Plato’s Lysis (Part II)
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VII
Philosophy of Love and Sex
A definition of friendly love?
• “[a] That which is neither good nor evil is a friend to [b] good on
account of [c] an evil to which it [i.e., a] is an enemy, for the sake of
[d] a good to which it is a friend” (219B).
• If the son is sick, and the doctor prescribes wine for the son, the
father (a: neither good nor evil) is friends to the wine (b: good) on
account of sickness (c: an evil), for the sake of health (d: a good).
• Refinement: can omit the evil. Health would be valuable even if
there were no sickness.
• [a] That which is neither good nor evil is a friend to [b] good, for
the sake of [d] a good to which it [i.e., a] is a friend
• Puzzle: This seems to generates an endless regress of goods. A is
a friend to B for the sake of C; A is a friend to C for the sake of D; A
is a friend to D for the sake of E.
• Solution: Eventually we reach a case where good b = good d, and A
is a friend to it for its own sake.
• Some things we are friends with for their own sake. What are these?
Persons? Forms? Happiness?
The ending
• At the end, Socrates explores what it is
that we desire—that which is natural to
human beings.
• He is unsatisfied with his answers.
• The discussion ends with the paradox that
we don’t know what friendship is even
though we think we are friends.
Aristotle
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384BC-322BC
Plato’s most famous student
teacher of Alexander the Great
“Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in
all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now
fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit
much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought to exist
only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also exhibit a
similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for
before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and
others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in
speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the
truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are
only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to
reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore,
should each of our statements be received; for it is the mark of an
educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far
as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand
from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.” (NE I)
Three kinds of friendship
• Friendship (philia) is a kind of love
• Love needs a reason—can’t just love pond
scum unless one finds something loveable
in it
• Three kinds of reasons for loving x:
– x is good (character friendship)
– x may or may not be good, but produces
• an actual good (utility friendship)
• a good feeling (pleasure friendship)
Differences
• In all forms of friendship, we wish the friend well…
• …but for different reasons:
– because the friend benefits us when she is doing well (utility)
– because the friend is more pleasant when she is doing well
(pleasure)
– because the friend’s doing well is good in itself (character)
• In utility and pleasure friendships, the other is fungible
(someone else would do just as well if she was as useful
or pleasant)
• In character friendship, we appreciate the other for who
she is
• It takes virtue to recognize virtue, so only the virtuous
can have character friendships
Permanence
• Which friendship lasts longest?
• Virtue (excellence of character) is lasting.
• Utility and pleasure depends on changing
features of both lover and beloved
“Loving under a description”
• In Aristotle’s theory, in all three cases one
loves under a description
– one loves the other “as good”, or “as useful”,
or “as pleasant”
Exhaustiveness?
• Do all kinds of friendship fall into this?
• What about a friendship between three
Nazis, dedicated to the purity of the Aryan
race? What kind of friendship is it?
Imperfect cases?
• We are not virtuous. Can we have
character friendship?
• Without virtue, can we recognize virtue?
• Maybe it does take virtue to recognize
virtue, but it doesn’t take the same virtue.
• A lazy person can recognize the value of
Thomas Edison’s hard work—but only
because she has some virtues (practical
wisdom — “prudence”?)