MICROSOFT PROJECT
MODULE 1- INTRO
CLASS DETAILS
• JEREMY CALLINAN
• FRIDAY, 5/15/15
• FRIDAY, 5/22/15
• FRIDAY, 5/29/15
• ALL SESSIONS: 8:30 AM UNTIL 12:30 PM
OVERVIEW OF CLASSES
•
MODULE 1 – INTRO
•
MODULE 2 – EXAMPLE PROJECT : BUILD A HOUSE – MAKING TASKS
•
MODULE 3 – SETTING UP YOUR PROJECT FILES – WORKING TIME & OTHER OPTIONS
•
MODULE 4 - TASKS & PREDECESSORS
•
MODULE 5 – SETTING UP RESOURCES
•
MODULE 6 – RESOURCE LEVELING
•
MODULE 7 – CRITICAL PATH
•
MODULE 8 – REPORTING
•
MODULE 9 – OTHER EXAMPLE PROJECTS
•
NOTE: MODULE 9 ALSO HAS A GLOSSARY
BONUS – THE DISC
• HAS:
• POWERPOINTS
• EXAMPLE PROJECT FILES
• PROGRAMS – MICROSOFT PROJECT TRIAL, PROJECT LIBRE
• MORE PROJECT NOTES
WHY USE PROJECT MANAGEMENT SOFTWARE?
•
HTTP://WWW.FORBES.COM/SITES/LORENTHOMPSON/2013/12/03/HEALTHCARE-GOVDIAGNOSIS-THE-GOVERNMENT-BROKE-EVERY-RULE-OF-PROJECT-MANAGEMENT/
• THE OCTOBER 1, 2013 ROLL-OUT OF HEALTHCARE.GOV WENT THROUGH AS PLANNED, DESPITE
THE CONCURRENT PARTIAL GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN. HOWEVER, THE LAUNCH WAS MARRED BY
SERIOUS TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THE PUBLIC TO SIGN UP FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE. THE DEADLINE TO SIGN UP FOR COVERAGE THAT WOULD BEGIN JANUARY
2014 WAS DECEMBER 23, 2013, BY WHICH TIME THE PROBLEMS HAD LARGELY BEEN FIXED. THE
CURRENT ENROLLMENT PERIOD DEADLINE IS THE LAST DAY OF MARCH. STATE EXCHANGES ALSO
HAVE HAD THE SAME DEADLINES; THEIR PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN VARIED.
• THE DESIGN OF THE WEBSITE WAS OVERSEEN BY THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES (CMS) AND BUILT BY A NUMBER OF FEDERAL CONTRACTORS, MOST PROMINENTLY CGI
GROUP OF CANADA. THE ORIGINAL BUDGET FOR CGI WAS $93.7 MILLION, HOWEVER THIS
GREW TO $292 MILLION PRIOR TO LAUNCH OF THE WEBSITE. WHILE ESTIMATES THAT THE OVERALL
COST FOR BUILDING THE WEBSITE HAD REACHED OVER $500 MILLION PRIOR TO LAUNCH,
THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL RELEASED A REPORT FINDING THAT THE TOTAL COST OF THE
HEALTHCARE.GOV WEBSITE HAD REACHED $1.7 BILLION. ON JULY 30, 2014, THE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE RELEASED A NON-PARTISAN STUDY THAT CONCLUDED THE
ADMINISTRATION DID NOT PROVIDE "EFFECTIVE PLANNING OR OVERSIGHT PRACTICES" IN
DEVELOPING THE HEALTHCARE.GOV WEBSITE.
• FROM: HTTP://EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/WIKI/HEALTHCARE.GOV
HOW THEY SCREWED UP
• 1. UNREALISTIC REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME ANYBODY HAS EVER TRIED TO DEVELOP A SINGLE WEBSITE WHERE DIVERSE USERS COULD (1) ESTABLISH AN ON-LINE IDENTITY, (2) REVIEW HUNDREDS OF HEALTHINSURANCE OPTIONS, (3) ENROLL IN A SPECIFIC PLAN, AND (4) DETERMINE ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL SUBSIDIES
— ALL IN REAL TIME. THE WAY PEOPLE HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACCOMPLISHED THESE TASKS IS TO GO TO AN
INSURANCE AGENT AND WORK THROUGH THE POSSIBILITIES OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL DAYS (IF NOT LONGER).
IT PROBABLY WASN’T REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT SO MANY ARCANE FUNCTIONS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A
COUPLE OF HOURS BY USERS WHO LACKED ADVANCED COMPUTER SKILLS OR HIGH-SPEED INTERNET SERVICE.
THE IMPROVED HOMEPAGE OF HEALTHCARE.GOV ALERTS USERS TO OTHER OPTIONS FOR ENROLLING, LIKE OLDFASHIONED PAPER APPLICATIONS.
• 2. TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY. AS OFTEN OCCURS WITH POORLY-PLANNED WEAPON PROJECTS, UNREALISTIC
REQUIREMENTS FOR HEALTHCARE.GOV RESULTED IN AN EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLICATED SYSTEM THAT IS
DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN. THERE ARE JUST TOO MANY MOVING PIECES. A TYPICAL USER MIGHT HAVE TO
NAVIGATE 75 SCREENS TO GET TO THEIR GOAL OF OBTAINING INSURANCE, AND THE WHOLE SYSTEM CONTAINS
OVER A THOUSAND SCREENS. A TOTAL OF 55 CONTRACTORS WERE HIRED TO PRODUCE THE VARIOUS PIECES,
AND IN ORDER FOR ALL THE STEPS TO WORK CMS HAD TO INVOLVE FIVE FEDERAL AGENCIES, 36 STATES, AND
300 PRIVATE-SECTOR INSURERS OFFERING WELL OVER 4,000 PLANS.
• 3. INTEGRATION RESPONSIBILITY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING ORGANIC EXPERTISE IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, BECAUSE THE PRIVATE SECTOR OFTEN HIRES AWAY THE BEST TALENT. AN EXECUTIVE
AT A BIG TECH FIRM ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING ONCE REMARKED TO ME THAT WHENEVER HE
MEETS WITH GOVERNMENT PROJECT LEADERS, HE ALWAYS KNOWS HE IS TALKING TO THE PEOPLE INDUSTRY DIDN’T
WANT.
DESPITE WEAK
INTEGRATING
THE RESULTS
IT CAPABILITIES, THOUGH, CMS DECIDED IT WOULD TAKE CHARGE OF
ALL THE PARTS IN HEALTHCARE.GOV, AND TESTING THE END PRODUCT TO ASSURE FUNCTIONALITY.
ORGANIC
SHOW WHY THE MILITARY ALMOST ALWAYS HIRES OUTSIDE COMPANIES TO SERVE AS LEAD
INTEGRATOR.
• 4. FRAGMENTED AUTHORITY. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF INFIGHTING WITHIN CMS OVER HOW
THE WEB-SITE WOULD OPERATE AND WHAT THE USER EXPERIENCE WOULD FEEL LIKE. WITH THREE DIFFERENT PARTS
OF THE BUREAUCRACY CONTENDING FOR CONTROL — THE IT SHOP, THE POLICY SHOP, AND THE
COMMUNICATIONS SHOP — KEY DECISIONS WERE OFTEN DELAYED, GUIDANCE TO CONTRACTORS WAS
INCONSISTENT, AND NOBODY WAS TRULY IN CHARGE. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES APPEAR TO HAVE CONCEALED
CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM EACH OTHER, AND ON OCCASION MANDATED THAT CERTAIN FEATURES BE
IMPLEMENTED OR SUPPLIERS BE USED DESPITE CONTRACTOR WARNINGS THAT PROBLEMS WOULD RESULT.
• 5. LOOSE METRICS. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN KEEPING COMPLEX PROJECTS ON TRACK IS FOR
MANAGERS TO UTILIZE RIGOROUS, UNAMBIGUOUS PERFORMANCE METRICS IN MEASURING PROGRESS. THE
GOVERNMENT SAID IN A REPORT RELEASED ON SUNDAY THAT IT HAS MADE “IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITE’S KEY
OPERATING METRICS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS,” WHICH IS A TACIT ADMISSION THAT IT DIDN’T INITIALLY
HAVE ADEQUATE WAYS OF MEASURING PROGRESS. ABSENCE OF RELIABLE METRICS HELPS EXPLAIN WHY FEDERAL
OFFICIALS DIDN’T REALIZE UNTIL LATE IN THE GAME THAT HEALTHCARE.GOV MIGHT NOT BE READY FOR PRIMETIME.
• 6. INADEQUATE
TESTING.
THE WASHINGTON AIRPORTS AUTHORITY ANNOUNCED THIS WEEK THAT IT WOULD
DELAY OPENING A NEW SUBWAY LINE TO DULLES AIRPORT SO THAT ADDITIONAL TESTING OF SOFTWARE COULD
BE CONDUCTED, STATING THAT ITS OVERRIDING GOAL IS “SAFETY.” THE PEOPLE OVERSEEING HEALTHCARE.GOV
CLEARLY HAD A DIFFERENT MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY. DESPITE REPEATED WARNINGS FROM CONTRACTORS
THAT MORE TESTING OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS WAS NEEDED, CMS WAS DETERMINED TO SEE THE SITE GO LIVE ON
ITS PLANNED DEBUT DATE OF OCTOBER 1. BECAUSE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ABOUT THE SITE WERE STILL BEING
MADE ONLY DAYS BEFORE THIS DATE, THERE WAS ALMOST NO END-TO-END TESTING OF THE SITE BEFORE IT
BECAME OPERATIONAL — WHICH IS WHY HUNDREDS OF SOFTWARE BUGS HAD TO BE FOUND AND FIXED LATER.
• 7. AGGRESSIVE
SCHEDULES.
YOU WOULDN’T THINK THAT STANDING UP A WEB-SITE AFTER LITERALLY YEARS OF
PLANNING MIGHT ENTAIL OVERLY AGGRESSIVE SCHEDULES, BUT IN THE CASE OF HEALTHCARE.GOV THE
DISORGANIZED BUREAUCRACY TOOK SO LONG TO MAKE DESIGN CHOICES THAT THE BACK END OF THE PROJECT
WAS WAY TOO HURRIED FOR COMFORT.
WHEN
THE
PENTAGON DEVELOPS
A MISSILE-WARNING OR WEATHER
SATELLITE, IT SOMETIMES DELAYS LAUNCHES FOR YEARS TO MAKE SURE ALL SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE ISSUES ARE
RESOLVED.
ONE VITAL SATELLITE
CALLED THE SPACE
BASED INFRARED SYSTEM
WAS DELAYED FOR OVER A YEAR
DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT SOFTWARE GLITCHES; WHEN THE SATELLITE FINALLY REACHED ORBIT, THOUGH, IT
WORKED PERFECTLY.
THAT DIDN’T WORK.
CMS CHOSE TO STICK WITH
• 8. ADMINISTRATIVE BLINDNESS. THE CENTER
ITS SCHEDULE EVEN AS PROBLEMS MULTIPLIED, AND GOT A SITE
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES MAY NOT HAVE HAD GOOD
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OR METRICS FOR IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS, BUT THAT DOESN’T MEAN IT DIDN’T GET
PLENTY OF WARNINGS ABOUT POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH HEALTHCARE.GOV. OUTSIDE CONSULTANTS AND
FOR
CONTRACTORS ON THE PROJECT REPEATEDLY WARNED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ABOUT FUNCTIONAL DIFFICULTIES
WITH SOME FEATURES OF THE SITE, LACK OF ADEQUATE TESTING, POOR PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION,
AND THE LIKE.
SOMETIMES CMS LISTENED, BUT MUCH OF THE TIME IT WAS IN DENIAL ABOUT HOW DEFECTIVE THE
SITE WAS. IT NEVER ADEQUATELY INFORMED THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, AND NEVER
SUBJECTED HEALTHCARE.GOV TO SYSTEMATIC REVIEW UNTIL AFTER THE SITE WENT LIVE AND NEARLY COLLAPSED.
THIS COULD HAVE ALL GONE SMOOTHLY
• WITH
THE RIGHT PROJECT MANAGEMENT
MICROSOFT PROJECT
MICROSOFT PROJECT
MICROSOFT PROJECT
ALSO: HTTP://SOURCEFORGE.NET/PROJECTS/PROJECTLIBRE/
SOME THINGS YOUR WILL LEARN TO DO
• KEY FUNCTIONALITY
IN
PROJECT - SETTING UP RESOURCES – PEOPLE, EQUIPMENT, AND
MATERIALS
• ASSIGNING RESOURCES
TO TASKS
• TRACKING PROGRESS ON TASKS
• PREDECESSORS / CRITICAL PATHS
WHAT IS THE POINT OF ALL THIS?
• A PROJECT IS A TEMPORARY ENDEAVOR THAT HAS A BEGINNING
AND AN END. A PROJECT ALSO PRODUCES A UNIQUE
DELIVERABLE OR END RESULT. IT TAKES:
• TIME
• RESOURCES
• PEOPLE
• EQUIPMENT THAT COSTS MONEY OVER TIME, OR THAT HAS TO BE SCHEDULED
• MICROSOFT PROJECT HAS SOME SIMILARITIES TO EXCEL… HOWEVER THE STRENGTH OVER
EXCEL IT HAS IS A SCHEDULING ENGINE.
• THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TO-DO LIST AND A GANTT CHART
A DELIVERABLE - GANTT CHART
REMEMBER….
• “COST, QUALITY, TIME,
PICK TWO”
Another way to look at it…
• When the project triangle gets skewed:
Or…
Time
Cost
Time
Quality
Scope
If your cost goes up, you
may be able to increase your
scope OR time.
Cost
Quality
Scope
If your cost is decreased, you may
have to decrease your scope, AND
increase your time.
BASICS
• FOR EACH TASK, YOU ENTER
DURATIONS, TASK DEPENDENCIES, AND CONSTRAINTS.
THEN CALCULATES THE START DATE AND FINISH DATE FOR EACH TASK.
• YOU CAN ENTER
PROJECT
RESOURCES IN YOUR PROJECT AND THEN ASSIGN THEM TO TASKS TO INDICATE
WHICH RESOURCE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPLETING EACH ASSIGNMENT, AND TO CALCULATE
HOW MANY MACHINES ARE NEEDED OR HOW MUCH OF A MATERIAL RESOURCE WILL BE
CONSUMED.
• IF YOU ENTER
RESOURCES, TASK SCHEDULES ARE FURTHER REFINED ACCORDING TO
RESOURCE WORK, UNITS, AND WORKING TIMES ENTERED ON CALENDARS.
LET’S PLAY
• OPEN UP PROJECT, AND LET’S MAKE SOME
EXAMPLE TASKS