"When does new science
become a threat?".
The scientific process
problem - experimentation - discovery
The scientific process
problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
The scientific process
problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
Where do …………….. intervene in the
process to identify DURC
Controversial biological publications
• Jackson et al. 2001: Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant
Ectromelia Virus suppresses cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes
Genetic Resistance to Mousepox
• Cello et al. 2002: Chemical synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious
Virus in the Absence of a natural Template
• Tumpey et al. 2005: Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Flu
influenza Pandemic Virus
• Wein et al. 2005: Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of
Botulinim Toxin in Milk
• Herfst et al. 2012: Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus between
Ferrets
• Imai et al, 2012: Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA confers respiratory
Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets
• Xiong et al. 2013: Receptor binding by a ferret-transmissible H5 avian Influenza
Virus
• Bieringer et al. 2013: Experimental Adaptation of Wild-Type Canine Distemper
Virus (CDV) to the Human Entry Receptor CD150
• Zhang et al 2013: H5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes
transmit in Guinea Pigs by Respiratory Droplet
The scientific process
problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
Vanity publishing
Where do …………….. intervene in the
process to identify DURC
The scientific process
problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
Where do …………….. intervene in the
process to identify DURC
The scientific process
Funding
Scientists
Open innovation
problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination - repetition - adoption
Science is a moving target – good science identifies new ground
The pace of change
Introduce
new traits
into an
organism at
the genetic
level
1
Use an
existing
pathway to
make
something
new.
2
Engineer an
organism to
modify to
an existing
pathway
3
Engineer an
organism to do
something
completely
new
4
Engineer a
new functional
organism from
scratch
5
The politics of
20/20 hindsight
The pace of change
Can we prevent access to new sciences: e.g. oligonucleotide synthesis
Interferon gamma
17kDa, 166aa, 498 bp
Code of conduct – what is you want scientists to do differently?
Security culture – responsible conduct
The scientific process
problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
Where do …………….. intervene in the
process to identify DURC
Self policing
Constant vigilance!!
•
•
•
•
•
Provide education – at all levels
Engender a community responsibility
Provide a reporting framework
Provide confidential contacts
Provide a knowledge base
A problem
Categories of Experiments that might be DURC
1. Enhance the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin.
2. Disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of immunization without clinical
and/or agricultural justification.
3. Confer to a biological agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or
agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that
agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies.
4. Increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a
biological agent or toxin.
5. Alter the host range or tropism of biological agent or toxin.
6. Enhance the susceptibility of a host population.
7. Generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or reconstitute an eradicated
or extinct biological agent.
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), USA, 2012;
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html
Emerging Science Makes Security a Moving Threat Beyond the 15
Key Pathogens/7 Core Experiments of Concern – moving target
A problem
No common framework in which to conduct sound risk/benefits
analyses of science:
• In different countries
• In different cultures
• In different communities (e.g. science vs. security)
Therefore probability that too risky experiments yielding too
little benefit will be conducted.
• However, can we apply universal rules?
• Should the restrictions/expectations placed on a 3rd world be
the same as a developed nation?
• Rather do we really need common ethical guidance?
Who provides the solution
Quid est veritas: What is truth
• Convergence of science
• Divergence of scientists
- in interest/expertise
- who is doing the science - including
“the public”
Safety
Risk
Security
Threat
The language
Advise on risk/benefit assessment and risk mitigation
• don´t do it
• do it in another way
Dissemination
• don’t publish it
• publish it with balancing/redacted information
• Advise on supporting structures, e.g.
local/regional ethical review committees
What is the cost of security?
“The biological world is displacing the machine as a general
world of design.”
DARPA – Living Foundries: Large U.S. investment in nextgeneration bio-based manufacturing
Unknown unknowns – horizon scoping and the pace of scientific
development
• Most science develops iteratively and easy to map.
• Some scientists work in a different way and think about where
they want to be and describe the route to get there, real scientific
breakthrough
• Step change is often serendipitous, or is unrecognized at the point
of discovery.
• Nature as a threat – biggest bioterroist.
How good at this are we?
Scientists are good at identifying where science is going in the near future
Horizon scoping 10 years and beyond less reliable – pace of change
Dealing with potential issues in advance ….
Discussion between science, policy and security ….
Identifying a clear and present danger
Coreponsibility …..