The Influence of Interest Groups on Federal Education Policy
Anne Whitesell
Fowler Paper Competition
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................................................1
LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................................................................................... 2
INTEREST GROUPS IN EDUCATION ........................................................................................................................................... 8
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................................................................... 15
METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................................................................20
STRATEGIES TO INFLUENCE EDUCATION POLICY ................................................................................................................ 22
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
SUBMITTING LETTERS TO MULTIPLE HEARINGS ................................................................................................................. 25
THE INFLUENCE OF PACS, LOBBYING, AND REVENUES ...................................................................................................... 27
EDUCATION POLICY ISSUES ..................................................................................................................................................... 29
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................ 32
CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................................................... 38
APPENDIX 1. ............................................................................................................................................................................ 41
APPENDIX 2. ............................................................................................................................................................................47
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 49
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Abstract
Much research has been devoted to studying the influence of interest groups in shaping public
policy; I chose to focus my research on groups interested in federal education policy. The data comes from
the letters of support submitted by interest groups to the nomination hearings for Secretary of Education
appointees Rod Paige, Margaret Spellings, and Arne Duncan. I collected data on the characteristics of the
groups, their strategies, and the issues mentioned within the letters. The relationships between variables
were analyzed using a series of chi-square tests and binominal regressions. My results show that
financial resources and the nature of the group’s members affect the group’s strategies. The results also
show that the specific issues mentioned are influenced by the background of the nominee, the incoming
administration’s priorities, and the current political climate. Further research on the topic might include
looking into how interest groups shape education policy in other venues (lawmaking, regulations, etc.).
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Literature Review
Any study of American education policy will uncover an extensive network of competing
interests looking to make their mark in governmental policy. These groups cover a vast constituency,
ranging from educators (primarily teachers, principals, and administrators) to student and parent
advocacy groups, to groups representing various religious, ethnic, and other minorities (Bailey 1975, 7).
These groups have existed since the creation of public schools, and special interests have existed since
the country’s founding. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 10, the role of a republican
government is to control the effects of factions, or those groups which are “united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest.” Therefore, before delving into the influence of outside groups
in education, it is important to have a basic understanding of the creation of interest groups as a whole
and their influence in the governmental process.
In his 1951 book The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, David Truman
postulated that advanced societies are bound to see an increase in the quantity, and significance, of
interest groups. As people develop specific skills and labor becomes specialized, those with similar
interests will band together; in times of disturbance, such as periods of economic crisis or political
change, these individuals will meet with increased frequency (Truman 1951, 97). Eventually, these
meetings lead to the formation of interest groups, defined as “any group that, on the basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment,
maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman
1951, 33). Truman also suggested that the formation of new groups occurs in waves, for as one group
emerges to present their claims, another will emerge in opposition (59). These groups will then bring
their concerns, whether they are interested in maintaining the status quo or are promoting policy change,
to government institutions (Baumgartner, et al. 2009; Truman 1951).
Agreeing with Truman’s general principle concerning the creation of interest groups, Mancur
Olson stated in The Logic of Collective Action that interest groups generally exist to advance the common
interests of its members (1965, 5). Olson disagreed, however, with Truman’s emphasis on the importance
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of group size in promoting common interests. According to traditional group theory, the amount of
power accorded to a group was proportional to its membership size, so the larger groups, generally those
with broader interests, would usually succeed over the smaller interest groups (Olson 1965, 121). Olson
refuted this theory, pointing out that it assumes there is a general consensus within large groups as to
which action will best achieve the group’s goals (1965, 60). This is almost never the case, however, and so
small groups that can reach consensus and organize their actions more quickly have an advantage (Olson
1965, 58). Olson cited politics as evidence against the traditional theory, where politicians are very much
aware of the power of small, “special interest” groups to change public policy (1965, 127).
If the primary objective of an interest group is to change current policy to align with the group’s
claims, the intermediary goal is to attain access to the government (Truman 1951, 264). This proves to be
a difficult task, however, as the time and resources of government officials are scarce (Baumgartner, et al.
2009, 22). To begin, advocates must elevate their grievances to the public agenda. Items on the public
agenda generally meet three criteria: first, the group identifies the problem or gives it a name by which it
will be known to the public. Secondly, the group identifies the culprit causing the problem, whether it is
another group or a government institution. Finally, the group issues specific demands on the government
to resolve the issue (Cobb and Ross 1997, 5-6). For public action to be taken on an issue, it must move
from the public to the formal agenda, a shift that signifies the issue is actively under consideration (Cobb
and Ross 1997, 7). In order to be added to the formal agenda, an advocate promoting change from the
status quo must provide objective evidence that an issue exists, as well as convince the public that a
complete overhaul of current policy is necessary. This is especially pertinent when considering policy
changes that have varying impacts on different constituencies (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 21). Within the
education sector, education issues with strong ties to other policy areas often see a shift to the formal
agenda. During the Cold War, for instance, increased attention to math and science programs came from
the threat posed by the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union.
For some issues, securing a place on the formal agenda will be easier, such as those issues that are
well-covered by the media. The issues that attract media coverage and the attention of the public are
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known as salient issues; frequently, when the salience of an issue grows, so does its importance for the
political parties (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 99). In other instances, there is a crisis or focal event that
draws attention to an issue. Even so, the likelihood of policy change will remain low unless the issue was
already being discussed prior to the focal event (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 122). In the absence of a focal
event or the media coverage that comes with a partisan issue, Truman (1951) places the responsibility on
interest groups to increase awareness of the issue and its possible consequences. This process is
necessary to rally public support based on rational and stable principles; rationality and stability make
for a public that is more willing to act. In addition, an interest group has a greater chance of gaining
access to government if it is well-established and has a history of success in the political process (Cobb
and Ross 1997; Truman 1951).
Interest groups have an assortment of access points from which to choose when looking to
receive governmental attention. First, the group must select which branch of government will be the
venue for the proposed policy change, and whether it will be most effective to lobby local, state, or
federal officials. When appealing to Congress members or the presidential administration, the group may
become involved in the nomination and election process, or wait until the official has been elected.
During the campaign season, interest groups may opt to donate to campaigns or encourage their
members to vote in the primary and general elections. They may also supply their members with the
voting records and backgrounds of the candidates, thus highlighting which candidate is most supportive
of the group’s goals (Truman 1951, 289-290). Rarely do interest groups come out with open endorsements
of candidates. An interest group faces potential hostility in the new administration if they campaigned
against them during the election season, and groups with members from different political affiliations
risk division within their organization if they issue an endorsement (Truman 1951, 290). While interest
groups may not officially come out in favor of one candidate, common links between certain groups and
political parties are well known. Labor unions, for example, typically favor Democratic candidates, while
business organizations generally work with Republicans (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 92)
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Opponents of change may threaten to withdrawal support should the candidate advocate a
change in the status quo. This strategy is less effective when used by groups with a small membership or
geographically dispersed constituency, because they are unlikely to have much influence on other groups,
and the membership is not large enough to carry significant weight (Truman 1951, 304). This would seem
to run counter to Olson’s group theory, mentioned previously. There is a caveat to Olson’s theory, though;
while small groups succeed when the issues are narrow and concern a small population, they tend to be
less powerful “when questions which divide the entire nation are involved” because they are faced with
opposition from much larger organized groups (1965, 147). The sheer size of large business organizations
or labor unions, with their millions of members (and voters), outweighs the quicker mobilization of small
interest groups. Withdrawal of support, therefore, is used most often by the most powerful interest
groups (Cobb and Ross 1997, 39). Those groups that do officially endorse a candidate seek to gain more
than those who choose to remain neutral, with the greatest gain seen by those who endorse the winning
candidate and help create the candidate’s policy platform (Truman 1951, 285). According to Truman
(1951), an interest group chooses to influence a candidate’s platform in hopes that it will guarantee access
to the future administration.
Turning toward the executive branch was a common route for the policy advocates studied by
Baumgartner et al. (2009, 14). If an interest group seeks to become influential in the administration, it
may begin making its case during the transition. One way to become involved in the transition is through
political appointments. Truman observed that the public official without conflicting motivations is an
“illusion” and some of the most important connections officials have are those in “professional and skill
groups” (450-452). Consequently, interest groups that have a hand in creating the administration have
the opportunity to discuss the issues to be addressed by the administration. Thus, when analyzing public
policies, Truman suggested questioning the interest groups associated with the administration and their
internal organization (439-441). Becoming involved in implementation is not only important for the
advancement of a group’s own objectives, but also gives them the opportunity to determine which issues
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will not be addressed. Bachrach and Barantz called this process of limiting the scope of policy options
“non-decision-making” (as cited in Cobb and Ross 1997, 16).
The transition is a period in which interest groups from all sides are faced with uncertainty.
Those opposed to change increase their efforts to maintain the status quo, while policy initiators see a
presidential transition as an opportunity for change. Uncertainty increases when control of the White
House switches parties, for as Truman (1951) noted, the new administration may repeal old policies,
adjust former methods, or head in a completely new direction. This window of opportunity is short-lived
because issues capture public attention for only a short time before being replaced by new concerns.
Reauthorizations and nondiscretionary items occupy a large amount of public officials’ time, forcing new
ideas that require extra time and resources into “issue limbo” (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 220; Cobb and
Ross 1997, 11). In addition, politicians are typically risk averse, so interest groups with ideologies that
conflict with the views of the administration face even more difficulties. Politicians will also be wary of
engaging in issues that increase partisan conflict (Cobb and Ross 1997, 17).
Policy advocates are at a disadvantage because of their limited opportunity to bring their issue to
the formal agenda, and so for many interest groups, maintaining the status quo is their most important
objective, as found by Baumgartner et al. (2009) in their study of 98 policy debates. While advocates for
change fight for increased visibility of their issue and attention from public officials, opponents benefit
from staying out of the spotlight and initially may refuse to recognize that an issue even exists (Cobb and
Ross 1997, 26-27). When the opponent can no longer deny the existence of an issue, both sides may
choose to share research with public officials. Baumgartner et al. (2009) noted that advocates are more
successful when they can provide an official with expert policy information because it gives an advocate
the opportunity to emphasize one dimension of the debate (124). It is also a valuable tool because it
subsidizes the official’s limited time and effort. Conversely, a supporter of the status quo can use
distribution of information to highlight potential negative consequences of policy change and may even
suggest that a policy initiator’s position is built on weak evidence (Cobb and Ross 1997, 30).
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In their study, Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that opponents of change were less likely than
proponents to report lobbying activity. Opponents are on the defensive and only need to act when a
group proposing change is a substantial threat to the status quo. Cobb and Ross (1997) theorized that
opposition groups will attempt to keep the status quo intact using as few resources as possible. As
mentioned above, opponents may stave off change by ignoring the issue completely, and in many cases,
time is on their side; eventually attention dies down and public officials move on to other issues (Cobb
and Ross 1997, 26). On those issues that require some action, opponents attempt to discredit policy
advocates through the use of stereotypes and attacks on their issue. In addition, opponents may resort to
symbolic placation strategies such as the creation of committees or commissions. Designed to
acknowledge the problem without seriously considering the initiator’s solution, a committee is typically
made up of a bipartisan expert panel with limited time and resources to study the problem (Cobb and
Ross 1997, 34-35). In contrast, Truman stated that advisory committees give change advocates another
opportunity to influence decision-making. Such committees provide public officials with technical
information by consulting with those who are likely to be affected by the new government action
(Truman 1951, 458). Regardless, supporters of the status quo have a distinct advantage because they have
already gained access to the system. As Baumgartner et al. (2009) reported, after two years, over twothirds of the policy issues studied had not experienced any change.
Along with the assumption that groups with more experience in policymaking (usually those
defending the status quo) will have greater success, there is a widely held belief that groups with greater
financial resources will get their way more often. In reality though, policy debates are often composed of
sides with relatively equal resources, for as one side collects resources, their opposition is likely to do the
same (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 229). The correlation between resources and policy success was positive,
but not statistically significant, in the Baumgartner et al. study. Furthermore, this advantage was
stronger for supporters of the status quo, while advocates of change saw the advantage decrease over
time (2009, 234). The support of the president appears to be more important than the amount of
resources. The probability of success for defenders of the status quo was far greater when the
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administration was also defending the status quo (233). For proponents of change, change was more
likely to occur when the administration was in support of change, though even this probability was
lower than the likelihood that the status quo would remain in place (235). Ultimately, the numerous
factors that play into policy advocating make it extremely difficult for advocates and public officials to
predict the final outcome of a policy debate (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 260).
Interest Groups in Education
Narrowing the focus to interest groups concerned with education policy, many of the same
trends found among interest groups in general exist. Policy advocating, regardless of the issue, typically
requires a long-term commitment (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 219). The majority of education interest
groups seek solutions to far-reaching problems, although occasionally groups form around a single issue,
such as sex education, school and bus safety, or drug abuse (Adam 1975, 170). In general, a consensus
already exists on these issues, so once the policy is changed, the group disbands (Baumgartner, et al.
2009, 219). Even for those who advocate over long periods of time, the ultimate goal may not be to
change an established government program (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 116). Within an education interest
group, a few critical issues exist, but others may be on the agenda simply because a minority feels
strongly about it, or an ally is advocating on the same issue. This combination of crucial and less
important issues is due to the fact that only a small proportion of education interest groups have any
substantial influence (Bailey 1975, 48). Few groups, for example, have the resources to become heavily
involved in campaigns, or the membership to rally behind a candidate (Bailey 1975, 79).
As a result of the relative political weakness of education groups, sides of the policy debate may
be composed of a coalition. As observed by Baumgartner et al. (2009), the composition of debate sides
fluctuates for strategic purposes. Groups may seek out allies whose resources complement rather than
duplicate their own strengths (222). The same occurs within education groups; coalitions form to work
on national issues and separate to deal with local issues, only to come together again at a later time
(Bailey 1975, 72). These coalitions may include groups that represent other interests in society, such as
business groups, labor unions, and other professions (Bailey 1975, 79). Typically, business groups aim to
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keep taxes low while raising educational standards (Spring 2005, 45). In addition, the Chamber of
Commerce and the AFL-CIO involve themselves in education policy because education is seen as a means
of training the workforce (Adam 1975, 169). In the 1970s, proponents for a cabinet-level Department of
Education argued that the complexity of the interest groups involved in education policy necessitated a
Department separate from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Opposition to the
department felt that a secretary of education would become a “special pleader for an organized clientele,”
creating more problems than solutions for the president (Miles 1979, 107). In fact, the groups concerned
with education policy are far less organized and dominant than in other fields (such as labor, where the
AFL-CIO prevails) and a secretary of education can sort through all of the conflicting positions to create
coordinated, effective policies (Miles 1979, 110).
The wide-ranging nature of education interest groups makes coalition building an important
aspect of advocating, while at the same time complicating any attempt to predict which groups will see
policy success. As mentioned previously, these groups are not in the least bit cohesive, and attempts to
categorize them will typically undermine their complexity. For general purposes, however, Bailey (1975)
broke down the field into ten categories. Possibly the most well-known, if not the most influential, of
these categories are those of the teachers’ unions. The development of teachers’ unions has been wellresearched, so without delving into the debates over their influence in education policy, a brief overview
will suffice. In the past, teacher unionization was seen as a threat to public schools, but over time, the
unions have become synonymous with the status quo, refusing any attempt at education reform (Cooper
and Liotta 2004, 117). The largest of the teachers’ unions is the National Education Association (NEA),
with more than 3.2 million members, including public school teachers, administrators, and retired
educators (National Education Association 2010). The association originated as a forum to discuss
teaching and learning issues, but became unionized in the 1970s (Hunt, et al. 2010, 631). Since its
unionization, and the leadership’s shift to a more aggressive political stance, the NEA has gained
recognition and power among interest groups and government officials (Adam 1975, 166). The other
major teachers’ union, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), has more than 1.4 million members,
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including education professionals but also some healthcare professionals and government employees
(American Federation of Teachers 2010). The AFT has been a union since its creation in 1916, keeping
close ties with the AFL-CIO, and its membership is concentrated in urban areas (Adam 1975, 167). The
two unions, while evolving from rivalry to a partnership representing teachers collectively, still disagree
on certain education policies (Hunt, et al. 2010, 629).
Splitting off from the larger teacher organizations are associations representing individual
disciplines (e.g. the National Council of Teachers of English), as well as organizations advocating for a
particular education level. Roy Adam (1975), for instance, noted the increasing influence of higher
education lobbies as a result of federal contributions to colleges and universities (168). Other important
groups include those representing administrations, such as the American Association of School
Administrators (AASA) and the National School Boards Association (NSBA). The NSBA represents
95,000 school board members, while the AASA has a membership of 13,000 (American Association of
School Administrators 2010; National School Boards Association 2010). These groups, while having a
much smaller membership than teachers’ unions, can be influential in policymaking because they handle
the day-to-day management of the schools (Adam 1975, 168).
Frequently, groups that advocate on other social issues also have an interest in education policy.
Religious groups have tried to promote their values through the education system. The Christian
Coalition and People for the American Way, for example, have engaged in a policy debate over censorship
in textbooks (Spring 2005, 50). The National Catholic Educational Association and the National Council
of Churches have an interest in moral education in public schools, and may also advocate for increased
support of independent or private schools (Adam 1975, 168-169). Women’s organizations and groups
advocating minority rights frequently lobby in the education sector, primarily on issues related to
equality (Adam 1975, 169-170).Think tanks, whether liberal or conservative, also influence education
policy through their research and policy proposals. These interest groups may not have as profound an
impact on education policy as teachers’ unions or administrative associations, but the effects of change in
education may result in change in other policy sectors (Adam 1975, 168).
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Regardless of their influence over education policymaking, many of the techniques used by
advocates are the same as those used in other issue areas. Education groups, for instance, commonly use
the mobilization of grassroots campaigns as a source of power (Bailey 1975, 70). Federal aid to education
began through grassroots movements during the 1960s. On the local and state level, civil rights groups
and religious organizations were not seeing any progress in education funding, and so they turned to the
national government (Spring 2005, 119). Since then, newsletters, journals, and other sources of
communication with group members, have been used by interest groups to disseminate information
about the government’s education programs and proposals. In return, the group will provide the
government agency with feedback concerning the operations and public opinions of the programs (Bailey
1975, 55). Education groups also understand the importance of building visibility through the media. As
Stephen K. Bailey (1975) writes, “Controversy over education, like all other controversy, is newsworthy”
(80). Oftentimes it is the most controversial of issues that see policy change.
On the federal level, there has been a significant policy change in recent years. George W. Bush
introduced the No Child Left Behind Act in January 2001, and Congress passed the bill later that year.
Under the Obama administration, the Department of Education created the Race to the Top Program as
part of the economic stimulus program (Brill 2010). Both of these policies push for student achievement
(especially for those in under-achieving schools), highly-effective teachers, and greater accountability,
but the states have the responsibility of developing the policies to meet these loosely-defined principles.
The definition of student achievement under NCLB was vague, as each state was responsible for
setting adequate yearly progress goals. Under Race to the Top, student achievement is defined differently
depending on whether the subject can be tested. In those subject areas that can be tested, achievement is
defined as “a student’s score on the State’s assessments under the ESEA.” In non-tested subjects,
achievement is an alternative measure “of student learning and performance” that is “rigorous and
comparable across classrooms” (U.S. Department of Education 2009, 14). In connection with student
achievement, George W. Bush announced that education reform needed to “increase accountability for
student performance” (Bush 2001, 2). This meant that educational agencies would be rewarded for
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increasing student achievement, and would be sanctioned for failure to meet standards. The Race to the
Top Initiative continued with this goal by providing the flexibility to use more innovative approaches in
those schools that have increased student achievement (U.S. Department of Education 2009, 13).
More specific reforms that have garnered increased attention in recent years include school
choice and performance pay. School choice is traditionally seen as a conservative method of education
reform because it decreases the federal government’s involvement in education while leaving the private
market to determine the success of schools. Ronald Reagan promoted school vouchers and parental
choice in the 1980s (McGuinn 2006, 43). Support for school choice was not universal though, as
demonstrated during the nomination hearing for Richard Riley, Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Education.
Several senators brought up the issue in their questioning of Riley. Senator Durenberger (R-MN) noted
that there appeared to be more letters to the editor of the New York Times concerning school choice than
health care reform, another important issue of the time (U.S. Congress. Senate 1993, 21). In an exchange
with Senator Coats (R-IN), after Riley expressed his opposition to school vouchers, the Senator asked
him if it would be possible to conduct a study to “prove once and for all whether all these editorial
writers, educators, and other choice advocates are right” (U.S. Congress. Senate 1993, 42). Senator Gregg
(R-NH) told Riley that opposing vouchers prevented lower- and middle-class families in rural and
suburban areas from having access to school choice. Riley held firm in his belief that vouchers would only
create a poorer public school system (U.S. Congress. Senate 1993, 52). The debate quieted down
throughout the 1990s, but remained a part of the Republican education agenda. In 2000, the Party’s
platform called for the government to “expand parental choice and encourage competition” through an
increasing number of charter schools. School choice was outlined in both NCLB and Race to the Top;
Bush proposed greater efforts to inform parents about the alternative to traditional public schools, and
advocated school choice for students attending low-performing schools (Bush 2001, 2). The Race to the
Top program provided incentives for states that foster “successful conditions for high-performing charter
schools and other innovative schools” (U.S. Department of Education 2009, 11).
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Performance pay for teachers, also known as merit pay, is another education policy that in the
past has been preferred by conservatives. Defining it at the most basic level, merit pay is any
compensation policy that is not based solely on the single salary schedule, which determines pay
according to years of service and degree held (Springer 2009, 3-4). Proponents for this type of
compensation system argue that the private market has always paid more those individuals who perform
at higher levels. Applying the same principle to teachers, the argument goes, would encourage the use of
the best and most efficient practices. Merit pay first received increased attention in 1983 when President
Reagan declared, “Teachers should be paid and promoted on the basis of their merit and competence.
Hard-earned tax dollars should encourage the best. They have no business rewarding incompetence and
mediocrity” (Reagan 1983).
The types of compensation reform programs used by school systems, and referenced by interest
groups, include: pay-for-performance, knowledge- and skills-based pay, career ladders, hard-to-staff
subjects, hard-to-staff schools, and recruitment and retention awards (Springer 2009, 5). The ambiguity
of the term makes it a prime target for interest groups; much of the advocacy work revolves around issue
definition. Without examining in detail the tactics used by interest groups debating this issue, it is
sufficient to say that many of the strategies studied by Cobb and Ross (1997), such as generalizing and
use of symbolic definitions, are employed when lobbying for or against merit pay. Generalization implies
that all merit pay policies are the same, even though, as indicated above, there are multiple approaches.
Generalizations may imply, for instance, that teacher compensation reform ties student test scores to
teacher pay. Symbolic definitions often arise when debating merit pay because the issue is still relatively
new and foreign to the general public (Cobb and Ross 1997, 14).
Opponents of performance pay also argue that such a requirement coming from the federal
government infringes upon states’ rights. Education reform has traditionally been limited at the federal
level, with states responsible for the performance of their school districts. Throughout the twentieth
century the federal government’s role in education increased as the quality of public education declined
(McGuinn 2006, 47). On newer issues state and local districts continue to be the first to experiment with
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reform. Across the country, for instance, school systems have begun merit pay plans, utilizing a variety of
the programs indicated above. In Portland, Maine the school system operates under the Professional
Learning Based Salary System. Teachers who go ‘above and beyond the job definition’ through
participation in professional development programs, leadership in student activities, or enrollment in
additional college courses, earn salary contact hours (SCH). Upon accumulating 225 SCH, teachers
permanently increase their salary by moving across salary lanes. Similarly, in Helena, Montana, teachers
can increase their salaries through voluntary professional development and the creation of a Career
Development Plan. They must also receive positive evaluations from administrators (Rosales 2009).
On the state level, Texas implemented the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant in 2007, which
provided 99 high-poverty high-performing schools in the state with noncompetitive grants for
developing and executing their incentive plans (Taylor, Springer and Ehlert 2009, 193). Incentives could
be distributed on an individual, team, or school level, and the amount of the awards was chosen by each
school (Taylor, Springer and Ehlert 2009, 218). Schools also determined the criteria upon which teachers
would be evaluated, ranging from student improvement based on assessments to a decrease in drop-out
rates to working in hard-to-staff subject areas (Taylor, Springer and Ehlert 2009, 195). In North
Carolina, the ABC’s of Public Education was established in 1996. The program awards teachers in all
public schools within the state based on student achievement in math and reading. Teachers in schools
that show “exemplary” growth receive $1,500; teachers in schools with “expected” growth receive $750
(National Center on Performance Incentives 2008). The differences among these four systems (Portland,
Helena, Texas, and North Carolina) demonstrate the difficulty in defining merit pay.
According to Patrick McGuinn (2006), changes in education policy such as these are the result of
gradual shift in the “policy regime” (11). These shifts were the result of a realization that the traditional
view of education—public schools work just fine, problems occur only in poverty-stricken areas, and any
reform should take place on the state or local level—no longer held true (McGuinn 2006, 22). Interest
groups sensed this shift in beliefs, and actively began promoting, or fighting against, change. These efforts
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to influence the administration’s education policies will be studied, and their effectiveness analyzed, in
relation to the policies put forth by No Child Left Behind and the Race to the Top Program.
Conceptual Framework
As noted in the literature review, one of the many ways in which interest groups seek to
influence the executive branch is through the political appointment process. While the president
appoints officials at various levels in both the executive and judicial branches, the appointment of
cabinet officials are some of the most important appointments a president will make. Rufus Miles wrote
in 1979, when the Senate was debating whether education should have its own cabinet department, that
cabinet officers “with special interests to promote [cause] problems for the president” but they also “have
great potential for helping the president achieve his purpose”. Cabinet officials help in “refining [the
president’s] vision as to where the country should be headed” and communicate these efforts to Congress
and the public (104). The president’s appointments are approved by the Senate, as outlined in Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution:
He shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law.
To fulfill this responsibility, the Senate holds nomination hearings. Though the nominees are
rarely rejected by the Senate, E. Mann and Zachary A. Smith noted several purposes to these hearings.
First, during the hearing the nominee is questioned to determine whether there is any potential conflict
of interest between a nominee’s financial interests and the responsibilities that come with the position. If
this is the case, the nominee will be asked to find a solution to this conflict (1981, 225). Second, the
nominees are questioned to ascertain his or her stance on policy issues related to the position. Members
of the committee are aware that presidential nominees may not agree with the president on every issue,
but in general they will represent his policy goals and commitments (Mann and Smith 1981, 217).
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Senators use the hearings to bring up their concerns within the policy area; in education, for instance,
there is oftentimes concern that the federal government has taken away too much authority from state
and local governments (Miles 1979, 103).
In addition to input from senators, nomination hearings also give interest groups an opportunity
to express their opinions on the nominee. A group’s interest in a particular poilcy field is usually evident
to the Senate and the nominee, but submitting a letter in support of the nominee allows the group to
outline their priorities within the field and their expectations for the administration. Rarely will an
administration be able to find solutions to all the issues, so it is in the best interest of the group to
emphasize issues in their nomination letters with which the president is concerned. Whether or not the
group supports the administration’s stance is irrelevant; the objective is to attain access so they can
assert some influence on the decision-making process. A collection of these letters, therefore, provides a
good foundation for an analysis of the types of interest groups involved in education policy, including the
strategies utilized and the issues of most concern. The letters analyzed for the purpose of this research
include those submitted for the hearings of Rod Paige, Margaret Spellings, and Arne Duncan.
The data analysis for this research tests numerous hypotheses, which can be broken down into
three areas: characteristics of the interest group, education issues, and the background of the president
and his political appointments. In regards to the interest group’s characteristics, Baumgartner et al.
suggested that interest groups with greater resources are not significantly more likely to see favorable
policies implemented. Extending this theory, groups with higher revenues should not have more
connections to the transition or administration than groups with lower revenues. Even though a wealthy
group may not see greater success than other groups, its resources allow it to become involved in
policymaking through different strategies, such as establishing a PAC or employing lobbyists. As a result,
advocacy groups with PACs will have greater resources than groups without PACs. This hypothesis
stems from the nature of PACs, organizations established “for the purpose of raising and spending money
to elect and defeat candidates,” according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Similarly, interest groups
that employ lobbyists also possess greater resources, because they can afford to hire lobbyists from an
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outside firm or to assign an internal staff member to advocate for their cause. Following the findings of
Baumgartner, et al., one might assume that interest groups with PACs or lobbyists are not more likely to
have connections to political appointees or transition team members. Lastly, if groups establish
organizations to elect or defeat candidates and designates employees as lobbyists, they are probably more
likely to submit policy proposals to the transition team. Having a PAC and engaging in lobbying, while
indicating greater resources, also suggests that the group is interested in pursuing multiple strategies to
gain access to the government, and submitting a policy proposal or attending a meeting with the
transition team is just another useful tactic.
Hypothesis 1: Interest groups with PACs will have greater resources than those without PACs.
Hypothesis 1a: Interest groups that lobby will have greater resources than those that do not lobby.
Hypothesis 2: Interest groups with greater resources will not have more connections to the transition team and/or
administration than those with fewer resources.
Hypothesis 2a: Interest groups that lobby will not have more connection to the transition team and/or administration
than those that do not lobby.
Hypothesis 3: Interest groups with greater resources are more likely to submit policy proposals to the transition team.
Other hypotheses based on an interest group’s characteristics concern the members of the group.
As outlined in the literature review, Truman said that interest groups develop as a result of individuals
looking for a place to express their grievances. When there is no other forum for expressing their
concerns, members expect to see the group involved in the policymaking process by presenting their
claims to the government (1951, 97). According to Olson, if the group is not adequately addressing the
concerns of its members, individuals may decide that they can provide the same benefits for themselves
without being a part of the group. Successful groups provide greater benefits to its members than the
members could hope to attain by themselves (1965, 50). Attaining access to the government is one such
incentive; thus, one may hypothesize that groups with members use more strategies to gain access to the
government than groups without members. Another hypothesis, stemming from Truman’s finding that
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groups representing members from varying political parties are less likely to issue endorsements, is that
interest groups representing a collection of organizations are less likely to be openly partisan, and
consequently less likely to advocate for more partisan issues.
Hypothesis 4: Interest groups with members use more strategies to gain access to the government than groups without
members.
Hypothesis 5: Interest groups with a diverse membership will be less likely to advocate for partisan issues.
The characteristics of the president and his political appointees are as important in
understanding which areas see policy change as the characteristics of the interest groups involved. As
stated in the literature review, Baumgartner, et. al found that interest groups whose priorities aligned
with the position of the president were more likely to see policy change than those in opposition. The top
priorities of the administration are more likely to ascend to the formal agenda, and when they do, interest
groups want to be a part of the discussion. As well as focusing on the priorities outlined by the
president, the interest group may choose to highlight the areas with which the political appointee has
experience. For instance, both Roderick Paige and Arne Duncan Paige served as senior officials in urban
school districts prior to their nominations as Secretary of Education, so interest groups are more likely to
mention issues that are of high priority in urban school districts. Margaret Spelling, however, came to the
Department of Education after serving as Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy. She was known
on the national stage as one of the crafters of NCLB (Senior Staff: Margaret Spellings 2008). The
background of the nominee will also contribute to the number of nomination letters received. Paige and
Duncan were known on a state or local level, so their letters of support were likely to come from regional
groups, while Spellings was likely to receive letters from national organizations
Hypothesis 6: Interest groups will highlight education issues with which the nominee has experience.
Regarding education issues, less contentious issues are more likely to be addressed than
controversial issues. The reasoning for this hypothesis is alluded to previously: groups that do not wish
to be seen as leaning to either side of the political spectrum will stay away from more controversial
issues. If a group does choose to advocate for a more salient issue, they are likely to mention it in a letter
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for the nominee that is more likely to add that issue to the formal agenda. For example, school choice, as
introduced in the literature review, is generally a reform embraced by conservatives. Therefore, one can
hypothesize that school choice is more likely to be on the formal agenda during a Republican
administration. Following the theory that interest groups tailor their letters of support to those issues
more likely to reach the formal agenda, interest groups should address school choice more frequently in
letters of support for Republican nominees. Performance pay is another example of education reform
supported by conservatives that applies the private market to education. One could hypothesize then
that support for performance pay would be more evident for conservative nominees, or at the very least,
would show up equally among the letters of all three nominees.
Hypothesis 7: Less contentious issues will be mentioned with greater frequency than contentious issues.
Hypothesis 8: There will be more mentions of school choice in letters of support for Republican nominees.
Hypothesis 9: There will be more mentions of performance pay in letters of support for Republican nominees.
The political climate must also be considered by interest groups when submitting a letter of
support. Over time, both liberal and conservative interest groups may accept what were once partisan
issues. Democrats, for instance, came to accept the idea of accountability-based reform in the 1990s, after
clinging to an education platform based on equity (McGuinn 2006, 145). Therefore, while accountability
prior to the 1990s may have been discussed less, the issue should be fairly common in the Paige, Spellings,
and Duncan letters of support. A similar shift occurred from 2000 to 2008. In 2000, the focus was on
student achievement and accountability-based reform and by 2008 there was a push for renewed
innovation in education. The Democratic Party promoted innovation in assessments to evaluate teachers
and students, adaptation of curricula and school calendars, and new teacher salary scales in its 2008
platform. Therefore, letters of support for Duncan should address different issues than those brought up
during the nomination of Paige and Spellings.
Hypothesis 10: A changing political climate means that different issues will be brought up over time.
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Methodology
I used the letters of support submitted to the confirmation hearings held by the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions for the position of Secretary of Education to
compile a sample of advocacy groups involved in shaping education policy. While the list provides a good
foundation for the interest groups interested in education policy, it by no means includes every group, for
as mentioned previously, interest groups from many sectors are interested in education. The hearings
investigated are those of Roderick Paige, in 2001, Margaret Spellings, in 2005, and Arne Duncan, in 2009.
I included only the letters coming from organized groups in the analysis. Consequently, letters from
individuals or, as was frequently the case for the Duncan hearing, from individual schools, are not parts of
the data collection. In total, the list consists of 89 letters of support from 77 different organizations1. Prior
to analyzing the issues addressed by these groups and their methods of influencing policy, I gathered
some basic characteristics to enable further comparison among the groups.
First, I used data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics to categorize each group
according to whether or not they have an affiliated political action committee (PAC) as of 2010. It should
be noted that these PACs may or may not have contributed to the 2000, 2004, or 2008 presidential
elections. I also used data from the Center for Responsive Politics to categorize each group according to
their lobbying activity. Interest groups listed as “lobbying clients” were coded “yes” in the data set; those
not listed were coded “no.” The Center defines a lobbying client as those groups that submitted lobbying
disclosure reports to the Senate’s Office of Public Records during any period from 1998 through 2009.2 I
also coded the groups according to their types of members. Types of members were broken down into
three separate categories: individual membership (such as the teachers’ unions), group membership
(such as those representing school boards), and non membership (typically think tanks). It is important
to note that some groups open their membership to both individuals and groups; however, for the
purpose of this research, the primary source of membership was used for coding. Information on annual
Because the number of letters did not match up perfectly with the number of organizations, I worked with two
data sets, one with the group as the unit of observation and the other with the letter as the unit of observation.
2 The information for both of these characteristics can be obtained through the Center for Responsive Politics
website (www.opensecrets.org).
1
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revenues was also included in the data collection to represent an estimate of the financial resources of the
group. These figures came from the most recent Form 990 submitted to the IRS by the advocacy group3.
The groups were divided in half according to their revenue levels, with the 39 groups labeled as “low”
reporting revenues less than the median (approximately $7.7 million). The 38 groups labeled as “high”
reported revenues greater than the median4.
Upon collecting basic information on the interest groups, I analyzed their positions on certain
key education issues. The letters were read and coded according to their mentioning of keywords or
phrases that correspond to these issues. The first issue is student achievement, represented by
“achievement” in the search; essentially, an increase in student achievement is evidence that reform
efforts have worked. Various synonyms exist for achievement, such as performance or improvement, but I
selected achievement as the keyword because of its widespread use during the 2000 election and after
the enactment of NCLB. The Republican Party’s 2000 platform spoke of “closing the achievement gap”
and promoting academic standards that would show “measured progress in student achievement.”
Student achievement came to be associated with standardized testing, capturing one of the main themes
of recent federal education policy. Closely related to student achievement is the issue of accountability,
which, as mentioned previously, has become a more widely-known term since Congress passed NCLB in
2002. Letters of support that mentioned the issue were coded “yes” under the variable “accountability,”
while those that did not mention the issue were coded “no.” The vague, yet positive connotations
associated with these terms suggest they will be more widely used in the endorsement letters.
Other issues analyzed in this project are geared toward specific reforms. The issue of school
choice, previously discussed in the literature review, is one area included in the data set5. The remaining
issues are those pertaining to teachers. Both NCLB and RTTT recognize the importance of teacher
quality in student achievement. As discussed earlier, the issue of performance pay, which in theory
encourages teachers to employ the most effective teaching methods available, remains a controversial
The forms were obtained through GuideStar USA (www.guidestar.org).
Revenue data was unavailable for 12 groups, typically because the group is not listed as a non-profit organization.
5 In addition to “school choice,” “voucher” and “charter” were also used as search terms.
3
4
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issue6. I searched for mentions of teacher recruitment and retention as well, using the keywords “recruit,”
“retain,” “attract” and “retention”. The NCLB proposal sought to combine federal education programs to
provide more funding for teacher recruitment, while RTTT awards educational agencies that recruit and
retain teachers in hard to staff subject areas or school districts (Bush 2001, 12;U.S. Department of
Education 2009, 10). Finally, increased professional development or teacher training has been a focus of
both administrations. Interest groups were coded “yes” for this variable if the keywords “training,”
“train,” or “professional development” appeared in their letters. These efforts are another way to place a
high quality teacher in every classroom.
Strategies to Influence Education Policy
The final section of the data set relates to the methods used by the interest groups to influence
education policy. Obviously, indicating their areas of interest through a letter of support is one strategy
used by interest groups. Another strategy is to submit a policy proposal or letter to the president’s
transition team. The Obama administration made public all of the documents submitted to the transition
team on its website: www.change.gov. From that source, I searched for each interest group’s name, and
abbreviation if applicable, to ascertain whether or not the interest group had also submitted a document
to the Obama administration. Several groups submitted multiple proposals to the transition; this is not
indicated in the data set. In addition, some groups submitted proposals unrelated to education (i.e.
business groups). These proposals were not coded as “yes” in the data set. Occasionally, proposals were
submitted on behalf of multiple groups. For instance, the Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development (ASCD) was part of a large coalition of interest groups that submitted one request for the
administration to reform NCLB. In this instance, the ASCD was coded “yes” as having submitted a
proposal to the transition team.
As mentioned previously, a third way interest groups seek to influence public policy is by having
a member of their organization appointed to the transition team or the administration. In this project,
connections focused on the department of Education. Therefore, lists of education agency review team
6
“Pay-for-performance” and “merit pay” were an alternative term used in the search.
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and education policy working group members were collected from both the Bush and Obama
administrations7. The same information was gathered for Department of Education political appointees.
For Bush, appointees from his first and second terms are included. I conducted searches on the
professional backgrounds of these individuals to determine whether they had connections to any of the
interest groups in the data set. Only their previous ties to interest groups were considered for the data
set; the connections made after the individual left their position were not included in the analysis. The
organizations affiliated with an appointee or transition team member in the Bush or Obama
administration were coded “yes” for “connection.” If no individual from the Bush or Obama transition
teams or administrations was affiliated with the organization it was coded “no.”
Analysis
The 77 groups that submitted letters to the nomination hearings represent a diverse selection of
interest groups. A majority of the groups, about 55%, engage in lobbying activity, and 10 groups, about
13%, also affiliate with a PAC. The data suggests that groups engaging in lobbying did not equally
support the three nominees. Out of the letters of support written for Paige, over 85% came from lobbying
groups, while this percentage was much smaller for Spellings and Duncan (about 58 and 46 percent,
respectively). A chi-square test indicates this difference to be statistically significant with value p= .05
(see Table 1). Also, Paige received a higher percentage of his letters of support from PAC organizations;
one-third of his supporters had PACs, while less than 10% of Spellings’s and Duncan’s supporters had
PACs. This difference is also shown to be statistically significant with value p = .05 (see Table 2).
The composition of this sample of interest groups is diverse; over 30% of the groups are not
comprised of members. Out of the 53 groups considered to be membership-based, 33 represent
individuals, while the other 20 represent organizations. This breakdown is not significantly different
from the composition noted by Walker in the early 1990s. In his analysis of interest groups, 39% of
advocacy groups represented organizations, 32% represented individuals, and the remaining 29% either
The names from the Obama transition teams were obtained from www.change.gov. The names from the Bush
transition teams came from www.ombwatch.org.
7
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had no members or a combination of organization and individual members (as quoted in Andrews and
Edwards 2004, 488). The data confirms hypothesis 4, which speculated that groups with members
utilize more strategies to attain government access than those groups without members. A comparison of
member-based groups with those that do not have members shows that a greater percentage of groups
with members engage in lobbying than those without. Three quarters of interest groups representing
organizations engage in lobbying and over half of groups representing individual members lobby. In
comparison, less than 40% of non-member groups engage in lobbying activity; a chi-square test reveals
this difference to be statistically significant with value p = .05 (see Table 3).
Non-member groups were also less likely to propose policies to the Obama transition; only 8.3%
submitted a document. In contrast, one-third of groups composed of individual members and 60% of
groups representing organizations submitted a proposal (see Table 4). While the nature of the group’s
membership appears to influence the avenues in which interest groups seek access to the government, it
did not appear to influence the support of a particular nominee. The largest percentage of Paige’s and
Spellings’s letters came from groups with individual members. Duncan received the greatest percentage
of support from non-member groups, but the differences between the three nominees are not great
enough to be statistically significant (see Table 5).
Although 77 organizations are included in the data set, only ten of the interest groups have ties to
transition or administration officials; six groups have connections to the Bush administration, while four
have connections to the Obama administration. A chi-square test shows that a letter of support does not
indicate that a group had ties to the transition team, nor did it guarantee an affiliation with a member of
the administration. Less than 14% of interest groups that submitted letters for the Spellings and Duncan
hearings had connections to the administration. This percentage was lower for groups submitting letters
to the Paige hearing (less than 7%), but the difference is not statistically significiant (see Table 6). This
data suggests early support for an administration and its Secretary of Education does not guarantee a
group’s involvement in the administration. In regards to the transition, nearly one-third of interest
groups submitted a letter or proposal to the Obama transition. Out of that third, only two had
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connections within the transition team or administration. Submitting a policy proposal may increase a
group’s odds of being included in discussions, but it is not a gateway to political appointment.
Submitting Letters to Multiple Hearings
Out of the 89 letters of support sent to the Senate committee, 52 letters were submitted in
support of Spellings, constituting over 58% of the total letters. For Paige, 15 letters, nearly 17% of the
total, were submitted, and Duncan received 22 letters, about 25% of the total. As mentioned earlier, this
could be because Spellings was known on the national stage, while Paige and Duncan came from local
school districts. Of the 77 organizations to submit letters of support, only two groups—the Council of
the Great City Schools (CGCS) and the National School Boards Association (NSBA)—submitted letters
for all three nomination hearings. These two interest groups display similar characteristics. For instance,
neither one has a PAC, but both engage in lobbying. The data supports hypothesis 5, which predicted
that interest groups with diverse members are less likely to be partisan and less likely to advocate for
more partisan issues. Neither group openly issued campaign endorsements in 2000, 2004, or 2008. Their
nonpartisan nature may be rooted in the groups’ memberships. The CGCS and NSBA represent groups
throughout the country, so to take a partisan position would likely create tension within the groups.
Also, neither group mentioned school choice or performance pay plans, the two most controversial issues
in the data set, in any of their letters. As well as refraining from endorsements and more controversial
issues, neither of the groups had connections to the transition team members or the administrations.
Including the CGCS and NSBA, 10 groups submitted letters to more than one nomination
hearing, for a total of 22 letters. All of these groups are composed of members; seven are composed of
individual members, while three represent groups as members. The majority of these groups engage in
lobbying activity, but do not have an affiliated PAC. Only the teachers’ union (NEA and AFT) have
established PACs. The teachers’ unions are also the only interest groups out of the 10 that issue formal
endorsements; as is customary, the teachers’ unions supported Democratic candidates in 2000, 2004, and
2008. It is interesting to note that the unions wrote letters of support for both of Bush’s appointees. No
assumptions can be made from this observation, however, because any number of reasons could explain
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why a letter of support was not issued for Duncan. Seven out of the ten groups submitted proposals to
the Obama transition, but only one of the ten had connections with either of the administrations;
Gabriella Gomez, Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Congressional Affairs during the Obama
administration, advocated on behalf of the AFT.
In regards to the issues, when submitting letters for more than one nominee, interest groups
tended to tailor the letter to the background of the nominee and the current political climate. Hypothesis
6 predicted that groups will mention issues with which a nominee has experience. This hypothesis is
supported in the letters of support submitted by the Council of the Great City Schools. The CGCS
mentioned student achievement in both Paige’s and Duncan’s letter, but it was not mentioned in
Spellings’s. One possible explanation for this is that both Paige and Duncan came to the Department of
Education from urban school districts, where one of the main focuses was to increase the achievement of
students in under-performing schools. Spellings, however, was nominated as Secretary of Education after
serving as Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (Senior Staff: Margaret Spellings 2008).
The political climate also shifted in the course of eight years. The Obama administration
advocated for innovation in order to sustain the increasing student achievement begun under NCLB, as
discussed in the conceptual framework. Accordingly, the NSBA mentioned professional development,
and teacher recruitment and retention in their letter of support for Duncan. Also, during his tenure as
CEO of Chicago Public Schools Duncan was known for encouraging change in the areas of teacher
recruitment, retention, and compensation (Dillon 2008). These issues were not addressed when writing
letters of support for Paige and Spellings. Rather, the focus was on student achievement and
accountability—issues that were at the heart of the education debate during the Bush administration.
Overall, the most common issues brought up by the interest groups were accountability and
student achievement. These principles have become less partisan in recent years; they transcend
presidential administrations, so regardless of the nominee it is an idea worth supporting. Conversely,
none of the organizations addressed school choice or performance pay plans. This finding suggests that
even though both issues are considered to be more salient and partisan, few groups actively push for
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change in these areas. This may be because supporters of the status quo have been effective at supressing
the issue and keeping it off the formal agenda. The absence of these issues from the support letters may
also show that interest groups do not propose policy changes unless there is known support from public
officials. Further explanations for the presence, or absence, of the issues will be discussed upon analyzing
the data set as a whole.
The Influence of PACs, Lobbying, and Revenues
The data set supports hypothesis 1, which predicted that advocacy groups with PACs generate
more revenue than those without PACs. Of the 65 groups for which revenue data was available, eight
were affiliated with PACs, and five of these organizations fell into the upper quartile of the revenue
spread. A chi-square test reveals this difference to be statistically significant with value p =.10. The data
also supports hypothesis 2, which stated that groups with PACs are not more likely to have connections
to the transition team or administration. Out of the 10 groups with PACs, only two (20%) had ties with
the administration; approximately 12% of groups without PACs had connections. The small sample does
not lend itself to generalization, nor is the difference statistically significant (see Table 7). Upon
analyzing the relationship between PACs and proposals sent to the transition team, it may be that PACs
seek to influence policymaking outside of the executive branch. Any interest group had the opportunity
to submit a proposal to the Obama transition, and yet only half of PACs submitted a proposal. Granted,
only 30% of interest groups without PACs submitted a document to the transition, but once again, a chisquare test shows this difference is not statistically significant with value p=.10(see Table 8).
Similar results are found by examining the influence of interest groups that lobby. As was the
case for PACs, groups that lobby had higher revenue levels, providing support for hypothesis 1a. Thirty
eight groups from which revenue data were available engaged in lobbying activity; 24 of those 38 groups,
or 63%, reported revenues above the median. Over 70% of groups with low revenue levels did not engage
in lobbying activity, a difference that is statistically significant with value p =.10 (see Table 9). Also
similar to PACs, the data lends support to hypothesis 2a: relationship between lobbying activity and
connections to the transition team or political appointees is not statistically significant. The 10 interest
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groups with connections to the administrations were evenly split between groups that engage in
lobbying and those that do not (See Table 10). A similar breakdown exists when looking at the
connections in each of the administrations. Five individuals in the Obama administration had
connections to four of the interest groups in the data set. Out of these four interest groups, two
organizations engage in lobbying (AFT and Ariel Invesments), while two do not (Advance Illinois and
the Aspen Institute). Eight individuals from the Bush administration had connections to six interest
groups listed in the data set. Three of those groups engage in lobbying (the Business Roundtable,
National Center for Family Literacy, and the Education Finance Council ) and three do not (Manhattan
Institute, SallieMae, and the Black Alliance for Educational Options).
The relationship between groups that lobby and those that submitted proposals to the Obama
transition is statistically significant, however. Groups that lobby are basically divided equally between
submitting and not submitting to the transition; 21 groups submitted a proposal and 22 groups did not.
In contrast, among groups that do not lobby the overwhelming majority, over 90%, chose not to submit a
proposal to the transition. A chi-square test shows this to be significant with value p=.01 (see Table 11).
From this evidence, one can infer that these interest groups use other access points to influence
policymaking. Whether or not this leads them to much success, however, has yet to be determined.
The data does not support the idea that groups with greater revenue will have more access to the
government. Ten groups had connections with the administrations and revenue data was available for
nine of those groups. Four of these connections were to groups in the lower 50% of the revenue range,
meaning that five groups with connections reported revenues greater than the median. A chi-square test
shows this to be not statistically significant, though this evidence should be looked upon with caution
because half of the cells from the cross tabulation had observed counts less than the expected counts (see
Table 12). In addition, there appears to be no relationship between an interest group’s lobbying efforts,
their revenue, and their connections to the administration. Out of those groups with connections to the
administration and high levels of revenue, three participated in lobbying, while two did not. On the other
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hand, for those groups with connections but low levels of revenue, only one out of the four participates in
lobbying (see Table 13). More observations are needed to provide any conclusive results.
Hypothesis 3 stated that an interest group’s financial resources factor into their decision to
submit a policy proposal to the transition, and the data supports this hypothesis. From the data
collected, there is a steady increase in the percentage of groups submitting proposals as the revenue levels
increase. Among those groups that sent in a proposal to the Obama transition team, nearly three-quarters
reported revenues above the median. Less than 40% of groups who reported revenues less than the
median submitted a policy proposal to the transition team; this difference is statistically significant with
value p = .05 (see Table 14). As noted before, any organization was welcome to submit a document to the
Obama transition, so it was not as though resources bought access to that approach. Groups with more
resources may feel they have more invested in public policies, and therefore, there is greater risk that
policy change will not be in their favor. Consequently, they are more willing to submit policy proposals.
These possibilities will be examined further upon analysis of the issues addressed in the support letters.
Education Policy Issues
Accountability and student achievement were the most common issues brought up in the letters
submitted to the nomination hearings. Twenty eight of the letters (over 30% of the total) mentioned
accountability, and 22 (nearly one quarter of the total) addressed student achievement. Accountability
was mentioned more frequently in letters of support for Spellings: 20 of the 52 letters (38%) pointed out
accountability as an issue. For Paige and Duncan the percentages are smaller, but not statistically
significant (see Table 15). This indicates that accountability has been considered an important issue in
education policy from 2000 to 2010, spanning across two presidential administrations led by the two
political parties. Accountability is a positive term that both sides of the political spectrum can support—
who doesn’t want to see the school system held responsible for ensuring that students are provided an
adequate education? Knowing that accountability could be spun as a bipartisan issue, Bush used it as the
centerpiece of his education policy proposal during the 2000 campaign. He served as governor of Texas
when the state began using accountability measures to increase student achievement in the 1990s, and in
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the campaign he focused on the issue to create a new brand of conservatism—“compassionate
conservatism.” It was this new way of thinking that helped Bush beat Gore on the issue of education,
which has typically been a Democratic-dominated area (McGuinn 2006).
Student achievement is another issue supported by both political parties. A chi-square test,
however, shows a statistically significant difference between the percentages of letters discussing
student achievement among the three nominees. Over half of the letters submitted in support of Paige
raised the issue of achievement, compared to 36% of letters written for Duncan and less than 12% written
for Spellings (see Table 16). This difference probably has less to do with the political affiliation of the
nominee than his or her professional background, as presumed in hypothesis 6. In their letter of support
for Duncan, for instance, the Council of the Great City Schools states, “Mr. Duncan has led the third
largest school system in the Nation since 2002” and “his efforts can be seen in better schools and
significantly enhanced student achievement and opportunity.” In their endorsement of Paige, the
American Association of School Administrators writes, “Dr. Paige was an outstanding member of the
Houston board of education” and “the Congress and the administration will benefit from the advice of
one who has used federal funds to help improve student achievement.” Spellings, while just as committed
to student achievement as Paige and Duncan, did not have the experience of running a school district
that went through major reform.
Analyzing two more specific education issues, school choice and performance pay, produced
surprising results. I predicted in hypothesis 8 that groups supporting school choice would be more likely
to submit letters of support for Republican nominees. The data sample does not indicate this to be the
case, however. Out of all the 89 letters submitted to the Senate committee, approximately 16% of the
letters brought up school choice. Broken down among the individual nominees, 13% of Paige’s letters,
15% of Spellings’s letters, and 18% of Duncan’s letters addressed school choice (see Table 17). One
possible explanation for this finding is that while school choice was a relatively new phenomenon in the
1980s and 1990s, by the beginning of the 21st century, the idea had become more commonplace and widely
accepted among all groups, evenly those traditionally opposed to the idea.
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The results concerning performance pay were equally striking. The data runs against hypothesis 9,
which assumed that merit pay would be given greater attention in letters of support submitted for
Republican nominees. Out of the 89 letters submitted by interest groups, only six brought up
performance pay, and all six of these were submitted in support of Duncan. After consideration of the
results, additional search terms were used to guarantee that the issue was being captured by the search.
“Incentive” (referring to teacher incentives) was added to the search, but the results did not change.
There are some limitations to this data because the number of observations is so small; in fact, in the
cross tabulation, 50% of the observed counts were less than the expected counts.
To reconcile this issue, multiple issues were combined to create a new variable, labeled “teacher
issues.” This category includes mentions of performance pay, as well as teacher training and professional
development, and teacher recruitment and retention. Some reform efforts have focused on recruiting the
brightest individuals to the teaching profession with the belief that they will be more effective teachers.
For those already in the classroom, training or professional development is seen as a way to enhance
teacher quality. Therefore, the variable “teacher issues” encompasses all the issues that pertain to teacher
quality. After performing a chi-square test, the differences are still statistically significant (see Table 18).
Over 60% of the letters submitted for the Duncan hearing mentioned at least one teacher issue, whereas
for the Paige and Spelling hearings, less than 10% of letters from the interest groups mentioned a teacher
issue. Further analysis of this variable shows there no dominant trends concerning the groups lobbying
for teacher issues. Of the 19 letters mentioning teacher issues, just under half were submitted by groups
that engage in lobbying. The groups are also nearly evenly split between the two revenue levels: six
letters came from groups in the lower revenue bracket; eight came from those in the higher bracket
(revenue data was unavailable for two groups). Even the type of members among groups that mentioned
teacher issues is not drastically different; about 30% of non-member groups mentioned teacher issues,
compared to 22% and 12% for individual and group members, respectively (see Table 19). From these
findings it appears that the characteristics of the interest groups are not behind the differences in
concern for teacher issues.
Page | 32
If the explanation behind these discrepancies is not reflective of the interest group’s
characteristics, then what factors contributed to the dramatic increase in the awareness of teacher
issues? Again, part of the relationship may stem from Duncan’s background in Chicago Public Schools. In
a speech to the NEA in July 2009, Duncan recalled his experiences working with teachers in Chicago to
implement new policies; under his leadership, the district increased the number of National Board
Certified teachers and created a pilot performance pay system (Duncan 2009). Duncan’s personal
experience in tackling teacher issues reflects a larger shift in education policy. George Bush established,
through No Child Left Behind, an education policy that expected high levels of student achievement.
State and local education agencies explored various factors that contribute to a student’s success,
including the presence of a high-quality teacher, as the pressure to improve student performance
increased. As Libby Nelson remarked in an article in the Chronicle of High Education, the awareness of the
impact of teacher quality intensified around 2007 when Congress began debating NCLB’s renewal. Kevin
Carey, policy director of Education Sector, noted that the most contentious debates “were actually not
around the testing and the standards part” but “around the teacher-quality provision” (as quoted in
Nelson 2010). The treatment of teacher issues provides another example of the influence of the political
climate, the stances of public officials, and a shifting policy paradigm on the actions taken by interest
groups to attain access to the government and the policymaking process.
Multivariate Regression Analysis
I used several multivariate regressions to allow for comparison with the chi-square tests as well
as to examine in further detail the variables contributing to an interest group’s selection of nomination
hearing strategy. As noted previously, 10 groups submitted letters of support to more than one hearing,
raising the question as to whether groups that submit multiple letters address the same concerns with
each nominee. I created a new variable, “multiple submissions,” with organizations coded “yes” if they
submitted to more than one nominee, and coded “no” if they submitted a letter in support to only one
hearing. I also transformed the variable “hearing” into a dichotomous variable: “Republican” represented
Page | 33
letters in support of Paige or Spellings, and “Democrat” represented letters in support of Duncan. I named
the transformed variable “political party”.
The first regression uses the interest group as the unit of observation. It tests the relationship
between the interest group’s characteristics and their decision to submit more than one letter. The model
is represented by the following equation:
Submission of letter to multiple hearings = βpolitical party + βmember + βPAC + βlobbying+
βconstant
The results from this regression are severely limited by the data set. To create a more complete
picture, more cases would need to be included from other nomination hearings. In the regression,
“Republican” represents political party; therefore, the results model the relationship between the
dependent variable and the group’s decision to submit letters to Republican nominees only. The model
reports the relationship between the political party and the group’s decision to submit letters to multiple
hearings to be statistically significant. Duncan, however, is the only Democratic nominee in the data set
so more hearings from Democratic nominees would be needed to provide any solid results. In addition,
the regression showed that the relationship between a group’s members and their decision to submit
letters to multiple hearings is not statistically significant (see Table 20). These results seem to go against
hypothesis 4, which predicted that groups with members seek to use as many opportunities as possible
to gain access to the government. When looking closer at the data though, I found that within the data
set, every group that chose to submit multiple letters of support has members. There may be a
statistically significant relationship among these two variables, but more observations are required to
reach any sound conclusions.
The second series of logistic regressions is composed of five models with the letter serving as the
unit of observation. Each regression tests the variables that contribute to which education issues are
mentioned in the letters of support. The independent variables entered into the model include political
Page | 34
party8; although the political affiliation of the nominee may have an impact on the issues brought up by
interest, it cannot be assumed that this affiliation is the sole factor behind the issues mentioned in the
letters. To analyze in greater detail how the traits of the interest groups factor into which issues they
bring up, I included three interest group characteristics as independent variables: members, PAC, and
lobbying9. The model is as follows:
Education Issue = βpolitical party + βmembers + βPAC + βlobbying + βconstant
The results suggest the political party of the nominee and the lobbying activity of the interest
group relate to the decision of interest groups to raise concerns about “accountability” when controlling
for other factors (see Table 21b). When submitting a letter to a Republican nominee, the probability that
the interest group wrote about accountability increased by a significant percentage (β = 1.145, p < .10).
Interestingly, a bivariate analysis did not indicate the differences in the percentage of letters mentioning
accountability to be statistically significant among the three nominees, but when other variables are
taken into account, there does appear to be a significant relationship. The results are to be expected
when taken in conjunction with the political climate during the time of the nominations, as
accountability was a larger issue in the Bush administration than in later years. The model also indicates
that interest groups engaging in lobbying are significantly less likely to mention accountability (β = 1.044, p < .05). This does not mean that accountability is not of interest to groups that lobby, but it may
suggest those groups chose to bring up more specific, and possibly more controversial, concerns. The
National Association of Charter School Authorizers, for instance, mentioned accountability in their letter
in support of Spellings, but clearly their focus is on promoting the benefits of charter schools and
emphasizing how school choice can contribute to increased accountability.
Results from the regression on “achievement” show few significant relationships between the
issue and the independent variables. When the hearings are separated according to Republicans and
Democrats, there is not a significant relationship between the variable “political party” and achievement
8 To
clarify the political party taken into account, the results show the relationship between the dependent variable
and a Republican nominee.
9 Table 21a provides a breakdown of the expected relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
Page | 35
when controlling for other variables. The lack of a strong partisan relationship suggests that achievement
is a common issue. Within the data set, it was the second most referenced issue, behind accountability; it
was included in approximately 25% of the letters. The issue lays at the core of education reform;
essentially all the other issues—increased accountability measures, school choice, better quality
teachers—are the ways to reach higher levels of student achievement. Debate in the education sector is
not over whether students should be achieving more, but how that will happen.
Similarly, the model on “school choice” does not find any statistically significant relationships.
The results must be interpreted with caution because the number of letters that brought up school
choice is relatively small (14 of the 89 letters). The model shows, for instance, a very large decline in the
probability of mentioning school choice among groups that have PACs (β = -19.333). There may be a
genuine relationship between these two variables, but more observations are needed to provide sufficient
evidence. It is interesting to note that neither of the three interest group characteristics appear to have
any relationship with mentioning school choice. Perhaps the only characteristic that connects these
groups are their mutual interests in the issue.
The regression on “teacher issues” shows a strong relationship between the issue and the
political affiliation of the nominee. When submitting a letter of support to a Republican nominee, the
probability that the interest group will mention teacher issues drops significantly (β = -3.043, p < .01).
This is to be expected, in light of the bivariate analyses, which showed that Duncan received the majority
of letters mentioning teacher issues. The results also provide support to hypothesis 6, which predicted
that issues would be tailored to the experience of the nominee. As was discussed previously, during his
time as CEO of Chicago Public Schools, Duncan placed a lot of effort on working with teachers to
provide better training and a new compensation system. The results also seem sensible considering that
Democrats are widely known as being associated with labor groups, and teacher groups are one of the
largest constituencies within that industry. It should come as no surprise then that those advocating
better conditions for teachers would turn to Democratic nominees.
Page | 36
I decided to run one final regression testing the variable “performance pay” against the
independent variables. I discussed earlier the limitations that came with the performance pay variable,
particularly relating to the small number of observations (the issue was brought up in only 6 of the 89
letters). The variable “teacher issues,” while solving the size problem, had a different limitation: because
it combines multiple issues, the relationship between the issue and the interest group characteristics may
not be accurate. For instance, organizations that have members may be in support of training and
retaining the best teachers, but they may not support performance pay plans (e.g. the NEA and AFT
support professional development but are strongly opposed to performance pay). The results from the
regression support this theory; groups that have members were significantly less likely to mention
performance pay in their letters of support (β = -2.293, p < .10).
Upon finding that membership plays a significant part in the determining whether an interest
group will mention performance pay, I broke down the variable “members” to see if the specific kind of
members had an influence. I separated the variable into three categories: those involved in K-12
education, including teachers, principals, and school boards; other groups, such as business
organizations, civil rights groups, and associations for higher education; and groups without members.
The regression that followed did not produce any significant results. This most likely occurred because
only six groups in the data set mentioned performance pay. Of these six groups, only the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) has members. For this group, education is not the main focus, but is
one of the many areas in which they promote greater civil rights and equal opportunity (Education 2010).
These results support hypothesis 5, which predicted that groups with members would be less likely to
address controversial issues. Teacher issues on the whole may not be controversial, explaining why there
was essentially no relationship between a group’s members and its mention of teacher issues, but
performance pay remains contentious.
After noting that the political affiliation of the nominee had a relationship with the mentioning
of some education issues, I conducted another series of regressions with the letter as the unit of
observation. In this set, the political party variable was broken down into “Paige” and “Spelling.” For the
Page | 37
variable “Paige,” I coded letters submitted to his nomination as “yes” and those submitted to other
hearings, I coded as “no.” For “Spellings,” letters submitted to her nomination were coded “yes” and those
submitted to Paige or Duncan were coded “no.” The regression equation is as follows:
Education Issue = βPaige + βSpellings + βmembers + βPAC + βlobbying + βconstant
The results from the regressions provide further support for hypothesis 6, which stated that
interest groups tailor the issues mentioned to the nominee. The regression for “accountability” showed
that when controlling for other factors, groups that submitted a letter to Spellings are significantly more
likely to mention accountability(β = 1.196, p < .10; see Table 21c), but this is not the case for those who
submitted a letter to Paige. This reflects the political climate of the time; when Spellings was nominated
in 2005, NCLB and its accountability measures were in full swing. Spellings also had experience working
with accountability measures. As Senator Hutchinson stated during Spellings’s nomination hearing,
during her time as domestic policy advisor to President Bush, she helped implement education, health
and labor policies. In addition, she worked to implement accountability measures in Texas when
President Bush served as governor of the state (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005). The “achievement”
regression indicated that groups submitting letters of support for Spellings were significantly less likely
to mention achievement when controlling for other factors (β = -1.540, p <.05). As noted earlier, this may
be due to the fact that Paige and Duncan, as the head of two of the largest city school districts in the
country, focused heavily on student achievement prior to becoming Secretary of Education. Lastly, for the
“teacher issues” regression, the model showed that the relationship between teacher issues and the
nominee remained the same from the previous regression. Interest groups were still significantly less
likely to mention teacher issues when submitting letters to Paige and Spellings (for Paige β = -3.128, p
<.05; for Spellings β = -3.023, p <.01). Distinguishing between the Republican nomineees provided further
evidence that interest groups cater to the priorities of the nominee and the administration.
Page | 38
Conclusions
There exists a widely held assumption, promoted by the mass media, that lobbyists can get
whatever policy change they want by simply spending enough money and schmoozing enough
politicians. What is not widely forecast, however, is the reality that many policy advocates spend years
fighting for their issues only to reach a stalemate with the opposition (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 6). This
struggle for significant policy change reflects the situation within the education sector as well. A large
part of this challenge in reforming education comes from the actors involved. Interest groups involved in
formulating education policy come from many different fields, from labor unions to big business to
single-issue advocacy groups, all with a different goal in mind for the future of education. Secondly,
within the government, a fine line exists between the responsibility of the local and state governments
and the influence of the federal government. An increasing percentage of education funding comes from
the federal level, but is not always accompanied with increased federal regulation; state and local
districts are reluctant to yield power to the federal Department of Education. Even when reform efforts
develop amidst the complicated network of interests with a stake in education, the result is oftentimes
not too far from the status quo.
To study the influences of interest groups on federal education policy, I analyzed the letters of
support submitted for three Secretary of Education nominees: Rod Paige, Margaret Spellings, and Arne
Duncan. I used the sample of 89 letters, coming from 77 organizations, to test 10 hypotheses relating to
the groups’ characteristics, their strategies in governmental relations, and their advocacy of certain key
education issues. I consulted previous research in the area of interest group politics to compose
hypotheses tailored to my data set, drawn exclusively from the education sector. Many of my results
aligned with the findings of other scholars. My analysis, for instance, found that financial resources do
matter in that they provide the group with the ability to create PACs and employ lobbyists, but resources
do not guarantee appointments within the presidential transition team or administration; the Policy
Agendas Project made similar conclusions. Recognizing the limitations of my data, I also concluded that
interest groups with members typically use more strategies and avoid more controversial issues than
Page | 39
groups without members. These findings are not surprising when taking into account David Truman’s
and Mancur Olson’s works on the development and purpose of interest groups.
After analyzing the traits of the interest groups within the dataset, I focused on the education
issues presented within the letters. Some of the results were to be expected; for example, interest groups
brought up more general issues, such as accountability and student achievement, with greater frequency
than more focused issues, such as performance pay and school choice. Unexpectedly, interest groups
addressed school choice with nearly equal frequency among the three hearings; I had originally
hypothesized that groups would present the issue more often for Republican nominees. I also anticipated
that letters advocating performance pay would be submitted to Republican nominees. The data showed
the exact opposite though: interest groups addressed performance pay exclusively in letters submitted to
the Duncan hearing.
From these results, I reached two conclusions. The first is that the nominee’s background plays
an important role in shaping the education policies mentioned in the letters of support. In the case of
performance pay, it appears that Duncan’s experience working with Chicago public school teachers to
create performance pay systems may have encouraged interest groups to broach the topic. Secondly, just
as in other sectors, the opportunity for education policy change is limited by the gradual shift in the
salience and controversy surrounding reform issues. In the 1980s and 1990s, public officials fought over
the issue of school choice, but by the turn of the century, liberals and conservatives alike viewed school
choice as a viable option in improving the nation’s schools. Similarly, accountability measures began in
Texas during the 1990s, and by the end of the George W. Bush administration the approach had become
the centerpiece for federal education policy.
Further research could provide stronger support for these conclusions. Analyzing the hearings
from previous administrations would provide a more complete account of the development of education
policy throughout the decades. For instance, Congress approved the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act under President Johnson. Were there any specific issues mentioned in letters of support
for his Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare nominee? Also, the Department of Education became
Page | 40
its own cabinet position under President Carter; what issues were addressed in the hearing for the first
Secretary of Education? As well as looking at the development of education issues over time, it would be
interesting to see if interest groups express different priorities in other venues. How did the issues
presented to the Obama transition team, or the feedback submitted as public comments on the Race to
the Top regulations, compare to those mentioned in the letters of support? Did the interest groups
themselves display different characteristics? Knowing that the education sector is composed of numerous
interest groups, representing diverse constituencies and presenting different priorities, my research
sheds light on only a small part of the role of interest groups in the education policymaking process.
Page | 41
Appendix 1.
Table 1.
Duncan
Does not engage in lobbying
12 (54.5%)
Engages in lobbying
10 (45.5%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 6.468; Significance: .039
Hearing
Paige
2 (13.3%)
13 (86.7%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
22 (42.3%)
30 (57.7%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
36 (40.4%)
53 (59.6%)
89 (100.0%)
Hearing
Paige
10 (66.7%)
5 (33.3%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
47 (90.4%)
5 (9.6%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
77 (86.5%)
12 (13.5%)
89 (100.0%)
Membership
Individual
14 (42.4%)
19 (57.6%)
33 (100.0%)
Non
15 (62.5%)
9 (37.5%)
24 (100.0%)
Total
34 (44.2%)
43 (55.8%)
77 (100.0%)
Membership
Individual
22 (66.7%)
Non
22 (91.7%)
Total
52 (67.5%)
11 (33.3%)
2 (8.3%)
25 (32.5%)
33 (100.0%)
24 (100.0%)
77 (100.0%)
Hearing
Paige
4 (26.7%)
10 (66.7%)
1 (6.7%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
16 (30.8%)
22 (42.3%)
14 (26.9%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
25 (28.1%)
40 (44.9%)
24 (27.0%)
89 (100.0%)
Table 2.
Duncan
Does not have a PAC
20 (90.9%)
Has a PAC
2 (9.1%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 6.097; Significance: .047
Table 3.
Group
Does not engage in Lobbying
5 (25.0%)
Engages in lobbying
15 (75.0%)
Total
20 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 6.292; Significance: .043
Table 4.
Group
8 (40.0%)
Did not submit transition
proposal
Submitted transition
12 (60.0%)
proposal
Total
20 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 13.301; Significance: .001
Table 5.
Duncan
Group Membership
5 (22.7%)
Individual Membership
8 (36.4%)
Non Membership
9 (40.9%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 6.263; Significance: .180
Page | 42
Table 6.
Duncan
No connections to transition
19 (86.4%)
team or political appointee
Connection to transition
3 (13.6%)
team or political appointee
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: .540; Significance: .763
Hearing
Paige
14 (93.3%)
Spellings
45 (86.5%)
Total
78 (87.6%)
1 (6.7%)
7 (13.5%)
11 (12.4%)
15 (100.0%)
52 (100.0%)
89 (100.0%)
Table 7.
Does not have a PAC
No connections to transition
59 (88.1%)
team or political appointee
Connection to transition
8 (11.9%)
team or political appointee
Total
67 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: .500; Significance: .479
Has a PAC
8 (80.0%)
Total
67 (87.0%)
2 (20.0%)
10 (13.0%)
10 (100.0%)
77 (100.0%)
Has a PAC
5 (50.0%)
Total
52 (67.5%)
5 (50.0%)
25 (32.5%)
10 (100.0%)
77 (100.0%)
Table 8.
Does not have a PAC
Did not submit transition
47 (70.1%)
proposal
Submitted transition
20 (29.9%)
proposal
Total
67 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 1.611; Significance: .204
Table 9.
Does not engage in
lobbying
Low Revenue
19 (70.4%)
High Revenue
8 (29.6%)
Total
27 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 7.099; Significance: .003
Engages in Lobbying
14 (36.8%)
24 (63.2%)
38 (100.0%)
Total
33 (50.8%)
32 (49.2%)
65 (100.0%)
Table 10.
Does not engage in
lobbying
29 (85.3%)
No connections to transition
team or political appointee
Connection to transition
5 (11.9%)
team or political appointee
Total
34 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: .159; Significance: .690
Engages in Lobbying
Total
38 (88.4%)
67 (87.0%)
5 (20.0%)
10 (13.0%)
43 (100.0%)
77 (100.0%)
Page | 43
Table 11.
Does not engage in
lobbying
31 (91.2%)
Engages in Lobbying
Did not submit transition
proposal
Submitted transition
3 (8.8%)
proposal
Total
34 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 15.523; Significance: .000
Total
21 (48.8%)
52 (67.5%)
22 (51.2%)
25 (32.5%)
43 (100.0%)
77 (100.0%)
Table 12.
No connections to
transition team or
political appointee
Low Revenue
29 (51.8%)
High Revenue
27 (48.2%)
Total
56 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 2.424; Significance: .120
Connection to
transition team or
political appointee
4 (44.4%)
5 (55.6%)
9 (100.0%)
Total
33 (50.8%)
32 (49.2%)
65 (100.0%)
Table 13.
No connections to
transition team or
political appointee
16 (84.2%)
Connection to
transition team or
political appointee
3 (15.8%)
13 (92.9%)
1 (7.1%)
14 (100.0%)
6 (75.0%)
2 (25.0%)
8 (100.0%)
21 (87.5%)
3 (12.5%)
24 (100.0%)
Total
56 (86.2%)
Low Revenue Chi-Square Value: .566; Significance: .452
High Revenue Chi-Square Value: .711; Significance: .399
9 (13.8%)
65 (100.0%)
Low Revenue
High Revenue
Does not engage
in lobbying
Engages in
lobbying
Does not engage
in lobbying
Engages in
lobbying
Total
19 (100.0%)
Table 14.
Did not submit
transition proposal
Low Revenue
27 (64.3%)
High Revenue
15 (35.7%)
Total
42 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 8.676; Significance: .003
Submitted
transition proposal
6 (26.1%)
17 (73.9%)
23 (100.0%)
Total
33 (50.8%)
32 (49.2%)
65 (100.0%)
Page | 44
Table 15.
Duncan
No mention of accountability
18 (81.8%)
Mentions accountability
4 (18.2%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 3.141; Significance: .208
Hearing
Paige
11 (73.3%)
4 (26.7%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
32 (61.5%)
20 (38.5%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
61 (69.5%)
28 (31.5%)
89 (100.0%)
Hearing
Paige
7 (46.7%)
8 (53.3%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
46 (88.5%)
6 (11.5%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
68 (76.3%)
22 (24.7%)
89 (100.0%)
Hearing
Paige
13 (86.7%)
2 (13.3%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
44 (84.6%)
8 (15.4%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
75 (84.3%)
14 (15.7%)
89 (100.0%)
Hearing
Paige
14 (93.3%)
1 (6.7%)
15 (100.0%)
Spellings
48 (92.3%)
4 (7.7%)
52 (100.0%)
Total
70 (78.7%)
19 (21.3%)
89 (100.0%)
Membership
Individual
31 (77.5%)
9 (22.5%)
40 (100.0%)
Non
24 (70.8%)
7 (29.2%)
31 (100.0%)
Total
70 (78.7%)
19 (21.3%)
77 (100.0%)
Table 16.
Duncan
No mention of achievement
14 (63.6%)
Mentions achievement
8 (36.4%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 13.058; Significance: .001
Table 17.
Duncan
No mention of school choice
18 (81.8%)
Mentions school choice
4 (18.2%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: .169; Significance: .919
Table 18.
Duncan
No mention of teacher issues
8 (36.4%)
Mentions teacher issues
14 (63.6%)
Total
22 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 31.132; Significance: .000
Table 19.
Group
No mention of teacher issues
22 (88.0%)
Mentions teacher issues
3 (12.0%)
Total
25 (100.0%)
Chi-Square Value: 2.206; Significance: .332
Page | 45
Table 20. Organizations Submitting Multiple Letters
Multiple Submissions
Coefficient β
Republican (vs. Democrat)
-1.590**
(.769)
Members (vs. No Members)
19.715
(8035.759)
PAC (vs. No PAC)
.080
(.995)
Lobbying (vs. Does Not Lobby)
1.123
(.921)
Constant
-.012
(.990)
Pseudo R2
.302
Observations
77
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 21a. Letters Mentioning Education Issues: Expected Results
Accountability Achievement
School Choice
Teacher Issues
Republican
Paige
Spellings
Members
PAC
Lobbying
No Expectation
+
No Expectation
+
No Expectation
+
No Expectation No Expectation
No Expectation No Expectation
+ No Expectation
+
+
+
+
+ No Expectation
+
+
+
No Expectation No Expectation No Expectation
No Expectation No Expectation No Expectation
Table 21b. Letters Mentioning Education Issues: 4 Variables
Accountability Achievement
School Choice
Republican
1.145*
(.643)
Members
-.033
(.558)
PAC
.413
(.713)
Lobbying
-1.044**
(.523)
Constant
-.644
(.639)
Pseudo R2
.106
Observations
89
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
-.901
(.561)
.416
(.621)
-.697
(.855)
.391
(.556)
-1.724**
(.801)
.060
89
.159
(.703)
-.634
(.648)
-19.333
(11394.703)
-.836
(.636)
-21.451
(11394.703)
.145
89
Teacher Issues
-3.043***
(.656)
.001
(.736)
.094
(1.037)
-.261
(.705)
.505
(1.017)
.419
89
Performance
Pay
Performance
Pay
19.715
(4444.595)
-2.293*
(1.274)
-16.078
(9462.203)
-1.100
(1.347)
-38.718
(10454.076)
.641
89
Page | 46
Table 21c. Letters Mentioning Education Issues: 5 Variables
Accountability Achievement
School Choice
Paige
.823
(.883)
Spellings
1.196*
(.647)
Members
.005
(.563)
PAC
.503
(.735)
Lobbying
-1.004
(.527)
Constant
-1.662
(.902)
Pseudo R2
.110
Observations
89
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
.946
(.801)
-1.540**
(.639)
-.139
(.663)
-1.434
(.960)
.172
(.612)
-1.738
(1.044)
.0237
89
.788
(1.097)
.086
(.720)
-.742
(.677)
-19.509
(11315.186)
-.910
(.653)
-21.905
(11315.186)
.154
89
Teacher Issues
-3.128**
(1.182)
-3.023***
(.690)
.006
(.736)
.110
(1.055)
-.255
(.708)
.525
(1.043)
.419
89
Performance
Pay
-18.048
(9573.624)
-19.939
(5076.757)
-2.293*
(1.274)
-16.084
(9487.312)
-1.100
(1.347)
-19.009
(9487.312)
.641
89
Page | 47
Appendix 2.
Explanation of Variables
Variable
Hearing
PAC
Lobbying
Membership
Accountability
Achievement
Performance Pay
School Choice
Teacher Issues
Connections
Transition
Revenue
Multiple Submissions
Political Party
Members
Description
To which hearing the interest group
submitted a letter (Paige, Spellings, or
Duncan)
Dichotomous; yes or no: does the group
have an affiliated PAC as of 2010?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the group
submit a lobbying disclosure report to the
Senate’s Office of Public Records from
1998 through 2009?
Whether the group is composed of mainly
individual members (“individual”),
members representing organizations
(“group”), or no members (“non”)
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter
mention accountability?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter
mention student achievement?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter
mention performance pay for teachers?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter
mention school choice?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter
mention performance pay, teacher training
and professional development, or teacher
recruitment and retention?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did a member of
either transition teams or administrations
have previous connections with the group?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did a group
submit a document to the Obama
transition team?
Dichotomous; of the groups for which data
was available, did the group have a
reported revenue below (“low”) or above
(“high”) the median ($7.7 million)?
Dichotomous; yes or no: did the group
submit a letter to more than one hearing?
Dichotomous; was the letter submitted to
a Republican or Democratic nominee?
Dichotomous; yes or no: does the group
have members?
Frequency
Paige: 15/89 letters (16.9%)
Spellings: 52/89 letters (58.4%)
Duncan: 22/89 letters (24.7%)
Yes: 10/77 organizations (13.0%)
Yes: 42/77 organizations (54.5%)
Individual: 33/77 organizations
(42.9%)
Group: 20/77 organizations
(26.0%)
Non: 24/77 organizations (31.2%)
Yes: 28/89 letters (31.5%)
Yes: 22/89 letters (24.7%)
Yes: 6/89 letters (6.7%)
Yes: 14/89 letters (15.7%)
Yes: 19/89 letters (21.3%)
Yes: 10/77 organizations (13.0%)
Yes: 25/77 organizations (32.5%)
Low: 33/65 organizations
(50.8%)
High: 32/65 organizations
(49.2%)
No data: 12/77 organizations
(15.6%)
Yes: 10/77 organizations (13.0%)
Republican: 67/89 letters (75.3%)
Democratic: 22/89 letters
(24.7%)
Yes: 53/77 organizations (68.8%)
Page | 48
Explanation of Coding
Concept
Accountability
Keyword/ Phrase
“accountability”
Student Achievement
“achievement”
Performance Pay
“performance pay”
“pay-for-performance”
“merit pay”
School Choice
“school choice”
“charter”
“voucher”
Teacher Training
“training”
“train”
“professional development”
“recruit”
“attract”
“retain”
“retention”
Teacher Recruitment and
Retention
Example in Confirmation Hearing
“Dr. Paige has demonstrated that
accountability and rigorous
expectations can indeed produce
results for all students…”
“…his relentless determination has
produced some of the most impressive
achievement gains of any major city
school system in the nation.”
“…Mr. Duncan instituted significant
reforms for the Chicago teachers’
corps, including pay-for-performance
salary incentives…”
“…she played key roles in passing the
No Child Left Behind legislation as
well as Washington, D.C.’s pilot
voucher program.”
“…increase our focus on improved
professional development for our
educators…”
“…the nation faces a host of other
challenges that are outside of the scope
of NCLB; these include better working
conditions and compensation to
attract and keep good teachers…”
Page | 49
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