AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO
POLITICAL SECTION
OFFICE OF TRANSLATION SERVICES
INQUIRIES: 03-3224-5360
INTERNET E-MAIL ADDRESS: tokyoots@state.gov
DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS
Friday, July 14, 2000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INDEX:
(1) Is Secretary General Nonaka going to use his "resignation card", or is he just bluffing to preserve his
clout in the LDP? "I want to become administrative reform headquarters chief"; "I deserve maximum
punishment"; "Once the Summit is over, I will have fulfilled my responsibility "
(2) Complaints heard about Shinsei Bank as the only bank in the world that benefits from destroying its
business partners
(3) Sogo declares bankruptcy; Bumpy road lies ahead for company’s restructuring; Attention now
focused on whether it will receive financial help from foreign-capital firms; Will sell off its excellent
stores one by one
(4) Debts-waiver scheme meets with strong objection owing to the Government's involvement; The
source of trouble is the warranty clause included in the transfer contract of the former LTCB
(5) BOJ caught on horns of dilemma over its "zero-interest-rate policy;" Policy Board meeting on
monetary policy to be held on the 17th;" If it removes it, it is bound to draw fire both at home and
abroad, but if it keeps it in place, it may lose market confidence
(6) Competition policy accelerated by IT: Another possible split of giant NTT; How to meet
"international standards" seen now as urgent task
(7) Ruling parties' administrative reform panel agrees on proposal to ban Amakudari practices by 2005
(8) MAGAZINE ARTICLE: Foreign Ministry's Rasputin
- 1 -
other ruling camp executives immediately dissuaded
him from resigning.
ARTICLES:
(1) Is Secretary General Nonaka going to use his
"resignation card", or is he just bluffing to
preserve his clout in the LDP? "I want to
become administrative reform headquarters
chief"; "I deserve maximum punishment";
"Once the Summit is over, I will have fulfilled
my responsibility "
The next time was on July 1. In a faction
chiefs' meeting for launching a new Cabinet, Kato
called for discussions in the LDP to be more open.
In response, Nonaka said, "I am ready to step down
anytime to take responsibility." Moreover, in an
interview on July 7, Nonaka remarked, "Once the
Summit is over, I will have fulfilled my
responsibility."
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full)
July 13, 2000
Reporters asked Nonaka about his true
intention, but he never offered a clear response.
Nonaka seems to be enjoying the fallout from his
remarks. Some junior members think he is just
crying wolf.
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members
are perplexed with Secretary General Hiromu
Nonaka's repeated hints about his resigning from his
current post. As Prime Minister Mori's powerful
backer who represents the former Obuchi faction,
the largest in the LDP, if Nonaka resigns at this
point, it would invariably shake the Mori
Administration's very foundation, which is already
sinking. Nonaka's resignation might trigger a shift
of "power" to the YKK trio, including former
secretary general Koichi Kato. Is Nonaka serious
about using his resignation card? Or, having lost
his political "patrons," namely, former prime
ministers Noboru Takeshita and Keizo Obuchi, is it
just an "unusable card," albeit a vital one for his
continuing to hold political sway in the LDP?
Worn out?
The prevalent view now is that Nonaka
made the above comments before the election and
on June 25 out of consideration to the LDP, which
was becoming more disgruntled over the poor
election cooperation, as well as to the New
Komeito. At the same time, the remarks might be a
"curve ball" to put Prime Minister Mori and his
aides off guard, while they were merrymaking after
winning a ruling camp majority in the election.
[Yoshiyuki Komurata]
Some LDP executives deem, "Mr. Nonaka
was burned out after the fierce election campaign."
Pro-Nonaka members share the view that Nonaka's
high survivability comes from his apparent ability to
detach himself from power. They feel Nonaka's
series of comments hinting of his resignation
conversely has uplifted his presence.
Four times in a month
Over the last month, Nonaka has hinted at
resigning four times.
The first time was on June 22 in Kyoto. He
told local supporters: "If possible, I would like to
be LDP administrative reform headquarters chief
after the election…" Then on June 25, on election
day, he hinted at it again. As he learned of the New
Komeito's serious setback, Nonaka said, "I deserve
maximum punishment." Prime Minister Mori and
Nonaka became deputy secretary general
immediately after resigning as chief cabinet
secretary under prime minister Obuchi. Witnessing
such developments, some other members do not
take Nonaka's words at face value. They say, "Mr.
Nonaka repeatedly indicated that he would become
- 2 -
a rank-and-file member with no executive title. But
that never happened" (former Cabinet minister).
(2) Complaints heard about Shinsei Bank as the
only bank in the world that benefits from
destroying its business partners
No patrons
YOMIURI (Page 8) (Full)
July 13, 2000
With the absence of Takeshita and Obuchi,
however, the position of the Obuchi faction and that
of Nonaka have become less secure.
The department-store chain Sogo Co. has
filed for court-mandated rehabilitation under a new
bankruptcy law designed to give firms facing
imminent
collapse
a
jump-start
toward
rehabilitation. Sogo will now begin the legal
process. In the banking world, which is certain to
see losses increase, criticism is mounting of Shinsei
Bank, which frustrated the bailout scheme by
refusing to write off Sogo's loans.
The environment around Nonaka in the LDP
is changing. The view in the party that is growing is
that Nonaka himself realizes that he has to hold on
to the secretary general's post for the time being.
The more Nonaka's position becomes shaky,
the more he needs to rely on his "resignation card."
But the more he uses the card, the more it loses its
effectiveness.
Objections are rising particularly against
Shinsei Bank Chairman & President (Chief
Executive Officer) Masaki Yashiro, who has made
such statements as:
Nonaka's recent remarks hinting at resignation
[Before the election] I will devote myself to the
upcoming election. And (after the election), if
possible, I would like to become the party's
administrative reform headquarters chief … (on
June 22, in Kyoto).
"Banks acting in concert to write off
debts follows the logic of the
'banking village.' It is inappropriate
for Shinsei Bank to agree to the
scheme for we were reorganized into
a new bank though the injection of a
vast amount of taxpayers' money."
[Election day] In particular, we have put the New
Komeito to much trouble. I deserve maximum
punishment (on the night of June 25, on an NTV
program).
In rebuttal, a city bank executive claimed:
"The debts-waiver program could help collect more
loans from Sogo. It is strange for him to criticize
the decision based essentially on economic
rationality as 'the logic of the banking village.'"
[After the election] I will have fulfilled my
responsibility once the lower house election and the
Summit are over. If possible, I want to be placed in
a less demanding position that will allow me to take
action boldly in carrying out administrative and
fiscal reforms. At the same time, I need to avoid
acting hastily so as not to cause any negative impact
on the new Mori Cabinet (July 7, in an interview
with the media, including the Asahi Shimbun).
Firms relying on Shinsei Bank as a major
bank are going bankrupt in succession, such as
leading consumer credit firm Life Co. Ltd. and the
Daiichi Hotel. Pointing to this circumstance, such
criticism is heard as: "Shinsei Bank is the only
bank in the world that benefits from wrecking its
business partners" (another major city bank
executive). A high-level city bank officer gave this
remark: "If banks are irresponsible for management
(00071304st)
- 3 -
of their business partners, that means the banking
side is the ultimate moral hazard."
(4) Debts-waiver scheme meets with strong
objection
owing
to
the
Government's
involvement; The source of trouble is the
warranty clause included in the transfer contract
of the former LTCB
(00071304ku)
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Full)
July 13, 2000
Ailing department store chain Sogo Co. was
pressed hard to give up on restructuring its
operations by waiving some of the company's debts
and to instead file for court protection under a new
law designed to let firms facing an imminent
collapse jump-start rehabilitation -- a prebankruptcy rehabilitation law. Behind this move is
the strong criticism of "the Government that was
about to bail out a private firm." The Government,
specifically, was involved in private firm Sogo's
debts-write off issue because it concerned the
private banking institution Shinsei Bank (formerly
the Long Term Credit Bank [LTCB]). The root
cause of why the Government came to have a hand
in the deal made between private firms lies in the
LTCB restructuring mechanism. When the LTBC
went bankrupt, it was temporarily placed under state
management and later reconstructed as a private
bank.
(3) Sogo declares bankruptcy; Bumpy road lies
ahead for company’s restructuring; Attention
now focused on whether it will receive financial
help from foreign-capital firms; Will sell off its
excellent stores one by one
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Lead Paragraph)
July 13, 2000
Debt-ridden department store chain Sogo
Co. has given up on self-restructuring and instead
has filed for court protection under the law designed
to let firms facing imminent collapse jump-start
their rehabilitation process. Under court control,
Sogo will endeavor to restructure its operations in
line with the legal framework. Under the law,
Sogo's debts totaling 1.87 trillion yen will be certain
to be curtailed drasticly. The company will then be
free from that huge obligation, a stumbling block so
far in the company's efforts to reorganize itself.
However, Sogo has suffered a blow to its image
since it has gone bankrupt in effect, so the company
faces a rough road ahead before it can win back the
consumers' trust. Considering that Sogo is by far
larger in size than other distribution industry
companies that collapsed in the past, it will likely
have many more difficulties seeking help from other
firms and choosing a new management lineup.
The LTCB collapsed in October 1998 and
was subsequently put under state control. Later, it
looked for a party to purchase it. On that occasion,
how to handle the loans held by the LTCB to the
Sogo group emerged as a big problem.
No purchaser wants to assume loans that
could turn uncollectable down the road. It was thus
only natural to think about some kind of safety-net
measures for losses that might arise in the future.
But the financial reconstruction law does not have
provisions stipulating loss compensation if losses
arise after corporate transfer.
Consequently,
negotiations on the transfer of the LTCB ran into a
road block.
(00071306ku)
- 4 -
Setting aside the loans to firms whose
management is going downhill from the loans the
buyer side will take over could help proceed transfer
negotiations smoothly. But the fear in this case is
that once the Resolution and Collection Corporation
(RCC) commences collecting the loans that are left
untransferred, loan-borrowers might see their
management deteriorate in one swoop.
(5) BOJ caught on horns of dilemma over its
"zero-interest-rate policy;" Policy Board
meeting on monetary policy to be held on the
17th;" If it removes it, it is bound to draw fire
both at home and abroad, but if it keeps it in
place, it may lose market confidence
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 5) (Full)
July 13, 2000
What came out as a last resort in a bid to
finalize transfer talks was a "warranty clause,"
which is based on the thinking under the civil code
that if a purchased good is found to be defective, the
good is returnable. The idea was to include the
clause in the transfer contract.
Regarding its zero-interest-rate policy, the
Bank of Japan (BOJ) is now caught between two
arguments put up in and outside Japan -- one calling
for a prompt lifting of such and the other claiming
that it is premature to do so. The money market is
generally discounting the possibility of the BOJ
Board meeting opting for the removal of such at its
monetary policy meeting to be held on the 17th.
The BOJ is concerned that if it does lift that policy
line, it may impair market confidence in its
monetary policy. In the meantime, the prevalent
view of the Government, the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) and the business world is that it is too
early to do so. In addition, there has appeared the
issue of the liquidation of major department chain
operator
Sogo,
which
requires
cautious
consideration. An increasing number of Policy
Board members now support the removal of the
policy line. The situation is, however, that it is still
unclear whether the removal of such will get the
approval of the majority.
The transfer contract concluded with U.S.
Ripplewood Holdings LLC. eventually included the
warranty clause that indicates that if the value of the
loans decline 20 or more percent within three years
after the transfer, the Deposit Insurance Corp. (DIC)
will buy back the loans at book value.
When Sogo, after suffering financial
difficulties, called on creditor banks to waive claims
on the loans to the company, Shinsei Bank,
following the warranty clause, asked the DIC to
purchase the loans to the Sogo group. The DIC had
no choice but to accept Shinsei Bank's request.
Also in order not to directly trigger a bankruptcy of
Sogo, it judged it necessary to agree to forgive
Sogo's debts as requested by Sogo. The FRC as
well gave a nod to the DIC's decision.
Aftermath of bankruptcy of Sogo
Because of the circumstances where "no one
could have purchased the LTCB if no warranty
clause had been added" (senior official of the FRC),
the warranty clause as a last resort was added to the
contract to transfer the LTCB to another company.
This last resort clause was in the end the source of
trouble this time.
The filing of a court-mandated rehabilitation
by Sogo is likely to have impact on the BOJ's
monetary policy in a delicate way. There is concern
that if the bankruptcy of Sogo produces a domino
effect among its business partners, it would dampen
the business sentiment of consumers and
companies.
(00071305ku)
The view prevailing the Government and the
LDP is that with the Group of Eight Summit
Conference (Okinawa Summit) only a week or so
- 5 -
away, it is premature to lift the zero interest policy,
contrary to the ongoing economic policy line of
giving priority to turning the economy around. Top
business leaders, such as Takashi Imai, chairman of
the Federation of Economic Organizations
(Keidanren), and Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the
Japan Federation of Employers' Associations
(Nikkeiren), unanimously take the position that it is
too early to lift the zero-interest rate policy.
deflationary concern is beginning to dissipate.
However, Nobuyuki Nakahara, a deliberation
member, is most likely to oppose the removal of
such. Other deliberation members, such as Tohio
Miki, Kazuo Ueda and Teizo Taya, have indicated a
cautious stance in judging a right timing. At
present, it is not possible to categorically say that
those who are in favor of lifting the policy line
command a majority.
The BOJ adopted the so-called zero-interest
policy in February 1999 with the aim of providing
more liquidity to the money market, by guiding
overnight call loan rates to 0 percent. Since then,
the economy has taken an upward turn for selfsustained recovery. Judging that the "situation
where the dissipation of deflation concern can be
envisioned" – a condition the BOJ has set for lifting
its zero-interest policy – is close at hand, the BOJ
has searched for the timing for doing so.
(00071303yk)
Moves that
"removal"
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Excerpts)
July 12, 2000
discount
zero-interest
(6)
Competition policy accelerated by IT:
Another possible split of giant NTT; How to
meet "international standards" seen now as
urgent task
policy
On the 12th the call market saw the yield of
three-month government securities rise to 0.277
percent. The move apparently indicated that the
market has discounted the removal of the BOJ's
zero-interest policy, by raising the target of
guidance for the rate of overnight call loans to 0.25
percent.
Whether to "dismantle" the Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT) group has
quietly become a major topic for discussion.
Minister now urged to make up his mind
If the BOJ decides to continue the present
zero-interest policy at the meeting on the 17th,
chances are then disenchantment will permeate on
the market that "the BOJ has postponed the removal
of its policy line, succumbing to pressure from the
political and business worlds and the U.S., which
hopes that the BOJ will keep that policy line in
place." If market confidence in the BOJ declines, it
could undermine the efficacy of its monetary policy.
The
Ministry
of
Posts
and
Telecommunications (MPT) has in mind a scenario
for a second breaking up of the NTT group. The
plan calls for the Government to sell all the NTT
stocks it possesses and to uncouple NTT DoCoMo
from NTT. NTT will cut connection charges it
imposes on other carriers and promote market
access to its facilities, such as telegraph poles. In
return, the Government will allow NTT East and
NTT West – the regional carriers – to expand their
business activities.
Many of the nine BOJ Policy Board
members are now leaning toward lifting the zerointerest policy line, taking the position that
"Japan cannot catch up with the United
States unless it adopts a genuine policy to stimulate
competition." This advice was given by a senior
- 6 -
MPT official while briefing newly-installed MPT
Minister Kozo Hirabayashi on July 4, when the
second Yoshiro Mori Cabinet was launched.
addressed the structural problem of breaking up
American Telegraph & Telephone (ATT). In Japan
as well, since the privatization of [NTT] in 1985,
the Anti-Monopoly Law has applied to the
telecommunications market, but the FTC so far has
remained silent. When the central government is
reorganized in January 2000, both the MPT and the
FTC will come under the control of the new
Ministry of General Affairs. In part because of this
circumstance, MPT is eagerly looking for ways to
emerge from the previous regulation-driven
administration, while the FTC is busily trying to
play up its raison d'être.
Both
the
NTT
Law
and
the
Telecommunications
Business
Law
are
characterized as having strong aspects of a
command-style administration, focusing on
licensing, for instance, instead of promoting
competition among firms. MPT, however, now
insists, "We need to radically switch from the
previous way of thinking, if we want to bring about
inexpensive telecommunications rates and highspeed Internet" (Telecommunications Bureau). The
ministry is looking for ways to switch policy from
the previous protective administration toward firms
through business regulations to one that would
"promote competition" as well as provide for
"follow-up monitoring."
Even in the NTT group, calls for fostering
competition are growing. NTT DoCoMo Chairman
Koji Ohboshi, who has engineered the company's
rapid leap forward, has come out in favor of another
breakup of NTT. If DoCoMo is completely
uncoupled from NTT, a new-born DoCoMo and
other new common carriers, such as Japan Telecom
Co., can line up on equal footing. They eventually
might call on NTT's regional carriers to reduce
linkup charges.
In the meantime, the Fair Trade Commission
(FTC), which is tasked with competition policy, is
making its move at a long last. One commissioner
is aiming to look into the dispute involving
conventional phones and cellular phones, which are
both supposed to vie against each other. In March,
the official in an article contributed to a technical
journal stressed: "NTT is the leader in the fixedphone business, while NTT DoCoMo is the leader
in the cellular-phone world. NTT's holding of more
than half of DoCoMo's stocks in a way results in
placing a curb on competition between the two
businesses."
In the meantime, NTT has been quick to
rally. Sensing that MPT is moving to switch its
policy line, NTT has begun contacting the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) postal policy clique
[yuusei-zoku) for prior consultations on the issue of
whether to cut interconnection fees, a thorny
problem lying between Japan and the U.S. Thanks
to its groundwork, NTT has succeeded in getting
MPT to accept NTT's proposal for a 22.5 percent
cut over three years.
The previous breakup of NTT useless
As if to endorse his argument, a study group
under the FTC released a report in mid-June which
concluded that "last year's breakup of NTT has
failed to spur competition." It urged splitting apart
NTT in a more complete manner.
With an eye now on next year's upper-house
election
On July 7, the LDP Telecommunications
Council held a staff meeting, in which a leading
lawmaker urged that "should there be any funds
available to reduce linkup fees, a fixed Internet
account for free use should be introduced in local
areas, such as my electoral district." With the
In the United States, the Department of
Justice has played a role in promoting competition
in the telecommunications area.
In 1984, it
- 7 -
upper-house election set for next year, some party
members are inclining toward pork-barrel
approaches rather than pushing for another breakup
of NTT. This holds true also for the opposition
camp. A Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan)
member, backed by NTT-affiliated labor unions,
visited senior MPT officials, including the director
general of the Telecommunications Bureau, and
warned them, "A sizable cut in linkup charges
would deal a serious blow to NTT's management."
(7) Ruling parties' administrative reform panel
agrees on proposal to ban Amakudari practices
by 2005
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
July 13, 2000
The ruling parties' "Administrative and
Fiscal Reforms Promotion Council" decided in its
first meeting yesterday to address administrative
and fiscal reforms by focusing on reform of special
corporations and imposing a ban on Amakudari
(“descent from heaven” or retired senior
government officials obtaining high-level posts in
the private sector) practices.
The council is
composed of the secretaries general and policymaking officers of the three ruling parties – the
Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito and
Hoshuto (Conservative Party). LDP Secretary
General Nonaka, who chairs the council, stated,
"We would like to draft administrative and fiscal
reform measures by year's end, eyeing the
reorganization of the central government that starts
January 6 2001."
The U.S. is a country that is not very strict
toward
corporate
mergers,
but
in
the
telecommunications area, to bring about brisk
competition, it seeks to constrain "giant firms" from
gaining excessive control over the market. In Japan,
the aim of last year's breakup of NTT was "to keep
up with international competition letting NTT
remain a giant." But is such logic acceptable today?
For users, an inconvenient telecommunications
infrastructure only increases the digital divide,
standing in the way of individuals and firms trying
to compete internationally with counterparts in other
countries.
The Mori Cabinet has declared information
technology (IT) to be its showcase program for
revitalizing the economy.
An electronic
government, Internet-based education, and ecommerce are all related to the IT revolution. The
key to Japan's future lies in its ability to establish a
telecommunications infrastructure that can bear
comparison with the international standard. Should
NTT be broken up again? Or will Japan aim at
becoming an IT-based nation by forming another set
of competition measures? Japan has no time to stop
and think about it.
In the first meeting, the council decided to
include among items for consideration: (1) the
streamlining of special corporations, licensed
companies, and public interest organizations,
including the option of scrapping them; a ban on
Amakudari practices, and reform of the civil servant
system, including extending the retirement age to
make up for the amakudari ban; (2) introduction of
a regulation-evaluation system; (3) review of burden
sharing and allocation of finances between the
central and local governments; (4) consignment of
over-the-counter services by the central and local
governments to specific postal offices; and (5) a
second reorganization of NTT to ready it for the
information technology (IT) revolution.
[Shingo Miyake of the Economic Department]
(00071203ku)
(00071304ys)
- 8 -
resolution ordering Tanaka and Amano to stand
down from attending the negotiations. Hiroyuki
Arai, a lower-house member representing the
group, called on Tanaka and read the resolution
aloud to him.
(8) MAGAZINE ARTICLE: Foreign Ministry's
Rasputin
BUNGEI SHUNJU (Page 234-235) (Full)
July 2000
The most conspicuous issue lying between
Japan and the United States is the size of cuts in
interconnection rates charged by Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Co. (NTT). The discord has
increasingly become stronger between the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) -- which desperately
wants to resolve the issue before the Okinawa G-8
Summit in order to make it a success, even if it
means giving way to the U.S. – is battling with the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT),
which has no choice but to say no to the U.S. in
order to defend the vested interests of that Japanese
company.
LDP Secretary General Hiromu Nonaka is
known as the boss of the postal policy clique in the
Diet. He met with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Foley
just before he was to return home to attend the U.S.Japan summit. Nonaka warned the Ambassador,
"Since we expect to revise the NTT Law, I would
like the U.S. Government to see the NTT issue from
a long-term perspective."
But Tanaka, one of the shrewdest men in
MOFA, having been the one who had paved the
way for an agreement on the reversion of the U.S.
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station, did not back
off.
He laid the groundwork at the State
Department for an NHK corespondent in
Washington to do an interview. He then succeeded
in receiving the answer that "the NTT
interconnection rate cut issue would become the
priority agenda in the summit talks.” At a briefing
right before the summit, he also told Prime Minister
Mori, who did not understand anything that was
going on, that it would be wise for Japan to bring up
the issue before the U.S. does. Mori did as he was
told. Such a development greatly surprised the
reporters accompanying Mori and Japanese
politicians, who had assumed that there would be no
progress on the interconnection issue.
The visit to the U.S. by Prime Minister
Yoshiro Mori in early May became one of the
turning points. Economic Cooperation Bureau
Director General Hitoshi Tanaka (MOFA class of
1969), who is in charge of negotiations with the
U.S., set up a bureau director-level meeting with
U.S. government officials just before the summit
between Mori and President Clinton. He hoped to
pushing the NTT issue forward through the summit
talks.
However,
MPT's
Telecommunications
Bureau Director General Sadanori Amano (MPT
class of 1967) entreated the postal policy clique in
the Diet to send him to the bureau director generallevel negotiations, though he had no fresh proposals
to take with him.
The reason for Tanaka striving for resolving
the interconnection rate issue is because it is his
fixed idea to defeat North American Affairs Bureau
Director General Ichiro Fujisaki in the MOFA's
promotion race even if that means coming up
against the communications policy clique in the
LDP. Fujisaki is a private college graduate, unusual
among MOFA diplomats. Compared with Tanaka,
who has the reputation for being Mr. Big, he is a
modest and reserved person, who has the tendency
to avoid competing for fear of defeat. Foreign
Members of the postal policy clique in the
Diet were boiling mad, one saying, "We must reject
the U.S.' selfish requests and protect our national
interests in the telecommunications area." A group
of Dietmembers from the Liberal Democratic Party,
including
the
chairman
of
the
party's
Communications Division, adopted an emergency
- 9 -
Policy Bureau Director General Yukio Takeuchi
(MOFA class of 1967) chose him to be his partner
as director general of the North American Affairs
Bureau, having a liking for Fujisaki's personality.
However, the reputation in the ministry is that
Tanaka is more competent than Fujisaki. So,
Tanaka is eager to play up his ability as a diplomat
who can control LDP policy cliques in the Diet.
Muneo Suzuki, former deputy chief cabinet
secretary, who is called Japan’s Rasputin, is the
person who has made the personnel changes of
bureau director generals complicated. Since the
time when he served as parliamentary vice foreign
minister, he has been butting into MOFA affairs.
He has begun to meddle in the ministry's personnel
changes. He has provoked the anger of sensible
MOFA officials. He reportedly aims at picking out
European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau Director
General Togo, who is the only aide to Suzuki in the
ministry, for the post of Foreign Policy Bureau
chief, which directly leads to becoming
administrative vice minister.
Logically, such is possible.
But each
ministry has an unwritten rule in selecting its
administrative vice minister. As seen in examples
in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), political
intervention will have enormous impact on ministry
business on the whole for several years. Therefore,
observers see that such to be impossible despite
Suzuki's influence. But it is true that MOFA has no
politician on whom it relies. Since former prime
minister Hashimoto and Nonaka have taken no
notice of the ministry, it can safely be said that
MOFA will have to consume tremendous energy in
order to evade Suzuki's offensive. Administrative
Vice Minister Yutaka Kawashima (class of 1964)
reportedly is trying to figure out behind the scenes
what to do.
(00071304kn)
- 10 -