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Active Shooter and
Generation Warfare
How to minimize loss of life
as crime and terrorism blend
A Resource for Law Enforcement
Credits
People: Chief Bert DuVernay, Sergeant Michael
Conti, John Giduck, Colonel Thomas Hammes,
LTC Dave Grossman, John Holschen, Captain Al
Sharon, Chuck Remsberg, Chief Richard Fairburn,
Todd Rassa, Lt. Frank Borelli, Paul Howe, Nick
Minzghor, Keith Jones, Sgt. Allan Garcia, Dr.
Laurence Miller
Organizations: PoliceOne.com, LAPD, AIS/Prism,
NTOA, ILEETA, IL SP Academy, NC DOJ
Purpose
The purpose of this resource is to:
– Familiarize law enforcement officers and command staffs about
trends in active shooter/terrorist events
– Help them to understand the nature of emerging threats
– Suggest plans and training that will minimize the loss of life in
these events
This resource is not meant as training in and of itself.
Training for these events is a complex endeavor in which
there is no substitute for hands-on work. There are many
good organizations that can provide such training.
We aren’t trying to tell you how to train and plan, but rather
what to plan and train for.
How to use this resource
There is a lot of information here!
In some cases you may want to use this as a
presentation as it is, but in most cases you
will probably want to use this file as a
resource as you construct your own material
for a specific audience.
Cut, paste and modify slides and the
information on them as you wish.
Part 1
Active shooter as we know it
A review of basic principles and issues
What is an active shooter?
A situation where one or more people are in
the process of causing death or injury or
posing an immediate danger thereof
– Not a hostage situation
– Not a stand off
– Not a barricaded perpetrator
But can transition to one of these
What’s different about it?
•
•
•
•
Danger is immediate
Cannot wait for SWAT
Must act now to save lives
A “come as you are” affair for responders
– Weapons, equipment, skills, mindset, physical
condition
• You have less than a minute to act
• You’re it! This is what they pay you for!
Rapid Deployment response
• The Rapid Deployment (R/D) active shooter
response came out of the Columbine
tragedy
– Pre Columbine, post SWAT: establish
perimeter and call SWAT
– Post Columbine: neutralize the threat
• Theory originally out of LAPD/NTOA
– Many variations on the theme exist today
Active Shooter priority change
Normal LE priorities
1.
2.
3.
4.
Officer safety
Hostage/public safety
Perpetrator apprehension
Perpetrator safety
Active shooter LE priorities
1.
2.
3.
4.
Neutralize perpetrator
Hostage/public safety
Officer safety
Perpetrator safety
Rapid Deployment concept
• Imperative:
– Stop the violence NOW
• Theory of operation:
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Enter structure with minimally safe team
Move quickly to sounds/source of violence
Search only when source of violence unknown
Move past victims and threats (IEDs, etc.)
Engage and neutralize perpetrators
Responding to scene
• Describe situation to dispatch
• Position vehicle to take in information and
communicate with facility authoritypreplan who that is
• Activate ICS
• Wait for more officers?
Ideal situation
• First officer on scene is initial commander
– Has most information
– Directs other responding units
– Hands off command to supervisor
• Entry team(s): 4 officers
– Larger buildings have multiple teams enter different
entrances (note comms issue)
• Rescue team: 4 later-responding officers
• Ad-hoc ICS-commander outside
– Everyone can communicate with each other 
Reality
•
•
•
•
•
It may be you or 2 of you
You can’t wait for ICS or supervisor
Your radio talks to whomever it does
No rescue team
Chaos will reign
Your Job 1 is to neutralize the perpetrator
Moving to structure
• Do not be in tight formation
• Spread out patrol-like
• Utilize cover and leapfrogging
– Do you know how?
• Maintain areas of control with muzzle
• No hard rules
• Form up at breach point
Movement formations
• Most R/D instruction is based on officers moving
through the structure in one or more teams of 4
officers
• Most R/D instruction spends most of its time on
teaching officers to move effectively as a team,
either searching as they go or moving to the sound
of gunfire
• A lot of emotional energy is spent defending one
movement formation vs. another
4 officer movement
• Diamond formation
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Looks cool, military like
Front officer exposed going by doors
Often falls apart at corners
Most everyone moves into a T anyway
• T formation – probably the best of a bad situation
• Long gun ideally at front center and rear
• Team leader
– In center or at wing
– Designates a comms officer
Diamond formation
Direction of travel
= officer
T formation
Direction of travel
= officer
1-2 officer movement
• Fewer officers = more risk
• You go with what you have
• “Formation” is fluid and dependent on
environment
• All officers need to have basic
searching/clearing/movement training…
• Both alone and as part of a team
Principles, not specific tactics
• Use normal building clearing techniques when searching
• Only faster
• Structure movement principles
– Muzzle orientated to general area of danger
– All areas of responsibility (AOR) covered
– Scan areas as you pass them
– ALWAYS with a high or low ready—muzzle not pointed at
innocents!
• T intersections: wings pie both ways; lead pies in direction of travel
• X intersections: make a choice!
• Stairs: normal clears for type
 Emphasis on flow and speed
Room entry principles
• Stack if door open
– Wings enter or wing/point entry
• Door closed: get one PO to try door knob
– Pie through door glass if you cross
• Entry
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Structured: criss-cross vs. button hook
Unstructured: whatever the other officer doesn’t do
Maintain AOR
Drive to corners (often advisable)
Triangulate on suspect
Speed: AVOID FATAL FUNNEL
As you move
• Students/workers will be running past you
– Detain them and gather intel
• Where? How many? Race? Sex? Weapons? Clothing?
• Pass by injured, dead and dying
– Might be your friends, relatives, or even children
• Pass by IEDs
• Sprinklers will be spraying, noises will be loud,
chaos will be everywhere
 Focus on your goal
• Communicate your progress
Contact team
• If bad guys are shooting, you know where they are
– move to them quickly
• Bypass other rooms and areas
• If they are not shooting
A. Use your intel (verbal, visual, radio) to move
quickly to them, or
B. Slow down and do quick entries/searches as you move
• Challenge or engage when you encounter them
• If life not in imminent danger, transition to SWAT
mode
Rescue team
• Follows entry team
– Removes victims (including officers)
– Must be capable of becoming contact team if
perpetrators encountered
• Fire/EMS personnel rescue team issues
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Non-sworn
No tactical skills
No training
Armed?
Not likely to enter an un-secured area anyway
TEMS exceptions
Typical movement mistakes
• Not moving smoothly
• Getting too tense
• Moving too fast; moving too slow
• Failing to communicate with each other
• Every officer trying to command the team
• Moving into each other’s line of fire
• Not maintaining areas of responsibility
• Breaking role
 Training is the key!
Non-active shooter events
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•
•
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Life NOT in imminent danger
Isolate and contain subject
Call in specialized resources
Use the 4Cs:
Contain/Control/Communicate/Call SWAT
Multiple jurisdictional response
Issues to be sorted out AHEAD of time:
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Notification mechanism
Command structure
Communication capability
Legal agreements/MOUs
Tactics commonality
Roles and responsibilities
Joint training exercises
And so on…
To ponder…
1. “In SWAT, making entry is the last
option. In R/D, we’re asking minimally
trained officers to use SWAT’s last option
as their first.”
2. These skills are perishable. Do you have a
policy and schedule for regular training?
3. Do other responding agencies?
R/D largely untested
R/D used but few times. Out of 80 active shooter
events from 1966-2003, 44 had detailed info*:
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Southfield, MI – R/D positive outcome
Williamsport, PA – moot outcome
Bethel, AK – R/D positive outcome
LA, CA – negative outcome – friendly casualties
Spokane, WA – R/D positive outcome (POSA source)
*Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident,
Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003
ISP study* conclusions
• Most incidents over by the time first officers on scene
• Immediate action by on-scene officers most likely to have
positive effect
– But SROs not usually chosen for their “warrior” qualities
• Israel had similar problems
– They arm the population
– They arm the teachers
– Schools are no longer targets
• R/D success chances heightened by rifle
*Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident,
Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003
Since 2003
• Multiple active shooter incidents per year,
including Virginia Tech (VT)
• In most, all killing was done before the first
officers got to the scene
Implications of the data
• Training in Rapid Deployment/Active
Shooter tactics, while necessary, is unlikely
to minimize loss of life
• The most important thing you can do to
save lives is pre-event work with
facilities, so that they take action
immediately to execute their plan (details
later in this resource)
Prepared school staffs the key
courtesy of School Violence Solutions www.schoolviolencesolutions.com
• The truth is the educational staffs can do more to mitigate
the loss of life than the police, due to being on scene when
the shooting starts
• The need for training the educational staff in every school
in how to recognize, react to and prevent active shooter
events is CRITICAL
• Passing out a comprehensive school safety plan to school
staffs is simply not enough preparation/training for an
active shooter event!
• Training EVERY member of the school community is
paramount!
The Rhode Island model
courtesy of School Violence Solutions www.schoolviolencesolutions.com
• Governor’s Statewide Steering Committee formed
• Curricula created to instruct educational staffs
statewide
• Multi-media learning modules are given to
hundreds of educators throughout the state during
six training sessions
• Schools are now mandated to perform lockdown
drills and training. Sanctions apply if not
performed
• Additional training for teachers and staff in
schools continues
Part 2
Active shooter as a terrorist event
Where we’re headed
Crime to
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gen. warfare
• Until now in the U.S., active shooter
incidents have been crimes perpetrated
by individuals for their own purposes
• But future active shooter incidents will
include persons perpetrating 4G and
even 5G warfare
What is 4G warfare?
One definition (there are many):
“The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the
first loyalty of its citizens, and the rise of non-state
entities that command people’s primary loyalty
and that wage war. These entities may be gangs,
religions, races and ethnic groups within races,
localities, tribes, business enterprises,
ideologies—the variety is almost limitless”
William S. Lind
Strategic Defense Initiative
Warfare generations
There are several different schemes that
divide history into generational periods of
warfare, and these schemes often differ in
the characteristics of warfare that they use
to define its generations.
What follows is one popular scheme, provided
for context.
1G to 3G Warfare
• 1st Generation Warfare-up to WWI
– Armies fought attrition-based battles at close range with
individual and squad-level weapons (cannons)
• 2nd Generation Warfare-WWI
– Armies fought attrition-based battles at close range with
large-scale weapons support (chemicals, bombs, etc.)
and mechanized transport (e.g., railroads)
• 3rd Generation Warfare-WWII
– Large-scale maneuvers (e.g. the blitzkrieg)
– Long range weapons targeting enemy infrastructure
th
4
generation warfare
• Carried out by small cells that blend with the
population—not by armies
• Fundamentally a political endeavor
• Seeks to destroy the will of the enemies decision
makers—not to defeat its military
• Examples: Mao, al-Queda; I.R.A.; Sandinistas
• Terrorism is a tactic of, not a synonym for, 4GW
• Co-opting the media is a crucial element of 4GW
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5
generation warfare
There are many different definitions of 5th
generation warfare, but they all agree that
actions undertaken by individuals of their
own initiative will be a salient characteristic
of it.
That is the important attribute of 5GW for our
purposes.
4/5GW and active shooters
• Active shooter tactics are essentially the
same as terrorist tactics: kill a lot of
innocent people indiscriminately
• But a 4/5GW terrorist incident will be better
planned and resourced than a lone (or a
couple of) active shooter(s)
Self-deployment (5G warfare) examples
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•
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MD / VA snipers
LAX / El Al incident on 7-4-02
Richard Reed (the “Shoe Bomber”)
Vehicle attack at UNC-Chapel Hill, 3-3-06
Seattle shootings, 7-28-06
Vehicle attacks in SF-Fremont area,
8-29-06
What to expect?
• Our enemies freely tell us what they are
planning and want to accomplish!
• We have merely to pay attention…
• And come out of denial
– Most public officials have taken a “downplay,
deny and deflect” position
Captured al-Queda tapes
• Produced for internal use, not propaganda
• Included:
– Live-fire room entry
– Live-fire/role-player scenarios
• Any resistance was met with being shot
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Assassination scenarios
Kidnapping training
No presumed compliance from victims
Explosives planting
Prisoner handling: search, control and execution
al-Queda tapes (2)
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Commands given in English
Prisoners begging for their lives in English
Distraction devices preceding entry
Multiple breach points
Targeting LE officers in ambushes using “disabled”
vehicle as ploy, then sounding horn to initiate assault
– Scenarios on 6-lane highways at clover-leafs (to
facilitate exfiltration)
• There are few such highways in the Middle East
al-Queda tapes (3)
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Security/overwatch elements to shoot responding LE
Residential and golf course assassinations
Use of storm drains and sewers for exfiltration
Much practice on assault of buildings with a large
number of occupants, including inconspicuous
movement to entry points (weapons hidden)
– Anyone giving any trouble at all is shot
– Executing hostages in front of the media
– Often no exfiltration plans for buildings – they plan to
kill everyone and die in place
Take-home lesson
While terrorist plans for large-scale events
including WMD are certainly in place…
They are preparing smaller-scale attacks
by small groups with various small arms
and planted explosives in populated
buildings, particularly schools
Why schools?
• Our Values
– The most sacred thing to us are our children
– Killing hundreds of children will boost the terrorist’s
morale and lower ours, leaving us stunned
• Our Lack of Preparation
– Police deal with crime, but school attacks are war acts
– Police are generally not prepared
– Society hasn’t come to grips with terrorism on U.S. soil
Why schools? (2)
• al-Qaeda has said they have the right to kill
millions of American children
• al-Qaeda terrorists have been video-taped
practicing school takeovers and issuing commands
in English
• Some Islamic religious literature condones killing
children if it is done for the “general good”
• Target scouting and infiltration efforts have
already reportedly occurred
School assault model-Beslan
• A dress rehearsal has already taken place in
2004 in Beslan, Russia where 172 children
were killed
• Large buildings with complicated floor
plans are preferred—they are harder to
counter assault
• In Beslan, over 1,000 people were held
hostage by 100 terrorists for three days
without food or water
Beslan (2)
• Started as at least 4 vehicle, 36 person “active
shooter” attack
• Additional 40+ terrorists in crowd
• One police officer, one security officer present,
both armed only with handguns, both killed
immediately
• Secured building in 15 minutes with over 1000
hostages
Beslan (3)
• Terrorist snipers and RPGs were immediately
positioned in strategic locations once the school
was taken
• Terrorists’ weapons included AK-47s, sniper
rifles, rocket propelled grenades and explosives
• Hostages’ cell phones were taken
• Adults and teachers were separated from children
to keep complete control
• Intel spotters were in crowd
Beslan (4)
• Attempts at negotiation by responders were
used by the terrorists to buy time to fortify
the school
• All entrances and many stairwells were
booby trapped with explosives
• Children were used as shields by snipers
• The terrorists used amphetamines to stay
awake
Beslan (5)
• 11 hours of fighting, 8 hours of heavy
fighting
• Women and older children were repeatedly
raped
• Adult males and large boys were made to
help fortify the school, then they were shot
• Over 330 persons killed and over 660
persons injured
Beslan (6)
• When troops stormed the school, troops and
children were gunned down
• Explosions started many fires
• Trip wires connected to explosives slowed the
assault
• Terrorists broke into three groups
– One group attempted to escape by dressing in hostage’s
clothing
– One group attempted to fight off the rescue teams
– One group focused on killing the hostages by shooting
them and detonating explosives
The dead children
Beslan lessons
• Terrorists were well prepared
• Reconnaissance started months in
advance
• Gained tactical superiority quickly
• Excellent tactics were employed
• Terrorists were well trained
Beslan lessons (2)
• Terrorists had effective communication
equipment
• Terrorists were well funded; reports
indicate al-Qaeda funding
• Had learned from prior incidents
– Had gas masks
– Broke out windows to negate gas effects
Schools are real targets
• bin Laden has promised that Beslan will
happen to the U.S. many times over
• First 6 months of 2006 alone: 204 schools
attacked in Afghanistan
• 1984-1994: more than 300 schools attacked
in Turkey
• Floor plans for schools in VA, TX and NJ
have been recovered from terrorists in Iraq
What’s likely here?
• Terrorists striking simultaneously at multiple schools, or:
• a Beslan-type attack with fewer terrorists but better bombs
• Middle schools without a police presence are preferred
– The girls are big enough to rape; the students are not big enough to
fight back; staffed largely by females
• Preferred targets are states that do not allow concealed
carry of firearms, have no hunting culture, and where the
police do not carry rifles
• Rural areas are favored because of the delayed response
time for police to arrive in force
• Schools with external surveillance cameras are preferred so
terrorists can observe the LE response
What’s likely here? (2)
• As they seize the school, the attackers will initially kill
every teacher and many of the students they see
• They will rape, murder and toss the bodies outside, as was
done in Beslan
• They will plant bombs throughout the school, and on
students
• Emergency responders and fleeing children will be blown
up by car bombs in the parking lot
• 100 to 300 children could be killed on the first strike
• The terrorists are likely already here, many having crossed
over the border with Mexico
What’s likely here? (3)
• Fully automatic weapons placed in over-watch positions
• Faux “negotiations” to buy time for fortification and PR
value
• They expect to fight and die there, not negotiate their way
out
• They know that Americans will not assault if
“negotiations” are going well
• Logical SWAT entry points heavily fortified with bombs
• Will force SWAT entry by starting to kill children
Skewed priorities
• U.S. schools extensively guard against fire
– Fire drills
– Sprinkler systems
– Building codes, etc.
• Yet not one child had died from fire in any U.S.
school in over 25 years (excluding dorm fires)
• Well over 200 deaths have occurred by active
shooters in the same period here
– But training and preparation for these events meets with
stiff resistance and denial
Overall response plan
Four elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Deter
Detect
Delay
Destroy
Deter
• An armed police presence in a school is a
strong deterrence against attack
• The terrorists are willing to die, but they
don’t want to die without completing their
tactical objective. They want a high body
count
• Unarmed security in a school is pointless
Detect
• They have to live among us, plan the event and recon the
facility. Alert police officers are essential.
• Follow good patrol procedures on traffic stops:
– Ask probing questions, be alert for contradictions, inconsistencies,
unduly nervous behavior. Be aware of the inside of the vehicle and
the people in it
• Watch for signs of surveillance on potential targets.
Terrorists always conduct recon and may use cameras and
camcorders
• Some terrorists are blue-eyed blonds who may not fit the
usual profile
• Have the school report any inquiries about security
practices. It could be a recon event.
Detect (2)
• In order to avoid failure or embarrassment, they will plan
extensively
– Info gathering (libraries, public records, etc.), recon, dry runs
– For example, in Miami, two Saudi “students” who spoke English
well, climbed onto a school bus and refused to get off. When the
police arrived, they said they thought is was a public transit bus.
They were probably seeing how long it took police to respond.
– Report all suspicious activities to your fusion center
• Beware of groups renting halls/schools, and people
videotaping the interior during the event.
• Most non-police incident intell will come in the form of
gossip and stories
– Make friends with mail carriers, landlords, store clerks, and so on
to receive these intell nuggets
Delay
• One police officer firing from behind effective cover inside
a school may hold off a group of attackers for several
minutes and save lives by buying time for help to arrive
and to let students evacuate
• At the first hint of trouble, the school should engage in a
three step lock-down model
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Lockdown is to violence what fire drills are to fire
Move away from the violence. Don’t be paralyzed by the event.
Move to a pre-selected secure location(s) to wait for police
Move again when in danger. “Lock-down” does not mean hunker
down and die.
Destroy
• Police officers must be fully prepared,
mentally and physically, to aggressively use
deadly force to stop the threat
• Act immediately. Every minute the
Russians waited, the target got harder.
• If you hesitate, people will die
Infrastructure/personal issues
• Officers need to be trained to essentially go to
war—many are not physically, mentally or
emotionally prepared
• Your ICS capabilities incorporating other agencies
will be critical—are you prepared?
• Your comms capability is critical—is it capable?
• Inter-agency plans and roles/responsibilities are
crucial—are they in place?
Where to start?
Getting started - pick ten
• Concentrate on the ten most likely
structures/locations in your jurisdiction or precinct
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Schools
Businesses
Municipal offices
Shopping districts, malls, theatres
Visitor attractions
Outdoor venues: fairs, sporting events, etc
• Assign an officer to be responsible for each
Getting started (2)
• Initiate a relationship with the facilities manager
and top business manager there: CEO, Principal,
etc.
• Develop an active shooter and/or 4/5 Gen takeover
plan with them
• There are many good active shooter plans out
there
– IACP, ASIS, NEA, US Dept. of Education, NASRO, Etc.
– Even Google will return many good plans
• Pick one for a starting point with each of your 10 facilities
– Develop a custom plan for each with the facilities personnel
Stakeholders involved
Involve in planning:
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Primary LE agency
Assisting LE agencies
Fire/EMS
Facility management
Professional societies/organizations
EMS
Hospitals
Crisis resources: Red Cross, etc.
Media—don’t forget them!
Facility planning issues
Once you’ve selected a plan template from an
appropriate source and identified
representatives from each stakeholder
group, you’ll need to develop a specific
plan for each of your “top 10” facilities.
The following slides are examples of issues
that you’ll have to address; this is not an
exhaustive list, but simply examples.
Facility planning issues (2)
• Distribute to appropriate personnel:
– Floor plans
– Keys
– Facility personnel lists and telephone numbers
• Understand which suspects are there
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People with records
Suspicious people you know
Probation involvement
Intel from regional intel task forces
Info shared by other agencies
Info sharing with facility personal department
Facility planning issues (3)
• People don’t just “snap”
• Typical active shooter has longstanding
histories of involvement with legal, mental
health, and/or substance abuse services
• Most of these people will not be murderers,
but they form a pre-event suspect pool
Facility planning issues (4)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Facility personnel rules and regulations
Visitor sign-in and out procedure
How will you know who’s in the building at any time?
Physical security and monitoring
Suspicious activity reporting mechanism
Monitoring of suspended/fired persons
Employee screening: criminal, substance abuse, etc.
Counseling services involvement
Threat identifications and assessments
Facility planning issues (5)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Establish crisis team at each facility
Establish chain of command
Establish communication chains and mechanisms
Who has control over what? Keys, controls, entrances…
Involve maintenance staff: sprinklers, plumbing,
electrical…
Determine evacuation or lockdown decision process and
procedures (address disabled persons, too)
Establish evacuation holding sites – use safe room?
Determine how to take student/employee/visitor inventory
Make up crisis kits: radios, floor plans, student/employee
lists, etc
Facility planning issues (6)
• How will first observers communicate the threat? To
who?
• How will the threat be communicated to everyone in the
facility? Code words?
• Lockdown or evacuate? When? How?
• Consider a kit in each room including color-coded signs
with room numbers on them to post under hallway door
and outside windows (e.g., red sign means help needed,
green sign means no one hurt)
• Each room should have 2 exits, even if a window
Facility planning issues (7)
• How/when will the facility communicate to family
members of people involved? When?
• Should all doors have locks on them?
• Have busses respond to evacuate students/building
occupants to a reunification/debriefing/counseling
area
• Plan to shut down streets for emergency vehicle
access
Lockdown vs. Escape
• Currently, a lockdown is often advocated in
an active shooter situation. That is, secure
the potential victims in a locked room(s).
But if it was you or your child, wouldn’t
you want (them) to break a window and get
out of the potential kill zone?
• Consider evacuation and escape as
alternatives to lockdown
LE recommendations-officers
• Obtain patrol rifles, ballistic shields, ballistic helmets and
other tactical gear
• Get every officer comfortable with a rifle
• Learn how to use AK-47 type weapons
• Train to shoot while moving
• Train officers in
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Bomb awareness
Basic crowd management
Basic riot control
Ballistic shield tactics
Team firing drills,
And other response skills needed for a mass school takedown
LE recommendations-officers (2)
• Make sure every officer is familiar with all of the
likely target structure’s interiors in their
jurisdiction/precinct
• If you are a police parent, consider changing your
personal data at the school to something more
generic (city employee versus police officer) so
that your child won’t be as valuable a hostage
• Encourage all police officers to always carry a weapon
off duty. What if you were off duty visiting your
child’s school and you were the only one there to save
them?
Individual officer response bag
• Police officers should have a response bag for these events
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Multiple spare rifle and pistol magazines
Floor plans for every structure in their AOR
Locations of utility shut-offs, HVAC vents, etc.
Facility contact numbers, including cell phones
Keys
Self-rescue medical supplies
Chemlites to mark IEDs
Glass punch (to breach building)
Door wedges
Breaching rounds if shotgun carried in cruiser
• Can be incorporated into a vest with extra ballistic
protection
LE recommendations-agency
• Expand active shooter training to include large,
complicated, multi-adversary scenarios and exercises with
multiple responding agencies
• Train for open-air encounters, not just within a structure.
The incident may transition to or include the outdoors.
• Practice against a booby trapped environment
• Practice counter-assault on school buses. Terrorists may
hijack several buses and drive them to a school
• School Resource Officers will be specifically targeted by
terrorists. They will probably be the first casualties. SROs
need training in surveillance awareness and the real-life
testing tactics of terrorists.
LE recommendations-agency (2)
• Incorporate suicide-bomber shooting drills
into firearms training for every police
officer
• Teach effective CQB skills that integrate
empty-hands techniques with the firearm
• Make sure that who makes the “enter”
decision and when has been addressed,
simulated and trained
LE recommendations-agency (3)
• Get the name and phone number of every private
helicopter in your area and coordinate with them
ahead of time to deploy in an emergency. News
helicopters can be great allies when transporting
troops into a siege site in exchange for news footage.
Practice landing personnel on flat roofs.
• Practice frequent incident command training and
exercises using multiple jurisdictions and multiple
disciplines (EMS, Fire, Police, Public Works, etc)
LE recommendations-agency (4)
• Integrate the fire service into your tactical training.
A fire hose can be a “crew-served weapon” at the
scene of a terrorist attack. They not only put out
fires but they can knock a combatant out of a
window 50 yards away.
• Have a policy for officer parents of hostage
children/spouse/etc.
• Have a plan for a “parent siege” of an attacked
school
• Have a plan for handling the media
LE recommendations-agency (5)
• Develop breaching capability
– Barricading/securing facility prior to starting to kill people is a
trend with recent shootings
– VT shooter chained doors shut
• White lights for weapons are necessary; facility may be
dark
• Shotgun breaching rounds in each cruiser
– Frangible buckshot or slugs
– Other breaching capability for specific structures
• Develop sniper capability, and ability to get several on
scene fast
• Plan for a siege: ammo, water, first aid, etc.
LE recommendations-aftermath
Include immediate aftermath planning and training:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Treating injured
Consolidating victims
Managing the scene
Training facility personnel to maintain crime scene
Managing any prisoners
Protecting/moving all from additional IEDs and other
threats
• Notifying victim’s families
EMS issues
• EMS won’t enter an area until it’s secure
• After you neutralize the shooter, it will still take a
long time to secure the facility
• Designate a causality collection point to bring
casualties out to
• Use uninjured subjects (victims, bystanders, etc.)
to hold pressure on bleeding victims
If you are captured
• Aggressively escape if you can
• You will be killed immediately if you
don’t
• You will be killed eventually anyway
• The intelligence you provide will be
invaluable
Final thought
“If not me, who?”
That’s the motto of the Russian Special
Forces, but it applies to every police officer,
and by extension to every public safety
official and government executive.
Required Reading
• Terror at Beslan, John Giduck
– www.terroratbeslan.com
• The Sling and The Stone, Col Thomas
X. Hammes
Resources
• Prevention and Response To Suicide Bombing Incidents, New Mexico
Tech, Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center,
www.emrtc.nmt.edu/
• Many incident critical event/active shooter simulation software
packages available
• Rural Law Enforcement Technology Center—several training
DVDs/discs, www.nlectc.org/ruletc/
• Terrorist Screening Center—information on using the nationwide
database of terrorist watch subjects—(866) 872-5678
• School Violence Solutions, www.schoolviolencesolutions.com
• National Terrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/site/index.html