Owen Wiltshire
ID: 4148908
How does Nationalism Manifest Itself on the Internet?
It has been argued that globalization is bringing an end to the nation-state. Cosmopolitan
writers, popular in the mid 1990's, argued that the world was changing into a new “global
village”, whereby cultural differences eroded along with state lines. The authority of states is
seen to be decreasing, while the authority of transnational corporations is increasing. Further
there has been a boom in world populations, and with technology the world has become
increasingly connected. The development of the internet reflects the reality of an increasingly
connected world. Its structure links every state and every nation. It is in this sense, a global
village. How then does nationalism manifest itself in the contexts of the internet? Does the
interconnectedness that comes with the internet act as a democratizing and homogenizing
cosmopolitanism or does it, as Gellner argues, stimulate national movements based on national
sentiments that are disturbed by the incongruousness of borders in today's more connected
world? This essay is largely an examination into the nature of nationalism, its history and
development, and its relation to the development of the internet – it asks, how does nationalism
manifest itself on the internet?
Gellner defines nationalism as “... the organization of human groups into large, centrally
educated, culturally homogeneous units...” (Gellner, 1983:35) and argues that nationalism is both
a theory and a principle. It is a theory that legitimates the state's right to bring order, and a
principle in the belief that the authority of the state should apply to its particular nation, and not
to foreigners. He also writes that it is the result of a specific social evolution, and not an essential
feature of human society. For him, nationalism is a consequence of historical and social contexts.
He writes:
“... a society has emerged based on a high powered technology and the expectancy of
sustained growth, which requires both a mobile division of labor, and sustained, frequent
and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning,
transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required.” (Gellner, 1983:34)
It has emerged through a process of increasing specialization whereby social tasks – jobs necessitate special training such that it is impossible for a person to teach the next generation all
the skills he or she would need to know to reproduce the society. The specialization of jobs
depends on what Gellner calls, “exo-education”, where children are educated outside the
contexts of the local communities (where they learn through acculturation), and are educated
according to the needs of the state. The state being the sole institution with the right to apply
violence to maintain order. Without the state controlling education, it would be impossible to
teach a standard idiom that would allow people to work together even though they might be
strangers. In this way the state requires a degree of cultural homogeneity. He writes:
“Nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries
should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a
given state... should not separate the power-holders from the rest.” (Gellner, 1983 :1)
So Gellner's cultural homogeneity leaves room for ethnic diversity. Ethnic boundaries can
function within the nation without “violating” the nationalist principle – just as long as those
same lines don't divide rich and poor. He discusses the ideology of nationalism:
“The nationalist principle can be asserted in an ethical, “universalistic' spirit. There could,
be and on occasion there have been, nationalists-in-the-abstract, unbiased in favor of any
special nationality of their own, and generously preaching the doctrine for all nations alike:
let all nations have their own political roofs, and let all of them also refrain from including
non-nationals under it. There is no formal contradiction in asserting such non-egoistic
nationalism. As a doctrine it can be supported by some good arguments, such as the
desirability of preserving cultural diversity, of a pluralistic inter-national political system,
and of the diminution of internal strains within states.” (Gellner, 1983 :1)
However he argues it does not play out this way. He doubts that every nation can have its own
state, unless of course there was mass genocide. For Gellner, a homogeneous culture needs only
to have a shared set of communication symbols. As long as the nation is homogeneous according
to a certain functionalist standard idiom, then it will meet the nationalist principle. Gellner argues
this does not replace local acculturation, but works on top of it. Local acculturation is unable to
reproduce the large variety of specializations required in industrial society.
To what extent then, with the growth of transnational corporations, has the standard idiom
needed for specialized workers to function together as a society become a global one? Gellner
writes:
“Mankind is irreversibly committed to industrial society, and therefore to a society whose
productive system is based on cumulative science and technology... Agrarian society is no
longer an option, for its restoration would simply condemn the great majority of mankind
to death by starvation, not to mention dire and unacceptable poverty...”. (Gellner, 1983:39)
The culture of the telegraph, computer, and the internet have become a global phenomenon that
creates a kind of cultural homogeneity – a standard idiom - the kind necessary according to
Gellner, for a functional industrial society.
Let's complicate this further. Within Germany, factory workers speaking German, work
on tools they have been trained to work with, punching in codes they learned to manipulate
through state controlled education. They have different backgrounds, but everyone in the factory
fulfills the requirement that he can communicate with the machinery and with his co-workers.
One could follow this train of thought around the globe and say that the world was becoming
cosmopolitan in that so many cultures were becoming industrialized, and modernized with the
same technology. But Gellner argues against this line of thinking - stating that “... the
determination of society by the available economic base does not seem to hold. Neither hunting
nor agrarian societies are all alike...” (Gellner, 1983:115). In this way modernization is not
cultural homogenization. It does however create a consistent set of specializations – like
computer programming, machine operation, etc.
“The shared economic infrastructure of advanced industrial society and its inescapable
implications will continue to ensure that men are dependent on culture, and that culture
requires standardization over quite wide areas, and needs to be maintained and serviced
by centralized agencies. In other words, men will continue to owe their employability and
social acceptability to sustained and complex training, which cannot be supplied by kin or
local group. This being so, the definition of political units and boundaries will not be able
to ignore with impunity the distribution of cultures.” (Gellner, 1983:121)
Appadurai refers to todays world as being an “interactive system”, where interactions
have in recent years become more intense through processes of globalization. He
writes:
“For in the past century there has been a technological explosion, largely in the
domain of transportation and information... For with the advent of the steamship,
the automobile, the airplane, the camera, the telephone, we have entered into an
altogether new condition of neighborliness.” (Appadurai, 1990)
This neighborliness however has not led to cosmopolitan peace and democracy. The
reality of it is “disjuncture”. He argues that corporations have become de-territorialized
through international markets, and hence come into conflict with state power, and
national and cultural sentiments. Further, migration has led to increased deterritorialization of workers, such that national sentiments are mobilized from within
the state boundaries, and from the diaspora as well.
Transnational corporations, “freed” through neoliberal economic policies imposed by the
WTO, IMF and Worldbank, have increasingly come at odds with state authority. Neoliberals
saw the power of the state as being a threat to economic development and imposed policies to
deregulate markets, to privatize social programs like education and health care, as a way to
encourage foreign private investment. They believed that capital would redistribute itself
through the trickle down effect – instead it ended up redistributing the wealth in even greater
favor of the rich. The nature of the market allows them to distribute and establish themselves
wherever state authorities work to their favor. In this way transnational corporations are deterritorialized, often being owned by complicated networks of investors spanning numerous
global stock exchanges. Gellner argues that nationalism necessitates the state control of
institutions that allow for social reproduction. Transnational corporations however dominate
international affairs, often dwarfing the economic power of states. Following the principle of
nationalism argued by Gellner, this competition for authority will raise national sentiments, and
in turn national movements.
As discussed, industrialization and rapid modernization have, according to Gellner,
locked the world into a particular configuration. Many have argued that this new configuration
is leading towards a new cosmopolitan democracy. The internet, as a global village, was seen as
one of the signs of this new age of interconnectedness. Many saw a new global society
developing above the nation-state. But as Legros writes:
“As Calhoun points out, in the 1990s, some influential anthropological discourses
about globalization were beset by a false opposition between the utopia of
cosmopolitan liberalism and the condemnation of parochial nationalism as well as
most attempts at autonomy on the part of minority and marginalized groups.
However, US and other countries' reactions to the Sept. 11 attacks have upset the
1990s vision of a progress towards cosmopolitan democracy... Nowadays,
international security issues impede flows of international visitors and migrants
and revive in new ways feeling of belonging to particular cultural or national
entities.”
Where many saw the world as becoming increasingly interconnected, and homogeneous,
the events of September 11th reinforced national sentiments and the role of the state. The
changes from the utopian view of cosmopolitan democracy, to the reality of global disjuncture
and the affirmation of national sentiments is paralleled in the development of the internet.
The Internet took on, in the mid 1990's, mythological status, as this CNN report reveals:
“Nicholas Negroponte, head of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Media
Laboratory, told an information technology conference in Brussels on Tuesday that the
potential of the global computer network has actually been vastly underrated.
"I have never seen people miss the scale of what's going on as badly as they are doing it
now," he said, predicting that the Internet would do no less than bring world peace by
breaking down national borders.” (CNN Report, 1997)
This reflects the cosmopolitan utopian view promoted in the mid 1990s that has been
problematized by Legros and Calhoun. Kluver discusses the way the internet was used during a
standoff between the US and China – when an American airplane went down in Chinese
territory, and its crew was taken into custody. He found that there was a flurry of discussion
about the incident on both American and Chinese chat rooms. On Chinese chat rooms many
positions were censored – including ones that argued the Chinese government was being too
lenient with the US. On American chat rooms biased prejudiced positions prevailed. He states
that on one CNN public forum, American voices greatly outnumbered Chinese ones – and many
of those voices reflected “... stereotypes and distorted images of China” (Kluver, 2001). These
posts were reflected back through links on Chinese forums, such that Chinese readers could see
the aggressive ethnocentric positions of American writers. In this way the internet has become a
battle ground for national sentiment and national movements. Interconnectedness has never led
to cultural homogenization and the internet is no different. Kluver argues that the internet allows
users a fresh, and new ability to connect with the world. It does give people a new way to
communicate with the public. But he points out that the internet is also very consumer driven,
and consumer configurable. He writes “By personalizing news portals, web search guides, etc.,
the user is able to completely isolate himself or herself from issues that require knowledge and
experience outside his or her own” (Kluver, 2001:5). The internet, as a civic space, allows for
new kinds of discourse, but this discourse can be controlled to support and vent national
sentiment, and not necessarily against it. In this way the internet facilitates the division of ideas
and people into “culturally homogeneous units” that never need to interact – although it can be
structured to do so.
One important way the internet breads cultural homogeneity is through language. Internet
World Statistics reveals the the following distribution of language online – English 31.5%,
Chinese 15.7%, Spanish 8.7%, Japanese 7.4%, French 5.0%, German 5.0%, Portuguese 4.0%,
Korean 2.9%, Italian 2.7%, Arabic 2.5%. (Internet World Stats. 2007) The fastest growing
language group is Spanish, which has grown over 311% since the year 2000. This shows how the
internet has become increasingly culturally diverse. Where many argued English would be the
language for international commerce, state authorities and corporations have instituted changes
to the internet that now allow for more languages.
Further, corporate and state interests have worked against the anonymity of the internet.
Both credit card companies and states seek control over the content flowing across their borders.
Kluver writes “Rather than bringing about political liberty, economic growth has actually
contributed to the ability of the state to better monitor Internet activity” (Kluver, 2001:7). In this
way he argues China can more easily monitor traffic to Taiwanese websites, and Visa can
guarantee your transaction on the internet.
Kloet writes:
“Even though cyberspace can easily be imagined to be quintessentially global where time
and space dissolve, "reality" turns out to be different. Cyberspace is predominantly
colonized by the West, leaving little space to the Rest. However, this imbalance seems to be
gradually changing, given, for example, the more pro-active role of governments in Asia
towards information and communication technologies (ICT) when compared to Western
governments [1].” (Kloet. 2003:5)
He argues that ethnography of the internet, that dissects the distinctions between online and
offline, are important in countering utopian visions of reality. He points out that the spaces where
people use the internet are a valuable site for ethnographic research. In this way the relationship
between nationalism and the internet is an interesting avenue for anthropological research.
Where people in the West use the internet primarily in their homes, in Asia internet cafés have
boomed and become an important social space. Online participation on the internet is a growing
ethnographic phenomenon that can shed light on how nationalist sentiment plays out online.
Where many reports saw the internet as being a cosmopolitan, democratizing force in the mid
1990's, more current research works against this idea. Modernization and technology play a part
in the development of a standard idiom, required by specialized societies. They are not however
a cosmopolitan force. Modernization and technology do not produce cultural homogeneity.
People access the internet differently, using homogeneous technology. Unfair flows of media and
capital do however, lead to the kind of homogenizing that works against nationalism. The
influence of foreign media can have powerful effects on national identity.
In “Suitably Modern”, Mark Liechty argues that the consumption of foreign media has
played a major role in the construction of middle class identity in Kathmandu. Styles and
fashions popular in media are contrasted against traditional clothing. Middle class identity is then
constructed against modern, and traditional – with the modern being a reality more “real” in
media than in the actual context of Kathmandu. So while modernization does not necessitate
cultural homogenization, it can certainly assist it. The internet, connecting a growing urban
population around the world could facilitate media conglomeration and homogenization, but
more likely it does as Liechty observed, work to raise national sentiment – as people fail to
realize foreign realities. Gellner argues that disparities between rich and poor are manageable by
states and nations as long as the disparity lies between nations and not within. Foreign media
stirs national sentiment by accentuating and making visible economic and social divisions.
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity
declared that globalization and neoliberal policies have increasingly become a threat to the
diversity of cultural production. Consolidated global media networks have an unfair competitive
advantage against local cultural production. Following the free market policies pushed by the
WTO, states face the difficult challenge of developing their own industry against private, foreign
funded corporations that favor profit – and hence cheap sources of media (aka why the entire
world can enjoy David Hasselholf and Baywatch). The convention works to give authority back
to the state, to protect its cultural capital from the unfair and dominant flows of media in the
world. Clearly, the interconnectedness that comes with technology, and economic
interdependence comes at a price. States are increasingly finding it important to control cultural
flows.
Bernal examines the way the internet facilitated national movements from the diaspora.
She writes:
“While globalization is thought to render borders meaningless, transnationalism to render
nationhood passe, and the Internet to have ushered in a new era of openness and
connectivity, the activities of the Eritrean diaspora and the Eritrean state point to the ways
that nations not only continue to matter, but how nations can be constructed and
strengthened through transnational flows and the technologies of globalization.” (Bernal,
2004:3)
She argues that the communication network provided by the internet allowed the Eritrean
diaspora to establish a community online. Through this online gateway, national sentiments
worked into a powerful national movement. The capital of a small diaspora dwarfed that of the
capital within its borders. Citizens of other countries, maintaining the Eritrean identity funded
military campaigns and activities that liberated the state. The success of this nationalist
campaign resulted in an independent nation-state. She writes “No one who visited Eritrea under
Ethiopian rule and again after independence could doubt that, overall, Eritreans will benefit from
having a nation of their own.” (2004) In this way the internet, and global flows of information,
people, and capital worked to create and support national movements – which works against
Appadurai's argument that the nation-state is “on its last legs.” (Appadurai. 1999)
As Kloet argued, the internet can be configured and channeled in many ways. Syria
recently blocked its networks from accessing Facebook, a popular community networking site.
They cited “internet activism” as the primary concern – activism being a national movement of
its own kind. Where the internet facilitated activism against Ethiopia, state authorities can also
control and deny it. China maintains the most sophisticated internet censorship structures in the
world. It has become an essential industry in the country where internet connectivity is booming.
The government has developed sophisticated programs that search out offensive content, and it
has thousands of workers monitoring internet behavior. Transnational corporations working with
China and internet development have bowed to state pressures and facilitated state control.
Google came under large international criticism for implementing the demands of government
censorship. What this shows is that the authority of the state has the power to control and limit
the internet. In doing so the internet can become a powerful tool to develop homogeneity and
national identity. The Chinese government creates a carefully controlled, false, image of reality
through the control of democratic participation. Democratic Internet activism is a possibility, but
not an essential feature of interconnected computer networks.
In the U.S. Corporations have taken much control of the internet. Just as the Chinese
government censors chat rooms, so too do American media companies. Discussions of 9/11 on
Fox's forums were of one kind only. When the internet was first created it was designed as a
decentralized network that allowed individual points to link between each other such that the
failure of one point would never interrupt the flow of other points. Data could be sent through a
large number of different routes allowing for maximum reliability – and to a large extent
anonymity. Of course the number of such options depends on the physical connections between
the machines – and these have developed unequally around the world. But where they have
developed they did so with the principle that they were linking to an open, transnational,
network. Regulating this network has been a trying job for state authorities. In the United States
the Senate is currently debating “Net Neutrality”. Media corporations are fighting for the right to
control and prioritize the flow of data on their networks. Originally, all data was rated equally –
such that one persons chat conversation would have the same network priority as a Fox News ad.
Google, the same corporation that works with the Chinese censorship system, has taken up the
fight for “net neutrality”. They write:
“Network neutrality is the principle that Internet users should be in control of what
content they view and what applications they use on the internet. The Internet has
operated according to this neutrality principle since its earliest days. Indeed, it is this
neutrality that has allowed many companies, including Google, to launch, grow, and
innovate. Fundamentally, net neutrality is about equal access to the Internet. In our view,
the broadband carriers should not be permitted to use their market power to discriminate
against competing applications or content... Today, the neutrality of the Internet is at stake
as the broadband carriers want Congress's permission to determine what content gets you
first and fastest. Put simply, this would fundamentally alter the openness of the internet.”
(http://www.google.com/help/netneutrality.html)
In this way transnational, de-territorialized corporations still require the authority of states to
impose control. The internet is growing at a phenomenal rate, but as states assert control the
“open” nature of the internet is becoming less of a reality. There are becoming many internets
not one Internet. From an individualist perspective, each person limits and prioritizes content
such that only particular views are encountered. From the state perspective, control over media –
be it the domination of foreign media, or of subversive “democratic” discourse, the control of the
internet is a necessity.
In conclusion it is interesting is that corporations and states needed to institute such
powerful measures of control. The internet in its original, non-capitalist, conception, allowed for
greater anonymity. Technologies had been developed to allow networks to connect, whereas
now states and capitalist corporations have developed technology to limit and identify access.
Corporations and states are fighting with non-governmental internet authorities over the rights
to prioritize and identify data flows. In this way internet service can be made more hierarchical.
It will allow states and corporations to determine which media has priority over other media.
That states and corporations need to exert such control speaks to the internet and new
communication technologies power to promote democratic discussion. This however, is easily
controlled and limited by the very same technology and with the states authority. The control of
the internet also reflects the increasing need for states to protect their own cultural productions.
In this way the internet has been bent to the will of state and corporate authorities, facilitating
homogenization. That states and corporations have had to work so hard to control it shows that
it does work against nationalism in many ways. These ways however have been largely
exagerated, and as the case of Eritrea clearly shows – the age of globalization reinforces
boundaries just as much as it “flows” over them.
Kluver, Alan R. 2001. “New Media and the End of Nationalism:
China and the US in a War of Words.” <http://motspluriels.arts.uwa.edu.au/MP1801ak.html>
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. “Nations and Nationalism.” Cornell University Press. New York.
Kloet, Jeroen. 2002. “Digitisation and its Asian Discontents: The Internet, Politics and Hacking
in China and Indonesia.” First Monday Journal.
<http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_9/kloet/index.html>
Google. 2007. “Report on Net Neutrality”. Accessed 11/21/2007.
<http://valleywag.com/tech/jeff-gerstmann/gamespot-editor-on-fired-writer-328775.php>
Bernal, Victoria. 2005. “Eritrea on-line: Diaspora, cyberspace, and the public sphere.” American
Ethnologist. Vol. 32, No. 4.
Bernal, Victoria. 2004. “Eritrea Goes Global: Reflects on Nationalism in a Transnational Era.”
Cultural Anthropology. Vol 19. No. 1.
Liechty, Mark. 2002. “Suitably Modern. Making Middle-Class Culture in a New Consumer
Society.”
Appadurai, Arjun. 2002. “Globalization”. Durham. Duke University Press.
Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. “Disjuncture and Difference.”