CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS “Rules of the Game”

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CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
DRAWING OF HOUSE DISTRICTS
--Process for allocating each state
its share of House seats
--Effects of fixing the size of the
House at 435
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
• District-drawing process within the
states
• --Initial judicial reluctance to
interfere
• --Relevant Constitutional provisions
• --Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders,
and the “Reapportionment
Revolution”
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
• GERRYMANDERING
• ---Partisan gerrymandering:
“cracking and packing,” “wasting
votes,” “trading security for seats”
• --Is partisan gerrymandering legal?
What about midterm
gerrymandering?
• --Why partisan gerrymandering is
less common/effective than people
think
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
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RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
--1965 Voting Rights Act
--1980 Bolden v. City of Mobile
--1982 Voting Rights Act
Amdendments
• --1986 Thornburg v. Gingles
• --Dramatic 1990 Redistricting
• (from 25 Afr.-Amer./10 Hispan.Reps
in 1992 to 38 and 17 in 1993)
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
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RACIAL REDISTRICTING CONT’d
--Shaw v. Reno (1993) NC
--Miller v. Johnson (1995) GA
Reasons for Controversy
--related to Affirmative Action
--MMDs help GOP?
--is votitng always racially polarized?
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
• EFFECTS OF DISTRICT-DRAWING
PROCESS ON HOUSE ELECTIONS IN
GENERAL
• 1.) Unnatural districts may aid
incumbents?
• 2.) Minimizes role of television in
some House races due to bad fit
between media markets and
districts
• 3.) Local party orgs more interested
in city, county, state races
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
• CAMPAIGN FINANCE
• No real meaningful reform until 1970s Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) and Amendments
• 1.) Disclosure of campaign contributions and
expenditures
• 2.) Disclosure of “independent spending” on candidates’
behalf
• 3.) $1000 limit on individual contribution to campaign
• 4.) PACs legalized (explain how they originated), limited
to $5K contributions
• 5.) Party contributions: higher limits, “coordinated
expenditures”
• 6.)***Attempts to limit overall spending by a campaign,
self-contributions, and independent expenditures
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
• Buckley v. Valeo (1976) struck down
*** overall spending limits ind.
Spending limits, and selfcontributions (explain why)
• 1980s (“Old School”) proposed
campaign finance reforms:
outlawing PACs, partial Fed. Funding
of campaigns coupled with spending
limits
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
“Rules of the Game”
• 1990s-2000s proposed reforms, sparked by
• A.) Republican takeover of Congress in 1994
• B.) Turnover meant less concern about incumbency
advantages
• C.) New (or newly discovered) loopholes in FECA
• In mid1990s
• ---unlimited raising and spending of “soft money” by
parties
• ---”independent spending” that wasn’t really
independent’
• ---”issue advocacy” campaign advertising that
avoided limits/regulation by avoiding use of “magic
words”
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: “Rules of the
Game”
• Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, a.k.a.
“McCain-Feingold” bill); finally passed in 2002 after
many attempts
• 1.) Raised indiv contribution limit to $2000
• 2.) Banned raising and spending of soft money by
national parties, and by state parties for Fed.
Candidates
• 3.) Authorized FEC to tighten restrictions on
independent spending
• 4.) Brought “electioneering” (i.e., issue advocacy)
communications under FEC regulation (define
“electioneering”)
---unlimited, but could only be done by PACs, not by
corporations or labor unions themselves
---electioneerers had to disclose contributors
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: The
Incumbency Advantage
• High re-election rates, especially for
House members (why is Senate reelection rate lower?)
• Esp. since late 1960s: incumbents
winning by larger margins “vanishing
marginals”
• Measures of incumbency PERSONAL
advantage---sophomore surge,
retirement slump---on the rise
Rules of the Game:
Finale
• SUPREME COURT action on
BCRA
---2003 McConnell vs. FEC: act as
a whole facially valid
---2007 FEC v. Wisconsin RTL:
ban
on corporate $ invalid as applied in this case
---2008 Davis v. FEC:
invalid
millionaires amdt.
---2010 Citizens United v. FEC:
ban on corporate $ invalid, totally
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: The
Incumbency Advantage
• EXPLANATIONS FOR INCREASE IN INCUMBENCY
ADVANTAGE
• 1.) Not 1960s redistricting (although 1990s and 2000s
may have mattered)
• 2.) Increase in “independent” (nonpartisan voters)---but
that’s not entirely it either
• 3.) Mayhew “Congress: the Electoral Connection” 1974
• a.) Advertising
• b.) Credit-claiming (includes both non-legislative
“casework” and “pork barrel legislation”
• c.) Position-taking on issues of concern to the district
• (In all of these activities, Congressional resources---i.e.,
personal and committee staff, exposure on C-SPAN,
franking privilege of free mailing to the districts, more
paid trips home---increasingly and aggressively used to
promote re-election)
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: The
Incumbency Advantage
• EXPLANATIONS FOR INCREASE IN
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE CONT’D
• Morris Fiorina, “Congress: Keystone of the
Washington Establishment” (1977),
emphasized casework, argued that
Congress deliberately keeps the
bureaucracy big and confusing so they can
“rescue” constituents
• Even though few ever ask their member of
Congress for help, the few that are helped
spread the word; most members acquire a
general reptuation for helpfulness
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: The
Incumbency Advantage
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INCUMBENTS’ FINANCIAL ADVANTAGE
--Corporate and trade association PACs (biggest and wealthiest)
tend to favor incumbents and the majority party
--Only labor unions and ideological (nonconnected) PACs are
willing to help challengers
THE SCARE-OFF EFFECT
Possibly the biggest consequence of incumbents’ activities and
fundraising is to scare off qualified potential opponents
“Strategic” candidates only run when they believe they can win;
if incumbents look unbeatable, only unqualified opponents will
run
Paradoxically, the strongest incumbents end up facing the
weakest opposition
Paradoxically, even though they find it easier to raise money,
spending doesn’t appear to help incumbents that much (‘cuz
incumbents get so much free publicity); pre-emptive vs. reactive
spending may have different effects
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: are they local
or national affairs?
--Long-time trradition of “coattails” and
midterm losses for president’s party
--Since 1980, most presidents have lacked
coattails, and in 1998 and 2002 midterms
presidents gained seats
--Size of presidents’ party gains and losses
seems to reflect presidential approval and
ups and downs in the economy; but do
voters really consider these national
factors when voting for Congress?
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: Local or
National Affairs?
• Jacobson and Kernell’s “Strategic Politicians Theory”
tried to explain how cong. Elections could be both
national and local
• Candidates, potential candidates, and contributors all
make decisions in response to national factors
(presidential approval, economy, war, etc.)
• National factors influence the quality of candidates
voters get to choose from, and voters respond primarily
to candidate quality
• So voters don’t have to be consciously thinking of
national factors in order for those factors to have an
effect; what influences cong. Elections most is national
factors EARLY in the year (when elites are making
decisions) rather than in November
• Some argue that in elections like 1994 and 1998 (Clinton
impeachment) voters DO payattention to national factors)
e.g. commercials featuring local candidates “morphing”
into Clinton or Gingrich
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