POLITICAL SCIENCE 407: Public Policy Making and Implementation
Fall 2007
966 Damen Hall, Wednesday 7:00-9:30 pm
Professor Richard E. Matland
Office: 903 Damen Phone: 773 508-7127
Office Hours: Thursday 10:00-12:00 and by Appointment (rmatlan@luc.edu)
COURSE DESCRIPTION: This course is designed for students in the graduate program in
political science, although other students are certainly welcome. The course serves as the
introduction to public policy. The policy field deals with the outputs of politics. What are the
outcomes in specific public policy areas and why do those outcomes occur? We will consider
several different models of the policy process. This course places a heavy emphasis on the study
of institutions and in particular a “comparative institutions” perspective. A comparative
institutions perspective does not necessarily mean studying an issue or policy cross-nationally,
although it can be. An institutions perspective means looking at how using different institutional
arrangements to make decisions affects the final outcome. While a pure behavioralist model
might argue that outcomes are largely determined by preferences, an institutionalist perspective
states outcomes depend not only on preferences, but on the institutions used to translate
preferences into outcomes. There has been an EXPLOSION of research using the
institutionalist perspective, although different researchers mean radically different things when
they talk about an institutionalist perspective. We will consider several perspectives over the
course of the semester. Finally, there is an expectation students will learn about the institutions
of American politics. How Congress, the bureaucracy, and the courts function and how they
affect the outputs of the American political system.
COURSE REQUIREMENTS: In addition to regular attendance, reading of all assignments, and
participation, there are three major requirements. You are to write a paper, take a final exam,
and present the readings for one of the weeks in class. Let me describe each.
I. The Paper. There are three smaller papers and one larger paper. The larger paper is created
by merging the three smaller papers and taking into consideration the comments I make along
the way. The goal is to have a research design paper at the end of this process that includes a
question, a place to study the question, and how you would study the question.
A. The first of the three papers is a “Concept Paper and Literature Review” looking at a specific
topic of public policy (agenda setting, policy adoption, etc.). A list of possible topics is included
on a separate handout. This paper should be 5-6 pages long (you can stretch it to 8-10 if you’re
feeling VERY inspired).1 Topics for Papers A, B, and C are to be handed in to me by
9/19/2007. The paper is DUE OCTOBER 3, 2007 and is 10% of your grade.
B. The second paper is a 5-6 page case study of some policy issue now being discussed in
Washington or the states. The major sources for this work should be scholarly ones. There is
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Please use 12 pt. font, 1-inch margins, Times Roman or something that takes up about the same amount of space)
plus include a real bibliography.
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LOTS of flexibility regarding topics, but have the topic approved by me first. I want at least
two of the following three items included in this paper: at least one major court case in this area,
one specific piece of legislation under consideration or one particular regulation of a federal
agency. The reference needs to be to a specific law, regulation, or court case (not “in an
important case in 1997 the Supreme Court said”.. but in X v. Y ...). You may need to go to the
Law Library to get the cases and regs and laws. This paper is DUE October 31st, 2007 and is 10
percent of your grade.
C. The third paper is a “data sources and methodology” paper on how to research your topic.
What sources of data are available to look at this question? Are there mass surveys that may be
relevant (NORC, ICPSR)? Is there census data or Bureau of Labor Statistics data that illuminate
the question being asked? Would you need to interview anyone? Who? What would your
survey questionnaire look like? You don’t actually need to go out and collect the data, but you
need to say what data you would collect if you were to do this work and how you would collect
it. Again a 5-6 page double spaced paper is to be handed in November 28th, 2007, worth 10
percent of the grade.
D. Your final paper combines the three mini-papers you’ve done so far, taking into account my
comments. You DO NOT just want to renumber the three papers when you put them together.
Weave them together so it reads like one paper, not three separate papers. To get a good grade
you will need to take into consideration the comments that I’ve made on your earlier papers.
This final paper is going to be a research design paper to look at a specific aspect of public
policy. While the final paper isn’t due until the end of the semester (December 13th) you need to
start thinking about all parts at the beginning of the process. Pick a concept that will mesh
easily with your policy. I.e. if your concept piece is about “Social Construction of Target
Groups” then you’re going to want to pick a policy that has an identifiable clientele such as
TANF or veteran’s benefits or something similar.
II. The Final. The written final may include some short answer questions, but the bulk of the
exam will be 3-5 broad questions. You will have some choice as to which to answer. They will
be typical of the questions used in a comprehensive examination. Exams will be available at
either noon or 5 pm on Wednesday December 12th and are due back to my office 24 hours later
on Thursday December 13th at either noon or 5 pm. I can e-mail people the exam, but you must
bring the final exam in to be stamped when it is returned.
III. Rapporteur assignment. Each student will serve as a rapporteur for one class session. The
student should review in a 15 minute oral presentation on one or more of the major issues raised
by the literature. The person should write a 4-5 page synopsis of their presentation to be handed
in to the professor for a grade. Your grade will also be affected by the level of polish in the
public presentation. Power Points are acceptable. Your paper should take pains to NOT say
Author X says A, author Y says B, author Z says C. Integrate the readings into a coherent
perspective. It is not necessary to refer to all of the readings, but take some subset of them,
describe the major points of the readings and present a critique of the readings.
As we discuss the research we read you will find I have a standard litany of concerns. Questions
like #1) What’s the theoretical argument of the author or what hypotheses are the authors trying
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to test? #2) Do the data the author presents speak to the hypotheses he wants to talk about? #3)
What data could they have used? #4) What questions does the author leave unanswered and how
might we study them?
BOOKS REQUIRED FOR PURCHASE:
Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech (1998) Basic Interests Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How Government
Prioritizes Problems (University of Chicago Press).
Michael Hill and Peter L. Hupe (2002) Implementing Public Policy: Governance in Theory and
in Practice. Sage Press.
John W. Kingdon (2002) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2d. ed. New York:
Longman Classics Edition.
Elinor Ostrom 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kenneth Shepsle and Bonchek (1997). Analyzing Politics, Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions
New York: Norton & Co.
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 2007.
E.E. Schattschneider (1960) The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston (reprinted 1975 by Harcourt Brace).
BOOKS RECOMMENDED FOR PURCHASE:
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingeman (eds.). 1996. A New Handbook of Political
Science Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.). 2002. Political Science State of the Discipline The
Centennial Edition. New York: W.W. Norton Press.
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WEEK 1: INTRODUCTION (8/29)
Gabriel Almond (1995) “Political Science: The History of the Discipline” in R. Goodin and
Hans Dieter Klingeman A New Handbook of Political Science.
Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (2002) “American Political Science: The Discipline’s State
and the State of the Discipline” in Political Science State of the Discipline The Centennial
Edition.
WEEK 2: THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (9/5)
Bo Rothstein (1995) “Political Institutions: An Overview” in R. Goodin and Hans Dieter
Klingeman (ed.) A New Handbook of Political Science.
Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) “Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms”. Political Studies 44: 936-957.
Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol (2002) “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political
Science” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.) Political Science State of the Discipline
The Centennial Edition. pp. 693-721.
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1996) "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions”
Governance, pp. 247-264.
Ken Shepsle and Mark Bonchek (1997) Analyzing Politics, Chapters 1, 2 and 11.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Barry Weingast (2002) “Rational-Choice Institutionalism” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V.
Milner (eds.) Political Science State of the Discipline The Centennial Edition. pp. 660-692.
Karen L. Remmer (1998) “Theoretical Decay and Tehoretical Development: The Resurgence of
Institutional Analysis.” World Politics 50(1):34-61.
John Chamberlin (1990) “Formal Political Theory and the Design and Evaluation of Institutions”
in John E. Jackson (ed.) Institutions in American Society: Essays in Market, Political and Social
Organizations Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (1991) “Introduction” in The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis. Pages 1-38, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1984) "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in
Political Life" in The American Political Science Review , pp. 734-749.
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational
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Basis of Politics. New York, NY: Free Press, esp. Chapters 1, 2, and 7.
WEEK 3: BEGINNINGS: POLICY PROCESS MODELS AND THE EXPANSION OF
CONFLICT (9/12)
Schattschneider, E.E.. (1957) The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston (reprinted 1975 by Harcourt Brace).
Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz. 1962. “The Two Faces of Power.” American Political
Science Review 56:947-952.
Haider Markel DP, KJ Meier (1996) “The politics of gay and lesbian rights: Expanding the scope
of the conflict.” Journal of Politics 58: (2) 332-349.
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1999.
Chapter 1. Introduction. The need for better theories / Paul A. Sabatier ;
Chapter 2. (from 1996 edition) The stages approach to the policy process: what has it done?
where is it going? / Peter deLeon.
Matland, Richard E. 1993. “A Policy Process Perspective on the Implementation of Budgetary
Reforms in Norway”. Paper presented at American Political Science Association Meetings,
Washington, D.C., 1993.
WEEK 4: PROBLEM DEFINITION (9/19)
Weiss, Janet A. 1989. “The Powers of Problem Definition: The Case of Government
Paperwork.” Policy Sciences 22:97-121.
Jeon Y, and Donald P Haider-Markel. 2001 “Tracing issue definition and policy change: An
analysis of disability issue images and policy response”. Policy Studies Journal 29(2): 215-231.
Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Chapters 1-4, 7, 10, conclusion.
Wood, B. Dan, and Arnold Vedlitz. 2007. “Issue Definition, Information Processing, and the
Politics of Global Warming” American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 552-568 JULY 2007.
Wood, B. Dan, and A. Doan. 2003. “The politics of problem definition: Applying and testing
threshold models” American Journal of Political Science 47 (4): 640-653 OCT 2003
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
Chapter 4. Social Construction and Policy Design / Helen Ingram, Anne Schneider, Peter
DeLeon.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
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Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1993. “Social Construction of Target Populations:
Implications for Politics and Policy.” American Political Science Review 87: 334–47.
Rochefort, David L. and Roger Cobb. 1994. The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the
Policy Agenda Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. Chapter 1, 2 and 5.
Lieberman, Robert C. 1995. “Social Construction (continued)” comment on Schneider &
Ingram’s APSR article, American Political Science Review 89:437-441. Reply by Helen Ingram
and Anne Schneider “Response to Lieberman” American Political Science Review 89:441-446.
Portz, John. 1996. “Problem Definitions and Policy Agendas: Shaping the Educational Agenda
in Boston” Policy Studies Journal 24(3):371-386.
Edwards, George and B. Dan Wood (1999) “Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress,
and the media” American Political Science Review 93(2): 327-344.
Flemming RB, Wood BD, Bohte J (1999) “Attention to issues in a system of separated powers:
The macrodynamics of American policy agendas” Journal of Politics 61: (1) 76_108 FEB 1999
Downs, Anthony. 1972. “Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue Attention Cycle.” Public
Interest 28:38-50.
McCombs, Maxwell, and Donald Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.”
Public Opinion Quarterly 36: 176–87
Neuman, W. Russell. 1990. “The Threshold of Public Attention.” Public Opinion Quarterly 54:
179–96.
WEEK 5: AGENDA SETTING I: Garbage Can Models (9/26)
Kingdon, John W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2d. ed. New York: Harper
Collins. Read all chapters (skim chapters 2 and 3).
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chapter
3. “The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects: Nikoloaos Zahariadis.
M. Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) “The Politics of Presidential Agendas” Political Research Quarterly
58 (2): 257-268 JUN 2005.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1-8, and 12.
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Roger W. Cobb and Marc Howard Ross (eds.) Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1986. “ Garbage Can Models of Decision Making
Organizations” in Roger Weissinger-Baylon Ambiguity and Command Marshfield, MA: Pitman
Publishing.
Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder. "Experimental Demonstrations of the
'Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." In Donald R. Kinder and
Thomas R. Palfrey (eds.) Experimental Foundations of Political Science University of Michigan
Press, pp. 313-331.
Walker, Jack L., Jr. 1977. “Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem
Selection.” British Journal of Political Science 7: 423–45.
James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers. (1996) Communications Concepts 6: Agenda Setting.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hilgartner, Steven, and Charles Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public
Arenas Model”. American Journal of Sociology 94: 53–78.
McCombs, Maxwell, and Jian-Hua Zhu. 1995. “Capacity, Diversity, and Volatility of the Public
Agenda: Trends from 1954 to 1994.” Public Opinion Quarterly 59: 495–525.
WEEK 6: AGENDA SETTING II: Punctuated Equilibrium Models (10/3)
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chapter
6. “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking:
Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policy Making”, True, Jone and Baumgartner.
Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner (2005) The Politics of Attention: How Government
Prioritizes Problems, University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1-7.
Benjamin Cashore and Michael Howlett (2007) “Punctuating Which Equilibrium?
Understanding Thermostatic Policy Dynamics in Pacific Northwest Forestry” American Journal
of Political Science 51(3): 532-551.
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WEEK 7: POLICY ADOPTION: CONGRESS AND PUBLIC POLICY (10/10)
Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner (2005) The Politics of Attention: How Government
Prioritizes Problems, University of Chicago Press, Chapters 8-11.
Ken Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 12.
Andrew D. Martin (2001) “Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers”
American Political Science Review 95: 361-78.
Tim Groseclose and David C. King (2001) “Committee Theories Reconsidered” in Larry Dodd
and Bruce Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered, 7th Edition.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (1994) “Positive Theories of Congressional
Institutions” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19(2):149-179.
Frank Baumgartner, Brian D Jones, and MC MacLeod (2000) “The evolution of legislative
jurisdictions” Journal of Politics 62 (2): 321-349.
Bryan D. Jones, T. Sulkin, HA Larsen (2003) “Policy punctuations in American Political
Institutions” American Political Science Review 97(1): 151-169.
Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner, and Jeffery C. Talbert. (1993) “The Destruction of Issue
Monopolies in Congress.” American Political Science Review 87: 657–71.
Barry R. Weingast, William J. Marshall (1988) “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or,
Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets” The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 96(1): 132_163.
Sarah Binder (2001) “Congress, the Executive, and the Production of Public Policy: United We
Govern?” in Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered, 7th Edition.
Miller, Warren and Donald E. Stokes (1963) “Constituency Influence in Congress” American
Political Science Review 45-56.
James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, Robert S. Erikson (1995) “Dynamic Representation”
American Political Science Review 89(3): 543_565.
Robert Weissberg (1978) Collective v. Dyadic Representation in Congress American Political
Science Review 535-547.
Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Barry R. Weingast (1987) Why Are Congressional
Committees Powerful? (in Controversies) The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No.
3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 929_945.
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Kenneth A. Shepsle, Barry R. Weingast (1987) “The Institutional Foundations of Committee
Power.” The American Political Science Review 81(1): 85_104.
Fiorina, Morris P. and Charles R. Plott. (1978) “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An
Experimental Study.” The American Political Science Review 72(3):575-98.
Week 8: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (10/17)
Michael Hill and Peter L. Hupe (2002) Implementing Public Policy: Governance in Theory and
in Practice Sage Press.
Richard E. Matland (1995) "Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The AmbiguityConflict Model of Policy Implementation", Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory 5(2):145-174.
CF Adams, ME Bell, T Brown (2002) “Building Civic Infrastructure: Implementing community
partnership grant programmes in South Africa” Public Administration and Development 22(4):
293-302.
Kathryn A. McDermott (2006) “Incentives, Capacity, and Implementation: Evidence from
Massachusetts Education Reform,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16:
45-65.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Richard Weatherly & Michael Lipsky (1977) “Street Level Bureaucrats and Institutional
Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform”, Harvard Educational Review. Vol. 47,
pp. 170-196.
Jo Ann G. Ewalt and Edward T. Jennings, Jr. (2006) “Administration, Governance, and Policy
Tools in Welfare Policy Implementation” in Public Administration Review 64(4):449-462.
Metrick, Andrew and Martin L. Weitzman. (1998) “Conflicts and Choices in Biodiversity
Preservation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (Summer): 21-34
Condrey, Stephen E. and Jeffrey L. Brudney (1998) “The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990" American Review of Public Administration 28(1): 26-42.
Steven J. Kelman (1984) "Using Implementation Research to Solve Implementation Problems:
The Case of Energy Emergency Assistance." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Vol.
4(1), pp. 75_91.
Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. (1986) "Policy Recommendations for Multi_Actor Implementation: An
Assessment of the Field" Journal of Public Policy. Vol. 6, pp. 181-210.
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Week 9: BUREAUCRACIES (10/24)
Daniel Carpenter (2005) “The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States” in Joel
D. Aberbach and Mark Peterson, eds., The institutions of American Democracy; The Executive
Branch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Ken Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, Chapter 13.
KJ Meier (1997) “Bureaucracy and democracy: The case for more bureaucracy and less
democracy.” Public Administration Review 57: (3) 193-199 MAY_JUNE 1997.
Terry M. Moe (1985) “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB”
American Political Science Review, 79(4): 1094_1116.
Carpenter, Daniel P. (1996) “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in
Federal Regulation” American Political Science Review 90(2): 283-302.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Scholz JT, Wood BD (1999) “Efficiency, equity and politics: Democratic controls over the tax
collector” American Journal of Political Science 43(4): 1166-1188.
Scholz JT, Wood BD (1998) “Controlling the IRS: Principals, principles, and public
administration” American Journal of Political Science 42(1): 141-162.
Snyder SK, Weingast BR (2000) “The American system of shared powers: The president,
congress, and the NLRB.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16: (2) 269_305 OCT
2000.
M. Weber “Bureaucracy” in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (1946) Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hugh Heclo (1978) "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in A. King (ed.), The
New American Political System. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute.
Evan J. Ringquist (1995) Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39(2): 336_363.
P.R. Schulman, "Non_Incremental Policy Making" American Political Science Review
(December, 1975), pp. 1354_1370.
R. Goodin and I. Waldner (1979) "Thinking Big, Thinking Small, and not Thinking at All",
Public Policy (Winter, 1979), pp. 1_24.
M. Weber, "Legitimate Authority and Bureaucracy", in Organization Theory, D.S. Pugh, Ed.,
1971, pp. 15_29.
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Charles T. Goodsell, The Case For Bureaucracy, 2nd edition, 1985, Chapters 1, 2 and 7, pp.
1_37,139_149.
Jeffrey S. Banks, Barry R. Weingast (1992) The Political Control of Bureaucracies under
Asymmetric Information American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 2. (May, 1992),
pp. 509_524.
Meier KJ, Polinard JL, Wrinkle RD (2000) Bureaucracy and organizational performance:
Causality arguments about public schools American Journal of Political Science 44: (3) 590_602
JUL 2000.
Meier KJ, Wrinkle RD, Polinard JL “Representative bureaucracy and distributional equity:
Addressing the hard question”. Journal of Politics 61: (4) 1025_1039 NOV 1999.
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Week 10: INTEREST GROUPS (10/31)
Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech (1998) Basic Interests Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press. Chapters 1,2, 4-9 (skim chapter 3).
Shepsle & Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, Chapters 8 and 9.
P Burstein, A. Linton (2002) “The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social
movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns”
Social Forces: 81(2): 381-408.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson (2000) “A Nation of Organizers: The
Instiutional Origins of Civic Volunatarism in the United States” American Political Science
Review 94(3): 527-546.
Ken Kollman (1997) “Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and
Congressional Committees” American Journal of Political Science, 41(2): 519_544.
Paul A. Sabatier, John Loomis, Catherine McCarthy (1995) “Hierarchical Controls, Professional
Norms, Local Constituencies, and Budget Maximization: An Analysis of U.S. Forest Service
Planning Decisions”. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 1. (Feb., 1995), pp.
204_242.
Robert Reich (1988) The Power of Public Ideas Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
Introduction, Chapters 1, 2 & 3.
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1965), Chapter 1, pp. 5_52.
Theodore Lowi (1979) The End of Liberalism
Jack L. Walker (1983) “The Origin and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America.” American
Political Science Review 77:390-406.
Keith Hamm (1983) “Patterns of Influence Among Committees, Agencies, and Interest Groups.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 8: 379-426.
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Week 11: ADVOCACY COALITIONS, LONG TERM MODELS and EVALUATION
EFFECTS 11/7
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Chapter 5 “The Network Approach” Silke Adam and Hans Peter Kriesi
Chapter 7 “The advocacy coalition framework: innovation and clarification” / Paul A. Sabatier
and Chris Wieble.
Chapter 8 “Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research” Frances Stokes Berry and
William Berry.
Martin Rein & Sheldon White (1977)"Can Policy Research Help Policy?" The Public Interest
Fall.
Michael Munger (2000) ‘Experts and “Advocacy”: The Limits of Policy Analysis’ in Analyzing
Policy: Choices, Conflicts, and Practices Chapter 5, pp. 134-161.
Tom Lovelace (1998) “The Use and Misuse of Research in Educational Reform” in Brookings
Papers on Education Policy, 1998, Diane Ravitch (ed.). pp.279-317.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Hank Jenkins-Smith (1990) Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis, Chapter 3 especially but
all chapters.
Kevin B. Smith (1997) “Explaining Variation in State-Level Homicide Rates: Does Crime Policy
Pay? Journal of Politics.
L. Vernon Henderson (1996) Effects of Air Quality Regulation American Economic Review.
September.
Peter De Leon (1987) "Policy Termination as a Political Phenomenon" in D.J. Palumbo The
Politics of Program Evaluation. Newbury Park, CA:Sage.
P. Sabatier and D. Mazmanian (1982) "The Delayed Takeoff of Compensatory Education:
Implementing TItle I of ESEA, 1965_78", in Sabatier and Mazmanian, Implementation and
Public Policy, Scott, Foresman, Co. , pp. 175_217.
David Whiteman (1985) "The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional Decision Making:Three
Types of Use in Committees." Western Political Quarterly. Vol. 23: 294_311.
Evan J. Ringquist (1993) “Does Regulation Matter?: Evaluating the Effects of State Air Pollution
Control Programs” Journal of Politics 55(4): 1022-1046.
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Week 12: COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (11/14)
Ken Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, Chapter 15.
Tracy E. George and Lee Epstein (1992) “On The Nature of Supreme Court Decision-Making”
American Political Science Review 86:323-337.
Segal, Jeffrey (1997) “Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts.” American Political Science Review 91(1):28-44.
Gerald N. Rosenberg (1991) The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Chapter 1, pp. 9-36.
Flemming RB, Bohte J, Wood BD (1997) “One voice among many: The Supreme Court's
influence on attentiveness to issues in the United States, 1947-92” American Journal of Political
Science 41: (4) 1224-1250.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Gerald N. Rosenberg (1991) The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Additional chapters.
Lawrence Baum (1990) “Appellate Courts as Policy Makers” In L. Baum (1990) American
Courts: Process and Policy Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Raoul Berger (1997) Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the 14th Amendment
Liberty Fund Inc.
Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth (1996) “The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices American Journal of Political Science 971-1003.
Gregory Caldeira and John R. Wright (1988) “Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the
U.S. Supreme Court” American Political Science Review.
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Week 13: Political Economy I: Institutional Rational Choice (11/28)
Paul A. Sabatier (1999) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1999.
Chapter 2: Institutional rational choice: an assessment of the institutional analysis and
development framework / Elinor Ostrom.
Elinor Ostrom 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shepsle & Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, Chapter 10.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Ostrom, E., J. M. Walker, and R. Gardner. 1992. "Covenants with and without a sword: Selfgovernance is possible." American Political Science Review 86: 404-417.
Palfrey, Thomas R. 1993. "The Conflict Between Private Interests and the Common Good." In
Donald R. Kinder and Thomas R. Palfrey (eds.) Experimental Foundations of Political Science
University of Michigan Press, pp. 211-219.
Dawes, Robyn M., John M. Orbell, Randy T. Simmons, and Alphons J. C. van de Kragt.
"Organizing Groups for Collective Action." In Donald R. Kinder and Thomas R. Palfrey (eds.)
Experimental Foundations of Political Science University of Michigan Press, pp. 245-263.
van Dijk, Eric and Henk Wilke. (1995) "Coordination Rules in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas:
A Comparison between Public Good Dilemmas and Resource Dilemmas." Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 31: 1-27.
Wilson, Rick K. and Jane Sell. 1997. “‘Liar, Liar ...’ Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated
Public Goods Settings.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (5): 695-717.
Orbell, John M., Alphons J. C. van de Kragt, and Robyn M. Dawes. 1988. “Explaining
Discussion-Induced Cooperation” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54: 811-819.
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Week 14: Public Policy: Summation and Model Overviews (12/05)
Cardenas, JC and Elinor Ostrom (2004) “What do people bring into the game? Experiments in
the field about cooperation in the commons.” Agricultural Systems 82(3): 307-326.
Paul A. Sabatier (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1999.
Chapters 9, 10, 11. Large-N Comparative Studies, Comparative Assessments of Policy Theories,
Fostering the Development of Policy Theory.
Shepsle & Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, Chapters 16 and 17.
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