The New Craft of Intelligence: Europe as Victim, Europe as Leader Robert David STEELE Vivas1 Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................................1 A Short History of Intelligence—Europe as Victim ...............................................................................................2 The Purpose of Intelligence—Modern Theory and Practice ..................................................................................3 The Threat Today—Internal, External, and Common ............................................................................................3 Rethinking Intelligence in a Multipolar World—Change as Challenge .................................................................5 The New Craft of Intelligence—An Alternative Approach for the 21st Century ....................................................5 Encryption: Gaining Control by Giving Up Control ..............................................................................................6 Intelligence in the 21st Century: Thinking Creatively.............................................................................................7 Requirements Definition .................................................................................................................................7 Collection Management ..................................................................................................................................7 Processing Information....................................................................................................................................8 Producing Intelligence .....................................................................................................................................9 Paying for Intelligence ....................................................................................................................................9 The Failure of the American Model—Europe as Leader...................................................................................... 11 Endnotes ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 Abstract Over the course of human history, "intelligence"—the art of knowing the plans and intentions of one's enemies—has become confused with spies and secrecy—the methods have come to dominate the objective. The Americans, with their vast sums of money and their obsession with satellite technology, have corrupted the modern understanding of intelligence. At the same time, as we enter the 21st Century, each nation faces new and unusual internal threats, more complex external threats, and many non-traditional common threats including ethnic conflict and water scarcity along the Slavic-Islamic borders and the Sino-Slavic borders. There are two other major changes each government must accommodate: the international information explosion has shifted the challenge from one of stealing a few secrets to one of "making sense" of vast quantities of open information; and at the same time, "who decides" has changed from a topdown command mode driven by elites, to a bottom-up consensus mode driven by non-state actors. Under these circumstances, spies and secrecy must yield to scholars and open source information as the primary foundation for national decision-making. The Internet is now the common international vehicle for communicating and sharing information. Encryption must not be controlled, so that the Internet can prosper as a means of sharing both open and restricted information. National intelligence agencies must be recapitalized and restructured. They must learn to discover, discriminate, distill, and deliver exactly the right information, even if it is not secret. They must shift their spending from spies and satellites to analysts, analytic tools, and open sources. Finally, each government must learn how to share the financial and intellectual burden of "Global Coverage" by working closely with its national business, academic, and media partners to create a "virtual intelligence community" that uses the Internet to produce reports, administer expert forums, and provide distance learning on any topic to any citizen. The American model for national intelligence has failed; so has the old European model. The new European Parliament and the European Commission could now lead the way in creating a new "internationalist" model of intelligence, a model better suited for the realities of the 21st Century. 2 A Short History of Intelligence—Europe as Victim It is an honor to be here, speaking at the first truly European conference dedicated to the future of intelligence. As Europe reconsiders the Atlantic Alliance, its new regional relationships, the growing threats from the fringe regions to the West and from the Islamic, Arabic, and North African zones of instability, as well as the new global economic and technological environments, it is appropriate that we have a fresh review of this important topic. First, the history of intelligence in three minutes. It started long before Christ, and initially consisted of forward scouts and merchants—today we call them "legal travelers." Over time, and particularly in China, it matured into a complex secret network of spies, counterspies, and counter-counter-spies. It remained largely human in nature until World War II. Espionage was the secret side of the "game of Nations," the sport of kings, and at its most ruthless, was a form of permanent secret war between states. The United States of America, despite its successful use of military spies in the Revolutionary War, was by its nature not well-suited to the art of espionage. As Christopher Andrew has documented so brilliantly in his book on intelligence and American presidents, only four American presidents have properly understood national intelligence in over 200 years: George Washington, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and George Bush the father.2 The son gives no sign of appreciating the value of intelligence, and his current Secretary of Defense is on record as saying that the Director of Central Intelligence has a "a crappy, irrelevant job."3 The Americans, the newcomers to the world of intelligence in the 1940's, made up with money and technology what they lacked in finesse and analytical insight. Sherman Kent, a brilliant man, introduced the new American definition of intelligence, one focused on analysis rather than secret warfare.4 Unfortunately, the Americans have only paid lip-service to analysis in relation to the over-all roles and missions of the larger U.S. Intelligence Community. If one examines the record of U.S. intelligence spending since World War II, it is easy to establish that the Americans are spending roughly 85% of their $30 billion dollars a year on satellite-based covert technical collection. This is bad, but it gets worse—the Americans are only processing 10% of their collected images, 6% of their Russian and Chinese signals, approximately 3% of their European signals, and less than 1% of their "rest of the world" signals. They have sacrificed analysts, analytic tools, and access to open source intelligence; in their obsession with waste and mismanagement in outer space. The latest plans to recapitalize satellites continue this pattern. Europe would be foolish to follow this example. Europe is already a victim of the American way of espionage because Europe has become too reliant on American intelligence products and the American intelligence relationship at the same time that Europe has failed to properly capitalize its own national and regional intelligence architectures. Europe has also been "sucked in" at the highest levels to a "systems of systems" approach to military and intelligence communications and computing that demands interoperability with the Americans. I am here to tell you that the American approach to communications and computing is not affordable by the Europeans and that it also cuts its commanders off from 98% of the relevant information that is available only from the private sector. Spies and secrecy are a very small part of national intelligence in today's world. The new European intelligence community must find a new model for its future. 3 The Purpose of Intelligence—Modern Theory and Practice Each nation and each private sector organization has a choice about how it approaches the mission of intelligence. In theory, in the ideal, the mission of intelligence is to inform policy. That is the argument I make in my book and that is the argument I have made to over 6,000 officers from over 40 countries who have chosen to attend my annual May conference on intelligence reform and open source intelligence.5 In practice, the reality is that most nations focus on expensive technical collection that they cannot process, and on secret clandestine activities that are very inefficient as well as insecure. We like to pretend that our spies, most of whom are working out of official installations, are doing important secret work. The reality is that local liaison—the local government's counterintelligence organization—knows with certainty who all of our spies are, and is controlling at least half of our so-called secret agents. Both governments and corporations have a similar problem in their general approach to information and information technology. Most have made the mistake of spending money on information technology—on expensive communications and computing equipment—without giving any thought to the sources of information that they are seeking, or the analytic processes they wish their experts to pursue, or to the products that are to be created and distributed to policy makers. An expensive cooking pot will not improve old fish or a bad cook. It has been my experience that 80% of what we need to know to produce useful intelligence is not secret, is not online (either on the Internet or available from premium commercial sources such as Factiva), and is generally not even published in hard-copy. It has also been my experience that governments and corporations are not competent as discovering, discriminating, distilling, and digesting open sources of information. We have much to learn. The purpose of intelligence must be to inform policy-makers, acquisition managers, and operational commanders including law enforcement commanders. Anyone who persists in the belief that the purpose of intelligence is to collect secrets is betraying their responsibility to their country and undermining the national security as well as the national competitiveness of their home country. Intelligence in the 21st Century must focus on open source intelligence, on many smart analysts working together, and on analytic tools. Spies and secrecy have a role to play, but it is a very small role and must be carefully managed within a larger holistic approach to the new craft of intelligence.6 Let me be clear: my vision for intelligence reform includes dramatic improvements in our clandestine service—we must have spies that the French cannot find—but this is a very small part of the much larger issue of how we manage the totality of national intelligence collection and production. The Threat Today—Internal, External, and Common Before we consider how best to rethink intelligence in a multipolar world, let me spend just three minutes on the nature of the threat today. This is an area where the preceding speaker, Dr. John Gannon, not only excels, but in so doing he sharply outlines a new globalized understanding of 4 non-traditional threats. I agree with everything he says. I wish to focus in general terms on three areas of concern: internal threats, external threats, and common threats. Internal threats are growing with the open borders that characterize most of the world and especially the European community of nations. Internal threats are also growing with our reliance of electronic systems whose genesis and internal coding we do not understand. New means must be found to provide intelligence and counterintelligence support for internal stability, crime-fighting, disease control, and electronic systems. The proven process of intelligence has much to offer to internal decision-makers, but we must set a new standard for decision-making about all internal matters—all decisions must be informed by basic, estimative, and counterintelligence operations and analysis. External threats cannot be denied. I believe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that is represented at this conference by Brigadier General James Cox, and I believe that both NATO and the various combinations of European nations, including those contemplating a separate European rapid reaction force, must recognize that the security of Europe is rooted in out of area instability and will require out of area military and assistance operations.7 In this regard, NATO, and other European coalitions are urgently in need of new methods for sharing information that permit the inclusion of non-governmental organizations in planning and operations—this generally means that most of the information cannot be secret information. For this reason, I am very pleased that as a result of leadership from the German, Dutch, Norwegian, and Canadian flag officers within NATO, that today there exists a NATO Open Source Intelligence Working Group that is specifically focused on a vision for future intelligence sharing with the Partners for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialog nations. The future intelligence architecture vision of NATO, if it is separated from the American obsession with very expensive technology, has much to offer all of Europe as a model for thinking about the future of intelligence. Finally there are common threats where we have failed to establish useful means of sharing the cost of collection, processing, and analysis. OSS has been tracking eighteen different genocide campaigns around the world. How many others are doing the same thing? Or when East Timor became a nightmare, how many different Nations and organizations were duplicating one another's work in basic collection and analysis? Then there is the fact that conflict is pervasive throughout the world. Today we have 26 high-intensity conflicts, 78 low-intensity conflicts, and 178 violent internal political conflicts.8 Can each of our countries and businesses afford to be monitoring all of these conflicts all of the time? I do not think so! In terms of future threats, I am especially concerned about water scarcity, and the fact that water scarcity and ethnic conflict are especially strong along the Slavic-Islamic and the Sino-Slavic borders. The proliferation of bio-chemical weapons, trade in women and children, toxic dumping in European rivers as well as in Africa, and the collapse of global public health, at every level and in every nation, are among the things we must all worry about. Spies and secrecy have very little to contribute to our understanding of these topics of common concern, yet we have failed to establish alternative means of sharing open source intelligence that are as structured as our many bilateral arrangements for sharing secrets. 5 Rethinking Intelligence in a Multipolar World—Change as Challenge What has changed? Let me contrast the nature of intelligence during the Cold War with the demands on intelligence in a new globalized world where instability and disease and water shortages in otherwise insignificant areas can bring severe danger to Europe. During the Cold War, we focused on collecting secrets about one denied area target, the Soviet Union. Our customers for these secrets were the policy elite within government. We collected a relatively small amount of information, and from this we made grand deductions.9 Today our challenges are completely different. Instead of stealing a few secrets we must make sense of vast quantities of information that overwhelm us—information that is not secret. The average man on the street has access, in one day, to more information on the Internet than any President or Prime Minister receives during their entire Administration from their secret intelligence services. We must also accommodate ourselves to a complete change in "who decides." Instead of government leaders deciding and issuing instructions in a top-down "command" fashion, today decisions are made by multi-cultural and transnational groups, most of whom are non-state actors. Openly-arrived at consensus, rather than secretly-derived command, is the operational concept most relevant to thinking about the future of intelligence and its role in support of national and regional decision-making. There is a subtlety here. When public consensus is the objective, and the citizen is the ultimate consumer of intelligence, then the education of the citizen becomes rather important. Trying to provide intelligence about global threats to Senators and Representatives and citizens who boast that they do not have a passport and have no need to understand other countries or other peoples is a very frightening and very real challenge we face today in America. Senator David Boren and Mr. David Gergen have both called for the internationalization of education, and I believe that we all share a common concern: real world information must be fully integrated into all public educational curriculums—students must learn how to study and understand the various constituencies in the real world—or we will all be trying to create intelligence for what will arguably be "dumb Nations." Intelligence in the 21st Century must embrace and inform every element of the Nation, from policy and the military to law enforcement and coalitions, to business and the academy and the man on the street. The New Craft of Intelligence—An Alternative Approach for the 21st Century Now I begin my conclusion, by outlining my vision for the future of intelligence. 10 It begins with the Internet. The Internet is not, as some might assume, an alternative source of useful knowledge. Over 90% of the content on the Internet is pornography, opinion, or advertising. While it will no doubt improve over time, the importance of the Internet to Europe is primarily as an alternative to the secret and expensive American command, control, communications, computing and intelligence (C4I) system. That system is unaffordable, has access to only 2% of 6 the relevant information, and should be dumped into the ocean as soon as possible. Europeans should not spend one additional Euro-dollar buying in to the American "system of systems." Instead, Europe should focus on elevating the security of the Internet to the point that it can be used as the C4I backbone for government and private sector information sharing, for intelligence support and information sharing among ad hoc coalition partners including non-governmental organizations, and as a means of mobilizing what Dr. Alessandro Politi called, in 1992, the "intelligence minuteman"—the private citizen with knowledge or observations of immediate value to the government.11 I believe that the Internet can offer the countries of Europe, and their corporations, and their citizens, four specific functionalities that will characterize the virtual intelligence community of the future: Shared reports on every country and topic of common interest Expert forums with differing levels of qualification and including private teams Internet and distributed database link tables creating a virtual information network Distance learning to internationalize education and help new analysts come up to speed Global Coverage—the ability to monitor every aspect of our global environment in order to obtain early warning, estimate trends, and react responsibly to significant changes, is now unaffordable by any government or any corporation. New means must be found to share this burden, and I believe that the new craft of intelligence, with European leadership and perhaps a Canadian role as an honest broker of shared Internet spaces, will move from the vaults of secrecy to the open terrain of cyber-space. It is there that intelligent life is to be found in the 21st Century. Encryption: Gaining Control by Giving Up Control Both the American and the European policies on encryption are inappropriate and unenforceable. It is not possible to gain control over the wealth of information that could be communicated over the Internet until every government is willing to give up control over encryption. Let me explain this simply: 98% of the information we need to do good governance and good business is available from private sector parties but we are either too afraid to let our analysts have a connection to the Internet; or the private sector is not willing to put its information on the Internet due to the lack of security that characterizes electronic communications and computers today. We must all agree that the Internet, as the new international standard for sharing information, requires the same level of security that now is provided for secret government communications. If we give up control over encryption, then we gain control of—we gain access to—the totality of world knowledge through the Internet. We "explode" the value of the Internet a tri-billion-fold. 7 Two more quick points on this vital topic. First, I must observe that governments have already lost control of the Internet and of encryption. The Internet interprets censorship and government-approved encryption as a power outage, and routes around it.12 The Internet also hosts new levels of anonymous emailing and hidden encryption, such as steganography (the concealment of encryption within images) that are beyond the capabilities of the Americans as well as the rest of the world. Second, I must emphasize that while today there are roughly 3.5 million users of the Internet, there will be, within 10-15 years, 3.5 billion users of the Internet. We are at the beginning of time in terms of modern information practices, and government can no more stop this trend than it can control the weather. 13 Government must become part of the total Internet, and stop trying to hide and isolate its secret information. We must protect our secrets, but we must also allow the private sector to properly protect its intellectual property and its secrets—in this way, the Internet can become the true "information commons" of the 21st Century, and we will all benefit, irrespective of nationality, ethnicity, or profession. Intelligence in the 21st Century: Thinking Creatively Very briefly, I want to cover the fundamentals of intelligence, which most governments have abandoned, and end with the need for new partnerships. Requirements Definition Requirements Definition is a lost art form. If you do not get the policy-maker to ask the right question, then you will waste, as the Americans and others waste, billions of dollars collecting too much of the wrong information at the same time that you fail to go get exactly the right information. Policymakers and commanders must be trained in how to task and use intelligence—this is not a game for children, an adult version of "I have a secret." Just a month ago we had a two-star general ask his one-star intelligence general for "anything you can get on mines." We wasted three days and over $6000 dollars before someone finally asked the two-star general what he really wanted to know. It turned out that what he really wanted to know was how a U.S. militant might incapacitate a U.S. port with commercial off-the-shelf explosives. This was still not the right question—you can incapacitate a port with an electronic attack on its computers or a chain saw on its communications cables, but this time we knew what was expected. This mistake is repeated thousands of times every single day in every single country. Collection Management I have been a spy, I have helped steal signals codebooks, I have programmed funds for overhead imagery satellites. I have also helped lead the open source revolution in partnership with many others around the world. One of our biggest problems today is that we do not manage collection—we let the collection resources dictate what we do. The U.S. Intelligence Community is "severely deficient" in its access to open sources of information,14 at the same 8 time that it is spending billions of dollars on imagery and signals collection that cannot be processed, and it spends so little on clandestine human intelligence that it must rely on low-cost recent college graduates working out of official installations—non-official cover officers hired at mid-career cost more and require more effort to support in the field. As each country thinks about the future of its intelligence capabilities, it must first step back from what exists, and think instead about what it needs. Most of what we have in the U.S. technical collection architecture is from the 1970's and not worth saving—it is time for every Nation to carefully consider the balance that it requires between spies and scholars—between secret sources and open sources. Finally, within collection management, it is imperative that the most senior collection manager be an analyst, not a collector. Properly balanced collection management must keep the question to be answered firmly in mind, must know the strengths and weaknesses of each collection discipline, and must have the authority to narrowly focus each collection capability—often this will require strict instruction to the spies to do nothing because the information is more cheaply and more quickly available through open sources. Processing Information Where we in America have failed most dramatically, is in failing to invest any money at all in what we call TPED—Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination. We have spent billions on overhead technical collection (and some ground level computer collection) and we have spent nothing—quite literally, nothing—to create tools that analysts could use to task the collection capabilities; to process the information being brought in; to cluster, weight, and visualize the information so it could be understood; to distill the information into multi-media presentations that could be quickly delivered to the customer. Astonishing as this may seem, although we defined a desktop computer system for analysts in 1986 that could do all this using object-oriented programming, we were forbidden to develop it because the official CIA computer was first the Wang and then the IBM PS 2, and neither of these old computer architectures was capable of advanced processing. We are 20 years behind private sector technology today, in the processing arena, because of terrible decisions we made in the 1980's. The information technology revolution has not yet reached the intelligence analyst. This must be one of the top three priorities, apart from hiring more analysts and better analysts, and improving our access to open sources of information. They must have the tools with which to think, or they will drown in information and be rather useless. There is, however, one other aspect to processing, including data extraction and storage, which I wish to address. In the age of distributed information, the concept of centralized intelligence is not only an oxymoron, it is the surest way to deprive government of access to most of the information that it requires to make informed decisions. It is impossible for any central intelligence organization to be effective at "Global Coverage." 9 Only by creating a "virtual intelligence community" that uses the Internet to establish open source information collection, processing, and analysis partnerships with business and the academy—and with other governments and their own internal private sector information specialists—can any government hope to be truly informed and effective in the 21st Century. Producing Intelligence I am concerned by several trends that I have noticed within the various production communities I have worked with over time. First, it is very silly to try to have a 12 month production plan with an 18 month editing cycle so that by the time the intelligence reaches the policy maker or the commander the country in question no longer exists—or the topic is overtaken by events. Production communities must shift to a "just enough, just in time" form of production. Most of the writing should be left in the analyst's filing cabinet. Intelligence reports must be one page or less, and the analyst must be able to answer any follow-up questions immediately and on the secure telephone, in an interactive mode. In many cases, the analyst will not know but they must be expert at "knowing who knows."15 The acme of analytic skill in the 21st Century will be the ability to put the policy maker with a question in touch with a private sector expert who can create new knowledge "on the spot", tailored exactly to the needs of the policy maker. This will require dramatic changes in our intelligence cultures, and especially in our security culture. I am also concerned about the obsession of production managers with creating huge piles of paper, of creating very long reports that no one will ever read. Apart from the fact that they are wasting the analysts' time (and driving the best analysts out of government), apart from the fact that they are failing to meet the intelligence needs of the traditional as well as their new clients across many different branches of government, they are also preventing their analysts from thinking and training. In my view, analysts should spend one third of their time traveling to conferences and to study their target, one third of their time thinking without necessarily writing, and one third of their time with their customers, seeing what their customers see, understanding their customers problems, and gaining their customers trust. If we follow this path, we will be able to produce superior intelligence on a "just enough, just in time" basis. Paying for Intelligence I must conclude this overview of needed changes in how we execute the new craft of intelligence by speaking briefly about how we pay for intelligence. Most countries today set aside a relatively modest amount of money for intelligence. In America we set aside $30 billion a year, which is roughly 10% of what we spend on defense. This is, however, a deceptive number, because all but $2 billion is spent on technical collection and defense intelligence. Only about $2 billion is actually under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence, and this pays for both the clandestine service and all of our national-level analysts as well as a very expensive global communications infrastructure. In my experience most major European countries are spending between $1 billion and $3 billion a year as a total. 10 I believe we are all spending our money badly, and we have failed to properly integrate the cost of information support into every department of government. In America, for example, our military builds very expensive weapons, mobility, and communications systems, and does not plan for how the information and intelligence will reach these systems, nor does our military include the costs of information support in the cost of the system. Precision munitions, for example, require extraordinarily expensive classified imagery and imagery processing and analysis support. The military "assumes" that the intelligence professionals will provide them with what they need, when they need it, for "free." We must break way from this model. Intelligence support in the future must be no less than 1% and ideally as much as 3% of every department's total budget. That portion of every department's budget for intelligence should be set aside, into a special intelligence fund, so that the department cannot choose to pay for travel instead of intelligence, or furniture instead of intelligence, or new cars for the leadership, instead of intelligence. This happens all too often in America, except that we spend our money on people and in many cases our intelligence budgets are so heavily invested in people—over 50% in most cases, up to 85% in some cases—that we have nothing left over to spend on actually buying travel, training, expert consultations, desktop analytic tools, or improved access to open sources of information. There is plenty of money available for intelligence if we simply look deeply into our budgets and establish two things: first, how must we are wasting on ineffective secret collection that is not properly processed; and second, how much we are wasting on weapons, vehicles, and people that will never be properly used until they earmark a fraction of their acquisition and maintenance costs for intelligence support. Within government, there should be no difficulty with increasing the intelligence budget by 20% by forcing the consumers of intelligence to allocate funds for the intelligence they demand. At the same time, I recommend that the government cut the intelligence budget each year by 20% for five years in a row, while asking for what we call "new initiatives" that can be funded with the savings—in other words, cut 20% being spent on old ideas that no longer work, while immediately restoring the same 20% for specific new ideas. In this way, without reducing the budget for intelligence, we can "churn" it, renew it, and completely refresh our intelligence capabilities. There is one final observation that I would make on paying for intelligence: it must be paid for in partnership with the business community and the universities. There needs to be a national consortium, a "virtual intelligence community", with expert councils for every topic of common interest. For North Africa, to take just one example, there should be a council with representatives from each major organization that meets quarterly to discuss information collection and analysis objectives, to establish protocols for information sharing, to discuss changes to a shared Internet space with shared reports, expert forums, and distance learning, and to agree on unfunded deficiencies that need attention from the government or perhaps from a major business sponsor—or even a few directed dissertations by promising graduate students! In the age of distributed intelligence, it is no longer possible for the government to be informed without a full partnership with business and the academy. It is the role of government now to provide leadership, but not to try to do everything by itself. Global Coverage is unaffordable by any single government or any single corporation or any single university. 11 The Failure of the American Model—Europe as Leader America has failed. I have failed. It cost the U.S. taxpayer $20 million for me to learn, in creating the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, that 80% to 90% of what I needed to create useful intelligence for my general officers was not online, not secret, and therefore not available from the secret intelligence agencies. Europe, like America, has been slow to grasp the urgency associated with redirecting our intelligence spending from secret collection toward analysis, analytic tools, and open sources of information. Europe, however, now has an advantage. If it recognizes the failure of the American model; if it recognizes the failure of technology as a collection solution; if it recognizes the fact that it is Europe, not America, that will suffer the most from the collapse of Africa and ethnic water-wars between Russia and China and between Russia and Islamic revolutionaries, then perhaps Europe might step forward to create a new "internationalist" vision of intelligence. Such an internationalist vision would create new partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Such an internationalist vision would ensure that open source intelligence was the source of first resort, and that spies and secrecy were used only in the context of what could be legally and ethically gathered, at low cost, from open sources. Such an internationalist vision would restore Europe to the forefront of the global intelligence community that is emerging in the Internet era, and would ensure that our shared global intelligence endeavors reflect a proper multi-cultural and continental perspective. Too often we mistake money for power and secrecy for knowledge. There are a great many "naked Emperors", both in America and in Europe, and the time has come to either get them dressed or throw them out of office. Thank you. Endnotes 1 Robert David STEELE Vivas is a 25-year veteran of the U.S. national security community, with over 20 years residence in various countries in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. His family roots extend to the Barcelona region of Spain in the 17th Century, and to a British silk weaver in Cheshire County in England, also in the 17 th Century. He is the founder of www.oss.net and the Global Information Forum (www.oss.net/OSS01) held each May, and the author of ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA International Press, 2000), available from http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0916159280/qid%3D957557681/103-7533232-2724657. He holds two graduate degrees, in international relations and public administration, and two advanced certificates, in intelligence policy and in defense studies. A copy of this paper with all endnotes is at www.oss.net/Papers/white/FutureIntel.doc. Reproduction and dissemination are encouraged. 2 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (HarperCollins, 1995). 3 As quoted in Bob Woodward's "Editorial: Bush's Wild Card", The Washington Post, 01/12/2001, Page A25. 12 4 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in War and Peace (Cambridge University Press, 1996). In addition to his distinctions between the two major forms of national intelligence—the traditional European form, also characteristic of the Israeli's, of intelligence as secret war, versus the American definition of intelligence as secret analysis— Professor Herman also distinguishes between long-term intelligence endeavors that rely primarily on open sources, and short-term espionage that tends to be intrusive and heighten the target's feelings of vulnerability and hostility. 5 I have not been alone. Over 500 distinguished international speakers have spoken at one of my 15 conferences, and most of what they have said is on record and available for free at www.oss.net in the Open Archives where past issues of OSS NOTICES and many White Papers can also be found. A complete index of all intelligence reform conference presentations is provided in supra note 1, pages 403-420. 6 For one sharp contrast between the views of the current Director of Central Intelligence and myself, see Mr. Vernon Loeb, "Back Channels: The Intelligence Community; Despite Objections, Authorization Bill Passes" The Washington Post, 12/12/2000, FINAL, Page A45 and the article to which he refers, my "Possible Presidential Intelligence Initiatives" in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Volume 13, Winter 2000, pages 409-423). http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/fedpage/columns/backchannels/A579102000Dec11.html 7 On 13 April 2000 I presented the lecture "One World, Ready or Not" to over 60 generals responsible for military intelligence across the NATO community. This lecture is freely available to the public online at www.oss.net/Papers/white/SHAPE.ppt. My written materials included the following distinguished European papers: "Towards a European intelligence policy" by Mr. Klaus Becher, Mr. Bernard Molard, Mr. Frederic Oberson, and Mr. Alessandro Politi (Chaillot Paper 34, Paris, December 1998); "Open Source Intelligence: The Challenge for NATO" by Commodore Patrick Tyrrell, OBE MA LLB RN; "Open Source Intelligence: The Lingua Franca for regional intelligence co-ordination and information sharing" by General Director S. J. van Hulst of the National Security Service (BVD); and "Open Source Intelligence: Foundation for Regional Co-operation in Fighting Crime and Establishing a Regional Intelligence Community" by Mr. Jurgen Storbeck, Director of EUROPOL. 8 See the PIOOM project at http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm. Several of my recent papers have focused on non-traditional threats and alternative military strategies, visit http://www.oss.net/White.html. 9 This contrast between the old and new paradigms of intelligence has been made in different ways by several people. Dr. John Gannon, Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis & Production, has addressed this in several of his speeches and is in the best position to observe how the current environment impacts on his analysts. My own distinctions between who decides, the nature of the sources, the timeframes, and the manner of deciding, is depicted in supra note 1, page 205, in Figure 37: Intelligence Power from the People, to the People. 10 I first outlined my vision for the new craft of intelligence, on the need for the reconstruction and globalization of intelligence, at the Canadian intelligence conference in Ottawa, in September 2000. My presentation in Canada, none of which is repeated here, is at www.oss.net/Papers/white/CASIS2000.rtf. 11 Dr. Politi was among a very select group of Europeans that attended the first international conference on intelligence reform, and was such a positive influence that his term, "intelligence minuteman", has become a standard. He and others like him—the authors of Chaillot Papers, for example—represent the future of intelligence. 12 This penetrating insight was articulated by John Perry Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, at my first international conference in 1992. 13 The most authoritative information about the future of the Internet is available from Dr. Vinton G. Cerf, the true father of the Internet. His personal web page is http://www.worldcom.com/about_the_company/cerfs_up and includes all of his recent presentations documenting the past, present, and future directions of the Internet; for these go directly to http://www.worldcom.com/about_the_company/cerfs_up/presentations/index.phtml. He is the source of the estimate that we will have 3.5 billion users (as opposed to 3.5 million users today) within ten to fifteen years. 14 As a result of my testimony, and a spontaneous competition on Burundi in which my six telephone calls produced more intelligence than was available from the entire $30 billion a year U.S. Intelligence Community, the AspinBrown Commission concluded that our access to open sources is severely deficient and should be a top priority for funding. This recommendation, like their others, has not been acted upon by our current leadership. More recently, the Hart-Rudman Commission, whose final report is available at www.nssg.gov, included the recommendation (number 38) that we should incorporate more open source intelligence into analytical products, and that the U.S. State Department should be more active in collecting open source information. 15 Dr. Stevan Dedijer, the father of business intelligence, introduced this concept to me when he spoke spontaneously at the first international conference on intelligence reform in 1992.