‫פרשת תרומה‬
A basic term in Halachah is ‫קנין‬. Kinyan is an acquisition. A person is able to
acquire an object by virtue of an act that the Torah imbues with the power to
allow a meaningful transaction1.
A Kinyan is used when one acquires something that has no owner, i.e. it was hefer
or to acquire something that belonged to someone else and by virtue of the
Kinyan, the ownership is transferred from the previous owner to the new owner.
Kinyan is not a robotic act. That is to say, the act of Kinyan in and on its own does
not affect transfer of ownership. Except for the case when one is acquiring an
object which was made hefker, an essential component to transfer ownership is
that of ‫דעת מקנה‬. Da’as mak’neh means that the person who is the present
owner wishes to affect a transfer of ownership. In the absence of ‫דעת מקנה‬, the
act of acquisition has no meaning or validity.
In general, the acts that are valid for acquisition include ‫הגבהה‬, lifting up the
acquired object, ‫משיכה‬, pulling the acquired object or ‫מסירה‬, when the previous
owner hands the object to the new owner2. These are all means for the new
owner to literally hold the object which he is acquiring3.
The first Perek of Masseches Kiddushin serves as a primary source for the types of
Beginning with the specifics of acquisition of marriage
and then of slaves, the Mishnah than expands its discussion to general rules. Some
of those Mishnayos will be cited below.
1
Kinyonim and their laws.
The multiplicity of kinyanim does not mean that all are valid with all types of
objects. It could be that an article that could be lifted, i.e. acquired with the kinyan
of ‫ הגבהה‬could not be acquired with the other acts of acquisition.
2
The Mishnah (ibid. 25 b) writes:
‫ בהמה דקה‬:‫ דברי רבי מאיר ור' אליעזר; וחכמים אומרים‬,‫ בהגבהה‬- ‫ והדקה‬,‫בהמה גסה נקנית במסירה‬
.‫נקנית במשיכה‬
A large animal is acquired through transfer. A small animal-through lifting, these
are the words of Rabi Meir and Rabi Eliezer. The Chachamim say, ‘a small animal
is [also] acquired through pulling.
3
In the event that real estate is being transferred, and there is no way to literally
hold the object, an act that demonstrates ownership is required. Such an act is
called ‫חזקה‬. Chazakah, in this context, means ‘possession’ or ‘holding-on’ to the
object. Some examples of chazakah are making improvements on property and
planting and harvesting crops.
Real estate is also acquired by contract and by monetary payment4.
There are additional types of Kinyan, too, but the above are the basic acts that
demonstrate that a person owns the property with which he is dealing5.
In our Parshas Terumah, we wish to ask a question regarding Kinyan. Our
ancestors were asked to make a donation to the building of the Mishkan.
Specific items were necessary for its construction and they are enumerated in our
Parsha. By what mechanism did those donated objects the property of the soonto-be Mishkan?
We read in our Parsha (Perek 25/Posuk 2):
:‫דבר אל בני ישראל ויקחו לי תרומה מאת כל איש אשר ידבנו לבו תקחו את תרומתי‬
We read in the Mishnah (ibid. 26 a):
.‫ אין נקנין אלא במשיכה‬- ‫ שאין להם אחריות‬,‫ נקנין בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה‬- ‫נכסים שיש להם אחריות‬
Property that has security is acquired with payment, contract and chazaka.
Property that does not have security in only acquired with pulling.
4
Rashi explains that real estate is called property that has security because if
someone lends money to the owner of such property he is secure in his knowledge
that he will be able to collect the debt from the property if the borrower defaults.
The Mishnah cited in note 4 continues:
‫ ובחזקה‬,‫ ובשטר‬,‫ בכסף‬- ‫נכסים שאין להם אחריות נקנין עם נכסים שיש להם אחריות‬
Insecure property can be acquired with secure property which is acquired with
payment, contract or chazaka.
5
In the Gemara this type of acquisition is called ‫ קנין אגב קרקע‬which means that one
acquires non-real estate by virtue of the acquisition of real estate. Of course, this is
a convenient type of acquisition because with the payment for the real estate, the
other properties are acquired without having to make an individual act of
acquisition on each and every object where it happens to be.
Speak to B’nei Yisroel and they should take for Me teruma, from each man of
Israel whose heart will donate, you should take My teruma.
It is clear that the teruma will be eventually collected. That is implied by the end
of the verse that reads ‫תקחו תרומתי‬-you should take My teruma.
However, the initial stage is done completely by the individual. ‫ויקחו לי תרומה‬they, the householders, should take My Teruma. If the householder takes an
object from himself, how does it become teruma? Where is the transfer of
ownership6?
We learn in the Mishnah in Masseches Kiddushin (28 b):
‫אמירתו לגבוה כמסירתו להדיוט‬
His “saying” (or even ‘thinking’7) for hekdesh8 is the same as his transfer9 for nonhekdesh10.
Further on we will discuss the source for the principle about to be discussed. It
would seem that this verse could also serve as the source for the principle that the
means of sanctifying an object, that is transferring it to the possession of the
Mishkan/Beis HaMikdosh can be accomplished without the participation of the
‘body’ that will make the acquisition.
I searched to see if someone would relate to this point but I have not found anyone
who discusses it. Perhaps, then, there is a flaw that I have not yet discovered.
6
Although the term used here is ‫אמירתו‬, his ‘saying’, in regards to the sanctification
of objects, ‫הקדש‬, it is not necessary to utter the words. In fact, a ‫מחשבה‬, thought, is
sufficient to transform a non-sanctified item to a state of sanctity.
In Masseches Shavuos 26 b we read:
‫כב ויבאו האנשים על הנשים) כל נדיב לב‬/‫ (שמות לה‬:‫ גמר בלבו מנין? ת"ל‬,‫אין לי אלא שהוציא בשפתיו‬
.)'‫(הביאו חח ונזם וטבעת וכומז כל כלי זהב וכל איש אשר הניף תנופת זהב לה‬
7
I only know [that an object can be sanctified] when he expressed this with his lips, if
he decided in his heart [without saying that he is sanctifying the object] from where
do we know [that the object is sanctified]? Because it says “…every donation of the
heart brought the gifts to the Mishkan.
Thus we see that a decision ‘in the heart’, that is in one’s thought can accomplish
the act of sanctification.
Rashi notes an additional verse in Divrei HaYomim II (Perek 29/Posuk 31):
‫ויען יחזקיהו ויאמר עתה מלאתם ידכם לה' גשו והביאו זבחים ותודות לבית ה' ויביאו הקהל זבחים‬
:‫ותודות וכל נדיב לב עלות‬
Chizkiyahu (the king) responded and said, ‘now you have dedicated yourselves to
Hashem, approach and bring offerings and thanksgivings to Hashem and the people
brought offerings and thanksgivings to Hashem, every donor of the heart brought
Olos-burnt offerings.
By using the phrase ‫ נדיב לב‬we understand that the sanctification of these offerings
was done by thought, not by expressing the thought in words.
The addition of this verse removes a possible question that could have been raised.
In the Torah, in our Parshas Terumah and the other instances where phrases like
‫ נדיב לב‬are used, it is always in the context of building the Mishkan. It is not in the
context of the korbonos that will be offered there. Thus, one may think that to
dedicate materials to build the Mishkan, a thought is sufficient. To dedicate
materials for the actual offerings to Hashem, though may be insufficient and I
require a clear declaration-one that is uttered. Thus, the verse in Divrei HaYomim
teaches us that ‫נדיב לב‬, this dedication that comes about through thought alone, is
valid for the korbonos as well.
[Vis a vis the p’shat of the Posuk, the phrase ‫ נדיב לב‬is used in relationship to the
Korbon ‘Oloh, the burnt-offering, and not to the other offerings mentioned in the
verse. That is because in regard to the other offerings, people partake of Korbon,
Kohanim and those who brought it.
In regard to the ‘Oloh, however, no one partakes of it. it is completely burnt and
thus one who donates the ‘Oloh, is particularly generous.
Thus, in Parshas Tzav, when various aspects of the Korbon ‘Oloh are discussed,
Hashem tells Moshe Rabbenu ‫צו את בני ישראל‬, command Israel. Why was it
necessary to add the word ‫צו‬, command, when the very word of G-d is a
commandment in and of itself?
The Posuk (Vayikro Perek 6/Posuk 2) reads:
‫צו את אהרן ואת בניו לאמר זאת תורת העלה הוא העלה על מוקדה על המזבח כל הלילה עד הבקר ואש‬
:‫המזבח תוקד בו‬
Command Aharon and his sons saying, This is the law of the ‘Oloh, it is the ‘Oloh
that is on the fire on the altar all of the night until the morning and the fire of the
altar will be inflamed in it.
Rashi explains:
‫ אמר ר' שמעון ביותר צריך הכתוב לזרז במקום שיש בו‬.‫ אין צו אלא לשון זרוז מיד ולדורות‬- ‫צו את אהרן‬
:‫חסרון כיס‬
Command Aharon-Tzav is an expressing of urgency, for the moment and for all
time. Rabi Shimon said, ‘in particular the verse had to urge in a place where there
is a monetary loss.
The Gemara there gives a clear example of the application of this rule:
‫ אפי' בסוף‬,‫ בית זה הקדש‬,‫כיצד אמירתו לגבוה כמסירתו להדיוט? האומר שור זה עולה‬
.‫ בהדיוט לא קנה‬,‫ קנה‬- ‫העולם‬
What is an example [of the application of this rule] that “His saying for hekdesh is
the same as his transfer for non-hekdesh”? If one says, this ox is a Korban Oloh,
this house is hekdesh-holy, even if they are at the other end of the world,
[hekdesh] has acquired it, with a commoner - he did not acquire it.
Thus, when the donor will say, ‘this gold is for the Mishkan’, this silver is for the
Mishkan’, they are immediately imbued with sanctity and their use for a nonMishkan function is an act of 11‫מעילה‬. They are now holy objects.
The word in the Mishnah is ‫גבוה‬, that which is ‘high’ or above.
It is
unquestionable from the context that the Mishnah is referring to hekdesh with this
term.
8
All the commentators note that the term ‫מסירה‬-handing over in the Mishnah is not
meant to denote a specific act of kinyan but is used here generically-representing
the entire repertoire of Kinyanim that are valid for the various types of
circumstances that exist.
9
The Mishnah uses the term ‫ הדיוט‬which is translated as commoner. However,
the term hedyot is understood in relationship to its context. That is, if the context
is a king, then ‫ הדיוט‬means a commoner, non-royalty. If the context is a Kohen, then
a ‫ הדיוט‬could mean a Levi or a Yisroel.
We find the term ‫מנהג הדיוט‬, a practice of commoners, to denote a practice which
does not meet the standard of ‫ מנהג ישראל‬which is binding.
Here the context is one of ‫ הקדש‬so hedyot means non-hekdesh.
11 The Torah forbids the misuse of hekdesh articles for non-hekdesh purposes. We
read in Parshas Vayikro (Vayikro Perek 5/P’sukim 15-16):
‫נפש כי תמעל מעל וחטאה בשגגה מקדשי ה' והביא את אשמו לה' איל תמים מן הצאן בערכך כסף‬
‫ ואת אשר חטא מן הקדש ישלם ואת חמישתו יוסף עליו ונתן אתו לכהן‬:‫שקלים בשקל הקדש לאשם‬
:‫והכהן יכפר עליו באיל האשם ונסלח לו‬
A person who acts fraudulently and sins without knowledge from the articles made
holy for Hashem-he should bring his guilt-offering to G-d an unblemished ram from
the sheep with the value of two shekolim in the valuation of the sanctified shekolim,
for Hashem. He who sins from the sanctified objects should pay and add a fifth
upon it and give it the Kohen and the Kohen should atone for him with the guiltoffering-ram and he will be forgiven.
10
Chazal tell us a source for this power of speech that is given to the individual vis a
vis the sanctification of his property.
The Yerushalmi on Masseches Kiddushin (Perek 1/Halachah 6) explains that this
ability to sanctify an object merely by means of an oral declaration is learned from
the Posuk in Tehillim (Perek 24/Posuk 1): ‫לה' הארץ ומלואה תבל ויושבי בה‬.
The land belongs to G-d, the entire earth and those who dwell upon it. By virtue
of this verse, Meiri to our Gemara (Masseches Kiddushin 28 b) explains that the
world is already in the possession of G-d. the Halachah teaches us that an object
that is within the confines of one’s enclosed and secured property can be
acquired by virtue of the fact that it is contained within his control. Meiri
explains that the world is G-d’s enclosed and secure property and thus, merely, by
giving expression to the decision to sanctify the object, it is already in G-d’s
possession.
Rashbam (Masseches Bava Basra 133 b) says that the source for the efficacy of an
oral declaration to sanctify an objective his learned from the verse in the Torah
(Vayikro Perek 27/Posuk 14):
‫ואיש כי יקדש את ביתו קדש לה' והעריכו הכהן בין טוב ובין רע כאשר יעריך אתו הכהן כן‬
:‫יקום‬
When a man sanctifies his house to be holy for Hashem, the Kohen determines its
value, for more or for less, as the Kohen determines its value so shall it be.
Thus, an unintentional act of ‫ מעילה‬requires a sacrifice, restituting whatever
monetary loss that was caused to Hekdesh with the additional payment of a fine of
one-fifth on the value of the principal.
When the act of ‫ מעילה‬was intentional, there is no offering and no monetary fine.
It seems that Rashbam understands that the individual in question here declared
the house to be sanctified and the Torah says “'‫”קודש לה‬, it is [=becomes]
sanctified.12
Perhaps we can view this unique kinyan-process in another light as well. G-d
introduced sanctity to man13. By virtue of enabling man to sanctify, Hashem
enhanced his essence. With that enhanced essence that which would not be
sufficient for a mundane kinyan becomes effective for a kinyan that introduces
sanctity. That is, when a person sanctifies an object, he does so from the source
of his own sanctity. His own sanctity is superior to his physicality and thus he
does not have to do a gross motor act to give over the object to hekdesh. This
higher-level declaration of sanctification, which stems from the higher level of
being able to sanctify works on a rarefied level. The power of speech in the area
of sanctification accomplishes what the hands and legs could accomplish in the
mundane world.
Thus, it is the increased sanctify of the act of sanctification which concretizes the
words that a person utters and makes them as powerful as actual accomplished
deeds.
We know that we can divide our activities into three divisions: ‫מעשה‬-deed, ‫דבור‬speech and ‫מחשבה‬-thought.
In his opening article for Chodesh Sivan, the B’nei Yissoschar writes:
‫והנה ידוע דזאת התורה הניתנה למורשה מחויבים אנחנו לקיימה בכל חלקי מצותיה‬...
‫ כציצית‬,‫ המעשה הוא עשיית המצות בגשמיות עשיה ממש‬,‫במחשבה דבור ומעשה‬
‫ והנה חלק המעשה בלבד בזולת דבור ומחשבה נקרא רק בחינת‬,‫ותפילין ולולב וכיוצא‬
‫ כמו העיבור בהתגלות וחידוש ראשון שיצא מן הכח אל הפועל להתהוות עיבור‬,‫עיבור‬
‫עצמים בבטן המלאה אין לו בחינת דבור כי הפה סתום [נדה ל ב] (ומכל שכן שלא יצוייר בו‬
‫ וחלק הדבור בהצטרפו‬,‫ רק מעשה יש לו כי יש לו תנועה באיבריו גם במעי אמו‬,)‫מחשבה‬
That is the interpretation offered by Encyclopedia Talmudit Volume 2, footnote 5
in the entry of ‫אמירה לגבוה כמסירה להדיוט‬.
12
The Sefer Avnei Miluim Siman 1/s’if koton 2 says that the principle of
‫ אמירה לגבוה כמסירה להדיוט‬is valid for a non-Jew too!
13
‫עם המעשה נקרא בחינת יניקה כמו הילד אחר השתלמות ימי העיבור נפתח פה הסתום‬
‫ ובהצטרף לדבור ומעשה גם חלק‬,'‫ועל ידי היניקה מעט מעט מתחיל לדבר והוא חידוש ב‬
‫המחשבה זה נקרא מוחין כמו התינוק הגם שמתחיל לדבר עם כל זה אינו יודע לישא וליתן‬
.'‫ולשאול ולהשיב כהוגן עד שישתלמו מוחותיו בגדלות והוא חידוש ג‬
'‫והנה הוא הרמז לכל אדם בכל עת ובכל זמן לא ישתלם בקבלת התורה עד יושלמו בו ג‬
.‫חידושים הללו מחשבה דבור ומעשה‬
It is known that we are required to fulfill the Torah that was given to us as a
legacy, with all parts of its Mitzvos, in thought, in speech and in deed.
‫מעשה‬-deed is the doing of the Mitzvos with actual physicality, like Tzizis, Tefilin,
lulav, etc. This aspect, deed alone, without speech or thought, is comparable to
the aspect of the fetus. Just like the fetus, which is a chiddush in actualizing the
potential [of father and mother to create a new life] to become a fetus with
substance in the full stomach [of the mother] has no power of speech, because
the mouth is shut14 (and certainly one cannot envision that it has thought, so
‫מעשה‬-deed alone has bodily movement, even inside the mother.
The aspect of speech, when he joins the deed, is referred to as the aspect of
nursing, similar to the way in which a child [at birth] following pregnancy has his
[previously] closed mouth opened and through nursing he gradually begins to
speak, and this is the second chiddush.
B’nei Yissochor refers us to Masseches Niddah (30 b) where we read:
‫ שתי אציליו על‬,‫ ידיו על שתי צדעיו‬.‫ לפנקס שמקופל ומונח‬- ‫ למה הולד דומה במעי אמו‬:‫דרש רבי שמלאי‬
‫ ואוכל ממה‬,‫ ופיו סתום וטבורו פתוח‬,‫ וראשו מונח לו בין ברכיו‬,‫ וב' עקביו על ב' עגבותיו‬,‫ב' ארכובותיו‬
- ‫ וכיון שיצא לאויר העולם‬.‫ ואינו מוציא רעי שמא יהרוג את אמו‬,‫ ושותה ממה שאמו שותה‬,‫שאמו אוכלת‬
.‫ שאלמלא כן אינו יכול לחיות אפילו שעה אחת‬,‫נפתח הסתום ונסתם הפתוח‬
Rabi Simlai interpreted-a child inside the mother is like a folded tablet, lying in place. His hands
are on his temples, his arms are resting on his legs, his heels are by his buttocks, and his head is
[folded down] between his knees. His mouth his shut and his navel is open and he eats from
that which is mother eats and he drinks from that which is mother drinks and he does not emit
waste because he would perhaps kill his mother. When he is born, that which was closed,
opens and that which was open, closes. Were that not so, he would be unable to live even one
hour.
14
When the aspect of thought joins the aspects of deed and speech, this is called
‫מוחין‬-‘minds’ just like the child who begins to speak but has no ability to discuss,
or ask and answer properly, until his ‫ מוחין‬reaches completion with maturity, and
that is the third chiddush.
Thus, in addition to the quantitative physical development of the child inside the
womb and out, there is qualitative development as well. That qualitative
development is not only the unique additional functioning of the already-existing
aspects. That qualitative development is the introduction of new aspects of life
that are able to bring the individual into full and complete functionality.
If full and complete functionality is defined by realization of all three of these
aspects, rising to ‫דבור‬-speech and culminating with the full use of ‫מחשבה‬, then
this aspect of sanctification, ‫הקדש‬, culminates the second and third aspects in
which speech alone accomplishes15 that which deed is to do and finally, ‫מחשבה‬
alone culminates that which we may have thought could have been accomplished
only by deed and/or speech.
Now that we have seen that the process of sanctification empowers man, and lets
speech and thought replace action, we must wonder in what way we can
approach such levels16 when we do not have the Beis HaMikdosh17.
Man still remains a physical being, and therefore, even with the superiority of
speech and thought, those Mitzvos that require action are not exempted by speech
or thought.
One is commanded to put on Tefilin and to take Lulav and Esrog. Those Mitzvos
cannot be fulfilled by speech and thought alone.
One is commanded to read Megillas Esther. He will not fulfill that Mitzvah by just
‘thinking about it’.
15
In fact, there are major discussions beginning with Chazal and continuing to this
day regarding ‫הרהור כדבור‬-is thought equivalent to speech. In particular the focus is
in regard to the recitation of Shema’, davening and learning Torah.
The discussion begins in Masseches B’rachos 20 b.
16
In fact, a person can sanctify articles ‫בזמן הזה‬, even in the absence of the Beis
HaMikdosh and those articles would have full sanctity. However, the issues with
17
The Rama in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah Siman 258/s’if 13 writes:
‫ אלא‬,‫ חייב לקיים מחשבתו ואין צריך אמירה‬,‫ אם חשב בלבו ליתן איזה דבר לצדקה‬:‫הגה‬
‫ והעיקר כסברא‬.‫ אינו כלום‬,‫ וי"א דאם לא הוציא בפיו‬.‫דאם אמר מחייבין אותו לקיים‬
).‫ (ועיין בחושן המשפט סימן רי"ב‬,‫הראשונה‬
Gloss of Ramah-if one thought in his heart to give something for charity, he is
obligated to fulfill his thought and he is not required to say [something to obligate
himself], but that which he says, we obligate him to fulfill. There are those who
say that if he did not utter [his gift to tzedaka] it does not count for anything.
The basic din is like the first opinion. (See Choshen Mishpot Siman 21218).
That is, if an act of Tzedaka can be accomplished through thought alone, it too has
the capacity to raise a person in a way similar to Hekdesh.
Perhaps that is the meaning of the verse in Mishlei (Perek 14/Posuk 34):
:‫צדקה תרומם גוי וחסד לאמים חטאת‬
Tzedaka will raise a nation and kindness to the nations is a sin.
Rashi explains:
:‫ ישראל‬- ‫צדקה תרומם גוי‬
Tzedaka will raise a nation-Israel
:‫ שהיו נוטלים מזה ונותנים לזה‬- ‫וחסד לאומי' חטאת‬
and kindness to the nations is a sin-The nations took from this one and gave to
that one.
In Masseches Bava Basra (10 b) we learn:
guarding them against impurity and misuse are many and grave and thus this idea
which may be true is far from practical or advised.
The Shulchan Aruch there brings another aspect in which Hekdesh is more
potent in Kinyan-power than non-Hedkesh.
18
‫לד) צדקה‬/‫ מהו שאמר הכתוב (משלי יד‬,‫ בני‬:‫ אמר להן רבן יוחנן בן זכאי לתלמידיו‬,‫תניא‬
,‫ אלו ישראל‬- ‫ צדקה תרומם גוי‬:‫תרומם גוי וחסד לאומים חטאת? נענה רבי אליעזר ואמר‬
...‫) ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ‬19‫כג‬/‫ (שמואל ב ז‬:‫דכתיב‬
The Braisa teaches: Raban Yochanan ben Zakai said to his students-what is the
meaning of the verse “Tzedaka will raise a nation and kindness to the nations is a
sin”? Rabi Eliezer responded and said, “Tzedaka will raise a nation”-this refers to
Israel about whom it says, “Who is like Your People Israel, a unique nation in the
land”.
Tzedaka for the Jewish People is not just an act of charity. It is not only an act of
righteousness. Tzedaka raises the Jewish People. It raises the Jewish People to a
state of uniqueness. What is that state of uniqueness? The commentators
explain that uniqueness in relationship to Tzedaka. Perhaps, we can add an
additional factor.
Israel is unique because Tzedaka raises us to a level in which our speech and our
thoughts are meaningful in a concrete way. The words that we say bind us; the
thoughts that we think oblige us to fulfill them, at least in some of the pursuits in
which we participate.
We do not have the Beis HaMikdosh today but we do have Tzedaka. We are used
to saying Vayikro Rabba Parshas Behar (34):
‫יותר ממה שבעל הבית עושה עם העני העני עושה עם בעל הבית‬
More than the homeowner does for the poor man20, the poor man does for the
homeowner.
The entire verse reads:
‫ל'קים לפדות לו לעם ולשום לו שם ולעשות לכם הגדולה‬...‫ומי כעמך כישראל גוי אחד בארץ אשר הלכו א‬
:‫ונראות לארצך מפני עמך אשר פדית לך ממצרים גוים ואלהיו‬
Who is like Your People Israel, a unique nation in the land that G-d went to redeem
them for Him to be a nation and to give it a name and to do for your greatness and
awesomeness for your land before the people whom You redeemed for Yourself from
Egypt, nations and its gods.
19
We understand, correctly, that G-d takes care of the poor and the individual who
donates to the poor is a vehicle in G-d’s plan. Thus, the donor is merely a ‘middleman’. However, the poor individual who accepts the charity allows the donor to
have a Mitzvah opportunity. Thus, the poor man has done more for the rich man
than vice-versa.
With this comparison of the empowerment of Tzedaka, we can understand a
further benefit that the poor man provides for the wealthy man. The opportunity
to participate in the act of Tzedaka raises the power of our speech and our
thought. Rather than lacking physical substance, in the case of speech, and being
abstract in the case of thought, the act of Tzedaka empowers both and makes
them substantive and concrete, effective and competent.
In this month of Adar we remember the Mitzvah of Shekalim (which was given
special mention last week) and Matanos LoEvyonim of Purim. The Shekalim
were collected to provide the public offerings, Korbonos Tzibbur for the coming
year and Matanos LoEvyonim are given to assure that the happiness of Purim is
not in the province of the ‘haves’ and outside the province of the ‘have-nots’21.
We often find that the one who gives charity is referred to the homeowner and the
poor man is on the outside. Thus in the first Mishnah in Masseches Shabbos we
read: ‫כיצד העני עומד בחוץ ובעל הבית בפנים‬. What is the case? The poor man stands
outside and the homeowner is inside.
Perhaps this is an ancient understanding of the poor being homeless?
20
Rambam writes in Hilchos Megillah vChanuka (Perek 2/Halachah 17):
‫ שאין שם שמחה גדולה‬,‫מוטב לאדם להרבות במתנות אביונים מלהרבות בסעודתו ובשלוח מנות לרעיו‬
‫ שהמשמח לב האמללים האלו דומה לשכינה‬,‫ומפוארה אלא לשמח לב עניים ויתומים ואלמנות וגרים‬
)‫ כי כה אמר רם ונשא שכן עד וקדוש שמו מרום וקדוש אשכון ואת דכא ושפל רוח‬-‫טו‬/‫שנאמר (ישעיהו נז‬
.‫להחיות רוח שפלים ולהחיות לב נדכאים‬
It is preferable for a person to increase his gifts to the poor (on Purim) rather than
increasing his festive meal of the mishlo’ach monos-presents of food that he sends to
his peers. This is because there is no happiness greater and beautiful than to
gladden the hearts of the poor, the orphans, widows and converts. One who
gladdens the heart of these unfortunates is comparable to the Shechinah as it says,
‘So says He Who is elevated and lofty, Who dwells forever, His Name is holiness,
‘exalted and holy I Hashem will dwell and the oppressed and of lowly spirit to
enliven the spirit of those who are low and to enliven the heart of the oppressed.
21
As we have seen Tzedaka and Hekdesh are the means in which we are
empowered, making our speech and thoughts as real and concrete as our actions.
In Masseches Beitza (15 b), Rashi writes: ‫אדר לשון קיום וחוזק‬. The name Adar is an
expression of vitality and power. The Gemara there derives this from the verse in
Tehillim (Perek 93/Posuk 4):'‫מקלות מים רבים אדירים משברי ים אדיר במרום ה‬.
Greater than the sounds of mighty multitudes of water, breakers on the sea,
Hashem is more powerful in the heights.
Could it be that this month of Adar which we inaugurated this week receives it
name because it provides special empowerment? Adar is strength, but that
strength is not brute force. That strength is to take those aspects of our
repertoire to which we relate to as ‘less real’ and actualize their potential as a
vital force that that endows us with the ability to realize our potential and make
us the beneficiary of ‫וצדקה מרומם גוי‬, to reach our uppermost heights as
individuals and as a nation
The classic commentary on Mishneh Torah, the Maggid Mishneh writes on this
Halachah: ‫דברי רבינו ראויין אליו‬. The words of Rambam are appropriate for him.
He implies that this Halachah was written by Rambam without having an explicit
source in Chazal and thus, only a Rambam could express these ideas in the fashion
that he did.
Perhaps, based on the point that we are developing, we can comment on the choice
of Rambam’s words. He writes: ‫מוטב לאדם‬. It is better for an Odom to be
extravagant with Matanos LoEvyonim rather than with the Seuda and Mishloach
Monos.
We know that the Rambam is uniquely particular in his writing and that each and
every word has a purpose. Why didn’t Rambam write ‫מוטב להרבות‬, it is better to be
extravagant-and omit the word ‫ ?אדם‬We know that he is talking about people.
Perhaps, the Rambam is hinting that a person is able to reach a fulfillment of ‫אדם‬
when he gives Tzedaka generously. The fulfillment of ‫ אדם‬is to reach a point where
his speech and his thoughts are just as meaningful as are the actions that he
undertakes.
Shabbat Shalom
Rabbi Pollock