Health
Healthand
andSafety
Safety
Executive
Executive
Energy Sector - EU/UK Regulatory
and Legal framework, Safety Cases
Kevin Myers
Director General Regulation
Health and Safety Executive, UK
EU-US Joint Conference on OSH
Fort Worth, Texas 17-19 September 2015
Background principles
•
•
•
28 Member States in EU
•
Developed from experience of incidents eg Seveso,
Deepwater Horizon
•
•
•
Each has its own history and OSH legal framework
EU OSH Legislation is largely expressed through
“Directives”…….
Which are transcribed into National legislation………
And in doing so inevitably reflect history, legal system,
philosophy………
So I will cover this through the UK perspective
Fundamentals of UK’s OSH system
•
•
A (largely) goal-setting regulatory framework
•
This outcome-focused approach is underpinned by risk
assessment to determine the appropriate controls
•
The business/employer is responsible for identifying and
managing risk and establishing the appropriate control
measures - not the Regulator
But the important thing is delivery of the controls – not the
piece(s) of paper!
Energy Sector
•
•
•
Traditional OSH activities – working with electricity,
falls from height etc
– failures are comparably high frequency, but ‘low’
consequence
– tend to regulate through core OSH regulations
“major hazard” activities - Oil and gas exploration,
refining etc
- failures are comparably low frequency but high
consequence
- tend to regulate through ‘safety case’ regimes
Emerging technologies
– under development?!
‘Traditional’ OSH risks I
Covered by a ‘Framework’ Directive setting out general
principles of prevention:
•
•
hierarchy of risks – avoid, evaluate, control at source
•
•
•
adapt to technical progress
•
adapt the work to the individual and prioritise
collective over individual protective measures
developing a coherent overall prevention policy
consult/engage with the workforce and provide
adequate training
workers to co-operate, use machinery and ppe etc
correctly and notify employer of shortcomings and /or
danger
‘Traditional’ OSH risks II
Framework Directive supported by over 20 “Daughter”
Directives – either sector or cross-cutting hazard-based
•
•
•
•
•
ppe, manual handling, display screen equipment,
vibration, noise, work equipment
chemical agents, carcinogens, asbestos, biological
agents, explosive atmospheres
construction
oil and gas extraction
mining
Major Drivers for Change
Technology
Risk
Management
Systems
Behavioural
Human Factors?
Time
Time
“Safety Case” Regime
•
•
•
Businesses need the regulator’s agreement or consent
before they can start operation:
– Safety Cases/Safety Reports /Licences
– Often this includes the regulator’s agreement on aspects
of the design, construction and commissioning of the
plant as well
Dependant on the business/employer demonstrating that the
risks are controlled ‘as low as is reasonably practicable’ ALARP.
Regulator’s role is to assess and verify that the case for
safety has been made and the risks effectively managed and
controlled.
Inspection
•
•
•
•
Risk based and targeted
Takes account of company performance
But also topic-based
Primary purpose is to verify that the control measures
described in Safety Case/Report actually exist on the
ground and are resilient
Investigation
•
•
•
High public expectations
•
Learn and share lessons
Hold accountable those responsible
Establish root causes:
– Technical
– Managerial
– Cultural
Hazard
Incident
Swiss Cheese Model of Defence
Hazard
Ideal
Reality
Incident
Swiss Cheese Model of Defence
Advantages/Disadvantages of
Safety Case Regime
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
No prescription - so flexibility and alternative ways of
reaching the desired outcome
Enables – indeed encourages - innovation
Need for good guidance, industry codes and standards
to establish good practice in achieving compliance
Need for an on-going dialogue with industry and its
involvement in developing and owning guidance and
standards
The role of the regulator
The business value of the safety case
It is no guarantee of safe production/operation
Key Lessons from UK experience
•
•
•
•
•
•
It’s often the routine day to day tasks and activities that go
wrong not the unusual/obscure
There are no new incidents just new people repeating the
same mistakes
Tomorrow’s major accident is lurking in the organisation
today. A seismic quake is always preceded by warning signs
Importance of leading indicators
No clear sense of vulnerability. Belief in the infallibility of
control system
Regulatory Codes can at best only be a imperfect fit to risk
management – not a guarantee of safety
HSE publication HSG254
•
•
What can go wrong?
•
•
•
What systems are in place to manage those challenges?
Where within the facility will these challenges to
integrity be most critical?
What does success look like?
What are the critical activities which must work right
to deliver the intended outcome?
Thank you for listening!