Dialogue Education
2009
Have I got any choice?
Free Will versus Determinism
THIS CD HAS BEEN PRODUCED FOR TEACHERS TO USE IN THE CLASSROOM. IT IS A CONDITION OF THE USE OF1THIS
CD THAT IT BE USED ONLY BY THE PEOPLE FROM SCHOOLS THAT HAVE PURCHASED THE CD ROM FROM DIALOGUE
EDUCATION. (THIS DOES NOT PROHIBIT ITS USE ON A SCHOOL’S INTRANET)
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Contents
Page 3 – Hoop shoot game on Free Will
Page 4 - Video Presentation outlining the Free Will/Determinism debate
Pages 5 to 6 - Free Will
Page 7 - Fundamental questions in the debate
Page 8 - Determinism
Page 10 - Libertarianism
Pages 11 to 12 - Compatibilism
Page 13 - Incompatibilism
Page 14 - Overview map
Pages15 to 17 - Moral Responsibility
Pages 18 to 22 - Science and the Free Will debate
Pages 24 to 25 - Eastern Philosophy
Page 26 - Jewish Philosophy
Page 27 - Islamic Philosophy
Pages 28 to 29 - Christian philosophy
Page 31 - Community of Inquiry Stimulus Material
Page 32 - Bibliography
2
HOOPSHOOT
• Click on the image above for a game of
“HOOPSHOOT”. Try playing the game with your
students at the start and the end of the unit. Make
sure you have started the slide show and are
connected to the internet.
3
You Tube Presentation on
Free Will / Determinism debate
• Click on the
image to the
left. You will
need to be
connected to
the internet to
view this
presentation.
• Enlarge to full
4
screen
Free Will versus Determinism
The question of free will is whether, and in what sense,
rational agents exercise control over their actions and
decisions. Addressing this question requires understanding the
relationship between freedom and cause, and determining
whether the laws of nature are causally deterministic. The
various philosophical positions taken differ on whether all
events are determined or not — determinism versus
indeterminism — and also on whether freedom can coexist with
determinism or not — compatibilism versus incompatibilism.
So, for instance, 'hard determinists' argue
that the universe is deterministic, and that this
makes free will impossible.
5
Free Will versus Determinism
• The principle of free will has religious, ethical, and
scientific implications. For example, in the religious
realm, free will may imply that an omnipotent
divinity does not assert its power over individual
will and choices. In ethics, it may imply that
individuals can be held morally accountable for
their actions. In the scientific realm, it may imply
that the actions of the body, including the brain
and the mind, are not wholly determined by
physical causality. The question of free will has
been a central issue since the beginning of
philosophical thought.
6
Free Will vs Determinism
The basic philosophical positions on the problem of free will can be divided in
accordance with the answers they provide to two questions:
1. Is determinism true?
2. Does free will exist?
Determinism is roughly defined as the view that all current and future events
are causally necessitated by past events combined with the laws of nature.
Neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the
debate about free will.
Compatibilism is the view that the existence of free will and the truth of
determinism are compatible with each other; this is opposed to
incompatibilism which is the view that there is no way to reconcile a belief in
a deterministic universe with a belief in free will. Hard determinism is the
version of incompatibilism that accepts the truth of determinism and rejects
the idea that humans have any free will. Metaphysical libertarianism
topically agrees with hard determinism only in rejecting
compatibilism. Because libertarians accept the existence of
free will, they must reject determinism and argue for some
version of indeterminism that is compatible with freedom.
7
Determinism
8
Determinism
Determinism is a broad term with a variety of meanings. Corresponding to
each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem of free will.
Causal (or nomological) determinism is the thesis that future events are
necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism
is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon. Imagine an entity that
knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the
universe. Such an entity may be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the
smallest detail.
Logical determinism is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present or
future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how
choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or
false in the present.
Theological determinism is the thesis that there is a God who determines all that humans will
do, either by knowing their actions in advance, via some form of omniscience or by decreeing
their actions in advance.The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our
actions can be free, if there is a being who has determined them for us ahead of time.
Biological determinism is the idea that all behavior, belief, and desire are fixed by our genetic
endowment. There are other theses on determinism, including cultural determinism and
psychological determinism. Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, e.g. bioenvironmental determinism, are even more common.
9
Libertarianism
 Libertarianism is the view that humans have
free will , and that we have the freedom to
choose what we want, and that our choices
are not pre-determined. It allows the
existence of the concepts of “good” and “evil”
because people have the capacity to do
either of those with the ability to have chosen
the alternative. Many religious people are
Libertarianists and some use the existence of
free will as proof of a divine creator.
10
Compatibilism
Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with
free will. A common strategy employed by "classical
compatibilists", such as Thomas Hobbes, is to claim that a
person acts freely only when the person willed the act and
the person could have done otherwise, if the person had
decided to. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist
freedom to the person and not to some abstract notion of will, asserting, for
example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but
the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing
what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe." In articulating this crucial
proviso, David Hume writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to
belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains". To illustrate their
position, compatibilists point to clear-cut cases of someone's free will being
denied, through rape, murder, theft, or other forms of constraint. In these
cases, free will is lacking not because the past is causally determining the
future, but because the aggressor is overriding the victim's desires and
preferences about his own actions. The aggressor is coercing the victim and,
according to compatibilists, this is what overrides free will. Thus, they argue
that determinism does not matter; what matters is that individuals' choices are
the results of their own desires and preferences, and are not overridden by
some external (or internal) force. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse
any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds
with free will.
11
Compatibilism
William James' views were ambivalent. While he believed in
free will on "ethical grounds," he did not believe that there was
evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own
introspections support it. Moreover, he did not accept
incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the
indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral
responsibility. In his work Pragmatism, he wrote that "instinct
and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the
social business of punishment and praise" regardless of
metaphysical theories. He did believe that indeterminism is
important as a "doctrine of relief"—it allows for the view that,
although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it
may, through individuals' actions, become a better one.
Determinism, he argued, undermines meliorism—the idea that
progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.
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Incompatibilism
"Hard determinists", such as d'Holbach, are those incompatibilists who accept
determinism and reject free will. "Metaphysical libertarians", such as Thomas
Reid, Peter van Inwagen, and Robert Kane, are those incompatibilists who
accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism
is true. Another view is that of hard incompatibilism which states that free will is
incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This view is defended by Derk
Pereboom.
One of the traditional arguments for incompatibilism is based on an "intuition pump": if a
person is determined in his or her choices of actions, then he or she must be like other
mechanical things that are determined in their behaviour such as a wind-up toy, a billiard
ball, a puppet, or a robot. Because these things have no free will, then people must have
no free will, if determinism is true.This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such
as Daniel Dennett on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with
these things, it does not follow that there are no important differences.
“There is no mind absolute or Free will, but the mind is determined for willing this or that
by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and this one again by
another, and so on to infinity.” (Spinoza, 1673)
13
A Diagram showing the Different stances in relation to
Determinism and Free will
14
Moral responsibility
•
Society generally holds people responsible for their actions, and will say
that they deserve praise or blame for what they do. However, many believe
that moral responsibility requires free will. Thus, another important issue in
the debate on free will is whether individuals are ever morally responsible
for their actions—and, if so, in what sense.
•
Incompatibilists tend to think that determinism is at odds with moral
responsibility. It seems impossible that one can hold someone responsible
for an action that could be predicted from (potentially) the beginning of time.
Hard determinists say "So much the worse for free will!" and discard the
concept. Clarence Darrow, the famous defence attorney, pleaded the
innocence of his clients, Leopold and Loeb, by invoking such a notion of
hard determinism. During his summation, he declared:
What has this boy to do with it? He was not his own father; he was not
his own mother; he was not his own grandparents. All of this was
handed to him. He did not surround himself with governesses and
wealth. He did not make himself. And yet he is to be compelled to pay.
15
Moral responsibility
Conversely, libertarians say "So much the worse for determinism!“
Daniel Dennett asks why anyone would care about whether
someone had the property of responsibility and speculates that
the idea of moral responsibility may be "a purely metaphysical hankering".
Jean-Paul Sartre argues that people sometimes avoid incrimination and
responsibility by hiding behind determinism: "... we are always ready to take
refuge in a belief in determinism if this freedom weighs upon us or if we need
an excuse". However, the position that classifying such people as "base" or
"dishonest" makes no difference to whether or not their actions are
determined is quite as tenable.
•
The issue of moral responsibility is at the heart of the dispute between hard
determinists and compatibilists. Hard determinists are forced to accept that
individuals often have "free will" in the compatibilist sense, but they deny
that this sense of free will can ground moral responsibility. The fact that an
agent's choices are unforced, hard determinists claim, does not change the
fact that determinism robs the agent of responsibility.
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Moral responsibility
•
•
Compatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism is a prerequisite for
moral responsibility. Society cannot hold someone responsible unless his
actions were determined by something. This argument can be traced back
to David Hume. If indeterminism is true, then those events that are not
determined are random. It is doubtful that one can praise or blame someone
for performing an action generated spontaneously by his nervous system.
Instead, one needs to show how the action stemmed from the person's
desires and preferences—the person's character—before one can hold the
person morally responsible. Libertarians may reply that undetermined
actions are not random at all, and that they result from a substantive will
whose decisions are undetermined. This argument is considered
unsatisfactory by compatibilists, for it just pushes the problem back a step. It
also seems to involve some mysterious metaphysics, as well as the concept
of ex nihilo nihil fit. Libertarians have responded by trying to clarify how
undetermined will could be tied to robust agency.
St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans addresses the question of moral
responsibility as follows: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the
same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?“
In this view, individuals can still be dishonoured for their acts even though
those acts were ultimately completely determined by God.
17
Science…
The most extreme determinists are mostly scientists, such as Richard Dawkins. One
argument against determinism focuses on science and free will in relation to it, the basic
argument is as follows:
Science is purely deterministic due to the scientific method of analysis. But, just because
science is deterministic, does not mean the universe is. Science is only capable of
seeing the universe as deterministic, because it looks only at the effects that are caused
by matter and energy. An analysis based on cause and effect can only conclude in
determinism.
In science a theory is only considered True if it has proof, which means you have to
demonstrate that it works in an experiment. And the experiment has to produce the
same outcome if it is carried out correctly. This means that the existence of Free will
cannot be proven through scientific method. This is because, if Free will exists, it is
possible to produce different outcomes in the same situation regardless of the events
leading up to it. This means that it is impossible for the existence of free will to be
proved True by science. Any experiment that is conducted by scientists to prove the
existence of free will is invalid as proof because if the
results vary, they could also or only be due to unknown
factors.
18
Physics
•
•
Early scientific thought often portrayed the universe as deterministic,[and
some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient
information would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy.
Modern science, on the other hand, is a mixture of deterministic and
stochastic theories.Quantum mechanics predicts events only in terms of
probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all.
Current physical theories can not resolve the question, whether determinism
is true of the world, being very far from a potential Final Theory, and open to
many different interpretations.
Assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics turns
out to be the right one, one may still object that such indeterminism is
confined to microscopic phenomena. However, many macroscopic
phenomena are based on quantum effects, for instance, some hardware
random number generators work by amplifying quantum effects into
practically usable signals. A more significant question is whether the
indeterminism of quantum mechanics allows for anything like free will, when
the laws of quantum mechanics are supposed to give a
complete probabilistic account of the motion of particles.
19
Genetics
Like physicists, biologists have frequently addressed questions
related to free will. One of the most heated debates in biology is that
of "nature versus nurture", concerning the relative importance of
genetics and biology as compared to culture and environment in
human behavior. The view of most researchers is that many human
behaviors can be explained in terms of humans' brains, genes, and
evolutionary histories.This point of view raises the fear that such
attribution makes it impossible to hold others responsible for their
actions. Steven Pinker's view is that fear of determinism in the
context of "genetics" and "evolution" is a mistake,
that it is "a confusion of explanation with
exculpation". Responsibility doesn't
require behavior to be uncaused, as long
as behaviour responds to praise and
blame. Moreover, it is not certain that
environmental determination is any less
threatening to free will than genetic
determination.
20
Neuroscience
• It has become possible to study the living brain, and
researchers can now watch the brain's decision-making
"machinery" at work. A seminal experiment in this field was
conducted by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, in which he asked
each subject to choose a random moment to flick her wrist
while he measured the associated activity in her brain (in
particular, the build-up of electrical signal called the readiness
potential). Although it was well known that the readiness
potential preceded the physical action, Libet asked whether
the readiness potential corresponded to the felt intention to
move. To determine when the subject felt the intention to
move, he asked her to watch the second hand of a clock and
report its position when she felt that she had the conscious
will to move.
21
Experimental psychology
Experimental psychology’s contributions to the free will debate have come
primarily through social psychologist Daniel Wegner's work on conscious will.
In his book, The Illusion of Conscious Will Wegner summarizes empirical
evidence supporting the view that human perception of conscious control is an
illusion. Wegner observes that one event is inferred to have caused a second
event when two requirements are met:
1.The first event immediately precedes the second event, and
2.The first event is consistent with having caused the second event.
For example, if a person hears an explosion and sees a tree fall down that
person is likely to infer that the explosion caused the tree to fall over.
However, if the explosion occurs after the tree falls down (i.e., the first
requirement is not met), or rather than an explosion, the person hears the ring
of a telephone (i.e., the second requirement is not met), then that person is
not likely to infer that either noise caused the tree to
fall down.
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In Eastern
philosophy
In Hindu philosophy
• The six orthodox (astika) schools of thought in Hindu philosophy do not agree
with each other entirely on the question of free will. For the Samkhya, for
instance, matter is without any freedom, and soul lacks any ability to control the
unfolding of matter. The only real freedom (kaivalya) consists in realizing the
ultimate separateness of matter and self. For the Yoga school, only Ishvara is
truly free, and its freedom is also distinct from all feelings, thoughts, actions, or
wills, and is thus not at all a freedom of will. The metaphysics of the Nyaya and
Vaisheshika schools strongly suggest a belief in determinism, but do not seem
to make explicit claims about determinism or free will.
• A quotation from Swami Vivekananda, a Vedantist, offers a good example of the
worry about free will in the Hindu tradition.
“Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as free-will; the very
words are a contradiction, because will is what we know, and everything that we
know is within our universe, and everything within our universe is moulded by
conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire freedom we have to get
beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be found here.”
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In Eastern philosophy
In Buddhist philosophy
Buddhism accepts both freedom and determinism (or something
similar to it), but rejects the idea of an agent, and thus the idea that
freedom is a free will belonging to an agent. According to The Buddha,
"There is free action, there is retribution, but I see no agent that
passes out from one set of momentary elements into another one,
except the [connection] of those elements." Buddhists believe in
neither absolute free will, nor determinism. It preaches a middle
doctrine, named pratitya-samutpada in Sanskrit, which is often
translated as "inter-dependent arising". It is part of the theory of karma
in Buddhism. The concept of karma in Buddhism is different from the
notion of karma in Hinduism. In Buddhism,
the idea of karma is much less deterministic. The
Buddhist notion of karma is primarily focused on
the cause and effect of moral actions in this life,
while in Hinduism the concept of karma is more often
connected with determining one's destiny in future
lives.
25
In Jewish Philosophy
• Jewish philosophy stresses that free will is a
product of the intrinsic human soul, using the
word neshama (from the Hebrew root n.sh.m.
or . ‫מ‬.‫ש‬.‫נ‬meaning "breath"), but the ability to
make a free choice is through Yechida (from
Hebrew word "yachid", ,‫יחיד‬singular), the part
of the soul which is united with God, the only
being that is not hindered by or dependent on
cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does
not belong to the realm of the physical reality,
and inability of natural philosophy to account
for it is expected).
26
In Islamic Philosophy
• In Islam the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile
free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's jabr, or
divine commanding power. al-Ash'ari developed an
"acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in
which human free will and divine jabr were both asserted,
and which became a cornerstone of the dominant Ash'ari
position. In Shia Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher
balance toward predestination is challenged by most
theologists. Free will, according to Shia Islamic doctrine is
the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions
throughout life. All actions taken by man's free will are said
to be counted on the Day of Judgement because they are
his/her own and not God's.
27
In Christian
Philosophy
•
•
The theological doctrine of divine foreknowledge is often alleged to be in
conflict with free will, particularly in Reformed circles. For if God knows
exactly what will happen, right down to every choice one makes, the status
of choices as free is called into question. If God had timelessly true
knowledge about one's choices, this would seem to constrain one's
freedom. This problem is related to the Aristotelian problem of the sea
battle: tomorrow there will or will not be a sea battle. If there will be one,
then it seems that it was true yesterday that there would be one. Then it
would be necessary that the sea battle will occur. If there won't be one, then
by similar reasoning, it is necessary that it won't occur. This means that the
future, whatever it is, is completely fixed by past truths—true propositions
about the future.
However, some philosophers follow William of Ockham in holding that
necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time
and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is
merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary
from the perspective of an omniscient. Some philosophers follow Philo of
Alexandria in holding that free will is a feature of a human's soul, and thus
that non-human animals lack free will.
28
In Christian Philosophy
• The philosopher Søren Kierkegaard claimed that
divine omnipotence cannot be separated from
divine goodness. As a truly omnipotent and good
being, God could create beings with true freedom
over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do
so because "the greatest good ... which can be
done for a being, greater than anything else that
one can do for it, is to be truly free." Alvin
Plantinga's "free will defense" is a contemporary
expansion of this theme, adding how God, free
will, and evil are consistent.
29
Is there any freedom for an actor
on a stage in time and space?
Does existence as
physical entities in time
and space allow any
genuine choices?
30
A community of Inquiry on Free
Will vs Determinism
• CLICK ON THIS
LINK FOR THE
STIMULUS FOR A
DISCUSSION ON
THE PROBLEM
OF FREE WILL
(You might like to
print this material
out and distribute it
to the class.)
31
Bibliography
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