Instituições Políticas
Aula 10
Ciência Política
AE
Topics
1) Definition of Presidential Institutions and
Separation of Powers
2) Political Theory and Separation of
Powers
3) Presidential Institutions and Liberalism vs
Democracy
4) Governo Dividido
5) Processo Decisorio e Democracia
Introduction
New Institutionalism
• Economics: Douglas North Nobel Prize
(1990)
• Political Science:
March & Olsen, “On Organizational Factors
in Political Life” (1989)
Linz & Valenzuela: Parliamentary
Government in Latin America ?
Definitions of Presidential and
Parliamentary Government
• Linz/Lijphart/Powell: Presidential
Government = “Direct Election of
Executive”
• Mettenheim (Horowitz/Jones/Mayhew):
“Separate election of executive and
legislature for fixed terms”
(minimal vs descriptive definitions)
Why?
• Definition 1 = residual category (parliamentary
vs all other)
• Definition 2 = separation of powers vs
Fujimori/Chaves/De Gaulle…
• Correlations, Parliamentary Govt + ….
• Spurious (income, history, region, context)
2 Biases
1) Liberal Reformism
Burke, Hobbes, Huntington, Linz:
Concentrate Power = Governability
Representative Government vs
Direct Democracy/Social Pressure
2) Euro-Centrism
Parliamentary Government, Stability vs
Underdevelopment/Instability/New World
Separation of Powers?
• Political Theory (mixed
constitution,Montesquieu, Locke,
Federalists…)
• VS Burke/Linz/Hobbes: Concentrate Power
to Increase Governability =
• Vote  MP  Law  Bureaucracy
Burke: “Address to Electors of Bristol”
Processo Decisório Contínuo
sob Separação dos Poderes
ONG’s
EXECUTIVO
SOCIEDADE
 MEDIA
MUNICÍPIOS
ESTADOS
JUDICIARIO
LEGISLATIVO
Political Institutions and
Social Mobilization
Political
Institutions
Popular
Middle
Praetorian
Oligarchy
1889
1930
Oligarchy
Social Mobilization 
1964
Middle Class
1985-2004
Popular Classes
Separação dos Poderes e
Democracia vs Liberalismo
• Europa: 18th C = Monarchy vs Oligarch
• 19th C + Liberalism = Representative
Government vs
• Direct Democracy via
• Corporatism, Populism, Direct Appeals
Presidential Institutions Institutionalize
Tension: Direct Democracy vs Representative
Government
Divided Government
Jones, Separated System (1994)
Mayhew, Divided We Govern (1989)
US Presidents 1945-1990 w/o majority >
US Presidents with majority in congress
WHY?
“Fast Track” vs Party Discipline ? (vote of
confidence)
Weber dizia:
(Politica como Vocação):
• Presidential Institutions Democratize
faster, because
• Head of government directly elected
• Free to nominate partisans to bureaucracy
• Outsiders gain power
• Party Machines of Immigrants “realign”
Institutional Variation in
Democracies
Party-system
Electoral system
Legislature
Government
Central Gov.
Courts
Local Gov.
Civil Service
Armed forces
State-market
Two-party
Proportional
Unicameral
Unitary
Parliament
Review
Weak
Spoils
Professional
Liberal
vs. Multi-party
vs. District
vs. Bicameral
vs. Federalist
vs. Presidentialism
vs. Preview
vs. Strong autonomy
vs. Merit
vs. Conscription
vs. Corporatist
Source: Bo Rothstein “Political Institutions: An Overview.” in Goodin,
Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds). A New Handbook of
Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
Brazil
Debate =
Pro-Parliamentary :
• FHC, Serra, Lamounier,
• Stepan, Mainwaring,
Pro-Presidential :
• Andrade, Moises, Mettenheim
Brazil
Reality defines debate
1) 1992-1993 Impeachment of Collor (fixed
terms, minority president, gridlock &
paralysis)
2) 1993 April Plebiscite on Form of
Government
Presidential > Parliamentary
Abranches 1988: “Presidencialismo de
Coalizao”
Questions about institutions
• Which institutions are best suited for
creating "good" government and societal
relations.
• What explains the enormous variation in
institutional arrangements?
• What impact differences have on political
behavior, political power and the outcome
of the political process?
Regional and National Context
Parliamentary Government E. Europe?
Communist Parliaments = 5000 Deputies
Brazil:
Assis Brasil, Codigo Eleitoral 1932
Proportional Representation Legislature
Direct Elections, 2nd Round, Executive
Transitions from Military Rule 
Deepening Democracy
“Modernization & Bureaucratic Authoritarianism”
Guillermo O´Donnell 1973 Yale Dissertation…
* Negative Correlation (“U”): GDP  Military Rule
Then: “Transitions” i.e. Peaceful Regime Change !!!
Argentina via Falklands War (1982)
Chile via Plebiscite (1989)
Uruguay via Plebiscite (1989)
Brazil via protracted cat-mouse game between:
Military-Opposition (1989)
Like Spain/Portugal/Greece in 1970s & USSR 1990s
From Consolidation to Deepening
1) Linz & Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation
1992
“Two change rule” if 2X gov´t change, then democracy
(But G. Almond & P. Converse said Japan & Germany would need 3
generations 1945+)
(Colombia & Venezuela = most consolidated?)
2) O’Donnell “Illusions about Consolidation” 1996
Democracy in global South/East: Norm? Ideal? Comparative
benchmark? Party systems? Parliament? Advanced economies?
Historical Evolution? 
Need New Empirical Studies/Concepts/Theories…
3) Mettenheim & Malloy: Deepening Democracy in Latin America,
1998:
Social Exclusion & Electoral Behavior,
Policy Process & Democracy,
Presidentialism = false problem
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about
Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy,
1996
Biases = Euro Centrism & Liberal Reformism
(Euro ideal benchmark / ignores unexpected consequences)
Example 1: Parliamentary vs Presidential Government
Mettenheim (ed), Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing
Regional and National Contexts. Johns Hopkins, 1997
Problem = Presidentialism residual category; US system is separationist, not
presidential…
Example 2: Electoral Behavior
Mettenheim, The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic Transition, 19741986. Pittsburgh, 1995
European Voters = Ideological, US Voters = Group Interest
Brazilian/Latin American Voters = immediate / personalist
US electoral history: Critical Elections & Party Realignment  Shift
Comparative Perspective
Debates sobre Instituições
Políticas Brasileiras
“Como se Governa o Brasil? O Debate sobre
Instituições Políticas e Gestão de Governo” Vicente
Palermo DADOS, 2000
Compared to What? Assessing Brazil’s Political
Institutions, Leslie Elliott Armijo et al
http://cps.sagepub.com, Comparative Political Studies,
2006
Palermo:
grau de concentração do poder decisório segundo /
capacidade de tomar decisões e implementá-las
a
baixa capacidade de
decidir e implementar
razoável capacidade de
decidir e implementar
I
G
Poder decisório
disperso
D-I:
disperso/ingovernável
D-G:
disperso/governável
D
(a governabilidade está
fora do alcance da
estrutura institucional
vigente)
(a governabilidade
obtém-se graças à
capacidade de produção
negociada de decisões)
Poder decisório
concentrado
C-I:
concentrado/ingovernável
(a governabilidade se
tenta obter excluindo; se
fracassa neste propósito)
C-G:
concentrado/governável
C
(a governabilidade
obtém-se graças à
capacidade de os
presidentes forçarem os
outros atores a
cooperar)
Armijo et al:
Hyperactive paralysis (HP) interpretation of Brazil has been
especially prominent in comparisons with postcommunist
polities (Beyme, 2001; Clark & Wittrock, 2005; Kitschelt,
Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999, pp. 55, 90;
Moser, 1999, p. 362; Papadoulis, 2004; Shvetsova,
1999).
Evidence = Brazil has not done worse than other Latin
American countries in either policy reform or
macroeconomic performance.
Argument = making is more centralized, decisive, and
predictable than is claimed. We call this de facto
executive dominance (ED; cf. Palermo, 2000).
Novas Teorias
Instituições Políticas Brasileiras
Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds).
A New Handbook of Political Science.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
Part II Political Institutions
4 Political Institutions: An Overview
Bo Rothstein, 133
5 Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
Barry R. Weingast, 167
6 Political Institutions: Legal Perspectives
Gavin Drewry, 191
7 Political Institutions, Old and New
B. Guy Peters, 205