FAMOUS QUOTES.
All human actions have one or
more of these seven causes:
chance, nature, compulsions,
habit, reason, passion, desire.
Aristotle
BACK IN THE DAY.
Aristotle,
• one of Plato's greatest students,
• was born in 384 BC.
• Aristotle's father was a physician to the king of
Mecadonia, and when Aristotle was seven years old,
• his father sent him to study at the Academy. He was there
at the beginning as a student, then became a researcher
and finally a teacher.
•
He seemed to adopted and developed Platonic ideas
while there and to have expressed them in dialogue form.
• When Plato died, Plato willed the Academy not to Aristotle,
but to his nephew Speusippus. Aristotle then left Athens
with Xenocrates to go to Assos, in Asia Minor, where he
opened a branch of the Academy. This Academy focused
more on biology than its predecessor that relied on
mathematics.
MORE.
There he met Hermias,
another former student of
Plato, who had become king
of Assos. Aristotle married
Hermias niece, Pythias, who
died ten years later. During
these years in Assos,
Aristotle started to break
away from Platonism and
developed his own ideas.
King Philip of Macedonia
invited Aristotle to the capitol
around 343 BC to tutor his
thirteen-ear-old don, Alexander.
Tutoring Alexander in the
Academy in Assos, Aristotle still
remained the president of the
Academy. In 359 BC,
Alexander's father, King Philip
decided to set off to subdue
the Greek city-states, and left
Alexander in charge, thus
stopping Aristotle's tutoring of
Alexander.
King Philip was then murdered,
in 336 BC, and Alexander then
became king. He mobilized his
father's great army and
subdued some city-states, thus
becoming "Alexander The
Great".
HIS DEATH
In 335 BC, Aristotle returned to Athens. Speusippus had died, but
Aristotle was again not given the presidency of the Academy in
Athens, instead, it was given to one of his colleagues Xenocrates.
So, Aristotle founded his own school this time, it was named the
Lyceum, named after Apollo Lyceus. In 323 BC, twelve years after
founding the Lyceum, Alexander the Great died. In Greece
resentment against the Macedonia hegemony seethed and riots
broke out. Aristotle was accused of impiety, and his life become
in serious jeopardy. So he left Athens, and went to his late
mother's estate at Chalcis on the island of Euboea. He died there
in the next year, 322 BC.
ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION*
Aristotle conceives of ethical theory as a field distinct from the theoretical sciences.
+Its methodology must match its subject matter—good action—and must respect
the fact that in this field many generalizations hold only for the most part. We
study ethics in order to improve our lives, and therefore its principal concern is
the nature of human well-being.
+Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a well-lived
life. Like Plato, he regards the ethical virtues (justice, courage, temperance and
so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills.
+But he rejects Plato's idea that a training in the sciences and metaphysics is a
necessary prerequisite for a full understanding of our good. What we need, in
order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as
friendship, pleasure, virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to
apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through
proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course
of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he
conceives it, cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also
acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that
enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways
that are suitable to each occasion.
PLEASURE (WINK)
Aristotle frequently emphasizes the importance of pleasure to human life
and therefore to his study of how we should live (but his full-scale
examination of the nature and value of pleasure is found in two places:It
is odd that pleasure receives two lengthy treatments; no other topic in
the Ethics is revisited in this way. Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics is
identical to Book VI of the Eudemian Ethics; for unknown reasons, the
editor of the former decided to include within it both the treatment of
pleasure that is unique to that work (X.1-5) and the study that is
common to both treatises (VII.11-14). The two accounts are broadly
similar.
+They agree about the value of pleasure, defend a theory about its nature,
and oppose competing theories. Aristotle holds that a happy life must
include pleasure, and he therefore opposes those who argue that
pleasure is by its nature bad. He insists that there are other pleasures
besides those of the senses, and that the best pleasures are the ones
experienced by virtuous people who have sufficient resources for
excellent activity.
Every activity has a final cause, the good at which it aims, and Aristotle argued that since there cannot be an infinite regress of merely extrinsic goods, there must be a highest good at which all human activity ultimately aims. (Nic. Ethics I 2) This end of human life could be
called happiness (or living well), of course, but what is it really? Neither the ordinary notions of pleasure, wealth, and honor nor the philosophical theory of forms provide an adequate account of this ultimate goal, since even individuals who acquire the material
goods or achieve intellectual knowledge may not be happy.
According to Aristotle, things of any variety have a characteristic function that they are properly used to perform. The good for human beings, then, must essentially involve the entire proper function of human life as a whole, and this must be an activity of the soul that
expresses genuine virtue or excellence. (Nic. Ethics I 7) Thus, human beings should aim at a life in full conformity with their rational natures; for this, the satisfaction of desires and the acquisition of material goods are less important than the achievement of
virtue. A happy person will exhibit a personality appropriately balanced between reasons and desires, with moderation characterizing all. In this sense, at least, "virtue is its own reward." True happiness can therefore be attained only through the cultivation of the
virtues that make a human life complete.
The Nature of Virtue
Ethics is not merely a theoretical study for Aristotle. Unlike any intellectual capacity, virtues of character are dispositions to act in certain ways in response to similar situations, the habits of behaving in a certain way. Thus, good conduct arises from habits that in turn can
only be acquired by repeated action and correction, making ethics an intensely practical discipline.
Each of the virtues is a state of being that naturally seeks its mean {Gk. mesoV [mesos]} relative to us. According to Aristotle, the virtuous habit of action is always an intermediate state between the opposed vi ces of excess and deficiency: too much and too little are always
wrong; the right kind of action always lies in the mean. (Nic. Ethics II 6) Thus, for example:
with respect to acting in the face of danger,
courage {Gk. andreia [andreia]} is a mean between
the excess of rashness and the deficiency of cowardice;
with respect to the enjoyment of pleasures,
temperance {Gk. swfrosunh [sophrosúnê]} is a mean between
the excess of intemperance and the deficiency of insensibility;
with respect to spending money,
generosity is a mean between
the excess of wastefulness and the deficiency of stinginess;
with respect to relations with strangers,
being friendly is a mean between
the excess of being ingratiating and the deficiency of being surly; and
with respect to self-esteem,
magnanimity {Gk. megaloyucia [megalopsychia]} is a mean between
the excess of vanity and the deficiency of pusillanimity.
Notice that the application of this theory of virtue requires a great deal of flexibility: friendliness is closer to its excess than to its deficiency, while few human beings are naturally inclined to undervalue pleasure, so it is not unusual to overlook or ignore one of
the extremes in each of these instances and simply to regard the virtue as the opposite of the other vice. Although the analysis may be complicated or awkward in some instances, the general plan of Aristotle's ethical doctrine is clear: avoid extremes of all sorts
and seek moderation in all things. Not bad advice, surely. Some version of this general approach dominated Western culture fo r many centuries.
Voluntary Action
Because ethics is a practical rather than a theoretical science, Aristotle also gave careful consideration to the aspects of human nature involved in acting and accepting moral responsibility. Moral evaluation of an action presupposes the attribution of responsibility to a human agent. But in certain circumstances, this attribution would not be
appropriate. Responsible action must be undertaken voluntarily, on Aristotle's view, and human actions are involuntary under two distinct conditions: ( Nic. Ethics III 1)
First, actions that are produced by some external force (or, perhaps, under an extreme duress from outside the agent) are tak en involuntarily, and the agent is not responsible for them. Thus, if someone grabs my arm and uses it to strike a third person, I cannot reasonably be blamed (or praised) morally for what my arm has done.
Second, actions performed out of ignorance are also involuntary. Thus, if I swing my arm for exercise and strike the third pa rty who (unbeknownst to me) is standing nearby, then again I cannot be held responsible for having struck that person. Notice tha t the sort of ignorance Aristotle is willing to regard as exculpatory is always of lack of
awareness of relevant particulars. Striking other people while claiming to be ignorant of the moral rule under which it is wr ong to do so would not provide any excuse on his view.
As we'll soon see, decisions to act voluntarily rely upon deliberation about the choice among alternative actions that the in dividual could perform. During the deliberative process, individual actions are evaluated in light of the good, and the best amo ng them is then chosen for implementation. Under these conditions, Aristotle supposed, moral
actions are within our power to perform or avoid; hence, we can reasonably be held responsible for them and their consequence s. Just as with health of the body, virtue of the soul is a habit that can be acquired (at least in part) as the result of our o wn choices.
Deliberate Choice
Although the virtues are habits of acting or dispositions to act in certain ways, Aristotle maintained that these habits are acquired by engaging in proper conduct on specific occasions and that doing so requires thin king about what one does in a specific way. Neither demonstrative knowledge of the sort employed in science nor aesthetic
judgment of the sort applied in crafts are relevant to morality. The understanding {Gk. dianoia [diánoia]} can only explore the nature of origins of things, on Aristotle's view, and wisdom {Gk. sofia [sophía]} can only trace the demonstratable connections among them.
But there is a distinctive mode of thinking that does provide adequately for morality, according to Aristotle: practical inte lligence or prudence {Gk. fronhsiV [phrónêsis]}. This faculty alone comprehends the true character of individual and community welfare and applies its results to the guidance of human action. Acting rightly, then, involves
coordinating our desires with correct thoughts about the correct goals or ends.
This is the function of deliberative reasoning: to consider each of the many actions that are within one's power to perform, considering the extent to which each of them would contribute to the achievement of the appropriate goal or end, making a delibe rate choice to act in the way that best fits that end, and then voluntarily engaging in the
action itself. (Nic. Ethics III 3) Although virtue is different from intelligence, then, the acquisition of virtue relies heavily upon the exercise of that in telligence.
Weakness of the Will
But doing the right thing is not always so simple, even though few people deliberately choose to develop vicious habits. Aristotle sharply disagreed with Socrates's belief that knowing what is right always results in doing it. The great enemy of moral conduct, on Aristotle's view, is precisely the failure to behave well even on those occasions
when one's deliberation has resulted in clear knowledge of what is right.
Incontinent agents suffer from a sort of weakness of the will {Gk. akrasia [akrásia]} that prevents them from carrying out actions in conformity with what they have reasoned. ( Nic. Ethics VII 1) This may appear to be a simple failure of intelligence, Aristotle acknowledged, since the akratic individual seems not to draw the appropriate
connection between the general moral rule and the particular case to which it applies. Somehow, the overwhelming prospect of some great pleasure seems to obscure one's perception of what is truly good. But this difficulty, Aristotle held, need not be fa tal to the achievement of virtue.
Although incontinence is not heroically moral, neither is it truly vicious. Consider the difference between an incontinent pe rson, who knows what is right and aims for it but is sometimes overcome by pleasure, and an intemperate person, who purposefully seeks excessive pleasure. Aristotle argued that the vice of intemperance is incurable
because it destroys the principle of the related virtue, while incontinence is curable because respect for virtue remains. ( Nic. Ethics VII 8) A clumsy archer may get better with practice, while a skilled archer who chooses not to aim for the target will not.
Friendship
In a particularly influential section of the Ethics, Aristotle considered the role of human relationships in general and friendship {Gk. filia [philia]} in particular as a vital element in the good life.
For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.Differentiating between the aims or goals of each, he distinguished three kinds of friendships that we commonly form. ( Nic. Ethics VIII 3) A friendship for pleasure comes into being when two people discover that they have common interest in an activity which the y
can pursue together. Their reciprocal participation in that activity results in greater pleasure for each than either could a chieve by acting alone. Thus, for example, two people who enjoy playing tennis might derive pleasure from playing each other. Su ch a relationship lasts only so long as the pleasure continues.
A friendship grounded on utility, on the other hand, comes into being when two people can benefit in some way by engaging in coordinated activity. In this case, the focus is on what use the two can derive from each other, rather than on any enjoyment th ey might have. Thus, for example, one person might teach another to play tennis for a
fee: the one benefits by learning and the other benefits financially; their relationship is based solely on the mutual utilit y. A relationship of this sort lasts only so long as its utility.
A friendship for the good, however, comes into being when two people engage in common activities solely for the sake of devel oping the overall goodness of the other. Here, neither pleasure nor utility are relevant, but the good is. ( Nic. Ethics VIII 4) Thus, for example, two people with heart disease might play tennis with each other for the
sake of the exercise that contributes to the overall health of both. Since the good is never wholly realized, a friendship of this sort should, in principle, last forever.
Rather conservatively representing his own culture, Aristotle expressed some rather peculiar notions about the likelihood of forming friendships of these distinct varieties among people of different ages and genders. But the general description has some value nevertheless, especially in its focus on reciprocity. Mixed friendships—those in
which one party is seeking one payoff while the other seeks a different one—are inherently unstable and prone to dissatisfaction.
Achieving Happiness
Aristotle rounded off his discussion of ethical living with a more detailed description of the achievement of true happiness. Pleasure is not a good in itself, he argued, since it is by its nature incomplete. But worthwhile activities are often associated with th eir own distinctive pleasures. Hence, we are rightly guided in life by our natural
preference for engaging in pleasant activities rather than in unpleasant ones.
Genuine happiness lies in action that leads to virtue, since this alone provides true value and not just amusement. Thus, Ari stotle held that contemplation is the highest form of moral activity because it is continuous, pleasant, self -sufficient, and complete. (Nic. Ethics X 8) In intellectual activity, human beings most nearly approach divine
blessedness, while realizing all of the genuine human virtues as well.