Helicopter
Risk Mitigation
International
Association of
Oil and Gas
Producers
Formerly E & P Forum
Presentation to Regional IHST Meeting in New Delhi, 12 June 2006
By Bob Sheffield, representing OGP’s Aviation Subcommittee
Overview
•
•
•
•
•
The current problem and the goal for improvement
What’s been proven already
What remains to achieve the goal
Justifying the necessary risk mitigation measures
Conclusions and summing up
Three Main Points
• The risk of flying in a helicopter is an order of
magnitude greater than in an airliner– we have a
problem
• Helicopter safety can be improved significantly – we
can fix it:
– Proven risk mitigations are available for helicopters.
– We need new helicopters built to the latest design
standards.
• To be effective at lowest possible cost requires a
combined effort from:
–
–
–
–
Regulators
Manufacturers
Operators
Their customers
- we need your help
Oversight and Safety Go Hand In Hand
• The best safety records come from those operations
where either regulatory oversight or corporate care is
highest.
• Corporate care is more expensive and less effective
when the operators serve customers with different
standards.
• If everyone in the industry (manufacturers, operators,
regulators, and their customers) works together to
implement the known, cost-effective solutions, these
risk mitigations will be more effective and less costly.
Oversight and Air Safety Performance
Currently Vary Greatly with
the Type of Operation
•
•
•
•
Fatal Accidents/million hrs
Commercial airline
0.6
Commuter airline
2.0
Offshore helicopter transportation
6.4
Helicopter support for seismic operations
23.0
… and across operators within a given type of operation
While airline safety trends are
improving,
Helicopter safety trends are getting
worse.
GOM Offshore Accident Rate/100K Hours with 3 Year Moving Average
We know we have a problem,
and we are confident that we
know how to fix it.
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Accidents
3 year moving average)
While this chart shows helicopter accident rates for the U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) the same
trend holds worldwide – the rate is getting worse.
Opportunities for Safety Improvements
• The airline industry has made significant improvements in its safety record
over the last 30 yrs through the introduction of:
– Damage tolerant design; system redundancy; improved
reliability/crashworthiness
– Modern flight simulators
– Engine and vibration monitoring systems to identify incipient failures
– Safety Management Systems and Quality Assurance to reduce human
errors
– Flight data monitoring programs (FOQA)
– Disciplined take-off and landing profiles (e.g. stabilised approach)
– EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS
• All of these are available today for helicopter operations and are being
implemented in some parts of the helicopter industry.
• However some helicopter industry segments have adopted few of these
measures.
• We need to apply all these risk reduction measures to all helicopter
operations.
The Helicopter Safety Goal
• OGP Safety Commitment: “The individual risk
per period of flying exposure for an individual
flying on OGP contracted business should be
no greater than on the average global airline.”
• This goal coincides with IHST’s goal of
reducing the current helicopter accident rate by
80%.
• This presentation will show you how this goal
can be achieved.
Overview
•
•
•
•
•
The current problem and the goal for improvement
What’s been proven already
What remains to achieve the goal
Justifying the necessary risk mitigation measures
Conclusions and summing up
Shell Group Fatality Distribution - 1992
40
5 year average
35
1992
30
In 1992, aircraft accidents
were the second most
common cause of Shell
Group fatalities.
25
20
15
10
5
0
Road
Aircraft
Fire /
Exposion
Fall
Falling
Object
Drowning
Other
Crush
Electrical
Assault
Shell Aircraft Responded With:
• Development of safety targets and focussed programme
• Shell Group Standards for Aircraft Operations
–
–
–
–
Aviation Safety Management System (SMS)
Aircraft performance standards
Pilot, maintenance and passenger training
Equipment fit – items that could have prevented half the GoM fatalities since
1992
– Quality-based maintenance
• Approval of aircraft operators and aircraft types
• More than $1.5million on a range of research programmes
– Health & Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS)
– Helicopter Operations Monitoring Program (HOMP)
– Underwater escapability trials that led to Helicopter Underwater Escape
Training (HUET)
– Safety management and safety case concept for aircraft operators
– Mathematical modelling of enhanced Performance Class 2
• Influenced industry and regulatory bodies via
– OGP, UKOOA, EHOC, CAA, FAA, NTSB, FSF/IFA, IAGSA, HAI, HSAC
Resultant Shell Fatal Accident Rate
STRATEGIC
SAFETY TARGETS
Safety System
Support
Research
Industry
Influence
20
Safety Performance
Air Contractors
15.1
13.2
13.7
5 Year Moving Average
11.3
12
16
Standards
Development
Airworthiness - Human
Factors - Secondary Safety
Log. (5 Year Moving Average)
Target
2000
8
5.8
Target
2005
5
4
4
0
0
97-01
2
96-00
4
2.9
4
Target
2008
2
Target '08
01-05
00-04
99-03
98-02
95-99
94-98
93-97
92-96
91-95
90-94
0
Fatal Accident Rate per million flying hrs
Audit/
Advice
Despite this Improvement,
the Industry Trend in 2003 was Unacceptable
• International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (1998 –
2003)
Average
2003
Accident rate (per million flying hrs)
17.8
34.7
Fatal accident rate (per million flying
6.4
11.6
Accidents per year
16.5
33
Fatalities per year
23.7
51
• If the 2003 rate applied to typical major oil company contracts:
– Almost 3 accidents per year
– One fatal accident every 13 months
– Unacceptable
• Cost?
• Concerns?
premiums
Lives; Material; Reputation
Duty of care; Litigation; Corporate liability; Insurance
Shell Aircraft Analysed Accident Data to
Evaluate Potential Risk Mitigations
•
•
•
•
OGP published data on offshore accidents – GOM and Worldwide
NASA/TM – 2000-209579 – US Civil Helicopter Accidents 1963 – 1997
Individual NTSB/AAIB Accident Reports
Annual Business Turbine Accident Review 1993 through 2003 – Breiling
Associates
• Design Reviews
• FAA Final Rules – 14CFR Parts 27 and 29 and associated NPRMs
– Amendments 12 through 47 (Part 29)
– Amendments 11 though 40 (Part 27)
• Type Certificate Data Sheets for offshore helicopters
• Design certification reviews with Sikorsky and Eurocopter specialists on
S76 and AS332
• CAA Paper 2003/1 – Helicopter Tail Rotor Failures
• UKCAA MORs for S76 and AS332
• SINTEF Helicopter Safety Study 2 – Dec 99
OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003 (121 Total)
Fuel Quality
Control
2%
Unknown
2%
Passenger
/HLO
Training &
Control
2%
Pilot
Procedure
50%
Mid Air
5%
Total
Technical
31%
Weather
Related, Not
CFITW
8%
OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003
Technical Related (31% of Total)
Component
Failure
54%
Engine
Related
46%
OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003
Component Failure - Technical Related
Unknown
10%
Main Rotor or
Transmission
Component
Bird Strike,
Damage to
Control Rods
5%
30%
Tail Rotor
Failure
45%
Other
Equipment
Failure
10%
CAA – HUMS Cost Benefit Analysis
CAA Data: Distribution of arisings
Rotor
Brake
Main Rotor
System
Tail Rotor
System
Planetary System
Oil Cooler
Engine to
gearbox
Gearbox
Tail Rotor
Drive
Failure
Evident
Success
• HUMS can detect 69% of mechanical defects in critical rotating parts before failure.
• Identifying incipient failures before they are manifest prevents in-flight failures and
accidents.
Risk Mitigation – Technical Failures
•
•
•
•
Improved design requirements (FAR 27/29)
Quality Assurance (QA) in Maintenance (enhanced Part 135)
Duplicate inspections (Required Inspection Item)
Enhanced training
– Human factors training for maintenance staff
– Flight simulator training/CRM/LOFT pilot training for emergency procedures
• Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring Systems such as
HUMS/VHM/EVMS
• Shell and others in the oil industry have:
–
–
–
–
Funded early development of HUMS in North Sea
Supported research to enhance analysis of HUMS data
Committed to the installation of HUMS/VHM/EVMS systems
Accepted costs of such systems and developed a minimum specification
for HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Recognised the need for minimum system management and serviceability
requirement (FAA AC29-2C MG15, CAP693 + OGP Aircraft Mgmt. Guide)
>10
~2
Technical Failures
Pre and Post
HUMS:
From about
eight per
million flying
hours
to only one
technical
accident cause
in nine years.
HOMP/FOQA Management Process
Flight data
Changes to
Procedures,
Manuals,
Training
etc.
Reporting of
Trend information
to Management
and Staff
HOMP
OPERATOR:
Data Replay,
Analysis and
Verification
Changes to
HOMP,
Investigations
SAFETY OFFICER:
Review Meeting
HOMP
MANAGER
(PILOT):
Assessment
Confidential
Crew Feedback
• 45% to 65% of all accidents involve human error.
• HOMP enables trend analysis and problem identification before they result in accidents.
• HOMP can help assure compliance with standard operating procedures; e.g., take-off
•
and landing profile compliance.
HOMP can help assess training effectiveness and troubleshoot operational problems.
Risk Mitigation – Pilot Human Factors
• Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM
• Improved aircraft performance and disciplined helideck take-off
and landing profiles to standardised helidecks
• Enhanced management controls within a structured safety
management system, including improved helideck management,
adequate weather forecasting and communications
• Defensive aids such as EGPWS (or AVAD) and TCAS
• Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP)
• Shell and others in the oil industry have :
–
–
–
–
–
Funded initial HOMP feasibility studies and development in UK
Deployed HOMP on UK North Sea operations on AS332L and S76A++
Committed to the installation of HOMP systems on contracted helicopters
Accepted the costs of such systems and are developing a minimum specification
Recognised the need for minimum system management and serviceability
requirement (CAP 739 and CAA Papers 2002/02 and 2004/12)
– Strongly endorsed initiatives of the ICAO HTSG to add HOMP to ICAO Annex 6 as
a Recommended Practice for all helicopters equipped with flight data recorders
In Sum - What Have We Learned?
•
Essential Pre-requisites for Safe Operations
– Safety culture supported by Quality and Safety Management systems
•
Equipment fit
– Appropriate to the operation
– HUMS/EGPWS/TCAS and cabin egress modifications
•
Pilot procedures
– Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM, also known as HOMP or FOQA)
– Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM
– Helideck performance profiles
•
Helideck management
– Helicopter Landing Officer and Helideck Assistant training
– Helideck procedures
•
System failure management
– HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Engine monitoring
– Flight Simulator training
•
Human error in maintenance
– Human factors training
– Duplicate inspections/RIIs
– HUMS/VHM/EVMS
•
All these items are addressed in OGP’s Aircraft Management Guide, and will mitigate
risk, but they are unlikely to achieve the long term safety goal.
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
All But The Latest Helicopters
Have Significant Design Gaps
• “Most important issues would be to improve helicopter design and
continuous airworthiness” - SINTEF
• “The evidence that tail rotors were … not meeting the spirit of
airworthiness requirements, was stark and compelling” – UK CAA
• “ ..This means that the helicopter is not considered airworthy without
HUMS installed and in function.” – Norwegian Committee for Review of
Helicopter Safety
• Typical aircraft in common use today - AS-332 Super Puma, Bell 412, and S76 were designed to requirements that are now over 25 years old
• Latest design requirements offer:
–
–
–
–
Improved performance with one engine inoperative
Redundant systems with flaw tolerance
Fail safe designs
Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload, improve situational
awareness, and help cope with emergencies
– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats
Old Cars & Vans
• How many of you are driving vehicles like these with:
–
–
–
–
No seat belts or shoulder harnesses
No anti-skid braking system (ABS)
No airbags
Low power engines with normally aspirated carburettors
• How many companies would use such vehicles to transport their
workers?
Old Helicopters
• Yet many helicopter operations still use aircraft such as B212 and AS350
that were designed in a similar era (1960/70’s) and to equivalent safety
standards.
• Whilst certification standards for new design aircraft have changed, these
models have continued to be built to old certification standards under
“grandfather rights.”
Design Requirements and Airworthiness
• Latest design requirements offer:
– Improved performance with one engine inoperative
– Redundant systems with flaw tolerance
– Fail safe designs
– Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload, improve
situational awareness, and help cope with emergencies
– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats
• FAR29/27 design requirements were reviewed to determine:
– How design requirements have changed over the years
– Potential safety improvements offered
– How far short of the ideal requirements are the helicopters in current use
– What impact this has on the achieved safety record of these types
Type Certification Basis
Model
FAR 27/29 AL
Except
Plus
Date
AS350B
1 - 10
EC155B
1 - 40
S-76A
1 – 11; parts of 12, 13
29.173 Equiv Safety Findings
Jan 79
S-76C+
1 – 11; parts of 12, 13, 24,
26, 30, 34
29.173 Equiv Safety Findings
Apr 91
Bell 212
1 – 2: parts of 3, 12
Oct 70
Bell 412EP
1 – 2; parts of 3, 6, 12, 14, 15,
16, 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32
Oct 94
AS332L/L1
1 – 16
29.397 Rotor brake
AS332L2
1 – 16
29.397 Rotor brake
Oct 77
AL 29-38 (Occupant Protection)
29.952/562/631/561/571/785/
901/903/963/973/975/1305
FAR 29 is now at AL 47
Dec 00
Nov 87
HIRF
30 sec contingency
May 93
Key Design Improvements
• FAR 29.67 Climb: One engine inoperative
Amendment 29-26 (Oct 88)
– New continuous OEI rating
• FAR 29.547/29.917 Main & Tail Rotor Drive System
Amendment 29-40
(Aug 96)
– Design assessment and failure analysis of Rotor/drive system
• FAR 29.571 Fatigue Evaluation of Structure
Amendment 29-28 (Nov 89)
– Tolerance to flaws and damage
• FAR 29.610 Lightning and static electricity protection
Amendment 29-40 (Aug 96)
– Improved protection
• FAR 29.863 Flammable fluid fire protection
Amendment 29-17 (Dec 78)
– New requirements
• FAR 29. 901/903 Engines
Amendment 29-36 (Jan 96)
– Design consideration of effects of uncontained engine rotor burst
– Containment and redundancy of key flight essential systems in the burst zone
• FAR 29.1309 Equipment, Systems and Installations
Amendment 29-24 (Dec 84)
– Safety analysis with consideration of system interactions and multiple failures
• FAR 29.1529 Instructions for continued airworthiness
– Requires substantiation via lightning tests
Amendment 29-20 (Oct 80)
New Types
EC 135
Agusta Bell 139
EC 225
Sikorsky S92
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
To Quantify the Potential Safety Benefit of New Design Types
Together with the Best Operating Practices, Shell Aircraft Focused on
a 2002 NASA Study of Accident Causes for Twin Engine Helicopters
In flight Collision
Loss of Control
Other ops
Loss of Power
Main Rotor
Tail Rotor
Other airframe
Rotor contact -person
.
Misc/other
We used the Dec 2000 NASA study as our baseline for accident causes
Accident Analysis – NASA Data for Generic Twin
0.65
1 Pilot related (in air)
%
In flight collision with object
14.3
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7
Wire
4.3
Other-trees, brush, acft
4.3
Loss of control
14.6
Handling
6.3
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0
System deficiency
2.3
Misc/undetermined
3.0
In flight collision with terrain
5.7
Weather
4.0
On ground/water collision with object
3.3
Hard landing
2.7
Mid air collision
2.0
Rollover/Noseover
1.3
Subtotal %
48.0%
2 Technical
Loss of engine power
13.0
Engine structure
5.0
Fuel system related
5.7
Other
2.3
Airframe component/system 29.5
Main rotor
6.3
Main rotor drive train
4.3
Main rotor control system 3.7
Tail rotor
3.3
Tail rotor drive train
6.3
Tail rotor control system 2.3
Other airframe
3.3
Fire/explosion
1.7
Gear collapsed
2.0
Subtotal %
46.3%
3 Other
Rotor contact -person
Misc/other
Subtotal %
2.7
3.0
5.7
We listed these
causes with all the
detail available.
Risk Mitigation Measures
Assigned Effectiveness of mitigation measures %
DR
Late FAR 29
50%
DR/HQ
Late FAR + HQ
60%
Training - 12 monthly Sim/CRM/LOFT
45%
HUMS
Incl effective mgt
65%
SMS/QA/OC/Helideck Enhanced SMS/QA 55%
HOMP
Incl effective mgt
50%
EGPWS/TCAS
75%
PC1/2e
IW
Incl 1D decks
New design
65%
50%
Key
DR
DR/HQ
Training
HUMS
SMS/QA/OC
HOMP
EGPWS
TCAS
PC1/2e
IW
CRM
LOFT
SMS
Design requirements - late amendt FAR/JAR 29
Handling qualities/advanced cockpit design + late FAR 29
FFS level C/D + CRM + LOFT
Health & Usage Monitoring System
JAR Ops 3 /SMS/QA/CAP 437 helideck management
Helicopter Operational Monitoring Programme
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System
Perf Class 1 or enhanced Perf Class 2
Impact warning system
Crew Resource Management
Line oriented flight training
Safety Management System
As we analysed the accidents, we evaluated risk mitigation measures and a panel of
experts assigned potential effectiveness levels for each of these risk mitigation
measures against the applicable hazards
Mitigation Potential – NASA Data for Generic Twin
1 Pilot related (in air)
%
Level 1
Mitigation
In flight collision with object
14.3
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7
IW
Wire
4.3
EGPWS/TCAS
Other-trees, brush, acft
4.3
EGPWS/TCAS
Loss of control
14.7
Handling
6.3
DR/HQ
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0
Training
System deficiency
2.3
DR
Misc/undetermined
3.0
Training
In flight collision with terrain
5.7
EGPWS/TCAS
Weather
4.0
Training
On ground/water collision with object
3.3
IW
Hard landing
2.7
Training
Mid air collision
2.0
EGPWS/TCAS
Rollover/Noseover
1.3
HOMP
Subtotal %
48.0 %
2 Technical
Loss of engine power
13.0
Engine structure
5.0
Fuel system related
5.7
Other
2.3
Airframe component/system 29.6
Main rotor
6.3
Main rotor drive train
4.3
Main rotor control system 3.7
Tail rotor
3.3
Tail rotor drive train
6.3
Tail rotor control system 2.3
Other airframe
3.3
Fire/explosion
1.7
Gear collapsed
2.0
Subtotal %
46.3
3 Other
Rotor contact -person
Misc/other
Subtotal %
2.7
3.0
5.7
MF1
Level 2
Mitigation
MF2
Level 3
Mitigation
MF3
Overall
MF
0.50
0.75
0.75
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
IW
0.43
0.43
0.43
HOMP
HOMP
Training
0.38
0.38
0.34
Accidents
prevented
%
0.82
4.65
0.91
3.94
0.90
3.92
0.60
0.45
0.50
0.45
0.75
0.45
0.50
0.45
0.75
0.50
HOMP
DR/HQ
HOMP
HOMP
HOMP
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
PC 1/2e
Training
DR/HQ
0.43
0.51
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.55
0.38
0.51
Training
HOMP
Training
PC 1/2e
Training
PC 1/2e
Training
DR/HQ
HOMP
Training
0.34
0.38
0.34
0.49
0.34
0.49
0.34
0.45
0.38
0.34
0.85
0.83
0.81
0.84
0.90
0.84
0.81
0.86
0.90
0.84
0.00
5.37
2.49
1.89
2.51
5.12
3.35
2.70
2.30
1.81
1.11
41.16
DR
PC 1/2e
PC 1/2e
0.50
0.65
0.65
PC 1/2e
DR
DR
0.55
0.43
0.43
HUMS
SMS/QA/OC
HUMS
0.49
0.38
0.49
0.89
0.87
0.90
4.43
4.95
2.09
DR
DR
DR
DR/HQ
DR/HQ
DR/HQ
DR
DR
DR
%
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.50
0.50
0.50
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.43
0.43
0.43
SMS/QA/OC
Training
Training
SMS/QA/OC
Training
Training
Training
Training
Training
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.86
0.85
0.85
0.89
0.88
0.88
0.81
0.81
0.81
5.44
3.69
3.12
2.96
5.58
2.05
2.70
1.34
1.62
38.36
SMS/QA/OC
HOMP
%
0.50
0.50
SMS/QA/OC
Training
0.43
0.38
Training
SMS/QA/OC
0.34
0.38
0.81
0.81
2.16
2.42
4.58
Factor
0.85
Factor
0.75
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures)
Effectiveness of mitigation measures %
Key
Risk mitigation measures applied to accident causes with 3 levels of diminishing efficacy.
84.10
Percentage of Accidents Reported in NASA Study
Preventable by Individual Mitigation Measures
Late FAR 29/Enhanced Handling
FFS Training + CRM/LOFT
Measures
OC/QA/SMS
HUMS/VHM
Seven Key
Initiatives
HOMP/FOQA
Perf Class 1/2e
EGPWS/TCAS
Requires development work
Tail Rotor Impact Warning
0.0
5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
Percentage acidents prevented
We Have Applied the Same
Methodology to Seismic Accidents
• Study looked at 57 reported seismic support accidents 1990 – 2005.
• Data and accident details taken from OGP, Transport Canada & U.S.
NTSB
• Summary:
– 52 single engine accidents (6 fatal)
– 5 twin engine accidents (2 fatal)
• Location:
– USA
44%
– Canada
32%
– S America
19%
– Rest of World
5%
• Seismic accident rate
114 per million flying hrs
• Seismic fatal accident rate
16 per million flying hrs
– For 2000 – 2004 Fatal accident rate 23 per million fly hrs
OGP Seismic Accidents 1990 - 2005
Other
5%
CFIT
2%
Sling Load
16%
Engine Failure
25%
Tail Rotor
5%
Obstacle strike
14%
Pilot Proc
26%
Component
Failure
7%
Mitigation Measures
% Effectiveness of mitigation measures
Radalt/AVAD
0.5
Radar altimeter/Auto voice alerting
DR
0.5
Late FAR 27/29 design certification
2P
0.5
2 pilot operations
EM
0.5
Engine monitoring
VHM
0.6
Vibration Health Monitoring
HOMP
0.5
Helicopter Ops Monitoring Program/HFDM
TR/Training 0.45
Enhanced line training + annual simulator training
OC/QA
0.5
Enhanced Op controls, SMS, QA, site procedures
PC1/2
0.65
Twin engine helicopter
Accident Mitigation Analysis
Overall accident mitigation achieved by applying each of the
Identified measures - 78.6%
Percentage accidents prevented by individual mitigation measures
Rad Alt/Avad
HOMP
VHM
Engine monitoring
Twin engine (PC1/2)
Two pilots
Late FAR27/29
Ops Controls, QA, SMS
Enhanced Training + sim
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Percentage accidents prevented
0.3
0.35
Risk Mitigation Options
OPTION A – Baseline NASA
FAR Part 135/Part 91 Twin Engine – early FAR 29
OPTION B – Typical global offshore (OGP)
Baseline/early FAR 29 + Limited SMS/QA and Ops
Controls + part HUMS + CRM, part simulator, LOFT
OPTION C – New aircraft – early/mid FAR
Option B + full SMS/QA + full HUMS + full simulator
training + Perf Class 2 + HOMP + TCAS/EGPWS
OPTION D - New aircraft - late FAR 29
Option C + enhanced cockpit/HQ + enhanced Perf Class
2/Class 1 + Impact Warning System
Cost assumes no action taken to reduce costs through
efficiencies; e.g., smart procurement, higher utilisation,
sharing etc
25
Accident Rate/million hrs
Fatal Accident Rate
Cost - $million per year (1000 hrs)
7
6
20
5
Variable depending on
procurement, finance and
depreciation policy
15
4
3
10
2
5
1
0
0
A
Baseline
NASA
B
C
D
Typical
New Aircraft New Aircraft
Current OGP early FAR - late FAR
Proving That Risk Reduction Measures
are Justified
• Use the layered defence model in Microsoft Excel as a
predictive tool to calculate the incremental risk reduction
for a given measure.
• Apply the risk reduction in question to the expected
exposure; i.e., number of helicopters, flying hours per
year, and number of passengers per flight.
• Use the incremental cost to calculate the implied cost of
avoiding a fatality (ICAF) and the individual risk of fatality
per annum (IRPA).
• Compare these outcomes to your company’s risk
management guidelines; e.g., maximum ICAF of $50
million, maximum IRPA of 1 in 10,000.
Example: Old vs. New Design
1 Pilot related (in air)
%
Level 1 Mitigation
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th 14.3
o b j ect
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7 IW
Wire
4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Lo ss o f co n tr o l
14.7
Handling
6.3 DR/ HQ
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
System deficiency
2.3 DR
Misc/undetermined
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th ter
in
S/ TCA S
5.7 r aEGPW
W ea th er
4.0 Tr a i n i n g
On g r o u n d / w a ter co l l i si
w i th o b j ect
3.3o n IW
Ha r d l a n d i n g
2.7 Tr a i n i n g
M i d a i r co l l i si o n
2.0 EGPW S/ TCA S
Ro l l o ver / N o seo ver
1.3 HOM P
Subtotal %
MF1
Level 2
Mitigation
MF2
Level 3
Mitigation
MF3
Overall Accidents
MF
prevented
%
0 .0 0
0 .7 5
0 .7 5
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
IW
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
HOM P
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .6 4
0 .9 1
0 .8 3
3 .6 3
3 .9 4
3 .6 1
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .7 5
0 .4 5
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .7 5
0 .5 0
HOM P
DR/ HQ
HOM P
HOM P
HOM P
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
0 .3 8
0 .0 0
Tr a i n i n g
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .6 2
0 .6 6
0 .6 2
0 .6 8
0 .9 0
0 .6 8
0 .6 2
0 .4 5
0 .9 0
0 .6 7
3 .9 2
1 .9 7
1 .4 4
2 .0 5
5 .1 2
2 .7 4
2 .0 6
1 .2 0
1 .8 1
0 .8 9
48.0 %
0 .0 0
34.38
2 Technical
1 Pilot related (in air)
%
Level 1 Mitigation
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th 14.3
o b j ect
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7 IW
Wire
4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Lo ss o f co n tr o l
14.7
Handling
6.3 DR/ HQ
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
System deficiency
2.3 DR
Misc/undetermined
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th ter
in
S/ TCA S
5.7 r aEGPW
W ea th er
4.0 Tr a i n i n g
On g r o u n d / w a ter co l l i si
w i th o b j ect
3.3o n IW
Ha r d l a n d i n g
2.7 Tr a i n i n g
M i d a i r co l l i si o n
2.0 EGPW S/ TCA S
Ro l l o ver / N o seo ver
1.3 HOM P
Subtotal %
MF1
Level 2
Mitigation
MF2
Level 3
Mitigation
MF3
Overall Accidents
MF
prevented
0 .0 0
0 .7 5
0 .7 5
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
IW
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
HOM P
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .6 4
0 .9 1
0 .8 3
3 .6 3
3 .9 4
3 .6 1
0 .6 0
0 .4 5
0 .5 0
0 .4 5
0 .7 5
0 .4 5
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .7 5
0 .5 0
HOM P
DR/ HQ
HOM P
HOM P
HOM P
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
0 .4 3
0 .5 1
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .5 5
0 .3 8
0 .5 1
Tr a i n i n g
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .4 9
0 .3 4
0 .4 9
0 .3 4
0 .4 5
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .8 5
0 .8 3
0 .8 1
0 .8 4
0 .9 0
0 .8 4
0 .6 2
0 .8 6
0 .9 0
0 .8 4
5 .3 7
2 .4 9
1 .8 9
2 .5 1
5 .1 2
3 .3 5
2 .0 6
2 .3 0
1 .8 1
1 .1 1
%
48.0 %
0 .0 0
39.20
2 Technical
Lo ss o f en g i n e p o w er 13.0
Lo ss o f en g i n e p o w er 13.0
DR
Fuel system related
5.7 PC 1 / 2 e
Other
2.3 PC 1 / 2 e
A i r f r a m e co m p o n en t/ sy
stem
29.6
Main rotor
6.3 DR
Main rotor drive train
4.3 DR
Main rotor control system 3.7 DR
Tail rotor
3.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor drive train
6.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ
Other airframe
3.3 DR
Fire/explosion
1.7 DR
Gear collapsed
2.0 DR
Engine structure
5.0
Subtotal %
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
PC 1 / 2 e
DR
DR
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
HUM S
0 .4 9
0 .3 8
0 .4 9
0 .4 9
0 .3 8
0 .4 9
2 .4 4
2 .1 3
1 .1 4
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .7 2
0 .7 0
0 .7 0
0 .7 2
0 .7 0
0 .7 0
0 .6 2
0 .6 2
0 .6 2
4 .5 6
3 .0 5
2 .5 8
2 .4 0
4 .4 5
1 .6 4
2 .0 6
1 .0 3
1 .2 4
46.3 %
27.46
3 Other
DR
PC 1 / 2 e
Other
2.3 PC 1 / 2 e
A i r f r a m e co m p o n en t/ sy
stem
29.6
Main rotor
6.3 DR
Main rotor drive train
4.3 DR
Main rotor control system 3.7 DR
Tail rotor
3.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor drive train
6.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ
Other airframe
3.3 DR
Fire/explosion
1.7 DR
Gear collapsed
2.0 DR
Engine structure
5.0
Fuel system related
5.7
Subtotal %
0 .5 0
0 .6 5
0 .6 5
PC 1 / 2 e
DR
DR
0 .5 5
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
HUM S
0 .4 9
0 .3 8
0 .4 9
0 .8 9
0 .8 7
0 .9 0
4 .4 3
4 .9 5
2 .0 9
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .6 0
0 .6 0
0 .6 0
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .8 6
0 .8 5
0 .8 5
0 .8 9
0 .8 8
0 .8 8
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
5 .4 4
3 .6 9
3 .1 2
2 .9 6
5 .5 8
2 .0 5
2 .7 0
1 .3 4
1 .6 2
46.3 %
38.36
3 Other
SM S/ QA / OC
HOM P
Rotor contact -person
2.7
Misc/other
3.0
Subtotal %
5.7 %
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
0 .4 3
0 .3 8
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
Factor
0.85
Factor
0.75
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
2 .1 6
2 .4 2
4.58
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures)
Expected FAR = 2.35 per
million flying hours
66.43
SM S/ QA / OC
HOM P
Rotor contact -person
2.7
Misc/other
3.0
Subtotal %
5.7 %
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
0 .4 3
0 .3 8
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
Factor
0.85
Factor
0.75
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
2 .1 6
2 .4 2
4.58
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures)
Expected FAR = 1.25 per
million flying hours
82.14
ICAF and IRPA
• ICAF = Incremental Cost per Annum divided by
the Incremental Lives Saved per Annum
– Incremental Lives Saved per Annum = (Incremental
Reduction in Fatal Accident Rate) * (Flying Hours per
Annum) * (Average Number of Occupants) * (Average
Percentage of Occupants Killed in Fatal Accidents)
• IRPA = (Fatal Accident Rate) * (Individual Flying
Hours per Annum) * (Average Percentage of
Occupants Killed in Fatal Accidents)
Overview
•
•
•
•
•
The current problem and the goal for improvement
What’s been proven already
What remains to achieve the goal
Justifying the necessary risk mitigation measures
Conclusions and summing up
How To Achieve the Air Safety Goal
• Customers must commit to the goal and contract for higher standards.
• Manufacturers must support HUMS/VHM/EVMS, the latest design standards
(FAR 29 - 47) and provide affordable solutions for legacy aircraft.
• Operators must adopt proven global best practices as their minimum
standard
• Regulators must support proven global best practices.
• All stakeholders must support these initiatives:
– Transition to new aircraft built to the latest design standards on new contracts.
– Require annual training in flight simulators to practice crew coordination during
emergency procedures.
– Equip all helicopters with Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring Systems such
as HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Require operators to implement quality and safety management systems.
– Require operators to implement HFDM (HOMP).
– Require operators to fly profiles that minimize the risks of engine failure.
– Equip all helicopters with EGPWS or TAWS and TCAS
We have many imperatives to make these
improvements!
• Respect for people – the disparity between helicopter
safety and airline safety
• ALARP – we know what can be done and that the cost
is not disproportionate to the benefits to be gained
• The Ford Pinto story
• The “Red Face” test
• Good business sense – safer operations will attract
more customers.
Here Is The Difference the OGP Can
Make
• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations
– Fatal accident rate – 6.4 per 1 million hrs
– 51 fatal accidents
– 250 fatalities
• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations
– Fatal accident rate – 2.0 per 1 million hrs –
airline
– 18 fatal accidents
helicopters
– 78 fatalities
Average commuter
and North Sea
Lives saved - 172
• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations
– Fatal accident rate – 1.0 per 1 million hrs –
airline*
– 9 fatal accidents
– 39 fatalities
Average global
Lives saved - 211
• Please join the IHST and contribute your knowledge
and data to the process.
• Please “raise the bar” for all helicopter operators.
– Helicopter operators who want to make these
improvements suffer from competition from the low cost
operators who barely meet standards.
• Support IHST goal of reducing helicopter accidents
by 80% and by implementing the risk reduction
measures featured in this presentation.
– Use the process I’ve described to identify the most
effective risk reduction measures for your business.
– Use the quantitative risk assessments tools I’ve described
to justify these measures.
Questions?
Accident Mitigation - Training
• Land support pilots typically receive only 1- 2 hrs training per year, which
includes annual check rides. Minimum regulatory requirements.
• Few companies provide dedicated operational line training (e.g. for long
line, helirig operations).
• Simulator training is very rarely undertaken by land support pilots.
• Most operations are conducted single pilot in complex aircraft.
• The ability of a single pilot to respond successfully to an emergency,
whilst simultaneously conducting vertical lift ops is limited.
• Many emergencies can only be effectively trained for in a simulator.
• Simulators or flight training devices (FTD) are available for most
helicopter types (S76, B212), but not readily available for many of the
numerous light helicopter types (AS350, B206).
• Simulator training should focus on line orientated flight training and crew
resource management/pilot decision making.
Accident Mitigation Operational Controls, SMS, QA.
• An effective safety management system that systematically
identifies and assesses the hazards associated with a
specific operation and identifies controls to manage those
hazards.
• Well defined operational procedures that include the controls
identified above and would include:
– Operational controls to manage pilot fatigue and crew duty hours.
– Oversight of maintenance and control of deferred defects.
– Weather minimums related to the task, including emergency
response.
• A quality assurance program that checks that the controls
are in place and working.
• The implementation of SMS, QA and company procedures at
remote sites is a challenge - what procedures do you have
in place to assure this?
Accident Mitigation Twin Engine
• Engine failures account for 25% of seismic accidents
• Single engine passenger flights should only be flown over
terrain that allows a safe forced landing in the event of an
engine failure.
• Forested areas and mountainous terrain does not allow this,
but is often the environment in which seismic and
geophysical ops take place.
Accident Mitigation Engine and Vibration Health Monitoring
• First generation HUMS has been proven to detect 69% of
mechanical defects in critical rotating parts before failure.
Later generation systems are more effective.
• Engine monitoring systems and HUMS are now available for
all aircraft types and are becoming widely accepted within
the helicopter industry. The more enlightened helicopter
manufacturers are fitting them as standard to new designs.
• However, no seismic, geophysical operators have yet
equipped with HUMS.
• HUMS not only provides a safety benefit, but also delivers
cost savings through pre-emptive maintenance, component
life management and reduced down time.
Accident Mitigation Two Pilot
Other
5%
CFIT
2%
Sling Load
16%
Engine Failure
25%
•Over 56% of the accidents are
directly related to pilot human factor
issues.
•Seismic and geophysical support
operations are pilot intensive, with
Component
Failure
Pilot Proc
short legs and many landings/take
7%
26%
offs or lifts, often into confined
areas.
• Pilot fatigue issues are exacerbated by environmental factors and living
conditions.
Obstacle strike
14%
Tail Rotor
5%
• Monitoring of engine and aircraft instruments is very limited during hi line
and vertical lift ops.
• Emergency require flying of the aircraft and taking immediate actions.
• 2 pilots = 2 sets of eyes + 4 hands + 2 brains.
• Operational impact of the weight penalties of the additional pilot can be
offset by the longer crew duty days.