The Political Economy
of the United Nations Security Council:
Money & Influence
James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University)
Co-author: Axel Dreher (University of Heidelberg)
1
Collaboration
Cooperation
& Change
3
The UN Security Council
IMF/WB project in Ghana
IMF
World Bank
The question:
• Do temporary members of the UNSC
receive financial perks?
Yes.
Why?
• The United States and other powerful
countries seek additional influence over
the UNSC.
Plan
• Overview of the book project
• What is the UN Security Council?
• Why seek influence over the UNSC?
• Evidence
– Anecdotes
– Large-n
The Political Economy
of the United Nations Security Council:
Money and Influence
• Ch1: Money and Politics on the International Stage
• Ch2: A Theory of Trading UNSC Votes for Aid
• Ch3: Examples of Punishments, Threats, and Rewards
• Ch4: Who Wins Election to Represent the World?
• Ch5: Statistical Evidence
• Ch6: Consequences
• Ch7: Reform?
What is the UNSC
(United Nations Security Council)?
What is the UNSC?
5 permanent members with veto power
10 elected members (2 year term - limited)
Nominated by REGIONAL caucus, elected by GENERAL ASSEMBLY
3
2
2
1
2
• Resolutions (open ballot) require 9 votes
• UNSC votes on
– UN military action against aggressors
– Economic sanctions & arms embargoes
10
Why bribe/reward votes?
• Elected members of the UNSC potentially will
vote on matters of extreme international
importance
• Voting power?
• Legitimacy
– There is a premium for getting (near) unanimous votes
to win domestic public support (Prof. Voeten)
– Symbolic
– Informational
11
Rally around the flag!
14
Conservative
UNSC member
Typical US voter
US President
15
US President public support before and after military action
– with and without UNSC authorization
US public opinion support
70%
60%
66%
56%
56%
54%
Average priorsupport
Average postsupport
Average priorsupport
Average postsupport
Std dev=0.9
Std dev=0.9
Std dev=8.0
Std dev=9.0
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
(n=198, |t|=-0.25)
(n=6, |t|=2.11)
Without UNSC authorization
With UNSC authorization
16
18
19
• The goal of the donor countries:
– Get countries under a program – in case important
issues come up.
• Godfather-esque:
– “Some day, and that day may never come, I'll call upon
you to do a service for me. But uh, until that day, accept
this justice as a gift on my daughter’s wedding day.”
•
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Bz9iXernY4&feature=fvw
20
Evidence
• Some anecdotes***
• Systematic evidence
Gulf War Examples
• Zimbabwe – UNSC member 1991-92
– 1992 – 1st IMF arrangement in a decade
– Votes for 2 resolutions against Iraq
– Then abstains…
– And Zimbabwe was threatened with new
IMF conditions
– Subsequently votes for 11 resolutions
condemning Iraq.
Gulf War Examples
• Zaire in early 1991: PRESIDENT of UNSC
– Request emergency UNSC meeting
– Inconvenient for:
–“Zaire was offered undisclosed ‘debt
forgiveness’ and military equipment in
return for silencing the Security Council
when the attack was under way.”
Obama – Ondimba
• Spring 2011: President Obama & senior State Department
officials meet with President Ondimba of Gabon
• Why would the United States grant Gabon (pop. 1.5 mil) a
high-level meeting?
• Gabon supported
– Res. 1970 (26 February 2011): Imposed sanctions on
Gaddafi’s regime
– Res. 1973 (17 March 2011): Established a no-fly zone
over Libya & provided the legal basis for the military
intervention in the Libyan Civil War.
– Res. 1973 was crucial & passed with only ten votes
–
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/14/137171315/for-u-s-dealing-with-dictators-is-not-unusual
Sec. Clinton
• Togo elected to the UNSC fall 2011 to serve 2012-13
• Sec. Clinton visits Togo
• Why?
– “No Secretary of State had ever been to Togo before.
– “Togo happens to be on the UN Security Council.
– “Going there, making the personal investment, has a real
strategic purpose.
– “When... you look at the voting dynamics in key
international institutions, you start to understand the value
of paying attention to these places.” – Sec. Clinton
Counter examples?
Gulf War Examples
• Cuba – UNSC member 1990-1
– Consistently opposed Iraq resolutions
– IMF arrangement?
– Left the IMF in 1964 – not an IMF member
– (Why? Claimed the IMF was a tool of the US)
Gulf War Examples
• Yemen – UNSC member 1990-1
– Voted against Desert Storm
– U.S. representative was overheard declaring to
the Yemeni ambassador that it was
“the most expensive vote you have ever cast.”
– The US cut hundreds of millions of dollars in aid
– (No IMF arrangement)
A more historical example?
• Tanzania
– 1961-1974 no IMF, no UNSC
– 1975
• UNSC member
• First IMF arrangement – exceedingly weak
conditionality
What does it mean
“to explain”?
Nomothetic (law-like)
vs. Idiographic (descriptive) approaches
• Law-like statement:
– Whenever & wherever X occurs, X is in a certain
relation to Y.
• Descriptive statement:
– Specifies spatio-temporal locations and makes all
subsequent propositions relative to these parameters.
Description (idiographic):
• Julius Nyerere was the first President of
Tanzania from the country’s founding in
1961 until 1985 (his retirement )
• 1975
– UNSC member
– First IMF arrangement – exceedingly
weak conditionality
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Law-like (nomothetic):
• UNSC members are more likely to receive
IMF loans with light conditionality
• Other examples:
– A particle to which no force is applied will move with constant
velocity in a straight line.
– Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other
particle with a force that is directly proportional to the product of
the masses of the particles and inversely proportional to the
square of the distance between them.
– E=mc2
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We can easily apply law-like statements
to particular cases…
• A particle to which no force was applied in Brazil during
the 1960s moved in a straight line with constant
velocity.
• Particles of matter in Argentina during the 1990s
attracted other particles in Mercosur and the rest of the
world with forces directly proportional to the product of
the masses of the particles and inversely proportional to
the square of the distance between them.
• In France, E equaled mc2 after the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system.
True - but redundant - statements.
But some would judge the following “improper” because people
don’t behave in a universal fashion the way “particles” do.
– Import substitution industrialization retards economic
development in the long-run.
– Fixed exchange rates may fail as credible commitments
leading to economic catastrophe.
– The Trilemma.
We have taken a “nomothetic”
approach to IPE
• Risky!
– We may have made false generalizations
• Alternative:
• History of international political economy
– Descriptive
– Less risky
– Can lead to the view that every outcome is UNIQUE
36
According to the approach of this class,
What is it to explain?
• To state the conditions under which a
phenomenon always or usually takes
place (perhaps probabilistically)
• The BRIDGE
– The BRIDGE between historical observations
and general theory is the substitution of
variables for proper names and dates
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• Instead of:
– Julius Nyerere, the first President of
Tanzania, saw his country elected to serve on
the UNSC in 1975 and entered into an IMF
arrangement with light conditions that year.
• We have:
– UNSC members are more likely to receive
IMF loans with light conditionality
38
IMF reply in the Washington Post
(November 1, 2006):
• An IMF spokesman said “the [Tanzania]
evidence is anecdotal and circumstantial.”
• To convince people, we need
– many more anecdotes
– statistical evidence (it’s not just luck)
Descriptive data
Bilateral aid 1960 to 2009
$140
$140
Millions of 2009 US dollars
$120
$98
$100
$80
$80
$74
$66
$60
$51
$41
$40
$40
$21
$20
$0
$39
non-UNSC
UNSC
members
United States
non-UNSC
UNSC
members
Japan
non-UNSC
UNSC
members
Germany
non-UNSC
UNSC
members
United Kingdom
(non-UNSC: n=5719) (UNSC: n=339)
non-UNSC
UNSC
members
France
Enter
the IMF & the World Bank
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Key points about the IMF & World Bank
• Involved with developing countries through
“programs”: loans+conditions.
• Influence over decisions pegged to economic
size.
• Growing evidence that the major
shareholders use their influence for political
reasons (e.g. Stone, Reynaud, Momani,
Kilby).
• Especially when they agree (Copelovitch).
42
Why use IFIs to influence the
UNSC?
– Political benefits (for both actors)
• “DIRTY WORK” (Vaubel)
– Leverage benefits
• Conditionality & loan disbursements
– Cost benefits
43
Figure 1: Participation in IMF programs by non-permanent UN Security Council Membership
over time
% of obs. participating in IMF programs
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Nonmembers
Members
Other years
4 years
before
3 years
before
2 years
before
1 year before
1st year
member
2nd year
member
mean=0.28
mean=0.34
mean=0.28
mean=0.28
mean=0.31
mean=0.33
mean=0.32
mean=0.35
mean=0.34
1 year after 2 years after
mean=0.30
mean=0.28
st.dev.=0.45 st.dev.=0.48 st.dev.=0.45 st.dev.=0.45 st.dev.=0.46 st.dev.=0.47 st.dev.=0.47 st.dev.=0.48 st.dev.=0.48 st.dev.=0.46 st.dev.=0.45
(n=6684)
(n=462)
(n=5405)
(n=178)
(n=196)
(n=215)
(n=236)
(n=236)
(n=225)
(n=234)
(n=221)
UN Security Council Membership Status
The horizontal line shows the average IMF participation rate across our entire sample. The dots reflect the results where only low and lower-middle income countries are included.
World Bank evidence
“It is true that during the Cold War years
aid was politically motivated.”
“Now however, aid is being delivered to
countries most in need and to those
who show they are determined to use
it well.”
(World Bank, FAQ, www.worldbank.org)
Average # of World Bank projects by UNSC membership
If politics mattered during the Cold War, but not after,
this bar should be above the line,
members
and this one should beUNSC
at/below
the line…continue to get
more World Bank programs
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
avg=1.29
avg=2.13
avg=1.29
avg=2.06
avg=2.19
avg=1.28
avg=2.15
avg=1.30
avg=2.10
std=1.95
std=2.93
std=1.95
std=2.75
std=3.11
std=1.96
std=2.96
std=1.93
std=2.92
n=5333
n=357
n=5333
n=176
n=181
n=2638
n=183
n=2695
n=174
Nonmember
Member
Nonmember
1st.year
member
2nd year
member
Nonmember
Member
Nonmember
Member
Total sample
Over time
During the cold war
After the cold war
Is this a US-thing?
• Regional Organizations
• Regional Hegemons
48
Asian Development Bank
Daniel Yew Mao Lim,
Class of 2011
49
African Development Bank
Pre-1982
1982 and onward:
UNSC Member
-0.104
(0.06)
1.717***
(3.55)
Pariah state
6.193***
(4.43)
0.072
(0.04)
0.904
(0.48)
-1.519**
(2.05)
6.582**
(2.14)
-0.043
(0.29)
1.368
(0.90)
0.026
(0.44)
Number of observations
355
1,338
R-squared
0.39
0.07
War
ln(GDP per capita, PPP)
Political regime
Notes: All regressions include country and year fixed-effects and regional quartics
(for North Africa and Africa South of the Sahara). Numbers in parentheses are the
absolute values of t-statistics.
Summary Observation by
Russian Student
• Bribes – no surprise
– Trade money for votes
• But the US & allies bribe…
– with a loan
– must be repaid!
• Impressive!
Who is surprised?
So what?
• Reform debate focuses on:
– NUMBER of representatives
• elected
• permanent
• No discussion of accountability
Accountability, the UNSC,
& the Paradox of Stability
Criteria
are too
high!
Criteria
are too
low!
Suggested reforms:
–Do away with term limits
–Let regions elect
DISCUSSION
56
DISCUSSION:
Will China play the foreign aid game?
• How China might use its powerful
position in international politics to try
to obtain its foreign policy goals?
– Dalai Lama?
– Caribbean recognition of PRC vs. ROC?
– Chiang Mai alternative conditionality?
57
58
Thank you
WE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!
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Gulf War Examples
• Ecuador – UNSC member 1991-92
– IMF arrangement in 1991
– Of course Ecuador is a regular IMF customer: 1961,
1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1972,
1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1994, 2000
– Voted for all but 2 Iraq resolutions
Note Ecuador’s IMF participation pattern above
• Countries participate in IMF programs about 25% of the
time (including ALL countries).
• Typical pattern: 5 years in, 5 years out, 5 years in, etc…
64
Cuba before & after 1961
IMF participation
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Non-member
Member
Non-member
Member
n=11
n=4
n=29
n=1
Cuba pre-1961
Cuba post-1961
Repùblica de Nicaragua, América Central
IMF participation
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Non-member
Member
Non-member
Member
n=27
n=2
n=9
n=2
Nicaragua 1951-1979
Nicaragua 1980-1990
IMF Participation
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Non-member
UNSC Member
n=27
n=7
Brazil 1970-2004
Member
Request aid
No request
Donor
No offer
Offer aid, set a>0
Nature reveals local politics b
Member
Member
Vote against
Vote with
Member: b
Donor: 0
Member: 0
Donor: v
Member: b
Donor: 0
Defect
Comply
Donor
Cut
Donor
Disburse
Member: b+a
Donor: –a
Cut
Member: 0
Donor: v-r
Disburse
Member: a
Donor: v–a
68
Is this a US-thing?
• Regional Organizations
• Regional Hegemons
69
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
n=1669 n=95 n=1119 n=47 n=1254 n=100 n=591
Africa
Asia & S.
Pacific
LA & Carib.
n=36 n=814
E. Europe
Member
Nonmember
Member
Nonmember
Member
Nonmember
Member
Nonmember
Member
Nonmember
Member
0.00
Nonmember
% of obs. participating in IMF programs
Figure 3: Participation in IMF programs
by UN Security Council Membership and Region
n=51 n=998 n=108
Middle East & Industrialized
N. Africa
Countries
UN Security Council Membership Status and Region
70
Implications for governance reform of the IMF:
• Q # 1: Is this a bad thing?
• Q # 2: Is it in the US interest to change things?
• Perhaps not – Short-run political gains.
• Long-run economic development?
• Elected to the UNSC 6 times
• 15 IMF arrangements since 1958
• 32 out of 48 years (66% of the time)
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In the meantime:
• The actual governance reform of the IMF
• Increase the voting power of:
– China, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey
• How will this address the political
manipulation of the IMF?
• It won’t.
“It is the correct thing to do, but probably won’t make
much difference.”
[personal conversation with Pres. Henrique Cardoso, Brazil &
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Pres. Ernesto Zedillo, Mexico]