Making Terrorists: Best Practices
James J.F. Forest, Ph.D.
Director of Terrorism Studies
West Point, NY
August 9, 2006
1
Making Terrorists: Best Practices
• What do we know about the transformation of an
ordinary person into a terrorist?
– A terrorist needs to develop the will to kill: motivational learning
– A terrorist needs to develop the skill to kill: operational learning
• We can counter the will to kill (indoctrination,
radicalization), but not the skill to kill (can't "unlearn" how
to drive a car)
• Thus, it is important to identify, recognize symptoms of
the radicalization process, the development of violent
intentions, and find opportunities to effectively intervene
in that process
2
What do we know about radicalization in the terrorist world?
• Because these are learning organizations, we know that they learn
from each other.
• If I were a member of this terrorist world, I would seek out whatever
learning resources I could find about best practices of radicalization
and terrorist recruitment.
• And, lucky me, there are literally thousands of terrorist group
websites and publications available throughout the world, some
offering their messages in multiple languages, and all of which
demonstrate effective ideological marketing practices.
• In general, these materials seek to establish a rationale for their use of
violence in pursuit of particular goals and objectives.
• In addition to written appeals for action, images, music, speeches and
videos are also used to persuade—or at least connect with—a website
visitor on an emotional and intellectual level.
3
If I were to write a central reference volume of radicalization, what would it look like?
Table of Contents
Radicalizing
New Members
A Compilation of Best Practices
and Guidance for Terrorist
Organizations
PART I: Means and Places of Radicalization
PART II: Case Studies
PART III: Best Practices and Lessons Learned
Published by the
Global Terrorism Media Front
4
Radicalizing New Members
PART I: Means and Places of Radicalization
1 – Places of Worship (mosque, church, synagogue); special importance because
of interpretation power
2 – Places of Political Ideas and Learning (school, madrasa, university)
3 – Places of Shared Purpose and Bonds (places of work, community centers,
soccer leagues, prisons)
4 – Communities, Families, Social Networks (dinner table, local picnic)
5 – The Internet (open access to publishers and seekers of info)
6 – Unique Places (training camps, secret facilities, al Manar)
As Marc Sageman and other researchers have observed, all of these produce
groups of like-minded individuals whose shared purpose and experiences build
lifelong trust and a sense of “us, together against the world” among its
members.
5
PART II: Case Studies
Irish Republican Army
Hizballah
ETA (Basque Separatists)
LEHI, Stern Gang and Zvi Irgun
(Jewish extremists)
Tamil Tigers (LTTE)
Sendero Luminoso
FARC
MRTA (Tupac Amaru movement)
Al Qaida
Jemaah Islamiya
Aum Shinrikyo
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Algerian GIA and GSPC
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
Hizb ut-Tahrir
Al Qaeda in Iraq
Lashkar-e Taiba (and other Kashmir groups)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Italian Red Brigades
Red Army Faction (Baader Meinhof Gang)
U.S.-based militia groups
The Order, the Aryan Brotherhood, Christian
Identity, The Sword, the Covenant & Arm of
the Lord
Others?
6
PART III: Best Practices and Lessons Learned
• Start the radicalization process when young
• So-called "seekers" of any age are prime candidates for becoming
radicalized (you know what a seeker is; you know a seeker, looking
for something that is not in his or her life; searching for meaning,
purpose, etc.)
• Family radicalization is more effective than focusing on a single
individual (bonds of blood)
• Radicalization of any kind requires local context (but not necessarily
local hardships); e.g., London vs. Kashmir
7
Radicalizing New Members
PART III: Best Practices and Lessons Learned
• Radicalization involves a new or different vision of the
future (a future that cannot be achieved w/out violence)
• Radicalization is rooted in information, beliefs and
perceptions, and interpretation (hence the important role
of churches, schools)
• Emotions are more powerful than intellectual appeals
(motivated by feelings, not rationale)
• Images are often more powerful than words
8
Radicalizing New Members
PART III: Best Practices (Cont.)
• All insurgencies require some form of radicalization
• A government can radicalize its people (e.g., Nazi
Germany)
• Effective radicalization typically needs a charismatic
leader or figurehead
(However, he/she might not necessarily be the source of
ideology, but the key transmitter/interpreter of it)
• Radicalization requires funding
• Radicalization requires purpose
9
Radicalizing New Members
PART III: Best Practices (Cont.)
•
Religious ideologies are the most powerful radicalization agents, because they:
1. Explain the state of the world, particularly why believers are continuously
persecuted, oppressed or discriminated
2. Explain how and why violence may be condoned and necessary
3. Are often theologically supremacist - meaning that all believers assume
superiority over non-believers, who are not privy to the truth of the religion
4. Are exclusivist - believers are a chosen people, or their territory is a holy land
5. Are absolutist - it is not possible to be a half-hearted believer, and you are
either totally within the system, or totally without it
(and only the true believers are guaranteed salvation and victory, whereas the
enemies and the unbelievers - as well as those who have taken no stance
whatsoever - are condemned to some sort of eternal punishment or
damnation, as well as death)
•
Overall, religious ideologies help foster polarizing values in terms of right and
wrong, good and evil, light and dark - values which can be co-opted by terrorist
organizations to convert a "seeker" into a lethal killer.
(JP Larsson, “Religious Ideologies,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Volume 1: Recruitment, edited by James JF Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006)
10
Counterterrorism Strategy
So, from this brief exploration into the world of terrorist radicalization,
what can we learn that informs our counterterrorism efforts against
the global jihadist movement?
• Our ability to intervene in these radicalization processes
requires the ability to:
– identify certain kinds of information (ideas, messages, images)
– identify the sources of this information (who is seen as a legitimate
source of knowledge/interpretation within a particular group or
movement?)
– disrupt the radicalization process any way we can
– understand (and if possible, avoid) actions which can be interpreted
as justification for radical ideology
11
Counterterrorism Strategy
• The problem is global in scope, yet local in context
– There is a universal strategy behind the current Islamist militant
threat: jihadi terrorism is about thinking globally and acting
locally.
– Local groups learn strategies and tactics from other groups
anywhere in the world, regardless of ideological vision
– It is thus important for counterterrorism professionals to understand
the global terrorism knowledge base
– We must understand the global spectrum of interpreters and
responders, and their role in a radical movement’s trajectory
12
Think global, act local
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what
we believe. Our driving motivation doesn’t come from
tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our
religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah,
and following the footsteps of the final prophet and
messenger Muhammad … Your democratically elected
governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my
people all over the world. And your support of them makes
you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible
for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and
sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And
until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and
torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at
war and I am a soldier.
Mohammad Sidique Khan, participant in the July 7, 2005 suicide bomb attacks in
London, in a video message released by the British authorities Sept. 1, 2005.
13
Counterterrorism Strategy
• There is a vital Information Warfare/Strategic
Communications dimension to the current terrorist threat
– How long a radicalization process might take will vary from individual
to individual, but there seems to be some evidence that it can happen
relatively quickly if the interpreters are recognized as authoritative,
credible and commanding of obedience.
– We need to develop the ability to counter radical ideologies with
alternative kinds of information (ideas, messages, images)
– The lack of countervailing influences within societies, communities,
families, and other institutions to which individuals belong will also
have an impact on how quickly an individual makes the journey
towards radicalization and extremism, including the desire for
martyrdom through suicide attacks.
14
Counterterrorism Strategy
• Focus on places of ideological interpretation
– We must establish a presence inside the places of
radicalization (institutions of worship, learning, shared
purpose, etc. as well as the Internet) in order to reach the
audiences that are being radicalized from within.
– Further, we must have the active assistance of individuals who
are already established as credible peers within those
institutions . . .
– Coming at this problem from the outside, where our messages
and ideas are already discredited, does very little.
– Local law enforcement personnel play an important role as the
intelligence “sensors” within communities of concern
• They should know where the hotspots are in their city, and have some
sense of the cultural dimensions of certain neighborhoods
15
Counterterrorism Strategy
• Multiple dimensions required in our CT approach
– Focus on where youth might be exposed to radical ideas
(including clubs, youth groups, video games, Internet, etc.)
– Identify and target the funding streams
– Radical charismatic leaders must be identified and dealt with (e.g.,
discrediting their radical ideas as unsupported by core values)
– Interagency and multinational cooperation will be critical to our
success.
16
Counterterrorism Strategy
• Tackling radicalization requires a multi-agency effort
– The FBI plays an important role in the information
warfare/strategic communications aspects of countering
radicalization
• Through extensive knowledge assets, investigation techniques
and national perspective
• By your ability to detect regional patterns and activities that
local law enforcement agencies would likely not be aware of
• By your ability to identify linkages among key interpreters in
various parts of the country as well as globally
– Overall, FBI brings an important nationwide perspective
to identifying the spread of radical ideologies and other
symptoms of a terrorist threat . . So, thank you for all
that you do to help protect this great nation.
17
Questions?
18