Strategic
From JP 3-0 Glossary:
strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or
multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to
achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated
fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)
Not defined in Army Doctrine
From JP 1-02 Glossary: operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.
From JP 1-02 Glossary: campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and
operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 5-0)
From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-7: A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and
operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles,
engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve
strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0).
Operational
From JP 1-02 Glossary: major operation — 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by
combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives
in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See
also operation. (JP 3-0)
From ADPR 1-02: major operation – (DOD) 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by
combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in
an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See
ADRP 3-0.
Are operations
at the
operational
level of war?
From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-58: For Army forces, an operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related
tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part
From JP 1-02 Glossary: operation — 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A
military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP
3-0).
Tactical
From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-58: A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions
designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity. Tactical actions include
widely varied activities. They can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a
population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity.
From ADRP 1-02 and JP 1-02: engagement 2. A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver
forces. (JP 3-0) See also battle; campaign.
From ADRP 1-02: battle – A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than
an engagement. (ADP 3-90) See also campaign; engagement; major operation.
Other Theorist Definitions
Clausewitz: strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war. Pg 128
Strategic
Antoine-Henri Jomini, “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.”
(From Swain JFQ Article)
Julian Corbett, “the art of directing force to the ends in view,” and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of
statesmanship and the latter having to do with plans of operations (From Swain JFQ Article)
Aleksandr A. Svechin set broad goals to be achieved over relatively long periods compared with tactics. (From Swain JFQ
Article)
Naveh: Therefore, one can rightly claim that the operational level is the application of the universal system in the military
sphere. The essence of this level, as the intermediary field between strategy and tactics, is the preparation, planning, and
conduct of military operations in order to attain operational objectives and strategic aims. pg 9-10; Criteria for Operational:
cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical mission; industrious manoeuvre, expressing dynamic interaction
between various elements of the system as well as between general action and the strategic aim; synergetic: more than a
sum of its parts, combined arms, amalgamation of various forms of warfare, and integration of various units in geography
and time; aim is disruption of enemy system; must account for randomness and chaos; non-linear nature. the plan should
be hierarchically structured and express depth; interaction between notions of manoeuvre and attrition; must be
independent from strategy; must be related to a broad and universal theory. pg 13-14
Operational
Kelly and Brennan: Operational Art: A two-way conversation between strategy and tactics. Operational level of war is the
grouping of tactical action by time and space towards a single idea or intent.
Schneider: Operational Art characterized by employment of forces in deep distributed operations.
Swain: Operational Art = the employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of
operations, through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.
Isserson (through Harrison): Now, the “main thing in the evolution of the modern operation, is its “depth, which determines
its new and enormous intensity” as it makes its way through the enemy’s position (emphasis in the original). Pg 106.
Aleksandr A. Svechin: translated the broad abstract goals of strategy into discrete tactical tasks and provided the
wherewithal to sustain action to accomplish intermediate goals, developing, in the whole, accomplishment of
the strategic design. (From Swain JFQ Article)
Tactical
Clausewitz: tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement. Pg 128
Aleksandr A. Svechin : to do with maximization of weapon or material capabilities within particular contexts to solve
immediate problems. (From Swain JFQ Article)
Size of operation
Type of Force
Strategic
Campaign
Operational
Are operations
at the
operational
level of war?
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Major Operation
Operation
Engagement
Tactical
Battle
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From ADRP 1-02: corps – The Army’s largest tactical
unit and the instrument by which joint force
commanders conduct operational-level maneuver.
(FM 3-90)
From ADPR 1-02: division – An Army echelon of
command above brigade and below corps. It is a
tactical headquarters which employs a combination of
brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and
functional brigades in land operations. (ADRP 3-90)
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ADRP 5-0, 2-1: Planning results in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time, space,
and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions
From ADRP 5-0 paragraph 2-20. Conceptual planning is directly associated with operational art—the cognitive
approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to
develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and
means (JP 3-0). Operational art is a thought process that guides conceptual and detailed planning to produce
executable plans and orders.
From ADRP 3-0 Paragraph 4-1: For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part,
through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. This approach enables commanders and staffs to
use skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and intricacies of a complex, ever changing,
and uncertain operational environment to better understand the problem or problems at hand. Operational art applies to
all aspects of operations and integrates ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. Operational art is applicable at
all levels of war, not just to the operational level of war.
From ADRP 1-02 Glossary: operational art – (DOD) The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by
their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize
and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0.
From JP 1-02 operational art — The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill,
knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment — to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and
employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)
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Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869)
Summary of The Art of War (1837)
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Experience: Staff of Marshal Michel Ney, One of Napoleon’s Marshalls; later Russian Army in Tzar Alexander’s Headquarters
Motivation: “frantic scramble to succeed by making an impression on some key man.”
Derived theory from study of campaigns of King Fredrick the Great of Prussia; influenced by Lloyd and Bulow
“It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all operations of war, - a principle which must be followed in all good combinations” = Universal
Principles
Decisive Point (from Schneider & Lawrence – “Clausewitz’s Elusive Center of Gravity” also in Calhoun – “Clausewitz and Jomini”):
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Jomini fundamental principles of war consist of the following maxims:
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To throw by strategic movements the mass of the army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications
of the enemy as much as possible, without compromising one’s own
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To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces.
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On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to
overthrow.
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To arrange that these masses shall not be only thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with ample energy.
Lines of Operation
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If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of
operations (as the primary means of attaining this end) may be regarded as fundamental in devising a good plan for campaign. (Jomini, pg113 and 176)
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Thus, when two armies confront each other, both on the battlefield and in the theater of operations, operations should usually be directed against one of the
extremities of the enemy’s front and towards his communication with his rear. (Gat, pg119)
“Principles of War”:
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Initiative, Mobility & Movement, Concentration of Force
Strategy is “the art of making war upon the map”
Simple – easy to understand (he wanted to sell books)
Serves as a field guide of practical advice for conduct of warfare through application of universal principles
Gat: “On one central point, Jomini’s theoretical outlook fundamentally differed from his predecessors. This divergence was related to the shift in emphasis from tactics
to strategy…” (pg115)
“The greatest secret of war consists in becoming master of the communications of the enemy” (Jomini did attribute to Napoleon, Gat, pg117)
The destruction of the enemy’s field army is the military aim. (Gat, pg117)
“The employment of masses upon the decisive points, constitutes alone good combinations, and … it should be independent of all positions.” (Gat, pg118)
Genius: the skill with which the commander could employ in combat the fundamental principles of war he is elucidating – how well can he identify the decisive point.
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“in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front. (Calhoun, pg34)
“Checklist”
Popular because it was “available,” having been written in French
Was linked by B.H. Liddle Heart as “strategy of the indirect approach” as means to break the gridlock of the modern battlefield
Still see his influence in current doctrine: interior/exterior lines; principles of war; etc.
Reynolds Theorist? No. Not sufficiently abstract (limited examples to Fredrick); does not achieve intersubjectivity (land-centered, principles specifically geared
towards land warfare); and does not show empirical relevance – true when tested against reality (principles don’t hold up to conflict today). (Calhoun, pg35)
Carl Philip Gottlieb Von Clausewitz (1780-1831)
On War (1832 – published by his wife, Marie)
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Experience: Prussian Army, Administered Prussian General War College and tutor to Prussian Crown Prince
Motivation: Development of a general theory of war
Significant impact on U.S. doctrine: quoted to start (second paragraph, pg I-1) JP 1 (the fundamental principles and overarching guidance for employment of the
Armed Forces of the United States) – description of “art of war”
Theory: You can not develop a theory. Challenges: 1)Psychological forces (hostility, danger, intellectual qualities) on the CDR – forces interact in unpredictable
ways; 2)War’s inherently interactive nature; 3)Unreliability of information in war, a result of the many unobservable actions taken by the participants (Calhoun, pg28)
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Thus: theory should guide student of war… “light his way, eas his progess, train his judgement, and help him avoid pitfalls.”
Method: Dialectical reasoning, or contrasting opposites in discourse. Not specifically Hegel-esque, rather it’s contrasting extremes to show that practical reality exists
somewhere in between. (Calhoun, pg29-30)
Also published after his death; “The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished” – leads to confusion
War is an act of force, . . . Which theoretically can have to limits:
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Referred to in discussion of ethics by Walzer, pg23
War is extension of policy: “the continuation of politics by other means” (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 24 heading)
Defense is stronger than offense, but has a negative object. Offensive has a positive object. (Dr. Brucino)
Fog of war: “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.
(pg101)
Friction in war: “the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective” (pg119)
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“Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult” (pg119)
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“Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper” (pg119)
Duality (concept)
Paradoxical trinity between primordial violence (blind natural force: people), hatred (play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam:
commander & army), and enmity (element of insubordination, as an instrument of policy: government) – theory on war must maintain balance of the three.
COG:
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Book 8, CH4: “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the
hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” (pg595-6)
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Book 6, CH27: “A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow;
furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity.” (pg485)
“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Book 1, CH1
“Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war.”
“Theory should be study, not doctrine” (pg141)
Military Genius: “any complex activity, if it is to be carrie don with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are
outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called “a genius.” (pg100)
Questions about revised chapters?
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Revised: Book1: On Nature of War, Book 7: The Attack, & Book 8: War Plans
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Unrevised: Book Two: On the Theory of War, Book 3: On Strategy in General, Book 4: The Engagement, Book 5: Military Forces, Book 6: Defense
Reynolds Theorist? Yes. Sufficiently abstract (broad description of phenomenon of war); achieves intersubjectivity (range of conflict from total war to limited war);
and shows empirical relevance – true when tested against reality (says his principles don’t hold up to reality… is reality). (Calhoun, pg35)
Operational Art
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Current (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27): The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop
strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0.
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Strategy: A prudent idea or set of ideas for the employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national,
and/or multinational objective (JP 3-0)
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Campaign: (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See ADRP 30. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)
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Operation: 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical,
service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, 15 July 2012)
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Ends: objectives and desired end state (JP 3-0, pg II-4)
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Ways: sequence of actions most like to achieve objectives and end state (JP 3-0, pg II-4)
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Means: resources required to accomplish that sequence of actions (JP 3-0, pg II-4)
Alternate Definition (ADP 3-0, pg 9): “Operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space,
and purpose. … The effective arrangement of military conditions in time, space, and purpose is the task of operational art.”
Old (FM 1-02, pg 1-138): (DOD) The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and
conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately,
tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.
JP 1-02 (Amended through 15 July 2012): The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment
– to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0) (*Same as ARDP 1-02)
James Schneider (Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundation of the Operational Art): operational art is characterized by the employment of forces in deep
distributed operations. (pg28)
John Olsen and Martin van Crevald (The Evolution of Operational Art – From Napoleon to the Present): Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics,
operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a
given theatre of operations. (pg1)
Michael R. Matheny (Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945): At the heart of operational art is campaign planning. The campaign plan actually
links tactics to strategy by determining where, when, how, and, most importantly, to what purpose military forces will engage the enemy. (pg xviii). While some would
claim it was lost, he claims that it was never lost, and was called by different names, and it was rediscovered in 1981 when it was codified with the current name.
Shimon Naveh (In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory): The introduction of the term “operational art” in the 1986 field manual (FM 100-5)
marked the definite recognition of creativity, as the basic quality required from operational level commanders. . . . The American definitions of campaign and theater now
resemble those of the Russians. (pg12)
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Naveh “test to deem something operational” (nine checks) – pg 13-4
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Reflected cognitive tension between orientation towards strategic aim and adherence to the tactical missions
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Muse be based on industrious maneuver, expressing dynamic interaction between elements in the system
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Planned action should be synergetic (synthesis through aspects of combined arms combat, amalgamation of various forms of warfare, and integration
of forces across geography and time)
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At tactical level, operations aim at destruction of opponents system
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Must reflect contemplative attitude towards randomness, chaotic dimensions and interrelation between contentious systems
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Should be non-linear in nature (should be hierarchically structured and express depth)
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Should reflect deliberate interaction between notions of maneuver and attrition
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Should constitute a completely independent entity with specific scope of mission/aim
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Concept, plan or act must be related to a broad and universal theory
Operational Approach
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Current Definition: Operational Approach – (DOD) A description of broad
actions that the force must take to transform current conditions into those
desired at end state. See ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27)
Completed CDR Vision (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4)
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Through operational art, commanders translate their operational approach
into a concept of operations and ultimately into tactical tasks. (ADRP 3-0, pg
4-1)
In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of
intellectual tools to help them communicate a common vision of the
operational environment as well as visualizing and describing the
operational approach. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the
elements of operational art. These tools help commanders understand,
visualize, and describe combinations of combat power and help them
formulate their intent and guidance. (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-4)
Depicting Operational Approach
“Techniques”
JP 5-0, pg III-39
JP 5-0, pg III-15
(Ten) Elements of Operational Art (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-2)
In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an operational environment as well as visualize and
describe their approach for conducting the operation. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-2)
Element
Definition
End State and
Conditions
The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. (ADRP 3-0,
pg 4-3)
Center of Gravity
A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP
5-0 / ADRP 3-0, pg 4-3)
Decisive Points
A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows
commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0 /
ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4)
Lines of Operation &
Lines of Effort
Line of Operation: a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy
and that links the force with its base of operations and objectives. LOOs connect a series of decisive points that lead
to control of a geographic or force oriented objective.
- A force operates on interior lines when operations diverge from a central point
- A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy
Line of Effort: a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus
efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (In operations involving man nonmilitary factors,
LOEs may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-5)
Operational Reach
The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0, pg 4-5)
Basing
A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported. Army basing overseas typically falls into two
general categories: permanent (bases or installations) and nonpermanent (base camps). (JP 4-0 / ADRP 3-0, pg 4-6)
Tempo
Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-7)
Phasing and
Transitions
A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase usually
involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling and
may be indicated by time, distance, terrain or an event. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-7)
Culmination
The culminating point is the point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue
its current form of operations (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-8)
CDR Role in the Operations Process (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-3)
The commander’s role is to drive the operations process through activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing (as
depicted in figure 1.1). (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-2)
Method
Definition
Understand
Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. It is
essential to effective decision making during planning and execution. Analysis of the operational
variables provides the information used to develop understanding and frame the problem (ADRP
5-0, pg 1-3) Mission variables include: Mission, Enemy, Terrain & Weather, Troops and support
available, Time available, Civil considerations (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-9, Table 1-3)
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Mission
Enemy
Terrain & Weather
Troops & Support Available
Time available
Civil Considerations
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Current Situation / Operational Approach / End State
Visualize
As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the problem, they start
visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the problem. Collectively, this is
known as commander’s visualization – the mental process of developing situational
understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which
the force will achieve that end state (ADP 5-0). In building their visualization, commanders first
seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next commanders
envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state.
Commander complete their visualization by conceptionalizing an operational approach – a
description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those
desired at end state (JP 5-0) (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4)
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Describe
After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to
facilitate shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates
understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During
execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance
and directives resulting in FRAGOs that adjust the general order. Commanders express
visualization in terms of commanders intent, planning guidance including an operational
approach, CCIR and EEFI. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4-5)
CDR Intent
Planning Guidance & Operational Approach
CCIR (PIR – intelligence requirement that CDR need to know to
understand enemy or OE & FFIR – information the CDR needs
to understand his force or supporting capabilities)
EEFI (critical aspect of friendly operation that if known by
enemy could lead to failure – should be protected from enemy
detection)
Direct
Lead
Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting
achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations
process, commanders direct forces by – preparing and approving plans and orders; establishing
command and support relationships; assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures and task
organization; positioning units to maximize combat power; positioning key leaders at critical
places and times to ensure supervision; allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter
threats; committing the reserve as required. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-6)
Through leadership, commander provide purpose, direction and motivation to subordinate
commanders, their staff and Soldiers. Where the commander locates within the area of
operations is an important leadership consideration. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-6)
Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and
Consider
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preparing and approving plans and orders
establishing command and support relationships
assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures and task
organization
positioning units to maximize combat power
positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure
supervision
allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter
threats
committing the reserve as required
Leader Location
Balance of time between leading staff and away from
Command Post
(Eight) Elements of Combat Power (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)
To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat
power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement
and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the
last six elements as the warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)
A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and
processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADP 3-0, pg
13)
Element
Definition
Leadership
Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of
combat power. The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and
motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)
Information
Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power.
Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve definitive results. Knowledge management enables commanders to
make informed, timely decisions despite the uncertainty of operations. Commanders use information as a mission
command system to understand, visualize, describe and direct operations. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-2)
Mission
Command
The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of
command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-2)
Movement and
Maneuver
The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the
enemy and over threats. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-3)
Intelligence
The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. (ADRP 3-0, pg
3-4)
Fires
The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile
defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-4)
Sustainment
The related tasks and systems that provide support and service to ensure freedom of action, extend operational
reach, and prolong endurance. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-4)
Protection
The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to
accomplish the mission. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-5)
Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply
at a given time. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)
Operational and Mission Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-7)
An operational environment for each operation differs and evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables
(PEMESII-PT) to analyze and understand a specific operational environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission
variables (METT-TC)to focus on specific elements of an operational environment during mission analysis. (Paragraph 1-8, pg 1-2, ADRP 3-0)
Operational Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-7)
Political
Describes the distribution of responsibility and
power at all levels of governance—formally
constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert
political powers .
Military
Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of
all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a
given operational environment.
Economic
Encompasses individual and group behaviors related
to producing, distributing, and consuming
resources.
Social
Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup
within an operational environment and the beliefs,
values, customs, and behaviors of society members
Information
Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and
effects of individuals, organizations, and systems
that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information.
Mission Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-9)
Mission
Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their
impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with
the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason
therefore. It is always the first variable commanders consider during
decision-making. A mission statement contains the "who, what, when,
where, and why" of the operation.
Enemy
The second variable to consider is the enemy—dispositions (including
organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine,
equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
Terrain &
Weather
Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each
other’s impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features
(such as rivers and mountains) and manmade features (such as cities,
airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military
aspects of terrain expressed in the memory aid OAKOC: observation and
fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles,
cover and concealment. The military aspects of weather include visibility,
wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity.
Troops &
Support
Available
This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of
friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and available
support available from joint, host nation and unified action partners. They
also include support from civilians and contractors employed by military
organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel
Command.
Infrastructure
Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and
installations needed for the functioning of a
community or society.
Physical
Environment
Includes the geography and manmade structures, as
well as the climate and weather in the area of
operations.
Time
Available
Time
Describes the timing and duration of activities,
events, or conditions within an operational
environment, as well as how the timing and
duration are perceived by various actors in the
operational environment.
Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and
executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to
assemble, deploy, and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and
conditions.
Civil
Consider
ations
Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian
institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and
organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military
operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in
the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,
people, and events.
(Nine) Principles of War / (Twelve) Joint Operations
Since the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, joint doctrine has recognized nine principles of war. Subsequent experience from a wide variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations
has identified three additional principles – restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations. (JP 3-0, pg I-2)
(Army) The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of war. The principles are not a checklist. While commanders
can consider the principles in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of successful operations. Their greatest value lies in
educating the military professional. Applied to the study of past operations, the principles are powerful tools that can assist commanders in analyzing pending operations. While considering the
principles, commanders synchronize efforts and determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-1)
Principle
Principle as outline in JP 3-0, Appendix A “Principles of Joint Operations”
Objective
The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
achievable goal.
Offensive
The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Mass
The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to
produce decisive results
Maneuver
The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of
combat power
Economy of Force
The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to
allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts
Unity of Command
The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every
objective
Security
The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.
Surprise
The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.
Simplicity
The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by
preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.
Perseverance
The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.
Legitimacy
The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.
Restraint
The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.
Design
• Operational Design: The conception and construction of the
framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan
and its subsequent execution. See also campaign; major
operation. (JP 5-0) (JP 1-02, pg 234)
• Operational design is a process of iterative understanding and
problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their
application of operational art with tools and a methodology to
conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and
campaigns. (JP 5-0, pg III-1)
• Army Design Methodology: A methodology for applying critical
and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe
unfamiliar problems in approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0).
(ADRP 1-02, pg 1-3)
• A design is a vision expressed in terms of intent (what I want to
do), concept (how I want to do it), and narrative (my
instructions). (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to
Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53,
2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)
(Thirteen) Elements of Operational Design (JP 5-0, pg III-18)
Within
operational art, joint force commanders and staffs consider elements of operational design. Elements
of operational design are individual tools that help the joint force commander
Element
Definition
and staff visualize and describe the broad operational approach. (See figure 4-3. See JP 3-0 for a discussion of the elements of operational design.) Army forces use elements of operational
developed first among
elements
of operational design as they enable the development of the military end state and objectives. Termination criteria describe the standards that must be
design
when functioningTermination
as a jointcriteria
forceare
headquarters.
(ADRPthe3-0,
pg 4-3)
Termination
met before conclusion of a joint operation. (JP 5-0, pg III-19).
Military End State
Military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the
military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. While it may mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, the military end state typically
will be more specific and contain other supporting conditions. (JP 5-0, pg III-19)
Objective
An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed. … Objectives prescribe friendly goals … Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach
the end state. Four primary considerations for an objective: 1) establishes a single desired result (a goal); 2) should link directly or indirectly to higher level objectives or to the end state; 3) is prescriptive, specific,
and unambiguous; 4) does not infer ways and/or means – it is not a written task. (JP 5-0, pg III-20)
Effects
An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated
objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. Four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement: 1) should link directly to one or more objectives; 2)
should be measurable; 3) should not specify ways and means for accomplishment; 4) should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task (JP 5-0, pg III20 – 21)
Center of Gravity
A COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point at
which all our energies should be directed.” An objective is always linked to a COG. There may also be different COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the strategic level, a COG could be a military
force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful
element of the armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. (JP 5-0, pg III-22)
Decisive Point
A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving
success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). … Although decisive points are usually not COG’s, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them. (JP 5-0, pg III-26)
LOO & LOE
A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). LOOs describe and
connect a series of decisive actions that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using LOOs generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined
sequence, although multiple LOOs can exist at the same time (parallel operations). Major combat operations are typically designed using LOOs. (JP 5-0, pg III-27)
A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Lines of effort are essential to operational
design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or stability operations. (JP 5-0, pg III-28)
Direct & Indirect
Approach
The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, COGs are generally
well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually choose an indirect approach. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s COG by applying combat power against a series of decisive
points that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength. (JP 5-0, pg III-31 – 32)
Anticipation
Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for
opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with higher headquarters, subordinates, partner nations, and other organizations in the OA. (JP
5-0, pg III-33)
Operational Reach
Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Although reach may be constrained or limited by the geography in and around the OA, it may be
extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effectiveness of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and contract support (system, external, theater) and maximizing the
throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture. The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of LOOs. (JP 5-0, pg III-33)
Culmination
Culmination is that point in time and/or space at which the operation can no longer maintain momentum. In the offense, the culminating point is the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer
possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the
counteroffensive or defend successfully. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in
protection leading to excessive casualties. (JP 5-0, pg III-34)
Arranging
Operations
Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and
sequential operations to reach the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging
operations. (JP 5-0, pg III-35)
Force and Functions
Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary
forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible friction between friendly and adversary forces and capabilities. (JP 5-0, pg III-38)
Army Design Methodology (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-4 – 2-11)
•
•
Definition: a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe
problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). (ARDP 1-02, pg 1-3)
Key concepts:
–
–
–
–
–
•
Critical & creative thinking
Collaboration and dialogue
Framing
Narrative Construction
Visual Modeling
Army Design Methodology (4x activities)
1.
Improved understanding of operational environment
•
Frame Operational Environment
–
–
•
Frame the Problem
–
2.
3.
•
4.
Elements of operational art and method (defeat vs. stability mechanisms) related to core competency (CAM & WAS) feed
into developing LOE chart (logic of purpose vs. geographical reference: LOO)
LOE chart (product)
Initial Commanders Intent
•
•
•
Purpose
Key Tasks
Endstate: Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in
relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.
Key Outputs
–
–
–
Problem Statement
Initial Commander’s Intent
Planning guidance, to include operational approach
•
•
•
Technique (ask these questions):
» What is the difference between the current state and the desired end state of the operational environment?
» What is preventing US forces from reaching the desired end state?
Problem Statement (product)
Operational Approach (serves as link between detailed and conceptual planning)
•
•
Diagram current state of Operational Environment (product) & Narrative (product)
Diagram desired end state of the Operational Environment (product) & Narrative (product)
Operational Approach: organizes combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose that will guide the force to a
desired end state
Planning guidance: orients the focus of operations, linking desired conditions to potential combinations of actions that force
may employ to achieve the desired end state
Reframing: during operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have
changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through current operational approach, or because of
change of mission or end state.
Activities of the Army Design Methodology
ADRP 5-0, pg 2-6
“A/The” Design Process (Swain – “Commander’s Business,” JFQ, issue 23, 2nd
QTR 2009)
1.
2.
3.
Figure out what inspired the external directive (Higher HQ
Guidance/OPORD) that opened the deliberations
CDR has dialogue with superior to ensure complete understanding
between sponsor (Higher HQ) and actor (Sub-units)
Conduct System Framing (effort to learn all one can in the time available
about the nature and content of the systems creating the unsatisfactory
situation): Create system frame which bounds the hypothetical portrayal of
a relevant system, captured both graphically and narratively.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
4.
5.
Contains a group of interacting actors and potential actors (must always contain the
United States)
Define existing relationships that govern interactions
Then group actors into assemblages (subgroups with collective influence on system
behavior)
Cognitively transfer from learning to action
Create a mental model (a depiction of sponsor’s desired state of affairs, or system,
as a basis) of the desired system (may/should look similar to first system with
different roles/links)
Assess logic of enemy rationale, logic of command rationale, and logistics rationale;
and do not limit model to friendly side of considerations
Formulate the problem – what needs to be done to establish the conditions
to achieve the desired endstate
Operational Framing: formulating the strategy, or pattern of actions to
change the system described by the system frame (this is the defining act
of design)
Guide to the use of Army Design Methodology (with references)
Why Army Design Methodology?: War is a complex system, which means that it is open, interdependent, emergent, multidimensional, purposeful, and
counterintuitive (Clausewitz, Gaddis, Gharajedaghi, Doerner, Senge, Boyd/Osinga, Naveh, Lawson).
That said, a lot of the time in tactics and even campaigning, there are enough repetitive patterns to be useful, so a lot of the time, doctrine informed by military
theory is enough. For example, in campaigning, we can use elements of operational art, principles of war, mission command, operational frameworks,
and military theory elements of strategy and operational art (ADP 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0; JP 3-0 and 5-0; Jomini; Clausewitz; Liddell Hart; Isserson; Svechin).
Sometimes, these more common patterns do not fit as well or do not fit at all, which is usually an indication that the problem is unfamiliar. In such cases we
can use different tools to improve planning: Army Design Methodology and Joint design, which emphasize understanding the operational environment,
identifying the problem, and developing operational approaches—activities that are enabled by doctrinal tools such as visual modeling, narrative,
framing, PMESII, DIME, and METT-TC.
In order to better apply these activities and tools, we study certain theories, which in turn provide tools that can fall into three broad categories:
1. In thinking about all activities in planning, strive to:
•Be aware of causal links, implicit and explicit (e.g.: Gaddis, Reynolds, Stone)
•Be aware of cultural norms and assumptions—your own, enemy, local
population (e.g.: Gat, Potter, Linn, Lynn, Gharajedaghi)
----Gharajedaghi:
•Think holistically—structure, function, process, purpose/context
•Think operationally—feedback loops, delayed responses, carrying capacity
•Understand self-organization of the system—its propensity, especially toward
cultural norms
•Be interactive—experiment (wargame), test to see if it is the right problem
Doerner:
•Make more decisions
•Test hypotheses
•Have goals—structured, intermediate, tested
•Think by analogy
•Ask why questions
•Freely experiment
•Cull unsuccessful techniques
•Develop well buffered systems—with stable negative feedback loops
•Delegate—don’t overcentralize
Bar-Yam:
•Understand degrees of interdependence across the system
•Scale responses/approaches to appropriate level
2. In checking the work of all activities, watch out for:
•Causation, normalization, rhetoric, closure, focalization,
underreading, overreading, and gaps in narratives (Abbott)
•Falling into the icon trap, image trap, puzzle trap, numbers trap, or
category trap (Lawson)
•Vague goals, absolute language, overgeneralization, repair service
behavior, solving problems one at a time, fixation on familiar issues or
solutions, methodism, goal inversion, ballistic behavior, and dosage
(Doerner)
3. Leadership, teamwork, and organization:
These problems, activities, and tools are difficult. They can be dealt with
by just the commander or select individuals on the staff, but that usually
requires genius and/or a lot of time to do the work. As a result,
commanders and leaders need support in dealing with difficult and
unfamiliar work, which usually falls to staffs and planning teams. Those
staffs and teams in turn require leadership and teamwork to be
successful.
Strong teams and leaders are characterized by the qualities emphasized in
ADP 5-0, ADP 6-0, ADP 6-22, JP 5-0, supported by the leadership and
organizational lessons found in Kotter, Schoen, and Hatch.
Problem
•
•
No definition in ADRP 1-02 / JP 1-02
ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9: “2-41. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a
desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual becomes aware of a
significant difference between what actually is and what is desired. In the context of operations, an
operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their
desired end state.”
–
•
Problem Statement: A concise statement of the issue or issues requiring resolution. (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9)
Critical to defining the problem is determining what needs to be acted on to reconcile the differences
between existing and desired conditions. (JP 5-0, pgs III-12 – 13)
–
The JFC and Staff must identify and articulate (from JP 5-0, pg III-13):
a)
b)
c)
d)
–
•
Tensions between current conditions and desired conditions at end state
Elements within the operational environment which must change or remain the same to achieve desired end states
Opportunities and threats that either can be exploited or will impede the JFC from achieving the desired end state
Limitations. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or restraint, and other restrictions
that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, ROE, political and economic conditions
in affected countries, and host-nation issues.
A concise problem statement is used to clearly define the problem or problem set to solve. It considers how tension
and competition affect the operational environment by identifying how to transform the current conditions to the
desired end state – before adversaries begin to transform current conditions to their desired end state. The statement
broadly describes the requirements for transformation, anticipating changes in the operational environment while
identifying critical transitions. (JP 5-0, pg III-13)
Problem Statement example (from ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9) [141 words]
– The Newland defense force is the primary impediment to establishing a democratic government in Newland and the
primary factor of instability in the region. For over forty years, the Newland defense force has maintained power for
itself and the regime by oppressing all opposition within society. In addition, the Newland defense force has a history
of intimidating Country Z through force (both overtly and covertly). Corruption in the Newland defense force is
rampant within the leadership, and it has close ties to several drug cartels. General E is the latest of two dictators
emerging from the Newland defense force. Even if General E is removed from power, the potential of a new dictator
emerging from the Newland defense force is likely. There is no indication that the leadership of the Newland defense
force is willing to relinquish their power within Newland.
ADP 3-0 “Logic Map”
Decisive Action
•
The Army conducts unified land operations, in the anticipated operational
environment, in support of unified action, executed through decisive action. (ADP 30, pg iii)
•
Decisive Action – (Army) The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive,
defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0) (ADRP 102, pg 1-11)
–
–
–
–
Offensive Operations: operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize
terrain, resources and population centers. They include movement to contact, attack, exploitation,
and pursuit. (ADP 3-0, pg 5)
Defensive Operations: operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize
forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive and stability tasks. These operations include
mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. (ADP 3-0, pg 5-6)
Stability Operations: military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States to
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental
services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. (ADP 30, pg 6)
[Homeland Defense and] Defense Support Of Civil Authorities represents DoD support to U.S.
civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities,
or from qualifying entities for special events. They include tasks: provide support for domestic
disasters; provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives incidents; provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies; and provide
other designated support. (ADP 3-0, pg 6)
Army Core Competencies (CAM & WAS)
The Army’s two core competencies – combined arms maneuver and wide area security –
provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the
tactical actions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It is the
integrated application of these two core competencies that enables Army forces to defeat or
destroy an enemy from gaining a position of advantage. (ADP 3-0, pg 5)
Combined Arms Maneuver: The application of the element of combat power in unified action
to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical,
temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. (ADP
3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-8)
Wide Area Security: The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to
protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of
advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative. (ADP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 138)
“…You don’t do one without the other, it is not CAM is
Combined Arms Live Fire, and WAS is KLE’s.”
- LTG David Perkins (28 Nov 2012; talking to SAMS 13-01)
Defeat Mechanisms (ADRP 3-0, pg 2-9)
(also, JP 5-0, pg III-30)
•
•
•
•
•
Current Definition: The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.
(ARRP 1-02, pg 1-12)
Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for combined arms maneuver, while stability mechanisms are best
suited for wide area security (ADRP, 3-0, pg 2-9)
Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate and isolate.
– Destroy: CDRs apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that is can no longer perform any
function.
– Dislocate: CDRs dislocate by employing forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the
enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.
– Disintegrate: Disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations.
Leads to rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight.
– Isolate: CDRs deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion,
influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action.
CDRs describe defeat mechanisms as Physical, temporal or psychological:
– Physically defeating: deprives enemy forces of ability to achieve enemy aims
– Temporally defeating: friendly anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they become effective
– Psychologically defeating: deprives the enemy of the will to continue to fight
JP 5-0: Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. Combat
aims at defeating armed enemies – regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to
kill, destroy, or capture by all means available. There are two basic defeat mechanisms to accomplish this:
attrition and disruption. (pg III-30)
– The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy’s ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated
organization. Th alternative is to destroy his material capabilities through attrition, which generally is
more costly and time-consuming). …Joint doctrine favors disruption because it tends to be a more
effective and efficient way of causing an enemy’s defeat. (pg III-30)
Stability Mechanisms (ADRP 3-0, pg 2-10)
(also, JP 5-0, pg III 30-1)
• Current Definition: The primary method through which friendly forces
affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a
lasting, stable peace. (ADRP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-84)
• Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for combined arms
maneuver, while stability mechanisms are best suited for wide area
security (ADRP, 3-0, pg 2-9)
• The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and
support.
– Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control
and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with
mandates, agreements, or civil authority.
– Control involves imposing civil order.
– Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of
foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through inform
and influence activities, presence, and conduct.
– Support is to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the
instruments of national power to function effectively.
• As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms
produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the
mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do
alone.
Tenets of Unified Land Operations
(ADP 3-0, pg 7)
• Not defined in Army/Joint doctrine; explained in ADP 3-0
• Unified land operations describes the Army’s approach to generating
and applying combat power in campaigns and operations. (ADP 3-0,
pg 7)
Tenet
Description
Flexibility
employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations
Integration
involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners
as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept
Lethality
The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other military capabilities, and the most basic
building block for military operations.... Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in
conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission.
Adaptability
Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific
situation they face. This requires an adaptable mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or
rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment.
Depth
Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, or purpose. Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout
their depth by arranging activities across the entire operational framework to achieve the most decisive result.
Synchronization
Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum
relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is the ability to execute multiple, related, and
mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing
each task in isolation.
Campaign vs. Phase and Operation
• Campaign: (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed
at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a
given time and space. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)
• Operation:
– ADRP 1-02 does not have definition for “operation”
– OLD: Operation – (DOD, NATO) 1. A military action or the carrying out of
a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative
military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including
movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the
objectives of any battle or campaign. See FM 3-0 (FM 1-02, pg 1-137)
– Joint – JP 1-02, 15 July 2012: operation – 1. A series of tactical
actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1) 2. A military
action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service,
training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0).
• Phase: (Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an
operation in duration or activity (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-29)
– OLD: Phase: (Army) A specific part of an operation that is different from
those that precede or follow. A change in phase usually involves a
change in task. (FM 3-0 / FM 1-02, pg 1-145)
HVT vs. HPT vs. HVI
• High-Value Target (HVT) – (DOD) A target the enemy commander requires
for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets
would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions
throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. See FM 2-01.3 and
FM 3-60. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)
• High-Payoff Target (HPT) – (DOD) A target whose loss to the enemy will
significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. Highpayoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and
successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission.
See FM 3-60. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)
• High-Value Individual (HVI) – A high-value individual is a person of interest
(friendly, adversary or enemy) who must be identified, surveilled, tracked
and influenced through the use of information or fires. A HVI may become a
HPT that must be acquired and successfully attacked (exploited, captured or
killed) for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. (FM 3-09)
(ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)
Doctrine
• No definition of doctrine in ADRP 1-02
– Old Army FM: doctrine – (DOD) Fundamental principles by
which the military forces or elements thereof guide their
actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative
but requires judgment in application. (NATO) Fundamental
principles by which the military forces guide their actions in
support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgment in application. See FM 3-0. (FM 1-02, pg 1-65)
• JP 1-02: Fundamental principles by which the military
force or elements thereof guide their actions in
support of national objectives. It is authoritative but
requires judgment in application. See also
multinational doctrine; joint doctrine. (JP 1-02, pg 97)
Center of Gravity (Schwerpunkt)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Current Definition: (DOD) The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6, also
described in various ADP/ADRP’s as both an element of operational design and operational art)
A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will to act (JP 5-0). This definition states in modern terms the classic description
offered by Clausewitz: “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”* The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. The center of gravity is a vital
analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point, identifying sources of strength and weakness. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4 – 4-5)
Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. . . . Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or a military force, are typically easier to identify,
assess and target. They can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic
leader, powerful ruling elite, religious tradition, tribal influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Affecting
them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4)
One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s staff during planning is identifying and analyzing friendly and adversary COGs. A COG is a source of power that provides moral or
physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point at which all our energies should
be directed.” An objective is always linked to a COG. There may also be different COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the strategic level, a COG could be a military force,
an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—
such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. In identifying COGs it is important to remember that irregular warfare
focuses on legitimacy and influence over a population, unlike traditional warfare, which employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s
war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. Therefore, in an irregular warfare environment, the enemy and friendly COG will
most likely be the same population. (JP 5-0, pg III-22) – This joint pub has four pages dedicated to COG.
–
Joint definition of objective – 1. the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential
to the commander’s plan. See also target (JP 5-0) (JP 1-02)
Clausewitz:
–
A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the
center of gravity. (On War, Howard & Paret, pg 485 – Book 6, CH 27)
–
*… One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends. That point against which all our energies should be directed. … For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII and Fredrick the Great, the COG was
their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally their capital.
In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of
the leaders and public opinion. (On War, Howard & Paret, pg 595-6 – Book 8, CH 4)
Antulio J. Echevarria II (Clausewitz & Contemporary War, pg 177-190) on Center of Gravity:
–
Clausewitz clearly considered COG important – used it 50+ times in On War
–
Question of relevancy is valid – concentration of forces (mass refers to concentration of effects) is no longer considered a necessary principle of war; trend is towards non-contiguous
operations, and terrorists/insurgents/non-state actors have no physical center to attack
•
1991 Gulf War, GEN Schwartzkopf (Combatant Commander) identified 3x COG: Saddam Hussein, Republican Guard & Iraqi Chem/Bio/Nuke capabilities while his Air
Component Commander, GEN Charles Horner, identified 12x “target sets” ranging from national leadership and command and control to railroads, airfields, and ports – each
of which in his view corresponded to a center of gravity. (pg 184)
–
Since reintegration into doctrine since 1980’s – multiple interpretations, Joint Publication definitions changed with each issue, and don’t accord with examples given
–
Pure Clausewitz concept: COG was the thing that, if struck, would lead one to decisive victory. Inspired by physics: “… it is against that part of the enemy’s forces where they are
most concentrated that, if a blow were to occur, the effect would emanate the farthest…”
–
Applied Concept: Clausewitz did allow for multiple COG’s (also said to ideally get to just one – pg 617, Book 8, CH 9), and it depended on the degree of connectivity, or overall unity,
the opposing force possessed – when Clausewitz references the COG where the forces are most concentrated, he is really referring less to the actual forces than to what
concentrates them. Based on this, for Clausewitz, COG refers to the actual element that causes them to concentrate and gives them purpose and direction.
–
Conclusions: term has become too diluted; better to think of COG as focal point rather than source of strength or specific strength or weakness; COG only exists where threat
separate parts are connected enough to form a single entity; COG only valid if complete defeat of an opponent is sought; COG for jihadist organizations if political and ideological –
reduce overall appeal & empathy is success; WMD is interesting factor when considering COG ; Finally – concept is effects-based, not capabilities-based, should encourage
thorough thinking by policy-makers.
Analyzing Center(s) of Gravity
Strange, Joe and Richard Iron. Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part II: The CG-CC-CR-CV
construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship Between Centers of Gravity and their Critical
Vulnerabilities.
(1) Critical Capabilities (CC)
ILE: Critical capability—Actions (verbs) that will achieve the objective.
JP 5-0: Critical capabilities are those that are considered crucial enablers for a
COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the
adversary’s assumed objective(s). (pg III-24)
Strange: Primary abilities or military instruments whose presence allows a
centre of gravity to function and to be identified.
Strange & Iron: Every center of gravity has some primary ability (or abilities)
that make a center of gravity in the context of a given scenario, situation or
mission – including phases within campaigns or operations. Most simply
stated: what can this center of gravity do to you that puts great fear (or
concern) into your heart in the context of your mission and level of war?
Within a critical capability, the key word is verb: it can destroy something, or
seize an objective, or prevent you from achieving a mission. (pg7)
(3) Critical Requirements (CR)
ILE: Critical requirements are essential resource, or means for the CoG to
perform a critical capability.
JP 5-0: Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that
enable a critical capability to become fully operational. (pg III-24)
Strange: Those essential conditions, resources, and means that sustain
effective critical capabilities.
Strange & Iron: Are conditions, resources, and means that are essential for a
CoG to achieve its critical capability. Examples are:
• Good weather, precise intelligence, fuel and ammo re-supply,
chemical gear, ability to go 35mph across open desert for 6 hours
• Force X must accomplish its mission as a precondition before force Y
can accomplish its mission
• A robust sea train for a warfighting fleet operating long periods at
sea.
• Political leader Y needs no less than X% popular support (pg7)
(2) CoGs (CG)
ILE: The CoG possesses the critical capability. The CoG performs the action
that achieves the objective.
JP 5-0: A COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength,
freedom of action, or will to act. (pg III-22)
Strange & Iron: CG are physical or moral entities that are primary
components of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They
don’t just contribute to strength; they ARE the strength. They offer
resistance. They strike effective (or heavy) physical or moral blows. At the
strategic level, they are usually leaders and populations determined to
prevail. At operational and tactical levels they are almost invariably specific
military forces. (pg7)
(4) Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)
ILE: Critical vulnerabilities are aspect s of a critical requirement, which are deficient or
vulnerable that if successfully attacked will degrade the CoG. (THESE BECOME DECISIVE
POINTS)
JP 5-0: Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that
are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or
signifigant results. (pg III-24)
Strange: Can be deduced from recognizing which of the enemy’s enemy requirements can be converted into
vulnerabilities by an attacking force using means of interdiction, neutralization, or destruction.
Strange & Iron: Are those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient, or vulnerable to
neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a center of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability. The
lesser the risk and cost, the better. Critical vulnerabilities may, usually, be of the silver-bullet type: so if success can be
achieved by focusing on just a single vulnerable critical requirement, then that’s great! An example might be where
one precisely targeted cruise missile destroys the enemy leadership and results in an immediate end to conflict. More
typically, critical vulnerabilities are of the lead-bullet type; where final success can only be achieved by focusing on a
combination of vulnerable critical requirements that can be neutralized, interdicted or attacked simultaneously or
sequentially. Here it is the cumulative effect that produces decisive results. This involves seeking a series of successive
battlefield advantages that will lead to the unbalancing and eventual culmination of the enemy, with or without a
final dramatic decisive act. (pg8)
CCIR (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-5)
•
•
Definition: commander’s critical information requirement – (DOD) An information requirement
identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. Also called CCIR.
See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-8)
The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence
requirements (JP 3-0). (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-5)
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•
A commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) directly influences decision making and
facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide to designate an
information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the course of
the operation. A CCIR may support one or more decisions. During planning, staffs recommend
information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution,
they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is—
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Priority Intelligence Requirement – (DOD) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence
support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. Also
called PIR. See FM 2-01.3. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-30)
Friendly Force Information Requirement – (DOD) Information the commander and staff need to understand to
understand the status of friendly and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg
1-17)
Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
Time-sensitive.
Essential Elements of Friendly Information: Commanders also describe information they want
protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is
a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise,
lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy
detection. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish elements of
information to protect rather than ones to collect. Their identification is the first step in the operations
security process and central to the protection of information.
•
MOP vs. MOE (and Indicator)
Measure of Performance: (DOD) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is
tied to measuring task accomplishment. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-24) (MOP
answers “was the action taken” or “were the tasks completed to standard” = “are we
doing things right”)
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ADRP 5-0, pg 5-2: The uses of MOPs are a primary element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on
the friendly force. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and
often results in a yes or no answer. Examples of MOPs include:
•
•
•
Route X cleared
Generators delivered, are operational, and are secure at villages A, B, and C
Measure of Effectiveness: (DOD) A criterion used to assess changes in system
behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the
attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. See
ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-24) (MOE answers “are we doing the right things”)
– ADRP 5-0, pg 5-2: MOE for the objection to “Provide a safe and secure environment” may
include:
1) Decrease in insurgent activity
2) Increase in population trust of host-nation security forces
• ADRP 5-0, pg 5-4: In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of
information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of
performance. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys
and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question
“What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform
multiple MOPs and MOEs. Examples of indicators for the MOE “Decrease in
insurgent activity” are:
•Number of hostile actions per area each week.
•Number of munitions caches found per area each week.
•Number of reports of insurgent activity by the population per area per
week.
ADRP 5-0, pg 5-3
COA Sketch
ADRP 1-02, pg 10-1 – 10-4
ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-21
ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-20
COA Validity Check (ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-16)
(FAS-DC)
Screening Criteria
Feasible
Acceptable
Suitable
Distinguishable
Complete
Definition
The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time,
space, and resource limitations.
The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.
The COA can accomplish the mission within the commander’s
intent and planning guidance
Each COA must differ significantly from the others (such as
scheme of maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, use of reserve, and
task organization).
COA must incorporate:
• How decisive operation leads to mission accomplishment.
• How shaping operations create and preserve conditions for
success of the decisive operation or effort.
• How sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive
operations or efforts.
• How to account for offensive, defensive, and stability or civil
support tasks.
36
• Tasks to be performed and conditions to be achieved.
(Three) Organizing Framework(s) (ADRP 3-0,
pg 1-9 – 13)
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•
Organizing Framework not defined in ADRP 1-02; refer to ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0
An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist greatly in Army leaders
are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and
resources.
•
Deep-Close-Security: historically associated with terrain orientation (contiguous; nonlinear and
noncontiguous; nonlinear and contiguous) but can be applied to temporal and organizational
orientations as well.
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Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining: lends itself to broad conceptual orientation.
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Deep: In contiguous areas of operations, a deep area is an area forward of the close area that a commander
uses to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area.
Close: In contiguous areas of operations, a close area is an area assigned to a maneuver force that extends
from its subordinates’ rear boundaries to its own forward boundary.
Security: In contiguous areas of operations, a support area is an area for any command that extends from its
rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command.
Decisive: the operation that directly accomplishes the mission
Shaping: an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other
actors, and the terrain.
Sustaining: operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and
maintaining combat power.
Main and Supporting Efforts: more simplistic than other organizing frameworks, focuses on
prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, commanders can employ it with either the deepclose-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework.
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Main: The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to
overall mission success.
Supporting: A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the
main effort.
Strategy
•
No definition of strategy in ADRP 1-02
•
JP 1-02: A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,
national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, pg 300)
•
Clausewitz: “[Strategy] is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war.” (On War – Howard & Paret, pg 177)
–
[Clausewitz’s definition of strategy] recognizes only one means, combat or fighting. Yet it is actually broader than his critics admit, and
demonstrably valid even in today’s postmodern setting. In judging his definition unfit, his detractors typically commit at least one of two classic
errors: 1) mistake conclusions drawn from pure concept of war, that is, war considered from a strictly logical standpoint, as reflective of his
approach to strategy; 2) they overlook the critical point that his definition of war’s means includes not only violence, but the threat of violence.”
Echevarria (Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 133)
•
Jomini: “Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations.” (Summary of the Art of War, trans. Mendell
and Craighill, pg 69)
–
OR… “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or invasion” (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to
Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)
•
Napoleon: “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space.” (Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pg 161)
•
Colin Gray: “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144) / “To
paraphrase Gray, strategy is the product of the dialogue between policy and national power in the context of the overall international security
environment.” (Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking, pg114)
Richard Betts: “the link between military means and political ends” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144)
Liddle Heart: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144)
Raoul Castex (French Admiral, inner-war): “Strategy is nothing other than the general conduct of operations, the supreme art of chiefs of a certain rank
and of the general staffs destined to serve as their auxiliaries” (Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, pg39)
Thomas Schelling: “Strategy is not concerned with the efficient application of force by with the exploitation of potential force.” (Strachan, “The Lost
Meaning of Strategy,” pg43)
Moltke: “Strategy is the transfer of knowledge to practical life… the art of acting under the pressure of the most difficult conditions.” (Strachan, “The Lost
Meaning of Strategy,” pg46)
Mackubin Owens: “In essence, strategy describes the way in which the available means will be employed to achieve the ends of policy” (“Strategy and
the Strategic Way of Thinking” pg111)
Julian Corbett: “the art of directing force to the ends in view” [and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of statemanship and the latter
having to do with plans of operations.] (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd
QTR 2009, pg 65)
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Levels of War
•
The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions.
Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and
tactical. They apply to all types of military operations. (FM 3-90, pg 1-2)
•
Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve
military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg
GL-17) / (JP 1-02, pg 309)
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The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected
and unfocused actions. Engagements are linked to battles. One or more battles are linked to winning major operations and campaigns, leading to operational
success, which can lead to strategic success. (FM 3-0 discusses major operations and campaigns.)
A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0). Battles can affect the course of the
campaign or major operation. A battle occurs when a division, corps, or army commander fights for one or more significant objectives. Battles are usually
operationally significant, if not operationally decisive.
An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0). An engagement
normally lasts only a short time—minutes, hours, or a day. It can result from one side’s deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a chance
encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An engagement can be a stand-alone event or one of several related engagements
comprising a battle.
Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level of war. National assets, such
as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions
are strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Many times the accuracy of
these labels can only be determined during historical studies.
Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between
the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command.
However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels
(see FM 3-0). (FM 3-90, pg 1-2-3)
•
Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and
sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (Approved for incorporation into
JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-14) / (JP 1-02, pg 234)
•
Strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines
national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses
national resources to achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-16) / (JP
1-02, pg 299)
Rapid Decisionmaking and Synchronization
Process - RDSP (ADRP 5-0, pg 4-6)
• RDSP is a technique that commanders and staffs commonly
use during execution. Consists of five steps;
1. Compare the current situation to the order
– During execution:
• Monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions
• Ask if changes effect overall conduct of of operations and if changes are
significant
• Identify the changed conditions represent variances from the order – especially
opportunities and risks
2. Determine that a decision, and what type, is required
–
Variance identified:
•
•
•
Describe variance
Determine if variance provides significant opportunity or threat and examines
the potential of either
Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if variance
–
Indicates
3. Develop a course of action
4. Define and validate the course of action
5. Implement
Elements of Decisive Action Chart
(ADRP 3-90, pg 2-3)
Tactical Mission Tasks (1 of 8)
Graphic
Task
Definition
An attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or
temporarily halted enemy. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-2, pg 9-1)
Ambush
Attack by Fire
Block
Breach
Bypass
Canalize
Clear
A tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires,
to engage an enemy without closing with the enemy to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive
the enemy. (FM 3-90) See also destroy; fix; frontal attack; support by fire; suppress;
tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-4)
1. A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents his
advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. 2. An obstacle effect that
integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of
approach or to prevent him from passing through an engagement area. See also contain;
disrupt; fix; turn. (FM 3-90) See also avenue of approach, contain; disrupt; fix; tactical
mission task; turn. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-5)
(Army) A tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break
through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or
fortification. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-5)
A tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit to maneuver around an
obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain momentum of the operation while
deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission
task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)
A tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow
zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver.
(FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)
1. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and
eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. (FM 3-90) 2. To eliminate
transmissions on a tactical radio net in order to allow a higher-precedence transmission to
occur. (FM 6-02.53) 3. The total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually
performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. (ATTP 3-90.4) See also
reduce; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-7)
Tactical Mission Tasks(2 of 8)
Graphic
Task
Definition
Contain
A tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy
forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from
withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere. (FM 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-9)
Control
A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a
specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for
successful friendly operations. (FM 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-9)
Counterattack
Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such
specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance
units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the
enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to
restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-10)
Counterattack
by Fire
NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02
No symbol in ADRP 1-02
Delay or Delay
(with a specific
time)
A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the
enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle,
becoming decisively engaged. (FM 3-90) (See page A-3 for symbol.)
Defeat
A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently
lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or
unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly
commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of
friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90)
See also decisive point; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-12)
NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02
Demonstrate
Demonstration: 1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought,
made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. See also amphibious demonstration;
diversion. 2. In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not
sought that is made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact
with the adversary is intended. (JP 3-13.4) (JP 1-02, pg 88)
Tactical Mission Tasks(3 of 8)
Graphic
No symbol in ADRP 1-02
Task
Disengage
Disrupt
Envelopment
Definition
A tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break contact with the enemy to
allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement. (FM 3-90) See
also decisive engagement; tactical mission task (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-13)
1. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires,
terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or
cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90) 2. An
obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break
up his formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely,
and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 90-7) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-13)
A form of maneuver* in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy
defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force
to be destroyed in their current positions. (ADP 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-14)
NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02
Exfiltrate
Old: (DOD) The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth,
deception, surprise, or clandestine means. See also special operations; unconventional
warfare. See FM 3-90
NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02
Exploit
Exploitation: An offensive task—usually following a successful attack —designed to
disorganize the enemy in depth. (ADP 3-90) See also attack; offensive operations. (ADRP
1-02, pg 1-15)
NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02
Feint
In military deception, an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted
for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual
main offensive action (JP 3-13.4) (JP 1-02, pg 115)
Tactical Mission Tasks(4 of 8)
Graphic
Task
Definition
Fix
A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of
his force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that
focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified
area, normally an engagement area. (FM 3-90) See also block; contain; disrupt; support
by fire; tactical mission task; turn. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-16)
Follow and
Assume
Follow and
Support
Infiltration
A tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an
offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed,
attrited, or unable to continue. (FM 3-90) See also attack; fix; follow and support; offensive
operations; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-16)
A tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force
conducting an offensive operation. (FM 3-90) See also direct pressure force; encircling
force; exploitation; follow and assume; offensive operations; tactical mission task. (ADRP
1-02, pg 1-16)
A form of maneuver* in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through
or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy
rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires. (ADP 3-90). (ADRP 102, pg 1-20)
A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s
use of an area or route. (FM 3-90) See also delay; disrupt; tactical mission task. (ADRP 102, pg 1-21)
Interdict
Isolate
A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off — both physically and
psychologically — an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of
movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM
3-90) See also encirclement; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-22)
Tactical Mission Tasks(5 of 8)
Graphic
Task
Neutralize
Occupy
Passage of
Lines (Forward /
Rearward)*
Definition
A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of
interfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-26)
A tactical mission task that involves a force moving a friendly force into an area so that it
can control that area. Both the force’s movement to and occupation of the area occur
without enemy opposition. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27)
A tactical enabling operation in which one unit moves through another unit’s
positions with the intent of moving into or out of enemy contact. (FM 3-90) See also
forward passage of lines; rearward passage of lines. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-28)
A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a
narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-28)
Penetrate
No symbol in ADRP 1-02
Reduce
Relief in Place
1. A tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an encircled or bypassed enemy
force. (FM 3-90) 2. A mobility task to create and mark lanes through, over, or around an
obstacle to allow the attacking force to accomplish its mission. (ATTP 3-90.4) See also
assault; bypass; destroy; neutralize; obscure; secure; suppress; tactical mission task.
(ADRP 1-02, pg 1-31)
An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced
in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the
mission and the assigned area of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The
incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-31)
Tactical Mission Tasks(6 of 8)
Graphic
Task
Retirement
Secure
A
A
Security
Definition
A form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (ADRP
3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-32)
A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location
from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action. (FM 3-90) See also
assault; breach; denial measure; destroy; reduce; suppress; tactical mission task. (ADRP
1-02, pg 1-33)
Screen: A security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (FM
3-90) See also concealment; flank guard; guard; security operations; sensor; surveillance.
(ADRP 1-02, pg 1-33)
Guard: A security task to protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also
observing and reporting information and to prevent enemy ground observation of and
direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate
independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support
assets of the main body. (FM 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-18)
Cover: A security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also
observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and
direct fire against the main body. (FM 3-90) See also covering force; security operations.
(ADRP 1-02, pg 1-10) – Should be able to operate away from the main body.
A tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using
overwhelming force. (FM 3-90) See also contain; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 133)
Seize
A tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can
engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. (FM 3-90) See
also attack by fire; overwatch; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-34)
Support By Fire
Tactical Mission Tasks(7 of 8)
Graphic
Task
Definition
Suppress
A tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force
or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90) See
also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-35)
Turn
Withdraw /
Withdraw Under
Pressure
1. A tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy force from one avenue of
approach or mobility corridor to another. 2. A tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire
planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one avenue of approach to
an adjacent avenue of approach or into an engagement area. (FM 3-90) See also avenue
of approach; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-37)
A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an
enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy. See chapter 9 of this
publication. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-39)
Steps to Developing Scenarios
Schwartz, Peter. The Art of the Long View. (New York: Doubleday, 1991.), 226-34. // Wilkinson, Lawrence. “How to Build
Scenarios” Wired.
Task
Ste
p
1 Identify Focal Issue or Decision
Key Forces in the Local
2
Environment
Detail Instruction
Begin with a specific decision or issue, then build out toward the environment. The best way to
begin with important decisions that have to be made and the mind-set of the management making
them. …what keeps me awake at night?
List the key factors influencing the success or failure of that decision… FACTS about [customers,
suppliers, competitors, etc. – Frame the Environment]
Once the key factors have been listed, the third step involves listing driving trends in the macroenvironment that influence the key factors identified earlier. / What are the forces behind the key
1. Social Dynamics (quantitative, demographic issues; softer issues of values,
forces. Some are predetermined (eg. Often demographics), some highly uncertain (eg. Public
lifestyles, demand, or political energy)
opinion). This is the most research-intensive step in the process. The scenario planner is searching
2. Economic Issues (macroeconomic trends and forces shaping the economy as
a whole, microeconomic dynamics, forces at work or within the company itself) for the major trends and trend breaks.
Driving Forces
3
3.
4.
4
Political Issues (electoral, legislative, regulatory, and litigative)
Technological Issues (direct, enabling, indirect)
Rank by Importance and
Uncertainty
Rank key factors and driving trends based on degree of importance, and degree of uncertainty. The
point is to identify the two or three factors or trends that are most important and most uncertain.
[THESE BECOME THE X and Y axis – understand that some large issues may get let behind, this
becomes the driving factors that frame the future scenario] – Determining these axes is among the
most important step in the entire scenario generating process.
5 Selecting Scenario Logics
Axes of crucial uncertainties presented along matrix (two axes). The logic of a given scenario will be
characterized by its location in the matrix of most significant scenario drivers. [PUT THE X AND Y
AXIS ON MODEL]
6 Fleshing Out the Scenarios
Fleshing out the skeletal scenarios can be accomplished by returning to the lists of key factors and
trends identified in steps two (key forces ) and three (driving forces). Each key factor and trend
should be given some attention in each scenario. Then weave the pieces together in the form of a
narrative
7 Implications
Once scenarios have been developed, return to focal issue or decision identified in step one to
rehearse the future. How does the decision look in each scenario? What vulnerabilities have been
revealed? Robust across all scenarios OR only one (a high-risk gamble)?
8
Selection of Leading Indicators
and Signposts
Important to know which scenario is closest to the course of history as it unfolds. Once the different
scenarios have been fleshed out and their implications for the focal issue determined, then it’s
worth spending time and imagination on identifying a few indicators to monitor in an ongoing way.
Old /New Testament
CONCRETE
Theory
COGNITIVE
1942 Field Marshal Slim (Burma Campaign)
American Civil War (Vicksburg) Jomini
1863 influence
Franco Prussian War (Bismark) General staff 1866
Moltke
Phillippines (Counter
1900 Insurgency)
Meuse-Argonne Offensive (WW1
1918 Pershing)
1776 Revolutionary War (George Washington)
Napolein (Jena Campaign 1806 – Corps
1806 structure
Mexican War (Scott’s Campaign) Jomini
1847 influence
History
Vietnam War (MACV Westmoreland)
Cambodian Campaign
(Abrahms/….Vietanamizaiton)
Yom Kippur War (Egypt invades Isreal)
Operations
Industrial Revolution
1962
1970
1973
Tactics
Containment
1950 Korean War (UN offensive MacArthur)
Policy
Strategy ( Mintzberg, Dolman, Clausewitz)
Wilsonianism
_____
Global Police
War on Terror –
2003-2013 Echevarria “America has two grammars of warconventional / unconventional “ Application of
creative imaginations by commanders and staffsDesign strategies, campaigns and major operations
and organize and employ Military ForcesOperational Level is where this takes place (usually
Corps)
MCDougal
Forces
Cold War/ Bipolar World
1990 Operation Desert Storm (Schwarzkoph))
Bosnian War Seige of Sarajevo (Blue Helments 19921992
1995) UN
1990 Operation Desert Storm (Schwarzkoph))
Manifest Destiny/ Monroe
1944 WWII (Overlord, Cobra, Goodwood)
Soviet Offensive Campaign ( Operation
1944
Bagration)
Joint Operations in the Philippines (Luzon) Pacific
1944 Campaign
Policy
Herring
fighting”
Thucydides (Peloponnesian War) Melian Dialogue –”Strong Do what they can , weak
suffer”
Sun TZU – “Subdue the enemy without
Evolution of Operational ART
Epstein (Napolean’s Last Victory (1809) a strategic war plan that effectively integrates the various theaters of operations; the fullest mobilization
of the resources of the state. Operational Art requires Structure- IE. Modern Task Org and mobilization.
Snieder (Vulcan’s Anvil) Civil War: decline of the decisive battle, the emergence of the empty battlefield and the rise of distributed free
maneuver. Operational art Requires Instantaneous communication – IE technology
Bruce Menning- “Operational Art’s Origins” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art
Soviet’s and Deep Battle: Operational art required the practitioner to:
- Identify strategic objectives within theater.
- Visualize a theater in three dimensions.
- Determine what sequence of military actions – preparation, organization, support, battles, and
command arrangements – would bring attainment of those objectives
Swain: Filling the void “The employment of military forces to
achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of
operations, through the design, organization and conduct of
campaigns and major operations.” 1982 FM 100-5
Dolman- Pure Strategy Operational Art- Directly matches means to ends. Bruscino, Thomas: “The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations Concrete vs Ethereal- The cognitive linking of
strategy and tactics. Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory Operational Art is that cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical execution
Swain- “Filling the Void” (T105)
Speculative
Theory
Operational Art
“The employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals
in a theater of war or a theater of operations, through the
design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major
operations.”
Defense
Offense
(Pessimism)
(Initiating)
Crisis
Loss in
Vietnam
Abrams (~1973)
Soviet Threat
Yom Kippur
War
Military Moral
Crisis
New Paradigm
•TRADOC Est.
•DePuy- “Fight
Tonight”
•TRADOC Focus
• Doctrine
• Training
• Equipping
• Organization
Military
Downsizing
•Abrams
•DePuy
•Starry
1976 FM 100-5
1982 FM 100-5
1986 FM 100-5
•Intended for Revision
•Focused BN/BDE
•Focused General
Defensive Plan
(Europe)
•Graphs/Charts
•Prescriptive
•“Active Defense”
(match strength with
strength)
•Revolutionary Idea
(Doctrine should be
followed)
•Standards based
training
•Training Center
•Air-Land Battle
•Close Battle (BN,
BDE, DIV)
•Deep Battle
(Corps)
•Principles of War
•Got rid of graphs/
charts
•Elements of
Combat Power
•Operational Level
of War
•Human Dimension of
Combat (CDR’s Vision,
Leadership)
•Addressed
Campaigns (multiple
engagements)
•Structure of Modern
Warfare
•Defined Operational
Art
•COG (ID, Defeat,
Protect)
Army tests
principles of
100-5 and
debates
•Otis
•Downing
•Sinnreich
•DePuy
•Gorman
•G.O. Peers
•Lind
•Schneider
•Luttwak
1969
1974
Nixon
1977
Ford
1981
Carter
•Wass de Czege,
Henriques, Holder
•Rogers
•Menning
•SAMS (est. 1983)
1985
Reagan
Operational Art
•Filled void in
US Military
thought
•Linked Tactical
Actions to
Strategic
Purpose
•Reestablished
importance of
“policy” and
involvement of
PMs