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Cyclone Nargis & Humanitarian
Intervention
Jenny & Steve
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Storyline
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Introductory video
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Cyclone Nargis & humanitarian intervention
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R2P+ ??
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NGO: an alternative to R2P
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Aung San Suu Kyi @Oxford
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGqlsS6Zseg&feature=relat
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Source: BBC
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From Yangoon to Naypyidaw:
Problems along the story
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Myanmar has been with violation of human rights, ethnic
conflicts since its formation in 1948
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As of 2011, about 800,000 Muslim refugees coming from
Myanmar, most of them reside in borders with Thailand and
in South-east Myanmar
(http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html)
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Under President Thein Sein, Myanmar has improved its
freedom (overall) by at least 4 points
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_ima
ges/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf)
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The release of Aung San Suu Kyi
NLD managed to secure seats at the parliament
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Cyclone Nargis-1
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According to Haacke:
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Myanmar’s junta, no capacity to respond to the humanitarian
disaster
Govt blocking international relief, rejecting the use of foreign
military assets to deliver aids
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Myanmar is the first country within SE Asia that has become a
target for explicit discussion about applying R2P principle.
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R2P:
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Genocide
War crimes
Ethnic cleansing
Crimes against humanity
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Cyclone Nargis-2
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UN Charter Art 39
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Dynamics of the post-cyclone situation and R2P?
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Invocation of the R2P principle and the response to Nargis?
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International reaction towards Nargis and armed conflict?
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Implications and conclusions follow from the Myanmar case in
relation to R2P more generally?
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Cyclone Nargis-3
Myanmar’s malign neglect
Pro-R2P
Anti-R2P
Bernard Couhner
Kevin Rudd
Khalizad (former US
ambassador to the UN)
ASEAN member states
Government of USA
French Foreign Ministry:
Not in the category
Gordon Brown: even
without help, UK will
interfere
Gareth Evans: true essence
of R2P and the suspection
from the junta
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Cyclone Nargis – Diplomatic
solutions 1
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Visas to international staff working for the UN and humanitarian
agencies and granting of access to more remote parts of the delta
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Agreement to receive an emergency assessment team from the
ASEAN
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The hosting of EU Commissioner for Development and
Humanitarian Aid
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WFP using ten helicopters to ferry supplies from warehouse
facilities in Yangon directly to remote locations the delta
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ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Response
mechanism not fully ratified as of 2005, so help has been on
bilateral basis
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ASEAN + ERAT + Govt of Myanmar relief efforts
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Cyclone Nargis – Diplomatic
solution 2
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Singapore Foreign Minister, George Yeo:
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“Many western countries feel that much more should be done
and perhaps it should be forced to them, but I don’t see how
this can be done, because if you try to do that, you make the
situation worse and will only increase the suffering of the
people in Myanmar”
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ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting: open a way
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7th ASEAN Security Summit:
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The responsibility of disaster-hit countries to quickly and
effectively bring humanitarian relief
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Countries concerned should provide entry for humanitarian
relief
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Consent and supervision from the affected countries
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Cyclone Nargis and Ongoing
Problems
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Armed conflict
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Outflow of refugees, ethnic group vs govt
Eastern Myanmar: local govt vs Karen National Union  refugees
in northwest Thailand
 Myanmar: highest IDP rate in SE Asia
In 2006, there was a shared idea of Myanmar potentially being a
stumbling block to the international peace
 1100 political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi), outflow of
refugees (problems with Thailand), drugs, HIV-AIDS and
diseases.
 Objection from Russia, China, Congo and Qatar
 China and Russia argue that Myanmar’s problem is far from
disturbance to the international peace and stability
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Cyclone Nargis and Ongoing
Problems
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Obstacles of applying RtoP to Myanmar
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There is no genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity which disturb international peace and/or stability
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There is no clear picture on problems related to refugees in Northwest Thailand and Eastern Myanmar.
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There is no significant number of victims to be classified as ethnic
cleansing
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Lack of access to eastern Myanmar
China and the UNSC
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Ties between Beijing and Naypidaw
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Russia has always been against the idea of intervention
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Indonesia has been abstain since Jan 2007 draft resolution on
Myanmar  ASEAN does not really agree on intervention
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R2P-Plus?
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Limited applicability of current global demand (particularly
in addressing ‘natural catastrophe’) + suspicion that it could
be a tool of Western neo-imperialists ---- R2P-Plus
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Focuses on preventive aspect of R2P + Removes the capacity
for aggression or armed interference (Omission of reactive
element)
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Responsive pillar (R2P) > Preventive pillar (R2P-Plus)
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“benign preventive pillar”
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Addressing the problem of Natural
catastrophe – R2P-plus
R2P
R2P-Plus
Strictly focuses on mass atrocity
crimes
Concentrate on natural
catastrophes + conflict situations
arguable of lighter scale, covers
situations of human suffering
Possible military intervention
Non-coercive , Non- aggressive
Responsive pillar
Preventive pillar
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ASEAN – Crisis management
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Relative success of ASEAN in crisis management
1.
ASEAN’s involvement in the 1979 Vietnam-Cambodian War
2.
Indonesia’s request for a peacekeeping force led by
ASEAN in the East Timor conflict in 1999
3.
Recent inroads made by ASEAN and the Chinese govt in
persuading the Myanmar junta to allow humanitarian
organizations greater access to the disaster-stricken areas
following Cyclone Nargis
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R2P-Plus for ASEAN: Prospects and
Challenges
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R2P-Plus fits strongly with
strategic interests of ASEAN
states and their traditional
ASEAN way of interaction
which revolves around
diplomacy and minimal
interference in each other’s
domestic affairs
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R2P-Plus within ASEAN
Security community ( to foster
regional integration)
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5 strategic priorities for SC
1.
2.
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Non-coercive methods ->
response to humanitarian
problems + preserve core
national interests of member
states
Political development
Norms-setting
3.
Confict prevention
4.
Conflict resolution
5.
post-conflict peace building
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essential conditions of conflict
prevention – 1. Early warning
Capability
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ASEAN ->utilize the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly (APA)
network
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To establish a regional network of NGOs, think-tanks,
academics -> prevent a crisis from escalating
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Strategic partners : China, South Korea, Australia, India ->
help to develop effective domestic early warning capability
through technical assistance
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2. Preventive Toolbox
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Could be composed of representative form gov. , academia, civil
society and expertise
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Monitoring role (Investigation of specific human rights situations
that could potentially trigger crisis)
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ASEAN envoys could be dispatched to mediate and monitor
under ASEAN Troika
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Goal : to resolve conflicts through regional cooperation if
possible
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Natural catastrophe – Disaster response mechanism ( ASEAN
Emergency Rapid Assessment (ERAT), ASEAN Humanitarian
Task Force, Advisory group, UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Nongovt. organizations
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3. Generating Political Will
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ASEAN and interested parties to convince states and affected state of the need to act
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Strong leadership
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Need to impress upon ASEAN states that ‘security of one’s neighbors impact its own’
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3 most recent crisis in ASEAN
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1. The Saffron Revolution 2. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar 3. Thai-Cambodian border
dispute
: how the national interests of individual states are intertwined with the region and being
shaped by external forces
- ‘regional neighbors will naturally intervene in the affected state’s affairs’ but the question
is “how, when and to what ultimate end those regional interventions will occur” ‘
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Characteristics of ASEAN and
ASEAN Charter
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ASEAN charter (2007) : preserve traditional and
conservative norms and consensus
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HLTF (High Level Task Force)
1.
Composed only of 10 people from ASEAN member states
2.
Only 9-10 months to draft ASEAN Charter
3.
NGOS -> didn’t have access to the draft before it was
presented to and signed by the leaders during the 13th
summit in Singapore
4.
Public : no opportunity to debate the document
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Criticisms
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Fails to put people at the center, much less empowered them
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Lacks role of citizens and civil society organization in
regional community building
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Adopt “ASEAN WAY” : “rule-based organization and remain
just that’s”
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Consensual Decision Making
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Article 20:
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Decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation
and consensus (provide each member state with veto power)
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Consensus is needed in order to make non-consensus
decision and for these to be valid
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No sanctions (not even have provisions for suspension of
members)
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ASEAN’s Traditional consensus
approach
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1. Thai Prime Minister Thanksin Shinawatra’s treat to walk out
of ASEAN Summit in 2005
: If the violence in Southern Thailand was raised
2. Prime Minister of Myanmar’s opposition to the planned
briefing, on the situation after the military junta’s crackdown
against protesting Buddihist monks
 Traditional
norms of state sovereignty and non-interference
- Promotion of R2P difficult
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Regional Human Rights Body
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Myanmar and Vietnam  opposed to the creation of a human
rights body
: Premium on State sovereignty and non-interference
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Compromise : all members agreed to include a second
paragraph under Article 14
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‘operate in accordance the terms of reference to be
determined at a later stage by the foreign ministers
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High Level Panel (HLP) created in July 2008
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What kind of regional human
rights body should be created
Member states with HR
Commission
Member states without HR
commission
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand
Singapore, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, Vietnam
Monitoring and enforcement
capacity
Only an advisory function + focus
on “promotion” rather than
protection of human rights
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NGO: an alternative to R2P?
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Review on the situation in Myanmar
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Human rights violation – no freedom of expression
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Ongoing conflicts, stateless people & refugees
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Poor public health facility
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Governance, democracy and civil society problems
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Economics and livelihoods
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Education – only 1.3% of GDP for this sector
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Why supporting NGOs?
International actor(s)
Interests in Myanmar
Policies Pursued
SPDC Relationship w/
Actor(s)
ASEAN and its member
states
Regionalization;
reputation; counter
China’s influence,
drugs, etc
Constructive
engagement, historical
non-interference
shifting to quiet urging
Provides legitimacy;
Helps SPDC in its desire
to avoid undue
influence of China
UN
Its mandate
Humanitarian aid;
diplomatic engagement
Depends on specific UN
representatives
Japan
Counter China’s
influence
Large amount of
economic assistance
Historically positive
relationship
China
Cheap energy,
geopolitically strategic
Political, economic, and
military support
SPDC’s lifeline,
intervention and UNSC
India
Counter China’s
influence in region;
cheap energy, c
disease/drugs
Economic and military
suppport
SPDC 2nd lifeline, helps
SPDC in its desire to
avoid undue influence
of China
US
Democracy and
freedom promotion
Isolation, sanctions,
withdrawal of aid
Strong suspicion
towards each other
EU
Democracy
Sanctions and
humanitarian aid
Varies depends on
country
Multilateral Institutions
(World Bank, ADB, IMF)
Its mandate
Large amounts of
assistance
Non-existent
relationship
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NGOs in Myanmar – Coordination
in the field
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The importance of strong field-based governance structures
with mechanisms to hold NGO LO staff to account is
underestimated. Where he NGO LO has a responsibility to local
NGOS, governance structures must include them
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Recognising the perceived and actual influence of location,
source of fudning, and language on effectiveness of NGO
coordination
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NGO coordination must regularly consult with and anticipate the
rapidly changing demands of field-based stakeholders
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While a good coordination is necessary … an NGO coordinator
should have experience working with different stakeholders
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NGOs in Myanmar – Coordination
in the field
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Without a commitment to the Principles of Partnership and a
means to evaluate whether or not they are being met, lip
service to endeavouring to build on local capacity remains
just that
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Facilitating LNGO participation in the mainstream
coordination is not necessarily the only or the most effective
way to support local response and/or improve coordination
and collaboration
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A mutual recognition of the role and relationship between
NGO coordination mechanism, HAP and Sphere can result in
the benefits of networking, peer-learning and peerevaluation, and sound technical advice
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What can we do with Myanmar and
NGOs?
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Increase funding levels
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Improving local capacity
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Opening up the humanitarian space
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Improving reliable data
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Changing western donor policies
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Donor harmonization
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Myanmar, UN and ASEAN
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The three actors
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Humanitarian aid should take precedence over political
reform
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ASEAN and UN should be at the forefront of humanitarian
actions in Myanmar
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Efforts to extend the TCG’s operations to other crises in
Myanmar should be, and remain, completely apolitical
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IF!! Intervetion does happen?
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Supreme humanitarian emergency ×
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Last resort ×
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Proportionality ？
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Positive humanitarian outcome ▲
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Humanitarian motives ▲・×
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Humanitarian justification ？
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Legality ×
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Selectivity ？
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Main references
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“Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises: Pushing the Limits of
R2P in SE. Asia” by Caballero – Chang
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“The ASEAN Charter and the Promotion of R2P in SE. Asia:
Challenges and Constraints” by Noel M. Morada
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“Myanmar, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Need for
Practical Assistance” by Jurgen Haacke
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“Working Through Ambiguity: International NGOs in
Myanmar” by Soubhik Ronnie Saha
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Additional references
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Information on Tripartite Core Group: ASEAN-Myanmar-UN
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Information on Cyclone Nargis Chronology
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http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=research/myanmar-cyclone-nargis-timeline
Breakdown of international actors’ interests
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http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AR09.pdf
http://www.aseansec.org/CN-PR-22TCG-PR.pdf
http://unic.un.org/imucms/userfiles/yangon/file/19th_TCG_Press_Release.pdf
http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/brown_elizabeth.pdf
The Case Study 2008-2010: NGOs in Myanmar
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http://www.icva.ch/doc00004598.pdf