of these
cases am I deprived of my right of selfdefence… (Hugo Grotius)
Problems with symmetrical
self-defence
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Fails to distinguish between different
types of aggressors
Counter-intuitive results
Doctrine of self-preferment
Leads to a reductio ad absurdum?
Self-defence as an
asymmetrical right
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To have a right of self-defence means
that the aggressor has no right of
counter-defence
Two descriptions must be true:
(1) if Victim does not kill Aggressor,
Aggressor will kill Victim
(2) the attack on Victim is unjust
Self-defence as particular form
of forced choice between lives
(1)
(2)
Demarcates self-defence from other
situations of forced choice between
lives
Demarcates legitimate from
illegitimate self-defensive acts
Intrinsic features of right of
self-defence
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Proportionality
Necessity
Immediacy
Analysing the case of Innocent
Aggressor and Threat
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Two competing interpretations:
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Extended Self-defence Doctrine (ESD)
Narrow Self-Defence Doctrine (NSD)
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Shared assumptions
ESD and NSD
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Aggressor and Threat are non-responsible threats
Aggressor and Threat are morally on a par (no
relevant difference between the cases)
The right of self-defence is asymmetrical = no right
of counter-defence
To have a right of self-defence, the initial attack
must be unjust
An attack on a person A is unjust if..
A has a right not to be killed and has done/is doing
nothing to lose her right not to be attacked
The argument for the Extended
Self-Defence Doctrine
Part I
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I have a right not to be unjustly killed
Fat man has no right to kill me
Therefore, if he kills me, he does so unjustly
Part II
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I have a right of self-defence against unjust threats to my life
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Therefore, I have a right of defence against the Fat Man
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The right og self-defence implies a non-right of counterdefence
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Therefore, the Fat Man has no right of counter-defence
The argument against the
ESD (NSD)
PART I
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To have a right always implies that someone has a correlative duty
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Any violation of a right is at the same time a violation of a duty
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An attack or threat can only be unjust if it is a violation of a duty
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A non-responsible threat cannot violate a duty
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Therefore, the Fat Man cannot threaten me unjustly
PART II
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Any right of self-defence must be response to an unjust threat.
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Fat Man is not an unjust threat
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Therefore, I have no right of self-defence against Fat Man
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Therefore, there is no non-right of counter-defence on the part of the
Fat Man.
Moreover…
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Does the Fat Man case fall under the description ”If A does not kill B, B will kill
A”?
Does the Axe Murderer?
Is ”kill” an appropriate term?
In the sense we can say: ”He got killed by a falling stone” or ”A tiger killed
her”, the term is appropriate.
But stones and tigers cannot violate rights because they are not the subject of
duties.
If Fat Man poses a threat in virtue of being a lethal object merely by being
causally threatening, like the stone….
…and the Axe Murderer poses a threat in virtue of being a lethal object merely
by being causally threatening like the tiger…
.. it may be correct to say they will kill me, but not that they will kill me in a
morally relevant sense..
They will not kill me unjustly because in the circumstances, neither Fat Man
nor Axe Murderer are moral agents
They do not fall under the class of entities who can threaten or kill someone
unjustly
Possible objections to the
common assumption
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Axe murderer acts with intent. Fat Man does
not act at all
Axe Murderer intends to kill me and will
pursue me if I try to run. Fat Man will not.
But Axe Murderer is not responsible for
forming the intent.
If Fat Man uses remote, he ceases to be
non-responsible threat. If Axe murderer
fights back, he does not cease to be
innocent threat.
Justifying intuitions
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I am permitted to move away
(intuitively correct)
I am permitted to change my awning
(???)
I am permitted to use a ray-gun
against the fat man (Nozick’s well
case) (counter-intuitive. To me ).
Moving away
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I have no duty to stay
put because:
I have no duty to
sacrifice myself for Fat
Man
Therefore, I have a
right to move away
Implication: Fat Man
has no right to glue me
to my sun-bed (if he
has a magic wand and
knows the ”petrificus
totalis” spell)
Using a ray-gun
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I am not permitted to use a ray-gun to dissolve the
Fat Man because
Fat Man has done nothing to lose his right to life,
hence I have a duty not to kill him.
To use the ray-gun is the same as killing
(=murdering) him, rather than letting him die (which
I do if I move away)
Therefore I have no right to use the ray-gun
Implication: Fat Man has a right to defend himself
against my ray-gun
Turning the awning
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A matter of killing or letting die?
Is it relevant that I change the direction of
Fat Man’s fall?
Harms should lie where they fall
But if so, why can I move away?
Suggested conclusion: The case is
indeterminate. Neither of us have a right of
defence against the other, and neither has a
duty of self-sacrifice.
A pluralist view of self-defence
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In ordinary self-defence, the permission applies
asymmetrically. That is, in every case where the
attacker is culpably responsible for initiating the
choice between lives, the guilt of the aggressor tips
the balance. Only in these cases can we speak of a
proper right of defence, implying a non-right of
counter-defence.
In cases of innocent threats, the permission applies
symmetrically. No party is justified, merely excused
for defending themselves. Weak permission
Self-defence and war
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How can self-defence apply to war, ad
bellum and in bello?
Depends on whether soldiers are
innocent aggressors or not
And that, in turn, depends on whether
or not they are individually responsible
for the wars they fight.
Oppgaver til neste gang
Oppgave 1: Argumentèr for Nagels påstand:
”If the participation in war X is entirely wrong to
begin with, then that engagement is
incapable of providing a justification for any
measure taken in its pursuit” (Nagel, 123)
Oppgave 2: Argumentèr for Walzer’s påstand
”There is a licence for soldiers, and they
hold it without regard for which side they are
on. They are entitled to kill, not anyone, but
men they know to be victims” (Wars, 36)
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