Olivier Tschannen
Université de Fribourg
Switzerland
A HISTORY OF THE SECULARIZATION ISSUE
Original unpublished English version
of the book published in French under the title
Les théories de la sécularisation, Genève: Droz, 1992
Written at the University of Wisconsin at Madison
1989-1990
Olivier Tschannen, Université de Fribourg / Suisse
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
2
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this study is to provide a sociologically informed history of
the secularization issue as is has been discussed among sociologists. The implications of
this formulation are threefold. First, this is a study in the history of ideas. It is not a
discussion of the problem of religion in the modern world. Nor is it a defense, a
refutation, or even an evaluation of the validity of "secularization theory". Although the
analysis sometimes uncovers the weaknesses or strengths of certain theories, and does
occasionally reflect on their relation to empirical data, this is done only incidentally.
Furthermore, even though I do dismiss claims put forward by certain theories, this is done
only from the point of view of the history of ideas. Certain theories in effect present
themselves as almost revolutionary, whereas in reality, they contain nearly nothing new.
Claims of this sort have to be dismissed.
Second, the history presented here is sociologically informed. An interpretation
can be properly understood only if the social background in which it plunges its roots is
taken into account. Accordingly, as far as this was possible, I have written a history not
only of ideas, but of the persons who put forward these ideas, and of the social contexts,
in particular the scholarly communities, in which these persons were embedded. But
perhaps more significantly, the whole account given here is organized according to a
sociological conception of sociological theory. This conception is not normative, but
descriptive: it does not tell us what sociological theory ought to be, but rests content with
an empirical description of a particular type of theory construction. Specifically, I will be
arguing that the recurrent emphasis on theory-construction in sociology is exaggerated;
that the sociological enterprise - at least as exemplified by the secularization issue - rests
not so much on formal theories and definitions, but on simple analogies and examples. In
other words, this book is not only a contribution to the history of sociology, but also to
the sociology of intellectual knowledge.
Third, the focus of this study is on sociological theories. The numerous
theological and philosophical implications of secularization are only briefly touched
upon. Unlike the great majority of sociologists who concern themselves with religion, I
have no personal religious commitment. However, I am not an atheist, nor even a very
systematic agnostic. As a matter of fact, until I started this work, I had never been
interested in religion - not even from an academic viewpoint. The original incentive for
this work was an interest in what Berger and Luckmann have called the social
construction of reality - a topic that can, but need not, be discussed with reference to
religion. In carrying out the research, I have remained faithful to this initial commitment
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
3
to sociology as a frame of reference. Accordingly, if this book can claim to contribute to
anything besides a better knowledge of the history of secularization theory, it is not to our
knowledge of religion in the modern world, but to our understanding of the sociological
enterprise.
Of course, these considerations do not suffice as yet to delineate my field of
investigation. For it is not immediately clear what is to be understood under the
"secularization issue". The notion of secularization can be defined in a number of ways
and, no matter which definition one adopts, one finds that some authors speak of
"secularization" without ever using the word, while others use the word while actually
speaking of something else. Accordingly, any investigation in the history of this issue
must rest on two preliminary decisions. The first is the definition of secularization. For
reasons that will become evident in the course of this study, I will consider that a
secularization theory is a body of propositions that gives an account of the situation of
religion in the modern world, and that describes the evolution which led to this situation.
The second decision concerns the fate of all uses of the term "secularization" that are not
consistent with the chosen definition. Strictly speaking, they could be ignored. But this
would greatly restrict the significance of the findings. Typically, debates among
sociologists are defined by the addition of a problematic and of a term. Experience shows
that, even though some uses of a term are irrelevant to a given problematic, they still
impose themselves upon the discussion. Accordingly, this study is focused on the
sociological theories that concern the situation of religion in the modern world (although
some of these are not designated as "secularization theories"), but will not neglect uses of
the term "secularization" which should in principle not concern this problematic.
Throughout this historical investigation, I will be arguing that the meaning of a
text cannot be properly understood if one ignores the intentions of its author. As the same
principle applies to the present text, it is only fair that I should outline what were my own
intentions in writing it. This is especially important since these intentions might easily be
misinterpreted, which might in turn give rise to a biased reading of the present book. As I
do not spare my criticisms against certain facile and superficial reproaches addressed to
"secularization theory", some readers might be tempted to conclude that my main
intention has been to defend and rehabilitate the "secularization thesis". Nothing could be
further from the truth. Not only because I am not very deeply involved personally in the
secularization issue. But, more significantly, because my intention when I started this
work was exactly the opposite. As the original dissertation proposal out of which this
book grew testifies, one of my intentions was to demonstrate that secularization theory
was nothing but a modern myth, or ideology of modernity - not that I had any personal
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
4
reasons to dislike "secularization theory" (I did not really know it); but this approach
appeared to me a convenient way to address the problematic which I was interested in:
the social construction of reality. At the beginning of my research, I had been very taken
in by certain criticisms of "secularization theory", and eagerly set out to uncover the
mythical aspects contained in it. I hoped to be able to show that, in modern societies,
sociology had taken over the role once played by religion in the construction of a coherent
cosmos. However, very much to my dismay, the more I read the works of modern
proponents of the "secularization thesis", the less I found reason to consider them
ideological. During a few months, I felt that I would be unable to live up to the intention
encapsulated in my dissertation proposal, and that I would have to abandon the whole
enterprise. But I pressed on, and in doing so, my intention drastically altered. My aim was
no longer to show that secularization theorists were wrong, but only to find a way to
reorient my dissertation! Eventually, I found a solution to my dilemma: The people who
considered secularization theory mythical were wrong, and I had been tricked by them,
but at least, I felt that I was able to explain why. Not only why they were wrong
(factually), but what, in the history of the field, helped explain why they had come to hold
these opinions. And the only way to succeed in explaining this was in giving as complete
as possible an account of the genesis of "modern secularization theory". Such, I feel, is
the intention that lies behind my enterprise.
The main sources used for this history are the usual written ones: books, scattered
articles, main journals in the sociology of religion, textbooks, acts of conferences,
bulletins of professional associations, and the Social Science Citation Index. But an
additional and very valuable source was provided by a series of formal and informal
discussions with specialists in the field as well as with some other sociologists and
theologians. The formal part of the investigation included twenty tape-recorded
interviews with sociologists of religion, carried out in the framework of international
conferences. I have made no systematic content analysis of these interviews, but have
used them freely to bolster my understanding of the problem at hand. Some of the
information obtained in this way is very personal - and sometimes polemical - and could
not be printed, but used only as background. Some blunt remarks made during the
interviews had to be revised afterwards to allow for publication (but this is always
indicated). In most cases, however, quotations from the interviews have been directly
integrated in the text or in the footnotes.
The most difficult and painful (as well as exhilarating) phase in any research is the
entry into a completely new and unknown field. In this research, I have repeatedly had to
immerse myself into unfamiliar areas of knowledge and foreign intellectual communities.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
5
These adventures would have been impossible without the help and the support of people
familiar with these topics and at home in these social circles. The first incentive to study
the subject of secularization came from my dissertation supervisor, Giovanni Busino, in
long and repeated discussions over lunch. Without his help, I would never have been able
to transform the vague problematic that interested me into a concrete research. And, I
might add, without his advice and his tolerant attitude all along my endeavor, I might
have abandoned the enterprise altogether.
As a result of the choice of secularization as a topic, the next step was the
familiarization with religion as a subject of research. I was helped in this by my colleague
Maya Burger, with whom I attended a very enlightening seminar on the history of religion
given by Carl Keller. At a later stage, I received support and advice from a number of
theologians and sociologists who had more intimate contact than I with religion, most
notably Shaffique Keshavjee, Bernard Raymond, Richard Schoenherr, Jacques
Waardenburg, and a number of participants in the Séminaire romand de troisième cycle
de théologie. While in the United States, I took advantage of the religious pluralism
prevalent in this country to attend a number of religious services in different
congregations. I hope that, through these contacts, I have been able to develop a certain
measure of empathy for the religious experience.
The next step was to penetrate into the international community of researchers in
religion. I was greatly helped in this by Roland Campiche, then Secretary General of the
Conférence Internationale de Sociologie des Religions. He proposed that I conduct a
series of interviews to gain greater insight into the social processes behind the scene, an
idea that had a great impact on my research. Further familiarization was made possible
through participation in major international conferences on the sociology of religion: the
CISR meetings in Tübingen and Helsinki, the meeting of the Comité de recherche
sociologie de la religion of the AISLF in Geneva, the SSSR meeting in Salt Lake City,
and the ASR meeting in Washington D.C.
When I was ready to start writing the dissertation out of which this monograph
grew, I moved to the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where I benefited from support
and friendly criticism. Charles Camic introduced me to the world of Quentin Skinner, and
helped me tremendously all along by sharing with me his experience in writing
intellectual history and his knowledge of American sociology. Warren Hagstrom guided
my steps in my investigations into the sociology of science, and drew my attention to
many a point I had overlooked in my utilization of the works of Thomas Kuhn and others.
Joyce Sexton, from the Writing Lab, assisted me very efficiently in dealing with my
difficulties with the English language and in my search for a more concise and precise
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
6
style. I have also benefited much from exchanges in a seminar on the history of social
science directed by Victor Hilts (department of history of science), and from discussions
in an informal seminar with other dissertators: Su-Jen Huang, Steven Lybrand, and
Richard Randell. Other friends and advisors have read my papers and helped me with
their comments. I am grateful especially to Pierre Ammann, Godehard Baeck, Alexander
Bergmann, Meerten ter Borg, Claudia Dubuis, Robert Alun Jones, Franco Panese, JeanPierre Sironneau, Laurent Thévoz, and Stephen Warner.
In addition to providing support and advice, several of the persons mentioned
above have read and thoroughly criticized hundreds of pages of the working papers and
drafts out of which this manuscript grew. That their name should be mentioned twice is
by no means excessive. The final form of this study owes much to the constructive
criticism of the members of the dissertation committee and of my advisors in Madison:
Giovanni Busino, Karel Dobbelaere, Pierre Gisel, René Lévy, Charles Camic, Warren
Hagstrom, Richard Lachmann, and Richard Schoenherr. To all of them, I wish to express
my warmest thanks for their prolonged and patient effort, and my regrets for not always
having been able to improve this study along the lines they had suggested.
Finally, I am very grateful to the twenty persons who took one or two hours from
their time in Lausanne, Geneva, Konstanz, Helsinki, and Salt Lake City for interviews:
Yoshiya Abe, Eileen Barker, Jim Beckford, Roland Campiche, Karel Dobbelaere,
Richard Fenn, Antonio Grumelli, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Christian Lalive d'Epinay, Leo
Laeyendecker, Thomas Luckmann, Emile Poulat, José Prades, Jean Rémy, Roland
Robertson, Wade Clark Roof, Jean Séguy, Liliane Voyé, Jean-Paul Willaime, and Bryan
Wilson.
This research would not have been possible without the support of a number of
institutions. The Department of Sociology of the University of Wisconsin at Madison
invited me to be an Honorary Fellow for two years (fall 1989-fall 1991), during which I
enjoyed the most nearly perfect conditions I could hope for to write this study. Adequate
financial support was provided by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Commission
de la recherche de Lausanne), the Fondation du 450e anniversaire de l'Université de
Lausanne, the Fondation Van Walsem, the Société Académique Vaudoise, and the Faculté
des Sciences Sociales et Politiques de l'Université de Lausanne.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
7
CHAPTER 1
SECULARIZATION THEORY IN A KUHNIAN PERSPECTIVE
Since Max Weber at least, sociologists have been aware that the objects of
scientific enquiry are not simply given, but must be constructed, and that this can be done
only at the cost of what French sociologists call an epistemological break (Bourdieu et al.
1968, pp. 27-34; pp. 51-54), that is, a break with the common, socially given, perception.
But when they turn to studying their own discipline, sociologists often fall back to a more
comfortable position. They accept, as would-be "external" observers, the understanding of
the field which they have as insiders. In other words, they take their familiarity with
sociology as practitioners as sufficient to allow them to dispense with the usual
epistemological standards. In historical investigations, this attitude often results in
"presentism", that is, a reduction of past theoretical preoccupations to those current in the
discipline at the time of the analysis (Jones 1977).
Nothing is more revealing of this situation than the usual approaches to
"secularization theory". Sociologists who investigate this field never construct
"secularization theory" as an object: they consider it as given1. But, as disagreements and
divergences among them show, in reality there is no such pre-defined object as "modern
secularization theory". Indeed, the very definition of "secularization theory" is itself part
of the secularization debate.
Secularization as a Theory
The debate about secularization is twofold. Not only do sociologists debate about
whether secularization has happened or not; they also debate over the question whether
"secularization theory" exists or not, and what this theory exactly is. This second aspect
of the debate is just as important as the first one. As Pierre Bourdieu has shown in La
distinction (1979), scientific definitions of reality must always be situated in a social
field. This is true not only for concepts like "class", which seek to account for "social
reality" through theories, but also for meta-discursive concepts, which seek to describe
these theories themselves. The different definitions of the field of "secularization theory"
given by different actors in the social field of sociology cannot be reduced to purely
methodological or theoretical divergences: in Bourdieu's terminology, they must also be
1
At least seven different attempts at providing a general overview of the "secularization thesis" have been
made: Shiner 1967, Lauwers 1973, Rosanna 1973, Glasner 1977, Coleman 1978, Roggero 1979,
Dobbelaere 1981.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
8
understood as efforts in the struggle for the monopoly of symbolic violence inside of the
field (1976, pp. 113-20).
To illustrate: Criticisms against "the secularization thesis" are sometimes based on
the contention that the concept of secularization is unclear, that the theory is
contradictory, incomplete, indeed inexistent. Thus for instance Jeffrey Hadden (a critic of
"secularization theory") contends that secularization is "a hodgepodge of loosely
employed ideas rather than a systematic theory", and that "the theory has not been
systematically stated" (1987, pp. 598-99). To this charge, Frank Lechner (a defender of
"secularization theory") answers that "by strongly positivist criteria, it is hard to see what
current sociological 'theories' in any domain would pass muster. [...] It is no longer clear,
if it ever was, what qualifies as theory in sociology". However, he goes on to comment,
"even by Hadden's standards there is a body of work that deserves to be called
secularization theory" (1990, p. ?).
I am not very interested, at this particular point, in taking position in this debate
(for a discussion, see chap. 13). It will suffice, for our purposes, to note that in the dispute
over secularization, "secularization theory" is at stake just as much as "secularization" as
such, and that there is no agreement as to what that theory is.
But - if we provisionally accept Hadden's point of view - does the absence of a
unified theory really mean that there is no "secularization thesis"? The ambiguities
displayed in the position of Hadden - who contends that there is no theory, but at the
same time proceeds to show that the theory is wrong2 (1987, pp. 598-99) - are a clear sign
that the two things are quite distinct. For the absence of a unified theory does not prevent
sociologists from doing research, writing books and articles, and even from obtaining
certain results. Consideration of our discipline as a whole suggests that unified theories
are by no means always necessary - nor even very helpful, as some famous examples
should remind us.
It is indeed curious that so many sociologists should have spent so much time and
energy classifying secularization theories in a seemingly desperate attempt to discover the
underlying unifying theory. I would contend that these efforts can at least partially be
explained by an overestimation of the importance of theory induced by an obsolete
philosophy of science. For in research on secularization as in most other sub-sectors of
the discipline, formal theory plays only a minor role in conducting research. In fact, for
2
This contradiction struck me the first time I read this article, but it has also been noticed by other persons,
for instance Frank Lechner, who remarked upon it during the discussion following the presentation of his
paper (Lechner 1990; this paper was first presented at the 1989 meeting of the Society for the Scientific
Study of Religion in Salt Lake City).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
9
every new research, sociologists take bits and pieces from different theories, and
assemble them eclectically.
I would therefore suggest that a more useful way of looking at the whole
secularization issue would be to take into account the developments that have occurred in
the philosophy of science with the transition from Popper (1934) to Kuhn (1962). This
will induce us to stop looking for a unified theory which apparently isn't there, and to
consider instead that secularization is a paradigm. The test of the usefulness of thinking
in terms of paradigm will have been passed with success if it can be shown that this
approach allows us to make sense of the material which is the matter for discussion, and
thus to find a way out of the blind alley in which so many authors got stuck when they
tried to clarify "secularization theory".
One of the most interesting consequences of the approach in terms of paradigm, as
will be shown, is that even sociologists who appear to completely disagree (for instance
Stark and Wilson; see chap. 13) in reality operate strictly within the same paradigm, and
that their squabbles are nothing more than what Thomas Kuhn calls "mopping-up
operations" (1962, p. 24), by which new elements - in the case of Stark and Wilson, the
rise of the new religious movements - are made to fit into the paradigm.
Secularization as a Paradigm
In applying the idea of paradigm to the secularization issue, I will adapt somewhat
loosely Kuhn's schema (1962), together with the re-reading proposed by Margaret
Masterman (1970). In the Kuhn-Masterman model of science, a paradigm can be roughly
characterized as follows. First, as Masterman explains, a paradigm is something "which
can function when the theory is not there" (1970, p. 66). It is not a theory, but an entity
which consists of at least three distinct elements: 1) a set of philosophical or metaphysical
assumptions; 2) a set of universally recognized scientific achievements, which are
translated into a set of scientific habits; 3) artefacts that can be used as puzzle-solving
devices (1970, pp. 65-69). In the 1969 postscript to his Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn reacted positively to Masterman's reinterpretation of his concept, and
proposed to distinguish between two main meanings of the term paradigm: 1) "the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given
community"; 2) "one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions
which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the
solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" (1969, p. 175). Kuhn thus agrees
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
10
with Masterman that a paradigm is not a theory, but a complex structure that includes
what might be called a supra-theoretical, as well as an infra-theoretical level.
Second, if it is true that a paradigm contains a very abstract as well as a very
concrete level, the latter is much more central to the Kuhnian conception. Although this
did not appear very clearly in the 1962 Structure, Kuhn has since become quite explicit
on this point: "The paradigm as shared example is the central element of what I now take
to be the most novel and least understood aspect of this book" (1969, p. 187).
Third, the main function of the central device at the infra-theoretical level, the
shared example, or exemplar, is to socialize the new student into the discipline (1969,
pp. 187-89). This aspect of the Kuhnian approach has been best illustrated by Barry
Barnes. "Kuhn considers a boy taking a walk with his father, in the course of which he
will learn something of the different kinds of birds. We are to imagine that the child can
already recognize birds, including some specific kinds of them; on the walk he will learn
to recognize the hitherto unknown kinds, ducks, geese and swan. The child's father, who
can be taken as a source of the accepted usage of his community, teaches that usage to the
child by ostension. He points to particular birds and names them, say, as swans. When the
child in his turn points to birds and identifies them as swans, the father confirms the
identification, or rejects it: 'No, that's a goose'. Having seen a number of cited instances of
'swan', 'goose' and 'duck', and having himself practiced their identification under the
guidance of his parent, the child becomes himself competent in identifying the three
different kinds of bird. At this point the instruction is completed; the child knows the
three kinds of bird" (1982, p. 23). Likewise, in the education of the would-be scientist,
instruction relies not so much on formal definitions as on concrete examples of past
scientific achievements. Learning is based on ostension.
Fourth, unlike a theory - which can be produced by any solitary thinker - a
paradigm must be shared by an existing scientific community in order to exist at all
(Kuhn 1969, p. 176). Paradigms are the result of a struggle among different groups of
scientists or scholars over the cognitive models (or exemplars) that shape scientific
activity. And a new paradigm can be considered to have been established only when it is
routinely employed by a concrete community of researchers as a guide for the solving of
the day-to-day puzzles occuring in normal science. These communities are not to be
confused with the discipline as a whole. Kuhn speaks of communities of "perhaps one
hundred members" (1969, p. 178), and Eckberg and Hill draw from his writings the
conclusion that these communities are sub-specialities. Paradigms are never disciplinewide (Eckberg and Hill 1979, p. 929). Let us briefly note that, due to the increasing
division of sociology into myriads of sub-specialities (Collins 1986, p. 1340), the notion
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
11
that a paradigm concerns only a small group of specialists and not the whole discipline
has become even more relevant today than it was when Kuhn was writing his Structure.
Finally, the dominance of a new paradigm must be linked to a revolution.
Needless to say, revolutions are not as violent in science as they are in politics. Yet they
involve a certain measure of social conflict. On the one hand, Kuhn's thinking on
scientific revolutions is definitely internalist: The factors that provoke the overthrow of
one paradigm and the acceptance of another are internal to the logic of science. The main
factor in this process is the accumulation of anomalies (Kuhn 1962, pp. 52-65). But on
the other hand, Kuhn also acknowledges that a scientific revolution cannot be brought
about without a change of personnel. To illustrate this, he approvinlgy quotes Max
Planck: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation
grows up that is familiar with it" (quoted in 1962, p. 151). Why is that so? Paradigm
changes are "changes of world views". Such changes are extremely difficult from a
cognitive point of view. Thus for example, "contemplating a falling stone, Aristotle saw a
change of state rather than a process" (1962, p. 124). It is doubtful whether any of us
moderns can really contemplate a falling stone with Aristotle's eyes. Accordingly, "the
competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs"
(1962, p. 94). For this reason, it is often only the younger generation in a scientific
community that accepts a new paradigm. Thus, all things considered, there are many
similarities between scientific and political revolutions (1962, p. 94). In political
revolutions, one must finally "resort to the techniques of mass persuasion, often including
force" (1962, p. 93). Although Kuhn does not explicitly say so, it cannot be excluded that
the same should apply, in certain cases, to the realm of science. And, I would like to add,
this is all the more likely in the social sciences (especially in a field so emotionally
charged as the study of religion), where one's world view almost necessarily influences
one's scientific work.
The approach to the notion of paradigm just outlined is, I believe, faithful to the
Kuhnian model. As a result, it is radically at odds with the reading of Kuhn most usual in
the sociology of sociology. It is at odds, in particular, with one of the most well-known of
these readings, that of Robert Friedrichs (1970). The approach proposed by Friedrichs and
others - which, I should hasten to say, I do not think wrong, but only very un-Kuhnian has been adopted by most sociologists. Of particular interest to us is the fact that it has
been adopted by Karel Dobbelaere, the best expert on "secularization theory" as well as
its most successful systematizer. According to this analysis, different secularization
theories can be classified according to the paradigm on which they are based (Dobbelaere
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
12
1984). Following George Ritzer (1975), Dobbelaere broadly distinguishes between the
"social facts" and the "social definition" paradigms. Which (Dobbelaere's denial
notwithstanding3) is a mere variation on the old distinction between the Weberian and the
Durkheimian lines of analysis, that is, between two "general sociological orientations", as
Merton much more aptly calls them (1968, pp. 141-43).
Thus for Dobbelaere as well as for Firedrichs and Ritzer, a paradigm is a general
orientation to sociological research based on a set of meta-theoretical assumptions. If one
wishes to remain within a Kuhnian framework, several reasons militate against this use of
the notion of paradigm. First, if the Weberian and the Durkheimian approaches, being
grounded in existing scientific communities, loosely organized around the Archiv für
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in one case and around the Année Sociologique in
the other, could perhaps be considered as paradigms at the beginning of this century4,
they can no longer be considered as such today. For, even if one is reluctant to follow
Parson's "convergence thesis", or if one is not convinced by Berger and Luckmann's effort
to bridge the two approaches, sociologists today very rarely fit exclusively into either of
these two tendencies. Modern sociology has reached a point where the two approaches
have somehow been eclectically combined. This view is confirmed by the difficulties into
which Dobbelaere runs in his attempt. Having classified both Berger and Luckmann in
the "social definition" paradigm, and finding that they both use the terms "private sphere"
and "public sphere" as "objective structural elements of society" (1984, p. 207), he
concludes that they have failed to live up to their own definition5. But to say this is to
ignore that Berger and Luckmann's aim is precisely to bridge the two approaches. Of
course, Dobbelaere is aware of this - he refers to this attempt by citing the Social
Construction on p. 206 - but explains that, in his article, he refers only to the parts of the
3
Dobbelaere argues that he is not discussing the Durkheimian paradigm, because "sociologists using a
Durkheimian approach rather reject the process of secularization" (1984, p. 201). This is true with respect
to Durkheim's theory of religion, but not with respect to his general methodological orientation. In reality,
Dobbelaere's discussion unwittingly includes the Durkheimian paradigm, as is clear from Ritzer's definition,
which he follows. Ritzer distinguishes his two "paradigms" in the following way: "While the social factist
studies social facts as coercive on man, the phenomenological sociologist studies how men engage in the
process of creating the maintaining social facts that are coercive on him" (quoted in Dobbelaere 1984,
p. 205). Which is exactly what separates the "Durkheimian" from the "Weberian" lines of analysis, which
Berger and Luckmann attempt to bridge: "How is it possible that human activity (Handeln) should produce
a world of things (choses)?" (Berger and Luckmann 1966a, p. 30). Indeed, Ritzer's presentation of the
"social facts paradigm" is based on Durkheim's definition of "facts" (Ritzer 1975, p. 36), and his
presentation of the "social definition paradigm" is based on Weber's definition of social action (1975, p.
84).
4
But even this must be questioned: it is clear that both of these approaches are much more complex and
subtle than is implied by Ritzer's, or by Berger and Luckmann's definitions.
5
"By using 'social definitions' as if they were 'social facts', that is to say, as social entities, they made a
switch of paradigms which distorts their analysis and which is totally misleading" (1984, p. 207).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
13
work of these authors which are relevant for secularization theory. Is this procedure
legitimate? I think not: Authors do not write their different books in water-tight
compartments, but there is always a great degree of continuity in their writings.
Second, by taking into account only the most abstract - and least significant - level
in the Kuhnian paradigm, this approach totally bypasses the fundamental innovation
brought about by the Kuhnian approach (Masterman 1970, p. 71; Eckberg and Hill 1979).
The fact that different theories are grounded in different preconceptions can hardly be
denied, but misses Kuhn's main point. The interest of his approach is that it teaches us
that science does not function as its legislators, for example Popper (1934), would have it.
Science is not based so much on the hypothesis-falsification cycle as on the routine
solving of puzzles on the basis of exemplars. I intend to show that the same applies to
sociology, and that this point of view results in a better understanding of the
secularization issue.
It is my contention that, if there are any paradigms in modern sociology, they are
to be found around specific sets of problems, through a combination of different "general
sociological orientations". I consider that "secularization" must not be considered as
grounded in different paradigms, but that "secularization" itself is a paradigm. Now this is
an ambitious claim, that needs to be substantiated. Specifically, I must show how I can
justify the application to sociology of a concept developed by Kuhn for the understanding
of the natural sciences. If sociologists have always avoided applying the infra-theoretical
part of Kuhn's argument to sociology, is it not precisely because it cannot be applied to it,
or to any of the social sciences? This raises the question of the differences between the
natural and the social sciences. I will be as brief as possible in addressing this thorny
issue.
My use of Kuhn's model is based on the assumption that there are important
similarities between the natural and the social sciences. Which does not mean that the
social sciences are coming ever closer to an ideal hypothetico-deductive model, embodied
in the natural sciences. Quite the contrary. The similarity lies in the fact that, all things
considered, in their actual functioning, the natural sciences are not so different from the
social sciences. The very revolution brought about by Kuhn must be understood in this
sense. By showing the importance of world-views, socialization processes and power
struggles, Kuhn has to a large extent demystified the natural sciences. This tendency has
recently been pushed even further by the proponents of the "strong program" in the
sociology of science (Bloor 1976). Latour and Woolgar's analysis (1979), for instance,
brings to light many similarities in the ways the natural and the social sciences actually
function. In both, persuasion and personal credibility play an important role. In both,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
14
"facts" are socially constructed. This is not to deny, of course, that the techniques used
differ very widely. But the cognitive and the social processes involved are very similar.
Now, if these similarities warrant the use of the paradigm concept in sociology,
the very important technical and epistemological differences necessitate some caution in
the application of the model. The central idea underlying my attempt is that what I call a
paradigm in sociology fulfills the same social and cognitive functions a paradigm fulfills
in the natural sciences. To bring out this fundamental parallel, I will discuss three
important characteristics that serve to define the Kuhnian paradigm: the notion that a
paradigm is a shared example, the puzzle-solving function of the paradigm, and the
existence of a research tradition.
To repeat, according to Kuhn, the most important element of a paradigm is the
exemplar, or shared example. As an illustration, he gives Newton's Second Law of
Motion, where the force is equal to the mass, multiplied by the acceleration (f=ma). This
law is used as a model that can be applied analogically to a number of situations. As
Kuhn explains, "it is not quite the case that logical and mathematical manipulations are
applied directly to f=ma. That expression proves on examination to be a law-sketch or
law-schema". In different situations, f=ma will be translated into formulas which, for the
layman, have very little in common with the original exemplar, and which are not simply
deduced from it through mathematical manipulations. What, then, is the function of the
"law", if it is not directly applicable? As mentioned above, such exemplars play an
important role in the socialization process of the future scientist: "The student discovers,
with or without the assistance of the instructor, a way to see his problem as like a problem
he has already encountered. [...] The law-sketch, say f=ma, has functioned as a tool,
informing the student what similarities to look for, signaling the gestalt in which the
situation is to be seen" (1969, p. 189).
Let us now examine an example drawn from sociology. The general context is no
longer the relationship between force, mass and acceleration, but the relationship between
religion and social change. Suppose an instructor in an introductory sociology course
wants to make clear to his students that religion is not always a conservative force. He
might choose among a variety of historical examples to make his case. But most likely he
will take this opportunity to present Weber's Protestant Ethic (as he will have to present it
anyway - it is on the curriculum). The core of the analysis presented in the Protestant
Ethic is not much more difficult to grasp or to memorize than f=ma: To relieve the
unbearable psychological stress put on him by the question Am I predestinated or not?,
the puritan subjected himself to a rigorous work and life ethic, the practical results of
which he then took as a sign of divine grace, which in turn relieved his psychological
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
15
anxieties. This example of an unintended consequence of a theological system has
roughly the same function as f=ma in the socialization process of the sociologist. It can
be applied analogically to many situations where the problem of theodicy has a practical
impact on social life through the mediation of psychological processes. Pondering over
this example, the student will discover that a number of situations, which were until then
unrelated in his mind, possess striking similarities. As a result of this, he will probably be
able to generate some "original" answers of his own to the problem of the relationship
between religion and social change when the time has come for him to write his exam.
At this point, it is probably necessary to briefly discuss the distinction that must be
made between an exemplar and a concept. In the course of this study, I will for example
be asserting that, in Parsons' theory of evolution, one encounters the differentiation
exemplar (see chap. 10 and 12). This needs clarification. Surely, in Parsons' framework,
differentiation is not a mere exemplar, but a concept. I do not wish to contest this. What,
then, is the difference between an exemplar and a concept, and why do I reduce the
concepts I encounter to the level of exemplars? I would contend that an exemplar
becomes a concept when it is: 1) formally defined; 2) coherently integrated into a
theoretical framework. Now, in some cases (Parsons' being the clearest exemple), this
actually happens. But in some other cases, it does not. Differentiation is certainly not a
concept in Richard Fenn's theory. It is never defined (nor even designated as
"differentiation"), and its integration in the theoretical framework is rather approximative
(see chap. 12).
Under these circumstances, why refuse to distinguish between exemplar and
concept? Because, at the analytical level at which I am working, this distinction is
immaterial. All concepts - even Parsons' - are based on exemplars, as is demonstrated
most evidently by the fact that Parsons' formal definitions generally only make sense to
the reader once they have been explained with reference to a concrete example6. (As a
matter of fact, it is the very rarity of examples in Parsons' prose that renders it so
unintelligible.) As I am working at the paradigmatic level - the only level that truly allows
us to compare the different theories - I need not concern myself with concepts.
The second important element of the Kuhnian paradigm I will discuss is the
puzzle-generating and puzzle-solving function. The main problem in the comparison
between the natural and the social sciences again lies in the technical differences between
them. I will directly turn to what I consider a good example of a puzzle in sociology of
6
This is best illustrated by Charles W. Mills' famous "translation" of Parsons' Social System (1959, pp. 2733).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
16
religion: the "American paradox". This paradox, as it has been expressed by Will
Herberg, is that "America seems to be at once the most religious and the most secular of
nations" (1955, p. 3). Now this is probably not a puzzle exactly in the same sense as in the
natural sciences. But it is a puzzle, and moreover, an empirical puzzle: it concerns
discrepancies in the assertions made by Americans in answer to survey questions. As
Herberg explains: "When asked 'Would you say your religious beliefs have any effect on
your ideas of politics and business?', a majority of the same Americans who had testified
that they regarded religion as 'very important' answered that their religious beliefs had no
real effects on their ideas or conduct in these decisive areas of everyday life" (1955, p.
73). This puzzle can be solved by different devices. Herberg's answer is that "the
American Way of Life is the operative faith of the American people" (1955, p. 75; see
chap. 10). Thomas Luckmann's is that religion in America has become "internally
secularized" (Luckmann 1967, p. 37; see chap. 12). Now what is really important to note
is that these two complementary answers both fit into the framework provided by the
secularization paradigm (as I will describe it in chap. 4). People working in the preparadigmatic phase would have been hard put to solve this puzzle - if they had formulated
it at all. As we can see, even if the solutions are given conceptually rather than in the form
of mathematical models and/or of technical artefacts, there are puzzles in sociology, and
these puzzles can best be solved in the framework provided by a paradigm.
The third important element in the Kuhnian paradigm is the existence of a
research tradition. Eckberg and Hill (1979, p. 935) express the view that few such
traditions exist in sociology. This may be true, but I would like to argue that, in the case
of secularization, there is indeed an important research tradition, which is grounded in
Weber's Protestant Ethic (1904-05), and has produced such fundamental reassessments as
Lenski's Religious Factor (1962), and Berger's Sacred Canopy (1967). But what is the
precise nature of this traditional link? Does it follow from the fact that a paradigm
contains concrete examples embedded in a research tradition that the scientific
achievement must remain tied to the context of its production? In other words, if
"rationalization" is considered an examplar, or recognized scientific achievement (see
chapter 4), does this imply that the sociologist who uses it today must refer to Weber and
to the context in which Weber used it? The answer to that question is by no means clear
from an examination of Kuhn's writings. Presumably, every student knows that f=ma is a
Newtonian formula, but how much does he know about what this formula really meant to
Newton, and about the context of its production?
My own answer to this question is that the more widely a scientific achievement is
recognized, the more likely it is that the context in which it was produced gets forgotten.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
17
The exemplar may, or may not, remain attached to its inventor's name - this consideration
does not seem to be very important. What seems more important is the broader context
surrounding the invention. Latour and Woolgar have shown how "statements" (which can
be more or less plausible, and are subjected to a constant process of reevaluation in an
agonistic field) are transformed into "facts" (the only difference between a statement and
a fact being that the latter is no longer contested, and that it is taken for granted as
representing some reality which is "out there"). In this process, the most dramatic
transformation occurs when someone is able to produce evidence that will dramatically
improve the plausibility of a given statement (such as: "TRF is Pyro-Glu-His-Pro-NH2";
Latour and Woolgar 1977, p. 147), pushing it beyond the point at which it becomes a
"fact". At that moment, Latour and Woolgar tell us, the whole context in which the fact
was constructed - the polemics that surrounded it, the technical conditions of its
production -disappear. Nothing remains but an unproblematic and timeless "fact": "TRF
is Pyro-Glu-His-Pro-NH2". The "fact" has become a black box7: its internal structure, all
the debates which have surrounded its production - and which still operate at the
empirical level - disappear into oblivion.
I would like to contend that the same process - although obviouly less clear-cut is at work in the production of "facts" and exemplars in sociology. The sociologist who
uses the concept of rationalization may, or may not, refer to Weber. But even if he refers
to Weber, he is very likely to use the idea of rationalization like a black box. The context
in which the idea was born - Weber's personal fight against "the forces that unite to
rationalize society and destroy individual autonomy" as they were embodied in his
mother's religious ethic and in his father's "authoritarian despotism at home and
bureaucratic subservience in his office" (Mitzman 1969, p. 179) - is forgotten and, if it is
not forgotten, it is most of the time discarded as irrelevant. As a result of this process, the
elements that make up paradigms in sociology seem to float in a timeless Platonician
realm of ideas. Although the exemplars which undergird these elements may still be
invoked, they are detached from the context in which they were produced.
This has important consequences for this study. As we will see, the exemplars
used by modern secularization theorists can generally not be traced directly through
footnotes to the sociologists who created them. Thus for example, all modern
secularization theorists use the notion of differentiation (see chap. 4 and 12), but none of
them (except Parsons) explains where this notion comes from. The reason for this is
evident: differentiation is so fundamental an exemplar in the education of any sociologist
7
The notion of fact as a "black box" has been developed by Latour in Science in Action (1987).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
18
that there is no need to refer to Spencer, to Durkheim, or to Parsons. "Differentiation" is
used as a black box. Consequently, in tracing the genesis of the modern approach to
secularization, we will not seek to trace the origins and development of such exemplars
through footnotes. We do not need footnotes to tell us that modern views on
differentiation are the result of many successive contributions, among which those of
Spencer, Durkheim, and Parsons are foremost. In other words, to the extent that modern
secularization theorists do not take the trouble to indicate the origin of the terms they use,
they signal that they are the stock in trade of the sociologist.
Any sub-discipline is built on a few traditions. If the view I have sought to express
is correct, these traditions find their strength, not so much in the empirical relevance of
the theories, but in the practical usefulness of a few exemplars which are somehow
interrelated and can be used analogically to understand the world. This becomes quite
clear when we compare what Weber and Parsons, on the one hand, and what Sorokin and
Becker (see chapter 9), on the other, have written on the relationship of religion and
modernization. Weber and Parsons immediately "make sense" - even if we disagree with
them - whereas the writings of the other two simply strike us as irrelevant and outmoded.
This is not, I would contend, because Becker's or Sorokin's theories are stupid, or wrong:
when one pauses to think of it, they are just as clever theoretically and relevant
empirically. But we have learned to see the world through exemplars drawn from Weber
and Parsons, and not from Sorokin and Becker.
To conclude, my approach to paradigms is centered on (but not limited to - see
chap. 4) the notion of exemplar. An exemplar is a relatively simple and briefly formulated
"image" of the world, which is widely recognized as useful and used analogically in a
great number of situations. Furthermore, the context in which the analogy was first made
is only of secondary importance: the exemplar has acquired a timeless quality. Therefore,
in the framework of this study, the history of the secularization issue is largely the history
of the exemplars used by modern secularization theorists. Before writing this history, we
must become acquainted with the works of these scholars to determine what exemplars
they have been using.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
19
CHAPTER 2
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SECULARIZATION PARADIGM
So far, we have pursued a theoretical discussion concerning the reasons that sould
induce us to consider secularization as a paradigm rather than as a theory. As noted in the
preceding chapter, there are excellent methodological reasons to do so. But no matter how
excellent these reasons are, they are by no means sufficient. To show that we must replace
the vague and inappropriate expression "modern secularization theory" by the notion of
"modern secularization paradigm", we must show that this paradigm in fact exists - that it
is not just wishful thinking. To do this, we must undertake four steps. The first is to show
that, at a certain point in time, "secularization" became an important issue, and that a
certain consensus emerged around the meaning of this term. This will be the object of the
present chapter. Second, in concordance with the Kuhnian approach, we must show that
this paradigm has been put forward by a concrete scholarly community. This will be the
object of chapter 3. Third, it must be shown that the paradigm became institutionalized
through an intellectual revolution within that community. This point will be taken up only
in chapter 10. Finally, we must show that this paradigm has a content. In other words, we
must show that the scholarly community put forward a number of interrelated exemplars
contained within a series of meta-theoretical assumptions, and that there is a degree of
consensus between the different authors as to what these elements are. This point will be
addressed in chapters 4 and 12.
In the present chapter, I will show that "secularization" became an important issue
in the 1960s, and that this evolution coincides with the emergence of a consensus around
the meaning of this term. In order to do this, I will use two main sources: a systematic
analysis of textbooks, and a systematic analysis of the Acts of the most important
European organization for the sociology of religion, the Conférence internationale de
sociologie des religions (CISR).
The Rise of Interest in "Secularization" in the 1960s
Before turing to these systematic analyses, I would like to briefly present some of
the other available evidence. Some scattered testimony alerting us to the transformations
which occurred in the 60s can be found in the literature. Thus, Roland Robertson noticed
a "rapid upsurge of interest in the theme of secularization during the 60s" (Robertson
1971, p. 308). Gustavo Guizzardi, in the introduction to the anthology on secularization
he published with Sabino Acquaviva, states that he wants to offer a panorama of the
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
20
problem "as it has been posed in its 'explosive' phase, which can be dated to the early
60s" (Acquaviva and Guizzardi 1973, p. 25). The same evolution has also been stressed
for example by Roberto Cipriani (Cipriani 1981, pp. 141-42).
But in order to establish the increasing importance of this theme, we need more
solid evidence. The first such piece of evidence is found in a recent research conducted by
William Silverman (1989), who analyzed all the general review essays (that is, 20 essays)
published in English in the field of sociology of religion between 1929 and 1988. A
content analysis revealed the tendencies with regard to 27 different topics. The clearest
trends can be summarized as follows: There is a marked decline in interest in topics
closely related to Catholic sociology8. So for instance, "morals, ethical behavior and
religion"; "the rural Church"; "studies of clergy"; "organizations: Churches as
organizations [...]"; "family and religion: premarital sex [...]"; "Church research of the H.
Paul Douglass type" all decline sharply. Contrariwise, there is a "fairly steady increase in
interest" (1989, p. 4) in other topics, which are almost all related to the secularization
paradigm9. "Secularization" as such, which had progressed steadliy from the period 29-45
(0%) to 51-59 (17%), and from this period to 62-76 (20%), has been subjected to a
remarkable progression between the two periods 62-76 and 82-88 (where it reached
80%). Interest also rose in related subjects, including "functional theory of religion"10;
"religion as a source of social integration"; "new religious movements"; "civil religion"
and "modernization".
The next piece of evidence indicating an increase in interest in the theme of
secularization is drawn from a systematic analysis of introductory textbooks to sociology.
As Silverman remarks, textbooks are unlikely to reflect "the cutting edge of a field"
(Silverman 1989, p. 1). For this reason, he himself preferred to analyze review essays. It
is clear that the changes appearing in a field are likely to be reflected with considerable
delay in textbooks written for undergraduates. Any evidence as to the presence of an
interest in secularization in textbooks should therefore be regarded as a strong indicator
of the existence of the paradigm.
8
This last interpretation is mine, not the author's.
This is again my interpretation of the author's data.
10
As will be shown later on, the secularization paradigm is very much tied to a functionalist approach of
religion. But this affirmation must be qualified: as Wade Clark Roof remarked in the debate which followed
the presentation of Silverman's paper, the rise he noted does not mean that functional theory is endorsed by
all the reviewers, but merely that it is an important topic. By the same token, I do not mean to say that
secularization theory depends on functional theory, but that it raises questions - like the definition of
religion, or the problem of civil religion - which are always debated against the background of functional
theory.
9
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
21
I have analyzed fifty-four textbooks11 for the period 1939-1984. In the twentyseven textbooks appearing before 1969, there is not a single instance of a chapter, or even
of a section, being entirely devoted to "secularization". Only two texts included the term
"secularization" in their indexes. Mention of terms such as "secular society" or
"secularity", however, was somewhat more frequent. Most of these referred to Howard
Becker's sacred-secular dichotomy (see chap. 9). Although some other early texts made
descriptive use of the term secularization, it is only in later texts that the term
secularization increasingly came to be used with a meaning approaching that of the
modern paradigm. But, to repeat, there is no systematic treatment of "secularization"
before 1969. As we will see, the situation obtaining after this date offers a stark contrast.
Let us now turn to the twenty-two textbooks that have been published after
196912. (Unfortunately, at this point, we will sometimes have to anticipate somewhat on
the following discussion, and refer to some of the exemplars of the paradigm, which will
be presented systematically only in chapter 4. But this procedure should not prove to be
too much of a problem, since the terminology used for the exemplars is largely selfexplanatory.) We will first say a few words of the 10 texts in which "secularization" does
not appear13. First, seven of these texts contain a chapter on religion, and all of them
discuss the "protestant ethic thesis". Thus, they cannot be said to ignore religion
completely. Differentiation and rationalization (the two most important exemplars in the
paradigm; see chap. 4), however, play only a minor role in these texts: they appear only in
the indexes of three of them14. Discussions of other topics related to the secularization
paradigm are rare: civil religion is discussed only in TXT 1975c15 (p. 379), worldliness is
discussed only in 1969b (p. 660; p. 678) and decline in practice and autonomization only
in 1971c (p. 251; pp. 253-54). The only textbook that discusses in some detail the
11
The analysis bears on all the texts included in the HM51 section (official Library of Congress
denomination: "General works, treatises, and advanced textbooks in English [in sociology]") of the
Memorial Library of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, except for 1) readers and anthologies;
2) foreign (non-American) textbooks; 3) very short introductions.
12
In reality, I started with 27 texts. In this sample, I found a first category of textbooks in which this word
never appeared: in critical textbooks. In these texts (TXT 1975a, 1977a, 1978, 1979c) the treatment of
religion in general is very weak. Critical approaches, as exemplified in these texts, largely ignore the
modern sociological approach to religion, and rest content with analyzing religion as "the opium of the
people" (TXT 1979, p. 185). None of these texts contains a separate chapter on religion. Still another text is
in a particular position, since it was written by Peter and Brigitte Berger (TXT 1972a). For obvious reasons,
the treatment of secularization theory in this text cannot simply be regarded as evidence of the existence of
the paradigm. Once I had eliminated the 4 critical texts and Berger's, I was left with an homogeneous
sample of 22 textbooks.
13
TXT 1969a, 1969b, 1971c, 1971d, 1972b, 1973a, 1973b, 1975c, 1976a, 1979a.
14
But in two of these, rationalization is used in the psycho-analytical sense.
15
References for the textbooks are included in the bibliography under a separate heading.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
22
secularization paradigm is TXT 1976a, but this discussion takes place under titles such as
"the growth of secularism", "secular determinants of religious thought", and "religious
thought and the secular audience" (pp. 484-88), which brings us very close to
"secularization" indeed. Few of these texts use words close to "secularization": apart from
TXT 1976a, which we have just mentioned, only TXT 1973b uses "secular", and only
TXT 1971d uses "secularized".
In short, what is striking in these texts is not only do they ignore the word
"secularization" as such, but that they ignore the whole paradigm associated with it. But
let us now turn to the 12 texts in which the word "secularization" is mentioned. Four of
these texts use "secularization" only incidentally. In TXT 1969d, secularization is briefly
described as the "accommodation [of religion] to non-religious values and pursuits", and
also as "efforts on the part of organized religion to convey messages that are meaningful
to the life of modern man" (p. 103). In TXT 1971a, secularization is taken in the sense of
changes occurring in the function of the family, in line with Burgess16 (pp. 488-89), and
also as used in the Middletown studies, as "secularization of marriage" (p. 489). In the
chapter on social change included in TXT 1975b, the general trend of evolution is called
"rationalization", but, authors remark rather vaguely, "we encounter a number of possible
words to use, [...] for example, secularization, industrialization, urbanization" (p. 71). In
the remainder of the text, two elements of the secularization paradigm are accepted, but
the paradigm itself is not spelled out. Finally, in TXT 1984, secularization is used in the
sense of the increasing worldliness of certain denominations (p. 359). So, in these texts,
the use of the word secularization is rather incidental, and does not imply the totality of
the secularization paradigm.
We are thus left with 8 texts, in which "secularization" is used much more
systematically17. These 8 textbooks are, on the whole, more recent than the others.
Among the 14 texts published before 1976, only 3 use "secularization" in a systematic
way, whereas this is the case with 5 of the 8 texts published from 1976 on. Secondly, in
all but one of these texts (TXT 1979b), there is a special section on secularization, which
can range from two paragraphs (1976b, p. 496) to a whole chapter called "Secularization,
religion and social control" (TXT 1976d, p. 199).
We can thus complete the conclusion drawn from the analysis of the 10 texts in
which secularization never appeared. Not only is the secularization paradigm ignored
when the word "secularization" is ignored but, conversely, in most cases where the word
16
Secularization is related by Burgess to "the declining control of religion and [...] the increasing role of
material comforts [...]" (Burgess, cited in TXT 1971a, p. 489).
17
TXT 1969c, 1970, 1971b, 1976b, 1976c, 1976d, 1977b, 1979b.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
23
"secularization" is used, the whole paradigm comes with it. In other words, the
secularization paradigm is generally not to be taken in small portions: it is either
discarded entirely, or fully accepted.
We can conclude that the analysis of the texts adduces further evidence as to the
sudden rise of "secularization" in the 60s. As we will see, a systematic analysis of the
Acts of the Conférence internationale de sociologie des religions (CISR)18, the most
important European organization in the sociology of religion, discloses a similar pattern.
Before 1967, "secularization" was never mentioned at the CISR, and the
discussions concerning the position of religion in modern society went mainly under the
heading of "dechristianization"19. The first paper referring "secularization" appeared in
1967. Leslie Paul discussed the crisis which appeared within the Anglican Church and
gave birth to the "secularization movement"20. At the end of his article, he criticized the
concept of secularization, and clearly took sides in the "debate" between Harvey Cox and
David Martin (on this "debate", see chap. 11). Two years later (in 1969), a first reference
was made to the sociological debate about secularization by Karel Dobbelaere and Jan
Lauwers. They stated that "the sociologist should not ask himself what relevance church
and religion have for the individual. He must question their social relevance. In this sense,
problems concerning the sociology of religion now have shifted from participation to
secularization. It is comforting to state that many sociologists of religion have taken this
direction, mainly under the impulse from Th. Luckmann and P. Berger" (CISR 1969,
p. 123). Dobbelaere and Lauwers welcomed this evolution and considered it as a major
improvement by comparison with the sociology of church involvement criticized in their
article. Secularization theory was presented by Dobbelaere and Lauwers as the symbol of
this new evolution of the discipline.
However, up to the 10th CISR (1969), the word "secularization" never appeared in
the title of a paper. At the 11th CISR (1971), it appeared in three places. Indeed, the first
massive use of the word "secularization" is found in this conference. At least seven
papers, by Grumelli, Houtart, Creyf, Stryckman, Barett and Verryn, and Acquaviva and
Rouleau, made use of the word. The first explicit attempt to construct a secularization
theory was also found in this conference. Antonio Grumelli proposed a theory which
explained secularization by a superiority of "values" on "structure", which in turn implied
a better acceptance of social change21. At the same conference, François Houtart
18
The Acts of the CISR are listed in the bibliography under a separate heading.
A thorough analysis of the Acts before 1967 is presented in chap. 10.
20
A social movement of priests of the Anglican Church.
21
This last point being drawn from Howard Becker, to whom the author referred.
19
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
24
approached the secularization issue through an empirical research on the basis of which
he planned to develop a complete secularization theory. Roger Creyf22 attacked Berger
and Luckmann's theories, criticizing the "anthropological presuppositions" on which they
were based. He wanted to promote a conception that should be closer to empirical
evidence, and at the same time more dialectical. Paul Stryckman analyzed the process of
democratization and administrative decentralization inside the canadian Catholic Church,
and considered it as a phenomenon of "sécularisation intra-ecclésiale".
The Transition to the Paradigmatic Status
But the analysis of the Acts of the CISR reveals more than just an increase in
interest for the theme of secularization. It also brings to light a qualitative evolution in the
approach of sociologists using this concept. In the late 60s and early 70s, "secularization"
was used very carelessly, whereas from the late 70s onwards, authors had a much better
grasp of the concept.
In the 60s and early 70s, some articles left the reader with the feeling that the
author had hastily added two lines on secularization at the beginning of his paper when it
was almost ready to be printed, just in order to make sure that it would profit from being
caught into the mainstream of a currently fashionable debate. A good example of this is
provided by a paper by Barret and Verryn, which was read at the 11th CISR (1971).
The authors show that religious affiliation and practice have increased all over
Africa since independence, and that Christianity is fostered rather than hindered by
urbanization. Which leads them to conclude: "There may be emerging a demonstration of
how modern man can be urbanized, industrialized, and even secularised, and yet remain
deeply religious" (CISR 1971, p. 268). The authors attach a great importance to the word
"secularization": it is used in the very first sentence of the article, and the words
"secularization" and "secular" appear four times in the first two paragraphs. But what do
the authors mean when they say that in Africa, man is secularized, and at the same time
truly religious? The evidence put forward in the paper shows but one thing: that religious
commitment and practice have increased. There is no evidence of secularization provided
in the paper, quite the contrary. The confusion probably arises from a misreading of Cox's
best-seller (see chap. 11). In The Secular City (1965), Harvey Cox used the word
"urbanization" in a very peculiar sense, to designate what sociologists usually call the
transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. And, in this same book, "urbanization" was
22
A student of Dobbelaere.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
25
presented as one of the main factors explaining secularization. This might explain why,
noticing that an increased urbanization (in the usual sense of the word) fosters Christian
religious affiliation, the authors concluded that religion and secularization (in reality:
urbanization) were not antithetical.
Another example is provided by Rouleau's paper in CISR 1971, which starts with
these words: "Secularization is a universal phenomenon", but which goes on to study the
confessional dimension of Catholic hospitals in Canada without discussing secularization
in any more detail. In other papers, the word "secularization" was used in a more precise
sense, and with more care. However, the word was almost never used with precise
reference to the sociological debate, or to a particular theoretical framework. In some
instances, authors had a very narrow conception of secularization, as for example
Duocastella in CISR 1973, for whom this concept apparently referred to changes in the
division of labor and responsibilities between the ministry and the laics - although this
point is not very clear (CISR 1973, pp. 193-94). Other examples are provided by David
Starkey in CISR 1977, where "secularization" referred to the decline of symbolism (a
decline which manifests itself most clearly through iconoclasm) during the Reformation,
by Aranguren in CISR 1975 (pp. 16-17), and also by most of the papers we have already
discussed: especially Paul in CISR 1967, Grumelli in CISR 1971, and Stryckman in CISR
1971.
The period opening with the 15th conference (1979) appears to be characterized by
a better assimilation and comprehension of the notion of secularization by the authors.
This does not mean that they all understand it, nor that none of them understood it
correctly in the previous period: but the trend seems to be toward a certain
institutionalization of the concept of secularization, along the lines provided by the
analyses of Peter Berger and Bryan Wilson (see chap. 12).
At the 15th conference (1979), several papers showed a good grasp of the issue.
We will briefly discuss four papers. Grassi et al. analyzed the paradox of the growing
importance of religious ties for the greatest Italian political party in the midst of a world
which was becoming ever more secularized. Secularization was circumscribed as "the
loss of control in the process of socialization in the new generations in which the space
before occupied by the parochial structures and by the powerful young Catholic
associations, has become more and more narrow to the advantage of the State structures
produced by the growth of the scholastic man" (CISR 1979, p. 32). Richard Fenn (himself
a secularization theorist) was one of the first to propose a clear and operationally usable
definition of secularization: "In the following discussion I will treat secularization as the
outcome of a political process between classes and religious communities or
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
26
organizations that enhances the integration of society. By secularization [...] I refer to the
degree to which the meanings are subject to reduction or transformation in interaction
with 'secular' authorities" (CISR 1979, p. 413). Yanagawa aimed at providing an answer
to the question: is secularization theory applicable to Japan? To this effect, he directly
discussed the theories of Bryan Wilson and Thomas Luckmann (see chap. 12). Finally, a
paper by Dobbelaere also showed a good grasp of the secularization issue. After
analyzing his empirical material, he concluded: "Whatever the meaning attached to the
term secularization, our study documents such a process. We have shown that in
Flanders, secularization has taken the form of declining church practice, ethical changes,
differentiation and privatization that privatizes and marginalizes religion, and a rejection
of religion as an 'overarching meaning system'" (CISR 1979, p. 288). Other examples
showing a good grasp of secularization theory include the papers by Yanagawa in CISR
1983, by Lalive d'Epinay et al. in CISR 1981, and by Guizzardi and Pace in CISR 1981.
We can thus distinguish two phases in the recent history of the secularization
controversy inside of the CISR: 1) a phase of debate, where there was no agreement on
the definition of the word "secularization", although the main theories which would allow
a consensus concerning the meaning of the word had already been produced and widely
diffused; 2) a paradigmatic phase, characterized by a cooling down of the debate and
some degree of consensus on the definition of secularization. This conclusion fits into
Kuhn's analysis23: in his words, the first phase is a revolutionary phase, and the second a
period of return to normal science.
We can now consider that we have established beyond doubt that, sometime in the
late 60s, "secularization" became recognized as an important topic in sociology of
religion. It has not been established yet, however, that "secularization" is a paradigm. In
order to do this, several steps must be taken: it must be shown that "secularization" is
more than a blanket term, and that it also has a content, that is to say that we will have to
put forward evidence supporting the idea that the other elements we defined as belonging
to the paradigm exist and are really attached to it. But before doing this, another point
needs to be established: it must be shown that the emergence of the term "secularization"
is linked to a specific scientific community.
23
This fact occured to me after I had defined these two periods with regard to the ICSR - I analyzed the
Acts of the CISR several months before adopting the Kuhnian approach. As a matter of fact, it is reflection
on my findings with regard to the CISR that rekindeled in my memory the arguments put forward in Kuhn's
Structure (1962), which I had read about two years before.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
27
CHAPTER 3
THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY
The scholarly community will be analyzed through the use of several methods:
first, an overview of the literature on secularization will yield a list of names and some
clues as to the structure of this list, that is, to the position of the different sociologists on
the theoretical level. This will then be completed by information obtained through the
interviews I conducted with several sociologists of religion and through the use of the
Social Science Citation Index. But let us turn, first, to the literature24.
The lists of names appearing in this chapter will, at first, constitute an unfamiliar
world for the readers not acquainted with the secularization issue. I will make no effort to
present these sociologists: throughout the chapter, they will remain anonymous shadows.
This procedure has been adopted on purpose: Rather than defining a scholarly community
by starting from the analysis of a series of theories, my aim is to start with the
community, and to present the corresponding theories only later on (see chap. 4 and 12).
Who are the "Secularization Theorists"?
The list of sociologists invited by the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Believers at the
1969 Symposium on Unbelief held at Rome (Caporale and Grumelli 1971) gives us a first
indication. The chairman of the conference was Peter Berger. Sociologists invited to
present lead papers were Thomas Luckmann, Robert Bellah, Charles Glock, and Antonio
Grumelli (himself one of the organizers). The sociologists invited to write a postscript
were Talcott Parsons, Bryan Wilson, and - again - Bellah. This instant picture of the field
in 1969 is remarkably accurate: as we will see, in the following 20 years, there will not be
many changes.
In 1973, Sabino Acquaviva and Gustavo Guizzardi published an anthology under
the title La secolarizzazione. The list of papers translated into Italian on this occasion
offers an overview of the field of secularization theory: authors are Larry Shiner, Bellah,
Wilson, Berger, Luckmann, Acquaviva himself and David Martin on the sociological
side. The anthology also includes some papers by theologians, most notably Dietrich
24
It might be argued that the way in which I selected this literature constitutes a bias. This seems very
unlikely to me: although Dobbelaere 1981 (the importance of which will be brought out in the following
analysis) was one of my first readings, during the subsequent 2 years, I assembled all the references
concerning secularization I found, very often by sheer chance. But very soon, I found that I had more or less
exhausted the existing literature (in so far as it was directly related to sociology of religion), and I kept
coming across the same references again and again.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
28
Bonhoeffer, Harvey Cox, and John Robinson. Of particular interest to us is the fact that,
in his introductory paper, Guizzardi brings out some of the articulations among these
different theorists. First, the stress on the marginalization of religion (i.e., the
autonomization of society; see chap. 4) is recognized as common, in different ways, to
Wilson, Luckmann and Berger. Acquaviva's position in this respect is defined as
"particular", since he is interested essentially in de-sacralization at the individual level
(i.e., unbelief; see chap. 4). Second, although Bellah does not consider himself as a
secularization theorist, his concern with civil religion is shown to be connected to
Berger's analysis of the religious legitimation of the State (i.e., generalization; Acquaviva
and Guizzardi 1973, p. 27). In the same manner - and although he does not either consider
himself a secularization theorist - Luckmann's analysis of the privatization of religion is
considered completely consonant with Berger's analysis of this same phenomenon
(Acquaviva and Guizzardi 1973, pp. 28-29). Bellah is connected in still another way to
this constellation, in that his article on Religious Evolution (Bellah [1963] 1970) reaches
conclusions similar to Luckmann's on the subject of privatization (Acaquavica and
Guizzardi 1973, p. 29). And, to close the circle, this analysis of privatization is congruent
with the analysis in terms of civil religion, in the sense that both amount to a complete deinstitutionalization of religion (1973, p. 30). The general conclusion that can be drawn
from Guizzardi's presentation is that the different secularization theories are
complimentary rather than contradictory.
The opposite conclusion was reached by Jan Lauwers (1973). But Lauwer's
classification is very unclear. He classifies secularization theories in three groups:
theories connected to the idea of pluralism (Herberg, Yinger), theories connected to the
idea of privatization (Luckmann, Berger), and theories connected to the idea of
rationalization (Wilson, Weber). However, in Lauwer's own presentation, pluralism also
appears as a constitutive element in Luckmann and in Berger's theories, and Herberg and
Yinger's theories, which are both put into the same category, differ radically in that the
first concludes that secularization has happened, whereas the second reaches the opposite
conclusion. In short, Lauwers arbitrarily chose one element which he found particularly
salient in each of the theories (pluralism in Herberg's, but why not in Berger's?) while
neglecting other factors that are common to some of the theories (for instance
generalization, which is common to Weber's and to Herberg's, or differentiation, which is
common to Wilson's and Luckmann's) in order to construct his typology.
Peter Glasner (1977) failed to acknowledge the break that occurred in the mid60s. For this reason, his choice of authors was extremely large, ranging from the Lynds
(Middletown; Glasner 1977, p. 15) to modern authors. But, as far as these modern authors
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
29
are concerned, his choice was not very different from that of others. He calls Wilson the
"main exponent of [the decline thesis] in Britain" (1977, p. 18). Parsons and Bellah are
considered the main exponents of the "differentiation thesis" (1977, pp. 26-27) and
"generalization thesis" (1977, pp. 35-37). Luckmann and Berger are considered
representatives of the "cognitively based" secularization thesis (1977, pp. 50-56). The
most recent of the other authors mentioned as secularization theorists are Yinger, Pfautz
and Herberg (on Verweltlichung of religious organizations; 1977, pp. 23-25).
In other examples, the scholarly community was less precisely defined. We can
regard it as axiomatic that some authors who appear to be more peripheral to this
scholarly community will less clearly perceive its homogeneity. In other words, the
scholarly community is to a large extent self-defined, that is, defined by its own members.
Thus for example, the treatment of secularization by Barbara Hargrove - who taught at
Yale Divinity School, and appears to have close ties with Bellah and Glock's "Religious
Conscious team" (Hargrove 1979, p. viii) - in her textbook, The Sociology of Religion
(1979), situates her at the periphery of the secularization paradigm. For one thing, she
does not devote a special chapter to "secularization". Furthermore, although she does
speak of secularization, and mentions rationalization (in the form of a transition from
sacred to profane; 1979, p. 26), privatization (1979, p. 54) and differentiation (1979, p.
117), her global approach to secularization is still very much influenced by Becker's
(1979, p. 54; see chap. 9), and she considers secularization essentially as a transition from
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (1979, p. 55). By the same token, she does not clearly
identify the scholarly community: although she cites Wilson (1979, pp. 57-58), it is only
on a peripheral matter, and Berger, whose Sacred Canopy is mentioned (1979, p. 18; p.
61) is not presented as a secularization theorist. Instead, proponents of secularization
theory appear to be Cox (1979, p. 27; p. 125), Becker (1979, p. 54; pp. 121-22) and
Parsons (1979, p. 55). Similarly, John Coleman, a Jesuit from the School of Theology at
Berkeley, first discusses in some detail Wilson, Luckmann, Berger, Parsons, and Greeley,
but later adds to this list Hudson Smith, Guy E. Swanson, Clifford Geertz, Roland
Robertson, Robert Bellah, Gerhard Lenski, Thomas O'Dea, David Martin, Hans Mol and
Charles Glock (Coleman 1978).
Having thus outlined the general characteristics of the field, we can mention
somewhat more briefly some other recensions. In his 1973 textbook on the sociology of
religion, Michael Hill devoted two chapters to secularization. Significant proponents of
secularization theory appeared to be, in order of appearance: Wilson, Pfautz, Berger,
Parsons, Bellah, Weber, Becker, and Luckmann (1973, pp. 229-60). The choice of
authors made by Enrica Rosanna (1973) was somewhat untypical: in addition to Berger,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
30
Luckmann and Acquaviva, she included in her study Yinger, but not Wilson, nor Bellah.
The sociologists identified as major proponents of secularization theory by Elio Roggero
(1979) were Berger and Wilson. Other sociologists encompassed in the broader
discussion of secularization theory were mainly Isambert, Luckmann, Herberg and
Yinger, Parsons, and Bellah. In his 1984 article on secularization, Franco Ferrarotti, after
briefly discussing Becker, devoted the rest of his analysis to Berger, whom he considered
as having given "the most refined presentation of the concept of secularization"
(Ferrarotti 1984, p. 14).
In 1981, Dobbelaere published a Trend Report which, as we will see, constitutes a
very important point of reference inside of the community. We can classify the titles
appearing in this report according to the number of times they were cited by Dobbelaere.
The Invisible Religion (Luckmann) was cited 22 times, the Sacred Canopy (Berger) 21
times, A General Theory of Secularization (Martin) 21 times, and Wilson's theory
(Religion in Secular Society + Aspects of Secularization in the West + Contemporary
Transformations of Religion) 19 times. Authors less frequently cited but considered
important were Fenn, Bellah, and Parsons.
Dobbelaere's trend report is particularly important because, as we will see, it is
very widely known and acknowledged inside of the scholarly community - which led it to
play an important role in the definition of the field, for one of the most efficient
mechanisms in the definition of the field is the progressive emergence of a citation
tradition. Thus, authors who review the literature on secularization very often refer to
previous attempts of the same type. Thus for instance, in 1965, Hermann Lübbe wrote a
history of the secularization issue. In 1967, Larry Shiner, in his review of the meanings of
he concept, referred to Lübbe (Shiner 1967, p. 208). In 1973, in a similar attempt, Jan
Lauwers referred to Lübbe (Lauwers 1973, p. 530) and, in the bibliography appearing at
the end of this edition of Social Compass, to Shiner (1973, p. 604). In 1977, Glasner
referred only to Shiner (Glasner 1977, p. 13; pp. 21-22; p. 41; p. 43; p. 45). But the
citation tradition was taken up again in 1979 by Roggero, who referred to Glasner, to
Lauwers, to Shiner, and to Lübbe. Finally, in 1981, Dobbelaere referred to Roggero
(misspelled "Ruggiero"; Dobbelaere 1981, p. 183), to Glasner, to Lauwers, to Shiner, and
to Lübbe.
By the same token, authors writing after 1981 very frequently referred to
Dobbelaere's trend report. Thus, in his brief outline of secularization theory in his
research on secularization in Iceland, Pétut Pétursson (1983) explicitly followed
Dobbelaere: important theorists appeared to be Berger, Luckmann, Dobbelaere, and
Martin. We need not continue this enumeration: after 1981, most of the sociologists
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
31
venturing to write on the subject of secularization knew Dobbelaere's trend report, and
their accounts fall into familiar grooves25.
Thus, a substantial degree of agreement emerges from this overview. The large
majority of recensions - even those that were written before 1981 - coincide with
Dobbelaere's definition of the field. The main proponents of secularization theory appear
to be Berger and Wilson and, in a somewhat peripheral position, Martin and Fenn. In
spite of their own refusal to be considered secularization theorists, Luckmann, Bellah and
Parsons are also very consistently considered as "part of the team". Several recensions
appearing before Dobbelaere's report also included discussion of the works of Herberg
and Yinger. There is, however, a very wide disagreement on the question of the
compatibility of these theoretical approaches. Whereas certain authors uncover implicit
links between the theories, others stress their separateness. But - and this is very
important for our purpose - even when they do so, they still consider that these authors
are all, in some way, "secularization theorists".
The conclusions reached so far concerning the identification of the sociologists
thought to be important secularization theorists are largely supported by the twenty-one
interviews. The first question I asked most of my respondents was: "what is secularization
theory: which authors, which books would you cite as representing 'secularization
theory'?" The names that came up most frequently were those of Berger, Wilson and, to a
lesser extent, of Luckmann and Martin. Dobbelaere was also very often referred to as a
"systematizer" of secularization theory.
The Structure of the Scholarly Community
Another device used in relation to these interviews was a short questionnaire in
which I asked respondents to indicate, among a list of 25 books and articles including all
the important works26 we have discussed so far and a few others (see below), which they
had "leafed through", which they had "read entirely", and which they considered as a
"reference book". I also asked them to indicate, very approximatively, how many times
they had personally met the authors of these articles or books. I weighted the results by
counting one point for each mention of a paper "leafed through", 2 points for each that
25
See for instance Cipriani 1981, p. 142, Hervieu-Léger and Champion 1986, pp. 187-227, Yanagawa
1987, McGuire 1987, pp. 221-254, and the volume of the 19th CISR (1987), entirely devoted to
secularization.
26
With the exception of Martin's, which was a mistake on my part. At the beginning of my research, I had
underestimated Martin's position in the field.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
32
had been "read entirely", and 3 points for each "reference book". I thus obtained the
following classification:
Author
title
points
Berger, The Sacred Canopy (1967)
Bellah, Civil Religion in America (1967)
Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (1967)
Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (1966)
Dobbelaere, Secularization: A Multi-Dimentional Concept (1981)
51
48
47
44
44
Cox, The Secular City (1965)
Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew (1955)
39
34
Shiner, The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research (1967)
Hervieu-Léger, Vers un nouveau christianisme? (1986)
Stark & Bainbridge, The Future of Religion (1985)
Parsons, Christianity and Modern Industrial Society (1963)
Bourdieu, Genèse et structure du champ religieux (1971)
Fenn, Toward a Theory of Secularization (1978)
Acquaviva, L'ecclisi del sacro... (1961)
Wilson, Aspects of Secularization in the West (1976)
Bell, The Return of the Sacred... (1977)
Isambert, La sécularisation interne... (1976)
Le Bras, Déchristianisation, mot fallacieux (1963)
Luhmann, Funktion der Religion (1977)
Matthes, Religion und Gesellschaft (1967)
Pfautz, The Sociology of Secularization... (1955)
Gauchet, Le désenchantement du monde (1985)
Lübbe, Säkularisierung... (1965)
Ferrarotti, Il mito della secolarizzazione (1984)
Luckmann, Neuere Schriften zur Religionssoziologie (1960)
30
29
29
29
27
26
26
25
23
23
23
17
16
15
13
11
4
3
As we can see, these works can be roughly classified in two groups ("very
popular" and "not very popular"), with a small intermediary group. Of course, there is one
problem with this classification. I conducted most of my interviews at the CISR
Conference in Helsinki. Thus, this classification is only representative of the position of
these texts as estimated by members of the CISR. However, as will be shown later on, if
properly accounted for, this bias is particularly enlightening.
One way to counter this bias is to use a different source. Another evaluation of the
impact of these authors can be made through use of the Social Science Citation Index.
The approximative number of citations per year during the 10 years27 following the first
27
In the case of some recent works, the number of years is inferior to 10. In some other cases, the number of
citations refers to a later period, as for instance with Herberg's book (the SSCI does not start before 1965).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
33
publication of a given piece of writing for different works can be represented in the
following table (keeping the same order and the same clusters):
Author
title
citations
Berger, The Sacred Canopy (1967)
Bellah, Civil Religion in America (1966)
Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (1967)
Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (1966)
Dobbelaere, Secularization: A Multi-Dimentional Concept (1981)
1328
9 (3)29
10
5
2
Cox, The Secular City (1965)
Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew (1955)
11
19
Shiner, The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research (1967)
Parsons, Christianity and Modern Industrial Society (1963)
Fenn, Toward a Theory of Secularization (1978)
Acquaviva, L'ecclisi del sacro... (1961)
Wilson, Aspects of Secularization in the West (1976)
Bell, The Return of the Sacred... (1977)
Isambert, La sécularisation interne... (1976)
Le Bras, Déchristianisation, mot fallacieux (1963)
Luhmann, Funktion der Religion (1977)
Lübbe, Säkularisierung... (1965)
2
1
1
1
0
2
0
0
3
1
There are some interesting discrepancies between what members of the CISR
consider important and what social scientists in general consider important. The most
interesting of these discrepancies concern Dobbelaere's Trend Report and, to a lesser
extent, Wilson's book30. We must postpone the interpretation of this discrepancy until we
have some insight into the social structure of the scholarly community. Three other
discrepancies - Bell, Herberg, and Luhmann - can briefly be commented upon: they are
indicative of the fact that some very well-known sociologists who have written on
secularization have found more echo outside of the community than inside of it. Note also
that the drop in popularity, which is very pronounced from Shiner down according to the
SSCI, is much less pronounced within the community. This is probably due to the
specialized culture shared by the members of this community, in which even works that
are relatively obscure for social scientists in general are almost required readings. The
28
Including the British edition, which appeared under the title The Social Reality of Religion.
The number of citations for Civil Religion is difficult to assess. 3 citations go to the original version
published in Social Forces, but another 6 go to Beyond Belief, in which the paper was reprinted 3 years
later.
30
The discrepancy with regard to Wilson is far less important than in the case of Dobbelaere, since his
writings on secularization are scattered in several books, all of which are relatively well-known outside of
the community (SSCI).
29
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
34
"intermediate" group probably owes its particular position within the CISR to its
popularity among social scientists in general.
This information about the popularity of certain writings offers us a first clue as to
the shape of the scholarly community. But they are not sufficient: as we will see, an
author can be very widely read without really belonging to the community. We therefore
need to push the investigation a little further, by considering the interpersonal
relationships, especially as revealed by the answers to the questionnaire, which allowed
me to construct a very rough sociogram of the relationships between members of the
CISR and the sociologists we have identified as carriers of the paradigm. In the following
list, the same authors are classified according to the number of persons who had had very
numerous (i.e., generally more than ten personal encounters31) contacts with them:
Author
number
of
persons
Berger
Bellah
Luckmann
Wilson
Dobbelaere
3
2
2
11
14
Cox
Herberg
2
0
Shiner
Hervieu-Léger
Stark
Parsons
Bourdieu
Fenn
Acquaviva
Bell
Isambert
Le Bras
Luhmann
Matthes
Pfautz
Gauchet
Lübbe
Ferrarotti
1
6
4
3
2
6
2
1
8
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
The comparison of the first and of the third table is enlightening. The most
striking discrepancies concern Berger, Bellah and Luckmann32. This is not surprising:
31
I fixed no strict limit, but corrected the figures given in some cases on the basis of comparisons between
persons who mutually evaluated the intensity of their relationship. Thus, X was apt to declare that he had
met Y "perhaps 1000 times", whereas Y declared that he had met X "about 50 times". These comparisons
indicated that the comparison of the general trends given by different persons were fairly reliable, but that
the absolute numbers were much less reliable. Hence the necessity to make some corrections.
32
Other significant discrepancies concern Hervieu-Léger and Isambert. These are not very important for our
purposes and can easily be accounted for: these two sociologists are both members of the very influential
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
35
Berger and Bellah have never attended a meeting of the CISR. Furthermore, after writing
The Sacred Canopy, Berger changed his mind considerably on the subject of
secularization, and to a large extent dropped his interest in this topic33. Thus, not only is
he an outsider because he is an American, and never came to the CISR, but also because
he no longer really belongs to the community of sociologists of religion. Luckmann,
although he came several times to the CISR, is also an outsider, largely for the same
reasons as Berger: for two decades, he even more completely neglected the sociology of
religion.
The only two cases where the position as a theorist (according to the first table)
and the social position (third table) coincide are those of Dobbelaere and Wilson. And
their social position can, in turn, explain the discrepancy between their positions in the
first and in the second table. These discrepancies are explained by the differences in the
judgements of the in-group with regard to the secularization paradigm (essentially the
CISR) and of the out-group. Although they are not as widely read as Berger or Bellah by
social scientists in general, their particular position in the CISR allows them to boost
their readership in this community, and thus to equal the more widely read scholars.
(These considerations will cause us to consider Dobbelaere's trend report, which we
should have had to discard if we had checked its popularity only in the SSCI, as a very
important piece of writing for the secularization paradigm.)
The number of ties Dobbelaere and Wilson maintain with the other respondents is
very impressive. Indeed, they can be considered to be standing at the very center of the
relational network that makes up the scholarly community which we were looking for.
This fact is particularly important in view of Wilson's immense prestige and influence in
British sociology of religion34 and of the important informal role he retains within the
CISR35. Furthermore, the relations between Wilson and Dobbelaere themselves are
particularly intense. First, Wilson's candidacy to the presidency of the CISR was
promoted and strongly backed by Dobbelaere36. Second, Wilson and Dobbelaere several
times invited each other to teach in their universities37. Third, Dobbelaere started working
Groupe de sociologie des religions (CNRS), and are thus in a central position in sociology of religion in
France - and 9 of my 20 respondents belong to the French-speaking world.
33
Although he did not lose his interest in religion.
34
Especially if we consider the "dispersal of Wilson's students and associates through British universities"
(Wallis and Brice 1989, p. 304).
35
Very much like former American presidents. Thus for instance, in Helsinki, when the General Assembly
had to choose a new name for the organization, Wilson, as a former president, was called by the president
(Dobbelaere) to give his very decisive advice.
36
Interview with Dobbelaere.
37
Interview with Dobbelaere.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
36
on his Trend Report during a 1977 Visiting Fellowship at Wilson's All Souls College in
Oxford (Dobbelaere 1981, p. 1). Finally, Wilson and Dobbelaere have written at least two
papers together38. The fact that the core of the community is constituted of two
sociologists whose combined influence is so important provides it with a particularly
solid foundation.
The best way to illustrate this situation is through a brief history of the evolution
of the debate. In 1967, Berger was very instrumental in proposing the first widely known
sociological secularization theory. This, as Robertson remarked (1971, p. 298), occurred
in conjunction with the growing interest in the sociology of knowledge, and in this
respect, the names of Berger and Luckmann are always associated. At this time,
Dobbelaere and Wilson - whose Religion in Secular Society (Wilson 1966), although the
idea and the word "secularization" were contained in it, was not as immediately
successful as Berger's book - were not very important names. Subsequently, both Berger
and Luckmann turned to other interests, and never came to be fully integrated in the
community of sociologist of religion. At the end of the 70s, a second wave of
secularization theories, much more firmly anchored in a community of sociologist of
religion - rather than in sociology of knowledge - erupted. At this time, Wilson wrote
several papers and books dealing much more explicitly with secularization (1975, 1976a,
1976b). Fenn (1978) and Martin (1978) proposed fully-fledged theories, and, shortly
thereafter, Dobbelaere summed the whole lot up in his Trend Report (1981). This second
wave was more than a coincidental flare-up: in fact, it was closely related to the
decompartmentalization of the CISR (see chap. 10), and these four sociologists are all
closely related to this organization. Martin, Wilson and Dobbelaere all acted as presidents
of the organization. Fenn always was a member without official duties - but he maintains
a considerable number of personal ties, as can be seen in the classification. In short, the
scholarly community in which the secularization paradigm is rooted is centered around
the CISR - although, as Dobbelaere explains (1989b, p. 385), it extends to sister
organizations like the SSSR,39 the ASR40, and the ISA. The persons who played - and still
play - an important role in the vindication of the paradigm (which Berger certainly does
not do) are the very persons who stood at the command of the CISR in the last decade.
38
In 1980 in Archives de sciences sociales des religions 50 (1), and in 1987 in the British Journal of
Sociology 37 (2).
39
Whose president, Meredith McGuire, represented the SSSR at the ICSR Helsinki meeting.
40
Whose president, Jim Beckford, was present in Helsinki.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
37
To summarize, the secularization paradigm has undoubtedly been very explicitly
vindicated by a concrete scholarly community41, gathered mainly around Wilson and
Dobbelaere, in the framework provided by the CISR. Other sociologists who are
important from a theoretical point of view and who stand very close to the center of this
community are Fenn, Luckmann, and Martin42. Others - Parsons, Berger, and Bellah - do
not belong to this community. But most of their writings and theoretical formulations
have been accepted by the community: they can therefore be considered as passive
carriers of the paradigm. The two other sociologists who appeared important from
consideration of the literature (Herberg and Yinger) have not been accepted by this
community, and will not be considered to be carriers of the paradigm.
The secularization paradigm has thus been recognized to have come into existence
in the 60s, and to be grounded in an identifiable scholarly community: the CISR. Until
now, I have been speaking somewhat vaguely of the "secularization paradigm". I can now
introduce the terminology I will be using throughout the rest of this book. The new
consensus that emerged in the 60s around the topic of secularization will be referred to as
the CISR secularization paradigm or, more briefly, the CISR paradigm. The next step in
the analysis will be to discuss the writings of the members of this community - and of the
other important authors who have been accepted by it - in order to identify the elements
of the paradigm.
41
One might want to object that an international association of scholars is too anomic to be considered a
scholarly community. However, this objection applies only if we consider the formal relations (exchanges
of views in official meetings). Behind this facade, there is a lively network of informal relations.
Furthermore, even at the formal level, the CISR can boast a somewhat more communitarian structure than
most other such associations: The mornings are always devoted to plenary sessions where most participants
sit together, since there are no parallel working sessions at this time of the day.
42
It is very unfortunate that I did not include Martin in my questionnaire. This conclusion is supported
mainly by informal discussions and consideration of Martin's active role in the ICSR.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
38
CHAPTER 4
THE CISR PARADIGM: A FIRST OVERVIEW
I will now delineate the main characteristics of the CISR paradigm, without much
critical elaboration. The evidence supporting this construction will be presented in
chapter 12. In presenting the elements of the paradigm, I will often underscore their
features by contrasting them with some of the assumptions held before the 1960s, that is,
before the paradigm had been established. I will first present the most abstract, then the
more concrete, levels of the paradigm.
The Meta-Theoretical Level and the Disciplinary Matrix
As noted in chapter 1, a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense consists of at least two
levels of abstraction. The first is meta-theoretical, the second infra-theoretical. At the
meta-theoretical level, the CISR paradigm rests on a series of beliefs and attitudes. Let us
first examine the beliefs. There are essentially two such beliefs: a philosophical
assumption, and an epistemological stance, itself largely derived from this assumption.
Most of the theoretical writings contained in the CISR paradigm share a common
philosophical assumption, which holds that man is simultaneously and inseparably a
rational and a religious being. This assumption contrasts very sharply with previous
thinking in this field, which was characterized by a dichotomy. Some thinkers thought
that man was a rational animal, and that religion was therefore doomed to disappear,
while others thought that he was essentially a religious animal, and that modernity must
therefore be combated.
Sociologists working within the CISR paradigm also share an epistemological
stance, which holds that sociology must be independent from religion and theology, while
at the same time remaining neutral by "bracketing" elements which fall outside of the
empirical realm. In this case also, the CISR paradigm stands in very sharp contrast to the
situation prevailing previously. Sociologists either considered that science could disprove
religion and should fight it or, contrariwise, that sociology was to be a mere tool in the
hands of the Church. The evolution leading to this new epistemological stance will be
shown to be closely related to the appearance and recognition of sociology of religion as a
speciality belonging to general sociology, yet distinctively autonomous inside of it.
So much for the meta-theoretical level. But before reaching the level of the
exemplars proper, we must rapidly discuss a number of other elements that belong to the
CISR paradigm - although it is not quite clear exactly how they fit into the Kuhnian
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
39
model. These elements are not beliefs, nor exemplars, but belong to an intermediate level
of abstraction, perhaps equivalent to what Kuhn calls the "disciplinary matrix" (Kuhn
1969, p. 182; Eckberg and Hill 1979, p. 926). This level is the result of technical choices
made by the sociologist.
Thus for example, the CISR paradigm contains an implicit definition of the area
which it covers. First, the paradigm is centered on a problematic that can be defined as
the relationship between modernization43 and religion. Thus, it clearly does not refer to
social change in general, but only to those aspects of social change that either have their
source in religion, or have consequences for religion. In other words, secularization must
not be confused with modernization per se (or with rationalization, societalization,
democratization, etc.), and attempts like those of Howard Becker (1957), who conceived
of secularization as a global process of social change, do not fit into the CISR paradigm.
Second, the CISR paradigm is centered on processes occurring at the macro-social level.
The church-sect typology, which was so central from Weber and Troeltsch to the
beginning of the 60s, is on the margins of the paradigm.
A majority of the persons who work inside the CISR paradigm also share a
definition of the object to be studied, that is, religion. This characteristic of the paradigm
is less unanimously shared than others. However, I will show that the approaches which
are closer to the "core" of the paradigm share a substantive definition of religion, whereas
some approaches which can be situated at the periphery of the paradigm tend to rely on a
functional definition44. But I will also show that where the approach becomes the most
relevant to the CISR paradigm, the definition of religion is indeed implicitly substantive as in the case of Luckmann (1967).
Finally, the CISR paradigm comprises a set of scientific habits, which determine
the means which are considered as appropriate for the study of the phenomenon. This
means, specifically, that sociologists working in the CISR paradigm typically engage in
broad historical analyses and theoretical reflections. These can be supplemented by
empirical material - generally collected by others - but the main focus is on
conceptualization, historical analysis, and theory. In this respect, the CISR paradigm
again stands in sharp contrast to the former scientific habits in the field, which laid stress
43
I use this term in a very loose fashion, to refer to all the transformations which can be related to the
transition from "traditional" to "modern" society - modern society being simply defined as the society in
which we live today in the West. This sloppy use of the term is justified by the fact that I use this term in a
metadiscursive way, to describe the theories I study, and that these different theories are all grounded on the
assumption that "modernization" has happened, but do generally not agree as to what it is.
44
Concerning the opposition between substantive and functional definitions of religion, see Robertson
1970, pp. 34-47.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
40
on an a-theoretical gathering of empirical material. I will show that the conflict between
these two sets of scientific habits is closely related to the institutional evolution of the
field.
The Infra-Theoretical Level
We now reach the bedrock of the paradigm, the level of the exemplars. As the
presentation of these elements is rather complex, I will first give a rapid overview of the
overall structure of this level. The precise content of the different exemplars will be
explained only after this global picture has been given. The reason for this procedure is
not only didactic. In the Kuhnian sense, a paradigm is a model, a relatively simple
construction, that can be apprehended fairly easily as a whole. Even though the technical
implementation of a paradigm may be very complex, its cognitive basis is simple, and can
be spelled out in a simple schema and no more than a few lines. This is what I will do
now.
The secularization paradigm is based on a core of three elements: differentiation,
rationalization, and worldliness. Each of these elements affects religion in a different
way. With differentiation, religion becomes a separate sphere of social life. With
rationalization, the non-religious sphere born from the process of differentiation starts to
function according to criteria of its own, which are rational45, non-religious. With
worldliness, the religious sphere born from differentiation loses more and more of what
constituted its own interest, to turn to interests peculiar to the non-religious sphere. These
three core elements are interrelated in several ways: rationalization and worldliness
presuppose differentiation, but differentiation itself proceeds according to criteria of
rationality and, in so far as the religious sphere becomes more worldly, it also becomes
more rational. The three core elements are then surrounded by a number of subordinate
elements, which can best be represented in a schema.
cf. Les theories de la secularisation, Genève: Droz, 1992
As can be seen from this schema, the subordinated elements are themselves
interrelated in numerous ways. Generalization and privatization represent two
complementary processes which both consist in a relocating of religion in modern
societies: religion strikes new roots in the private sphere on the one hand, and in the
45
In the sense of Zweckrationalität.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
41
cultural-political sphere on the other. Decline in practice and unbelief are related for
obvious reasons. Scientization and sociologization are both expressions of the more
general process of rationalization. Pluralization and rationalization work together to
undermine the plausibility of the traditional world view, causing it to collapse. This
collapse on the cultural level is closely related to unbelief on the individual level. Finally,
all these elements are situated in a field defined by the two introductory statements
situated in the upper part of the schema.
Let us now turn to a somewhat more detailed presentation of these exemplars,
starting with the two introductory statements situated in the upper part of the diagram.
FIRST INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Some of the roots of the process of modernization can be found in the religious
sphere itself. The classic statement of this exemplar is to be found in Weber's Protestant
Ethic, and has been thoroughly developed by Peter Berger.
SECOND INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Secularization does not imply the disappearance of religion. There is not really
any classic statement of this element, but it is implied in the whole sociological tradition
from Weber onwards, and is closely related to the philosophical assumption mentioned
above.
Let us now turn to the exemplars situated within the circle in the diagram.
FIRST CORE ELEMENT: DIFFERENTIATION
Functional differentiation is the prerequisite to any process of secularization. It is
a process by which the different institutional spheres in society become separated from
one another, and perform each a particular function. The classic statements of the idea of
functional differentiation abound, from Spencer and Durkheim to Parsons, and have been
totally incorporated in standard international sociology through functionalism.
FIRST CORRELATE OF DIFFERENTIATION: AUTONOMIZATION
The autonomization of society is one of the possible results of functional
differentiation. (It must be noted that functional differentiation does not automatically
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
42
imply autonomization, but is a prerequisite to it.) It implies a modification in the balance
of power between the religious and the non-religious spheres which originated in the
process of differentiation. (Seen from the religious point of view, this can also be
expressed as "marginalization".) On the social level, the power of social control of the
religious institution diminishes; it can no longer impose itself on social actors, but must
be "sold" on a free market. On the cultural level, the power of the religious symbols
declines, and the moral order is no longer religiously prescribed. This idea, which can be
found in various forms in the writings of several sociologists throughout the 20th century,
found its classic expression in the works of Berger and Wilson, and, although it is
logically subordinated to differentiation, it is one of the most important elements of the
CISR paradigm.
SECOND CORRELATE OF DIFFERENTIATION: PRIVATIZATION
Privatization is another possible consequence of differentiation. It is a process in
which religion, being no longer imposed, recedes from the public into the private sphere.
In parallel, this religion becomes more subjective, and established belief gives way to
personal interpretation. Every individual builds his own sacred cosmos by choosing
among the values available on the religious market. This position has found its classic
expression in the works of Luckmann and Bellah.
THIRD CORRELATE OF DIFFERENTIATION: GENERALIZATION
The logical complement of privatization is the generalization of religious world
views, beliefs and practices. It is a process by which symbols, values, norms, patterns of
behavior and interaction or types of organizations which originated in the religious sphere
are taken over in the secular sphere, and become dominant in this sphere after having
apparently lost their religious character. The classic statement of this position is of course
again to be found in the Protestant Ethic, and has been further developed by Parsons and
Bellah and, in a different way, by Luckmann. Very often, proponents of this view use it to
show that secularization has "not happened", but this need not concern us here. To justify
the incorporation of generalization in the CISR paradigm, it is sufficient to note that it fits
perfectly in the paradigm in the sense that it presupposes autonomization, and is
compatible with the other exemplars outlined here. Indeed, autonomization, privatization
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
43
and generalization can all be seen as part of a process of recomposition46 of religion in
modern society.
FOURTH CORRELATE OF DIFFERENTIATION: PLURALIZATION
Pluralization is another element tied to the idea of differentiation. It is a situation
in which cultural uniformity is no longer imposed by political authority, and the "sacred
canopy" splits into a multiplicity of competing world views. This applies to the nonreligious as well as to the religious sphere. In the religious sphere, it results in a situation
in which one religious world-view is set in competition with another religious world-view
(and no longer, as in the case of autonomization, only with a secular world-view) in an
open market. The classical statement of this position is to be found in all the works which
have been devoted to American religious pluralism, and has been incorporated into the
paradigm by Berger.
FIFTH CORRELATE OF DIFFERENTIATION: DECLINE IN PRACTICE
Another element closely related to the previous ones, but with a particular
position inside the CISR paradigm, is the decline in practice and affiliation. The
particularity of its position results from the fact that this element is not at all peculiar to
the CISR paradigm, but was already a prominent element in the views previoulsy held by
Catholic sociologists. Furthermore, the peculiarity of the position of religion in America
makes it difficult to consider this element as a recognized exemplar, although the trend is
considered as having been documented without doubt in Europe, in particular by Catholic
sociology. One way out of this dilemma is to state, as Luckmann does, that when there is
no decline in practice, this is because of internal secularization (1967, p. 37), or, as
Herberg does, that it is because religion in reality has come to fulfil another function
(1955, p. 261). Another way out is to state that secularization normally results in a decline
of practice, but need not have this result. Be this as it may, decline in practice appears as
one of the most peripheral and controversial elements of the CISR paradigm, indeed, as a
region where it seems to overlap with other paradigms.
46
I borrow the notion of recomposition from Hervieu-Léger and Champion 1986.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
44
SECOND CORE ELEMENT: RATIONALIZATION
Rationalization is a very general process by which certain areas of social life,
which were previously organized on a religious basis, come to be organized according to
criteria of means-ends rationality. Another way of expressing this transformation is to
speak of the transfer of things and ideas from the sacred realm to the profane. (Meansends rationality is, in effect, a complete negation of the sacred, in the sense that it reduces
things to their empirical functional value.) Although the classic statement of this process
is originally to be found in Weber, the way in which it is used in the CISR paradigm
(mainly by Wilson) departs from Weber insofar as rationalization includes mainly formal
rationality, and neglects substantive rationality (see chap. 8). Finally, it must be stressed
that rationalization is not only a transformation in the form of knowledge, but has a direct
impact on social life: it expresses itself in a rational economic order and administration,
in rational political and legal systems.
FIRST CORRELATE OF RATIONALIZATION: SCIENTIZATION
If we restrict the idea of rationalization to the area of knowledge, it can be seen as
scientization. It is then a process by which religion as a form of knowledge is replaced by
science. Classic statements of this more narrow process go back to the Enlightenment,
and hold a very central role in the less sophisticated approaches situated in the framework
of the CISR paradigm. But, even if somewhat relativized by its incorporation in the
broader rationalization process in the more complete approaches, scientificization never
loses its importance.
SECOND CORRELATE OF RATIONALIZATION: SOCIOLOGIZATION
If we combine the rationalization trend with the scientization of knowledge
concerning society, we obtain sociologization. This implies that, as a result of
rationalization, the determination of the social order is no longer left to chance or to
tradition. Sociology more or less takes on the function of religion - which traditionally
played a fundamental role in the definition of the social order - and, through social
engineering, helps define a rational social order. This element holds a very particular
position in the paradigm, for it is almost never explicitly recognized - although Wilson,
the most extreme of the secularization theorists working in the modern paradigm, does
recognize it.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
45
FIRST FLOATING CORRELATE: COLLAPSE OF THE WORLD VIEW
In a sociology of knowledge perspective, the collapse of the world-view, or sacred
canopy, is one of the consequences of pluralism, and must thus be considered a correlate
of differentiation. The very competition among different world views in effect drasitically
diminishes the plausibility of each of the competing views. This position has been most
consistently put forward by Berger and by Luckmann. But in another, partly preparadigmatic view that still survives in some theories (for example Wilson's), the collapse
of the world view is related to scientization: it is science as a world view that threatens
the dominant position of religion and causes it to lose ots plausibility. In this second
view, collapse of the world view must be related to rationalization, and not to
differentiation - hence its "floating" position.
SECOND FLOATING CORRELATE: UNBELIEF
The second floating element, which is in some ways related to decline of practice,
is unbelief. It is a process situated at the individual level, in which persons cease to
believe in a supernatural reality, or lose the sense of the sacred. As such - if unbelief is
considered to be an automatic result of secularization which applies to all individuals in a
society - it does precisely not belong to the CISR paradigm, but to pre-paradigmatic
views. In the framework of the CISR paradigm, this view has been restricted to a
statistical sense, namely, that one of the results of secularization is a decline in the
proportion of believers - which does not even imply that a majority of the population has
ceased to believe. But even so, this position, like the position concerning the decline of
practice, is one of the points on which the "mopping-up" work - in the form of numerous
surveys - has the most efficiently challenged the paradigm, up to a point where unbelief
has become of very minor significance in the paradigm as a whole.
THIRD CORE ELEMENT: WORLDLINESS
This last core element is, in a way, subordinated to the two other core elements for it presupposes a differentiation, and has one of its most important roots in the process
of rationalization. It must nevertheless be dealt with separately. On the social level,
worldliness is a process (in this sense, I could also use the German term verweltlichung,
which conveys the idea of a process) through which societies, groups or organizations
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
46
turn their attention from the supernatural to this world - for instance in that they allocate a
lesser amount of scarce goods or resources to other-worldly purposes. On the cultural
level, it is a process by which a distinctively this-worldly ethic takes the place of an otherworldly ethic. (This transformation can comprise the transition from sect to church. But
as the CISR paradigm is concerned mainly with developments occurring on the macrolevel, this aspect of the question is of secondary importance here.) In contrast to the case
of autonomization, there is no reference to power in this element. The classic statement of
this position is obviously again to be found in the Protestant Ethic as far as the cultural
level is concerned.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
47
CHAPTER 5
ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
Unfortunately, we are not quite done yet with methodological considerations.
Before embarking upon our journey through history, it is necessary to briefly discuss what
I take to be the proper way to conduct an investigation in the history of ideas. In effect,
the way I have proceeded up to this point raises an important question. By presenting the
CISR paradigm first, and then looking backwards in time for its genesis, I run the risk of
reducing the problems addressed by past sociologists to those considered legitimate in our
own time. The danger is quite real, and I am determined to do all I can to avoid this
mistake. To achieve this purpose, there seems to be no better way than to discuss the
views of one of the most recent and successful adversaries of this type of reductionism:
the historian of political science Quentin Skinner.
Quentin Skinner's intentionalism
Since the publication of Skinner's Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas in 1969, a debate has been going on among historians of science, and also among
sociologists, as to the proper methodology for the understanding of past texts. This debate
has led to the development of a new approach in the history of sociology, which was
introduced mainly by Robert Alun Jones (1977; 1983). The main point raised by the
proponents of this new approach is that ideas must be understood in the context in which
they were produced, and that failure to do so results in what has been dubbed a
"presentist" position, that is, a position where ideas situated in the past are illegitimately
reduced to present concerns.
As stated above, this debate has far-reaching implications for my own work. How,
for instance, must Weber's position on secularization be understood? As is well-known,
Weber did not use the term "secularization" very often. In spite of this, he is often
considered the father of secularization theory, and many modern sociologists read a
secularization theory into his writings. Is this procedure legitimate? This question cannot
be answered on the basis of mere expediency. To ground our answer in a sound and
systematic methodological perspective, we must, for a moment, step out of the framework
provided by the secularization debate itself.
The two opposed views on the way the history of ideas ought to be practiced can
best be exemplified by Parsons on the one hand, and by a certain reading of Skinner on
the other. In the Structure of Social Action, Parsons seeks to demonstrate that there exists
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
48
"an 'immanent' development within the body of social theory and knowledge of empirical
fact itself" (Parsons 1937, p. 5). To demonstrate this, Parsons chose to analyze four
authors who had worked in very different contexts: "It would scarcely be possible to
choose four men who had important ideas in common who were less likely to have been
influenced in developing this common body of ideas by factors others than the immanent
development of the logic of theoretical systems in relation to empirical fact" (1937, p. 14,
emphasis in original). Indeed, Parsons explicitly stated that factors such as the "influence
of the general 'climate of opinion'" were "irrelevant to the purpose of [his] study" (1937,
p. 13). As has been pointed out by Steven Seidman, this approach implies a positivist
philosophy of science, which views social science as a cumulative enterprise (Seidman
1983, p. 80).
If I chose to follow the perspective exemplified by Parsons, my investigation
would need to be designed to uncover the "immanent logic" underlying the development
of "secularization theory", from the first "incomplete attempts" of Weber to the complete,
"stable" theoretical system to be found in the CISR paradigm.
The most radical alternative to this approach can be exemplified by a certain way
of reading Skinner. According to Seidman, for instance, "the historicist maintains that
each generation of scientists faces a unique subject matter and set of problems that reflect
a particular sociohistorical constitution of society" (1983, p. 85). Likewise, Joseph Femia
presents Skinner as stating that "there are no universal truths or perennial questions [...].
Past thought must be completely dissolved in its precise context [...]; it possesses no
capacity for independent life" (Femia 1981, p. 157). In the framework provided by this
reading of Skinner's position, my investigation would have to be set up to enable me to
show that there is no such thing as a history of "secularization theory", and that the CISR
paradigm was created ex nihilo in the 60s. All the previous uses of the term should thus
be shown to be unrelated to each other, and the "immanent logic" of the development of
secularization theory would crumble into a heap of independent statements. (Of course,
this is not really Skinner's position.)
What methodology, then, will I implement in my own research? I do not want to
engage in an elaborate discussion of the merits and drawbacks of the two perspectives
presented. This would take me too far away from my concerns. What I will do, instead, is
simply state explicitly which course of action I intend to follow, without much critical
elaboration. The advantages offered by the methodology I am going to apply will not be
demonstrated in theory, but in practice, by showing that it allows me to shed more light
on the material concerning the history of the idea of secularization.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
49
I will first present my method in very general terms. Subsequently, I will discuss
more in detail some of the technical procedures it implies. The first step I will take in my
analysis will be to implement a radically historicist approach. It seems obvious to me that,
if I want to answer the question "What did Weber say with regard to what we today call
secularization?", I must be very careful to understand what he said in his own terms, not
in ours. The technical problems involved in this - most notably those which revolve
around the question of intentionality - will be taken up at a further stage of this
discussion.
As we will see, this position will lead me to the conclusion that Weber's use of the
term secularization was purely descriptive, and that whatever theory (if any) he put forth
concerning what we today call secularization did not involve a systematic use of this
term. Furthermore, I will be led to show that, when he developed his "theories" of
rationalization and/or of disenchantment, Weber's concerns were different from the
concerns of modern sociologists of religion.
But what next? In spite of all this, Weber's impact on modern sociology of
religion cannot be ignored; to take just one example, Berger's secularization theory owes
much to Weber's writings. Does this mean that we must, after all, revert to an
"immanentist" or "presentist" position, and consider that Weber's attempt was a step "in
the right direction", but only a first step? Shall we assume that Weber failed to fully grasp
the implications of the idea of secularization, which was somehow "out there"? I think
not. I think that we can account for Weber's impact on modern sociology of religion by
continuing to use an historicist method. As a second step in the implementation of this
method, I will concentrate on Berger's text, and ask two different questions. The first is
the same we already posed in relation to Weber's text: "What did Berger say with regard
to what we today call secularization?". The second, which will enable us to establish the
link between Weber's and Berger's approaches, is: "What did Berger say that Weber had
said with regard to what we today call secularization?".
Only this two-fold procedure can enable us to understand the genesis of the
secularization paradigm. To say that Berger found the idea of secularization in Weber
presupposes neither that Weber had put it into his text, nor that the contemporary reader
would have been able to find it there. To reformulate this important point: One the one
hand, I will be analyzing the history of the secularization issue in terms of the genesis of a
paradigm - that is, by superimposing on the texts I am analyzing a classification and a
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
50
series of categories that are usually not used in them47. But on the other hand, I propose to
apply a Skinnerian methodology - that is, a methodology in principle precisely opposed to
this kind of "presentist" reading. In other words, Skinner would probably argue that Max
Weber, for instance, cannot be considered to have contributed to the modern
secularization paradigm, since he naturally knew nothing of it. Does this mean that there
an insuperable contradiction in my methodology? I think not. I would admit that there is a
tension in it. But I would also argue that this tension, if correctly controlled, should prove
to be beneficial to my endeavor: It will compel me to straddle the ridge, always watching
my step in order to avoid falling on either side, thus avoiding any simplistic appraisal. To
reformulate in less poetic terminology: My aim is to determine just to what extent
secularization as it is discussed today is a pure produce of the 60s, and to what extent it is
heir to a longer tradition. To do this, I cannot rely exclusively on any single methodology:
I am compelled to choose a difficult, uncomfortable approach.
This procedure clearly implies that the text as such does not have a specific
meaning. A text can be meaningful only in relation to a given context. Which of these
contexts - the present or the past - are to be considered legitimate for the interpretation of
the text is a question of point of view or, in other words, of the question the researcher
asks. All that needs to be carefully distinguished is the past meaning of a text, and its
present meaning.
What consequences does this procedure have with regard to the question of the
"immanent logic" of ideas? It seems to me that this procedure remains neutral or, in other
words, allows us to answer the question of the immanent quality of a theoretical
development on an empirical basis. And the answer may vary from case to case: even if
some theoretical developments are not immanent, others may be. By carefully
distinguishing between past and present possible meanings, this procedure allows us to
assess which exactly were the ideas that were developed through a concrete chain of
influence, and which - if any - were developed independently by different writers, that is,
through the influence of an immanent logic. Furthermore, by allowing us to take into
account the differential impact of different historical contexts, this procedure allows us to
take into account a third factor beside influence and immanence, that is, context.
To summarize, the method I will use is based on relativist presuppositions in the
sense that the history of an idea is to a large extent considered to be the history of the
transformations of the meanings of different texts in the eyes of different readers. It is
47
Which does not mean, however, that I consider these categories to correspond to the writer's
intentions in a Skinnerian sense.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
51
relativist in the sense that a text can never be said to have a fixed meaning. But the
method is also based on non-relativist presuppositions in the sense that, at any given
period, the context in which a text was written does determine its meaning if we take this
period as a frame of reference. Thus, every reader is trapped in a particular historical
setting: even if it is possible for him, through the application of a careful methodology, to
familiarize himself with past historical settings, he can never get ahead of his time.
Hence, the later historian of ideas has one superiority over his predecessors: he possesses
one more context through which he can read a past text.
I must now turn to a more detailed discussion of the implementation of Skinner's
method. I will discuss four points: the different pitfalls that must be avoided, the rules
that must be followed to establish that a writer influenced another writer, what is needed
to "understand an idea in its context", and the more difficult and general question of what
it means to recover the meaning of a text.
The two first points are quite straightforward, and I will accept them without any
discussion. First, Skinner has presented the different pitfalls which must be avoided as a
list of different "mythologies". First, the "mythology of doctrines" corresponds to "the
expectation that each classic writer [...] will be found to enunciate some doctrine on each
of the topics regarded as constitutive of the subject" (1969, p. 32). This kind of
mythology is very present in the discussion on secularization: modern sociologists of
religion often turn to Weber with the intent of finding out what exactly Weber's theory
was with regard to secularization. A second form of this mythology Skinner mentions
(1969, p. 36) is also present in discussions on secularization: Durkheim is sometimes
blamed for "not having a secularization theory". The second type of mythology is the
"mythology of coherence" (1969, p. 39). Thus, to revert to the example of Weber, some
sociologists seem to find it unfortunate that Weber's position with regard to
disenchantment or rationalization was not sufficiently clearly stated, and endeavor to
"recover" the coherence they think "must somehow be there". The next mythology is the
"mythology of prolepsis", which arises "when the historian is more interested - as he may
legitimately be - in the retrospective historical significance of a given work or action than
in its meaning for the agent himself" (1969, p. 44). This, again, is what happens when
Weber is hailed as the "father of secularization theory". The last mythology is the
"mythology of parochialism" (1969, p. 45), which arises, for instance, when "the historian
may conceptualize an argument in such a way that its alien elements are redescribed into
an apparent but misleading familiarity" (1969, p. 47).
Skinner completes this negative advice with some positive rules concerning "the
necessary conditions [...] for helping to explain the appearance in any writer B of any
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
52
doctrine, by invoking the 'influence' of some earlier given writer, A" (1969, p. 46). The
conditions, as set forth by Skinner, are: "(a) that there should be a genuine similarity
between the doctrines of A and B; (b) that B could not have found the relevant doctrine in
any writer other than A; (c) that the probability of a similarity being random should be
very low" (1969, p. 46). In fact, it could seem at first sight that this test is most clearly
passed in one precise case: when a writer explicitly acknowledges his debt to his
predecessor. And this is much more often the case in the heavily institutionalized
framework of the modern social sciences than it was in the period Skinner is used to
studying. However, this method can be very misleading: a writer can acknowledge one of
his predecessors for a number of reasons, some of which may not be intrinsically
scientific - thus, there is an implicit rule that, in any good sociological research, one ought
to cite Weber - or result from a misunderstanding of the author who is cited.
The next point is designed to prevent any misunderstanding of what is implied in
the "contextualist approach". For what Skinner means by context is different from what is
usually understood under this term. Indeed, in the 1969 article, the contextualist approach
was one of the two positions Skinner criticized (1969, p. 59). He charged that, by
ignoring the intentions of the concrete human agent who performed a linguistic act, this
approach, even in the cases where it enabled us to explain an act, did not allow us to
understand it. In order to understand an act, we must replace the utterance in its linguistic
context: "The essential aim, in any attempt to understand the utterances themselves, must
be to recover this complex intention on the part of the author. And it follows from this
that the appropriate methodology for the history of ideas must be concerned, first of all, to
delineate the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally
performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance, and, next, to
trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider linguistic context as a
means of decoding the central intention of the given writer" (1969, pp. 63-64, emphasis in
original).
The last, and much more difficult question concerns the method which must be
applied in order to recover the meaning of a text. I will start with Skinner's well-known
and very convenient example: "Consider the case of a policeman who sees a skater on a
dangerous pond and issues to the skater the following serious utterance: 'The ice over
there is very thin'" (Skinner 1972, p. 83). The question Skinner asks in order to
understand the meaning of this utterance is: What was the policeman doing in issuing this
utterance? As this example shows, the answer to this question cannot be given simply by
analyzing the meaning of the utterance as such. The context tells us that, in issuing this
utterance, the policeman was probably warning the skater. This act is what, following J.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
53
L. Austin (1962), Skinner calls an illocutionary act48, that is, not simply the issuing of an
utterance, but an action performed in issuing this utterance. To illustrate, consider briefly
an example drawn from How to Do Things With Words, the book on which the whole
speech act theory on which Skinner relies is founded. In pronouncing the utterance "I
name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", I do much more than issue an utterance: I perform
the act of naming the ship (Austin 1962, p. 5). To quote Skinner again, "any agent, in
issuing any serious utterance, will be doing something as well as merely saying
something, and will be doing something in saying what he says, and not merely as a
consequence of what is said" (1972, p. 83). Skinner's point is that the meaning of an
utterance cannot be understood by itself, if detached from its context, but can be
understood only if we recover the intention of the person who issued the utterance.
These considerations led Skinner to conclude that a writer must always be granted
a "special authority" over his own intentions (Skinner 1969, p. 48). But, some of his
critics countered, this equivalence between meaning and intention is wrong: Surely, in
some instances, the meaning of what he says escapes a given agent, or, conversely, a
given agent may be unable to make himself understood (Graham 1981, p. 151; Femia
1981, p. 172).
In a later text (1988), Skinner grudgingly accepted this rather obvious caveat which he had tended to overlook before, although he had mentioned it casually time and
again - and set himself to the task of fully developing the consequences of the possibility
of unintentional illocutionary force. The complete reconstruction of Skinner's causal
chain can be presented as follows. The first cause of a given statement - and hence, the
ultimate element in the light of which it should be understood - are the reasons an agent
has for possessing a motive (1972, p. 89). If we revert to the example of the policeman,
we could say that the policeman's professional culture had stamped on him a sense of
duty49, which led him to warn the skater. But Skinner does not fully develop this
important point. Next in the causal chain are the agent's motives. As already mentioned,
the policeman's motive could be professional duty, but it could equally well simply be
fear - a genuine, brotherly fear that the skater might drown. Any of these motives
(situated at the causal level of analysis, in the positivist tradition) might prompt the
policeman to act - that is to say, to issue his utterance, to perform an illocutionary act. But
in order to understand this act, we must no longer situate the analysis at the causal level,
48
By contradistinction with the "locutionary" or "propositional" meaning, which is the meaning of
the sentence as such (Tully 1988, p. 8).
49
This example and some of the following are not drawn from Skinner.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
54
but at the level of comprehension - in the verstehende tradition: We now understand that
the policeman had an intention, which was to warn the skater.
Depending on the situation, the policeman's intention may be conveyed to the
skater, or may fail to be conveyed. We can easily imagine a number of reasons for failure.
In any case, the conveyed meaning might be different from the intended meaning. This
conveyed meaning, Skinnner calls the illocutionary force (1988, pp. 265-66).
Now, the question is, what is it that must be recovered if we want to understand
the meaning of an utterance? The illocutionary act, or the illocutionary force? Skinner's
answer is the following: "I have tried to distinguish two questions about the meaning and
understanding of texts. One is the question of what the text means, the other the question
of what its author may have meant. I have argued that, if we are to understand a text, both
questions must be answered" (1988, p. 271).
On the basis of the relativist position exposed earlier, I would like to add a further
distinction to Skinner's. In reality, we must ask at least three questions: 1) what the author
may have meant; 2) what the text may have meant in the original context; 3) what the text
may mean in a more recent context.
Which of these questions we are going to answer depends on the original question
we are posing. If our intent is to understand the author as a person, on a psycho-analytical
level, then surely we must try to discover what he may have meant. But if we want to
understand the impact an idea had in its historical context, we will want to understand
what it meant for a contemporary reader. And if we want to understand the impact an idea
had on subsequent generations, we will be interested in understanding what the text may
have meant in this more recent context.
Now, what is the question I am myself asking in this study on the history of the
secularization issue? My main interest is in the genesis of the paradigm. I will therefore
concentrate on the different meanings a text may have spawned as it was passed from one
generation of readers to the next. It might therefore seem as though Skinner's approach
could be of no help to me, for to understand this, I probably do not need to recover the
original meaning of a text, let alone its author's intentions. But this is not so. For, to
understand the genesis of a paradigm, I must be able to understand whence an idea came
from. As already mentioned, we can imagine at least three sources: influence,
immanence, and historical context. For instance, whenever a modern reader has
superimposed a new reading on an old text, we must conclude that he did not develop his
idea so much through influence - although he might have gained an intellectual stimulus
through this text - as through another factor, which might as well be the immanent
theoretical development of the field as the historical context. But, in order to be able to
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
55
tell when exactly a reader superimposed an alien reading upon a text, we must be able to
recover its original meaning. I will therefore have to answer at least the last two
questions.
But what about the first question? At first sight, the history of ideas is concerned
with ideas that had a certain amount of public currency. Weber's private thoughts - no
matter how great a man he was - are certainly of no great direct historical significance.
But again, we must refuse this too easy dismissal. The history of ideas is not concerned
solely with the transmission and the transformation of ideas, but also with their
production. And ideas are produced by individuals. This is not to say that we must fall
back on a naive psychologistic position. For individuals can only produce the ideas that
are available to them in a given time. Aristotle could never have produced relativity
theory - nor, for that matter, Parson's systems theory. To fully understand the genesis of
an idea, we must take into consideration the dynamic interplay between the individual
author and his, or her historical context. And in order to grasp this dynamic nexus in
which new ideas are produced, we must do all that is in our power to recover the author's
intentions.
To summarize: In my research, I propose to apply as systematically as possible
Skinner's methodology every time I am able to do so. This implies, first, that I will try to
recover - beyond the meaning of a text - the author's intention, that is, the illocutionary
act he performed. Unfortunately, this will not always be possible. Second, I will do all I
can to grasp the meaning a text had in its historical context - that is, the contemporary
illocutionary force. Finally, I will also endeavor to understand how this original meaning
has been modified through subsequent readings - that is, the anachronistic illocutionary
force.
As will become evident, in the following analysis, I am not going to quote Skinner
every time I provide an interpretation of a past text. Explicit references to the Skinnerian
method will be rare - the matter at hand is sufficiently complex to avoid superimposing to
is a scholastically contrived methodology. The only point where I will explicitly invoke
Skinner at some length is in the anlysis of a recent period - the "secularization debate"
that occurred in the 60s and 70s. But Skinner's methodology will remain present
throughout this study as an implicit standard, against which the plausibility of my
interpretations can always be tested.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
56
Appendix: An Important Technical Remark
Before turning to the historical part proper, a brief - but very important - technical
remark is in order. How will I proceed concretely in order to avoid writing a "whiggish"
account every time I mention an exemplar? Conversely, how will I proceed to avoid
totally isolating a given author in his own context every time I apply a Skinnerian
methodology? Some of the ways in which I will do this cannot be set forth a priori, but
will depend on a number of circumstances, which will have to be dealt with by
improvisation. At this point, using the formulation of one of Skinner's critics, I would
contend that sometimes, indeed, there is "remarkably little that can profitably be said in
general" (Minogue 1981, p. 186). But one of the techniques I will use is fairly simple, and
can be presented immediately.
Confusion in the forthcoming analysis between my own analytical categories (the
"exemplars" defined in WPs # 2 and 3) and the authors' categories can be avoided by the
use of a simple editorial convention. Every time I will use one of my own categories
while the author is not using it himself, this category will be followed by an asterisk (i.e.,
differentiation*). This device will allow us to become aware, as the analysis proceeds, of
the emergence of the elements contained in the exemplars which interest us while
avoiding any risk of terminological - and substantive - confusion. Exemplars that are not
followed by an asterisk were used by the author - either in the same sense as I do, or in a
different sense50.
Finally, one last technical comment: Throughout the following discussion, all the
italics within citations are the authors'. I have added no italics. From here on, I will no
longer note: "emphasis in original".
50
A few other technical remarks must also be made at this point. First, any italics inside quotation
marks are the author's; I have added none. Second, I have used two different types of quotation marks; the "
" indicate a quotation; the ' ' indicate parts which the author himself put into quotation marks in the part I am
quoting. Finally, the dates of the references refer to the date of the original publication (which is in ( ) in the
bibliography if this first publication is not the one I actually used), but the pagination refers to the later
publication (which is not put into ( ) in the bibliography) whenever there is one. Dates in [ ] indicate that a
chapter in a book appeared at that earlier date as a paper in a journal (but the pagination again refers to the
later publication).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
57
CHAPTER 6
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE GENESIS OF THE CISR PARADIGM
The whole methodology of the research having thus been set forth, we can now
embark upon the historical part by giving a first very brief overview of the history we are
going to cover in the rest of this part of the book.
The whole history of the development of the CISR paradigm must be seen against
a general background: the apparent crisis of religion which started at the time of the
Enlightenment. This crisis has gone through different phases, some of which can be
summarized under familiar headings: French Revolution, British secularism, German
Kulturkampf, liberal theology, oecumenism and Vatican II Council. Although they are in
most respects very different, all these events share some common elements: they are all
related to the transformations of institutional religion resulting from the advent of
modernity.
The first important event against this background is the rise of positivist social
science, which held a view of secularization in which religion was doomed to disappear.
In this context, the word "secularization" itself was sometimes employed, but more often
in the political field than in the "scientific field". Thus, Comte thought that traditional
religion would disappear, but did not use the word secularization. But some of the ideas
which were later going to be accepted in the CISR paradigm (i.e.: differentiation)
appeared in this period (see chap. 7).
The second important event against this background is the emergence of classical
sociological theory at the turn of the century. In contrast to the positivistic period, this
period witnessed the emergence of some of the most important ideas which were later to
be taken over into the secularization paradigm (i.e.: rationalization, worldliness),
reformulated some of the others which had already been expressed in the positivistic
tradition (i.e.: differentiation), and used the word secularization on some occasions, but
very unsystematically (see chap. 8 and 9).
The third important event is the rise of an empirical sociology of religion in the
period preceding and following World War II, mainly under the impulse of Catholic
sociologists. The approach typical of this period stands in sharp contrast to the later CISR
paradigm, and can best be understood through its genesis. First, Catholic sociology
depended on a world view which we could loosely define as "classical (or neo-classical)
theology", that is, a theology which had not yet drawn all the conclusions of the crisis of
religion. However, Catholic sociology was, in a different way, a response to this same
religious crisis, for one of the factors explaining its rise was a deep concern over the sharp
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
58
decline in practice characterizing this period. Finally, Catholic sociology was
characterized by a set of scientific habits directly derived from American empirical
sociology, that is, a largely a-theoretical gathering of "facts". The combination of these
factors enables us to define Catholic sociology as an attempt to use empirical research
methods in order to find a solution to the "crisis of the Church" (see chap. 10).
The fourth important event, again situated against the general background of the
perceived crisis of religion, is the emergence of secular theology, in the 50s and 60s. This
theology provided a new world-view in which, by contrast to classical theology,
modernization was no longer considered as intrinsically evil. Secular theologians held
that the crisis of the church should not be resolved through a return to the previous
situation, but through an adaptation of religion to the new prevailing conditions (see chap.
11).
The fifth important event is the religious revival which occurred in the United
States in the 50s. This revival suddenly brought religion back to the center of the stage as
an important element for sociological investigation. The study of religion, which had
hitherto been left to Catholic researchers, became a topic of interest for professional
sociologists, and sociology of religion very rapidly acquired a recognized, although not
very prestigious status, in the sociological field (see chap. 10).
We are now in a position to understand the emergence of the secularization
paradigm in the 60s. First, a new development in the "religious crisis", which had found
its provisional epilogue in Vatican II, resulted in a loosening of the grip of the Church on
Catholic sociology. Catholic sociologists, in turn, feeling partially demoralized by the
evolution of the situation, lost some of their belief in the virtues of empirical religious
sociology. Second, the arrival of professional sociologists in the field of religious studies
as a result of the American religious revival led to a reconsideration of the importance of
the theoretical aspect of sociology of religion, which took the form of a return to the
classics. This arrival of new actors in the field also resulted in a shift of emphasis in the
scientific habits, from a-theoretical empirical investigation to theoretically informed
empirical investigation, or event to pure theory. Third, the development of secular
theology made it possible to consider the fate of religion in modern society under a new
light, no longer as a decline, but as a transformation, an adaptation to the new conditions,
which could even yield positive results. Thus, in a few years, a completely new way of
studying religion in modern society appeared, and a new generation of scholars sent the
aging Catholic sociologists back to their churches. What happened in these years deserves
to be called an intellectual revolution (the equivalent of the Kuhnian scientific revolution,
but in the social sciences). This revolution was made possible not through a conversion of
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
59
sociologists to new evidence, but through a power struggle resulting in the elimination of
an older generation and the rise of a new one (see chap. 10).
The new names which became dominant in the field in the 60s are still very
dominant today. By the same token, the new paradigm they imposed is still the dominant
paradigm today. Although it shows some signs of aging, it still holds an excellent
explanatory value, and no new generation of sociologists of religion has made its
appearance on the scene yet (see chap. 12 and 13).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
60
CHAPTER 7
THE PREHISTORY OF THE SECULARIZATION ISSUE
In the present chapter, we will cover the history of the secularization issue from
the first mention of the term "secularization", in 1646, to the turn of the 20th century. The
use of the term "prehistory" to designate this phase is justified to the extent that presentday sociologists never refer to the writings of this period in their theories. These writings
thus constitute, as it were, an "unconscious", or "unwritten" substratum within the CISR
secularization paradigm.
I will make no attempt at providing an all-encompassing history of these early
developments. For one thing, they are sufficiently numerous to provide material for - at
least - a whole dissertation51. For another, we are interested in this early debate only to the
extent that it allows us to gain a better understanding of the genesis of the CISR paradigm
and of the approaches surrounding it. For these reasons, I will only marginally touch upon
the developments that took place either in the social-political sphere or in intellectual
fields such as anthropology or political theory, and devote most of this chapter to a
discussion of three figures central to the development of sociology and of the
secularization issue: Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Ferdinand Tönnies.
Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer
The early debate about the place of religion in a modern society was cast in terms
very different from those prevailing in the CISR paradigm. The debate largely revolved
around the question of the conflict between religion and science. In the political turmoil
accompanying and following the French revolution, science was seen by many as the only
solution to humanity's problems. Past societies were doomed because they were based on
religion, but the new society emerging to replace the old was to be based on a rational
understanding of the social order.
This was a central problem for both Comte and Spencer. The problem these two
thinkers saw themselves as addressing can be summarized as follows. Given the fact that
the traditional legitimation of society is rapidly vanishing52, how is the new social order
51
Detailed accounts of these developments have been provided by historians of science (see for example
Lindberg and Numbers 1986).
52
Comte expressed this feeling quite dramatically in the first lines of his Plan des travaux scientifiques:
"Un système social qui s'éteint, un autre système parvenu à son entière maturité et qui tend à se constituer,
tel est le caractère fondamental assigné à l'époque actuelle par la marche générale de la civilisation" (1822,
p. 55).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
61
envisioned by sociology to be sustained? As we will see presently in more detail, Comte's
and Spencer's answers were very different. But on one point at least, they fully agreed:
religion must be replaced by science.
Indeed, not only did Comte and Spencer want to replace religion by science, but
their "rational" systems themselves took on characteristics which, in retrospect, appear
more religious than scientific. Both thinkers reacted to the diminishing role of religion in
their societies - which entailed a good measure of anxiety as to the place of man in the
universe - by proposing a new answer of their own to the old religious question of the
relation between "this world" and the cosmos. In doing so, both of them went much
farther than pure reason and science (at least as we understand them today) would have
allowed, proposing new schemes in which every item "here below" found its
correspondent "over above". Both Comte and Spencer proposed schemes in which the
most insignificant features of this world were somehow in harmony with the global
structure of the cosmos. According to Comte, "our social evolution is [...] in reality
nothing but the most extreme development of a general progression, continued without
interruption in the whole organic realm, from the simple plants and the lesser animals"
(Comte 1839, p. 202). In Spencer, even more perhaps than in Comte, the subsuming of all
social processes under a universal law provided a reassuring ordering of every
individual's daily experience53. Everything fell nicely into place under a single law:
complexification. As Lewis Coser correctly stresses, "Spencer formulated a universal
explanatory scheme for those in quest of certainty, which in a previous age only religious
doctrines could provide" (Coser 1971, p. 123). As a matter of fact, not only did the
theories put forward by Comte and Spencer provide a new way of mapping the world;
such a mapping was implicit in the sheer form in which these theories were planned and
executed. Both attempts were encyclopaedic, extremely systematic and dogmatic, as is
exemplified by the fact that both of them were set out in multi-volume works which had
been planned well in advance, and which covered all the areas of knowledge.
Now, as we will see, the CISR paradigm is concerned only marginally with such
questions. From a broad historical perspective, the genesis of the CISR paradigm can be
interpreted as the gradual emergence of a more distinctively "social-structural" view of
the secularization process, as contrasted with the previous, more "anthropologically" (in
53
As Jack London wrote in his autobiographical novel Martin Eden: "And here was the man Spencer,
organizing all knowledge for him, reducing everything to unity, elaborating ultimate realities, and
presenting to his startled gaze a universe so concrete of realization that it was like the model of a ship such
as sailors make and put into glass bottles. There was no caprice, no chance. All was law. [...] All the hidden
things were laying their secrets bare. He was drunken with comprehension" (London, quoted in Budd 1977,
p. 139).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
62
the sense of a philosophical anthropology, or general conception of "man") inspired view.
In effect, to the extent that it is based mainly on the differentiation exemplar, the CISR
paradigm is inherently social-structural: differentiation (as defined in the paradigm) is
strictly a social-structural process. In contrast, by modern standards, the views of the
founders of sociology were more anthropological (in the sense indicated above) than
sociological.
Does this imply that there is no connection between XIXth century sociology and
the CISR paradigm? Strictly speaking, there is no direct link between Comte and Berger,
between Spencer and Parsons54, or between Tönnies and Wilson55. However, as we will
see, a number of indirect links are evident. In chapter 1, we have discussed how
exemplars acquired a "timeless" quality. To give an obvious example, Spencer directly
influenced Durkheim, who in turn influenced the carriers of the CISR paradigm. It is not
my intention to provide even a tentative map of these links between early secularization
theory and the paradigm. What I will do instead will be to focus on one particularly
important locale where a first evolution in the direction of the new approach is evident.
The first evidence of a differentiation between a "anthropological" and a more "socialstructural" approach can be noted in the gap between the views of Comte, who is literally
obsessed by self-reference, and the views of Spencer, who relies more on a structuralfunctional analysis.
To my knowledge, Comte never used the word secularization. Spencer used it at
least once in a context which will be mentioned below, but he did not give it a central
theoretical significance. As is the case with most other thinkers in the XVIIIth and XIXth
centuries, discussions concerning the fate of religion are placed in the framework of the
religion/science problematic. This is the set of problems that must be examined to
understand Comte's and Spencer's positions on the subject of what we today call
secularization.
The first difficulty in any attempt to compare these two authors is that, even
though they were contemporaries and focused their attentions on very similar questions,
Comte and Spencer were not much interested in each other's work. From a modern
vantage point - and even for some of their contemporaries - this mutual neglect is rather
surprising. As Spencer published his first paper twenty years after Comte's first book, the
54
Parsons developed his differentiation theory independently from Spencer's. Only belatedly did he
recognize the important similarities between his work and Spencer's (Parsons 1961). In his earlier works
(most notably 1937), he considered Spencer irrelevant.
55
Wilson frequently refers to the community/society dichotomy, but nothing indicates that in doing this, he
relies on Tönnies in particular.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
63
Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société (1822), there could
be some reason to suspect that he had been influenced by Comte. Allegations of this type,
which were repeatedly made, particularly infuriated Spencer, who was very sensitive as to
all matters of priority. He went out of his way on several occasions - most notably in his
Genesis of Science (1854), in his Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of
M. Comte (1864a), and in his Autobiography - to stress that their views were essentially
at variance, and that where they overlapped, this was only because, all things considered,
Comte's theories were nothing but a systematization of quite common conceptions. I am
not going to engage into a discussion of the mutual influences these men had on each
other. What I will do instead, will be merely to compare their views, centering on the
problem of the relationship between religion and science.
For the superficial observer, there are many reasons indeed to assume a close
similarity between these two thinkers. They were, each in their own country, the first to
propose a complete social philosophy under the new heading of "sociology": Comte
coined the word sociology, and Spencer was the first to follow suit in the Englishspeaking world (Spencer 1864a, p. 133; Peel 1971, p. vii). Both were dogmatic thinkers,
who read very little, and wrote dozens of volumes containing complete systems of
philosophy. Both were academically marginal scholars - neither of them ever held on
official position in a university. Finally, both were, albeit to different degrees, positivists,
who conceived of at least part of their work as an alternative to the rapidly decaying (as
they saw them) religious traditions. This overall impression of similitude is compounded
by the fact that these two founders of sociology have fallen into a common disgrace, and
are today considered to be representatives of an almost prehistorical, and abortive, phase
of sociological thinking56. They are the most outstanding examples of what sociology for
the most part no longer wants to be: positivist and evolutionary.
However, important as these similarities appear to be, they are mostly superficial.
Comte's evolutionary theory was very different from Spencer's, and his positivism especially in its later version - was of an altogether different breed. But before turning to
these divergences, a rapid assessment of the areas of convergence in their theories is
called for.
56
Even though there has lately been some revival in interest in Spencer (Peel 1971, p. vii).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
64
Similarities between Comte and Spencer
The first similarity between Comte and Spencer concerns the epistemological
status of sociology. None of them conceived of any discontinuity between the realm of
the natural and of the social sciences. This first convergence is important for the
religion/science problematic: Long after having abandoned their claim to authority on
natural phenomena, theologians continued to assert that human affairs were their reserved
domain. Comte and Spencer both rejected this stance. Human affairs were to be studied
by science exclusively, and could no longer be left to the authority of religion.
This is best illustrated in Comte's classification of the sciences. The only reason
why the knowledge of society had hitherto been considered to be of a different nature
from that of natural phenomena was that the first sciences to become positive were the
simplest. Only at the last stage of evolution could the study of man and of society, the
most complex of the sciences, reach the same level of positivity. The traditional
separation between the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of human society,
between science and politics, was nothing but the manifestation of an immature state in
social evolution. Similarly, and although he strongly disagreed with Comte's
classification of the sciences (Spencer 1854), Spencer's constant practice of simply
drawing parallels, without any sort of qualification, between biological and social
"organisms" bears testimony to his undifferentiated approach.
If we turn to more substantive aspects of their sociologies, we also find many
similarities between Comte and Spencer. The most striking, perhaps, is that both of them
contended that society must be considered as an organism. In his Reasons for Dissenting,
Spencer recognized that his own conception of society as an organism was essentially the
same as his opponent's: "The analogy between an individual organism and a social
organism, which was held by Plato and by Hobbes, is asserted in [my] Social Statics, as it
is in the Sociology of M. Comte. Very rightly, M. Comte has made this analogy the
cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy" (Spencer 1864a, p. 136). Furthermore,
both thinkers contended that society must be considered from two complementary points
of view: as an organism that could be studied on a synchronic level on the one hand, and
as an organism in evolution on the other hand. The first aspect, Comte called "static",
whereas Spencer analyzed it in terms of function and structure. The second aspect, called
"dynamic" by Comte, was studied by Spencer under the heading of the law of
differentiation. Although present-day sociologists tend to cast doubts on the compatibility
of these two divisions as they were presented by these thinkers, there is no mistaking the
fact that they both heavily insisted on this complementarity which, in their view, derived
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
65
necessarily from the biological analogy. This is obvious in the case of Spencer (Burrow
1966, pp. 190-96), but it also applies to Comte: "[The notions of order and of progress]
must be as rigorously inseparable in social physics as the notions of order and of life in
biology, whence, from the point of view of science, they obviously derive" (Comte 1839,
p. 16).
One of the main consequences of this continuity between the natural and the
social sciences, as it was put forward by Comte as well as by Spencer, was that history
became subjected to natural laws. It was no longer to be considered a human creation, but
the necessary unfolding of a cosmic necessity, which operated with the same ruthless and
blind precision as in nature itself. In both thinkers, the development of society necessarily
followed an universal pattern, which was molded on the development of the individual
organism. "Does not each of us, in looking back upon his own history - asked Comte
rhetorically - remember that he was successively, as to his most important notions,
theologian in his childhood, metaphysician in his youth, and physicist in his mature life?"
(Comte 1830, p. 6). Similarly, in Spencer, the progressive differentiation of the social
system was only a reflection of a universal law, observable in the evolution of the
universe as well as in all biological organisms.
As we will see, Comte's and Spencer's grand schemes of social evolution were
largely at variance, but on one point at least, they converged: Both theorists used a
dichotomy between the "military" (Comte), or "militant" (Spencer) societies of the past,
which directed their aggressivity toward other societies on the one hand, and their own
societies, which they both referred to as "industrial", and which directed their energies
toward the exploitation of nature on the other hand57. Even more importantly, in both
systems, as a result of natural evolution, religion had been markedly weakened. And, in
both cases, this weakness was to be compensated by the intervention of the authors of the
theories themselves - Comte wanted to base society on scientific knowledge, Spencer on
a rational morality. Thus, in both these thinkers, religion was being replaced by science
or, speaking more broadly, by some form of rationality. To this extent, as noted above,
Comte and Spencer both belong to the autoreference tradition. The writings of both these
men can best be understood against the XIXth century background of apparent decline in
the social influence of religion, as compared with the rising prestige of science. Both men
considered that the decline of religion was the necessary consequence of a natural law of
evolution, and both hailed the rise of science as the sign of the advent of a new age for
57
Unlike Comte's, Spencer's classification of societies in militant and industrial types is independent from
his other evolutionary scheme in terms of increasing complexity: Some relatively undifferentiated societies
are of the "industrial" type (Coser 1971, p. 94).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
66
humanity. Furthermore, both considered that the knowledge of society must be based
entirely on a positive approach, and that science must replace religion in shaping the
destinies of humanity.
First divergence: The law of evolution
So much for the assumptions explicitly or implicitly shared by Comte and by
Spencer. Their divergences will be presented in three parts. The first concerns their
different evolutionary schemes. Although they shared some conclusions, their theories
were based on very different assumptions. The second area concerns their epistemologies.
Although both Comte and Spencer proposed systems which, to different degrees,
possessed religious overtones, their explicit assessments of the ultimate cognitive validity
of religion differed markedly. Finally, we will turn to their differing appraisals of the way
in which reason was to be used to insure an harmonious relation between the individual
and the social order. If both thinkers agreed in their dismissal of traditional religion as a
guide to social life, the "rational" solutions they proposed could not have differed more
widely.
To turn to the first of these issues, whereas Comte's evolutionary scheme was
concerned mainly with the evolution of ideas, Spencer's was based almost entirely on the
evolution of the social structure. Spencer himself took pains to underscore this
divergence: "What is Comte's professed aim? To give a coherent account of the progress
of human conceptions. What is my aim? To give a coherent account of the progress of the
external world. Comte proposes to describe the necessary, and the actual, filiation of
ideas. I propose to describe the necessary, and the actual, filiation of things. Comte
professes to interpret the genesis of our knowledge of nature. My aim is to interpret [...]
the genesis of the phenomena which constitute nature" (Spencer, quoted in Coser 1971, p.
89).
Comte contended that one cannot find a single example of a change in society
which had not been preceded and made possible by "theoretical works". "Every social
regime is an application of a philosophical system and [...] consequently, it is impossible
to institute a new regime without having previously established the new philosophical
system to which it must correspond" (Comte, quoted in Arbousse-Bastide 1966, p. 5).
Thus for example, the feudal system had been made possible by theoretical works in the
Christian tradition since the foundation of the school of Alexandria, and the French
revolution had been made possible by the works of the philosophes (Comte 1822, pp. 8182). As a result of this conception, Comte's law of evolution was based on a series of
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
67
changes in human thinking, to which correlative social changes were only subordinated:
In the stage of theological thinking, humans ascribed the observed phenomena to
supernatural agencies; in the stage of metaphysical thinking, these supernatural agencies
were replaced by abstract forces; and in the stage of positive thinking, humans renounced
explaining these phenomena, and restricted themselves to observing them and to
establishing the laws to which they were submitted (Comte 1830, pp. 3-5).
Spencer explicitly refuted this conception of progress: "The progress of our
conceptions, and of each branch of knowledge, is from beginning to end intrinsically
alike. There are not three methods of philosophising radically opposed; but one method of
philosophising which remains, in essence, the same" (1864a, p. 125). Evolution, Spencer
argued, must be considered at the level of the social structure. At this level, it
immediately becomes clear that the evolution of the social organism is based on the same
law as the evolution of any organism, and of the universe in general: "The series of
changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an
animal, constitutes an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of
structure. In its primary stage, every germ consists of a substance that is uniform
throughout, both in texture and chemical composition. The first step is the appearance of
a difference between two parts of this substance; or, as the phenomenon is called in
physiological language, a differentiation. [...] This law of organic progress is the law of
all progress. Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life
upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of
Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into
the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout" (1857, pp. 9-10).
Thus, Spencer's law of progress was based on the idea of differentiation. One of
the early manifestations of this process appears in the area of religion. Even though the
first differentiation that arises in society is the one between the "governing" and the
"governed", and even though, in this stage, the rulers are regarded as divine, this initial
fusion between the political and the religious realms does not last: "No sooner does the
originally-homogeneous social mass differentiate into the governed and the governing
parts, than this last exhibits an incipient differentiation into religious and secular - Church
and State" (1857, pp. 20-21). Subsequently, other spheres of life differentiate themselves
from religion. Thus for instance, the arts - "Dancing, Poetry, and Music" - become
separate spheres (1857, p. 31). As we will see later on, science itself slowly became
differentiated from religion.
The consequences of these divergent evolutionary theories with respect to the role
of religion in social life are extremely important. We will return to them at the end of this
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
68
assessment of the thoughts of Comte and Spencer; for the time being, let it suffice to be
noted that whereas, in Comte's view, traditional religion, which was once all-powerful,
was eventually totally eliminated from social life, in Spencer's view, religion merely
changed its location and its function in the social system.
Second divergence: The epistemological status of religion
The second area of divergence with respect to the matter for discussion is the
different assessments on the ultimate validity of religious explanations of the world.
Comte asserted that philosophy and science were radically incompatible (1844, p. 33). He
was convinced that all views as to the ultimate causes of phenomena, in so far as they lay
beyond empirical observation, could not be part of science. "As to the problem of
determining what [...] attraction and [...] weightiness are in themselves, what their causes
are, these are questions which we all regard as insoluble, which are no longer part of the
domain of positive philosophy, and which we rightly abandon to the imagination of the
theologians, or to the subtleties of the metaphysicians" (Comte 1830, p. 13). Even when,
in his later life, Comte founded the Religion of Humanity, he remained truthful to this
insight; his religion was to be totally rational: In his Catéchisme positiviste, Comte
asserted that the aim of his theology was not to explain the causes of phenomena, but
only to describe phenomena (1852a, p. 57).
Spencer explicitly refuted this position: "The consciousness of cause remains as
dominant to the last as it was at first; and can never be got rid of. The consciousness of
cause can be abolished only by abolishing consciousness itself" (1864a, p. 127). Religion,
Spencer argued, cannot simply be discarded as irrelevant. Even if it contains a great deal
of error, it cannot be entirely false. In the first pages of his Synthetic Philosophy, before
setting out to explore the realm of the "knowable", Spencer carefully carved out a special
space for the Unknowable. Contrary to Comte, he argued that we must make the effort to
understand "what there was in this belief which commended it to men's minds" (1864b,
p. 3). Thus for instance, in primitive societies, leaders and kings were considered of
divine origin. We now know that this view is untrue. But the grain of truth it contained,
and which is still valid today, is that every individual action must, in some way, be
subordinated to social requirements. The reason for subordination given in the religious
views of primitive societies was incorrect, but the sheer necessity of subordination
implicit in them remains as a timeless truth (1864b, p. 9).
Primitive religion, then, can be regarded as a form of speculation on the order of
things, undertaken by an as yet immature intelligence. As human intelligence progresses,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
69
so does the quality of its conceptions. Thus, positive thought comes to occupy an ever
more important place in these conceptions. But does this imply that, one day, positive
conceptions will be able to totally eliminate religious views? Spencer thinks that this is
impossible: "Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the whole region of possible
thought. At the uttermost reach of discovery there arises, and must ever arise, the question
- What lies beyond" (1864b, pp. 16-17). The regress in causal analysis cannot be
indefinite: somewhere it has to stop. Somewhere, we are bound to say: This question I
cannot answer. Religion alone is able to answer the question of the First Cause of things.
Up to this point, Spencer's conception seems not very different from Comte's. The
latter also acknowledged that something, which he referred to as metaphysics, passed
scientific understanding, and that it must be "left to the theologians". But Spencer
diverged from Comte in that he contended that it was wrong to assert that, because it
passed scientific understanding and empirical observation, a knowledge of the ultimate
cause of things was impossible. We cannot know the Absolute rationally; but this does
not mean that we cannot know it by other means: "Besides that definite consciousness of
which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an indefinite consciousness which cannot
be formulated. Besides complete thoughts [...] there are thoughts which it is impossible to
complete; and yet which are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the
intellect. [...] To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that
there is an Absolute" (1864b, p. 90).
As there will always be unanswerable questions, there will always be a legitimate
place for religion. Thus, instead of speaking of a warfare of science of religion, we must
seek the best way to reconcile them, for they are not antithetical, but complementary. Far
from having suffered losses in its confrontation with science, religion has progressed
toward a fuller recognition of its true essence: "The truly religious element of religion has
always been good: that which has proven untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice,
has been its irreligious element; and from this it has been ever undergoing purification"
(Spencer 1864b, p. 104). The same applies to science: as it progressed, it gradually
abandoned metaphysical explanations to limit itself to establishing laws. In other words,
"religion and science have been undergoing a slow differentiation" (1864b, p. 108). Thus,
"the disagreements between [religion and science] have throughout been nothing more
than the consequences of their incompleteness; and as they reach their final forms, they
come in entire harmony" (1864b, p. 107).
Finally, Spencer also explicitly refused the idea of a Religion of Humanity: "No
such thing as a 'Religion of Humanity' can ever do more than temporarily shut out the
thought of a Power of which Humanity is but a small and fugitive product - a Power
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
70
which was in course of ever-changing manifestations before Humanity was, and will
continue through other manifestations when Humanity has ceased to be" (1873, p. 284).
Third divergence: The individual, the social order, intellectual knowledge, and religion
The previously mentioned problem of social engineering, which lay at the root of
Comte's and Spencer's attempts, can perhaps best be formulated as follows: What, given
the demise of religion, is to be the role of intellectual knowledge in the establishment of a
new harmony in the relation between the individual and the social order? To understand
the discrepancies between Comte and Spencer on this point, we must consider their views
as to the relation between the individual and the social order. For Comte, the social order
was to be predominant, whereas for Spencer, the individual was to retain predominance58.
Comte wanted every individual to be completely subordinated to the needs of society. In
his view, the natural evolution of humanity leads to "sociocracy", that is, a society in
which all individuals come to recognize the primacy of the collective order. This
tendency finds its logical development in the Religion of Humanity, where individuals
worship this society which stands so much above them. It should be stressed that this
view was not a late development in Comte's thought. As early as 1825, in his
Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel, Comte argued that man's natural anti-social
tendencies could be checked only by an organized moral force, which only could impose
to humans the constant sacrifices demanded by social life ([1825] 1968, p. 154).
For Spencer, this view of society as requiring sacrifices from individuals was not
wrong, but it applied only to the militant type: "In a society organized for militant action,
the individuality of each member has to be so subordinated in life, liberty, and property,
58
A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that the divergence concerned the role of government.
Thus, according to Spencer, "M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the
greatest extent [...], in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life.
[...] I hold [that we are progressing toward a society] in which government will be reduced to the smallest
amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible - [a society] in which human nature
will have become so molded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little
external restraint, but will be self-restrained" (1864a, p. 131). Now, this charge levelled by Spencer against
Comte is not justified. According to Comte, two types of authority must be distinguished: the spiritual
authority of the priest or of the scientist, and the temporal authority, held in positive society by the
industrials (Comte 1822, p. 88). Ultimately, as spiritual power becomes ever more effective in the course of
evolution, all temporal - or political - power will dwindle, and almost disappear (Comte 1839, p. 783). The
authority of society over the individual will no longer be wielded by a government, but through the
influence of civilization: "L'ordre politique n'est et ne peut être que l'expression de l'ordre civil, ce qui
signifie, en d'autres termes, que les forces sociales prépondérantes finissent, de toute nécessité, par devenir
dirigeantes. [...] L'ordre politique est l'expression de l'ordre civil, [et] l'ordre civil n'est lui-même que
l'expression de l'état de la civilisation" (Comte 1822, p. 107).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
71
that he is largely, or completely, owned by the State; but in a society industrially
organized, no such subordination of the individual is called for. [...] With the absence of
need for that corporate action by which the efforts of the whole society may be utilized
for war, there goes the absence of need for a despotic controlling agency" (1876-96, pp.
538-39). In an industrial society, order is not based on coercion, but on voluntary
cooperation and individual self-restraint59.
Thus, "while Comte stressed that men should aim at discovering the laws of
society in order to act collectively on the social world, Spencer argued with equal
conviction that we should study them in order not to act collectively. In contrast to
Comte, who wanted to direct society through the spiritual power of his sociologist-priests,
Spencer argued passionately that sociologists should convince the public that the society
must be free from the meddling of governments and reformers" (Coser 1971, pp. 99-100).
Thus, neither Comte nor Spencer advocated a society primarily based on political power.
For both men, civil society must be the base of the social order. Consequently, they both
lay great stress on the role of morality. They diverged only in the sense that for Comte,
this civil society was very holistic (to use a modern terminology), whereas for Spencer, it
could only be individualistic.
The second point which must be considered to understand the divergence is the
role attributed to scientific knowledge by the two thinkers. The shortest way to put the
difference would be to argue that, whereas Comte's reorganization efforts were to bear
solely on intellectual ideas, Spencer's also aimed at reforming sentiments. This is the
view taken by Spencer in his rebuttal of Comte: "So far from alleging, as M. Comte does,
that society is to be re-organized by philosophy; [my Social Statics] alleges that society is
to be re-organized only by the accumulated effects of habit and character" (1864a, p.
136). In other words, according to this view, the divergence between Comte and Spencer
would boil down to different views as to the forces that lay behind history. As noted
above, Comte contended that ideas were the driving force in any society. To this, Spencer
answered: "Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world: the world is governed or
overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. [...] Not intellectual anarchy,
but moral antagonism, is the cause of political crises" (1864a, p. 128). Spencer argued
that a sound morality was a very important basis for social order. So much so that, with
religion declining, it was urgent that a scientific system of morality be established. It is in
59
It should be noted that, from our modern vantage point, this aspect of Spencer's work is highly
problematic: "[Spencer] passes easily, and apparently without any sense of the enormous jump he is
making, from a description of the behaviour of single inanimate objects, and groups of them, to 'aggregates
of men' and finally, without any warning, to 'society'" (Burrow 1966, p. 199).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
72
this context that the word "secularization" appears in Spencer's writings: "The
establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that
moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposedly sacred origin, the
secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen more disastrous
than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter
regulative system has grown up to replace it" (1882, p. vi). The Principles of Morality,
which constituted the last part of the huge Synthetic Philosophy, were very important in
Spencer's work. Indeed, according to J. Peel, "The fundamental purpose of Spencer's
whole lifework was to provide a scientific morality" (1971, p. 84).
There thus seems to be a fundamental divergence between Comte and Spencer as
to the role of morality. However, this divergence is mostly superficial. Even tough Comte
contended that society could be changed through a reform of intellectual knowledge, at
the same time, like Spencer, he was aware that this could be achieved only by an appeal
to moral authority. As early as 1822, in his Plan des travaux scientifiques, Comte argued
that society must be reorganized and presided over by men holding spiritual power60
(1822, p. 83). This spiritual power was to be exercised by scientists, because they were
the only ones who were professionally trained to think theoretically (1822, p. 86). It is not
altogether clear, however, how this power of a spiritual nature is derived from the
exercise of reason. In the Plan, these two aspects are simply juxtaposed. This
fundamental ambiguity in Comte's proposal found expression in his own life by the
succession of two phases which are considered by most scholars as being of very different
nature. In the first part of his life, Comte founded positivism, and proposed to transform
politics, or the direction of society, into a positive science, based on observation (1822,
p. 94). In the second part of his life, after his encounter with Clotilde de Vaux, he
founded the Religion of Humanity, and proposed to transform politics into a religious
affair. Now, Comte always denied having shifted his views. Considering the ambiguity
already contained in several of his early writings, this claim cannot be dismissed a priori
(Manuel 1962, p. 266). But even if Comte did not change his mind, there remains the
question of how these two aspects of his proposal can be reconciled.
I think that this question can be resolved through consideration of a rather
machiavelian passage found in the Plan. Comte makes a distinction between the
intellectual processes which lead to decisions concerning the future of humanity, and the
practical means by which these decisions can be applied. As the decisions are taken by
60
Spiritual power is based on a greater moral merit: it is recognized to those who are most devoted to
society (Aron 1967, p. 92).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
73
scholars, in accordance with their best knowledge of the constraining nature of the laws
of evolution, we must conform to these laws regardless of whether they appear to be
"good" or not. The question whether evolution is ethically good is simply irrelevant: it is
neither good nor bad, but necessary. It is clear, however, that these decisions cannot be
presented to the general public in this fashion: "In order that a new social system
establishes itself, it is not sufficient that it be conceived correctly, it is also necessary that
the mass of society impassions itself to constitute it" (1822, p. 129). This can obviously
not be done by an appeal to the inevitability of that new system: "One will never be able
to rouse the passions of the masses of men for any system, by proving to them that it is
the system for which the walk of civilization, from its inception, has prepared the advent,
and which is today called to direct society. Such a truth is within the reach of too small a
number of minds, and even for these minds, it requires too long a series of intellectual
operations, to be apt to ever rouse the passions" (Comte 1822, p. 129). Comte goes on to
argue that, to achieve this implementation, we must revert to giving imagination free play,
for instance in favoring art.
This is probably the solution of the riddle. Although Comte did not advocate an
appeal to religious sentiments in this particular piece of writing, he clearly set forth the
dilemma which later led him to create the Religion of Humanity. This is the dilemma
inherent in the autoreference paradox: one must hide the intellectual operations that are
necessary to establish the new social order. Although the new society was to be planned
rationally, it was to be implemented through an appeal to the emotions. In the first part of
his life, Comte designed the rational plan; in the second part, with the help of a
biographical accident which allowed him to tap his emotional resources to foster his own
enthusiasm61, he sought to implement it. As Anthony Giddens explains, "at first sight the
call to establish a Religion of Humanity seems quite inconsistent with the positive
philosophy advocated in the Cours, and many commentators have supposed that there is a
major hiatus between Comte's earlier and later works. But it is perhaps more plausible to
argue that the Système de Politique Positive brings fully into the open the latent
substratum of the positivist spirit: we see that science cannot, after all, provide its own
commitment" (1972, p. 242).
By now, the reader must have the impression that we have strayed too far from
our basic question: the religion/science problematic. But this long parenthesis has been
necessary in order to establish what the effective divergence between Comte and Spencer
61
It should be remembered that Comte argued that not only the man in the street, but the man of science
himself, was unable to become passionate about this goal, since it involved too many intellectual operations
(see quotation above).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
74
was. This divergence can now easily be summarized. Comte contended that science could
eliminate traditional religion, but must at the same time find a way to replace it. In order
to do this, science must take on two functions traditionally attributed to religion: the
exercise of central moral authority, and the capability to arouse the passions of the
population. Hence, the necessity of the creation of the Religion of Humanity. As for
Spencer, he contended that science could not eliminate religion, and needed not replace it.
Furthermore, he argued that the social order in an industrial society needed no central
moral authority, and that it was sufficient for science to provide a new foundation for
ethics in order to guarantee social order. In other words, where Comte envisioned the
possibility of a totally autoreferent reconstruction of the social order, Spencer was much
more modest, proposing for autoreference a much more limited role: only morality could
be reconstructed autoreferentially.
But how can we explain these divergent positions? To do this, we must again
draw on some of the conclusions reached in the preceding analysis, and take into account
two factors. The first of these is extrinsic to the religion/science problematic; the second
is intrinsic. First, whereas Comte favored a view of social order in which the whole
determined the parts, Spencer contended that the parts are determining the characteristics
of the whole. Organized religion being by definition a collective phenomenon, it fitted
easily into Comte's scheme, but certainly not into Spencer's. Where Comte saw, as the
only solution to the problem of social integration, a strong central spiritual authority,
Spencer preferred a diffuse, secular, and consensual form of morality.
Second, as noted above, in the first part of his life, Comte held the view that
religion must be totally eradicated, and replaced by science. When he addressed the
problem of social integration, however, he recognized that this posed a problem: Society
needed spiritual power, and men could be motivated only by passion. Thus, for practical
purposes, religion had to be brought back into the picture. The new religion, however,
was to be totally subordinated to science. As Comte saw it, the Religion of Humanity was
a totally rational creation, purged of all mystical elements. As we can read in the opening
sentence of the Système de politique positive, "First spontaneous, then inspired, then
revealed, religion finally becomes demonstrated" (1852b, p. 7). Thus, society was to be
held together by science, which was translated into a religious appearance only in order to
appeal to the sentiments and the passions of men. Having taken a radical position on the
religion/science problematic, Comte was compelled to resort to a dramatic strategy when
faced with the "practical" problems of social engineering.
Spencer's position with regard to the religion/science problematic was not as
radical as Comte's; consequently, his strategy to cope with the problem of social
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
75
integration needed not be as dramatic. In Spencer's view, we unmistakably see at work
some of the exemplars central to the CISR paradigm. In the course of social evolution,
religion and ethics have undergone a progressive differentiation62 (differentiation).
Furthermore, in the realm of knowledge, religious views have progressively given way to
more empirical forms of knowledge (scientization*). Thus, only non-empirical questions
continued to fall under the purview of religion. Where Comte, having eliminated religion
in the first part of his life, was left with nothing but science, Spencer retained three
distinct entities: science, ethics, and religion. As the world was not governed by ideas, but
by morality, religion needed not play any role for social integration. All that was needed
to insure social integration was the creation of a scientific ethic. This could be done
without the help of religion, which could thus safely be left alone, concerned with matters
of no practical importance (autonomization*).
"Secularization" as a concept
As noted in the introduction, we will do two things in this history of the
secularization issue. On the one hand, we will discuss the theories that analyze the role of
religion in modern society. But on the other hand, we must also trace the different uses of
the term "secularization", even when this use does not really occur within such a theory.
As we have just seen, the first sociological theories about religion in modern society did
not rely on the concept of secularization. Indeed, for a very long time, "secularization"
was used exclusively in the political arena. It was a term used not to describe a historical
process, but to further or, more broadly, to interfere in this very process.
The term secularization was coined in 1646 by the duke of Longueville, the
French envoy to the negotiations that led to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Stallmann
1960, pp. 5-6). The term was invented to make possible a compromise in the difficult
question of the ownership of a number of spiritual lands. In order to satisfy territorial
claims from Sweden and from the elector of Brandenburg, the ownership of some
62
"The modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of
an independent ethics - an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart
from the previously-alleged theological foundation" (Spencer 1876-96, p. 638). This view was shared by
Comte (1844, pp. 65-67). However, he does not draw from this the some conclusions as Spencer. Comte
also envisioned a positive system of morality; but this system, he contended, could be effectively
implemented only through the intervention of a spiritual power: "Il est [...] incontestable que l'efficacité
morale d'un tel régime exige, en chaque cas, outre la puissante impulsion résultée naturellement des
préjugés publics, l'intervention systématique, tantôt passive, tantôt active, d'une autorité spirituelle, destinée
à rappeler avec énergie les maximes fondamentales et à en diriger sagement l'application" (1844, pp. 7071).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
76
episcopal lands had to be transferred to secular hands. "Secularization" was the ideal term
to describe this operation in diplomatically neutral terms: "The word 'secular' belonged to
the churchly vocabulary, and designated a worldliness which was not characterized by an
excluding contrast to the spiritual. [...] 'The secular' can be useful to churchly purposes
and can be ratified spiritually. The word secularization was particularly suited to the
situation in that it allowed to characterize the transformation of spiritual principalities not
as an alienation of property from its original purposes nor as a reversal carried out by
force, but to imagine a use which was provisional, and which did not preempt the
possibility of a different use of the property" (Stallman 1960, p. 7). Thus, from its very
origins, the term secularization contained the ambiguity that has so much disturbed many
subsequent scholars. It is this ambiguity that accounts, for a large part, for the muddy
aspect of the secularization debate: Where some theologians hail secularization as an
authentic product of Christian spirituality, other scholars use the term to refer to the final
and total demise of religion in modern society.
In the following centuries, the term tended to lose its original neutrality, and to
become a weapon in the fight for emancipation from the Church. For one thing, with the
increase in the Church/state conflict and the ever more numerous "secularizations" of
Church lands and prerogatives, the word could not but take a negative meaning. The
French revolution, the 1803 secularizations in Germany, and the later Kulturkampf
constitute the main historical benchmarks in this process. For another thing,
"secularization" started to be used by the thinkers who led the fight against the Church.
However, the first very systematic such use of "secularization" did not occur before the
middle of the XIXth century. In France, Victor Cousin announced the "secularization of
education" and the "secularization of philosophy" (Lübbe 1965, p. 43), while in England,
George Holyoake founded the Secular Society. This latter movement is particularly
interesting for our purposes.
The secular movement was created as an offshoot of the Owenite movement
(Campbell 1971, p. 47). The founder of the movement, George Jacob Hoyoake, converted
himself to Owenism in his youth and, as a result, lost his job. He thus became a full-time
"social missionary" for the movement. After an offending anti-religious remark he made
in a meeting, he ended up in jail, one among several victims of anti-atheist
"persecutions". When he was freed, the persecutions had notably abated and the Owenite
movement had virtually disappeared. Holyoake decided to found his own movement, an
association of freethinkers dedicated to the establishment of a secular morality.
In creating his movement, Holyoake drew on several traditions. In addition to
Owenism, he drew on the anti-clerical tradition inherited from the French revolution
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
77
(1971, p. 48). He was also close to contemporary positivism: Although he seems to have
created his system of thought without relying on them, he was a great admirer of Comte
(1971, p. 49) and of Spencer. The parallels are sufficiently obvious not to require too
much elaboration: Like Comte and Spencer, Holyoake wanted to autoreferentially build a
secular foundation for social life by drawing on the resources of "science" and "reason":
"Science (which he used interchangeaby with reason) was revealing to men the operation
of the natural world, and the contemporary systems of scientific morals of the utilitarians,
Spencer and the positivists and the science of personality of phrenology would ultimately
reveal the science of social life" (Budd 1977, p. 27).
The Londoner Secular Society was founded in 1853 (Campbell 1971, p. 49). In
1866, the movement had gained enough impetus for the foundation of a National Secular
Society to take place. The movement continued gaining momentum until about 1885,
when it started to decline (1971, p. 50). The Secular Society suffered from internal
rivalries between its founder, who believed that secularism did not imply atheism, and his
challenger Charles Bradlaugh, who believed it did and advocated more aggressive tactics.
But it also suffered from the growth of tolerance toward freethinking in society in general,
and from competition with the more successful socialist movement (1971, p. 54). The
secular movement had different offshoots both in Britain and in the U.S.A. One of them
which might be worth mentioning is the British Rationalist Press Association, founded in
1899 by Charles A. Watts, a great admirer of Spencer and of the other evolutionists,
whose works he eagerly published and helped disseminate (Budd 1977, p. 133). Watts
even attempted to "deify Spencer in the services held at the Agnostic Temple in South
London" (1977, p. 127). The importance of this movement for our purposes is rather
anecdotical: while continuing to publish secular manifestoes, Watts also published
Wilson's Religion in Secular Society (1966). Thus, the age-old links between secularism
as a political movement and secularization as a sociological theory were briefly revived
on the occasion of this important publication63.
Another, earlier and more significant such link is evident in Germany. A
movement similar to the British Secular Society emerged in this country at the end of the
XIXth century: the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ethische Kultur (DGEK). This association
of scholars, united to promote a technocratic positivism as an "apolitical" alternative to
either nationalism or Marxism (Lübbe 1965, pp. 44-45), proposed the creation of an
"ethical culture". By this, they referred to a morality independent from religious
63
This does not, I believe, indicate a "contamination" of secularization theory by secularist assumptions, but
only an odd revival of deceased social networks.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
78
assumptions, and based on the "practical conditions of social existence" (Lübbe 1965, p.
47). But although the program of the DGEK was very similar to that of the British
Secular Society, the word secularization itself was used only occasionally by its members.
What makes this association of interest to us is the fact that among its members, we find
Ferdinand Tönnies (Lübbe 1965, p. 43). Although Tönnies did not propose a
"secularization theory" nor systematically use the term (1965, p. 62), he proposed a theory
which forms one of the most important stepping stones in the development of the "socialstructural" approach to the problem of secularization. As we will see, in Tönnies, the
problem of the place of religion was posed in new terms.
Ferdinand Tönnies
Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (188764) is generally considered one of
the great classics of sociology. The reputation of this work is based mainly on the impact
of the two concepts it put forward65 on subsequent sociological thinking. Although
literally dozens of other sociologists66 have proposed classifications of types of societies
running along similar lines, it is Tönnies' terminology which has survived. Few presentday sociologist refer to Redfield's "folk-urban" dichotomy, or to Becker's "sacred-secular"
dichotomy67 (see chap. 9), but the opposition between "community" and "society", or
between "communal" and "societal" types of organization, has become part of the
sociologist's stock in trade.
The most important level of analysis underlying Tönnies' theory is
psychological68. According to Tönnies, there exist two distinct types of human wills69:
64
A first version of the thesis developed in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was presented by Tönnies as a
doctoral dissertation in 1881 at the University of Kiel (Leif 1946, p. 13), but the final version of the book
was published only in 1887. Tönnies, a member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, to which Max Weber also
belonged, was always somewhat an outsider to the academic world. Although he remained affiliated with
the University of Kiel for more than half a century, he was a full professor for only eight years (Heberle
1937, p. 145).
65
The two notions are, of course, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Although these German terms can readily
be translated into English, the first as "community", the second as "society", I will follow a widespread
practice (see the English edition I am using [Tönnies 1887], and also Heberle 1937), and use instead the
German terms.
66
For a discussion of a few of these proposals, and of the way they relate to Tönnies', see Loomis 1957.
67
Even Durkheim's distinction between "mechanic" and "organic" solidarities is not often used as such in
present-day sociological discourse; it is used mostly in discussions of Durkheim's work.
68
Indeed, a historical analysis of the genesis of the theory shows that this was Tönnies' starting point (Leif
1946, p. 13).
69
The notion of will must be understood in a very broad sense: as a matter of fact, it encompasses almost all
of human nature, or at least all those aspects of human nature which are related to the motives that prompt
human action (Leif 1946, p. 14).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
79
Natural will is "the will which includes the thinking", whereas rational will is "the
thinking which encompasses the will" (1887, p. 103). In other words, in natural will,
man's thought processes are dependent upon his organic life, whereas in rational will,
these thought processes come to take preponderance over organic life. Natural will can be
understood only in terms of the past: it is the produce of past experience, to which it
always refers. By contrast, rational will must be understood in terms of the future,
because it exists only in relation to a given, deliberately devised, project. Natural will is a
produce of activity; its rational counterpart "is prior to the activity to which it refers [...],
while activity is its realization" (1887, pp. 103-04).
Turning to the sociological level of analysis, the actions which express these wills
can either take the form of aggression or of cooperation. Only in the second case can we
speak of social relations. Thus, social relations are the product of the interaction of human
wills (1887, p. 33). But this interaction does not only result in social relations, but also in
the formation of a new type of will, a common, or social will (1887, p. 66).
Not surprisingly, depending on the type of will that is at work, different types of
social wills, and different social systems, will obtain. Natural will results in a social
organization Tönnies calls a Gemeinschaft70. In this type of organization, people are
related to each other through personal bonds, whose paradigm is the blood relation (1887,
p. 37). Even if they are not directly related, people living in a Gemeinschaft know each
other personally, and do not think of their relationships as being determined by selfinterest. By contrast, rational will results in a social organization Tönnies calls a
Gesellschaft. In this type of organization, people do not directly know each other. They
do not act toward each other as total human beings, but only as abstract beings, who exist
only insofar as they meet or oppose some rationally designed purpose of the acting agent
(1887, p. 65). "Accordingly", Tönnies tells us, "Gemeinschaft should be understood as a
living organism, Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate and artifact" (1887, p. 35).
Tönnies' theory contains several other levels of analysis. The only one which is
needed for an understanding of the rest of this presentation is the distinction - analogous
to Aristotle's distinction between three types of souls - between three forms of natural
will: the first (which gives rise to pleasure) is vegetative, and is found in plants, in
animals, and in humans. The second, (which gives rise to habit) is animal, and is found in
animals and in humans. The third, (which gives rise to memory) is mental, and is present
only in humans. Tönnies' other distinctions need not concern us here.
70
Of course, this terminology was not invented by Tönnies; it was quite common in German at that time
(1887, pp. 33-34). Tönnies only systematized its use. It should also be noted that Tönnies did not consider
these concepts as corresponding to empirical types of societies, but merely as analytic abstractions.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
80
Tönnies' views on the evolution of religion are presented as one of the subordinate
dichotomies arising from the basic dichotomies in a particular social sphere: morality. In
Gemeinschaft, morality was based entirely on religion. Religion is most important in the
most "supreme" of the three forms of Gemeinschaft71. In the Gemeinschaft of ideas - best
represented in town-life - the common will of the group expresses itself in religion72.
Furthermore, religion acts as a force that binds this looser form of Gemeinschaft together:
"A worshiped deity [...] has an immediate significance for the preservation of such a bond
[i.e., friendship], [and] is not bound to any place but lives in the conscience of its
worshipers and accompanies them on their travels to foreign countries" (1887, p. 43).
In contrast, in Gesellschaft, religion can no longer commend men's attention: "The
intellectual attitude of the individual becomes gradually less and less influenced by
religion and more and more influenced by science" (scientization*; 1887, p. 226). Even
tough religion retains some degree of influence in any kind of concrete social
organization, its influence makes itself felt only in realms where communal forms
continue to predominate, most conspicuously in family life (privatization*; 1887, p. 219).
But in public life, religion has been replaced by public opinion73. Thus, in Gesellschaft,
public opinion has replaced religion as an agency for the conduct of collective life
(autonomization*). This influence is exercised through the particular devices used in the
different types of social organizations to enforce social control: "Religion approves
folkways, mores, and customs as good and right or condemns them as false and bad.
Likewise, public opinion condones policy and legislation as effective and clever or
condemns it as ineffective and stupid" (1887, p. 219).
As we can see, in Tönnies' theory the autoreference question survives only in a
very limited form. What must be noted is that the transformations of religion are no
longer accounted for in cognitive terms (from "error" to "truth") nor in terms of social
engineering (in term of the emergence of a "scientific" order), but as a social-structural
evolution (from a form of association favorable to religion to a form of association
unfavorable to religion).
71
1: Community of blood, based on vegetative life; 2: Community of locality, based on animal life;
3: Community of ideas, based on mental life (1887, p. 42).
72
In contrast, for example, with the situation obtaining in the family (type 1), where the common will
expresses itself in the "family spirit".
73
It should be noted that public opinion is not simply an addition of the opinions of all members of society;
it is the product of the thinking of the most enlightened of its members (1887, p. 220). The instrument of
public opinion is the press, an immaterial power in many respects far more effective that the material power
of the state itself (1887, p. 221).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
81
Third divergence: The individual, the social order, intellectual knowledge, and religion
The previously mentioned problem of social engineering, which lay at the root of
Comte's and Spencer's attempts, can perhaps best be formulated as follows: What, given
the demise of religion, is to be the role of intellectual knowledge in the establishment of a
new harmony in the relation between the individual and the social order? To understand
the discrepancies between Comte and Spencer on this point, we must consider their views
as to the relation between the individual and the social order. For Comte, the social order
was to be predominant, whereas for Spencer, the individual was to retain predominance74.
Comte wanted every individual to be completely subordinated to the needs of society. In
his view, the natural evolution of humanity leads to "sociocracy", that is, a society in
which all individuals come to recognize the primacy of the collective order. This
tendency finds its logical development in the Religion of Humanity, where individuals
worship this society which stands so much above them. It should be stressed that this
view was not a late development in Comte's thought. As early as 1825, in his
Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel, Comte argued that man's natural anti-social
tendencies could be checked only by an organized moral force, which only could impose
to humans the constant sacrifices demanded by social life ([1825] 1968, p. 154).
For Spencer, this view of society as requiring sacrifices from individuals was not
wrong, but it applied only to the militant type: "In a society organized for militant action,
the individuality of each member has to be so subordinated in life, liberty, and property,
that he is largely, or completely, owned by the State; but in a society industrially
organized, no such subordination of the individual is called for. [...] With the absence of
need for that corporate action by which the efforts of the whole society may be utilized
74
A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that the divergence concerned the role of government.
Thus, according to Spencer, "M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the
greatest extent [...], in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life.
[...] I hold [that we are progressing toward a society] in which government will be reduced to the smallest
amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible - [a society] in which human nature
will have become so molded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little
external restraint, but will be self-restrained" (1864a, p. 131). Now, this charge levelled by Spencer against
Comte is not justified. According to Comte, two types of authority must be distinguished: the spiritual
authority of the priest or of the scientist, and the temporal authority, held in positive society by the
industrials (Comte 1822, p. 88). Ultimately, as spiritual power becomes ever more effective in the course of
evolution, all temporal - or political - power will dwindle, and almost disappear (Comte 1839, p. 783). The
authority of society over the individual will no longer be wielded by a government, but through the
influence of civilization: "L'ordre politique n'est et ne peut être que l'expression de l'ordre civil, ce qui
signifie, en d'autres termes, que les forces sociales prépondérantes finissent, de toute nécessité, par devenir
dirigeantes. [...] L'ordre politique est l'expression de l'ordre civil, [et] l'ordre civil n'est lui-même que
l'expression de l'état de la civilisation" (Comte 1822, p. 107).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
82
for war, there goes the absence of need for a despotic controlling agency" (1876-96, pp.
538-39). In an industrial society, order is not based on coercion, but on voluntary
cooperation and individual self-restraint75.
Thus, "while Comte stressed that men should aim at discovering the laws of
society in order to act collectively on the social world, Spencer argued with equal
conviction that we should study them in order not to act collectively. In contrast to
Comte, who wanted to direct society through the spiritual power of his sociologist-priests,
Spencer argued passionately that sociologists should convince the public that the society
must be free from the meddling of governments and reformers" (Coser 1971, pp. 99-100).
Thus, neither Comte nor Spencer advocated a society primarily based on political power.
For both men, civil society must be the base of the social order. Consequently, they both
lay great stress on the role of morality. They diverged only in the sense that for Comte,
this civil society was very holistic (to use a modern terminology), whereas for Spencer, it
could only be individualistic.
The second point which must be considered to understand the divergence is the
role attributed to scientific knowledge by the two thinkers. The shortest way to put the
difference would be to argue that, whereas Comte's reorganization efforts were to bear
solely on intellectual ideas, Spencer's also aimed at reforming sentiments. This is the
view taken by Spencer in his rebuttal of Comte: "So far from alleging, as M. Comte does,
that society is to be re-organized by philosophy; [my Social Statics] alleges that society is
to be re-organized only by the accumulated effects of habit and character" (1864a, p.
136). In other words, according to this view, the divergence between Comte and Spencer
would boil down to different views as to the forces that lay behind history. As noted
above, Comte contended that ideas were the driving force in any society. To this, Spencer
answered: "Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world: the world is governed or
overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. [...] Not intellectual anarchy,
but moral antagonism, is the cause of political crises" (1864a, p. 128). Spencer argued
that a sound morality was a very important basis for social order. So much so that, with
religion declining, it was urgent that a scientific system of morality be established. It is in
this context that the word "secularization" appears in Spencer's writings: "The
establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that
moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposedly sacred origin, the
75
It should be noted that, from our modern vantage point, this aspect of Spencer's work is highly
problematic: "[Spencer] passes easily, and apparently without any sense of the enormous jump he is
making, from a description of the behaviour of single inanimate objects, and groups of them, to 'aggregates
of men' and finally, without any warning, to 'society'" (Burrow 1966, p. 199).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
83
secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen more disastrous
than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter
regulative system has grown up to replace it" (1882, p. vi). The Principles of Morality,
which constituted the last part of the huge Synthetic Philosophy, were very important in
Spencer's work. Indeed, according to J. Peel, "The fundamental purpose of Spencer's
whole lifework was to provide a scientific morality" (1971, p. 84).
There thus seems to be a fundamental divergence between Comte and Spencer as
to the role of morality. However, this divergence is mostly superficial. Even tough Comte
contended that society could be changed through a reform of intellectual knowledge, at
the same time, like Spencer, he was aware that this could be achieved only by an appeal
to moral authority. As early as 1822, in his Plan des travaux scientifiques, Comte argued
that society must be reorganized and presided over by men holding spiritual power76
(1822, p. 83). This spiritual power was to be exercised by scientists, because they were
the only ones who were professionally trained to think theoretically (1822, p. 86). It is not
altogether clear, however, how this power of a spiritual nature is derived from the
exercise of reason. In the Plan, these two aspects are simply juxtaposed. This
fundamental ambiguity in Comte's proposal found expression in his own life by the
succession of two phases which are considered by most scholars as being of very different
nature. In the first part of his life, Comte founded positivism, and proposed to transform
politics, or the direction of society, into a positive science, based on observation (1822,
p. 94). In the second part of his life, after his encounter with Clotilde de Vaux, he
founded the Religion of Humanity, and proposed to transform politics into a religious
affair. Now, Comte always denied having shifted his views. Considering the ambiguity
already contained in several of his early writings, this claim cannot be dismissed a priori
(Manuel 1962, p. 266). But even if Comte did not change his mind, there remains the
question of how these two aspects of his proposal can be reconciled.
I think that this question can be resolved through consideration of a rather
machiavelian passage found in the Plan. Comte makes a distinction between the
intellectual processes which lead to decisions concerning the future of humanity, and the
practical means by which these decisions can be applied. As the decisions are taken by
scholars, in accordance with their best knowledge of the constraining nature of the laws
of evolution, we must conform to these laws regardless of whether they appear to be
"good" or not. The question whether evolution is ethically good is simply irrelevant: it is
76
Spiritual power is based on a greater moral merit: it is recognized to those who are most devoted to
society (Aron 1967, p. 92).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
84
neither good nor bad, but necessary. It is clear, however, that these decisions cannot be
presented to the general public in this fashion: "In order that a new social system
establishes itself, it is not sufficient that it be conceived correctly, it is also necessary that
the mass of society impassions itself to constitute it" (1822, p. 129). This can obviously
not be done by an appeal to the inevitability of that new system: "One will never be able
to rouse the passions of the masses of men for any system, by proving to them that it is
the system for which the walk of civilization, from its inception, has prepared the advent,
and which is today called to direct society. Such a truth is within the reach of too small a
number of minds, and even for these minds, it requires too long a series of intellectual
operations, to be apt to ever rouse the passions" (Comte 1822, p. 129). Comte goes on to
argue that, to achieve this implementation, we must revert to giving imagination free play,
for instance in favoring art.
This is probably the solution of the riddle. Although Comte did not advocate an
appeal to religious sentiments in this particular piece of writing, he clearly set forth the
dilemma which later led him to create the Religion of Humanity. This is the dilemma
inherent in the autoreference paradox: one must hide the intellectual operations that are
necessary to establish the new social order. Although the new society was to be planned
rationally, it was to be implemented through an appeal to the emotions. In the first part of
his life, Comte designed the rational plan; in the second part, with the help of a
biographical accident which allowed him to tap his emotional resources to foster his own
enthusiasm77, he sought to implement it. As Anthony Giddens explains, "at first sight the
call to establish a Religion of Humanity seems quite inconsistent with the positive
philosophy advocated in the Cours, and many commentators have supposed that there is a
major hiatus between Comte's earlier and later works. But it is perhaps more plausible to
argue that the Système de Politique Positive brings fully into the open the latent
substratum of the positivist spirit: we see that science cannot, after all, provide its own
commitment" (1972, p. 242).
By now, the reader must have the impression that we have strayed too far from
our basic question: the religion/science problematic. But this long parenthesis has been
necessary in order to establish what the effective divergence between Comte and Spencer
was. This divergence can now easily be summarized. Comte contended that science could
eliminate traditional religion, but must at the same time find a way to replace it. In order
to do this, science must take on two functions traditionally attributed to religion: the
77
It should be remembered that Comte argued that not only the man in the street, but the man of science
himself, was unable to become passionate about this goal, since it involved too many intellectual operations
(see quotation above).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
85
exercise of central moral authority, and the capability to arouse the passions of the
population. Hence, the necessity of the creation of the Religion of Humanity. As for
Spencer, he contended that science could not eliminate religion, and needed not replace it.
Furthermore, he argued that the social order in an industrial society needed no central
moral authority, and that it was sufficient for science to provide a new foundation for
ethics in order to guarantee social order. In other words, where Comte envisioned the
possibility of a totally autoreferent reconstruction of the social order, Spencer was much
more modest, proposing for autoreference a much more limited role: only morality could
be reconstructed autoreferentially.
But how can we explain these divergent positions? To do this, we must again
draw on some of the conclusions reached in the preceding analysis, and take into account
two factors. The first of these is extrinsic to the religion/science problematic; the second
is intrinsic. First, whereas Comte favored a view of social order in which the whole
determined the parts, Spencer contended that the parts are determining the characteristics
of the whole. Organized religion being by definition a collective phenomenon, it fitted
easily into Comte's scheme, but certainly not into Spencer's. Where Comte saw, as the
only solution to the problem of social integration, a strong central spiritual authority,
Spencer preferred a diffuse, secular, and consensual form of morality.
Second, as noted above, in the first part of his life, Comte held the view that
religion must be totally eradicated, and replaced by science. When he addressed the
problem of social integration, however, he recognized that this posed a problem: Society
needed spiritual power, and men could be motivated only by passion. Thus, for practical
purposes, religion had to be brought back into the picture. The new religion, however,
was to be totally subordinated to science. As Comte saw it, the Religion of Humanity was
a totally rational creation, purged of all mystical elements. As we can read in the opening
sentence of the Système de politique positive, "First spontaneous, then inspired, then
revealed, religion finally becomes demonstrated" (1852b, p. 7). Thus, society was to be
held together by science, which was translated into a religious appearance only in order to
appeal to the sentiments and the passions of men. Having taken a radical position on the
religion/science problematic, Comte was compelled to resort to a dramatic strategy when
faced with the "practical" problems of social engineering.
Spencer's position with regard to the religion/science problematic was not as
radical as Comte's; consequently, his strategy to cope with the problem of social
integration needed not be as dramatic. In Spencer's view, we unmistakably see at work
some of the exemplars central to the CISR paradigm. In the course of social evolution,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
86
religion and ethics have undergone a progressive differentiation78 (differentiation).
Furthermore, in the realm of knowledge, religious views have progressively given way to
more empirical forms of knowledge (scientization*). Thus, only non-empirical questions
continued to fall under the purview of religion. Where Comte, having eliminated religion
in the first part of his life, was left with nothing but science, Spencer retained three
distinct entities: science, ethics, and religion. As the world was not governed by ideas, but
by morality, religion needed not play any role for social integration. All that was needed
to insure social integration was the creation of a scientific ethic. This could be done
without the help of religion, which could thus safely be left alone, concerned with matters
of no practical importance (autonomization*).
"Secularization" as a concept
As noted in the introduction, we will do two things in this history of the
secularization issue. On the one hand, we will discuss the theories that analyze the role of
religion in modern society. But on the other hand, we must also trace the different uses of
the term "secularization", even when this use does not really occur within such a theory.
As we have just seen, the first sociological theories about religion in modern society did
not rely on the concept of secularization. Indeed, for a very long time, "secularization"
was used exclusively in the political arena. It was a term used not to describe a historical
process, but to further or, more broadly, to interfere in this very process.
The term secularization was coined in 1646 by the duke of Longueville, the
French envoy to the negotiations that led to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Stallmann
1960, pp. 5-6). The term was invented to make possible a compromise in the difficult
question of the ownership of a number of spiritual lands. In order to satisfy territorial
claims from Sweden and from the elector of Brandenburg, the ownership of some
episcopal lands had to be transferred to secular hands. "Secularization" was the ideal term
to describe this operation in diplomatically neutral terms: "The word 'secular' belonged to
78
"The modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of
an independent ethics - an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart
from the previously-alleged theological foundation" (Spencer 1876-96, p. 638). This view was shared by
Comte (1844, pp. 65-67). However, he does not draw from this the some conclusions as Spencer. Comte
also envisioned a positive system of morality; but this system, he contended, could be effectively
implemented only through the intervention of a spiritual power: "Il est [...] incontestable que l'efficacité
morale d'un tel régime exige, en chaque cas, outre la puissante impulsion résultée naturellement des
préjugés publics, l'intervention systématique, tantôt passive, tantôt active, d'une autorité spirituelle, destinée
à rappeler avec énergie les maximes fondamentales et à en diriger sagement l'application" (1844, pp. 7071).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
87
the churchly vocabulary, and designated a worldliness which was not characterized by an
excluding contrast to the spiritual. [...] 'The secular' can be useful to churchly purposes
and can be ratified spiritually. The word secularization was particularly suited to the
situation in that it allowed to characterize the transformation of spiritual principalities not
as an alienation of property from its original purposes nor as a reversal carried out by
force, but to imagine a use which was provisional, and which did not preempt the
possibility of a different use of the property" (Stallman 1960, p. 7). Thus, from its very
origins, the term secularization contained the ambiguity that has so much disturbed many
subsequent scholars. It is this ambiguity that accounts, for a large part, for the muddy
aspect of the secularization debate: Where some theologians hail secularization as an
authentic product of Christian spirituality, other scholars use the term to refer to the final
and total demise of religion in modern society.
In the following centuries, the term tended to lose its original neutrality, and to
become a weapon in the fight for emancipation from the Church. For one thing, with the
increase in the Church/state conflict and the ever more numerous "secularizations" of
Church lands and prerogatives, the word could not but take a negative meaning. The
French revolution, the 1803 secularizations in Germany, and the later Kulturkampf
constitute the main historical benchmarks in this process. For another thing,
"secularization" started to be used by the thinkers who led the fight against the Church.
However, the first very systematic such use of "secularization" did not occur before the
middle of the XIXth century. In France, Victor Cousin announced the "secularization of
education" and the "secularization of philosophy" (Lübbe 1965, p. 43), while in England,
George Holyoake founded the Secular Society. This latter movement is particularly
interesting for our purposes.
The secular movement was created as an offshoot of the Owenite movement
(Campbell 1971, p. 47). The founder of the movement, George Jacob Hoyoake, converted
himself to Owenism in his youth and, as a result, lost his job. He thus became a full-time
"social missionary" for the movement. After an offending anti-religious remark he made
in a meeting, he ended up in jail, one among several victims of anti-atheist
"persecutions". When he was freed, the persecutions had notably abated and the Owenite
movement had virtually disappeared. Holyoake decided to found his own movement, an
association of freethinkers dedicated to the establishment of a secular morality.
In creating his movement, Holyoake drew on several traditions. In addition to
Owenism, he drew on the anti-clerical tradition inherited from the French revolution
(1971, p. 48). He was also close to contemporary positivism: Although he seems to have
created his system of thought without relying on them, he was a great admirer of Comte
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
88
(1971, p. 49) and of Spencer. The parallels are sufficiently obvious not to require too
much elaboration: Like Comte and Spencer, Holyoake wanted to autoreferentially build a
secular foundation for social life by drawing on the resources of "science" and "reason":
"Science (which he used interchangeaby with reason) was revealing to men the operation
of the natural world, and the contemporary systems of scientific morals of the utilitarians,
Spencer and the positivists and the science of personality of phrenology would ultimately
reveal the science of social life" (Budd 1977, p. 27).
The Londoner Secular Society was founded in 1853 (Campbell 1971, p. 49). In
1866, the movement had gained enough impetus for the foundation of a National Secular
Society to take place. The movement continued gaining momentum until about 1885,
when it started to decline (1971, p. 50). The Secular Society suffered from internal
rivalries between its founder, who believed that secularism did not imply atheism, and his
challenger Charles Bradlaugh, who believed it did and advocated more aggressive tactics.
But it also suffered from the growth of tolerance toward freethinking in society in general,
and from competition with the more successful socialist movement (1971, p. 54). The
secular movement had different offshoots both in Britain and in the U.S.A. One of them
which might be worth mentioning is the British Rationalist Press Association, founded in
1899 by Charles A. Watts, a great admirer of Spencer and of the other evolutionists,
whose works he eagerly published and helped disseminate (Budd 1977, p. 133). Watts
even attempted to "deify Spencer in the services held at the Agnostic Temple in South
London" (1977, p. 127). The importance of this movement for our purposes is rather
anecdotical: while continuing to publish secular manifestoes, Watts also published
Wilson's Religion in Secular Society (1966). Thus, the age-old links between secularism
as a political movement and secularization as a sociological theory were briefly revived
on the occasion of this important publication79.
Another, earlier and more significant such link is evident in Germany. A
movement similar to the British Secular Society emerged in this country at the end of the
XIXth century: the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ethische Kultur (DGEK). This association
of scholars, united to promote a technocratic positivism as an "apolitical" alternative to
either nationalism or Marxism (Lübbe 1965, pp. 44-45), proposed the creation of an
"ethical culture". By this, they referred to a morality independent from religious
assumptions, and based on the "practical conditions of social existence" (Lübbe 1965, p.
47). But although the program of the DGEK was very similar to that of the British
79
This does not, I believe, indicate a "contamination" of secularization theory by secularist assumptions, but
only an odd revival of deceased social networks.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
89
Secular Society, the word secularization itself was used only occasionally by its members.
What makes this association of interest to us is the fact that among its members, we find
Ferdinand Tönnies (Lübbe 1965, p. 43). Although Tönnies did not propose a
"secularization theory" nor systematically use the term (1965, p. 62), he proposed a theory
which forms one of the most important stepping stones in the development of the "socialstructural" approach to the problem of secularization. As we will see, in Tönnies, the
problem of the place of religion was posed in new terms.
Ferdinand Tönnies
Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (188780) is generally considered one of
the great classics of sociology. The reputation of this work is based mainly on the impact
of the two concepts it put forward81 on subsequent sociological thinking. Although
literally dozens of other sociologists82 have proposed classifications of types of societies
running along similar lines, it is Tönnies' terminology which has survived. Few presentday sociologist refer to Redfield's "folk-urban" dichotomy, or to Becker's "sacred-secular"
dichotomy83 (see chap. 9), but the opposition between "community" and "society", or
between "communal" and "societal" types of organization, has become part of the
sociologist's stock in trade.
The most important level of analysis underlying Tönnies' theory is
psychological84. According to Tönnies, there exist two distinct types of human wills85:
Natural will is "the will which includes the thinking", whereas rational will is "the
thinking which encompasses the will" (1887, p. 103). In other words, in natural will,
80
A first version of the thesis developed in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was presented by Tönnies as a
doctoral dissertation in 1881 at the University of Kiel (Leif 1946, p. 13), but the final version of the book
was published only in 1887. Tönnies, a member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, to which Max Weber also
belonged, was always somewhat an outsider to the academic world. Although he remained affiliated with
the University of Kiel for more than half a century, he was a full professor for only eight years (Heberle
1937, p. 145).
81
The two notions are, of course, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Although these German terms can readily
be translated into English, the first as "community", the second as "society", I will follow a widespread
practice (see the English edition I am using [Tönnies 1887], and also Heberle 1937), and use instead the
German terms.
82
For a discussion of a few of these proposals, and of the way they relate to Tönnies', see Loomis 1957.
83
Even Durkheim's distinction between "mechanic" and "organic" solidarities is not often used as such in
present-day sociological discourse; it is used mostly in discussions of Durkheim's work.
84
Indeed, a historical analysis of the genesis of the theory shows that this was Tönnies' starting point (Leif
1946, p. 13).
85
The notion of will must be understood in a very broad sense: as a matter of fact, it encompasses almost all
of human nature, or at least all those aspects of human nature which are related to the motives that prompt
human action (Leif 1946, p. 14).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
90
man's thought processes are dependent upon his organic life, whereas in rational will,
these thought processes come to take preponderance over organic life. Natural will can be
understood only in terms of the past: it is the produce of past experience, to which it
always refers. By contrast, rational will must be understood in terms of the future,
because it exists only in relation to a given, deliberately devised, project. Natural will is a
produce of activity; its rational counterpart "is prior to the activity to which it refers [...],
while activity is its realization" (1887, pp. 103-04).
Turning to the sociological level of analysis, the actions which express these wills
can either take the form of aggression or of cooperation. Only in the second case can we
speak of social relations. Thus, social relations are the product of the interaction of human
wills (1887, p. 33). But this interaction does not only result in social relations, but also in
the formation of a new type of will, a common, or social will (1887, p. 66).
Not surprisingly, depending on the type of will that is at work, different types of
social wills, and different social systems, will obtain. Natural will results in a social
organization Tönnies calls a Gemeinschaft86. In this type of organization, people are
related to each other through personal bonds, whose paradigm is the blood relation (1887,
p. 37). Even if they are not directly related, people living in a Gemeinschaft know each
other personally, and do not think of their relationships as being determined by selfinterest. By contrast, rational will results in a social organization Tönnies calls a
Gesellschaft. In this type of organization, people do not directly know each other. They
do not act toward each other as total human beings, but only as abstract beings, who exist
only insofar as they meet or oppose some rationally designed purpose of the acting agent
(1887, p. 65). "Accordingly", Tönnies tells us, "Gemeinschaft should be understood as a
living organism, Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate and artifact" (1887, p. 35).
Tönnies' theory contains several other levels of analysis. The only one which is
needed for an understanding of the rest of this presentation is the distinction - analogous
to Aristotle's distinction between three types of souls - between three forms of natural
will: the first (which gives rise to pleasure) is vegetative, and is found in plants, in
animals, and in humans. The second, (which gives rise to habit) is animal, and is found in
animals and in humans. The third, (which gives rise to memory) is mental, and is present
only in humans. Tönnies' other distinctions need not concern us here.
Tönnies' views on the evolution of religion are presented as one of the subordinate
dichotomies arising from the basic dichotomies in a particular social sphere: morality. In
86
Of course, this terminology was not invented by Tönnies; it was quite common in German at that time
(1887, pp. 33-34). Tönnies only systematized its use. It should also be noted that Tönnies did not consider
these concepts as corresponding to empirical types of societies, but merely as analytic abstractions.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
91
Gemeinschaft, morality was based entirely on religion. Religion is most important in the
most "supreme" of the three forms of Gemeinschaft87. In the Gemeinschaft of ideas - best
represented in town-life - the common will of the group expresses itself in religion88.
Furthermore, religion acts as a force that binds this looser form of Gemeinschaft together:
"A worshiped deity [...] has an immediate significance for the preservation of such a bond
[i.e., friendship], [and] is not bound to any place but lives in the conscience of its
worshipers and accompanies them on their travels to foreign countries" (1887, p. 43).
In contrast, in Gesellschaft, religion can no longer commend men's attention: "The
intellectual attitude of the individual becomes gradually less and less influenced by
religion and more and more influenced by science" (scientization*; 1887, p. 226). Even
tough religion retains some degree of influence in any kind of concrete social
organization, its influence makes itself felt only in realms where communal forms
continue to predominate, most conspicuously in family life (privatization*; 1887, p. 219).
But in public life, religion has been replaced by public opinion89. Thus, in Gesellschaft,
public opinion has replaced religion as an agency for the conduct of collective life
(autonomization*). This influence is exercised through the particular devices used in the
different types of social organizations to enforce social control: "Religion approves
folkways, mores, and customs as good and right or condemns them as false and bad.
Likewise, public opinion condones policy and legislation as effective and clever or
condemns it as ineffective and stupid" (1887, p. 219).
As we can see, in Tönnies' theory the autoreference question survives only in a
very limited form. What must be noted is that the transformations of religion are no
longer accounted for in cognitive terms (from "error" to "truth") nor in terms of social
engineering (in term of the emergence of a "scientific" order), but as a social-structural
evolution (from a form of association favorable to religion to a form of association
unfavorable to religion).
87
1: Community of blood, based on vegetative life; 2: Community of locality, based on animal life;
3: Community of ideas, based on mental life (1887, p. 42).
88
In contrast, for example, with the situation obtaining in the family (type 1), where the common will
expresses itself in the "family spirit".
89
It should be noted that public opinion is not simply an addition of the opinions of all members of society;
it is the product of the thinking of the most enlightened of its members (1887, p. 220). The instrument of
public opinion is the press, an immaterial power in many respects far more effective that the material power
of the state itself (1887, p. 221).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
92
Third divergence: The individual, the social order, intellectual knowledge, and religion
The previously mentioned problem of social engineering, which lay at the root of
Comte's and Spencer's attempts, can perhaps best be formulated as follows: What, given
the demise of religion, is to be the role of intellectual knowledge in the establishment of a
new harmony in the relation between the individual and the social order? To understand
the discrepancies between Comte and Spencer on this point, we must consider their views
as to the relation between the individual and the social order. For Comte, the social order
was to be predominant, whereas for Spencer, the individual was to retain predominance90.
Comte wanted every individual to be completely subordinated to the needs of society. In
his view, the natural evolution of humanity leads to "sociocracy", that is, a society in
which all individuals come to recognize the primacy of the collective order. This
tendency finds its logical development in the Religion of Humanity, where individuals
worship this society which stands so much above them. It should be stressed that this
view was not a late development in Comte's thought. As early as 1825, in his
Considérations sur le pouvoir spirituel, Comte argued that man's natural anti-social
tendencies could be checked only by an organized moral force, which only could impose
to humans the constant sacrifices demanded by social life ([1825] 1968, p. 154).
For Spencer, this view of society as requiring sacrifices from individuals was not
wrong, but it applied only to the militant type: "In a society organized for militant action,
the individuality of each member has to be so subordinated in life, liberty, and property,
that he is largely, or completely, owned by the State; but in a society industrially
organized, no such subordination of the individual is called for. [...] With the absence of
need for that corporate action by which the efforts of the whole society may be utilized
90
A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that the divergence concerned the role of government.
Thus, according to Spencer, "M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the
greatest extent [...], in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life.
[...] I hold [that we are progressing toward a society] in which government will be reduced to the smallest
amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible - [a society] in which human nature
will have become so molded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little
external restraint, but will be self-restrained" (1864a, p. 131). Now, this charge levelled by Spencer against
Comte is not justified. According to Comte, two types of authority must be distinguished: the spiritual
authority of the priest or of the scientist, and the temporal authority, held in positive society by the
industrials (Comte 1822, p. 88). Ultimately, as spiritual power becomes ever more effective in the course of
evolution, all temporal - or political - power will dwindle, and almost disappear (Comte 1839, p. 783). The
authority of society over the individual will no longer be wielded by a government, but through the
influence of civilization: "L'ordre politique n'est et ne peut être que l'expression de l'ordre civil, ce qui
signifie, en d'autres termes, que les forces sociales prépondérantes finissent, de toute nécessité, par devenir
dirigeantes. [...] L'ordre politique est l'expression de l'ordre civil, [et] l'ordre civil n'est lui-même que
l'expression de l'état de la civilisation" (Comte 1822, p. 107).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
93
for war, there goes the absence of need for a despotic controlling agency" (1876-96, pp.
538-39). In an industrial society, order is not based on coercion, but on voluntary
cooperation and individual self-restraint91.
Thus, "while Comte stressed that men should aim at discovering the laws of
society in order to act collectively on the social world, Spencer argued with equal
conviction that we should study them in order not to act collectively. In contrast to
Comte, who wanted to direct society through the spiritual power of his sociologist-priests,
Spencer argued passionately that sociologists should convince the public that the society
must be free from the meddling of governments and reformers" (Coser 1971, pp. 99-100).
Thus, neither Comte nor Spencer advocated a society primarily based on political power.
For both men, civil society must be the base of the social order. Consequently, they both
lay great stress on the role of morality. They diverged only in the sense that for Comte,
this civil society was very holistic (to use a modern terminology), whereas for Spencer, it
could only be individualistic.
The second point which must be considered to understand the divergence is the
role attributed to scientific knowledge by the two thinkers. The shortest way to put the
difference would be to argue that, whereas Comte's reorganization efforts were to bear
solely on intellectual ideas, Spencer's also aimed at reforming sentiments. This is the
view taken by Spencer in his rebuttal of Comte: "So far from alleging, as M. Comte does,
that society is to be re-organized by philosophy; [my Social Statics] alleges that society is
to be re-organized only by the accumulated effects of habit and character" (1864a, p.
136). In other words, according to this view, the divergence between Comte and Spencer
would boil down to different views as to the forces that lay behind history. As noted
above, Comte contended that ideas were the driving force in any society. To this, Spencer
answered: "Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world: the world is governed or
overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. [...] Not intellectual anarchy,
but moral antagonism, is the cause of political crises" (1864a, p. 128). Spencer argued
that a sound morality was a very important basis for social order. So much so that, with
religion declining, it was urgent that a scientific system of morality be established. It is in
this context that the word "secularization" appears in Spencer's writings: "The
establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that
moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposedly sacred origin, the
91
It should be noted that, from our modern vantage point, this aspect of Spencer's work is highly
problematic: "[Spencer] passes easily, and apparently without any sense of the enormous jump he is
making, from a description of the behaviour of single inanimate objects, and groups of them, to 'aggregates
of men' and finally, without any warning, to 'society'" (Burrow 1966, p. 199).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
94
secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen more disastrous
than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter
regulative system has grown up to replace it" (1882, p. vi). The Principles of Morality,
which constituted the last part of the huge Synthetic Philosophy, were very important in
Spencer's work. Indeed, according to J. Peel, "The fundamental purpose of Spencer's
whole lifework was to provide a scientific morality" (1971, p. 84).
There thus seems to be a fundamental divergence between Comte and Spencer as
to the role of morality. However, this divergence is mostly superficial. Even tough Comte
contended that society could be changed through a reform of intellectual knowledge, at
the same time, like Spencer, he was aware that this could be achieved only by an appeal
to moral authority. As early as 1822, in his Plan des travaux scientifiques, Comte argued
that society must be reorganized and presided over by men holding spiritual power92
(1822, p. 83). This spiritual power was to be exercised by scientists, because they were
the only ones who were professionally trained to think theoretically (1822, p. 86). It is not
altogether clear, however, how this power of a spiritual nature is derived from the
exercise of reason. In the Plan, these two aspects are simply juxtaposed. This
fundamental ambiguity in Comte's proposal found expression in his own life by the
succession of two phases which are considered by most scholars as being of very different
nature. In the first part of his life, Comte founded positivism, and proposed to transform
politics, or the direction of society, into a positive science, based on observation (1822,
p. 94). In the second part of his life, after his encounter with Clotilde de Vaux, he
founded the Religion of Humanity, and proposed to transform politics into a religious
affair. Now, Comte always denied having shifted his views. Considering the ambiguity
already contained in several of his early writings, this claim cannot be dismissed a priori
(Manuel 1962, p. 266). But even if Comte did not change his mind, there remains the
question of how these two aspects of his proposal can be reconciled.
I think that this question can be resolved through consideration of a rather
machiavelian passage found in the Plan. Comte makes a distinction between the
intellectual processes which lead to decisions concerning the future of humanity, and the
practical means by which these decisions can be applied. As the decisions are taken by
scholars, in accordance with their best knowledge of the constraining nature of the laws
of evolution, we must conform to these laws regardless of whether they appear to be
"good" or not. The question whether evolution is ethically good is simply irrelevant: it is
92
Spiritual power is based on a greater moral merit: it is recognized to those who are most devoted to
society (Aron 1967, p. 92).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
95
neither good nor bad, but necessary. It is clear, however, that these decisions cannot be
presented to the general public in this fashion: "In order that a new social system
establishes itself, it is not sufficient that it be conceived correctly, it is also necessary that
the mass of society impassions itself to constitute it" (1822, p. 129). This can obviously
not be done by an appeal to the inevitability of that new system: "One will never be able
to rouse the passions of the masses of men for any system, by proving to them that it is
the system for which the walk of civilization, from its inception, has prepared the advent,
and which is today called to direct society. Such a truth is within the reach of too small a
number of minds, and even for these minds, it requires too long a series of intellectual
operations, to be apt to ever rouse the passions" (Comte 1822, p. 129). Comte goes on to
argue that, to achieve this implementation, we must revert to giving imagination free play,
for instance in favoring art.
This is probably the solution of the riddle. Although Comte did not advocate an
appeal to religious sentiments in this particular piece of writing, he clearly set forth the
dilemma which later led him to create the Religion of Humanity. This is the dilemma
inherent in the autoreference paradox: one must hide the intellectual operations that are
necessary to establish the new social order. Although the new society was to be planned
rationally, it was to be implemented through an appeal to the emotions. In the first part of
his life, Comte designed the rational plan; in the second part, with the help of a
biographical accident which allowed him to tap his emotional resources to foster his own
enthusiasm93, he sought to implement it. As Anthony Giddens explains, "at first sight the
call to establish a Religion of Humanity seems quite inconsistent with the positive
philosophy advocated in the Cours, and many commentators have supposed that there is a
major hiatus between Comte's earlier and later works. But it is perhaps more plausible to
argue that the Système de Politique Positive brings fully into the open the latent
substratum of the positivist spirit: we see that science cannot, after all, provide its own
commitment" (1972, p. 242).
By now, the reader must have the impression that we have strayed too far from
our basic question: the religion/science problematic. But this long parenthesis has been
necessary in order to establish what the effective divergence between Comte and Spencer
was. This divergence can now easily be summarized. Comte contended that science could
eliminate traditional religion, but must at the same time find a way to replace it. In order
to do this, science must take on two functions traditionally attributed to religion: the
93
It should be remembered that Comte argued that not only the man in the street, but the man of science
himself, was unable to become passionate about this goal, since it involved too many intellectual operations
(see quotation above).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
96
exercise of central moral authority, and the capability to arouse the passions of the
population. Hence, the necessity of the creation of the Religion of Humanity. As for
Spencer, he contended that science could not eliminate religion, and needed not replace it.
Furthermore, he argued that the social order in an industrial society needed no central
moral authority, and that it was sufficient for science to provide a new foundation for
ethics in order to guarantee social order. In other words, where Comte envisioned the
possibility of a totally autoreferent reconstruction of the social order, Spencer was much
more modest, proposing for autoreference a much more limited role: only morality could
be reconstructed autoreferentially.
But how can we explain these divergent positions? To do this, we must again
draw on some of the conclusions reached in the preceding analysis, and take into account
two factors. The first of these is extrinsic to the religion/science problematic; the second
is intrinsic. First, whereas Comte favored a view of social order in which the whole
determined the parts, Spencer contended that the parts are determining the characteristics
of the whole. Organized religion being by definition a collective phenomenon, it fitted
easily into Comte's scheme, but certainly not into Spencer's. Where Comte saw, as the
only solution to the problem of social integration, a strong central spiritual authority,
Spencer preferred a diffuse, secular, and consensual form of morality.
Second, as noted above, in the first part of his life, Comte held the view that
religion must be totally eradicated, and replaced by science. When he addressed the
problem of social integration, however, he recognized that this posed a problem: Society
needed spiritual power, and men could be motivated only by passion. Thus, for practical
purposes, religion had to be brought back into the picture. The new religion, however,
was to be totally subordinated to science. As Comte saw it, the Religion of Humanity was
a totally rational creation, purged of all mystical elements. As we can read in the opening
sentence of the Système de politique positive, "First spontaneous, then inspired, then
revealed, religion finally becomes demonstrated" (1852b, p. 7). Thus, society was to be
held together by science, which was translated into a religious appearance only in order to
appeal to the sentiments and the passions of men. Having taken a radical position on the
religion/science problematic, Comte was compelled to resort to a dramatic strategy when
faced with the "practical" problems of social engineering.
Spencer's position with regard to the religion/science problematic was not as
radical as Comte's; consequently, his strategy to cope with the problem of social
integration needed not be as dramatic. In Spencer's view, we unmistakably see at work
some of the exemplars central to the CISR paradigm. In the course of social evolution,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
97
religion and ethics have undergone a progressive differentiation94 (differentiation).
Furthermore, in the realm of knowledge, religious views have progressively given way to
more empirical forms of knowledge (scientization*). Thus, only non-empirical questions
continued to fall under the purview of religion. Where Comte, having eliminated religion
in the first part of his life, was left with nothing but science, Spencer retained three
distinct entities: science, ethics, and religion. As the world was not governed by ideas, but
by morality, religion needed not play any role for social integration. All that was needed
to insure social integration was the creation of a scientific ethic. This could be done
without the help of religion, which could thus safely be left alone, concerned with matters
of no practical importance (autonomization*).
"Secularization" as a concept
As noted in the introduction, we will do two things in this history of the
secularization issue. On the one hand, we will discuss the theories that analyze the role of
religion in modern society. But on the other hand, we must also trace the different uses of
the term "secularization", even when this use does not really occur within such a theory.
As we have just seen, the first sociological theories about religion in modern society did
not rely on the concept of secularization. Indeed, for a very long time, "secularization"
was used exclusively in the political arena. It was a term used not to describe a historical
process, but to further or, more broadly, to interfere in this very process.
The term secularization was coined in 1646 by the duke of Longueville, the
French envoy to the negotiations that led to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Stallmann
1960, pp. 5-6). The term was invented to make possible a compromise in the difficult
question of the ownership of a number of spiritual lands. In order to satisfy territorial
claims from Sweden and from the elector of Brandenburg, the ownership of some
episcopal lands had to be transferred to secular hands. "Secularization" was the ideal term
to describe this operation in diplomatically neutral terms: "The word 'secular' belonged to
94
"The modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of
an independent ethics - an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart
from the previously-alleged theological foundation" (Spencer 1876-96, p. 638). This view was shared by
Comte (1844, pp. 65-67). However, he does not draw from this the some conclusions as Spencer. Comte
also envisioned a positive system of morality; but this system, he contended, could be effectively
implemented only through the intervention of a spiritual power: "Il est [...] incontestable que l'efficacité
morale d'un tel régime exige, en chaque cas, outre la puissante impulsion résultée naturellement des
préjugés publics, l'intervention systématique, tantôt passive, tantôt active, d'une autorité spirituelle, destinée
à rappeler avec énergie les maximes fondamentales et à en diriger sagement l'application" (1844, pp. 7071).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
98
the churchly vocabulary, and designated a worldliness which was not characterized by an
excluding contrast to the spiritual. [...] 'The secular' can be useful to churchly purposes
and can be ratified spiritually. The word secularization was particularly suited to the
situation in that it allowed to characterize the transformation of spiritual principalities not
as an alienation of property from its original purposes nor as a reversal carried out by
force, but to imagine a use which was provisional, and which did not preempt the
possibility of a different use of the property" (Stallman 1960, p. 7). Thus, from its very
origins, the term secularization contained the ambiguity that has so much disturbed many
subsequent scholars. It is this ambiguity that accounts, for a large part, for the muddy
aspect of the secularization debate: Where some theologians hail secularization as an
authentic product of Christian spirituality, other scholars use the term to refer to the final
and total demise of religion in modern society.
In the following centuries, the term tended to lose its original neutrality, and to
become a weapon in the fight for emancipation from the Church. For one thing, with the
increase in the Church/state conflict and the ever more numerous "secularizations" of
Church lands and prerogatives, the word could not but take a negative meaning. The
French revolution, the 1803 secularizations in Germany, and the later Kulturkampf
constitute the main historical benchmarks in this process. For another thing,
"secularization" started to be used by the thinkers who led the fight against the Church.
However, the first very systematic such use of "secularization" did not occur before the
middle of the XIXth century. In France, Victor Cousin announced the "secularization of
education" and the "secularization of philosophy" (Lübbe 1965, p. 43), while in England,
George Holyoake founded the Secular Society. This latter movement is particularly
interesting for our purposes.
The secular movement was created as an offshoot of the Owenite movement
(Campbell 1971, p. 47). The founder of the movement, George Jacob Hoyoake, converted
himself to Owenism in his youth and, as a result, lost his job. He thus became a full-time
"social missionary" for the movement. After an offending anti-religious remark he made
in a meeting, he ended up in jail, one among several victims of anti-atheist
"persecutions". When he was freed, the persecutions had notably abated and the Owenite
movement had virtually disappeared. Holyoake decided to found his own movement, an
association of freethinkers dedicated to the establishment of a secular morality.
In creating his movement, Holyoake drew on several traditions. In addition to
Owenism, he drew on the anti-clerical tradition inherited from the French revolution
(1971, p. 48). He was also close to contemporary positivism: Although he seems to have
created his system of thought without relying on them, he was a great admirer of Comte
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
99
(1971, p. 49) and of Spencer. The parallels are sufficiently obvious not to require too
much elaboration: Like Comte and Spencer, Holyoake wanted to autoreferentially build a
secular foundation for social life by drawing on the resources of "science" and "reason":
"Science (which he used interchangeaby with reason) was revealing to men the operation
of the natural world, and the contemporary systems of scientific morals of the utilitarians,
Spencer and the positivists and the science of personality of phrenology would ultimately
reveal the science of social life" (Budd 1977, p. 27).
The Londoner Secular Society was founded in 1853 (Campbell 1971, p. 49). In
1866, the movement had gained enough impetus for the foundation of a National Secular
Society to take place. The movement continued gaining momentum until about 1885,
when it started to decline (1971, p. 50). The Secular Society suffered from internal
rivalries between its founder, who believed that secularism did not imply atheism, and his
challenger Charles Bradlaugh, who believed it did and advocated more aggressive tactics.
But it also suffered from the growth of tolerance toward freethinking in society in general,
and from competition with the more successful socialist movement (1971, p. 54). The
secular movement had different offshoots both in Britain and in the U.S.A. One of them
which might be worth mentioning is the British Rationalist Press Association, founded in
1899 by Charles A. Watts, a great admirer of Spencer and of the other evolutionists,
whose works he eagerly published and helped disseminate (Budd 1977, p. 133). Watts
even attempted to "deify Spencer in the services held at the Agnostic Temple in South
London" (1977, p. 127). The importance of this movement for our purposes is rather
anecdotical: while continuing to publish secular manifestoes, Watts also published
Wilson's Religion in Secular Society (1966). Thus, the age-old links between secularism
as a political movement and secularization as a sociological theory were briefly revived
on the occasion of this important publication95.
Another, earlier and more significant such link is evident in Germany. A
movement similar to the British Secular Society emerged in this country at the end of the
XIXth century: the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ethische Kultur (DGEK). This association
of scholars, united to promote a technocratic positivism as an "apolitical" alternative to
either nationalism or Marxism (Lübbe 1965, pp. 44-45), proposed the creation of an
"ethical culture". By this, they referred to a morality independent from religious
assumptions, and based on the "practical conditions of social existence" (Lübbe 1965, p.
47). But although the program of the DGEK was very similar to that of the British
95
This does not, I believe, indicate a "contamination" of secularization theory by secularist assumptions, but
only an odd revival of deceased social networks.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
100
Secular Society, the word secularization itself was used only occasionally by its members.
What makes this association of interest to us is the fact that among its members, we find
Ferdinand Tönnies (Lübbe 1965, p. 43). Although Tönnies did not propose a
"secularization theory" nor systematically use the term (1965, p. 62), he proposed a theory
which forms one of the most important stepping stones in the development of the "socialstructural" approach to the problem of secularization. As we will see, in Tönnies, the
problem of the place of religion was posed in new terms.
Ferdinand Tönnies
Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (188796) is generally considered one of
the great classics of sociology. The reputation of this work is based mainly on the impact
of the two concepts it put forward97 on subsequent sociological thinking. Although
literally dozens of other sociologists98 have proposed classifications of types of societies
running along similar lines, it is Tönnies' terminology which has survived. Few presentday sociologist refer to Redfield's "folk-urban" dichotomy, or to Becker's "sacred-secular"
dichotomy99 (see chap. 9), but the opposition between "community" and "society", or
between "communal" and "societal" types of organization, has become part of the
sociologist's stock in trade.
The most important level of analysis underlying Tönnies' theory is
psychological100. According to Tönnies, there exist two distinct types of human wills101:
Natural will is "the will which includes the thinking", whereas rational will is "the
thinking which encompasses the will" (1887, p. 103). In other words, in natural will,
96
A first version of the thesis developed in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was presented by Tönnies as a
doctoral dissertation in 1881 at the University of Kiel (Leif 1946, p. 13), but the final version of the book
was published only in 1887. Tönnies, a member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, to which Max Weber also
belonged, was always somewhat an outsider to the academic world. Although he remained affiliated with
the University of Kiel for more than half a century, he was a full professor for only eight years (Heberle
1937, p. 145).
97
The two notions are, of course, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Although these German terms can readily
be translated into English, the first as "community", the second as "society", I will follow a widespread
practice (see the English edition I am using [Tönnies 1887], and also Heberle 1937), and use instead the
German terms.
98
For a discussion of a few of these proposals, and of the way they relate to Tönnies', see Loomis 1957.
99
Even Durkheim's distinction between "mechanic" and "organic" solidarities is not often used as such in
present-day sociological discourse; it is used mostly in discussions of Durkheim's work.
100
Indeed, a historical analysis of the genesis of the theory shows that this was Tönnies' starting point (Leif
1946, p. 13).
101
The notion of will must be understood in a very broad sense: as a matter of fact, it encompasses almost
all of human nature, or at least all those aspects of human nature which are related to the motives that
prompt human action (Leif 1946, p. 14).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
101
man's thought processes are dependent upon his organic life, whereas in rational will,
these thought processes come to take preponderance over organic life. Natural will can be
understood only in terms of the past: it is the produce of past experience, to which it
always refers. By contrast, rational will must be understood in terms of the future,
because it exists only in relation to a given, deliberately devised, project. Natural will is a
produce of activity; its rational counterpart "is prior to the activity to which it refers [...],
while activity is its realization" (1887, pp. 103-04).
Turning to the sociological level of analysis, the actions which express these wills
can either take the form of aggression or of cooperation. Only in the second case can we
speak of social relations. Thus, social relations are the product of the interaction of human
wills (1887, p. 33). But this interaction does not only result in social relations, but also in
the formation of a new type of will, a common, or social will (1887, p. 66).
Not surprisingly, depending on the type of will that is at work, different types of
social wills, and different social systems, will obtain. Natural will results in a social
organization Tönnies calls a Gemeinschaft102. In this type of organization, people are
related to each other through personal bonds, whose paradigm is the blood relation (1887,
p. 37). Even if they are not directly related, people living in a Gemeinschaft know each
other personally, and do not think of their relationships as being determined by selfinterest. By contrast, rational will results in a social organization Tönnies calls a
Gesellschaft. In this type of organization, people do not directly know each other. They
do not act toward each other as total human beings, but only as abstract beings, who exist
only insofar as they meet or oppose some rationally designed purpose of the acting agent
(1887, p. 65). "Accordingly", Tönnies tells us, "Gemeinschaft should be understood as a
living organism, Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate and artifact" (1887, p. 35).
Tönnies' theory contains several other levels of analysis. The only one which is
needed for an understanding of the rest of this presentation is the distinction - analogous
to Aristotle's distinction between three types of souls - between three forms of natural
will: the first (which gives rise to pleasure) is vegetative, and is found in plants, in
animals, and in humans. The second, (which gives rise to habit) is animal, and is found in
animals and in humans. The third, (which gives rise to memory) is mental, and is present
only in humans. Tönnies' other distinctions need not concern us here.
Tönnies' views on the evolution of religion are presented as one of the subordinate
dichotomies arising from the basic dichotomies in a particular social sphere: morality. In
102
Of course, this terminology was not invented by Tönnies; it was quite common in German at that time
(1887, pp. 33-34). Tönnies only systematized its use. It should also be noted that Tönnies did not consider
these concepts as corresponding to empirical types of societies, but merely as analytic abstractions.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
102
Gemeinschaft, morality was based entirely on religion. Religion is most important in the
most "supreme" of the three forms of Gemeinschaft103. In the Gemeinschaft of ideas best represented in town-life - the common will of the group expresses itself in
religion104. Furthermore, religion acts as a force that binds this looser form of
Gemeinschaft together: "A worshiped deity [...] has an immediate significance for the
preservation of such a bond [i.e., friendship], [and] is not bound to any place but lives in
the conscience of its worshipers and accompanies them on their travels to foreign
countries" (1887, p. 43).
In contrast, in Gesellschaft, religion can no longer commend men's attention: "The
intellectual attitude of the individual becomes gradually less and less influenced by
religion and more and more influenced by science" (scientization*; 1887, p. 226). Even
tough religion retains some degree of influence in any kind of concrete social
organization, its influence makes itself felt only in realms where communal forms
continue to predominate, most conspicuously in family life (privatization*; 1887, p. 219).
But in public life, religion has been replaced by public opinion105. Thus, in Gesellschaft,
public opinion has replaced religion as an agency for the conduct of collective life
(autonomization*). This influence is exercised through the particular devices used in the
different types of social organizations to enforce social control: "Religion approves
folkways, mores, and customs as good and right or condemns them as false and bad.
Likewise, public opinion condones policy and legislation as effective and clever or
condemns it as ineffective and stupid" (1887, p. 219).
As we can see, in Tönnies' theory the autoreference question survives only in a
very limited form. What must be noted is that the transformations of religion are no
longer accounted for in cognitive terms (from "error" to "truth") nor in terms of social
engineering (in term of the emergence of a "scientific" order), but as a social-structural
evolution (from a form of association favorable to religion to a form of association
unfavorable to religion).
103
1: Community of blood, based on vegetative life; 2: Community of locality, based on animal life;
3: Community of ideas, based on mental life (1887, p. 42).
104
In contrast, for example, with the situation obtaining in the family (type 1), where the common will
expresses itself in the "family spirit".
105
It should be noted that public opinion is not simply an addition of the opinions of all members of society;
it is the product of the thinking of the most enlightened of its members (1887, p. 220). The instrument of
public opinion is the press, an immaterial power in many respects far more effective that the material power
of the state itself (1887, p. 221).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
103
Secularization was also used very briefly as a descriptive term by Hannah Arendt.
In her article on "The concept of history" (1954), she starts from the premise that we no
longer live in a religious, but in a secular world, and discusses two uses of the term
secularization, between which she expresses her preference. This discussion of Arendt's is
situated in the framework of a debate among historians as to the status of the Christian
notions of history and progress in the genesis of the modern historical consciousness, as
discussed most notably by Theodor Mommsen. Secularization can be viewed, on the one
hand, simply as an event which happened at some point in history, as the "separation of
religion and politics" (1954, p. 69). In this sense, it represents the rise of an independent
secular thought, which is based on the idea of the rules of natural law. But secularization
can be viewed, on the other hand, as a change in ideas, giving rise to a new historical
consciousness (generalization*), in which "secular concepts" have replaced "religious
categories" (1954, p. 69). This, in other words, is the thesis "that the modern historical
consciousness has a Christian religious origin and came into being through a
secularization of originally theological categories" (1954, p. 65). The first type of
secularization, Arendt deems undeniable, but the second, she finds very doubtful.
Finally, secularization was also used by Mircea Eliade, an historian of religion.
Eliade's concerns were not with secularization, far from that. He was interested almost
exclusively in religious man, in the analysis of the manifestations of the sacred in all
times and places. He considered the sacred as reality par excellence, and the experience
of the sacred as the truest manifestation of man's humanity. Eliade was deeply distressed
by the emergence of areligious, or profane man (he did not talk of secular man), who, he
thought, had fully emerged only in modern western societies (1957, p. 172). To him, this
evolution constituted an impoverishment of human experience. Whenever he mentioned
this transformation, he used the category of "desacralization". In his view, even the
religious experience of the urban Christian represented an impoverishment, because urban
man had lost contact with the cosmos, with nature as a manifestation of the sacred.
Eliade's analysis of desacralization was not a sociological analysis; it was entirely
contained inside the framework of the phenomenology of religion.
What must be noted for our purposes, however, is that Eliade sometimes used the
word secularization. And, although his terminology is not very rigorous, I think that the
intention that lies behind his use of the term, as it appears in Le sacré et le profane, can
be brought out quite accurately. Secularization is not the decline of the sacred; it is
something different from desacralization. Eliade uses secularization in the sense of
generalization*. Whenever he uses "secularization" instead of "desacralization", his
intention is to point to all that areligous man has inherited from his religious forebears:
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
104
"Just as 'Nature' is the produce of a progressive secularization of the Cosmos created by
God, profane man is the result of a desacralization of human existence. [...] In other
words, profane man, whether he wants it or not, retains traces of the behavior of religious
man, but deprived of its religious meaning" (1957, pp. 172-173). At another point, he
explains: "By opposing the 'sacred' to the 'profane', we mainly wanted to underscore the
impoverishment brought about by the secularization of a religious behavior" (1957, pp. 910). Thus, in Eliade, desacralization represents the radical impoverishment brought about
by the emergence of profane man, whereas secularization rather represents all that - in
spite of this impoverishment - survives from the richness of the religious experience in
profane man.
The evidence presented thus far should be sufficient to underscore the uncertain
status of "secularization" among intellectuals in general in the first half of the century.
Sometimes, secularization was loosely linked to a philosophy of history. But most often,
it was simply used as shorthand pointing to a number of different phenomena in the
dialectic relationship between the religious and the non-religious. The connotations of the
word ranged from the clearest dismissal to an adamant valorization of religion. But in all
cases, secularization was considered a thing of the past, a process which had given birth
to a new, secular society, definitive in its main features.
"Secularization" in Middletown
How did sociologists position themselves in this intellectual environment? The
same elementary linguistic logic which led to the use of the word secularization by
historians and historians of religion led to its use in sociology. The first systematic use of
the term secularization in a well-known sociological work occurred in the 1929
Middletown studies. These studies again bear testimony to the fact that interest and
awareness concerning religion rose rather than fell with the advent of empirical
sociology106. As is apparent in the general organization of the book as well as in the
conclusions drawn from the enquiry, the Lynds did not conclude that the importance of
religion had drastically declined in Middletown; quite the contrary. Chapter five of the
original study was entirely devoted to religious practice, and the first study concluded
106
In the Polish Peasant, another very important landmark in the development of empirical sociology,
religion also appeared as a subject-matter worthy of study (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918, pp. 205-88; 1280303). However, it appeared important mainly in the introduction, which presented the Polish peasant's
traditional way of life, and the general analytical category underlying the whole study was disorganization,
not secularization (which was apparently not mentioned).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
105
that, among the six "groups of activities" investigated, "formal religious activities" had
the least changed (Lynd and Lynd 1929, pp. 403-04; 497), and represented "permanence
in the face of surrounding change" (Lynd and Lynd 1937, p. 295).
In spite of this general trend, however, the authors noted a number of
transformations. To describe these changes, they used the word secularization very
systematically. But the concept was not defined explicitly: it was considered selfexplanatory. One thing, however, should be stressed: Secularization was not used to refer
to an overall decline of religion, but - exactly as in Weber - to a number of limited
changes in specific areas.
The most striking fact emerging from the Lynd's studies is that they used virtually
all the ideas which became later incorporated in the CISR paradigm as exemplars. The
most important use of secularization in Middletown is related to the idea of
differentiation*. In the second study, the authors note that "a further secularization of
Middletown [...] since 1925 is apparent in the effort to divorce religion and politics
through a bill passed by the State House of Representatives in 1931 prohibiting any
person or organization from sending questionnaires to candidates concerning their moral,
religious, or legislative opinions [...]" (1937, p. 307). The authors also note that religious
rites are performed increasingly inside specifically religious buildings and at a particular
date and time (1929, p. 339).
Secularization is also used in the sense of autonomization*, first in that an
increasing number of social practices are carried out without recourse to religious
ceremonies or beliefs (1929, p. 203). One example of this in the public sphere is the
secularization of charity organizations - the Social Service Bureau having replaced the
Church (1929, pp. 462, 468). But the most systematic use of this sense of secularization is
made in connection with the family. It refers, first, to the decline in the rate of marriages
performed by a religious representative as opposed to marriages performed by a secular
agent (1929, p. 112). Second, it refers to the fact that the taboo on the dissolution of
marriage is increasingly being lifted, which results in an increase of divorce (1929,
p. 121). Finally, the loss of potency of the taboo on voluntary control of parenthood
(1929, p. 123) can also be considered a secularization of the family.
Secularization is also linked to the idea of privatization* when the authors note
that the rapidity of the process differs from one institutional sphere to another, and is
slower "in the home and family" than in "business and industry" (1929, p. 26, n. 3).
The second core exemplar implied in the treatment of secularization in the
Middletown studies is worldliness*. This is most apparent in the secularization of the
Sabbath, which becomes the "Sunday Holiday" (1929, p. 343). One example of this is
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
106
"the operation of a night club on Sunday evening in Middletown" (1935, p. 277, n. 47),
another is the influence of the automobile, which induces people to leave the town instead
of going to Church (1935, p. 307). Finally, another element which is not considered by
the authors to be an example of secularization - but which is considered as such in the
CISR paradigm - is the fact that the retreat of the Church inside specific buildings which
we mentioned earlier is "countered" by a tendency of the Church to fight back by "taking
over extra-religious activities" (1929, p. 339).
Of course, the different senses of secularization can be isolated only analytically,
and the way secularization is used in Middletown makes it appear clearly that they are
closely interconnected. The best example of this is probably provided by what the authors
call the secularization of public lectures. This element will allow us to operate a smooth
transition from worldliness to the third core exemplar of the CISR paradigm,
rationalization*: "The heavy crop of moral and political lectures by visiting ministers and
denominational college presidents" is increasingly being replaced by "short talks to club
groups, more and more of them on specific subjects to specialized groups" (1929, p. 229;
338). Here, worldliness* (time is being devoted to this-worldly preoccupations) merges
with rationalization* (in the sense that these preoccupations can be characterized as
directly useful and rationally defined toward specific ends).
Rationalization* is also apparent in the secularization of health matters, modern
science replacing the reliance on the "will of God" (1929, p. 457), and expresses itself in
the secularization of literature: Scientific books found in the public library now carry
specifically scientific titles ("Introduction to Geology") rather than religiously influenced
ones ("The Wonders of Creation"; 1929, p. 237, n. 25).
But why did the authors not differentiate these different meanings of the term? It
is probably safe to answer that these differences would have seemed meaningless to them.
As we have noted, they are purely analytical - as their multiple interconnections make
clear. In the absence of any overall secularization theory, the Lynds were quite justified in
not making these distinctions. And the fact that they did not define secularization shows
that, for them, it must have referred to something quite obvious, which need not be stated
explicitly. In other words, as for the historians we discussed earlier, "secularization"
simply referred to any kind of transition from "religion" to "non-religion".
"Secularization" as a taken-for-granted decline of religion
Secularization was not always used in the subtle and differentiated way it was
used in the Middletown studies. As a matter of fact, one can find numerous examples of a
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
107
much cruder use of the term. For many writers, secularization is tantamount to a takenfor-granted decline of religion. Let us take, as an illustration, Ruth Benedicts' Patterns of
Culture.
Benedict does not discuss religion in modern society in any detail. The word
secularization appears only once in her book, when she mentions "the minor changes that
occasion so much denunciation today, such as the increase of divorce, the growing
secularization in our cities, the prevalence of the petting party, and many more [...]"
(Benedict 1934, pp. 36-37). Although she does not define secularization, what she means
by this word is clearly linked to "the fact that religion is no longer the area of life in
which the important modern battles are staged" (1934, p. 9). Thus, we see that at least two
things are taken for granted in Patterns of Culture: the meaning of the word
secularization, and the "fact" that religion has become unimportant.
This simplistic use of the term secularization was not restricted to the first half of
the century. Indeed, it perdures even today in a great many writings. A similar pattern
emerges, for instance, from Lerner's Passing of Traditional Society. In Lerner's
vocabulary, to become secularized is to acquire "a concern with problems identified as
socio-economic rather than religious" (1958, p. 165). This process is always closely
related to urbanization, industrialization, democratization, education and media
participation (1958, p. 438). Lerner considers secularization - which also includes a
decline in attendance - as self-evident: "The familiar process of secularization
accompanies urbanization in Egypt as elsewhere. While almost all of the Farmers
interviewed visit their village mosque daily, the Workers have ruptured this Traditional
bond" (1958, p. 230).
It is not necessary to pursue this presentation of the crudest uses of
"secularization". It will be sufficient to note, for our purposes, that sociologists did not
differ markedly from historians in their use of the term. This was to change with the
impact of the European classic tradition. Before we turn to this, let us summarize our
findings concerning the place of sociology of religion and the status of "secularization" in
America outside the European influence.
Interest in sociology of religion was rather low during the whole period, but seems
to have risen somewhat with the advent of empirical sociology. This can be explained by
the fact that, once they turned to community studies, sociologists could not fail to notice
that religion still played some role in the daily life of Americans - a fact that tended to be
overlooked by some of the most enthusiastic proponents of sociology as a cure for the
social problems brought about by the "demise" of religion. As for secularization, we have
noted that the term was not very widely used, and that its meaning was not determined by
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
108
a theoretical framework - rather, every writer felt free to use it as its etymology and the
subject-matter he was studying seemed to indicate. Most of the ideas taken over later in
the CISR paradigm, however, were already present. The core exemplar developed in most
detail was that of differentiation, whereas the idea of rationalization* was not nearly as
important. As we will see, with the reception of the European tradition, the secularization
issue will evolve in a more theoretical direction, and the idea of rationalization* will be
further developed.
"Secularization" as a theory (1921-1957)
"Secularization" in the Chicago School
I now wish to introduce one of the most important developments in the genesis of
the CISR paraidgm: The transformation of "secularization" from a mere descriptive term
into a master concept embedded in a global theory. Secularization was in effect not used
only as a descriptive term in the United States. It was included in a theoretical framework
for the first time by a group of sociologists - mainly Robert Park, Howard Becker, Robert
Redfield, and Everett Hughes - who were initially grouped in the Chicago Department of
sociology107. As we will see, the whole discussion of secularization as it was used in this
framework can be nicely delimited in time and in the social space, in contrast to the
somewhat incoherent aspect of the discussion of "secularization as a descriptive term".
This difference illustrates the interconnectedness of the social and of the cognitive realms
as soon as a theory acquires the status of a paradigm. And indeed, in the 40s and 50s,
secularization as used by Becker and Redfield did function as a paradigm - although on a
smaller scale than the modern secularization paradigm.
This paradigm rested on a dichotomy between the sacred and the secular
societies. According to Becker, the first use of the sacred-secular dichotomy can be traced
to one of his masters, Robert Park108, who "had used sacred and secular as terms for
designating societies in their value-system aspects for a considerable time, as his
publications from the early 1920's show" (Becker 1957, p. 180). At this point, Becker
refers to Park and Burgess' Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921), and to Park's
107
For this reason, I will refer to the "Chicago paradigm", although Becker pursued his career at the
University of Wisconsin at Madison.
108
This is confirmed by Martindale and Monachesi in their textbook: "We believe the [sacred-secular]
terminology was initially used in his seminar by Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago" (TXT 1951,
p. 204, n. 22).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
109
Race and Culture (1950). But these references are not very convincing. The 1921
textbook offers only a discussion of the differences of character between "those [ancient]
Greeks who mingled much in maritime affairs and those who did not" (Park and Burgess
1921, p. 261). The authors noted that the former were much more open to novelty than
the latter, but the sacred/secular dichotomy is not used in the text. In the article reprinted
in Race and Culture (which was written in 1931; Park 1950, p. 3), however, Park does
indeed briefly mention the sacred-secular dichotomy: "What characterizes a sacred
society is not so much antiquity as immobility. [...] The thing that characterizes a secular
society, on the other hand, is its mobility" ([1931] 1950, pp. 12-13). Park very explicitly
states that this dichotomy has found its classic expression in Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft and, for some reason which does not appear clearly, he goes on to explain
that these two types can "perhaps, [be] describe[d] as the sacred and secular societies"
(1950, p. 12). At this precise point, he refers to Tönnies, but also to Durkheim's Division
du Travail in a footnote. The fact that Park's use of the sacred-secular dichotomy in his
own writings was very scant should not be construed as a dismissal of his influence. As
Ellworth Faris109 explains, Park was much more interested and efficient in
communicating his ideas in the classroom than in writing; he would rather "induce men to
write ten books than to take time off to write one himself" (Faris, quoted in Coser 1971,
p. 371).
Becker acknowledges that he was greatly influenced by Park's views and that, in
addition, Park also greatly influenced Everett Hughes ("Who [was] the first of those
working with Park, so far as the writer knows, to have utilized the concepts [of sacred and
secular societies] in dealing with an empirical problem [reference is then made to Hughes
1928]") and Robert Redfield, who used it to develop his folk-urban typology (Becker
1957, p. 180).
Hughes appears, in effect, to be the first American writer to use "secularization" in
a theoretical framework, in a rather brief reflection on the "secularization of the division
of labor" (1928, p. 757). His immediate concern is with the different types of
personalities connected with different types of division of labor. Starting from
Durkheim's distinction between social segment and social organ, he draws a distinction
between a sacred division of labor (which obtains in social segments) and a secular
division of labor (obtaining in the social organs). He then gives a number of examples of
a sacred division of labor, drawn from his own researches110. This type of division of
109
110
One of Park's colleagues in Chicago.
"[...] done under the tutelage of Dr. Faris at the University of Chicago" (1928, pp. 756-57).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
110
labor included "'preliterate professions', including healers, performers of ritual, charmers,
medicine men, etc." (1928, p. 757). In contrast to this rigidly determined type of division
of labor, a secularized division of labor is much more flexible: New occupations are
created every day, and individuals have to adapt to this constantly changing situation.
"We may call the division of labor 'secularized' both in that new occupations or units of
function are developed, which are not hampered by tradition, and in that the persons who
enter the occupations come without definite, traditional notions about the way of carrying
on the occupation" (1928, p. 758). At this point, Hughes then refers to Sombart's
Wirtschaftsleben im Hochkapitalismus (1902), where Sombart effectively used the term
"secularization".
Howard Becker
Becker developed the first elements of his secularization theory as early as 1930
in his Ph.D dissertation (Redfield 1947, p. 293). A summary of the framework developed
in the dissertation is available in the form of a paper published by Becker shortly
thereafter (Becker 1932). This paper contains a detailed analysis of the transition from
traditional ("sacred") to modern ("secular") forms of social organization in terms of the
breakdown and reconstruction, on a new basis, of the social equilibrium, as influenced,
most notably, by population movements. However, it does not spell out explicitly what
later came to be considered the core of Becker's secularization theory: the definition of
"sacred" and "secular" in terms of refusal versus acceptance of change. We will therefore
rely on a later and more well-known formulation, which appeared in Sacred-Secular
Theory and its Development (Becker 1957).
In this paper, Becker's starting point is the process by which humans evaluate that is, bestow a value upon - their environment. In Becker's schema, values are
inseparably the objects of our needs (e.g., Swiss cheese or well-being) and the only form
of knowledge - since only the "givens" which are desired, positively or negatively,
become "takens": "What is known is needed; what is needed is known" (1957, p. 138).
Moreover, every value is the object of a judgment in terms of "right-wrong, good-bad,
proper-improper, convenient-inconvenient" (1957, p. 140), that is, in terms of norms.
Values, then, are referred to by Becker as "knowing-desiring-norming".
To reformulate in a somewhat less exotic vocabulary: Humans perceive reality
selectively (by "taking" some of the "givens" to be found in nature). In doing this, they are
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
111
influenced by their needs111 in such a way that the (positive or negative) objects of their
needs are what they perceive as reality, and vice versa. At the same time, this perception
is judged in moral terms. In other words, humans act in the world that surrounds them
through a given set of values, which is inseparably a form of knowledge and a moral
order, both of which are heavily influenced by human needs.
The distinction between the sacred and the secular is a distinction between two
types of orientations to these values: "Any society or part thereof that imparts to or elicits
from its members evaluations that can be altered, if at all, only in the face of definite
emotionalized reluctance is a sacred society [...]. Conversely, any society or part thereof
that imparts to or elicits from its members evaluations leading to well-marked readiness
to change is a secular society [...]" (1957, p. 142).
What Becker has in mind when he speaks of values is much broader than what is
implied in the everyday use of this term, or even than what is commonly implied in
sociology: Values are not just "ultimate" or "moral" values. Instead, all the objects
whatsoever that are part of the human world are values. By the same token, "sacred
values must be treated as comprising far more than the religious, divine, spiritual and son
on. [...] Unwillingness or inability or both - linked with distress or similar signs of tension
- to alter any aspect of one's 'way of life' is sacred evaluation". Similarly, "the learning of
secular conduct is [...] much more than the acquisition of awovedly or unawovedly nonreligious, profane, or skeptical needs or values" (1957, p. 142).
In this scheme, secularization is a movement along a continuum that extends from
the sacred pole (characterized by maximum reluctance to change) to the secular pole
(characterized by maximum acceptance of change). Along this continuum, Becker defines
a number of intermediary types, the exact description of which need not concern us here.
Let us briefly notice that at the secular pole, we find holy sacredness (that is, religion) and
loyalistic sacredness (patriotism); that when approaching the middle of the scale, we find
types like the "fittingly sacred"; and finally that moving toward the secular pole, we first
find different forms of rationality, and reach the extreme of the scale with the irrational
"pronormless" societies (1957, pp. 143-161).
We now begin to see where religion fits in in Becker's scheme. Although
secularization is much more than a transformation of religion, the starting point of the
process (sacred society) is defined mainly as holy, that is, religious (1957, p. 144).
Moreover, religion does not appear at any other place along the continuum: Any
movement toward the secular pole is by definition a moving away from religion. One
111
By needs, Becker refers to more than just biological needs.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
112
consequence of this view must be brought out right away. Religion is defined as
intrinsically opposed to change; indeed, immobilism itself is defined as religion. There is
apparently no room, in Becker's scheme, for a dynamic view of religion. Similarly, there
is no place in it for a consideration of the rational aspects of religion (in the sense of
substantive rationality): "Traditionalism and non-rationality go hand in hand" (1957, p.
153). As a result of this perspective, any tendency toward immobilism must, in the last
analysis, be attributed to sacred values, of which the most extreme form is religion, while
any tendency toward change must be attributed to secularism. Indeed, any movement, in
any direction on Becker's scale, can be understood only in terms of the degree of
sacredness of the values, for the "secular" pole is nothing but the negation of the sacred
pole; it does not possess a quality of its own: it can either be rational or irrational.
Becker's scheme does not include a bipolarity (sacredness-rationality). The whole process
of social change is reduced to a single dimension. Social change is never a movement
toward something, only a movement away from something.
As is apparent, Becker's view is that societies, if they want to survive, must
somehow find a compromise between these two extremes. At the two poles lies the
"extinction criterion": "sacrificial extinction" at the sacred pole (1957, p. 144) and
extinction through the "thrilling carving for the comfortable" (i.e., drug addicts) at the
secular pole (1957, p. 162). For this reason, secularization is not just an affair of modern
times: it is a process which has occurred many times in history, and which "has been
repeatedly followed by its reverse, sacralization" (1957, p. 173). "Far-reaching
secularization not infrequently engenders intensified sacralization; extremes meet" (1957,
p. 175).
Robert Redfield
Redfield first developed his secularization theory as early as 1934 (Tax 1941,
p. 35). However, for our purposes, we will rely on a later formulation of this theory, as it
appeared in his book on The Folk Culture of Yucatan (Redfield 1941). In this book,
Redfield establishes a dichotomy between the folk society, which is "small, isolated,
nonliterate, and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity" (Redfield 1947,
p. 297) and the urban society, which displays roughly the opposed characteristics. The
folk society, Redfield tells us, can also be considered a sacred society with respect to
certain of its characteristics (1947, p. 303). The transition from folk to urban society is
characterized by three processes: "the disorganization of culture, the secularization of
society, and the individualization of the society" (Redfield 1941, p. 18). Thus,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
113
secularization is used by Redfield in a more restricted sense than by Becker:
Secularization is merely one of the aspects in the global process of social change. The
different processes brought together under the heading of secularization can be
conveniently summarized under five headings. 1) "The separation of maize from the
context of religion and its treatment simply as a means of getting food or money" (1941,
p. 352); 2) the secularization of the division of labor; 3) the secularization of marriage; 4)
the decline of the gods; 5) the emergence of medicine.
First, the growing of maize (in contrast to the growing of chicle, which is an
entirely secular activity) is deeply interconnected with the religious life (religious
ceremonies to secure rain and co-operative endeavor) in Tusik (the collectivity which
most resembles a folk society), but it is very much secularized in the more urban
collectivities (1941, pp. 163-64). Second, there is a secularization of the division of labor.
We are already familiar with this notion, which had been developed by Hughes, to whose
1928 article Redfield refers at this point (1941, p. 180). Third, there is a secularization of
marriage, which ceases to have the character of a sacrament, and "tends to be a party, an
occasion fo gaiety, rather than a religious observance" (1941, p. 218). But the most
important element of secularization is designated in the title of chapter IX: "Decline of
the gods". This decline manifests itself through the "decline of religious faith and the
reduction in sanctity of the acts and images in which faith is manifest" (1941, p. 262).
First, whereas in the villages, the whole of life is embedded in "a sacred plan" which
presides over the conduct of individuals, in the cities, the rituals associated with this
sacred plan tend to disappear (1941, p. 229). This trend applies not only to pagan beliefs,
but also to the Catholic faith (1941, p. 241). In the villages, the Most Holy Cross is "so
sacred that few of its votaries are allowed to see it", and the local santo plays a very
important role. But in the city many of the inhabitants "do not even know which santo is
the patron of their local community" (1941, p. 244). As one moves from folk to urban
society, the proportion of unbelievers increases (1941, p. 244). The same trend can be
observed in the declining importance of the religious aspects of the novenas, the ritual
recitations of Catholic prayers held in private houses, which also served as a means for
the wealthy families to express their social status by inviting a great number of people.
Increasingly, novenas are being replaced by secular celebrations: "The santo had become
the excuse for a celebration, the owner of the santo an entrepreneur, and the novena a
business enterprise" (1941, p. 260). Finally, the last element of secularization is the
"transfer of the functions of healing from a man who is a priest as well as a shaman to a
woman who is only a healer and practitioner of beneficent magic" (1941, p. 314).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
114
Although Redfield's analysis is mainly descriptive, at the end of his book he offers
some "speculative" remarks to help account for the observed trends. Secularization
appears to be related, first, to the disorganization of culture. People cease to believe
because they no longer understand the meaning of the beliefs: The growth in the size of
the community (or its growing heterogeneity) makes it impossible for everybody to
participate in the rituals which express the understanding. Another possible explanation,
suggested by the history of our own society (as understood in the continental tradition, to
which Redfield refers at this point), would be the development of the modern economic
system and of centralized government (1941, p. 367). "Increase of contacts, bringing
about heterogeneity and disorganization of culture, constitutes one sufficient cause of
secularization and individualization. And the case of Guatemala [see Tax 1941], fortified
by certain interpretations of the history of our society, suggests that the development of
important commerce and a money economy may be another such sufficient cause" (1941,
p. 369).
Redfield's attempt thus appears much more modest than Becker's, and at the same
time closer to the CISR paradigm, mainly because formal religion plays a more central
role in Redfield's account. But we are still a far cry from the modern theories. Redfield
was concerned mainly with a typology drawn from an ethnological investigation in
Yucatan, and he was not very interested in the fate of religion in modern society.
The diffusion of the Chicago paradigm
The framework developed by Becker and Redfield was fairly influential in the 40s
and 50s. Let us briefly mention some of the uses to which it was put in articles published
in the American Journal of Sociology and in American Anthropologist. The results of
Redfield's field work in the Yucatan peninsula were partly contested by Sol Tax (Tax
1941). He questioned the universality of Redfield's dichotomy and, on the basis of his
own field work in Guatemala, claimed that, although the Guatemalan Indians were of the
"primitive type" with respect to their world view, they were of the "civilized type" as far
as their social relations were concerned (1941, p. 37).
In 1947, the idea of secularization was applied by Reuben Hill to the study of the
American family. The author used Becker's idea of secularization as a general background
against which he assessed the transformations of the family (Reuben Hill 1947, p. 126).
One year later, Ernest Burgess (who co-authored the 1921 Introduction to the Science of
Sociology with Park) used the idea of secularization to account for the changes in the
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
115
family itself112. Secularization was used by Burgess to refer to "the declining control of
religion, and [...] the increasing role of material comforts, labor-saving devices, and other
mechanical contrivances like the automobile, the radio, and television" (Burgess 1948,
pp. 417-18). Finally, in 1952, a study by Austin Portfield concluded that the two extremes
of the "folk-secular continuum" were characterized, on the secular side, by higher rates of
suicide, whereas the "depressed folk society resorts more to crime" (Portfield 1952,
p. 338).
The origins of the Chicago paradigm
We must now for a moment come back in time, and consider the origins of the
Chicago paradigm. To what extent was this paradigm a reformulation of the European
tradition, and to what extent was it an independent formulation? At first sight, the first
American sociologists to use the term "secularization" in a theoretical framework appear
to be quite heavily influenced by the German classical tradition. In suggesting the sacredsecular dichotomy, Park had in mind Tönnies. Becker, who developed the distinction in a
much more detailed way, had a good knowledge of continental sociology, and recognized
that he had been very much influenced by it (Becker 1957, pp. 178-80). Redfield also
occasionally referred to Tönnies and Sombart, who had already pointed to the
"relationship between the development of commerce and the secularization of society"
(Redfield 1941, p. 185, ref. in n. 14). And Hughes, who was apparently the first of the
Chicago sociologists to write about secularization, explicitly referred to Sombart.
The reason why Park decided to replace Tönnies' distinction by the sacred-secular
dichotomy, however, remains unclear. Hints indicating the relationship between
Gemeinschaft and sacredness can certainly be found in Tönnies, but the use of "sacred"
and "secular" nonetheless represented a definite change of emphasis113. And as we have
seen, the whole secularization theory developed by Becker on these premises was very
different from all that had been embodied in the German tradition. On second sight,
Hughes' reference to Sombart is also somewhat confusing. If we take a closer look at
Sombart's book, we notice that he used secularization to designate the decline, or
routinization, of the puritan ethic. The modern entrepreneur, Sombart tells us, freed
himself from the bonds of religion and morality. "It is the secularization of the capitalist
112
Although Burgess was from the University of Chicago and must have known at least Redfield's theory,
he did not refer to any literature in this particular article.
113
For an analysis of the numerous misunderstandings that accompanied Tönnies' reception in America, see
Cahnman 1977.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
116
spirit which prepares the way for the whole pandemonium of passions" (Sombart 1902, p.
30). In this framework, secularization meant, very specifically, the loss of power of
institutional religion and morality over social life, and in particular over economic life:
"Today, the fundamental characteristic of all economic behavior is 'the lack of scruples',
which is not very compatible with any religious system which would authoritatively
prescribe standards to the bourgeois morality" (1902, p. 31). As we have seen, however,
what Hughes had in mind when he referred to Sombart was much broader than that. It
certainly included a loss of power of the tradition over the contents of the occupation (but
not necessarily in the direction on a "lack of scruples"), but it referred mainly to a new
type of division of labor. Sombart's concerns, in short, were with morality; Hughes'
concerns were more with social structure and its effects on personality.
We must therefore conclude that, in developing their views on secularization, the
sociologists of the Chicago school were not simply following the German tradition. They
were reformulating the classical problem of that tradition (the transition from community
to society114) in terms of a sacred-secular dichotomy which was not to be found in that
tradition. And, confusingly, this dichotomy entailed the use of the term "secularization",
which was also used in the German tradition, although in a much more restricted sense. In
other words, they elevated "secularization" from the status of a descriptive term to the
status of a historical explicative category115. It seems correct, therefore, to emphasize the
discontinuity, as well as the continuity, between the German and the early American
tradition: Americans expanded the meaning of the term secularization as it was used in
Germany to encompass a general theory of social change taken over from the German
tradition - in which, however, the term secularization was not used.
114
Indeed, the sacred-secular dichotomy is widely recognized as one of the very numerous variations on
Tönnies' typology (Loomis 1957).
115
This is also the conclusion reached by Hermann Lübbe (1964, p. 229).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
117
CHAPTER 10
SECULARIZATION IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
The works we have studied so far displayed little interest in the situation of
religion in the modern world. They were concerned mainly with the analysis of historical
trends, with the analysis of the modern world as such, or with cultures situated outside the
area of maximal economic development. One of the reasons for this tendency is the
dearth of empirical data concerning religion. Another is the absence of interest in religion
as a subject matter among professional sociologists. As we will see, in these days,
religion tended to be considered a residual category, unworthy of serious study.
In the following decades, this situation was to be decisively, if slowly, altered.
One of the reasons for this change is an evolution within academic sociology. With the
parallel rise of empiricism and of functionalism, sociologist found good reasons to start
taking religion into account. But, perhaps more importantly, the situation was altered by
the commitment of a growing number of Catholic sociologists, who started creating
scholarly associations of their own, and launched empirical investigations of
unprecedented scale on the situation of religion.
Empiricism and the Catholic reaction in American sociology (1918-1949)
As, in the precedeing chapter, we moved from Ward and Sumner to Small and
Giddings, and then to Park, Sorokin and MacIver, we noticed that the space devoted to
religion steadily increased. This increase of interest was due in part to the European
influence; but I would like to argue that it was also related to the rise of empiricism. After
World War I, American sociology developed an increasingly empirical character (House
1936, p. 294). Although the sociology of religion remained a marginal area116 (Lenski
1962, pp. 308-09; Glock 1959, p. 153), empiricists did not write off religion a priori, and
devoted some attention to it. However, this was done in a manner that could not please
Catholic sociologists. The new attitude to religion can be illustrated by the treatment
116
Sociologists of religion have always been complaining that "American sociologists in the main may be
predisposed to perceive religion as no longer exercising a crucial influence on social life and, therefore, to
dismiss it as a suitable subject for inquiry" (Glock 1959, p. 175). David Martin has expressed the same view
in stronger words: "To study religion is like studying a residual penumbra. Of all the different enclaves of
contemporary specialization the sociology of religion most resembles the republic of Venice just before
Napoleon snuffed it out for ever. [...] The proper place for religion is a footnote" (Martin 1966, pp. 355 and
358). Other authors have expressed similar complaints quite recently. No matter how justified these
comments are today, they are certainly less justified than they were at the beginning of the century.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
118
reserved to it in the leading sociology journal in these years, the American Journal of
Sociology. Starting in 1928, religion found a recognized place in the AJS in the yearly
special issues devoted to "recent social changes" in areas such as population, education,
rural life and a few others (see for instance Holt 1928). These special issues appeared
again every year117 until 1935. The purpose of this innovation, as stated in the foreword
(1928, AJS 34 [1]), was "to present records of fact rather than speculative or exhortative
articles". In 1935, "Church attendance" became one of the social trends regularly
investigated by William Ogburn - alongside suicides, telephone conversations and first
class mail (!) - and presented in systematic tables (see for instance Ogburn 1935). The
picture of religion which emerged from these figures was not very optimistic.
Increasingly, the yearly reports tended to indicate a decline in religion. In 1942, Hornell
Hart, in a new report, summarized the trend of the decade as a whole. He documented the
decline of religion in several detailed tables, using indices like the decline in religious
articles in magazines, the decline in Church membership, in Church attendance, in
religious education, the increasing criticisms against the Church, the crisis in Christian
missions, and the decline in the proportion of scientists believing in God. As in the
previous reports, no comments accompanied these dry figures (Hart 1942).
It is against this general background that the emergence of Catholic sociology
must be understood. For one thing, Catholics felt that an exclusively empirical approach
to the study of society was totally improper. As one of the Catholic participants in the
ASS meetings recalls: "We were pretty much disgusted with the meetings of the A.S.S.
First of all, the papers were largely research topics, and to all appearances, it was largely
research for the sake of research. Secondly, the outlook of these sociologists was poles
away from ours. They were just in that period when Sociology was a science copying its
procedures from the natural sciences. For these secular sociologists the approach was
supposedly scientific and objective but, unconsciously, for all practical purposes, antimoral and anti-religious" (Dayton Friedel, quoted in Morris 1989b, pp. 329-30).
Furthermore, Catholics resented the "hostile condescension of academia and the scholarly
community" (Morris 1989b, p. 329). Thomas Imse, who claims to have been the first
person acknowledging being a Catholic "in the sociology department at any of the major
state universities of the country" (Imse 1989, p. 404), explains: "Many universities did not
want Catholics on their faculties in fields such as sociology, since they could not be
trusted. They would probably teach religious morality and not be able to stick to the facts
117
The chapter on religion was missing in 1934.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
119
on a variety of issues. The intolerance was quite openly expressed in classrooms and even
in public discussions" (Imse 1989, p. 403).
In 1938, reacting to the view held by lay sociologists that religion was nothing but
a hindrance to scientific study (Reiss 1970, p. 120), a few Catholic sociologists founded
the American Catholic Sociological Society (ACSS). This particular Catholic reaction in
the field of sociology was part of a larger reaction against modernism in American
Catholicism. "The establishment of the American Catholic Sociological Society was but
one instance between the wars of a trend in American Catholic intellectual circles to
create learned societies as counterparts to existing organizations in the larger society"
(Kivisto 1989, p. 352).
To justify the creation of a distinctively Catholic type of sociology, Ralph
Gallagher, the founder of the ACSS, stressed that sociology was "not in the full sense of
the word an exact science" (Gallagher 1938, p. 319), and that every sociology was
implicitly based on a social philosophy. "Thus Catholic sociology was looked upon as
one of several kinds of sociology each one being determined by the social philosophy
associated with it" (Reiss 1970, p. 121). Paul Mundie118, in his comments introducing the
Journal of the newly founded association, explained: "Catholics will not be poorer
scientists, but rather better scientists for knowing that man has a supernatural destiny and
that society has as its goal the organization of social life in such a manner as to help man
attain this destiny" (Mundie 1940, p. 321). This view resulted in a sociology in which
Encyclicals of the Popes were used as basic texts in sociology courses (Reiss 1970,
p. 121).
The rest of the history of the ACSS, which became the Association for the
Sociology of Religion (ASR) in 1970, can be compressed in a few sentences for our
purposes. The initial confidence in the virtues of a sociology based on Catholic doctrine
did not last. As early as 1941, Catholic sociologists began feeling ill at ease in this
framework. They started to ponder their role, and the relationships between social
philosophy, social science and social reform. From 1949 on, these doubts led the leaders
of the association to insist very heavily in their presidential addresses on the shortcomings
of Catholic sociologists as empirical sociologists: No one could be satisfied any longer
with the "second-rate scholarship" and "apathy toward social research" (Thomas Harte,
cited in Reiss 1970, p. 124). Eventually, abandoning its original aim of providing a
general sociology based on Catholic doctrine, the ACSS began to devote its energies to a
118
Third president of the ACSS.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
120
sociology of Catholicism based on standard sociology (Reiss 1970, p. 126), thus rejoining
the mainstream of lay sociology.
Empiricism and Catholic sociology in Europe (1929-1959)
The tensions we have encountered in America between Catholic and lay sociology
have their counterpart in Europe. However, as already mentioned, the situation in Europe
was rather different from what it was in America. For one thing, the rise of empiricism
occcurred later. In France at least, the classical period lasted until 1929: Despite
Durkheim's death in 1917, the group identified with L'Année sociologique remained
dominant for a number of years (Stoetzel 1957, p. 630). The end of this dominance
signaled a shift in the interests of sociologsts. According to Jean Stoetzel119, after the end
of this period, the number of empirical studies increased steadily. In parallel to this
evolution, the overall number of studies bearing on religion declined significantly. But
while studies relying on the "humanist approach" declined sharply, an interest in religion
reappeared "in an empiricist form" (1957, p. 626).
Another important difference between Europe and the United States concerns the
European Catholic association - the Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse
(CISR). First, the CISR never tried to promote an all-encompassing Catholic sociolgy as
the ACSS had, but from the start restricted itself essentially to religion as a subjectmatter120 (Dobbelaere 1989, p. 385). Furthermore, on the old continent, Catholic
sociology was not a reaction against empirical sociology, but participated in its very
development. In 1931, the man who was to become the "father" of French "religious
sociology", Gabriel Le Bras121, published a very influential paper in which he called for a
far-reaching empirical analysis of Catholicism (Steeman 1958, p. 2). His call was heeded,
even if it took over a decade (Hervieu-Léger and Champion 1986, p. 30) to really set off
what was to be the most important series of empirical studies on religion ever attempted.
The Catholic Church's support for these studies, which was first somehow slow to come,
was bolstered by a growing awareness of the alienation of the European working class
from the Church. H. Godin and Y. Daniel's book, La France, pays de mission?, published
in 1943, played a very important role in this new awareness122. Thus, as David Martin
119
Founder of the Institut Français d'opinion publique (IFOP) and the most important figure in the
development of empirical sociology in France.
120
Although it developed some interest in the study of urbanism, it never developed an all-encompassing
sociological approach.
121
A professor of Canon Law.
122
Interview with Roland Campiche; see also Hervieu-Léger and Champion 1986, p. 19.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
121
explains: "The relegation of religion to a footnote of the basic political text has resulted in
the attempt to create for 'religious sociology' an equally independent watertight
compartment concerned with its own specific order of phenomena. [...] Catholics have
been perhaps specially prone to this empiricist version of the sociology of religion, and to
a reduction of its scope to sociologie religieuse" (Martin 1966, p. 359).
As mentioned above, the most distinguished representative of European Catholic
sociology was Gabriel Le Bras. His importance was not due only to the impact of his
1931 article, but also to the very important empirical work he did himself (Steeman 1958,
p. 2). As Stoetzel explains: "Le Bras has formed a genuine school; and the monographs in
sociology of religion now are models for monographs in urban and rural sociology, as
well as in electoral sociology" (1957, p. 656). If we want to understand Le Bras'
influence, we must take into account the fact that ha was not merely a professor of Canon
Law, but also an academic holding many prestigious positions123. Owing to this great
intellectual and moral prestige, Le Bras was called to preside over the birth of the
CISR124, but also, paradoxically, over that of the rival lay Groupe de sociologie des
religions (Poulat 1969, p. 7). But Le Bras was not the only Catholic to play a prominent
role in the development of general sociology. To give just one example, Jacques Leclercq,
the founder of the CISR, introduced the teaching of sociology in Louvain (Poulat 1990,
p. 12; Dobbelaere 1989, p. 377, n. 1). As a result of these initiatives, by the beginning of
the 50s in the field of sociology of religion, "Catholic religious sociology occupied the
ground and had outrooted a Durkheimian school which was without posterity" (Poulat
1990, p. 25).
The CISR was founded in 1948 in Louvain, Belgium, by Jacques Leclercq, a
Catholic Bishop (Monseigneur; Poulat 1990, pp. 12-13). At that time, the CISR had no
more than the 16 members who participated in the first meeting. The first full-fledged
conference was held in 1951 and, from this date onwards, conferences were held roughly
every second year throughout Europe.
Originally, the group was non-confessional (Poulat 1990, p. 15). The founder of
the Conference - although he was a Bishop - deemed it necessary to leave the door open
to persons from other faiths. But very soon, he found himself isolated: Most members
were overwhelmingly hostile to this open spirit. The 1951 Conference was attended by 49
123
Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Centre d'Etudes
Sociologiques (Poulat 1969, p. 7), and later Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques, Faculté de Droit de Paris,
Membre de l'Institut.
124
Although he did not participate in the first conference and was not one of the founding members,
contrarily to what the succeeding presidents of the CISR always pretended (Poulat 1990, p. 14).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
122
churchmen and 17 laymen. Under the influence of the Dutch KASKI (Catholic Institute
for Socio-Ecclesiastical Research), the executive committee decided that the association
would henceforth further contacts exclusively among Catholics preoccupied with
religious sociology (1990, p. 21). The association was to retain this confessional character
until 1971, and at every conference, the few lay sociologists who attended found
themselves stifled in a heavily Catholic atmosphere. Karel Dobbelaere, the present
president of the CISR, remembers: "The older members may remember the typical
Sunday morning: everyone went to mass and in rows - one after the other - to
communion, and, at the same time, colleague priests were saying mass at the different
sidealtars, a new mass starting every 15 to 20 minutes. And in Rome, in 1969, we were
housed in a convent, each day at noon there was a mass, and we had rooms with doors we
could not lock, maybe because it was the year of Humanae Vitae" (Dobbelaere 1990, p.
44, n. 1).
The theoretical orientations of the CISR were concordant with this membership.
In the first conferences (3 to 5125, or 1951 to 1956), issues all revolved around
institutional religion: the Church, its ministry, its membership. The proportion of papers
directly based on empirical research was very high (particularly in 1951 and in 1956).
Another feature of these first conferences was the effort made to take stock of the state of
religious sociology. This effort was apparent in the contents of the articles as well as in
the general themes of the conferences: "Etat de la sociologie religieuse"; "Sociologie
religieuse, sciences sociales"; "Vocation de la sociologie religieuse [...]". This feature
must be understood in the light of the hopes entertained by the Catholic hierarchy that
religious sociology could be used as a tool in the fight against dechristianization:
"'Sociologie religieuse' was clearly a sociology at the service of the Catholic Church. [...]
Clerics were not interested in scientific discussions, which they interrupted with questions
about results; and scientists interrupted the discussion of results with methodological
questions" (Dobbelaere 1989, pp. 378-79). Indeed, the proponents of religious sociology
did not miss one opportunity to point out the practical results and the theological
legitimacy of their approach126. Sociology had become an ally of the Catholic church in
its endeavor to bring the lost masses back to Christianity. In the poetic words of a country
priest and amateur sociologist: "Today, one can no longer conceive a priest who would
not first embrace as closely as possible the sociological reality to which his apostle's heart
is called to devote itself" (Schmitt-Eglin 1952, p. 12).
125
126
The proceedings of the first two conferences were not published.
See for instance Labbens 1960.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
123
Religious sociology was also a moralistic enterprise. Authors frequently made
references to moral or pastoral dimensions. Talking of dechristianization, some members
used the phrase: "l'évolution du mal" (Georges Delcuve, CISR 1951, p. 377). In this
context, sociology was considered a remedy for the ailments from which the Church was
suffering, not as a tool to analyze the crisis. Researchers took the temperature of the
patient, but were not interested so much in the "illness" itself as in how to fight it. They
wanted their research to be practically applicable in the daily life of the Church, to
provide ready-made solutions127.
The relationships between Catholic and classical sociology have best been
summarized by Poulat: "As the Durkheimians were anticatholic, it was only natural that
the Catholics should be antidurkheimian" (Poulat 1990, p. 16). This "natural antagonism"
explains why religious sociology refused to establish itself in the framework provided by
classical sociology, and preferred to start from scratch (Goddijn 1958-59, p. 18). The
opposition between these two views was sharp, and revolved around the central question
whether being a believer hurt or helped a sociological understanding of religion. A
sociologist who was present at the CISR conference in Bologna in 1959 testifies that "this
point has raised particularly sharp discussions in the lobbies of the Bologna conference"
(Maître 1960, p. 79). Similarly, at the 5th World Congress of the ISA in Washington, a
quarrel erupted between the agnostic Wilson, who raised "the question of whether
religion can be studied at all by a religious man", and the Catholic Fichter, who "testified
to the possibilities of retaining both scientific objectivity and religious dedication"
(Moberg 1962, pp. 568-69).
To illustrate the drawbacks of the kind of sociological approach vindicated by
Catholic sociology, I will use a few excerpts from the only book stemming from this
period whose title (Le mécanisme de la déchristianisation) indicates an effort in the
direction of a global secularization theory (Schmitt-Eglin 1952). In this book, the
inadequacies of Catholic sociology are, admittedly, presented under their worst light. But,
even though this sociology was not always so extreme, this particular book gives a fair
representation of the general direction in which European Catholic sociology was drawn.
Schmitt-Eglin's approach can only be described as naive and obsolete; the author
apparently knows nothing - or wants to know nothing - about the modern sociological
approach. In a tone reminiscent - at best - of Plato, he explains: "Normally a society is
127
"Il est vrai que nous n'avons point là une enquête méthodique, [...] mais combien de tels coups de sonde
sont excellement révélateurs des problèmes de sociologie religieuse concrets, et aussi du désir, qui se fait
jour, de les connaître avec exactitude, afin de pouvoir y porter remède!" (Paul Droulers and Antoine
Rimoldi, CISR 1951, p. 83).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
124
organized in such a way that the most evolved members take into their hands the direction
of affairs and provide the common good to the profit of the least able. Beneath them lies
the most numerous part of the population, deprived of culture, of training, and of
initiative" (1952, p. 69). The individuals belonging to this strata he describes as "beings
who have been stopped in their intellectual and moral growth, who act by intuition rather
than by reason and tend to mistake their wishes for reality" (1952, p. 70).
The phenomenon of secularization itself is not really analyzed by Schmitt-Eglin.
Indeed, this is not necessary, since dechristianization "is immediately apparent" (1952,
p. 201). In his view, dechristianization is linked to a social decline, a sad retreat from the
golden age of Catholicism, which he describes in idyllic terms: "In the state of
Christianity, the role of the priest is to be the chief of the people. He is the lord of the
village and the father of his congregation" (1952, p. 223). The moralistic attitude clearly
shows through the vocabulary used: Instead of speaking of the seeds of secularization, the
author speaks of "les bacilles de la déchristianisation" (1952, p. 14). However, he
acknowledges that, even in this golden age, "approximately 20%" of the population did
not fit into this framework. The vocabulary in which he describes this unchristened
minority is a world view in itself: "This 20% can represent a human waste of retarded
beings, of embittered and vicious personalities as the best parishes inevitably drag along,
beings of reduced vitality" (1952, p. 225).
Thus, we now stand at the beginning of the 50s, the period in which the seeds of
the CISR paradigm were sown. To summarize what has been said thus far: On both sides
of the Atlantic, the study of religion was undertaken mainly by Catholic sociologists,
whose approach was far from adequate from a sociological point of view. Lay
sociologists either largely ignored religion, or imprisoned it into theoretical frameworks
which precluded any study of the religious institution as such. Thus, the divorce between
Catholic and lay sociology was almost complete. But at the same time, on both sides, an
increasing number of people were dissatisfied with this situation. We will now turn to the
evolution which allowed the progressive closing of this gap. We will first follow the rise
of interest in sociology of religion among lay sociologists, then turn to the
deconfessionalization of Catholic sociology, which will be studied mainly through the
example of the CISR. At the same time, we will follow the evolution of the use of the
term secularization.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
125
The growth of interest in sociology of religion in America (1929-1966)
The 50s were marked by a resurgence in interest in sociology of religion in the
United States (Glock 1959, p. 154). This resurgence was related to a specifically
American phenomenon: the "religious revival" which occurred after World War II (see
below). As interest in religion rose in the public, it was quite natural that interest in the
scientific study of religion should rise among academics - especially as this apparent
revival seemed to come as a dismissal of the reasons these academics could have had for
ignoring religion.
In Europe, similar tendencies were also at work, but they were much less
pervasive than in America. Writings showing a return of sociology of religion to
mainstream sociology - and, by the same token, an increased involvement of lay
sociologists in the field - appeared earlier in America than in Europe. In his 1968 trend
report, Karel Dobbelaere remarked that in America, "41% was socio-ecclesiastical
research and 46% was genuine sociology of religion", while in Europe, "genuine"
sociology of religion made up no more than 21% of the works analyzed (1968, p. 334).
Moreover, the kind of sociology of religion practiced in Europe was more parochial and
less theoretically informed than in the U.S.A.: up to 82% of the articles had no reference
to "previous research concerning the conceptual framework" (1968, p. 340). Similar
conclusions had been reached two years earlier in a trend report by Schreuder (1966, p.
211).
The increase in interest in religion in America was also closely related to the rise
of the functional model in all branches of sociology. The advantages in terms of
recognition in the academia brought about by functional theory were claimed by
sociologists of religion as well as by specialists in other sub-disciplines. Of course, the
advantages were not only institutional, but also theoretical. So for instance, Glock,
writing in 1959, criticized the "inability [of the framework bequeathed us by the classics]
to account fully for the place of religion in modern, complex, changing societies". He
deplored the fact that studies based on this tradition had "a tendency to ignore the
functional alternatives to religion in meeting social needs" (1959, p. 155). Glock
suggested that the structural-functionalist approach, in particular as represented by Bellah,
might provide the necessary framework.
The functional model exerted a tremendous influence on the development of
sociology of religion. This influence is so pervasive that it is simply impossible to
imagine what would have become of the new discipline had it not been for functionalism.
How, and why, did functionalism exert such a powerful influence? And when did this
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
126
change take place? In reality, the change advocated in the late 50s by Glock had to a large
extent taken place some time before as a result of the gradual emergence of
specializations rendered possible by the sheer growth in the number of professional
sociologists in America. This is apparent even in the textbooks128. In the 1930s, there was
a marked change in the general organization of the textbooks. The new pattern which
emerged in this period was based on a functional view heavily influenced by recent
developements in anthropology. "For a time after its publication in 1937 the single most
popular introductory text was that by Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward. The
authors organized the bulk of their material around major 'social institutions' (an
unfortunately ambiguous term), meaning the family, economy, polity, education, and so
on. The outstanding feature of this text was the introduction of each of these 'core' topics
with descriptive material from exotic (mainly tribal) societies" (Moore 1978, p. 335).
From this time on129, a large majority of the texts came to be organized around a core of
chapters analyzing the different institutions playing major functions in societies. As a
consequence of this new pattern, a majority of the texts appearing after 1930 included a
separate chapter on religion130. Generally, these chapters presented religion as an
institution alongside other institutions, all of which were frequently included in some
more general subdivision131.
This new pattern represented more than a mere reorganization of the material. It
allocated religion a totally new place in sociology. From the moment religion was
considered one of the major institutions in any society, it tended to be treated as an
independent variable, and the necessity for a specialized sub-discipline studying this
institution became apparent. But not only did religion become one among several
important social institutions; with Parson's systems theory, it was placed at the top of the
pyramid of cybernetical control, thus becoming even more important than the other
institutions. Whereas the evolutionary perspective had mainly tried to explain religion
away as a remnant of the past, the functional perspective sought to explain it as a present
128
The textbooks in themselves were not the most influential in bringing about this change. The most
important factor in this evolution was the theoretical evolution of the field itself.
129
It should be noted that, even before 1937, several textbooks were organized around a set of institutions
(see for example Cooley, Charles H. et al. 1933. Introductory Sociology. New York: Charles Scribener's
Sons. Pp. 402-72; Young, Kimball. 1934. An Introductory Sociology. New York: American Book Co. Pp.
215-345; Ballard, Lloyd Vernor. 1936. Social Institutions. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.
130
Some texts published before 1930 did include a chapter at least partly devoted to religion (see for
example Hayes, Edward C. 1918. Introduction to the Study of Sociology. New York: D. Appleton and Co.;
Hankins, Frank H. 1928. An Introduction to the Study of Sociology: An Outline of Primary factors and
Fundamental Institutions. New York: Macmillan). But these chapters did not form part of a systematic
pattern organized around the presentation of institutions.
131
E.g. "Part IV. Major Institutions"; TXT 1948.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
127
feature. The shift from an evolutionary to a functional perspective almost automatically
entailed a reassessment of the importance of religion in modern society.
The most important trends in the evolution of the treatment of religion in the
textbooks appearing after 1930 are all related in some way to the emergence of the
structural-functional model. We will first analyze in some detail a text which was very
influential in the development of American sociology (Moore 1978, p. 336; Coser 1971,
pp. 567-68): Kingsley Davis' Human Society (TXT 1948). In this text, Davis - one of the
most vocal and well-known proponents of functionalism - first presented the evolutionary
theories of religion (under the title "Outmoded theories of religion"), only to better
criticize them. The first critique addressed to evolutionary theory was that the accounts of
the origins of religion were highly speculative, "based on imagination rather than direct
evidence" (TXT 1948, p. 515). More important, however, was the contention that presentday social institutions could not be explained by an account of their origin, but must be
explained by their actual functioning. The evolutionary school was also criticized for
having a rationalistic explanation of religion, which tended to view religion as an "error"
rather than as a means of fulfilling useful functions. Finally, in the "faded pages of
evolutionary theory", the whole account of religion was based on an individualistic point
of view: "All that is required is a single individual sleeping, dreaming, looking at nature,
and speculating" (1948, p. 518).
Davis then presented the functional alternative, based on William Robertson
Smith, Durkheim, Malinowski, and Parsons. The adoption of this new view severely
undermined the disappearance thesis. One of the reasons why Davis disapproved of
evolutionary theory was the following: "The logical conclusion from the evolutionary
theory is that religion will ultimately disappear, being replaced by science" (1948, p. 517).
In contrast, in the functional view, religion and science are no longer viewed as
antithetical (1948, p. 535). "So long as one attributes religion merely to an error in
reasoning, its future seems dim. One simply imagines that science will increasingly
expose the error and religion will then disappear. One may even cite the decline of
religion in modern society as evidence for this contention. But this rationalistic point of
view itself falls into an error. It fails to see that the nonrational character of religion
performs a function for both the society and the personality" (1948, pp. 541-42).
Davis' chapter on religion closes with two pages in which he sketches a
secularization theory, which he himself presents as containing five core elements. "First,
the gods tend to be gradually withdrawn from the local scene" (1948, p. 542). Which
means that trans-local, more remote gods, make their appearance. Second, there is a
diminishing of anthropomorphism. Third, there is an increasing separation between
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
128
religion and everyday life: Religion becomes a category by itself. Fourth, with the
appearance of new faiths, there is a diminution in the homogeneity of religious life, and
fifth, "some of the essentially religious sentiments and ceremonies become attached to the
state [...]. The stage is set for church-state conflict" (1948, p. 543). Although the analysis
remains very sketchy, it draws the inevitable conclusion a consciously functionalistically
informed analysis of religion in modern society cannot fail to draw: There is an increasing
differentiation* between religion and the world.
The general framework provided by this analysis of Davis' textbook is found
again, with some variations, in a great number of the subsequent texts. The organization
of the chapter on religion, starting with a presentation of evolutionism, followed by a
presentation of the functional approach, is repeated in TXT 1950. Similarly, although it
does not start with evolutionary theory, TXT 1951 also presents criticisms of evolutionary
theory, followed by a presentation of functionalism. Later texts132 generally omit any
detailed discussion of evolutionary theory, and simply start from the functional point of
view - a clear sign that the transition to the new framework had been accomplished. In
many cases, the functional point of view results in a very broad definition of religion,
including "such doctrines as humanism, nationalism, imperialism, internationalism,
fascism, communism, democracy, and finally science itself" (TXT 1954, p. 562)133.
Some of these chapters also close on some considerations on religion in modern
society. Many exemplars make their appearance in some of these texts, for instance
worldliness*134,
scientificization*135,
differentiation*136,
generalization*137,
autonomization*138, and pluralism*139. Progressively140, empirical data concerning
religious affiliation and attendance were being added141. Another trend was, from TXT
1956a onwards, to take into account the American "religious revival" thesis142. However,
as mentioned in chapter 2, "secularization" itself was very rarely mentioned in these
chapters.
Thus, the emergence of the functional viewpoint provided the general framework
for the growing interest in sociology of religion. But this evolution was also marked by a
132
For instance TXT 1954, 1956a, 1966b.
See also TXT 1954, p. 562; 1961b, pp. 274-76; 1967, p. 338.
134
TXT 1950, pp. 420 and 422; 1956a, p. 445.
135
TXT 1950, p. 421; 1956a, pp. 417-18.
136
TXT 1951, p. 487; 1954, p. 573; 1962a, p. 290.
137
TXT 1956a, pp. 424-25; 1967, p. 338.
138
TXT 1951, p. 487.
139
TXT 1951, p. 487; 1956a, pp. 438-42.
140
Starting from TXT 1954 (pp. 569-70).
141
See also TXT 1956a, pp. 434-36; 1962b, p. 380; 1965, pp. 230-31; 1966b, pp. 494-503.
142
See also TXT 1965, pp. 230-31.
133
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
129
number of important studies and writings, to which we turn now143. We will pay attention
in particular to two themes: the growth of interest in sociology of religion, and the
secularization question.
Richard Niebuhr (1929)
The first book on American religion to reach a wide audience was Richard
Niebuhr's Social Sources of Denominationalism (1929). Niebuhr was a theologian144, and
his book is, at heart, an exhortation to his coreligionists, asking them to revive the true
spirit of Christianity, which has been so badly compromised by its subservience to the
secular realm. Denominationalism - the subject of the book - is considered by Niebuhr "a
compromise, made far too lightly, between Christianity and the world" (1929, p. 6).
Denominationalism "signalizes the defeat of the Christian ethics of brotherhood by the
ethics of caste" (1929, p. 22). But although the underlying aim of the book is theological,
the author uses the sociological approach to make his point - and, it should be added, he
uses it very skillfully. Sociology allows Niebuhr to bring through to his readers the fact
that divisiveness in the church is not of theological provenance, but reflects "the effect of
social tradition, the influence of cultural heritage, and the weight of economic interest [...]
in the definition of religious truth" (1929, p. 17).
The core of the book is devoted to an analysis of the different churches: the
churches of the disinherited, of the middle class, of the immigrants, of the different races,
and so forth. Niebuhr brings to light the relationship between the emergence of new
denominations (Anabaptists, Quakers, Methodists, Salvation Army) and the rise of new
classes - thus providing the first influential analysis of the influence of society on
religion. He also brings out the characteristics of the religiosity of the disinherited:
emotional fervor, but also moral discipline - the very discipline which allowed these
classes to rise. Concomitantly, he retraces the process by which these classes and
denominations lost their original fervor, and became more conservative, once they had
become dominant.
In this framework, Niebuhr does make some use of the term secularization. And
he uses it, precisely, to describe this compromise of religion with the world which he
criticizes so vehemently: "[...] the denominations [...] are the emblems [...] of the victory
of the world over the church, of the secularization of Christianity, of the church's sanction
143
For a discussion of the most important studies in American sociology of religion before the 60s, see
Glock 1959 and Lenski 1962.
144
Like his brother, Reinhold Niebuhr, author of Pious and Secular America (1958).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
130
of that divisiveness which the church's gospel condemns" (1929, p. 25; see also p. 113).
Secularization, however, is not used as a central theoretical concept, but merely as a
convenient equivalent to phrases like the "moral ineffectiveness of Christianity", the
"defeat of Christian ethics", or the "ethical failure of the church". The problem Niebuhr
wants to come to terms with is moral and theological, and most of the time he expresses it
in these terms. The sociological approach is a mere tool at the service of this moral
crusade - which might explain the subordinated role of the concept of secularization.
Secularization is also loosely used to refer to two related phenomena. The
secularization of the church can lead, in turn, to the "secularization of the masses" (1929,
p. 32): If a new religious movement proposing an ethical ideal fails to appear, the
disinherited transfer their religious fervor to secular movements. This is what usually
happens in modern times - the last truly religious revolution having been Methodism
(1929, p. 72). Finally, secularization can also refer to the "secularization of the state"
(1929, p. 123).
Pitirim Sorokin (1937-1966)
Unlike Niebuhr, Sorokin did not provide a full-fledged analysis of religion in the
United States. But he developed a number of views which had a bearing on the problem
of secularization. The views expressed in Sorokin's 1966 paper, on which I will base the
present analysis, only made more explicit and available in a convenient form ideas which
he had developed much earlier, most notably in his very lengthy Cultural and Social
Dynamics (1937). In this work, Sorokin outlined a cyclical theory of social evolution in
which three stages, the ideational145, the idealistic146, the sensate147, then again the
ideational, necessarily followed each other. In this framework, the 1966 article discusses
the "trend of secularization", that is, the demise of religion as culture passed from the
idealistic synthesis in the Middle Ages to the present sensate phase. This paper shows
some influence of the secularization debate which has just erupted: The term
secularization is used much more systematically than in the 1937 book, where it was used
very sparsely, most of the time in quotation marks, and mainly to refer to the very
circumscribed phenomenon of the decline in the proportion of works of art based on a
religious theme (see for instance Sorokin 1937, p. 384).
Although it is far from fitting into the CISR paradigm, Sorokin's theory is very
interesting for our purposes: It conveniently summarizes the view implicitly held by most
145
In which reality is perceived through a view that transcends the world.
An intermediate type.
147
In which reality is conceived as directly accessible through the senses.
146
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
131
sociologists in the 30s and 40s on the subject of secularization - and still held today by
those who are not familiar with the CISR paradigm. In Sorokin's view, secularization is a
very simple and straightforward process: it is an overall decline of religion, which started
"at the end of the twelfth century A.D." (Sorokin 1966, p. 9). Linked with this simplistic
view is an implicit definition of religion very close to the views held by conservative
clerics: Religion is what separates man from animality. When he is no longer controlled
by "deeply interiorized religious and ethical imperatives", man is quickly overcome by
"biological urges, passions and lusts" (1966, p. 25).
The first cause of the decline of religion is the emergence of science, which has
been carefully computed by Sorokin: 4 inventions in the VIIth century, 12 in the XIIth, 53
in the XIIIth, 429 in the XIVth and 8527 in the XIXth. The decline has been computed just
as precisely in the other areas: rise of materialist philosophies (0% in the Xth century,
53% in the XVIth), emergence of non-religious forms of art, and so forth. These trends
resulted mainly in a loss of power of the Church on society: 1) religious dogmas lost their
status as God-given revelations, and were turned into man-made rules of conduct; 2) the
Church lost its power to define the contents of art; 3) Christian norms lost their influence
on social life; 4) with the emergence of different confessions, the autonomization of the
state, and the privatization of religion, the Church declined as a social institution.
But this trend toward a "negative religious and moral polarization" - which
resulted in the atrocities of World War II - is, according to Sorokin, only one aspect of the
contemporary situation. Counterbalancing this negative trend, there is a "positive
religious and moral polarization", which - "despite a lack of statistical data" - manifests
itself most notably in the fact that a growing number of people are in search of "the
supreme reality and values" (1966, p. 32). Thus, we witness around us the first clues of
the crumbling of the sensate culture, which will, of necessity, be followed again by an
ideational phase.
The early Parsons (1937-1944)
As might be expected, Talcott Parsons strongly disagreed with Sorokin's theory.
As a matter of fact, he explicitly refuted it in the volume which was published in 1963 in
honor of Sorokin (Parsons 1963a). Although he did not provide any complete study on
religion in the United States, Parsons developed a great interest in religion, and played a
significant role in the development of sociology of religion. Parsons' influence on the new
sub-discipline was many-sided. His first and most decisive contribution was indirect, and
resulted from the fact that he played an important role in introducing the European
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
132
classical tradition into American sociology and that he helped to institutionalize sociology
itself through his personal commitment and writings. He also indirectly contributed to the
development of sociology of religion by establishing functionalism as the official creed of
American sociology. Finally, anticipating on what I will be saying later concerning the
institutionalization of the discipline, it must be noted that, at the moment new journals in
the sociology of religion were launched, Parsons lent them his authority by contributing
to some of the early issues148. But, as we will see, he also influenced this evolution
through his own writings on religion.
In view of the tremendous impact of The Structure of Social Action (1937) on
American sociology, the question of the treatment of secularization by Parsons in this
book must be investigated carefully. After all, one could easily imagine that it was
through this channel that Weber's ideas on secularization were introduced in America. As
we will see, this is not the case.
The word "secularization" appears in two different places in the Structure: in the
discussion of the positivist theory of action (1937, Vol. I), and in the discussion of the
idealistic tradition (1937, Vol. II). The first use of the term refers to the secularization of
social thought (sociologization*) in the seventeenth century in Europe (1937, p. 53; p. 61;
p. 88; p. 94). Whereas "in Christian thought the necessity of the state and its coercive
authority had been explained by the Fall and the consequent sinfulness of man", in
secularized social thought, "the sinful element of human nature was brought into the
framework of a concept of natural law" (1937, p. 88). Parsons uses this sense of
secularization very systematically in the discussion of the positivist theory of action, to
show that the problem of order emerged when social thought freed itself from religious
assumptions: "The immediate practical animus of Hobbe's social thought lay in the
defense of political authority on a secular basis" (1937, p. 94). Let us briefly note that in
the Social System, Parsons will use this sense of secularization again, and speak of the
necessity of "cognitive stabilization of ideological beliefs from other than religious
sources" (Parsons 1951, p. 518).
The second sense in which Parsons uses secularization is derived from Weber: In
the process which saw the emergence of the spirit of capitalism from the Protestant ethic,
there was a "gradual dropping out of the religious background of the attitudes concerned
and in place of the religious [the] substituing [of] a utilitarian motivation" (1937, p. 532).
Parsons is careful to distinguish the process of secularization in Weber from "the mutual
148
See Parsons 1957 (Archives de sociologie des religions, n. 3) and Parsons' commentary on a paper by
L. Kolb in the very first issue of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
133
relations of prophecy, rationalization and traditionalization". These two aspects of social
change are, Parsons tells us, "radically different". Secularization, then, is equated with the
"emancipation from ethical control, the setting free of interests and impulses from
normative limitations, traditional or rational ethic. [...] It is essentially the process
involved in Pareto's process of transition from dominance of the residues of persistence to
those of combinations, equally in Durkheim's transition from solidarity or integration to
anomie" (1937, pp. 685-86). What Parsons has in mind here is entirely different from
what he meant by secularization in the first sense. In his first discussion, secularization
was the replacement of religious ideological justifications of the state by secular
ideological justifications. It is a transition from a religiously based political order to a
secularity based order. In the second use of the term, Parsons speaks of a transition from
a religiously prescribed order to disorder.
But secularization is used in still a further sense by Parsons, when he speaks of the
submission, in ancient Greece, of the "hereditary professional priestly class" to the
political structure of the polis (1937, p. 613). Here, secularization no longer refers to a
change in social thought or in the moral order, but in the balance of power between a
class of priests and lay political authority.
The diversity of the meanings of the term (together with the fact that Parsons,
usually so pedantically aware of the necessity of defining his terms, never formally
introduces the term secularization) makes it clear that it is not linked to any
"secularization theory", but is simply used as a descriptive term. As with most other
writers in his time, it refers to any change - whatever its theoretical or historical
implications or the level of analysis - from "religion" to "secularity".
However, even if the term itself is not linked to a theory, it is clear that
"secularization theory" as it is understood today is very much present in Parsons' analysis,
if only because it was very present in the writings of the authors he analyzes. "It is one of
the most striking facts about the group of writers being considered in this study that with
the exception of Marshall they all bring forward ideas involving a process of
disintegration of the kind of social control associated with a faith" (1937, p. 288). But at
this point, interestingly enough, Parsons does not speak of secularization. Such broad
general use of the term in not to be found in the Structure.
The reasons for this failure to use what would appear to us to be the appropriate
term are clear if we remember that the ultimate consequence which Parsons attached to
secularization (as used in Vol. II) was anomie. Therefore, secularization could not be
considered by Parsons a stable product of social change. This appears most clearly in his
discussion of Pareto's process of the circulation of the elites. At one phase of the cycle,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
134
the instinct of combination residues come to predominate, inside of the governing elite,
over the persistence of agregates residues. At this moment, society enters into an "age of
skepticism" characterized by the absence of control by value elements over conduct. But
this stage of the cycle, like the others, is intrinsically unstable: Logico-experimental
science, which is associated with the age of skepticism, cannot produce really scientific
theories (in social thought), but only pseudo-scientific ones, "for action rests on premises
for which factual data are necessarily lacking. [...] The pseudo-scientific theories, those of
'skepticism', do not indicate a state of the sentiments which is stable any more than do
those which surpass experience, hence another reaction back to the pole of 'faith'" (1937,
pp. 286-87). To use a terminology which will be used by Parsons in his later
formulations, secularization is intrinsically unstable because it is unable to fulfil at least
two of the functional prerequisites essential to the existence of a social system: social
control (integration), and the definition of ultimate ends (goal-attainment).
How were these premises laid down in Parsons' first major work developed later,
in his other writings? In a 1944 paper, Parsons comments on the development of the
sociology of religion. As other functional theorists around the same period, he criticizes
the assumptions held by the evolutionary school concerning the fate of religion. He
explains to the reader that, in the views developed by Tylor and Spencer, religious belief
would "naturally disappear as an automatic consequence of the advance in scientific
knowledge" (Parsons 1944, p. 199). He then goes on to show that the writings of Pareto,
Malinowski, Durkheim, and Weber cast an entirely different light on the fate of religion
in modern society. In short, Parsons contends, these writers have shown that empirical
knowledge will never solve the problems of meaning, and that religion will thus never
disappear (1944, p. 211).
But it is not, to my knowledge, before 1957 that Parsons explicitly tackled the
problem of secularization. Before presenting this paper, we must turn to the first complete
study of American religion written by a person who defined himself as a sociologist.
Will Herberg (1955)
The second very important analysis of American religion, Will Herberg's
Protestant-Catholic-Jew (1955), appeared a quarter of a decade after Niebuhr's book.
Although he taught as a sociologist, Herberg did not really have any training in sociology
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
135
and, with his "casual statistics", he was "not a model for colleagues in that discipline"149
(Martin E. Marty, in Herberg 1955, pp. x and viii). His book, however, had a tremendous
influence on subsequent American sociology and, as we will see, many of the points of
view which were developed in it were very influential.
The book is famous, first of all, for its discussion of the American "religious
revival" which analysts had begun to become aware of at the end of the previous decade,
and which Herberg was the first to give widespread publicity. As already mentioned, this
"revival" - no matter how it is to be interpreted - played a very important role in reviving
interest in the sociology of religion. Herberg's book was therefore inseparably a result,
and a factor, in the revival of sociology of religion.
The religious revival trend, as presented by Herberg, can be summarized as
follows: "In the quarter of a century between 1926 and 1950 the population of continental
United States increased 28.6 per cent; membership of religious bodies increased 59.8 per
cent; in other words, church membership grew more than twice as fast as population"
(Herberg 1955, p. 47). Other indicators, like the growth in Sunday school enrollment, the
expansion in church construction, the increasing prestige of religious leaders, the new
intellectual prestige of religion as measured by the best-selling books list, pointed in the
same direction (1955, pp. 50-53). Herberg's figures were contested, most notably by
Seymour Lipset. A hot debate followed, Lipset and Herberg arguing against each other in
papers bearing revealing titles: "Religion in America: What Religious Revival?" (Lipset
1959); "There is a Religious Revival!" (Herberg 1959). The question whether there
indeed was a religious revival or not150 need not concern us here; let it suffice to be noted
that, with this debate, religion suddenly became a fashionable subject of inquiry, and that,
as a result, in the following years, a number of empirical investigations were launched,
most notably by Lenski (1961) and by Glock and Stark (1965).
Let us now turn to the interpretation of these trends, as attempted by Herberg. The
starting point of Herberg's analysis is the American religious paradox151: Religion seems
at once to be very important in America - more important than in any other modern
country - and irrelevant to the functioning of society. "This is at least part of the picture
presented by religion in contemporary America: Christians flocking to church, yet
forgetting all about Christ when it comes to naming the most significant events in history;
men and women valuing the Bible as revelation, purchasing and distributing it by the
149
It is very interesting to note that the first two important books in lay American sociology of religion were
not written by really professional sociologists.
150
This question has been very skillfully analyzed by Glock and Stark; [1959] 1965, pp. 68-85 (see below).
151
Which had been expressed in 1952 by Reinhold Niebuhr; cf. Herberg 1955, p. 270, n. 39.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
136
millions, yet apparently seldom reading it themselves. Every aspect of contemporary
religious life reflects this paradox - pervasive secularism amid mounting religiosity, the
strengthening of the religious structure in spite of increasing secularization152" (Herberg
1955, p. 2). "Secularization" played a much more important role in Herberg's analysis
than in any other previously published work. And, as we will see later on, the very
definition of secularization used by Herberg gives us the clue to the resolution of the
paradox.
Briefly stated, Herberg's thesis is that religion in America can only be understood
if, by analyzing religion while bearing in ming a historical background - the process of
assimilation of the succeeding waves of immigrants - we come to understand which role
religion played, as well as which functions it fulfilled, and still fulfils. For the immigrant,
religion represented continuity; it allowed him to define his identity, to answer to the
question "what am I?" (1955, p. 12). For the first and the second generation the ethnic
Churches provided a means of integration into American society. Things were somewhat
different for the third generation, who were de facto integrated, and had no need to
identify themselves with an ethnic Church. Increasingly, their allegiance shifted to one of
the major "American faiths": Protestantism, Catholicism, or Judaism. Each of these
religions worked as a melting pot: "The traditional 'single melting pot' idea must be
abandoned, and a new conception, which we will term the 'triple melting pot' theory of
American assimilation, will take its place" (Ruby Jo Kennedy, quoted in Herberg 1955, p.
33). Seen against this background, the American paradox can be resolved: Religion fulfils
the important social function of "belonging" - which explains its importance - but need
not be very important from a strictly religious point of view as defined by the man of
faith.
The same phenomenon can also be viewed in terms of "operative" versus
"conventional" religion. The operative religion is the set of rituals, images, and symbols
that is necessary in any society to give it an overarching sense of unity, to provide
individuals with a normative context. In most historical cases, this operative religion is
simply "conventional religion", that is, religion as it is institutionally defined. In America,
however, operative and conventional religion no longer coincide, and this characteristic is
precisely what Herberg calls secularization: "We may indeed define a secularized culture
as a culture in which the conventional religion is no longer the operative religion"
(Herberg 1962, p. 148). In America, Herberg tells us, the operative religion is the
American Way of Life: "Sociologically, anthropologically, if one pleases, it is the
152
At this point, Herberg refers to Sklare (1955); this footnote was already present in the 1955 edition.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
137
characteristic American religion, undergirding American life and overarching American
society despite all indubitable differences of religion, section, culture, and class" (Herberg
1955, p. 77).
The relationship between culture and religion has thus been inverted: "Instead of
the culture standing under the judgment of God to whom religion witnesses, religion (that
is, conventional religion) tends to understand itself as an expression of, and a utility for,
the culture" (Herberg 1962, p. 153). "The goals and values of life are apparently
established autonomously, and religion is brought in to provide an enthusiastic
mobilization of human resources for the promotion of the well-being of the individual
and society" (Herberg 1955, p. 270). In this framework, it is the operative religion which
prescribes what conventional religion must be. The operative religion prescribes that
conventional religion, "no matter which (of the three faiths) it is", is a good and necessary
thing. This religion, however, is "a way of sociability or 'belonging' rather than a way of
reorienting life to God. It is thus frequently a religiousness without serious commitment,
without real inner conviction, without genuine existential decision" (1955, p. 260). "The
American Way of Life [can] best be understood as a kind of secularized Puritanism, a
Puritanism without transcendence, without sense of sin or judgment" (1955, p. 81).
Indeed, "under the influence of the American environment the historic Jewish and
Christian Faiths have tended to become secularized in the sense of becoming integrated as
parts within a larger whole defined by the American Way of Life" (1955, p. 82).
To conclude, how can we assess Herberg's contribution to the secularization
debate? The answer is rather complex. On the one hand, in spite of the very wide use
Herberg made of this term, and of the importance it took in his theoretical framework, we
are still a far cry from the secularization theories of Berger and Wilson. In fact, in
Herberg's hands, secularization remains largely a descriptive term, which functions at
three different levels. The first refers to an evolution in society, in which the conventional
religion ceases to function as the operative religion. The second is a movement inside
conventional religion, in which this religion progressively becomes more similar to the
operative religion. The third (which we have not discussed) is, in accordance with the
traditional sect-church typology, a movement in conventional religion, in which a
religious cult becomes a denomination - thereby moving from the margins to the center of
society (Herberg 1962, p. 37). Obviously, the three processes are interrelated: Pushed
further, the cult-denomination movement results in the transformation of the
denomination in the "trifaith system" (1962, p. 39) - but at this point, we are no longer
witnessing an evolution in religion itself, but at the global, societal level. Thus,
secularization does not refer so much to historical process as to a movement, which can
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
138
occur in a wide variety of circumstances, along a continuum between "conventional
religion" and "operative religion", or "secularity".
But on the other hand, Herberg's definition of secularization as the process by
which the operative religion separates itself from the conventional religion constitutes
one of the most important building-blocks of the CISR paradigm. This definition makes it
possible to see privatization* and generalization* as complementary processes:
Conventional religion becomes irrelevant socially, or privatized*, but at the same time,
religion becomes generalized* as the operative religion. Herberg's view thus gives us the
key to a coherent understanding of the CISR paradigm: Although Wilson (decline of
conventional religion) and Parsons (rise of operative religion), for instance, might appear
to be arguing in different directions, Herberg's definition of secularization encompasses
both views in a broader consideration of secularization as a process of reorganization of
the forces of religion in modern society.
The later Parsons (1957)
Herberg's views on generalization* were further developed by Parsons. In a paper
published in 1957 in French, Parsons explains that we must reconsider the problem of
secularization. Developing the logical implications of his refusal to consider
secularization a stable product (Parsons 1937) and of his positive assessment of the place
of religion in modern society (Parsons 1944), he contends that this term cannot mean that
religion has been eliminated, but only that its place in society has been redefined: "It is a
'secularization' [The quotation marks were probably added by the translator because this
term was, at this time, very unfamiliar in France (see 1957, p. 22, n. 2)], not in the sense
that it would aim at the elimination of all organized religion from social life, but rather in
the sense of an effort toward a reconsideration of the place religion is entitled to hold in
social life" (1957, p. 23). This formulation marks a very important break in the thought on
secularization: For the first time, secularization was used in a positive sense by a
sociologist. This reevaluation was achieved by placing the problem of religion in modern
society in the framework of functional theory, more specifically, of structural
differentiation: "The particular place religion occupies in American society is determined
by a structural differentiation" (1957, p. 25). The key to this new understanding lay in a
distinction between the "primary" and the "secondary" functions of religion. Examples of
the primary function of religion, as given by Parsons in his article, revolve around the
problems of meaning, while the secondary functions are social (social control, social
integration, etc.; Parsons 1957, p. 26). Through structural differentiation, there is a
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
139
progressive transfer of some of the secondary functions to other social institutions:
politics (1957, p. 27), the intellectuals and the professions (1957, p. 28), and rights (1957,
p. 30). Therefore, even though religion seems to have lost much in the process, this is not
as dramatic as it may seem: "Has it lost everything? My own point of view is that, all
considered, it still has much left" (1957, p. 31). This positive reassessment of
secularization is fundamental in the genesis of the CISR paradigm: Together with the
reflections of the theologians, it opened the way for a new view of secularization, in
which religion would not necessarily be the loser.
Drawing on Weber, Parsons concluded his paper on a generalization* thesis very
close to that developed by Herberg two years before: "The values of contemporary
American society have roots which are fundamentally religious" (1957, p. 32). Parsons
expressed his views on secularization as generalization* in several subsequent papers,
most notably in his criticism of Sorokin's position on secularization (Parsons 1963). As
this formulation is part of the CISR paradigm, I will defer discussion of it to the next
working paper. For the present purposes, it was sufficient to note the shift in the
interpretation of secularization by Parsons, as early as 1957, and to note again the link
between functional theory and a more positive evaluation of the role of religion, and even
of secularization.
Harold Pfautz (1955-1956)
Harold Pfautz's two papers on secularization - which appeared in AJS and in
Social Forces - are not very important from a theoretical point of view, but rather because
they provided one of the first empirical studies on a form of secularization. Pfautz's views
on secularization are more a variation on the old sect/church typology than a move in the
direction of the CISR paradigm. The development of his theoretical framework was
motivated by the problems he encountered in his Ph.D dissertation on Christian Science
to isolate the "sociological aspects" of secularization (Pfautz 1955, p. 121, n. 1).
Pfautz disposed his types in the following order of increasing secularization: cult,
sect, institutionalized sect, church, denomination153. This classification of religious
movements represents an improvement over previous typologies in that it takes into
account more dimensions. The five dimensions are: the demographic, the ecological
(geographical diffusion and segregation), the associational (basis of recruitment, degree
153
This approach was inspired mainly by Niebuhr's (1929) analysis (Pfautz 1955, p. 121, n. 4).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
140
of differentiation and basis of solidarity: symbols or feelings), the structural (type of
leadership), and the psychological (Weber's types of orientation to social action).
The characteristics of the cult - the "most primitive form of religious
organization" - are mainly the confinement to the local community, the lack of internal
differentiation, non-symbolic (affectual) forms of social interaction, isolation, and a low
power and prestige relative to other groups in society (1955, p. 123). Christian Science, in
its early days, had the status of a cult. The appearance of the sect is marked by an increase
in size and by geographic expansion, by the appearance of an internal differentiation
(charismatic leadership), and by an increase in symbolic elements (ideology; 1955, p.
124). It is not necessary to pursue the detailed presentation of the evolution of religious
bodies as they move further along in the direction of increased secularization: Roughly
speaking, the more they become secularized and the more they become differentiated, the
more the symbolic elements - versus the affectual - play an important role and the more
the prestige of the religous body in society grows. The sect can become either an
institutionalized sect, a church, or a denomination. Examples of an institutionalized sect
are the Christian Scientists or the Mormons (1955, p. 126). The prototypical example of
church is the Catholic Church of the thirteenth century, while the denomination is best
represented by the modern American Protestant religious bodies. The author concludes
his article by briefly mentioning that "secularization is a general social process", and is as
such also relevant to the study of other institutions, as well as to larger societies - as in
Becker and Redfield, who are mentioned at this point - and that "the religious
denomination is functionally related to the more inclusive form, namely, urban society"
(1955, p. 128). But this view is not developed further.
In a later paper (Pfautz 1956), Pfautz simplified his analytical framework for the
sake of an empirical study of Christian Science, retaining mainly the psychological
dimension. He redefined secularization more simply as "the tendency of sectarian
religious movements and groups to become both part of and like 'the world'". (It is
interesting to note that this definition was apparently inspired by a discussion of
worldliness* by Parsons, in which Parsons himself did not use the word secularization;
Pfautz 1956, p. 246, n. 4, referring to Parsons n.d.154, p. 27.) The paper focuses on the
"social psychological aspect of this process", and is designed to test the idea that, in this
process, the psychological structure of the group "change[s] from that of an emotional to
a rational association" (1956, p. 246). To achieve this aim, Pfautz examines testimonies
of healings as they appeared in Christian Science official publications from 1890 to 1950.
154
This pamphlet appeared either in 1951 or in 1952.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
141
The content analysis of these testimonies sought to distinguish mainly the "affectual
motives" (e.g., benefits of a religious nature) on the one hand from the "traditional
motives" (e.g., "my parents were Christian Scientists") and the "purposeful-rational
motives" (e.g., benefits of a material nature)155 on the other hand (1956, p. 248). The data
indicated a decrease in the proportion of testimonies indicating an affectual motive (from
53% to 19%) and an increase in the proportion indicating a traditional motive (from 0%
to 21%) as well as of those indicating a purposeful-rational motive (from 4% to 32%).
The author thus concluded: "The data [...] clearly indicate that a process of secularization
has taken place in Christian Science as far as its social psychological structure is
concerned" (1956, p. 251).
Milton Yinger (1946-1967)
Yinger was probably the first lay American sociologist to offer a complete picture
of sociology of religion156. His contribution, unlike Herberg's or Lenski's, did not center
on a single study, but rather comprised a great number of articles and books examining
the different problems of sociology of religion from a single theoretical point of view.
This point of view was functionalism. Yinger thus fit very neatly into the general trend of
his time, in which, as we have seen, the rise of sociology of religion was closely related to
the emergence of the functional view. Yinger himself stressed this point. In a chapter
devoted to the influence of anthropology on sociology of religion, he asserted that the
strong reliance of early sociologists of religion on evolutionary theory "may actually have
slowed the development of a sociology of religion by reducing interest in the study of
religion among students of contemporary society". This trend was reversed by the rise of
functional theory: "Religion had been seen as an anachronism by many sociologists.
Functionalism has helped to refocus interest on religion and relate it to the whole
sociocultural complex" (Yinger [1958] 1963, p. 124). And, it must be added, Yinger
himself was a very active advocate of the recognition of sociology of religion, as is clear
from the opening statement of his 1957 Religion, Society and the Individual, which
sounds like a manifesto: "This book is an expression of the belief that the student of
society must be a student of religion" (Yinger 1957, p. xi).
What was the place of secularization in this framework? Yinger explicitly
discusses two meanings of the term secularization. The first, which he calls the "usual
155
The fourth Weberian dimension, the value-rational, was also taken into account.
Yinger's Ph.D dissertation and first major work, Religion in the Struggle for Power, was published in
1946.
156
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
142
dictionary meaning", is very close to differentiation*. The second, which is a use of
which he disapproves, is very close to the worldliness* of denominations. Here, instead
of secularization, Yinger proposes that we use the term "religious change". Yinger
discusses these terms not because he is interested in the secularization issue; as a matter
of fact, he does not seem to like it very much. Rather, he is attempting to show that some
of the recent analysts of religion - most notably Will Herberg and Peter Berger - were
wrong in considering that the increasing worldliness of American denominations
represented a secularization. This trend, Yinger explains, is not new: "The churches of
those who are comfortable in a society are almost always well accommodated to that
society. This is not secularization. It is instead one of the most persistent functions of
religion - whether we applaud or lament the fact" (Yinger 1963, p. 71).
This discussion is of particular interest to us since it represents one of the first
attempts to clarify the terminology in the secularization issue. Let us turn again to the first
of the meanings addressed by Yinger, that of secularization as differentiation*. According
to Yinger, this is the "standard definition of the concept of secularization - the separation
of religious motives, feelings, and decisions from other aspects of life". It implies that
"many of life's decisions are carried out without reference to religion" (1963, pp. 69-70).
Yinger does not develop this analysis further, and it is not really clear what he thinks with
respect to this issue157. The second meaning of the term - which he proposes to replace by
"religious change" - he discusses in much more detail. He defines it as a "decline in
orthodoxy or a reduction in the acceptance of traditional beliefs". Another way of
expressing the same phenomenon is to say that "persons [are] acting religiously in a way
that does not express directly the faith they profess", that "religious movements [...] lack
'authenticity'". (This is the way Herberg presented his "American paradox".) This
apparent discrepancy occurs because people redefine their religion "while disguising or
obscuring the process by holding, somewhat superficially, to many of the symbols of the
earlier religious system. Religious change is usually a latent process, carried out beneath
symbols of nonchange". In this process, the tension between religion and the world
diminishes so much that it all but disappears: The church abandons its "'prophetic task' of
reforming the world", and instead "supports American institutions and values" (1963,
pp. 69-71).
157
In 1957, Yinger almost seemed to accept the use of secularization as a self-evident decline; he spoke of
"modern society in which the process of secularization has gone so far - that is, in which traditional
religious symbols have lost force and appeal" (1957, p. 119). In a later paper, however, he asserted that "it
is difficult to say when secularism has increased or decreased. [...] Undoubtedly, there are many aspects of
life for contemporary men in which secular rather than religious considerations prevail. [...] On the other
hand, I belive that some aspects of life are being de-secularized" (1967, p. 24).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
143
Finally, it should be noted that one of Yinger's prevailing interests was in the
study of religious pluralism. In connection with this, he brought out the relationship
between pluralism and secularism (in the sense of differentiation*): "Pluralistic societies
that do not have a substantial amount of secularism are generally unable to develop the
mutual tolerance that religious diversity requires" (Yinger 1967, p. 27). In a pluralistic
society, the traditional religious assertions usually lose some of their force, while the
burden of social integration shifts to a new unifying system of belief - for instance
Herberg's American Way of Life (Yinger [1961] 1963, p. 106). Thus generalization* is
itself one of the consequences of pluralism.
Although he does not propose any global view on secularization, Yinger is very
close to the CISR paradigm in two respects. First, he separates the idea of worldliness* of
denominations from the more global process of secularization by renaming it "religious
change" (this distinction will be institutionalized in the CISR paradigm by Karel
Dobbelaere in his 1981 trend report [Dobbelaere 1981, pp. 22-26]). Secondly, he
establishes a link between pluralism - one of the exemplars of the secularization paradigm
- and differentiation*.
Charles Glock and Rodney Stark (1959-1965)
Glock and Stark's Religion and Society in Tension (1965) was another very
important landmark in the development of the sociological study of religion. Indeed, it
was a self-contained sociology of religion in itself, starting with a discussion of problems
of definition and measurement, which were then applied to the empirical study of religion
in America. It included one of the most important methodological proposals in the
development of the discipline: the five-fold classification of the dimensions of religiosity
in terms of the experiential, ideological, ritualistic, intellectual and consequential
dimensions (Glock and Stark [1962] 1965). This methodological refinement, which
substantially improved the measurability of religion, certainly played an important role in
the recognition of the new sub-discipline in the heavily empirical environment of
American sociology.
Glock and Stark repeatedly use the term secularization in this book. The most
important discussion of secularization appears in the chapter discussing the "religious
revival" in America. Some analysts, Glock and Stark explain, have noted a religious
revival in contemporary America, while others, in contrast, think that the trend is one of
increasing secularization ([1959] 1965, p. 68). The authors note that the proponents of the
revival view rely very heavily on the ritualistic dimension: The indicators of revival used
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
144
are essentially religious practice and affiliation. On this dimension - even though many
technical problems cast doubt on the reliability of the statistics used - the authors
conclude that "within the limits of the indicators used, some postwar growth in
religiousness has occurred" ([1959] 1965, p. 78). But what about the opposite claim,
concerning the increasing secularization? Authors presenting this thesis tend to
emphasize the ideological and consequential dimensions ([1959] 1965, p. 82). Proponents
of this view - who are "likely to be clergymen, church administrators, theologians or
journalists" - either argue that there is a "watering down of belief", which manifests itself
in the trend toward ecumenicity and the tendency to consider all religions equally good
(ideological dimension, or decline in belief*) or that "religion is playing less and less of a
role in family life, in education, in social welfare, and in economic life" (consequential
dimension, or autonomization*). The authors conclude, without any critical elaboration,
that "there is nothing in the literature that would constitute a serious and systematic
defense of the secularization hypothesis" ([1959] 1965, pp. 82-83). The easy dismissal of
the secularization thesis by Glock and Stark contrasts with their careful discussion of the
revival thesis. This contrast can be at least partially understood is one considers that the
revival thesis could be brought under the scrutinity of an empirical investigation, whereas
the secularization thesis, as presented in their book, called for a discussion on a broader
historical plane. But Glock and Stark are correct in the sense that, at the time they were
writing (in 1959), no modern sociologist had presented such a historical analysis. And the
dismissal of the other advocates of this thesis as mere theologians or journalists reflects in
an interesting way the growing professional self-awareness among sociologists of
religion.
In a later chapter, however, the authors reverse themselves: they now claim that
there was indeed a trend of secularization158 in the sense that "the mystical and
supernatural elements of traditional Christianity have been replaced by a demythologized,
ethical rather than theological, religion" (1965, p. 116). How can we account for this
reversal? Between 1959 and 1965, Glock and Stark had been conducting several
important empirical investigations in the framework of the Research Program in the
Sociology of Religion, at the Religion Survey Research Center, Berkeley, and were thus
able to substantiate empirically the hitherto unfounded claims that belief was declining:
"In light of the data we have just examined, it seems clear that important changes of this
kind [i.e., secularization] have indeed occurred in some American denominations" (1965,
158
They precise that they take secularization here in the same sense as they took in the chapter we discussed
previously (1965, p. 116).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
145
p. 116). Members of the most secularized denominations, Glock and Stark found, no
longer believe in tenets such as the Virgin Birth or Biblical miracles. Glock and Stark's
attitude toward secularization is thus rather ambiguous: their tendency to stick very
closely to empirical findings and to refuse any generalizing theorization compels them
always to waver, in their appreciation of secularization, between different conclusions,
depending on the definition they seek to operationalize and on the particular questions
they ask in their research.
To summarize, the situation at the beginning of the 60s was very different from
that which had prevailed 20 years earlier. The sociological study of religion had become
an empirical discipline, which increasingly drew the attention of lay sociologists.
Concomitantly, the distinctiveness of Catholic sociology tended to disappear, bequeathing
to lay sociology a professional association, which was put at the service of empirical
investigation. In parallel fashion, the theoretical status of religion had been drastically
altered: With the rise of functionalism, religion had become one of the institutions present
in any society, and with the American religious revival, it had asserted itself as a force
that must still be reckoned with. But although it appeared to be used slightly more
frequently, "secularization" remained a descriptive term. The interest in this period was
focused on revival, not on secularization; thus, secularization appeared as nothing but the
negative counterpart of the revival thesis.
Let us now turn to Europe again. The old continent had witnessed no religious
revival, and functionalism was not nearly as pervasive as in the United States. But the
new climate originating in America rapidly crossed the Atlantic, and started putting
Catholic sociology under pressure. This pressure, together with other factors, finally led
to what, in a Kuhnian framework, must be called an intellectual revolution in the CISR,
and to the end of the era of religious sociology.
The intellectual revolution in the CISR (1959-1983)
As has been shown in chapter 3, the CISR is the organization which constitutes
the main institutional framework for the scholarly community that vindicates the
secularization paradigm. The history of the CISR represents a crucial test for the model I
propose: If secularization can really be understood as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense,
then it must be linked to an intellectual revolution (see chap. 1). This notion does not
imply so much a change in thinking as the replacement of one generation by the next,
which brings with it a new way of thinking. And, it must be added, in order to fully
warrant the use of the term "revolution", this change of personnel must be determined in
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
146
part by the use of specifically political means: persuasion, manipulation, and even force.
To what extent does the history of the CISR bear out this scheme?
First criticisms of the sociographic approach
The first criticisms against sociography in the CISR must be understood against
the background of the conflict between sociologists and clerics mentioned above. In order
to gain a better understanding of the issues at stake in the debate between Catholic and lay
sociology, it is best to first turn to Thomas Luckmann, who is sometimes referred to as
the single most important and cogent critic of "religious sociology". (Throughout my
work, I am using indifferently the phrases "religious sociology", "sociographic approach"
and "church-oriented religion" to refer to the approach dominant in the 40s and 50s
among European Catholic sociologists.) Luckmann's acid remarks were widely diffused
through his 1967 Invisible Religion, but they had already been put forward in almost
exactly the same form in the German edition of his book (1963) and, before that, in a
1960 article in the Kölner Zeitschrift. In this article, Luckmann describes religious
sociology in terms which all implied serious shortcomings: "A narrowly positivistic
methodology and a sociologically insufficient exploitation of the enthusiastically
collected sociographic material. [...] An implicit axiomatic which identifies religiosity
with religious 'practice'. [...] An insufficient embedment in general sociological theory"
(1960, p. 316). As a result of these shortcomings, Luckmann observes, these studies are
"not really sociological" (Luckmann 1960, p. 318). But Luckmann was not alone in
putting forward these criticisms. In 1965, at the 5th Colloquium on the Sociology of
Protestantism, Friedrich Fürstenberg lamented that "many research projects focusing upon
the parish do not deal at all with problems within the scope of a proper sociology of
religion. Instead they offer data and explanations which belong rather to the area of
voluntary associations, of leisure time activities, etc." (Fürstenberg 1966, p. 305). He
went on to denounce "the lack of methodological skill of the persons doing research in
the sociology of the parish, especially if they have mainly a theological background.
People trained in high level discussion and in tracing abstract ideas quite often think that
sociological methods are just a banality, e.g. that interviews are nothing more than a kind
of sophisticated talk" (1966, p. 307).
For many sociologists, for instance Leo Laeyendecker159 and Karel Dobbelaere,
these outbursts - and particularly Luckmann's160 - were important. Dobbelaere himself
159
Interview.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
147
repeatedly advocated that sociologists of religion heed Luckmann's advice, for example in
the conclusion to his 1968 trend report: "I would like to plead again for a sound
theoretical and methodological foundation for the sociology of religion [...]. One of the
ways of effectuating this would be to employ the classical studies of Weber and
Durkheim. For this reason the recent attempts by Berger and Luckmann are welcomed"
(Dobbelaere 1968, p. 355). More generally, the influence of American functionalism
made itself felt and, for many sociologists of the new generation161, this discovery was a
revelation. The American influence in France was mediated mainly by the Groupe de
sociologie des religions (GSR)162, a research institute attached to the Centre national de
la recherche scientifique (CNRS). Members of the GSR were very familiar with the
American literature163, and took steps to see that some of the authors of the new
generation were translated into French164. These writings - especially Berger and
Luckmann's sociology of knowledge approach - were welcomed by some young
sociologists as a "gust of fresh air"165. The American influence made itself felt even
among Catholic sociologists. Some of the younger Catholic researchers who had been
educated in America tried to convince their coreligionists that a sound theoretical
framework was a basic prerequisite for the study of religion. Thus for instance, the
Franciscan Goddijn summed up the fundamental methodological presuppositions of
modern sociology in an article whose very didactic style makes it clear that his aim was to
convince practitioners ignorant of the most fundamental methodological rules (Goddijn
1958-59).
How was this debate reflected inside of the CISR? Since the foundation of the
organization, there had been tensions between professional sociologists and amateur
Catholic sociologists. In the interviews, Poulat and Dobbelaere both stressed that, in the
50s, the organization included a great many incompetent researchers. In 1962, this
situation led the executive Committee to request that "steps be taken in order to totally
eliminate [the incompetent]" (cited in Poulat 1990, p. 27).
160
The reason why Luckmann's criticisms had more effect than most others does not stem so much from the
criticisms themselves - which were not very new - but from the fact that Luckmann (together with Berger)
really did propose an alternative to the approach he criticized (see Berger and Luckmann 1966).
161
For instance Jean Rémy, who was marked by the presentation of functionalism at the 1959 CISR
conference in Bologna (Interview with Jean Rémy).
162
Interview with Emile Poulat.
163
As is attested by the very extensive reviews of the literature in Archives de sociologie des religions.
164
Thus, Bellah's paper Civil Religion and Berger's Sacred Canopy were both translated into French on the
instigation of Jean Séguy and Jean Maître, members of the GSR (Interview with Jean Séguy).
165
Danièle Hervieu-Léger (Interview).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
148
Criticisms against the narrowness of religious sociology had been expressed since
the very first conferences of the CISR166. But they were generally only implicit, and
presented in a programmatic form: Instead of condemning the present or the past
orientation, authors looked to the future, and expressed wishes for improvements. The
first to express these views in the very first pages of the first conference to be published
was not an amateur; he was the man who stood at the origin of the development of
religious sociography in Europe, Gabriel Le Bras167: "Among all the objects of research,
practice is the most accessible because it is the most superficial. We should like to see
explorations of the soul revealing to us the regions of faith, of conscience, of religious
sentiment"168 (CISR 1951, p. 42). Other authors expressed the same wishes: "An
aspiration toward a broadening of the scope of the investigation is being felt: what is the
use of measuring practice if one does not understand the meaning which is attached to
it?"169 (F-A. Isambert, CISR 1958, p. 46). And harsher critiques were expressed in the
debates following the presentation of the papers170.
166
A first version of the following analysis has been presented at the 1989 CISR conference in Helsinki
(Tschannen 1990).
167
Le Bras was not present at this conference. However, he wrote the introduction to the Actes and
contributed one paper (Poulat 1990, p. 14).
168
In another paper included in CISR 1951, Le Bras presented this point of view more in detail: "L'objet
inconstesté de la sociologie religieuse est [l'Eglise comme] établissement visible [...]. Elle peut prétendre
davantage. Nous lui attribuons sans hésiter l'examen des conditions sociales du développement des
croyances et des rites. [...] Les belles perspectives ouvertes par Troeltsch et Max Weber sur la morale et sur
l'économie, les préoccupations normatives des chrétiens sociaux, la hantise du complexe religieux-profane
dans les communautés civiles, ne mettent en mouvement que de rares théoriciens ou philosophes et surtout
au sein du protestantisme anglais et américain. [...] Une sociologie du catholicisme doit être insérée dans
une sociologie générale" (CISR 1951, pp. 18-21).
169
Other remarks going in the same direction include the following: "Certaines études entrant formellement
dans le cadre de la sociologie religieuse ont dû, parfois, n'accomplir qu'une partie essentielle, mais somme
toute préalable, de la besogne, compter, décrire, classer les phénomènes religieux, spécialement celui de la
pratique dominicale, sans arriver toujours à une véritable sociologie" (Jean Labbens, CISR 1953, p. 50).
"Des centres d'études dûment qualifiés aideraient l'observation à dépasser les faits de première zone pour
s'approcher des éléments moins saisissables. Elle franchirait le domaine des effets pour passer à l'ordre des
causes" (Giovanni Hoyois, CISR 1951, p. 80).
170
The very brief summary of the debates given on page 244 of CISR 1951 provides a good example of
this: "Le P. DELCUVE, S.J., demande au conférencier si sa conclusion ne risque pas d'être précipitée. La vie
chrétienne est principalement une réalité intérieure et qualitative; n'est-il pas dangereux de l'apprécier en se
basant sur la régularité d'actes extérieurs, dont l'importance est d'ailleurs évidente? - M. l'abbé VERSCHEURE
répond que telle est bien sa pensée; quelques-unes de ses expressions ne furent pas adéquates. Il se réjouit
de voir la J.O.C. attacher plus d'importance à l'élément qualitatif dans ses enquêtes récentes. Mgr
DELACROIX insiste sur cet élément et sur l'esprit de finesse, qui est nécessaire pour le découvrir. A son avis,
la statistique religieuse occupe une place exagérée dans les études sociologiques. M. le chanoine LECLERCQ
estime indispensables ces recherches quantitatives; elles introduisent à la connaissance d'une paroisse, d'un
diocèse [...]. Elles ne deviennent dangereuses que si l'enquêteur s'y arrête et ne procède pas ensuite à une
étude 'qualitative'".
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
149
As a matter of fact, with these criticisms, religious sociology was caught between
two fires. Strictures against sociography came from "sociologists" who were demanding a
sounder theoretical perspective and a more scientific approach on one hand, and from
"churchmen" who were calling for an explanation which stood closer to the teachings of
the Bible on the other hand. The "sociologists" criticized sociography because there was
"too little" science in it, whereas the churchmen criticized it because it contained
"too much" science. The sociologists warned: "We must, if we want our task to be
scientific, respect, in research, the rules of observation. To hasten to the results, to let
oneself be carried away by apostolic enthusiasm, is to compromise the objectivity of the
enquiry"171 (Georges Delcuve, CISR 1951, p. 376). Examples of the opposite approach172
were more common; they represented the viewpoint of the majority: "All of us who are
present here refuse, for reasons related to our beliefs, but also to our scientific
convictions, this 'sociology of religion' which pretended to explain the origins of religious
phenomena [...]. Religious facts constitute original evidence, which cannot be reduced to
other aspects of the social universe. We also contend that Christianity cannot be
interpreted by sociological explanation"173 (Jean Labbens, CISR 1958, p. 31).
Thus, although many participants to the early conferences were agreed that the
discipline suffered from serious shortcomings and that a revision was necessary, they
disagreed as to the direction this change should take. Psychology apparently constituted a
middle ground between these opposing tendencies, and was backed by Le Bras' authority:
"Statistics only yield quantities: psychology reveals us the qualitative aspect. [...] It is the
task of psychology to explore these depths. I have never ceased to request its active
cooperation" (CISR 1953, p. 12). The psychological approach presented the double
advantage of being scientific and (apparently) less reductive than the sociological
approach. It allowed an approach which was (apparently) closer to the spiritual, whereas
sociology was perceived as subordinating the spiritual element to the social factors. Thus,
171
Other example: "Les 'Scientifiques' [...] nous reprochent un manque d'esprit scientifique, ils ne veulent
pas se contenter d'une simple description des faits, mais insistent surtout sur la comparaison et l'explication
des faits" (N. de Volder, CISR 1953, p. 72).
172
On one occasion, the sociology of knowledge is ironically designated as "ce suppôt de l'Université"
(Gabriel Le Bras, CISR 1958, p. 43).
173
Other examples: "Lorsqu'en 1949, nous crûmes le moment venu d'informer le Saint-Siège de notre
Conférence Internationale de Sociologie Religieuse, la réponse qui nous vint nous mettait en garde contre
'les recherches sociales en matière religieuse qui pourraient se faire en partant des postulats et en usant des
méthodes de la science sociologique, telle qu'on l'entend communément'. Il est vrai que nous l'entendions
autrement [...]. Parce que chrétiens, nous sommes prémunis de la tentation dont la sociologie durkheimienne
reste un exemple bien établi, à vouloir tirer la règle du fait au lieu d'appliquer le fait à la règle" (Jacques
Leclercq, CISR 1958, pp. 25 and 28). "Sans la révélation, impossible de comprendre et d'expliquer les
structures sociales de la vie chrétienne. Celles-ci sont, en effet, si intimement liées à la révélation qu'une
étude purement empirique méconnaîtrait la nature de l'objet étudié" (N. de Volder, CISR 1951, p. 217).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
150
in spite of the criticisms, the CISR was far from moving in the direction it was to take
later on. The fundamental revisions were yet to come.
The subsequent evolution of the CISR: revision and revolution
A content analysis of the Acts of the CISR shows that the history of the
organization can be divided into three periods. The first - which was centered on churchoriented religion - lasted from the foundation of the Conference to the first attempts at
reform in 1959. The second - the reformist period, which was characterized by instability
- lasted from these first attempts to the 1971 Opatija conference, in Yugoslavia, where the
new generation almost completely took over. The third, "paradigmatic period" was
marked by a return to stability, on a new basis, very different from that of the first period.
Thus, the growing malaise which was apparent in the first period did not directly lead to
the outburst of the revolution. This revolution was preceded by attempts at reform from
within.
These attempts are apparent mainly in the 1959 conference. For the first time, the
theme of the meeting was oriented to a theoretical issue: religion and social integration.
This change was the consequence of new options deliberately chosen by the organizers of
the Conference, the proceedings of which were this year for the first time published by
Social Compass174. But this move did not entail an abandonment of the Catholic
framework. Both emphases - the "scientific" and the "theological" - are apparent in the
Editor's introductory note to the new formula of Social Compass inaugurated in this same
issue: "The planners of the new program envisaged in the review 'Social Compass' wish
to stress the scientific aspect of their work. Does this mean a deemphasis on pastoral
questions? By no means [...]. God speaks through events. A better knowledge of the
events to come will help show us His will. May He bless our efforts" (CISR 1960, pp. 34). This orientation was shared by Jean Labbens, the president of the CISR: "FERES
[International Federation of Institutions for Socio-religious and Social Research] has
assured us that it will devote a large part of the study which it organizes or patronizes, to
fundamental research. Thus FERES covers both the preoccupations of the Conference
and the orientations decided upon during our recent meetings" (CISR 1960, p. 8).
174
It thus seems that, as in the case of the ACSS (Morris 1989a, p. 3), the scientific publication which was
closest to the organization acted as a catalyst in transforming the CISR.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
151
The contents of the papers of the 1959 conference as they appeared in Social
Compass in 1960 were true to the new emphasis on "science" and theory included in this
new orientation: Eight of the twelve published papers clearly had a theoretical
orientation175. As the CISR opened up, the influence of the broader sociological tradition
made itself felt at once. The functional perspective almost totally dominated the
conference. In an article called "Functional analysis in the sociology of religion",
Father Tufari176 presented the different possible approaches from a structural-functional
standpoint. His presentation was very Parsonian: he explained that religion could be
analyzed as a system, in relation to its own functional prerequisites on the one hand, and
as a subsystem, in relation to the role it plays for the other systems (individual, cultural
and social) on the other hand. The functional perspective also informed the approach of
Houtart177, who analyzed the role of religion for social integration from a very general
point of view, and of Goddijn178, who analyzed religious minorities as a social group in
their relation to the rest of society. In contrast to the usage prevalent in the CISR, the
concepts used by Goddijn (for example the concept of "minority") were carefully defined
and discussed.
This conference opened a new period in the life of the CISR, a period which can
be called the "reformist period". This period, which lasted from 1959 to 1969, is very
interesting for our purposes. It was dominated by a number of figures who had been
trained in or converted to a sociological approach at variance with traditional religious
sociology. And yet, these sociologists were not really part of the new generation: they
remained priests loyal to the Catholic hierarchy. Thus, the new approach they proposed
did not have a very powerful effect on the orientation of the CISR. The only effect it had
was a destabilizing one - which explains the irregular aspect of the contents of the
conferences during this period: Old themes and approaches intermingled with new ones;
conferences almost exclusively centered on "church-oriented religion" (in 1962 and in
1967) alternated with conferences where this preoccupation was less present; conferences
with a strong empirical content (in 1967 and in 1969) followed meetings where this
preoccupation was practically absent. New approaches which were to become
predominant later on made their first appearance: sociological theory and social change
(in 1959), analyses making frequent use of the word "secularization" (in 1967), and
discussions of the implications of religion in everyday life and in politics (in 1969).
175
The papers by Houtart, Tufari, Carrier, Goddijn, Acquaviva, Birou, Maître and Laloux.
A Jesuit.
177
President of the CISR from 1951 to 1965.
178
A Franciscan.
176
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
152
In the third period, from 1971 onwards, we find an even balance between
empirical research, church-oriented religion, social change, secularization and
sociological theory in every conference. This pattern contrasts sharply with the emphasis
on church-oriented religion in the first period, and with the instability of the second
period. As a matter of fact, after 1971, church-oriented religion never appeared again as
the general theme of a conference. Instead, the main themes revolved around three topics,
all of which were very rarely found in the previous conferences: secularization and social
change; religion and politics; religious symbols, values, and everyday life. The 1971
conference was also the first in which the word "secularization" was widely used appearing in the title of several papers. This third period was inaugurated by the adoption
of the new statutes of the CISR, and was the first to be held under the direction of a new
team: Jacques Verscheure as Secretary General, and Sabino Acquaviva as President. And,
as will be shown later on, it was marked by the arrival of a new generation of scholars.
Let us now take a more systematic look at the social, or political, aspect of this
intellectual revolution. The succession of three phases with regard to the contents of the
Acts is paralleled by a succession of three generations of scholars, as can be shown by an
analysis of the list of authors179. Among the three generations which emerge from this
analysis, the most important numerically is the third. This new generation - which formed
179
I first established a list of all the authors who presented papers at the CISR (N=396, including multiple
occurrences). On this basis, I then established a second list (N=31, excluding multiple occurrences),
grouping all the authors who had presented at least 3 papers. This second list allowed me to calculate the
"longevity" of each author, that is, the period of time between his first and his last paper.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
153
the substratum of the scholarly community - appeared in 1971, at the very moment the
CISR entered into the "paradigmatic period"180.
The evolution in the membership of the CISR can also be documented in a
number of other ways. Thus for instance, the CISR progressively lost some of its
confessional character, as is apparent from the fact that the titles accompanying the
author's names (révérend, père, or an indication of the order to which the author
belonged: s.j.; o.f.m.; etc.) slowly disappeared181. A third evolution in the same direction
can be noticed with regard to the institutional ties of the authors. Authors can be
classified according to the type of institution to which they belong182. I have distinguished
five types of institutions, classified roughly according to their degree of proximity to the
Church: 1) university departments not specialized in religion and situated in lay
universities or academic institutes (ex.: Faculté de Droit de Split - Yougoslavie); 2)
departments specialized in religion situated in lay academic institutions (ex.: CNRS;
Groupe de Sociologie des Religions); 3) confessional universities (ex.: Université
pontificale de Rome); 4) ecclesiastical research institutes (ex.: Research Institute of the
Lutheran Church - Tampere - Finland); 5) Church (ex.: Centre pastoral des Missions à
l'Intérieur). According to my data, overall, more than half of the articles were written by
authors attached to institutions of the first type. Only 15 authors (5%) were directly
attached to a Church. The Acts of the CISR are clearly divided into two periods with
180
It should be noted that my method results in certain biases, because it focuses on the formal papers and
ignores the people who acted as chairpersons for the discussion groups and sessions. Thus, some not very
important names appear, while Dobbelaere, for instance, does not appear - he was too busy managing the
whole affair to present papers! The 3 generations emerging from this analysis are the following: First
generation: from 1951 to 1961 (3 d to 7th conference). Authors entering into this category are not
numerous; they are: Le Bras (from the 3d to the 5th conference), Labbens (3 to 5), Laloux (5 to 7) and
Boulard (5 to 7). Two other authors, whose longevity was somewhat greater, can be added to that list:
Houtart (3-11) and Fichter (3-10). Second generation: from 1959 to 1975 (6 th to 13th conference).
Members of the second generation are not very numerous either; they are: Acquaviva (6-13), Goddijn (612), Maître (6-11) and Pin (7-10). Burgalassi, whose longevity is greater (5-15) can also be considered as
belonging to this generation. Third generation: from 1971 to 1987 (11th to 19th conference). Members of
this generation are very numerous (and most of them appear for the first time at the 11 th and 12th
conferences); they are: Séguy (11-18), Servais (11-13), Swyecki (11-17), Voyé (11-19), Vrcan (11-19),
Beckford (12-19), Guizzardi (12-18), Hervieu-Léger (12-19), Laeyendecker (12-14), Lemieux (12-14),
Luckmann (12-19), Raphaël (12-15), Campiche (13-16), Maduro (13-17), Yanagawa (14-17) and Lalive
d'Epinay (15-16). Three authors, whose first paper was delivered before the 11th conference, can be added
to this list: Rémy (8-19), Martin (9-18) and Wilson (10-19). Finally, only one author, Isambert (5-19), is
impossible to classify, as his longevity covers the three generations.
181
Until 1962, about half of the names were followed by such a title, but from 1965 to 1969, only 10% to
30% of the names were followed by the title, which totally disappeared from 1981 onwards. Which
obviously does not mean that the number of persons bearing such titles decreased in similar proportions, but
that these titles no longer appeared officially.
182
As far as this can be guessed from the name of the institution given in the Acts.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
154
regard to the institutional attaches of the authors, with the 1962 conference constituting a
very clear dividing line:
Proportion
of authors
attached
to an institution
of the first type
Proportion
of authors
attached
to an institution
of the fourth type
3rd to 7th conference
0-29%
23-50%
9th to 19th conference
45-92%
0-13%
The two evolutions - in the institutional ties and in the themes discussed during
the conferences - are not only parallel: they are causally related. Crosstabs show that
authors attached to the Church (types 4 and 5) more frequently tended to write articles
based directly on empirical research. These authors also more frequently wrote articles
bearing on church-oriented religion183:
% of articles
bearing on
church-oriented
religion
Authors
attached
to a university
(types 1-3)
Authors
attached
to the Church
(types 4-5)
34%
70%
These generational trends were confirmed by most of the persons I interviewed. A
broad consensus supports the view expressed by Dobbelaere: "A new generation of
academics could not accept the 'self'-imposed limitations of the objectives of the CISR
[limited to sociography and research useful to the church] and [...] they wanted to link up
again with the mainstream of sociology and the sociological traditions of Weber and
Durkheim" (1989, p. 383). And virtually everybody in the CISR agrees that the
fundamental changes occurred between the 1969 Rome conference and the Opatija
conference two years later.
183
Separate analyses for the first (1-7) and the second (9-19) period show that these relationships are not
determined by the heavier presence of authors attached to a Church in the first conferences. In other words,
this difference is statistically significant (.05) in the second period as well as in the first one. This result
comes as no surprise: In his summary of recent trends in sociology of religion, Pin, writing in 1960,
remarked that most of the efforts toward a theoretically more relevant sociology of religion had been made
by academic sociologists (Pin 1960, p. 78).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
155
But, as convergent sources indicate, the arrival of this new generation was not
always a smooth process. Most interviewed sociologists who witnessed this change do
not hesitate to speak of power struggles, intrigues and personal fights184. The struggle for
power was between priests backed by the formally uncommitted185, yet influential
Catholic hierarchy, and a number of lay sociologists. Exact accounts of what happened
are not easy to establish: much remains shrouded in mystery186, and memories are not
always very accurate. But the general trends seem to indicate that the Church loosened its
informal grip first. The CISR had been indirectly supported for years by the Catholic
world, through the Catholic University of Louvain when François Houtart was Secretary
General, and through the Pontifical University in Rome when Emile Pin took over. But in
1969, when Pin decided to quit, the Catholic hierarchy apparently had lost some of its
interest in religious sociology. At the 1969 Rome conference, the "professional
sociologists" sat together, and started desperately looking for a successor, someone who
would be able to provide the same logistical support187. But the only candidate was
Jacques Verscheure, who headed a tiny research center in southern France. So Verscheure
was elected Secretary General. As it turned out, he was a very efficient Secretary, for he
compensated for the lack of resources of his research center by devoting himself
completely to the CISR.
This meant, however, that the CISR had become much more independent from the
Catholic hierarchy188. Behind Verscheure, one could no longer feel the power of the
Church189. In this context, the arrival of new members from the English-speaking and,
more generally, northern countries190, helped definitely offset the balance of power in
favor of the new generation. The CISR actively sought to attract young scholars, and
especially prestigious figures. Thus Luckmann, as well as Wilson - both of whom knew
nothing of the CISR - were invited to give lectures191. Very much to his surprise, Wilson
184
As most of the persons involved are still alive, I have renounced quoting some of the harshest
expressions of these strifes.
185
There never was a formal link between the CISR and the Church, but in the first years, the CISR always
required ecclesiastical approval for its conferences and its publications.
186
The CISR does not as yet have any centralized archives.
187
Interview with Leo Laeyendecker.
188
Interview with Emile Poulat.
189
Interview with Christian Lalive d'Epinay.
190
Interpretations diverge on this point: Jean Rémy thinks that the division was mainly along confessional
lines ("Même les allemands, qui venaient avant, c'étaient tous des gens de mouvance catholique. Et alors les
américains, qui sont toujours venus, venaient à travers l'association catholique de sociologie des religions.
Et Fichter, qui a été là tout un temps, c'était quand même un jésuite"; Jean Rémy, interview), while others
(Leo Laeyendecker and James Beckford) tended to think in different terms: "The power struggle was
between the French-speaking and the non-French-speaking" (James Beckford, interview).
191
Interviews with Thomas Luckmann and Bryan Wilson.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
156
was then asked to become president at this very first conference he attended192.
Obviously, this was exactly the kind of intellectual backing the CISR needed to gain a
wider acceptance among professional sociologists193.
As for Verscheure, no one seems to know to what extent he himself was
converted to the new approach. What is clear, however, is that he did undertake some
important moves: he sought contact with the French GSR194, and considered the
organization of the very important 1971 conference in Yugoslavia as "almost a
geographical break [allowing the CISR] to transcend the clerical dominance of the
conference, whilst nonetheless maintaining the support of the Church in a back-handed
way"195. Thus, the revolution came about with at least passive consent of the Catholic
hierarchy. Catholic researchers may even be said to have unwittingly favored this
evolution when they started engaging professional sociologists in their research centers
because they felt that they needed their professional qualifications196. But there is no
doubt that the transition also involved a great deal of muscle-flexing. The new generation
could not simply wait for the clerics who were in place to surrender control: they had to
fight to get it.
One of the persons who played a central role in this battle was Dobbelaere, whose
fiery temperament197 contributed to the polarization of the debate between the
"theological" and the "scientific" approaches. Interviews showed that, whenever the CISR
found itself at an important turning point, he was present and active. Even today, he does
not miss one opportunity to speak out, from the presidential seat or from the floor, against
attempts to come back to a "non-scientific" sociology of religion198. Indeed, if we follow
192
Interview with Bryan Wilson.
"Wilson was a man with a high prestige, also to the Americans, in the international world. And the CISR
realized that if they wanted to be accepted as a scientific association in the world, then they had to have
representatives who were scientists" (Leo Laeyendecker, interview).
194
Interview with Emile Poulat.
195
Bryan Wilson (Interview).
196
"Cessant de recourir à des 'pasteurs' et engageant [...] des sociologues professionnels, ces centres se sont
trouvés confrontés à un changement de priorité des objectifs de la recherche: non plus un objectif pastoral,
avec ce que ça peut amener parfois de regard peu ou pas critique, mais bien un objectif 'scientifique', avec
ce que cela suppose de regard froid et de non-engagement, tout au moins au stade de l'analyse, de
l'interprétation et du diagnostic - ceci n'empêchant pas, sinon toujours, du moins parfois, une préoccupation
ecclésiale certaine" (Liliane Voyé, personal communication).
197
Dobbelaere's assertiveness on the whole issue of the separation of the scientific and the theological
viewpoints must be understood against the background of the Belgian situation, where the Catholic
hierarchy retains a considerable power and a marked dislike for lay sociology of religion (Interviews with
Jean Rémy and Christian Lalive d'Epinay). Dobbelaere reacted strongly against this: "Fondamentalement,
vous avez devant vous un homme qui s'est rebellé contre l'Eglise qui voulait définir ce qu'on pouvait
accepter et pas accepter" (Karel Dobbelaere, interview).
198
Incidentally, this is the reason why I rely so heavily on Dobbelaere to document the strifes in the CISR.
He is much more outspoken than the other sociologists whom I interviewed, but there is no reason to think
193
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
157
Dobbelaere's explanations, it appears that the new generation took control by a kind of
legal coup d'état. In effect, Dobbelaere stresses the importance of the "preparatory
committee", an organism designed to plan each new conference. Provision for this
committee had been included in the 1968 statutes, but it was only in 1974 that Bryan
Wilson, who was at that time president, called it to meet199: "Since then, all CISR
conferences have been prepared by professional sociologists [...]. The impact of the
following professors on the association was consequently very great: Wilson, Martin,
Luckmann, Séguy, Rémy, Isambert, Gannon, Acquaviva, Guizzardi, Laeyendecker and
Dobbelaere. Especially the first three, through their presence and writings, helped a
younger generation of sociologists of religion to change the content and the image of the
association" (Dobbelaere 1989, p. 384)200.
Thus, the paradigm change was made possible by a change of personnel. The
revolution was not only intellectual, it was also political. The Kuhnian model is thus
confirmed (see chap. 1). And the fact the the very persons who were most active in the
political struggle - most notably the four presidents in the paradigmatic period: Wilson,
Martin, Dobbelaere, and even Acquaviva - were also the ones who most explicitly
vindicated the secularization paradigm can certainly not be attributed to mere chance.
"Secularization" in the Acts of the CISR
Let us now again turn to secularization itself, and analyze how this theme was
discussed during this revolutionary period. From the very beginning of the CISR, there
have been discussions about secularization, atheism, unbelief, and dechristianization201.
that his accounts should be considered as unreliable. On the contrary, I was struck, in my interviews, by the
fact that virtually everyone seemed to agree with Dobbelaere's description when directly asked, although
most people preferred to remain as reserved as possible.
199
But is it not the case that in 1974, the revolution had already largely been accomplished? Not entirely.
Even after 1971, the struggle was not completely over, as can be seen from the following account: "At first
there was a wide support for Verscheure; he re-organized the CISR, put some order in the administration,
and promoted contacts with Eastern Europe. However, he more and more acted - to use an expression the
French use when they speak about De Gaulle - like: 'La CISR, c'est moi'. The council lacked the means to
effectively control the Secretary General (the discussion started in Strasbourg), and there were provisions in
the statutes that limited the number of years one may function as an officer. Consequently, we had to resort
to changing the statutes as a tool to change this situation. Campiche, myself and others wanted more
democracy in the CISR: a limited number of years in the council, a limitation of the years a person can
serve as president or Secretary general, giving the members the power to nominate people as candidates for
vacant positions in the council, etc" (Karel Dobbelaere, personal communication)..
200
In this context, the ISA, in which many of the members of the new generation also participated, provided
a welcomed link to general academic sociology (Dobbelaere 1989, p. 385).
201
The term dechristianization as used by members of the CISR is not directly related to the notion of
dechristinaization as used by sholars of the French revolution.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
158
Articles discussing secularization in this early period fall into three categories. First, we
find attempts to explain the causes of dechristianization without breaking with the
assumptions of religious sociology. Second, we find articles in which many elements of
the later secularization theories were already present, without being presented in a
systematic manner, and without the emphasis on the word "secularization" itself. Finally,
in one article, the problems of secularization were considered from a coherent and
comprehensive theoretical point of view - although this point of view was very peculiar,
and differed widely from the paradigm which emerged later on.
Let us first consider a few of the papers seeking to explain "dechristianization"
from the point of view of religious sociology. In this framework, the problem of
dechristianization was considered mainly under a moral and pastoral angle. The
explanations given to dechristianization were sometimes tautological, and never reached
beyond the boundaries of religious sociology. The authors of these articles were
apparently unable to transcend the limits set by their theological training and by their
practice as churchmen.
In a paper presented at the 1959 conference, Birou explicitly starts from a moral
point of view: "We shall attempt to judge certain tendencies and certain excesses which
mark society today from the point of view of a Christian moralist" (CISR 1960, p. 228).
He then goes on to explain the causes of the irreligion of modern times. The main source
of irreligion, he explains, is to be seen in the use of technique; technical development as
such is a neutral factor, which does not have any immediate moral consequences. But the
way we use this technique does have moral consequences. Because we have glorified
technique, it has become an end in itself, and has resulted in an alienation of man: "What
we have here is a magical mentality in front of technical power, which thus becomes a
new pagan religion, a powerful materialistic principle of collective integration and of
personal disintegration, which, as we will see, is the fundamental cause of modern
irreligion" (CISR 1960, p. 230).
For a sociologist, Birou's explanation is tautological. If technique as such is not a
cause, the cause must be sought in a human attitude to it. But no explanation of this
attitude, other than moral202, is given by the author, who explicitly refuses the
sociological explanation: "The frequently repeated enumeration of the causes of
dechristianization is often nothing but a list of epiphenomena: loss of the sense of the
family, leisure forms, working conditions, migratory movements, and so forth. What we
202
"La volonté prométhéenne de l'homme a accordé à la technique, instrument de sa puissance incontrôlée,
un prestige absolu" (CISR 1960, p. 230).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
159
wanted to show is that there is, more profoundly, a global phenomenon which has an
impact on all dimensions of existence and which provokes a religious disintegration. [...]
Urbanization itself and industrialization in their present forms are merely consequences of
this global phenomenon. This phenomenon could be characterized by the fact that man
has become his own end in a rational and scientific control of his whole destiny" (CISR
1960, pp. 233-34). In short, Birou takes the very evil he wants to explain203 as a causal
factor for the explanation. This result is probably unavoidable as long as the situation to
be explained and the explanation are both defined in moral terms.
The paper presented at the same conference by Abbé Laloux falls prey to
deficiencies of the same order. Laloux explains religious change - one of whose
modalities is dechristianization - by a growing inadequacy between the "subject" (i.e.,
man) and the "object" (i.e., the Church): "Adequacy as it was realized in the times of
unanimous practice has deteriorated because of a rapid evolution of the subject in front of
which the object remained immobile or has taken a radically opposed position of
reaction" (CISR 1960, p. 58). Although his aim is to explain the "why" as well as the
"how" of religious change and dechristianization, Laloux explains no more than the
"how". The "evolution of the subject" is explained by the "facing" (affrontement) of a new
reality ("réalité nouvelle", CISR 1960, p. 53), and by "social change" (CISR 1960, p. 59),
but the author does not explain what this new reality is nor analyze this social change.
Furthermore, his analysis, by restricting itself to the interaction between the Church and
the believer204, remains inside the boundaries of the sociology of church-oriented religion.
In contrast to these narrow explanations, some papers presented arguments which
went much further, and which displayed the influence of modern sociological theory. At
the same conference, an article by Jacques Maître205 contains many elements of the future
paradigm: "In a certain period, when it was at the apex of its influence, Catholicism
fulfilled almost all the functions in society. [...] The practical functions have been largely
secularized through the invasion of technique [...]. Likewise, the political functions are
secularized by the progressive tendency toward the neutralization of the state [...]. The
203
Which he does not define precisely, but which he circumscribes as "le péché du monde"; "[les]
déséquilibres, [...] malaises et [...] troubles de la société moderne; [les] fausses intégrations" (CISR 1960,
pp. 228-29).
204
I understand that the author restricted his analysis to this level on purpose: "Ce n'est pas le changement
social comme tel qui est cause de la transformation religieuse, puisque celle-ci peut s'orienter dans le sens
positif ou négatif, mais bien l'adéquation sujet-objet, c'est-à-dire le moyen terme de caractère proprement
sociologique qui résulte des positions mutuelles du sujet et de l'objet et de leur interaction réciproque"
(CISR 1960, p. 59). However, this explanation is not convincing: The adequation between the subject and
the object is nothing but an intervening variable, which determines the form of religious change; but the
ultimate cause is social change.
205
A member of the CNRS Groupe de Sociologie des Religions.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
160
fight for well-being itself is carried out in completely secularized forms [...]. The
functions [which were fulfilled by Catholicism] have been progressively torn away [...]
through social change" (CISR 1960, pp. 113-116). But these elements - which are to play
a central role in the later theories - are presented by the author as unproblematic. They do
not play an important role in his theory about religion and social change, but are used as
the most obvious and simple way of describing a seemingly well-known phenomenon.
Emile Pin206 was the author of two papers presenting secularization theories, at
the 1959 and 1965 Conferences. However, in these two articles, Pin makes no use of the
word secularization. The first paper is based on two elements: autonomization* and the
transformation leading from community to society207. Dechristianization is presented as a
consequence of the "demicrostructuration" of society - the disappearance of small
communal groups to the profit of a network of specialized groups. Dechristianization
results in a loss of the power which the Church wielded through these groups: "The
Church used to embrace the individual in a tight mesh of groups, and most notably of
small groups, which all tied him to the global religious society. [Society put] to the
service of the Church a microstructure of organizations, small groups, small societies,
first of all the family. [...] Beyond the family, the Christian reference is warranted by
many other associative and communitary levels: the school (founded and overseen by the
curé), the brotherhoods, the workshops, the neighborhoods which exercise an informal
but efficient control. The curé had to control but a limited number of individuals to
ensure that all individuals are controlled through them" (CISR 1965, pp. 125-26).
In his other paper presented in 1965, Pin develops a typology of religious
motivation which allows him to explain the transformations of religion in the transition
from a pre-industrial to an industrial society. These transformations are brought about by
a change in some of the motivational bases traditionally underpinning religion: "In the
transition to an industrial and technical society, some of the motivations which underlay
religious activities in the pre-technical and traditional society tend to crumble" (CISR
1966, p. 34). It would be wrong, however, to speak of an automatic decline of religion in
modern society. For in this society, certain new motivations can prove efficient in
sustaining religious life: "It is not impossible that, after a more or less long technical
experience, [...] new motives for seeking the help of the numinous should appear. Most
notably the need to find a meaning to an existence whose creative effort is suddenly
terminated by death, and the need to give to society a new equilibrium and an integration
206
207
A Jesuit, Secretary General of the CISR from 1965 to 1969.
But the author does not use these terms.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
161
that the administrative and political techniques alone will not allow" (CISR 1966, p. 24).
This theory reminds unmistakably some of the features of Berger's and Luckmann's
theories: it describes something which is akin to the "loss of plausibility" described by
these authors. Moreover, the remarkably moderate judgement on the fate of religion
brings it close to some of the more subtle secularization theories (in particular those of
Luckmann and Fenn): "In conclusion: the transition from a pre-industrial society to an
industrial society on the part of a particular social class, region or nation, will be
accompanied by the retention or even the renewal of religious activity, or, on the contrary,
by its disappearance, largely as a result of the type of motivation which the religious
society had produced in its members before the epoch of change. That which worked
efficiently yesterday can be a cause of the failures and losses of tomorrow" (CISR 1966,
p. 26).
Finally208, in an article presented in 1967, Jean Rémy209 develops a secularization
theory which is very close to the "privatization" theory offered by Luckmann, which the
author does not seem to know: "Religion having lost a number of functions would no
longer be a decisive element to explain the development and the organization of society.
[...] This new insertion of the religion institution, which undermines its position of power,
does not preclude that the religious product can be valorized very strongly on the level of
the personality system [...]. Our hypothesis is opposed to the thesis frequently to be found
among the first sociologists of religion, who consider it as a cultural residue" (CISR 1967,
pp. 437-39).
Thus, the problems related to secularization received an increasing amount of
attention. However, in all these discussions, there was no awareness that the concept of
secularization might be important. "Secularization theory" itself was not an important
theme. Authors talked about secularization, not about the way secularization ought to be
talked about. The only exception to this pattern is found in 1959, when Sabino Acquaviva
delineated the main features of the desacralization theory he was to develop later in his
famous book, L'ecclisi del sacro nella civiltà industriale (1961). What is interesting to
note as far as Acquaviva's analysis is concerned is not so much the theory in itself as the
new attitude toward the problem of secularization it implied. This paper was the first to
pose the problems of the dynamics of secularization in all their implications. For the first
time, secularization appeared as a difficult problem which needed an ad hoc theoretical
explanation: "All this points out the importance of the study of the essential differences
208
Other discussions of the causes of dechristianization include the papers by Nicolas Monzel in CISR
1951, by Jean Labbens in CISR 1953 and by Henri Mendras in CISR 1958.
209
A professor at the Catholic University in Louvain (Belgium).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
162
between the pre-technological world and the technological world for the right
understanding of the dynamics of religious life. Such a study has been repeatedly made by
eminent scholars. But they have failed to arrive at that unified sociological theory which
should be the basis of further progress in this enquiry. In our opinion, such a theory
becomes a practical possibility only if elaborated within the framework of the sociology
of knowledge and the sociology of behavior. It is only through these more elaborate
instruments that the broad causes can be grasped in such a way as to bring out the logical
place of neo-paganism in the recent history of mankind" (CISR 1960, p. 214).
To summarize: the relation between the secularization debate and the
deconfessionalization of the CISR is clear. Although criticisms against sociography
developed early, it was only in 1971 that the era of religious sociology came to an end.
The new era which began then coincided with the arrival in the CISR of a new generation
of sociologists coming from the universities. This new generation brought with it the
modern sociological view of religion which had developed earlier, mainly in the U.S.A.,
but it also brought something which is of particular interest for us: the secularization
paradigm. However, the theoretical discussion did not really take place within the CISR:
The new development took place outside of it, and was presented to the public directly in
book form. Secularization theory itself was not used as a weapon inside of the CISR. this
seems to point to the subordinate role of the intrinsically scientific logic, and to the
preponderance of the political factors.
The institutionalization of the sociology of religion (1954-1964)
Before we turn to the presentation of the secularization paradigm, the final steps
in the institutionalization of sociology of religion as a recognized sub-discipline must
briefly be discussed210. The institutionalization of the new discipline was theoretical first,
and social only later. The main step toward the theoretical recognition of the discipline
had in effect already been taken with the rise of functionalism. From the analysis of the
textbooks, it appears that the 60s did not represent a significant improvement in the
theoretical status of sociology of religion. 13 of the 27 textbooks published before 1968
included a chapter on
210
For another overview of this process, see Beckford 1990.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
163
religion211, and 14 of the 22 texts published from this date included such a chapter212 which is only a slight improvement. The institutionalization we are concerned with in this
chapter is situated at the social level.
As a result of the theoretical developments, at the end of the 50s, sociologists of
religion felt that their field of inquiry had become sufficiently important to be recognized
as a sub-discipline. In order to achieve this, they had to impose themselves at the
institutional level. One aspect of this struggle to achieve recognition is related by Norman
Birnbaum, who played an active part in it: "For reasons not entirely clear, the Program
Committee planning the Fourth World Congress of Sociology (Stresa, Italy, September of
1959) made no provision for discussion of the sociology of religion" (Birnbaum 1960,
p. 111). In reaction to this exclusion, a group of sociologists of religion, led most notably
by Birnbaum, Becker, and Desroche, "respectfully petition[ed] for a full recognized and
implemented section on sociology of religion at succeeding congresses of the ISA" (1960,
p. 112). It will come as no surprise to us that this institutionalization of the sociology of
religion was inseparably linked to new theoretical developments; as a justification for the
recognition of the status of sociology of religion, Birnbaum asserted that the sociology of
religion must "move from sociographic emphases to theoretical analysis" (1960, p. 111).
The demand of the sociologists of religion was fulfilled by the ISA and, ever since, this
organization includes a Research Committee (n. 22) on religion.
In Europe, the Groupe de sociologie des religions (GSR), which had been created
in Paris in October 1954, represented the first move toward an institutionalization of
sociology of religion in a non-denominational framework. According to Poulat - one of
the founding members - the phrase sociologie des religions, which was not common in
French at this time, was deliberately chosen in order to break from the tradition of
sociologie religieuse as it was embodied in the CISR (Poulat 1990, p. 19). In the next few
years, interest in sociology of religion rose steadily: six conferences were held from 1959
onwards in the framework of the Centre de sociologie du protestantisme (Strasbourg),
and other, more sporadic conferences213, were also held (1990, pp. 23-24).
The progress in the institutionalization of the new sub-discipline can be traced
fairly accurately by the founding of the five journals which, to this day, remain the only
211
The texts including a complete chapter on religion are: TXT 1948, 1950, 1951, 1954, 1956a, 1960,
1961b, 1962a, 1962b, 1965, 1966a, 1966b, 1967.
212
Chapters including a complete chapter on religion include 1969b, 1969c, 1969d, 1971b, 1971c, 1971d,
1973a, 1973b, 1975c, 1976a, 1976b, 1977b, 1979b and 1984. In addition, 1970 and 1976d include chapters
partly devoted to religion.
213
According to Schreuder, between 1962 and 1964, at least 40 conferences on the sociology of religion
were held worldwide (1966, p. 206).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
164
regularly published scientific journals entirely devoted to sociology of religion. The first,
Social Compass, was launched in the Netherlands by the KASKI (Catholic Institute for
Socio-Ecclesiastical Research), and first appeared in Dutch in 1953 under the title Sociaal
Kompas. Very soon, it began publishing papers in other major languages, and from 1960
onwards, it published mainly in English and in French. In 1956, the French GSR started
publishing the Archives de sociologie des religions (today: Archives de sciences sociales
des religions). The next three journals were American. In 1959, the Religious Research
Association214 (RRA) started publishing the Review of Religious Research, and in 1961,
the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) launched the Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion. Finally, in 1964, the ACSS changed the name of its journal,
which had appeared since 1940, from American Catholic Sociological Review to
Sociological Analysis. Thus in a mere decade, the new sub-discipline had been equipped
with its five major journals. Even tough it still occupied a somewhat inferior status
(Beckford 1985), sociology of religion had become an officially established and
recognized sub-discipline within the academic world.
214
Originally a fellowship of Protestant researchers (Beckford 1990, p. 47).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
165
CHAPTER 11
THE ROLE OF THE THEOLOGICAL DEBATE
Most of the elements that account for the emergence of the CISR paradigm in the
mid-60s have by now become familiar to the reader. We have successively discussed the
emergence of the different exemplars, the rise of interest in religion as a subject matter,
the rise of functionalism, and the intellectual revolution within the CISR. However, all
these elements are not sufficient in themselves to explain the sudden popularity of the
notion of secularization.
As we will see, the suddenness of the popularity of this theme cannot be
understood without the theological debate around the theses put forward by a number of
"secular theologians". Without the interest and the passions aroused by this debate, it is
doubtful whether secularization would ever have so suddenly become a fashionable topic.
Secular Theology
To gain a better understanding of the ultimate transformation in the secularization
issue, we must now offer a brief survey of the developments that took place in Protestant
theology from the XIXth century to the 1960s. As we will see, these developments
brought about no less than a Copernician revolution - or, in Kuhnian terms, a change of
paradigm - in the evaluation of the impact of modernity on religion. The ultimate
consequence of this revolution was a change of polarity: Secularization was no longer
viewed as a sad decline from the Golden Age of Christianity, but as the final realization
of its long repressed potentialities.
The characteristic which most readily distinguishes modern Protestant theology
from previous theological thinking is a continuing effort to come to terms with the
intellectual developments which originated at the time of the Enlightenment. It will
hardly be necessary to linger at great length on this point. Suffice it to say that the
credibility of the Christian world-view appeared severely shaken by the new confidence
in the powers of reason which characterized this period. Alasdair Heron summarizes the
challenges these developments posed to traditional theology under five headings: 1) the
challenge to the authority of the Bible arising from the new scientific understanding of the
universe on the one hand, and from scholarly developments in the study of biblical
documents on the other; 2) the increasing questioning of the possibility of miracles
arising from the better understanding of the regularities in the natural order, which led to
conceptions such as those of the deists, who conceived of God as a necessary but remote
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
166
"First Cause" of the Universe, which was unlikely to upset the natural order to intervene
directly in specific, individual occurrences; 3) the development of the idea of a "natural
religion" (from Rousseau's "civic religion" to Robespierre's "Supreme Being"), which led
to a distinction between the "genuine" core of religion and the inauthentic traditions
which went along with it in Christianity; 4) the limits set to reason by philosophers such
as Hume and Kant, who reduced the sphere of the knowable to the empirical, thus putting
an end to a long tradition in Christianity which held that the existence of God could be
proven rationally; 5) the growing awareness of the huge cultural gap separating us from
the biblical times, which led to a questioning of the relevance of history - and particularly
of the history told in the Bible - for authentic religious belief by thinkers like Lessing
(Heron 1980, pp. 4-21).
The first theologian to bring a convincing answer to these multiple challenges was
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), the founder of modern Protestant theology. It is
not necessary, in the framework of this analysis, to go into an elaborate discussion of
Schleiermacher's work. It will suffice, for our purposes, to note that he re-stated the
meaning of Christian convictions by accepting the critiques set forth by the philosophy of
the Enlightenment, but only in order to better sidestep them. Schleiermacher asserted that
Christian faith had nothing to do with knowledge, nor with ethics, which were both much
too deeply marked by man's finitude. Instead, Schleiermacher contended, faith had its
roots at a level that lay deeper than knowledge or ethics, and which he sought to
circumscribe as "consciousness", "modification of Feeling" and "immediate awareness".
In his view, the ground of religious experience was provided by the "consciousness of
being absolutely dependant or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God"
(Schleiermacher, quoted in Heron 1980, p. 25). Thus, man is placed by Schleiermacher at
the periphery - which implies that what he knows or what he does cannot be taken as a
standard - and God at the center. Religious experience is this awareness of our own
finitude, and at the same time of the infinity of God, on which we depend.
Schleiermacher thus provides us with a first example of the ways in which a
theological explanation can be rescued from criticisms which seem to destroy its very
foundations, by moving, as it were, these foundations to another point. Heron in effect
states that "[...] Schleiermacher offers to religious language a new foundation and point of
reference, one with inbuilt defences against the attacks of the Enlightenment" (1980,
p. 27).
Although Schleiermacher did not have many followers during his lifetime, he
inaugurated a very important tradition in protestant theology (1980, p. 31). I will skip
some steps in the developments which ensued directly or indirectly from his work - most
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
167
notably Riltsch and Liberal Theology, Hegel and some of his followers, and Kierkegaard
- to come to what is most directly relevant for our purpose.
One of the main underlying motifs of all the theological thinking which we will
expose is a distinction between the "authentic" and the "inauthentic" in a religious
tradition. We have already seen that motif at work in Schleiermacher's thought when, in
answer to the attacks of the philosophers, he asserted that religion was not a form of
knowledge, but something that lies at a further depth. This basic motif will become very
important when we will assess the impact of the theological secularization theories on
sociology: if secularization does nothing but peel off the inauthentic crust of religion, it
leads to a purification, not to a decline. Rather than attempting to expose the main
theological systems of twentieth-century protestant theology - which would be impossible
- I will therefore trace this recurrent motif.
The first very important theologian to take up this motif in the twentieth century
was Karl Barth (1886-1968), who made a distinction between "religion" and "faith". To
understand this distinction, it is necessary to say a few words on Barth's conception of
God. The main point which must be emphasized for our purposes is that God is of a
totally different nature than man. God is definitely beyond our human understanding.
"God is God, not man writ large: and he cannot be spoken simply by speaking of
ourselves in a louder voice" (Heron 1980, p. 76, emphasis in original). Religion, then man's spiritual depth and moral awareness - is a form of idolatry, for in it, man is not
preoccupied with God, but with his "own secret divinity" (1980, p. 79). Faith, on the
other hand, is man's response to the "Word of God" - that is, to God's unpredictable and
ineffable invitation to be his children. In Heron's words, the Word of God "cannot be
trapped in the net of our thoughts and expressions. Instead, it flashes across between
them, coming 'vertically from above', and leaving behind only the marks of its passing,
much as lightning scorches the earth where it strikes" (1980, p. 77). "Religion is man's
striving after God [...], and when man finds his God he inevitably wants to use God for
his own purposes. Christian faith, however, is God's creation, called into being through
the Incarnate Word. Faith stays in judgment on every form of religion including
Christianity" (Shiner 1965, p. 279).
Although there are very important differences between Schleiermacher and Barth
from a theological point of view215, both of them discard some part of what was defined
as religion, to reduce it to that part which they conceived as most essential. However, it
215
The most important in respect to what we have said being that the stress in Schleiermacher is on man's
feeling of dependance, whereas in Barth it is on God's incommensurable act (Heron 1980, p. 78).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
168
should be noted that Barth's position derived from a completely opposed origin than
Schleiermacher's. Whereas the latter made his distinction to answer the devastating
challenges brought about by modernity while valuing them positively, Barth's attack on
religion was motivated by a rejection of this modernity, which had by then taken such
horrendous expression as the First World War (Heron 1980, p. 69), and with which the
Church came to be identified when a group of intellectuals, many of whom were
theologians, publicly supported the Kaiser's war policy (1980, p. 75). Thus, Barth's
distinction cannot be considered as directly seminal in the genesis of the CISR paradigm.
However, there is an indirect relationship, insofar as one other very important German
theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945), considered his own work as a way to carry
further Barth's attacks on religion (1980, pp. 96, 152).
Bonhoeffer advocated a "religionless Christianity" and a "worldly holiness" (1980,
p. 154). In his view, "holiness" had nothing to do with the restricted, the mystical and the
pious, but must be understood in a thoroughly worldly, secular fashion (1980, p. 154). For
if religion is considered as a kind of "other-worldliness", God is separated off from the
real life of the world. Instead, Bonhoeffer contended, there are not two levels of reality,
one "sacred", the other "secular", and God is not a remote entity to which man turns only
when he is helpless. "The gospel [...] must speak to men where they are strong, not only
where they are weak" (1980, pp. 154-55). Therefore, it is important to live in the world
"as if God himself was not given", and to take over responsibility in the secular world
(1980, p. 155). Bonhoeffer valued the secular world extremely positively. He considered
it as a liberation of man, and he coined the phrase describing the modern world "a world
come of age"216.
One other very important theologian for the genesis of the positive evaluation of
secularization is Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), who was a New Testament scholar. What
struck him most in his researches was that the New Testament was anchored in the worldview of a pre-scientific culture, extremely remote from ours, and that any literal reading
of the scriptures was therefore totally untenable (Bultmann et al. 1953, pp. 1-5).
According to Bultmann, "the world-view of the New Testament writers was 'mythical' in
the sense that they thought of the universe as containing heaven above, the underworld
below, and our earth in between, and believed the course of human life to be governed by
216
It is curious to note that the analogy between the development of the human organism and the evolution
of society, which was so widely criticized in some thinking of the nineteenth-century sociologists, is set
forth in the crudest terms by this otherwise very sophisticated thinker. But this should not really come as a
surprise to us, since theology, insofar as it is not committed to the same axiological neutrality as sociology,
can afford - and, indeed, is compelled - to make such value judgments on the sense of history.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
169
supernatural forces of good and evil" (1980, p. 103). Therefore, Bultmann maintained, it
is necessary to "demythologize" the New Testament, that is, to discover the real functions
of the mythical events in it.
Thus, in Bultmann, we find the same motif at work again: he asserted that what
was important about the Gospel was not its form, but its message, which must be rediscovered beneath the layers of mythological thinking. Where Schleiermacher had
jettisoned metaphysics and ethics, where Barth had discarded "religion", Bultmann
contended that we must do away with myth. However, the same cannot be said with
respect to Bonhoeffer. Whereas Bultmann, as Barth and Schleiermacher had done before
him, salvaged the Christian explanation by reducing its scope and, as it were,
concentrating it, Bonhoeffer definitely expanded it. God, which had become extremely
remote in Barth's approach, was seen by Bonhoeffer as pervading every aspect of secular
life. Both of these movements are important: on the one hand, religion goes through a
process of purification, but on the other hand, elements which originated in religion come
to pervade every aspect of secular life (generalization*). The combination of these two
processes can best be read as a reorganization of the forces of religion in society.
But we still have to deal with the theologian which most explicitly set forth a
secularization theory: Friedrich Gogarten (1887-1967). In his writings, we will find not
only some elements which were later to be incorporated into sociological secularization
theories, but a complete analysis of the roots and consequences of secularization. What
does Gogarten mean by secularization? It is important to distinguish two meanings in his
writings (Gogarten 1953, pp. 137-38). First, Gogarten uses secularization in the ordinary
sense of "the separation of originally Christian ideas and experiences from their divine
ground and their transformation into purely human phenomena" (Shiner 1966, p. 35).
Gogarten does not value this evolution positively. The other sense of secularization is the
one which really originated in the Christian tradition. This second type of secularization,
Gogarten contends, is the logical outcome of the fact that God turned the world over to
man. Not only is this secularization compatible with Christian faith, but its very origin is
Christian. It has actually been brought about largely because of Christianity, in the sense
that Christian faith desacralized the world. This desacralization of the world results in a
transition from a mythical to a historical relationship to the world (Gogarten 1953, pp. 99117). Whereas pre-Christian man established a "mystical" relationship to the world, in
which a cosmos determined and secured human life through its spiritual powers (Shiner
1966, p. 27), Christian man was from the beginning potentially "mature", which led him
to entertain a relationship of responsibility for the world (Gogarten 1953, pp. 24-34). The
world no longer encompasses man; in the sphere of ethics, for instance, man is no longer
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
170
accountable to a given reality, but fashions the normative arrangements himself, and is
responsible for his decisions. Theologically, Gogarten grounds his contention on elements
such as Paul's phrase: "all is permitted". "No matter how minor the external occasion on
which Paul spoke the phrase 'all is permitted' it remains one of the most powerful words
ever spoken. Because it opens up a fully new relation of man to the world, the face of the
world has been fundamentally changed" (Gogarten 1953, p. 94).
However, these two types of secularization are historically linked: it is only with
the Enlightenment (1966, p. 36) that the Christian leap into history, which had been
delayed by the influence of the Hellenistic philosophy on Christian faith - with its ahistorical, metaphysical world-view217 - came to fruition. Even today, the Church does
not fully recognize the independence of man which arises logically from the gospel.
In spite of this historical connection, Gogarten contends that the two processes
must be distinguished. Although it is very important that man be free from "any limits
imposed from outside on his own conscience", this independence "must be united with an
awareness of the mystery of man in the world" (1966, p. 166). If not, if man is no longer
open to the divine mystery, the positive evaluation becomes negative, and this evolution
is called "secularism" (1966, p. 166). This distinction is very important. The process of
autonomization of man is valued positively, but only up to a point. As long as man
conceives of his independence as a responsibility for the world, while agreeing to remain
a receiver over against God, Gogarten calls this independence Selbstständigkeit, and the
process is referred to as secularization. But if man refuses any determination beyond
himself, if he wants to be unabhängig218 (1966, p. 42, n. 25), then Gogarten speaks of
secularism. This distinction, as we will see later on, will turn out to be very fruitful, in
that it will enable Christians to accept secularization without appearing to give in to the
secular world.
So far, so good. But how did these theological discussions come to affect
sociology? Surely, very few sociologists, especially in the anglo-saxon world, were
familiar with these developments. They were expressed in a very intricate language and in
an alien intellectual setting for one thing, and, with the exception of Tillich's work (which
we have not discussed because it did not contribute any radically new idea to the matter
for discussion here, but which participates in the same tendency), the whole discussion
took place in Germany, and few of these works had been translated at the beginning of
the 60s.
217
On this point, see also Cox 1965, pp. 85-89.
The difference between the two words can be rendered in English by the contrast between "autonomy"
and "independence".
218
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
171
The moment this high-level squabble broke out into the public sphere can be
traced very accurately to march 1963, when the Londoner Student Christian Movement
Press published a little book written by the bishop of Woolwich, John Robinson: Honest
to God (Edwards 1963, p. 7). This book, wrote its editor the same year, "[...] appears to
have sold more quickly than any new book of serious theology in the history of the world.
Already over 350,000 copies are in print in Britain, America and Australia, and it is also
being published in German, French, Swedish, Dutch, Danish, Italian and Japanese"
(1963, p. 7). The bishop's book found a very large echo in the press, on the radio and even
on television. Reviewers from the Birmingham Post (1963, p. 87), the Observer (1963,
p. 91), the Daily Herald, the Guardian, the Daily Mail, the Church Times, the Sunday
Times (1963, p. 127), The Times (1963, p. 98), the Sunday Telegraph (1963, p. 95), to
name just the most well-known newspapers, fiercely discussed the book. In three months,
the bishop received over one thousand letters (1963, p. 9).
But what was the book about? Readers familiar with the theologians' writings
could find nothing new in it, nor did they consider it a very good book (see for instance
Heron 1980, p. 152). In fact, it simply popularized the views aired years before by some
of the theologians whose works we have just discussed: mainly Bonhoeffer, Bultmann
and Tillich. The book contended that we must get rid of the mythological view of the
three-decker universe (Robinson 1963, p. 11), and accept instead that God is not "up
there", nor even "out there", but that he is what Tillich calls "ultimate reality"219, or "the
ground of our being" (1963, p. 29).
So why the sudden public uproar? For one thing, the book had been written by a
bishop. A good many people were scandalized by the very idea that this high personage
could express such deep doubts about his faith (Edwards 1963, p. 40). As one letter to the
bishop nicely put it: "if the parsons say everything they have taught us is wrong, how can
they be right as to what they tell us now?" (1963, p. 49). For another thing, the book had
been advertised very efficiently. One week before the appearance of the book, the author
had written a short summary in the Oberver, a London newspaper, under a somewhat
provocative headline: "Our Image of God must Go"220. Thirdly, the book appeared at a
time when the Church of England, as all other major denominations over the western
world, faced a widespread crisis of legitimacy. Finally, for most readers, who were not
familiar with the theologian's writings, what the bishop said really was new.
219
The functional definition in sociology which defines religion as a concern with "ultimate reality" can be
traced to Tillich (Isambert 1976, p. 576, n. 8).
220
However, Robinson denies having any responsibility in this: the initiative to write the summary article,
as well as the provoking title, came from the staff of the Observer (Edwards 1963, pp. 234-35).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
172
But this first book was soon to be followed by a second one, by the same editor,
just a few months later. The book, by Paul Van Buren, bore the title The Secular Meaning
of the Gospel (Van Buren 1963). A much more difficult reading, it was nevertheless
considered a kind of rejoinder to the original manifesto, and the two books are often
referred to together (see for instance Mascall 1965, p. viii).
These two books, however, do not bear directly on the secularization debate. Their
preoccupations are much more with the theological problems linked to the emergence of
modernity than with the relationship between the modern world and theology as such. In
other words, these books are very theological, and not sociological at all, even if the
recasting of theology which they advocated did have implicit consequences for a
sociological understanding of religion. Furthermore, they draw much more on Bonhoeffer
and Bultmann than on Gogarten, whose problematic, as we have seen, is the one which
bears most directly on secularization. But these books were very important in creating a
new climate, in which the meaning of Christian faith became a topic of public discussion.
It is in the new atmosphere and the environment of general interest aroused by these two
books that Harvey Cox's Secular City221, which relied much more on Gogarten, and
which we take to have had a much more direct impact on sociology222, appeared.
Harvey Cox's book was another best-seller. "Within a short time", wrote its editor,
"The Secular City had gone into multiple printings". Christian Century acclaimed it as
"Protestantism's most discussed book [in 1965]" (Callahan 1966, p. 1). Harvey Cox relies
very heavily on Gogarten and on Bonhoeffer. Like Gogarten, he evaluates secularization
very positively. Like Gogarten, he makes a distinction between secularization and
secularism (Cox 1965, pp. 16-18). His main concern is with the consequences of
modernity for Christianity. The general argument is quite simple. Two processes are,
according to Cox, closely interconnected: secularization and urbanization. By
secularization, Cox refers to "the collapse of traditional religion, [...] the loosing of the
world from religious and quasi-religious understandings of itself, [...] the breaking of all
supernatural myths and sacred symbols [...]" (1965, pp. 1-2). Urbanization, on the other
hand, is what sociologists usually call modernization, in the sense of a transition from
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft: "Urbanization means a structure of common life in which
221
Evidence that these three books were, in 1965, considered as belonging to the same movement can be
found in a number of comments; see for instance Callahan 1966, p. 23.
222
According to the Social Science Citation Index, between 1966 and 1970, Cox's book got three citations
in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, one citation in Sociological Analysis, 5 citations in Social
Compass, and 4 citations in the Review of Religious Research. In the same period, Robinson's book got only
three citations in Social Compass, and none in the other journals, while Van Buren's got no citations in any
of these journals.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
173
the diversity and the disintegration of tradition are paramount. It means an impersonality
in which functional relationships multiply. It means that a degree of tolerance and
anonymity replace traditional moral sanctions and long-term acquaintanceships. The
urban center is the place of human control, of rational planning, of bureaucratic
organization - and the urban center is not just in Washington, London, New York, and
Peking. It is everywhere" (1965, p. 4).
Thus, not only does Cox borrow from Gogarten and Bonhoeffer, he also borrows
from sociology. Indeed, many of the categories he uses are nothing but a re-naming of
commonly used sociological concepts. In Cox's vocabulary, modernization is translated
into urbanization, social structure into the shape of the secular city, and culture into its
style (1965, p. 5). Indeed, Cox appears to be very much at home in sociology: In a very
sharp discussion with Andrew Greeley (himself a sociologist) which followed the
publication of his book, he quite rightly chastized Greeley for his simplistic account of
some theoretical developments in sociology223 (in Callahan 1966, pp. 113-20). Cox thus
brings together two very different intellectual traditions, and blends them into a single
analysis. In this way, the process of secularization which has been described and analyzed
by sociologists is interpreted, and valued positively, through Bonhoeffer's conception of
"man's coming of age". In Cox's analysis, secularization and urbanization always go hand
in hand, and the very irresistibility of this evolution is interpreted as constituting the
logical outcome of Christianity.
But one further aspect of Cox's approach must be stressed here. Cox, taking up
Gogarten's notion that secularization is the logical outcome of Christian faith, develops it
in a much more sociological fashion: "There are three pivotal elements in biblical faith
which have each given rise to one aspect of secularization. Thus, the disenchantment of
nature begins with the Creation, the desacralization of politics with the Exodus, and the
deconsecration of values with the Sinai Covenant" (Cox 1965, p. 15). These are not
theological statements. Although the labels given by Cox to these processes are biblical,
he does not interpret them theologically - unlike Gogarten, whose interpretation of Paul's
"all is permitted" is theological - but sociologically, as can be seen for instance in the way
he explains the importance he attaches to the Exodus: "There had no doubt been similar
escapes before, but the Exodus of the Hebrews [...] became the central event around
which the Hebrews organized their whole perception of reality" (1965, p. 22).
223
I will come back on this very interesting debate in chapter 13.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
174
The disenchantment of nature224 is rooted in the Creation because at this moment,
nature was separated from God - the sun and moon became creations of God - and man
from nature - the kinship system of the Hebrews is historical, not cosmological (1965,
p. 20). The desacralization of politics is linked to the Exodus because is was "an act of
insurrection against a duly constituted monarch, a pharao whose relationship to the
sun/god Re constituted his claim to political sovereignty" (1965, p. 22). Finally, the
deconsecration of values is related to the Sinai Covenant in that the commandment
against idolatry designates the gods as human projections, thereby relativizing all the
values, much like the social sciences do today (1965, p. 28).
Finally, many of the elements which will become important in the CISR paradigm
are set forth by Cox. Thus, we can read that religion has been "privatized" (1965, p. 2),
that a very important step in the process which led to secularization is the emergence of
"a group of self-conscious religious specialists" (1965, p. 8), and that one important
element of this evolution is "rationalization"225 (1965, p. 11).
The Role of the Theological Debate in the Emergence of the Paradigm
As noted in the first part of this chapter, in the early 1960s, the situation had come
to a point where sociologists were living in an intellectual environment where all the
elements of the paradigm were available, ready to be put into a theoretical framework.
Retrospectively, it even seems as though these elements were begging for a theoretical
framework: attempts in this direction - such as those by Acquaviva (1961), Birnbaum,
and O'Dea - were increasingly common.
In this situation, the theological debate acted as a catalyst. First, it made
secularization a popular issue. Second, it allowed for a more positive evaluation of the
secularization process. And third, it offered a vision: the promise of an all-encompassing
theory that would allow to organize a number of separate concerns into a unified
framework. The new generation of scholars who had taken over form the ageing Catholic
sociologists in America, and which was still fighting for supremacy in Europe, could only
welcome a unifying theory giving greater consistency to the study of one of the most
important problems in the sociology of religion. In this context, the significance of
Dobbelaere and Lauwers' exclamation at the 1969 CISR is clear: "The sociologist should
not ask himself what relevance church and religion have for the individual. He must
224
At this point, Cox refers to Weber, but only in a general fashion, although he refers to Ancient Judaism
on p. 51, n. 5).
225
Reference is made to Weber's Protestant Ethic.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
175
question their social relevance. In this sense, problems concerning the sociology of
religion now have shifted from participation to secularization" (Dobbelare and Lauwers,
CISR 1969, p. 123).
Curiously, the same applies to the Catholic world. The positive evaluation
contained in the theology of secularization could only be welcomed by by Catholic
sociologists. As a matter of fact, there was a convergence between the point of view
advocated by sociologists working in the functional framework (i.e., religion has become
differentiated and specialized, not eliminated) and the theological point of view (religion
has been purified). In the eyes of the Catholic sociologists, the functional view - which
undergirds so much of the CISR paradigm - was much less reductionistic than other
approaches. According to Goddijn226, the merits of functionalism are that it does not
considers religion to be a dependent, but an independent variable (1958-59, p. 27). The
new approach put forward by Parsons found a very positive echo among Catholic
sociologists. Jean Labbens227, in a paper significantly entitled "Déchristianisation ou
sécularisation?", stated: "What we notice is a change in the social structure which,
underneath appearances, has affected the structure of the Church. It is a 'laicization', a
'secularization', not a 'dechristianization'. The distinction is important, for the difference
between a sacred and a secular society is mainly a difference of structures" (Labbens
1964, p. 495).
In this saturated climate, a spark was sufficient to start the intellectual revolution.
It is my contention that this spark was provided by Cox's Secular City (1965). What
evidence do we have to support the assertion that the debate was transmitted from the
theological to the sociological field?
Some sociologists have always been aware that the sociological debate had a
theological origin. Thus for example, Roland Robertson states that "the sociological
discussion about secularization is simply a response to a culmination and popularization
in the 1960s of a long-drawn out debate within the confines of theological circles" (1971,
p. 308). But how exactly was this theological controversy transmitted to the sociological
field? After all, sociologists tend to be rather wary of the theological viewpoint. The
sociologists I interviewed virtually unanimously discarded Cox's book - and sometimes,
theologian's writings in general - as irrelevant. And even those who were very open to the
theological viewpoint took pains to underscore that Cox was not a very serious nor
consistent thinker. In France, secularization never became an important issue precisely
226
227
A Franciscan.
President of the CISR from and professor at the Catholic Faculties in Lyon.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
176
because sociologist refused to engage into a debate they perceived as largely theological:
"[Secularization theories] were badly camouflaged theological rafts" (Jean Séguy,
interview). Some English-speaking sociologists228 had the same reaction. How, then, did
sociology nevertheless come to explicitly formulate the secularization paradigm in
reaction to a theological debate?
The transition between theology and sociology was made possible by a number of
men who had both a theological and a sociological training or practice. Peter Berger was
trained as a theologian; he discussed secular theology and referred to the Secular City in
the last chapter of his Sacred Canopy (Berger 1967). Before writing this book, he had
written exclusively theological papers devoted to Bultmann (Berger 1955) and to
Bonhoeffer (Berger 1959). Indeed, the first use of the word secularization by Berger
appeared in his analysis on Bonhoeffer (Berger 1955, p. 24; 1959, p. 450). But Berger
was not alone in this situation. As early as 1951, Roger Mehl, a Protestant theologian as
well as the founder and director of the Centre de sociologie du protestantisme
(Strasbourg), presented an analysis of secularization in which moral and metaphysical
preoccupations of theological origin were interwoven with a sociological analysis very
close to the later CISR paradigm (Mehl 1951). Fiftenn years later, Mehl wrote a paper on
the consequences of the social process of secularization for Christian faith. This
discussion, which drew on Bultmann and Bonhoeffer, led him to the conclusion that
secularization did not necessarily entail atheism, and that it opened a new freedom to
theological thought and to faith (Mehl 1966, p. 77). Mehl's successor as head of the
Strasbourg research center, Jean-Paul Willaime, discovered secularization theory through
the works of theologians229. Larry Shiner, who was trained as a theologian230 and had
written extensively on Gogarten (Shiner 1966) and on secular theology (Shiner 1965),
produced the first sociological definitional paper on secularization231 (Shiner 1967).
Martin Marty, one of the editors of Christian Century as well as a writer influential in
sociology of religion, produced numerous books in which the sociological and the
theological dimensions are tightly intertwined (see for instance Marty 1964).
The direct influence of the theological debate on sociologists who became
discussants of secularization can be traced accurately in some cases. Thus for example,
Andrew Greeley directly exchanged views with Harvey Cox in The Secular City Debate
228
For instance James Beckford (Interview).
Interview.
230
Interview with Roland Campiche.
231
This paper was presented at the 1966 SSSR meeting (In this context, the role played by an organization
like the SSSR, in which all the persons interested by the study of religion can meet - whether they be
sociologist, historians of religion or theologians - deserves to be be stressed).
229
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
177
(Callahan 1966, pp. 101-26). Robertson cited Cox in his Sociologists and Secularization
(Robertson 1971, p. 306). In their reader on secularization, Acquaviva and Guizzardi
presented texts by theologians, among whom we find Cox (Acquaviva and Guizzardi
1973, pp. 201-92). Daniel Bell - who entered the secularization "debate" in the early 70s
(see chap. 13) - discussed secular theology (Bell 1971). In his book on secularization
theory, Elio Roggero also discussed secular theology (Roggero 1979, pp. 57-58). Robert
Bellah himself declared having been deeply influenced by Tillich (Bellah 1970, p. xv).
Moreover, Harvey Cox himself published an article in Social Compass232 (Cox 1968),
and Callahan's Secular City Debate was reviewed in 1968 in the Review of Religious
Research. Finally, at least one of the carriers of the CISR paradigm, Richard Fenn - who
was trained as a theologian - was very directly influenced by secular theology. The
parallel he himself sees between secular theology and sociological secularization theory
again illustrates their elective affinity: "When I left seminary, I read two authors both of
whom made a terrific impact on me. One was Bultmann, and the other was Bonhoeffer
[...]. And I really decided that Bonhoeffer was right. You have to live in this world as
though God were dead. God is being pushed to the margins. And this translates into
sociological propositions about the peripheral nature of religious movements and
organizations"233.
Finally, the role played by editors in the breaking up of the sociological
controversy must be brought to light. In my interviews, I discovered that Bryan Wilson's
Religion in Secular Society (1966) corresponded to a request by Watts (publisher of the
Rationalist Press Association)234. Thomas Luckmann's paper in the Kölner Zeitschrift
(1960) was requested by an editor of this journal235; his 1963 book in German was written
upon the suggestion of one of Luckmann's mentors, who was also an editor236. Cox's
Secular City originated as a series of conferences for the National Student Christian
Federation (Cox 1965, p. xi). In other words, the first secularization theories were
produced as a response to a demand coming from editors, who were aware of the fact
that, thanks to the ongoing theological debate, religion had become a fashionable matter
for discussion among a wider public. Thus, some of the most important contributions in
232
Although this paper was only indirectly related to secularization, it constituted an elaboration on the
main theme of the Secular City.
233
Richard Fenn, interview.
234
Interview with Bryan Wilson. On the Rationalist Press Association, see Chap. 7.
235
Probably René König (Interview with Thomas Luckmann).
236
Arnold Bergstraesser, editor of the sociological collection of Rombach, in Freiburg (Interview with
Thomas Luckmann).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
178
this field appear to be almost accidental237, and are less a result of an immanent
development of sociology than of an external solicitation.
Sociologists reacted quickly to the stimulation coming from the theological
debate: in September 1966, at the 6th World Congress of Sociology, the Committee on
the Sociology of Religion (which, as we have seen in chapter 10, had been formed at the
1959 conference) devoted its first session to the problem of "religion and social change".
Secularization was mentioned explicitly in at least three of the seven papers read at this
meeting. In his account of this session, Jean Séguy (not a proponent of secularization
theory by any means) tells us that the discussion turned mainly around the question of
"sacralisation, dessacralisation, sécularisation" (Séguy 1967, p. 302). Peter Berger, who
was probably writing the Sacred Canopy by that time, was himself present at that
conference.
The links between the theological and the sociological debate are thus quite clear.
Although all the exemplars had been set forth quite unambiguously for a number of years,
it is the theological debate that allowed these elements to be shaped into a vigorous and
successful new paradigm. To the study of this paradigm, we can now turn.
237
Thus, Thomas Luckmann embarked in his first research in the sociology of religion - a discipline in
which he was not particularly interested from a professional point of view - because he needed a job. As his
friend Peter Berger was drafted in the army, he took over his job (Interview with Thomas Luckmann).
Bryan Wilson also describes his first involvement in the sociology of religion as rather accidental (Interview
with Bryan Wilson).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
179
CHAPTER 12
THE CISR PARADIGM
This chapter will be devoted to a detailed presentation of the CISR paradigm, as it
can be found in the writings of Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Bryan Wilson, David
Martin, Richard Fenn, Karel Dobbelaere, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Bellah. These eight
writers are those we identified in chapter 3 as the carriers - active or passive - of the CISR
paradigm. As the most systematic and complete exposition of the paradigm can be found
in the works of Berger and of Wilson, we will devote more time to their writings than to
most others.
Two modes of presentation of the paradigm will be interwoven in the following
pages: a historical, and a systematical-theoretical account. The basic structure will be
dictated by the chronological order. The two most important early systematic statements
of secularization theory are found in Wilson's Religion in Secular Society (1966) and in
Berger's Sacred Canopy (1967). Berger's theory will be presented first, because it was
developed gradually from the early 60s, whereas Wilson's 1966 statement on
secularization was his very first238. These early statements - which must also include
Luckmann's Invisible Religion (1963 in German, 1967 in English) - represent the
paradigm in its nascent state, before any scholarly community vindicated it. The 1971
intellectual revolution in the CISR (see chap. 10) marks the beginning of the mature
period, in which the paradigm was vindicated much more explicitly, as is evident from
the title of certain books: Toward a Theory of Secularization (Fenn 1978); A General
Theory of Secularization (Martin 1978). These developments culminated in Dobbelaere's
trend report, Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept (1981). It is only at this late
stage that the views of Parsons and Bellah, the two authors we will analyze last, were
firmly integrated into the paradigm.
Although the general structure of the chapter will be determined by this historical
pattern, the systematic aspect of the paradigm will not be neglected. In order to allow the
structure of the paradigm to appear clearly, the exemplars will be marked off graphically
from the rest of the text. This, however, will be done without interrupting the logic of the
presentation, which will be based on the intrinsic logic of each theory. In effect, another
of my aims will be to offer as coherent as possible a picture of the theory developed by
each author. As the thought of most secularization theorists has evolved over time, this
238
With the exception of a short paper entitled "God in Retirement", published in Nineteenth Century and
After (Bryan Wilson, personal communication).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
180
poses some problems. In the following presentation, I will generally rely on what seems
to me to be the most systematic account given, at any time, by a theorist. Thus for
instance, Berger's most systematic and coherent account is found in an early piece of
writing (Berger 1967), whereas Martin's most systematic view is only to be found in a
later book (Martin 1978). Another problem is that, whereas some theories are presented
in a rather systematic and concise form, others are notoriously unsystematic. Wilson's
theory, most notably, is scattered in a number of different writings in which the
secularization problem is, every time, enmeshed in the particular problematic he happens
to address.
For the sake of clarity and concision, I have, in some cases, had to "reconstruct"
the theories - without, hopefully, my falling prey to criticisms of "presentism"239. All the
theories have thus been spread out, as it were, on a common diachronic scheme. After all,
even though some authors try to avoid giving this impression, secularization theory
always implies a fairly simple linear model. There has to be, first, what I have chosen to
call an initial situation* as regards the position of religion in society. The original event
which causes this initial situation to come to an end is designated as a rupture*. This
rupture* then unfolds in a process* of transformation - which can be unilinear or
dialectical, immanent to the logic of history or accidental. Finally, this process* results in
a given present situation*, which may - or may not - be considered definitive and
irreversible. It must be stressed that this general framework - initial situation*, rupture*,
process*, present situation* - must not be construed as the analysis of a historical process.
Most secularization theories are more systematical-deductive than historical, and the
present account is much too sketchy to present any historical accuracy anyway. The
framework I propose is noting more than the systematic spreading out of these theories
on a common diachronical dimension.
The CISR paradigm having thus been presented, we will discuss more briefly in
the next chapter some of the marginal or more recent contributions made by other
theorists in - or "against" - this framework. The emphasis will be on an assessment of the
degree of novelty of these different contributions. In other words, we will assess claims of
originality made by different authors, thus trying to determine to what extent they have
been able to transcend the paradigm.
239
My reconstruction is always limited to technical adaptations allowing me to save space and to present the
theories in a way that allows comparison between them. I am confident that, in doing this, I am not
betraying the authors' intentions. An earlier such reconstruction (which, however, did not include the
exemplar framework) was presented to Wilson, Luckmann, and Fenn. None of them objected to my reading
of their theory.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
181
Finally, I would like to make a technical remark. In the two following chapters, all
the statements regarding the theories presented must be attributed to the authors of these
theories, except in the cases where I clearly intervene myself in the text (i.e., "this author
does not define religion, but the way he uses this term clearly indicates that..."). And, as
in the remainder of this study, whenever I use one of my own analytical categories - be it
one of the exemplars or one of the diachronic categories outlined above - when this
category is not used by the author, it will be followed by an asterisk (i.e., initial
situation*).
We can now turn to a presentation of the different theories. We will start with the
earliest of them, that of Luckmann. However, as Luckmann and Berger collaborated very
intensely in the very years during which they produced their respective theories, an
assessment of their common contribution, mainly to the sociology of knowledge, is in
order first.
The genesis of Berger and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge
Berger and Luckmann met each other in Manhattan, at the New School for Social
Research. Both of them had recently immigrated from Europe. Peter L. Berger, born in
Austria in 1929, arrived in New York shortly after the end of World War II, at the age of
seventeen. He received his M.A. in 1950 from the New School for Social Research, and
his Ph.D. in 1954, from the same school. He also spent one year at the Lutheran
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, but eventually decided to abandon studies for the
ministry240. In his first paper241 (Berger 1954), published in the journal of the New School
for Social Research, he proposed a new approach to the sect-church typology - a classical
problem, if there ever was one, in the sociology of religion. In this early paper, he already
complained that "the study of sectarianism has been characterized, like so much else in
the scientific study of religion, by a mass of empirical data with little or no theoretical
orientation" (1954, p. 467). The new definition of the sect and of the church he proposed
was inspired by Carl Mayer, his teacher at the New School, and was consonant with
Weber's idea of "routinization". It was based on the idea of the degree of worldliness* of
a religious organization: "The social groupings that are religiously based can be
understood as forming themselves around the location of the sacred. The area near the
240
Current Biography 1983, p. 28.
A complete bibliography of Berger's works can be found in Making Sense of Modern Times: Peter L.
Berger and the Vision of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by James D. Hunter and Stephen C. Ainlay.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.
241
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
182
sacred is that which is specifically religious; outside lies the world, in the religious sense
of the word. [...] Imagine a figure of concentric circles, the innermost designating the
location of the spirit; the next circle is that of the sect, the next is the circle of the church,
and beyond that is the world" (1954, p. 475). One year later, Berger published a paper
analyzing the works of Bultmann, Gogarten, Bonhoeffer, and Barth. Their theology,
Berger argued, reflected the fact that, in the modern world, Protestantism had "its back to
the wall". It is in this context that the word "secularization" appeared for the first time in
Berger's writings, in the presentation of Bonhoeffer's theory: "The Christian must cease to
deplore the secularization of western civilization, which only means that modern man has
come of age" (1955, p. 24). As noted above, (see chap. 11), Berger's interest in theology
confirms the existence of the links between the theological and the sociological debates
on secularization.
Thomas Luckmann was born in Yugoslavia, near the Austrian border, in 1927. He
studied in Vienna from 1945 to 1948, then left for the United States. He received his
M.A. from the New School for Social Research in 1953, and his Ph.D. from the same
institution in 1956 - two years after Berger242. Carl Mayer, Berger's teacher, had a very
important research project on the development of religion in post-war Germany. As
Berger was drafted into the army, he was unable to take this position, and Luckmann was
offered the job. Luckmann explains: "I was not interested in religion; I was not interested
in Germany, which I did not know. But I was interested in having a job" (in Ferreux 1988,
p. 41). The fact that he carried out his first empirical research on the subject of religion
was thus rather accidental. This study provided him with material for his dissertation. On
the basis of this dissertation, he then published his two first papers on religion in
Germany in 1957 and 1959243. In 1960, the editor of the Kölner Zeitschritf244 asked
Luckmann to review the recent literature on sociology of religion. Luckmann took this
opportunity to criticize the naively empirical character of these studies. In his conclusion,
he announced the theme of his Invisible Religion: "The question with which sociology of
religion will increasingly have to concern itself will not be the - historically central problematic of 'secularization' [...] and its structural preconditions, which led to the
preemption of certain relations of meaning, to the loss of reality of whole layers of
symbolic reality and to the privatization of traditional churchliness. The central
sociological question will have to be, What are the relations of meaning of the symbolic
242
Contemporary Authors, New Revision Series, Vol. 19, p. 306.
Schriftenverzeichnis, roneotyped document provided by Thomas Luckmann.
244
Probably René König (Interview with Thomas Luckmann).
243
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
183
reality which obtains now, or will obtain, How is the internal structure of its thematic
created, and In what sense does it continue a Christian thematic"245.
The year he published this article, Luckmann became assistant professor at the
New School. In the meantime, Berger had become associate professor at the Hartford
Seminary Foundation (Connecticut). In 1961, he published his first book: The Noise of
Solemn Assemblies - an essay in which he reflected on his own, and on many of his
coreligionists' malaise. It was a rather anticlerical analysis the religious establishment,
which was denounced by Berger as not living up to true Christian commitment. Here
again, we find evidence of the links between the sociological debate and the
preoccupations of the churches.
Some of the elements of Berger's later secularization theory are adumbrated in this
work. First, Berger stresses the importance of the industrial revolution: "The most
important fact in the world today is not some particular ideological alignment but the
transforming power of the industrial revolution" (Berger 1961a, p. 18). Second, he
introduces the idea of secularization, mainly with reference to Herberg (see chap. 10).
Reflecting on Herberg's paradox (how can a religious establishment exist in the midst of a
highly secular society? [Berger 1961, p. 34]), he offers a solution of his own - which is
not, in its essence, different from Herberg's: "The paradox resolves itself in a simple
proposition: The social irrelevance of the religious establishment is its functionality. If
organized religion in this society were highly relevant to the major social institutions, it
would not be functional in the way it now is. It is functional precisely to the degree in
which it is passive rather than active, acted upon rather than acting" (1961, p. 103). Also
contained in this book is a rather caricatural prefiguration of the idea of privatization*:
"When our typical church member leaves suburbia in the morning, he leaves behind him
the person that played with the children, mowed the lawn, chatted with the neighbors and went to church. His actions now become dominated by a radically different logic - the
logic of business, industry, politics, or whatever other sector of public life the individual
is related to. In this second life of his the church is totally absent. What the church has
said to him might conceivably have bearing on his private life. But it is quite irrelevant to
his involvement in public life" (1961, p. 37). Finally, again following Herberg, Berger
245
"Die Frage, die die Religionssoziologie immer mehr wird beschäftigen müssen, ist also nicht die historisch zentrale - Problematik der "Säkulkarisierung" [...] und ihrer strukturellen Voraussetzungen, die
zur Entleerung bestimmter Sinnzusammenhänge, zum Wirklichkeitsverlust ganzer symbolischer
Realitätsschichten und zur Privatisierung der traditionellen Kirchlichkeit führen. Die soziologisch zentral
Frage wird vielmehr sein müssen, was denn der Sinnzusammenhang der jetzt gültigen oder gültig
werdenden symbolischen Realität sei, wie die innere Struktur ihrer Thematik beschaffen sei und inwiefern
sie eine Christiliche Thematik weiterführt" (Luckmann 1960, p. 326).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
184
presents American religion as radically worldly: "Perhaps the most striking characteristic
of [Herberg's] 'common faith' is its intense this-worldliness. [...] Today, the supernatural
has receded into a remote hinterland of consciousness [...]. Indeed, if religion were to be
identified with some sort of preoccupation with the supernatural, then what is said and
done in most of our churches can hardly be given that name at all" (1961, p. 42).
In retrospect, and although it created quite a stir, it appears that Berger's book did
not contain any original insights. It was mainly a synthesis of common sociological
knowledge on religion in America. The upshot of this synthesis was that religion
subserved too many useful functions - psychological as well as social - to be truly
consonant with Christian faith. Religion, in short, represented the "O.K. world": "In this
social-psychological constellation, religion becomes an essential element of what we
might call the 'O.K. world'. The religious institution becomes to the individual a
guarantee that the world is as it should be" (1961, p. 93).
In 1963, Berger published a paper in which he developed a precise account of the
market analysis of ecumenicity he was to present in his Sacred Canopy. As this analysis
will be presented in detail later on, we will not discuss it here.
With this general background on Berger and on Luckmann's early works and
biographies in mind, we can now turn to an assessment of their common contribution to
the sociology of knowledge and to the sociology of religion. As noted above (see chap.
10), this contribution acted as a very efficient stimulus for the new generation of scholars,
notably within the CISR. Berger and Luckmann have written three papers (1963, 1964,
1966b) and one book (1966a) together. The first paper must be understood as a stepping
stone in the construction of the book, which was projected as early as 1962246. It consists
in a remarkably programmatic statement on the relation between the sociology of religion
and the sociology of knowledge. The article starts on the note set by Luckmann's 1960
paper. First, the authors point to the enormous effort of data-gathering by European
Catholic sociologists. They deplore the "narrowly sociographic" orientation of this type of
research and the "enormous discrepancy between this latter-day sociology of religion and
the place that religion occupied in classical sociological theory" (Berger and Luckmann
1963, p. 419). They then relate this situation to the subordinate place of the sociology of
religion in contemporary sociology, and suggest that, if this discipline is ever to regain its
position, practitioners must break with the "ecclesiastically oriented definition of
religion", and build instead an approach based on a sound sociological theory (1963,
246
"The project of which this book is the realization was first concocted in the summer of 1962, in the
course of some leisurely conversations at the foot of and (occasionally) on top of the Alps of western
Austria. The first plan of the book was drawn up early in 1963" (Berger and Luckmann 1966a, p. 8).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
185
p. 420). Religion, they argue, must be considered a universal tool for the building and
maintenance of universes of meaning - and these universes, obviously, can best be
analyzed by a sociology of knowledge broadened to encompass, not only highly
intellectual schemes, but also the type of knowledge used in daily life.
Berger and Luckmann's 1963 proposal really makes sense only if it is seen against
a historical background, which the authors take for granted: secularization. "If it is correct
to speak of contemporary society as increasingly secularized (and we think that this is
correct), one is thereby saying that the sociologically crucial legitimations [without which
no society can exist] are to be found outside the area of institutionally specialized
religion" (1963, p. 423). In other words, to the extent that secularization as a decline of
institutional religion - as described by Catholic sociologists - is regarded by Berger and
Luckmann as evident, they are led to the conclusion that the study of religion, if it wants
to regain importance, must transcend the study of this declining institution to study other
manifestations of religion. Precisely because secularization has happened, the sociology
of religion must be redefined in a broader sociology of knowledge perspective. The
parallels of this type of reasoning with that employed in secular theology (see chap. 11)
are evident: In both cases, as a result of secularization, religion is no longer to be sought
where our fathers sought for it - which, however, does not mean that we can no longer
find it.
The next two papers are less important for our purposes. The second (Berger and
Luckmann 1964) presents more of an offshoot of Luckmann's first book, published the
previous year. The authors establish a connection between the looseness of the social
structure of modern societies and the problems of personal identity encountered by the
individuals. In this context - and as an example of the application of the broader approach
they advocate - social mobility is considered a "secularized version of a key feature of the
Protestant ethic" (1964, p. 339). The third paper (Berger and Luckmann 1966b) seems to
be much more influenced by Berger. It contains a brief, but precise, sketch of the analysis
of pluralism developed one year later in the Sacred Canopy. It also contains the first
definition, and application, of the notion of secularization: "The global historical force
producing pluralism is [...] secularization, by which we mean the progressive
autonomization of societal sectors from the domination of religious meanings and
institutions" (1966b, p. 74). This cooperative work finally led to The Social Construction
of Reality (1966), which is too well-known a work to need presentation247.
247
As a matter of fact, although all the theoretical foundations relating to secularization theory derived from
this work will be briefly presented, the following presentation is based on the assumption that the reader is
familiar with this book.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
186
Thomas Luckmann's theory
We must now examine the separate contributions of Berger and of Luckmann to
the debate on secularization. For all their agreements on many general propositions
concerning the study of religion, their views on secularization differed sufficiently to lead
them to apparently contradictory assessments. As will become evident, their disagreement
in fact boils down to differing definitions of religion.
As the German version248 of the Invisible Religion was published as early as 1963,
we will turn to Luckmann's theory first. In this theory, we find explicitly formulated most
of the exemplars of the paradigm. Some of them - like rationalization*, pluralism,
religious roots*, or collapse of the world view* - are presented cursorily. But four of them
- differentiation, privatization, generalization*, and worldliness* - are presented in
sufficient detail to allow us to analyze them. But before turning to this task, we must
outline the general outlines of the theory.
As Luckmann almost entirely dropped his interest in religion after writing the
Invisible Religion, his thought on this subject-matter did not evolve for many years,
although on two occasions, he slightly rephrased his model on the occasion of
conferences (Luckmann 1971; 1979). But in 1987, at the XIXth CISR, which was entirely
devoted to secularization, he introduced a new dimension. This new element constituted a
new way of presenting one of the exemplars of the CISR paradigm: worldliness*. In the
following pages, we will rely almost exclusively on the Invisible Religion for the
presentation of the first three exemplars, but for the presentation of worldliness*, we will
have to rely on the most recent papers (Luckmann 1987; 1988; 1990).
The Invisible Religion (1967) originated from Luckmann's frustration with the
sociology of church-oriented religion - as practiced by Catholic sociologists (see chap.
10), or as he had practiced it himself (Luckmann 1967, p. 7). Luckmann had no quarrels
with most empirical results of these studies. Indeed, the second chapter of the Invisible
Religion is devoted to a summary of these findings. Briefly stated: Institutional religion
has been pushed to the margins of modern society. In Europe, the persons who have most
retained their religiosity are the very persons who are least relevant to the intrinsic
248
The English version is not a simple translation; it was entirely rewritten by Luckmann himself (Interview
with Thomas Luckmann). It contains two additional chapters: "The Anthropological Condition of Religion"
(III) and "Modern Religious Themes" (VII). But this reorganization does not substantially modify the intent
of the first version, at least with regard to the secularization process. I will therefore rely mainly on the later
version.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
187
dynamic of modern society: the young and the old, the non-working women, and the
inhabitants of rural areas (1967, pp. 29-30). In the United States, religious involvement is
higher, but this is obtained at the cost of an "internal secularization" (1967, p. 37).
For all their usefulness, the great mistake of these studies, Luckmann contends,
lies in the equivalence put forward between church and religion. Instead of accepting the
way in which the social actors define religion, we must start from a sociological - and
functional249 - definition (1967, p. 42). The central idea underlying Luckmann's definition
is that "the transcendence by the organism of its biological nature" constitutes the
universal anthropological condition of religion. What does this mean?
Human beings can be considered from two points of view: as organisms
(instinctual beings, incapable of detaching themselves from immediate experience), or as
selves (beings capable of creating meaning in interaction with other human selves). By
becoming selves, human organisms transcend their biological nature. And the
transcendence of biological nature is made possible through interaction with other
organisms. Admittedly, this account is fictional: In reality, human organisms do not
construct systems of meaning from scratch through interaction; the system of meaning
pre-exists any individual, which then gets socialized into it (1967, p. 51). But whether this
transcendence of biological nature is accomplished through interaction or through
socialization, Luckmann contends that this process is intrinsically religious: "It is in
keeping with an elementary sense of the concept of religion to call the transcendence of
biological nature by the human individual a religious phenomenon" (1967, p. 49). The
"general anthropological function of religion", then, is to "mold natural organisms into
persons", to "socializ[e] human beings into historical social orders" (Luckmann 1987,
p. 23).
Luckmann's position in the paradigm is paradoxical, for he does not consider
himself a secularization theorist. In the Invisible Religion, he referred to the "so-called
process of secularization" (Luckmann 1967, p. 37). Later on, he explicitly denounced
secularization theory as a "modern myth" (Luckmann [1969] 1980, pp. 161-172; 1977,
pp. 17-21). Luckmann must therefore be considered a passive carrier of the paradigm.
However, whenever secularization is used in a sufficiently restricted sense - as "the
process which led to the increasing autonomy of different segments of the social
structure, to the autonomy over against norms which had been derived from the religious
cosmos" (Luckmann [1969] 1980, p. 168), Luckmann raises no objections250.
249
As will become clear later on, Luckmann understands this term in a somewhat particular sense.
But, Luckmann's argument goes on, in this restricted sense (which is precisely the one put forward in the
CISR paradigm) the concept would lose much of its mythological power.
250
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
188
Luckmann's position in the paradigm stems from his functional definition of
religion: Luckmann was never, from the start, interested in the fate of institutional
religion. All he was interested to show was that, if properly understood and defined,
religion could be considered to be intrinsically tied to man's humanity. In other words,
Luckmann agrees that secularization has happened, but contends that this does not imply
what is commonly taken for granted in the mythological accounts of secularization: "One
may conceive of a society whose social structures perform no religious function - we live
in the midst of such a type of 'secularized' society - although the fact that the social
structure is 'religion-less' does not mean that a society is without religion" (Luckmann
1987, pp. 29-30).
Thus, the Invisible Religion can be read as containing two separate arguments.
The first - which Luckmann finds not very interesting - is the whole account of the
marginalization of institutional religion (Luckmann 1967, pp. 37-40). The second - which
is the one Luckmann is personally concerned with - is the re-definition of religion in
functional terms and the demonstration that religion, understood in this sense, is still very
present in modern society. In the German edition, Luckmann explained: "While in the
framework of the sociology of church-oriented religion, the process of secularization can
be considered from the point of view of the diminishing churchliness, the general
sociological attention must be directed to the 'positive' product of secularization, that is,
to the symbolical relations of meaning that arise from it" (1963, p. 31). In other words,
from the point of view of a believer, secularization can be seen as having two aspects: one
negative, and one positive. As a matter of fact, this tension is inbuilt in the CISR
paradigm. On the one hand, religion has been privatized; on the other hand, it has become
generalized. Luckmann's approach very clearly articulates these two aspects.
Luckmann's account of secularization is based on the idea that the anthropological
pre-condition of religion - the transcendence of biological nature - concretizes itself in a
number of succeeding historical forms: 1) the elementary non-specific form (or world
view); 2) the historical specific form (found in simple societies); 3) the institutionally
specialized form (best represented by Christianity); 4) the institutionally non-specialized
form (or "invisible religion"). The evolution leading through these different forms can be
understood with reference to one of the central exemplars in the paradigm: differentiation.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
189
Differentiation251
Catholic sociologists tended to explain "dechristianization" by isolated factors,
such as urbanization, or industrialization. Luckmann reacts against this view by
subordinating these factors to the more global process of differentiation252 (Luckmann
indifferently uses the phrases "social differentiation", "institutional differentiation",
"institutional specialization", and "institutional segmentation"). "In identifying the
causes of secularization it does not suffice to refer to industrialization and
urbanization as though these processes would automatically and necessarily
undermine the value of traditional church religion. [...] The relation between
industrialization and secularization is indirect. [...] Industrialization and urbanization
were processes that reinforced the tendency of institutional specialization.
Institutional specialization, in turn, tended to 'free' the norms of the various
institutional areas from the influence of the originally superordinated 'religious'
values" (1967, pp. 38-39). In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be
stressed right away that Luckmann's theory of differentiation must not be read as a
law of social evolution: "The differentiation of the social structure into institutionally
specialized domains is not to be taken as the result of unilinear evolution. It is the
product of one line of historical development which, for various reasons, took on a
fateful universal significance" (Luckmann 1979, p. 128).
The initial situation* before secularization is the elementary non-specific form
of religion. In this elementary state, religion is nothing but a totally undifferentiated
world view, or configuration of meaning underlying a particular historical social order
(Luckmann 1967, p. 51). This, however, is a hypothetical theoretical construction
(1967, p. 78). In reality, in all historically known societies, religion is found in its
historic specific form, which means that within the world view, a domain of meaning,
which is specifically religious, has become differentiated (1967, p. 56). Thus, the
rupture* causing the secularization process to unfold is situated by Luckmann so far
back in time that it lies outside history.
The historic specific form of religion is found in "simple" societies (1967,
p. 61). In this form, the world view is organized in different superordinated layers of
251
For the sake of clarity, the exemplars will be separated graphically from the rest of the text by an italic
title on the right margin and by a line on the left margin.
252
In giving his account of differentiation, Luckmann's intention was to distinguish himself from traditional
formulations of this theory, as they had been expressed in functionalism (1967, p. 23). The whole point of
my approach, however, is precisely to show that an exemplar can be "transferred" from one theoretical
context to another, and can be used in a way contrary to some of the author's intentions.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
190
meaning, of which the lowest refer to non-problematical, every-day representations
(dog, tree), whereas the highest refer to "a domain of reality that is set apart from the
world of everyday life" (1967, p. 61). This higher level contains in itself a
representation of the structure of the world-view (as being made of superordinated
layers of meaning): "Thus a 'structural' trait of the world view becomes a part of its
'contents'" (1967, p. 58). In other words, the world view now contains different levels
of signification, the highest of which reflects the hierarchical organization of the
world view as a whole. But in this form, there is not, as yet, any social differentiation
of the religious world-view: Religion homogeneously permeates the whole social
structure253 (1967, p. 61). One of the consequences of this is that one cannot, in
simple societies, speak either of belief or of unbelief; the sacred cosmos is
internalized as a matter of course: "There is no such thing as selective internalization or refusal of internalization - of the sacred cosmos" (Luckmann 1971, p. 25).
The next step in the process* is marked by the appearance of the
institutionally specialized form of religion, which is determined by the advent of the
religious specialists. This social specialization is itself a response to the internal
differentiation of the world view: "The more pronounced the distinctness of the sacred
cosmos, the likelier is the emergence of a specialized institutional basis for that
cosmos" (Luckmann 1967, p. 63)254. However, this social basis can arise only from
the moment the economic system produces a sufficient surplus to allow a class of fulltime religious specialists to arise (1967, p. 64). Historically, this event can be traced
back to the advent of the Judaeo-Christian tradition (1967, p. 62).
But in which sense do these developments constitute steps forward in the
process of secularization? In the sense, Luckmann explains, that any progress in
differentiation automatically tends to undermine the plausibility of the sacred cosmos.
"[Before the development of a specialized institutional basis] the 'logic' underlying the
sacred cosmos is taken for granted because it is equally applicable to different social
institutions. The validity of that 'logic' is reinforced by everybody. Thus the sacred
cosmos and its underlying logic remain unproblematic. The chance of situations
occurring in which the 'logic' of the sacred universe is no longer self-explanatory
increases, however, as the social distribution of religious representations grows more
heterogeneous" (1967, p. 65). The link between differentiation and secularization can
253
Luckmann's views on simple societies are based on Redfield (Luckmann 1967, p. 61; 1979, pp. 128 and
130).
254
Note the implications of this point: secularization has religious roots. This particular statement, however,
was made in a more classic form by Berger.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
191
thus be condensed in a formula which reads like a law: "The more unequal the
distribution of religious representations, the more is the integrating function of the
sacred cosmos for society as a whole threatened" (1967, p. 65). Luckmann's model is
remarkably simple: everything in religion started to go awry from the moment the
original world-view started to differentiate internally, thus giving rise to the necessity
of a social differentiation, which in turn undermined the plausibility of the worldview.
More specifically, three factors tend to undermine the subjective plausibility
of religion once it has become differentiated. The first is the appearance of tensions
inside the official model: Some dimensions (for instance doctrine) pertain directly to
the sacred cosmos, whereas others (for instance social ethics) pertain to the role of the
church as a social institution. Thus arises the possibility of a discrepancy between
them. The second factor of tension is the emergence of a specifically religious sphere
in society, which results in religious practices being segregated to specific times and
spaces - which carries with it the risk that individuals will consider that their religious
duties can be accomplished routinely by superficial acts. Finally, the last factor is that,
the official model being at the hands of full-time experts, there is a risk of their
preoccupations getting increasingly remote from those of daily life. In short, "religion
could be and was increasingly perceived as the ideology of an institutional subsystem"
(Luckmann 1979, p. 133).
The seeds of secularization sown with the cultural and social differentiation
remained dormant until the end of the middle ages (Luckmann 1967, p. 93). In this
period, "Religion [...] retained a high degree of institutional specialization while the
political and economic domains had not yet achieved - or regained - autonomy from the
sacred cosmos"255 (Luckmann 1979, p. 132). How was this apparent anomaly possible?
As long as social change was not too fast, Luckmann argues, there remained some
possibility for the religious specialists to adapt their model to the changes that occurred.
More importantly, as long as socialization to the official model took place in early
childhood, individuals were not likely to question this model as they grew up (1967, p.
84). With the end of the feudal order, however, these two factors were no longer strong
enough to counteract the tensions resulting from differentiation. As social change
accelerated, it became increasingly difficult to adapt the official model. This in turn
255
Luckmann goes on to explain: "It is this unique and transitory historical situation which is mistaken by
the contemporary myths of secularization for a lasting structural arrangement between society and religion".
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
192
tended to foster the growth of secular counter-ideologies, which undermined the universal
character of socialization in the official model.
Thus Luckmann's account almost entirely rests on what could be called a sociologic of secularization, rather than on a precise historical analysis. Indeed, Luckmann's
treatment of other historical forces is rather sketchy, to say the least: "Church-state
relations during the period of absolute monarchies; the political and social context of the
'Religious Wars'; the proliferation of sects; the development of scientific thought and its
effect on philosophic and - eventually - popular conceptions of life and the universe, the
French revolution and its repercussions in 'traditionalist' and 'liberal' movements in
Catholicism and Protestantism; the social consequences of the Industrial Revolution and
the emergence of the working class; and the rise of ideologically oriented political parties,
Biblical criticism and its effects on theology, to mention only a few factors affecting the
Christian churches, attest to the danger of oversimplification" (1967, p. 94).
Privatization
The process of differentiation has three results: privatization, generalization*,
and worldliness*. Let us turn, first, to privatization. Luckmann's privatization theory
should not be reduced to the simple idea that the individual is left free to choose
among different denominations. In Luckmann's scheme, the significance of
privatization is not so much political as psychological. The whole privatization thesis
rests on the central idea that institutional differentiation results in a new type of
relationship between the individual and the social order (1967, p. 11). The
institutional specialization of religion is only one aspect of a more global historical
process in which, as the institutional order became segmented, each of these segments
started to function according to specific, "rational" criteria: "The norms within the
separate domains became increasingly 'rational' in relation to the functional
requirements of the institution" (1967, p. 95).
Now, what are the consequences of this process for the individual? He must
daily shift back and forth between different spheres, thus engaging into "a series of
performances of highly anonymous specialized social roles" (1967, p. 95). As a result,
the norms which he gets submitted to in these different areas are totally unrelated to
his individual biography. Therefore, every individual must construct his own personal
identity: "Personal identity becomes, essentially, a private phenomenon" (1967, p.
97). In the modern social order, every individual is free to determine his conduct in
reference to subjective preferences, as long as he abides by the superficial rules which
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
193
govern each institutional domain (1967, p. 98). Correlatively, the importance of
socialization markedly decreases (1967, p. 10; 1979, p. 131), and every institutional
domain "need be concerned only with the effective control of performances" (1967,
p. 96)256.
These general considerations also apply to religion: "One highly important
consequence of institutional segmentation, in general, and of institutional
specialization of religion, in particular, is that the superficially religious
representations, as congealed in the 'official' models of the churches, cease to be the
only, and obligatory items in the sacred universe" (1967, p. 98). But even though
official religion has declined, individuals continue to rely on an internalized system of
"ultimate" significance: In every individual consciousness, we find a "religious" layer,
which stands in the same relationship to an individual's personal identity as the
specifically religious layer stands to the world view as a whole (1967, p. 71). But this
system of "ultimate" significance is no longer internalized as a whole: Individual
religiosity is no longer a replica of an officially given model (1967, p. 102). "Once
religion is defined as a 'private affair', the individual may choose from the assortment
of 'ultimate' meanings as he sees fit - guided only by the preferences that are
determined by his social biography. An important consequence of this situation is that
the individual constructs not only his personal identity but also his individual system
of 'ultimate' significance" (1967, p. 99).
But what exactly does Luckmann mean by an "assortment of ultimate meanings"?
To shed some light on this question, we must now turn to the "positive" aspect of the
process of secularization: generalization*. Luckmann never uses the term generalization. I
have borrowed this term from Parsons (see below) because I think it allows us to bring
together a number of convergent approaches put forward by carriers of the secularization
paradigm. These convergences, however, might go unnoticed because of very wide
terminological divergences. The general idea is the following. The process of
secularization results in two complementary movements: On the one hand, religion as it is
defined by the man in the street recedes from the public into the private sphere; on the
other hand, religion as it may be defined functionally by the sociologist runs out all over
the world, while remaining invisible to the man in the street (and to the sociologist who
stubbornly sticks to a substantive definition of religion). The first movement can be
understood as a secularization in the sense that religion recedes in front of secularizing
256
As we will see, this point is also very important in Wilson's theory.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
194
forces; the second movement can be understood as a secularization in the sense that
religion permeates the world in disguise, under secular appearances. But let us come back
to Luckmann's views on the subject.
Generalization*
Luckmann's views on generalization* appear under the technical label of the
institutionally non-specialized form of religion - the last of the four social forms of
religion. This form became more commonly referred to as the invisible religion - from
title of Luckmann's book; in the book itself, however, Luckmann does not use this
term. The invisible religion emerges once the institutionally specialized form has lost
its preponderance. Luckmann also refers to this form of religion as the "modern
sacred cosmos" or the "modern religious themes". The uncertainty in the terminology
reflects the difficulty of conceptualizing this somewhat unstructured and unstable
object (1967, p. 109). Luckmann recognizes that his description is somewhat
tentative. The invisible religion is made up of three different components: 1) themes
originating in the "private sphere"; 2) remnants of specifically religious
representations; 3) remnants of former political ideologies.
The central theme originating in the private sphere is individual autonomy.
This theme endows the individual's private quest for identity with an ultimate status.
In other words, individual autonomy acquires a "sacred" status. Autonomy finds a
number of concrete expressions, among which we find "self-realization" and "selfexpression", the "mobility ethos", and a conception of sexuality as a means of
defining one's own identity - rather than as an expression of the social order. Another
important modern religious theme is familism - or the idea that the individual is
entitled to base his private system of ultimate meanings on social interactions
obtaining in the framework of the family. These themes are then surrounded by a
number of other, subordinate themes, which need not be mentioned here (1967, p.
113).
The two other main components of the modern sacred universe are remnants
of past formations. First, specifically religious themes are still available, even though
their status has radically changed: now, they can be adopted on an individual basis, as
a whole or in fragments, to enter into privately crafted systems of ultimate
significance (1967, p. 105). Second, some themes which originated in the XIXth
century as economic or political ideologies are also available on the same basis (1967,
p. 108).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
195
But in which sense can it be said that these themes are "religious"? The
specifically religious themes are obviously religious by definition. The former
political ideologies are religious because they themselves were "late mutations of
traditional religion" (1967, p. 108). Here, Luckmann simply accepts a very
widespread view of generalization*. The originality of his position lies in the themes
originating in the "private sphere". In keeping with his theoretical framework,
Luckmann calls these themes religious because they represent one of the ways in
which organisms transcend their biological nature, and become selves. By
internalizing a theme like individual autonomy, the individual builds up his own
system of ultimate significance, and thus becomes able to interact as a self with other
selves. To consider themes born from the private sphere as religious is not strange in
Luckmann's scheme; all social forms of religion are, ultimately, based on the
individual: "The social forms of religion are [...] based on what is, in a certain sense,
an individual religious phenomenon: the individuation of consciousness and
conscience in the matrix of human intersubjectivity" (1967, p. 69).
Let us now turn to the last exemplar contained in Luckmann's theory:
worldliness*. Luckmann's theory of worldliness* was already potentially contained in the
Invisible Religion. As I explained in the part on differentiation, every world view is
composed of superimposed layers, the lowest of which refers to unproblematic, daily
perceptions (dog, tree), whereas the upper are much more abstract. In his 1987, 1988 and
1990 papers, Luckmann developed this view in a more ambitious framework, in terms of
different levels of transcendence, and linked the increasing worldliness* of religion in
modern society to the process of privatization.
Worldliness*
Luckmann does not use the term worldliness*, although at one point at least,
he uses the expression "this-worldly" (Luckmann 1987, p. 30). His account of
worldliness* is grounded in a theoretical framework based on Alfred Schutz's
phenomenology. Luckmann distinguishes three levels of "transcendence": "little",
"intermediate", and "great" transcendences. At each level, the transcendence consists
in the fact that something which is not experienced directly by the human subject is
represented indirectly - or appresented - through indicators, signs, or symbols. Thus,
to give an example of a little transcendence, "the frontside of an object [...]
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
196
automatically appresents its backside" (1987, p. 24). The transcendence is "little" in
the sense that the thing which is appresented - the backside of the object - could itself
be presented directly (for example by turning the object around). On the second level,
that of the intermediate transcendence, the appresented object can no longer be
perceived directly, even though it is still part of the ordinary reality of everyday life.
This is the case, for example, with the experience of a fellow human being. Finally, a
great transcendence is defined by the fact that the thing which is appresented "belongs
to a reality different from the reality of everyday life" (1987, p. 25).
Now, these transcendences are all potentially menacing to humans: they are
very close to chaos. If they want to construct meaningful existences, humans must
find a way to cope with them. Humans must find a way to bridge the transcendences.
A little transcendence can be bridged by indications (smoke indicates fire), an
intermediate transcendence is bridged by signs, and a great transcendence can be
bridged only by the use of symbols. In practice, the most common way to bridge the
last two types of transcendence is through language, while rituals are generally used to
bridge the great transcendences only. "Rituals place the community of interacting
human beings into a relationship [...] with a kind of reality which is perceived to be
extraordinary, and - among other things - extraordinarily powerful" (1987, p. 28).
Obviously, the little transcendences of everyday life are more "worldly" than
the other two types, and the intermediate type is itself more worldly than the great
transcendences. Although "it is the 'great' transcendences which are most obviously
'religious'", many religions are concerned primarily with intermediate transcendences,
or with the transcendences of space and time. Some of the new religions (for instance
the "cults" of togetherness), in particular, are concerned mainly with the construction
of the intermediate, inter-subjective level of transcendence. The "historical religions",
however, are concerned mainly with great transcendences.
The remainder of Luckmann's argument, which is very brief, must be quoted
in full: "Conventionally institutionalized forms of religion have been replaced for
large segments of the population by privatized, non-institutional meaning systems,
and much of this institutionally 'invisible' new social form of religion is characterized
by the fact that 'collages' of relevant religious themes depend more and more on the
individual's will, and - at the same time, as the themes are linked to different levels of
(socially constructed) transcendence - by the fact that stable, elaborated models
integrating different levels of transcendence into a meaningful whole seem to be
losing ground. In any case, the typically modern 'span' of transcendence' sems to be
this-worldly" (1987, p. 30). In other words, "a wider range of different 'actors' on the
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
197
social scene is now involved in the social construction of various kinds of
transcendence. [...] There are the mass media, there are the churches and sects which
are trying to reinsert themselves into the process of modern social construction of
transcendence. [...] The tendency to shift intersubjective reconstructions and social
constructions away from the 'great' other-worldly transcendences to the 'intermediate'
and, more and more, also to the minimal transcendences of modern solipsism may be
considered as the cultural correlate of social-structural privatization" (Luckmann
1988, p. 21; see also 1990).
Peter Berger's theory
Berger's views on secularization have evolved considerably over time - to the
point that many sociologists accuse him of inconsistency. This charge, I think, is
exaggerated. One of the reasons for this impression is that Berger easily and frequently
shifts from "methodological atheism" to what can be viewed almost as a form of
Christian apologetics. Thus for instance, two years after publishing the Sacred Canopy,
Berger published A Rumor of Angels (1969), with the particularly telling subtitle: Modern
Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural. The viewpoint, however, was radically
different from that adopted two years earlier. In 1969, Berger was writing as a
theologian257. And the "rediscovery" he was talking about, as he explained himself, was
experienced only by a minority (1969, p. 7). In the same book, he still asserted that
"abrupt changes in the secularizing trend are not very likely in the foreseeable future"
(1969, p. 20). Thus the change was of tone more than of content.
The very year A Rumor of Angels (1969) was published, however, a more serious
challenge to the continuity of Berger's work emerged with the beginning of his
involvement in the Third World. In his field work, Berger came to the realization that his
former positions on secularization were "ethnocentric" (Berger 1980, p. 41). But here
again, it should be stressed that Berger never really recanted from the analysis of
secularization he had proposed in 1967, but only from the pessimistic prognostic which
accompanied it. Thus for instance, in a 1973 paper, he concluded on the somewhat
impressionistic assessment that "the reversibility of the process of secularization is
probable because of the pervasive boredom of a world without gods" (Berger [1973]
1977, p. 160). Just before making this assessment, however, he had developed two new
concepts: "invisible secularization" (to refer to the continuing trend of secularization in
257
The same considerations apply to The Heretical Imperative (1979).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
198
the midst of the apparent religious revival in the 40s and 50s), and "double secularization"
(to refer to two types of secularization undermining American civil religion). These new
"concepts" are not terribly important for our purposes. But they point to the fact that
Berger continued working in the framework provided by his old secularization theory
while at the same time rejecting the pessimistic prognostic which was included in it.
Berger himself quite explicitly stated this distinction between the theory and the
prognostic: "[The] irreversibility of secularization [has] become doubtful. [...] This does
not mean that those of us [...] who have analyzed the recent history of religion under the
aspect of secularization have been wrong in this analysis (though we may perhaps have
exaggerated the extent of secularization). Where some of us (myself included) may have
erred, is in projecting the indefinite continuation of present trends in the future" ([1971]
1977, p. 190). To mention one last example of apparent inconsistency, in 1983, Berger
asserted that the problem was no longer the crisis of religion, but rather the crisis of
"secularity as a world view" itself (Berger 1983, p. 14). Even though this crisis
constitutes, in a way, a reversal of secularization (in that it renders possible a certain
reawakening of the hitherto repressed religious world views), it is consistent with Berger's
earlier secularization theory: in effect, this theory states that pluralism undermines the
plausibility of all world views, be they religious or secular. That the "myth of progress"
should lose its plausibility (1983, p. 15) just as the religious myths had, is therefore not
the least surprising in the framework of Berger's own theory258.
Thus, Berger's shift concerning the prognostic on the future of religion does not
radically alter the logic of his earlier secularization theory. It is therefore possible to
present it by relying almost entirely on the Sacred Canopy - in fact, there is no other
possibility: Berger has never again extensively written on secularization.
Berger's secularization theory is entirely contained in part II of the Sacred Canopy
(1967), entitled "Historical Elements". It represents an attempt at practical application of
the theoretical perspective developed in part I of the book, and comprises three chapters,
"The Process of Secularization"; "Secularization and the Problem of Plausibility"; and
"Secularization and the Problem of Legitimation". Together with Wilson's Religion in
Secular Society (1966), these 65 pages probably represent the single most powerful event
in the history of the secularization paradigm.
The general viewpoint adopted by Berger "for heuristic purposes" is
epidemiological (Berger 1967, p. 109). He considers that secularization originated in a
particular locale in the social system, and then propagated itself through the system like a
258
It may be more surprising in the framework of Wilson's, though.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
199
virus, borne by what he calls the "carriers" of secularization. In Berger's view, the main
carriers of secularization in the Western world are the modern economic processes, but
other carriers - some of which are located at the cultural level, sometimes inside religion
itself - are at work too. Thus, secularization cannot be considered to be a monocausal
process, nor a process with universal consequences. It has a very different impact in
different parts of society. Religion tends to resist particularly in two opposed sectors of
the institutional order. On the one hand, it survives in the most "private" sector, the
family. On the other hand, it survives in a rhetorical form259 in the most "public" sector,
politics. "At a point where everyone takes for granted that 'religion stops at the factory
gate', it may nevertheless be also taken for granted that one does not inaugurate either a
war or a marriage without the traditional religious symbolizations" (1967, p. 129).
Berger's theory need hardly be reconstructed to fit my framework. As presented in
the Sacred Canopy, it unfolds very neatly according to a chronological scheme. The
initial situation* is located far back in history. In Egyptian and Mesopotamian religions,
Berger argues, there was a continuity between the microcosm and the macrocosm;
everything that happened in daily life had its correspondent in the world of myth or in the
cosmos in general.
Religious Roots (first part)
The initial rupture* with this situation was the advent of monotheism. The
religious developments resulting from this rupture* can be considered "causal factors
in the formation of the modern secularized world" (1967, p. 128). The main
differences between the cosmological and the Biblical conceptions can be
summarized under three headings. First, God became transcendentalized, placed
outside of the cosmos. Yahve is a geographically mobile God, which intervenes in
history through specific actions, and whose covenant with the chosen people is no
longer immanent in the logic of the cosmos. Second, in part as a consequence of the
transcendentalization of God, there has been a process of historicization: God having
been removed from history, it became a field in which man could intervene and shape
his destiny. Third, there was a process of ethical rationalization, through the
development of the Torah and the elimination of all magical elements (1967, pp. 115259
In 1967, Berger explicitly refused to consider that religion had been generalized*: "The religious
legitimations of the state [...] remain as rhetorical ornamentations devoid of social reality" (Berger 1967,
p. 133). Later on, he softened his stance, and discussed American civil religion without considering it as
mere rhetoric (Berger [1973] 1977, pp. 148-161).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
200
21). Thus, to quote Berger's well-known ironical formula: "Christianity has been its
own gravedigger" (1967, p. 129).
Once this initial rupture* has occurred, the process has been set in motion. But
before unfolding to its logical consequences, secularization suffered a setback during the
Middle Ages. Catholicism in effect created a synthesis between the disenchanted Biblical
religion and non-biblical cosmological conceptions (1967, p. 121). From the point of
view of historicization, however, Catholicism did not represent a setback, but a deepening
of secularization (1967, p. 122). The formation of the Church itself was a decisive step in
the direction of secularization, as it automatically defined all that was outside of it as "the
world" (1967, p. 123).
Religious Roots (second part)
The forces of secularization emerged again when Protestantism came back to
the disenchanted Biblical religion: "Protestantism may be described in terms of an
immense shrinking in the scope of the sacred in reality. [...] In other words, the radical
transcendence of God confronts an universe of radical immanence, of 'closedness' to
the sacred" (1967, pp. 111-12). In the new atmosphere created by Protestantism,
although religion seemed very strong, it had in fact become very fragile: "With
nothing remaining 'in between' a radically transcendent God and a radically human
world except this one channel, the sinking of the latter into implausibility left an
empirical reality in which, indeed, 'God is dead'. [...] A sky empty of angels becomes
open to the intervention of the astronomer, eventually, of the astronaut" (1967, pp.
112-113).
Rationalization
Once the secularizing forces which had been contained by Catholicism had
been liberated, secularization started spreading, propagated by the growth of
capitalism: "Modern industrial society has produced a centrally 'located' sector that is
something like a 'liberated territory' with respect to religion. Secularization has moved
'outwards' from this sector into other areas of society" (1967, p. 129). The reason for
this very strong link between secularization and industrialism is that industry is of
necessity based on the operation of rational processes (1967, p. 132). Berger does not
at any point explain what he means by "rationality"; his analysis of this phenomenon
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
201
remains very sketchy. The reason why it is nevertheless necessary to present Berger's
views on rationalization is that they play such an important part in the structure of his
theory. As what Berger has to say on this subject is very brief, I will quote him in full
rather than paraphrase him: "A modern industrial society requires the presence of
large cadres of scientific and technological personnel, whose training and ongoing
social organization presupposes a high degree of rationalization, not only on the level
of infrastructure but also on that of consciousness. Any attempts at traditionalistic
reconquista thus threaten the rational foundations of modern society" (1967, p. 132).
The rational spirit carried by the capitalist order is diffused to all other institutions, in
particular to the state: "As the modern state is increasingly occupied with the political
and legal requirements of the gigantic economic machinery of industrial production, it
must gear its own structure and ideology to this end. On the level of structure, this
means above all the establishment of highly rational bureaucracies; on the level of
ideology, it means the maintenance of legitimations that are adequate for such
bureaucracies" (1967, p. 132).
Autonomization*
As we can see, Berger definitely sets the issue between religion and the world
in terms of power. Indeed, the present situation* of religion is characterized by the
fact that industrial capitalism has allowed society to "liberate" itself from the grip of
religion. Autonomization* is again one of the ideas which Berger does not devote
much time to, but which is very important in his theory. Indeed, he defines
secularization as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed
from the domination of religious institutions and symbols" (1967, p. 107).
What does this mean in historical terms? The first sign of autonomization
comes with the separation of church and state (differentiation*). As a result, "the state
no longer serves as an enforcement agency on behalf of the previously dominant
religious institutions" (1967, p. 130). This is accompanied by the expropriation of
church lands and the "emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority".
Finally, this same process may also be observed in "the decline of religious contents
in the arts, in philosophy, in literature and, most important of all, in the rise of science
as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective on the world" (1967, p. 107).
The main reason why Berger's analysis of autonomization* is not further
developed is that its logical consequences are analyzed on the two separate levels
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
202
included in the definition of secularization: with regard to the "religious institutions" on
the one hand, and with regard to the "religious symbols" on the other hand. At the social
level ("objective secularization"), the new situation is characterized by pluralism. And
pluralism itself is related, at the level of consciousness (or "subjective secularization") to
the collapse of the world view*.
Thus, two levels of analysis are closely interconnected: social structure, and
culture. To fully understand the interconnectedness of these two levels, we must
remember Berger's sociology of knowledge framework: Social institutions are legitimized
by religious world views, but these, in turn, can survive only if they are based on an
existing social structure. On the one hand, "religion legitimates social institutions by
bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating them
within a cosmic and sacred frame of reference" (1967, p. 33), but on the other hand, "each
world requires a social 'base' for its continuing existence as a world that is real to actual
human beings. [...] Thus, for example, the religious world of pre-Columbian Peru was
objectively and subjectively real as long as its plausibility structure, namely, preColumbian Inca society, remained intact" (1967, p. 45).
As a consequence of this dialectical perspective, Berger argues, "it is very largely
a matter of convenience [...] as to which of the two spheres one begins with. Depending
on the starting point, one may then be able to show how a particular theoretical
constellation results from a certain practical infrastructure, or conversely how a practical
social structure is the result of certain movements in the realm of idea" (1967, p. 155).
For reasons which are not entirely clear, Berger himself chooses to start with the social
structure: "In looking at the collapse of plausibility suffered by religion in the
contemporary situation, hic et nunc, it is logical to begin with social structure and to go
on to consciousness and ideation, rather than the reverse. Quite apart from its theoretical
justification, this procedure will avoid the pitfall (to which religiously inclined observers
are particularly prone) of ascribing secularization to some mysterious spiritual and
intellectual fall from grace" (1967, p. 129)260. Whatever Berger's reasons may have been,
260
The reason for this choice is probably related to a desire to jog the most conservative of the "religiouslyinclined observers". Berger experienced a dramatic shift in his religious positions in the direction of
liberalism in the 50s and early 60s (1980, p. 41), and since then, he always seems to enjoy very much being
able to use the sociological perspective to unmask the inauthenticity of certain religious views (see for
instance 1961b, pp. 146-60). More important, however, is another reason: As we will see at the beginning
of the section on the collapse of the world view, Berger refuses, for theoretical reasons, to consider that any
world view is intrinsically superior to another, and therefore considers that it is wrong to start from the level
of ideas to establish causal connections.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
203
we will follow his example, and start with the social-structural aspect of
autonomization*.
Pluralization
In the monopolistic phase of Christendom, the Church and the state, which
both "represented the same religious world view" (1967, p. 136), cooperated to
impose this world view upon individuals. But when the state renounced using this
power of imposition, "the man in the street [was] confronted with a wide variety of
religious and other reality-defining agencies that compete[d] for his allegiance or at
least his attention, and none of which [was] in a position to coerce him into
allegiance" (1967, p. 127). Pluralization is clearly conceptualized by Berger as a direct
consequence of secularization: "Secularization brings about a demonopolization of
religious traditions and thus, ipso facto, leads to a pluralistic situation" (1967, p. 135).
Pluralism does not just mean that a denomination vies against another denomination
to transmit its world view, but also that each denomination must now compete with a
variety of secular world views. As a consequence of this, there appears a free market,
in which different world views are offered to individuals: "The religious tradition,
which previously could be authoritatively imposed, now has to be marketed. It must
be 'sold' to a clientele that is now no longer constrained to 'buy'. The pluralistic
situation is, above all, a market situation. In it, the religious institutions become
marketing agencies and the religious traditions become consumer commodities"
(Berger 1967, p. 138).
This market situation has some particularly interesting consequences for the
religious institutions. As they now find themselves in a competitive situation, they
tend to organize themselves, and even to fashion the world view they propose, in such
a manner as to gain a competitive advantage. The main result is that religious
institutions become increasingly rational: "'Public relations' with the consumer
clientele, 'lobbying' with the government, 'fund raising' with both governmental and
private agencies, multifaceted involvements with the secular economy (particularly
through investment) - in all these aspects of their 'mission' the religious institutions
are compelled to seek 'results' by methods that are, of necessity, very similar to those
employed by other bureaucratic structures with similar problems" (1967, p. 140). As
they all tend to become organized according to the same criteria, the religious
institutions increasingly resemble each other, and even non-religious institutions. In
other words, pluralism forces religious institutions to become more worldly*. Another
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
204
result of pluralism is that it fosters ecumenicity. This, for at least two reasons:
because, as they increasingly resemble each other, the religious institutions lose some
of the reasons which kept them apart; but also because cartelization is a more
efficient course of action given the situation (it brings advantages in dealings with
consumers as well as with the government). Still another consequence is that, if they
want to be successful, denominations must take into account the wishes of their
"clients". Thus, not only does religion become subjected to fashion, but it also
increasingly tends to cater to the "private" psychological problems of individuals
through counselling and quasi-therapeutic action (1967, pp. 145-47).
But how, then, can we explain the recent "rediscovery of denominational
identities" in America? Precisely through the same market analysis: As religious
products become increasingly similar, the religious institutions tend to lose their
distinctiveness, which is also a valuable element in the competitive market
environment. "[This] 'countervailing movement' is brought about by the need for
marginal differentiation in an over-all situation of standardization". Most often,
however (as is the case with the "identities" of commercial products forged by
advertisement), "the differentiation is one of 'packaging' only - inside the package may
still be the same old standardized product" (1967, p. 149).
Collapse of the World View*
The collapse of the world view*261 is a direct consequence of pluralization
(and not of rationalization!): "The pluralistic situation described above ipso facto
plunges religion into a crisis of credibility" (1967, p. 151). It should be most
emphatically stressed that Berger refuses to consider that the scientific and rational
world views as such undermine the plausibility of religion. As a matter of fact, Berger
explains, the generally held assumption that the modern world view is superior to the
more ancient ones stems from the fact that, whereas modern thinkers always
"relativize [the past] in terms of this or that socio-historical analysis [...] the present
[...] remains strangely immune from relativization" (Berger 1969, p. 51). In other
words, in terms of epistemological certainty concerning supra-empirical matters, we
261
Berger does not use this exact phrase; he speaks of the "collapse of the plausibility of traditional
definitions of reality" (1967, p. 127). The difference, however, is only terminological. By collapse of the
world view*, I refer exactly to what Berger proposes.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
205
are not better off than our forebears, and thus, our epistemology is not "more
convincing" for intrinsic, but for social reasons262.
If we want to explain secularization and the collapse of the world view,
instead of resorting to this shallow explanation, we must turn to a social-structural
process, to wit, the "pluralization of world views" (Berger [1967] 1977, p. 170). The
central idea, which is exactly the same as Luckmann's (presented under the heading of
differentiation), is that, because of pluralization, all views of the world, religious or
not, tend to become relative and to suffer a crisis of plausibility. Berger's theory can
be summarized as follows: the process of rationalization, born from religion, leads to
autonomization*, which in turn leads to pluralism, which causes the collapse of the
world view*.
This manifested itself as early as the XVIIIth century, as can be seen by the
loss of plausibility of the Christian theodicy evident in the distressed reactions of
intellectuals to the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. For the first time, tradition was no longer
sufficient to answer the question "How could God permit this?" (Berger 1967, pp. 7879). But this general crisis can be brought out most clearly in the case of
Protestantism, where an increasingly liberal theology engaged in a huge "bargaining
process" with secular consciousness, to end up with a much narrower prestige than it
started with. Berger provides a fairly detailed analysis of this crisis, tracing the
progressive relativization of Christian truths as they were redefined by succeeding
generations of Protestant theologians263. As a consequence of the collapse of the
religious world view, in this new theology, religious activities are almost reduced to
being legitimized as "some sort of psychotherapy" (1967, p. 167), even though "in a
truly impressive salto mortale, this very dissolution of theology into psychology is
hailed as a vindication of religion" (Berger [1967] 1977, p. 167).
262
Why is it, Berger asks, that secular theologians, for instance, "take [...] for granted the epistemological
superiority of the electricity and radio-users over the New Testament writers - to the point when the
theoretical possibility that there may be a non-scientific reality that has been lost to modern man is not even
considered. In other words, secularized consciousness is taken for granted, not just as an empirical datum
but as an unquestioned standard of objective validity" (Berger [1967] 1977, pp. 169-70). Berger again
develops this argument in A Rumor of Angels: "We may agree, say, that contemporary consciousness is
incapable of conceiving of either angels or demons. We are still left with the question of whether, possibly,
both angels and demons go on existing despite this incapacity of our contemporaries to conceive of them"
(Berger 1969, p. 52).
263
He notes that the only instance of a reversal of this tendency - Barthian neo-orthodoxy - was rather
"accidental" (1967, p. 166), as it coincided with the rise of Hitlerism, which seemed to crystallize all the
evils of modernity. The counter-trend reversed as soon as this area came to an end: "The turning point can
be dated with embarrassing clarity in 1948 - the year of the currency reform and the beginning of economic
recovery. At this point, the 'outside' world, including its secularized character, becomes much more difficult
to see as 'the enemy'" (1967, p. 164).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
206
Unbelief*
The consequence of this collapse for the individual is that "subjectively, the
man in the street tends to be uncertain about religious matters" (1967, p. 127).
Obviously, this does not mean that all individuals have lost their faith, but only that
religious belief acquires a new status. There is "a change in the 'location' of religion
within consciousness. [...] As the plausibility of the world view is weakened, so will
the subjective reality of the religious world in question. [...] The old religious contents
can now only be reached by a deliberate effort, an act of 'faith'" (1967, p. 150). As a
logical consequence, religion becomes a matter of personal opinion or, as the
Americans put it, of "preference", a development which ushers in the "age of
skepticism". Note, however, that Berger does not provide any statistics, and does not
pronounce on the extent of unbelief. All he seems to assert is that, all things being
equal, secular society tends to transform belief into a more personal, and hence, more
difficult, act. In other words, the burden of making sense of the world has been
transferred from society to the individual: "The realissimum to which religion refers is
transposed from the cosmos or from history to individual consciousness. Cosmology
becomes psychology. History becomes biography" (1967, p. 167).
The Epistemological Stance: Methodological Unbelief
In an appendix to the Sacred Canopy entitled "Sociological and Theological
Perspectives", Berger summarized most clearly and cogently the epistemological
stance which I take to be shared by all adherents to the CISR paradigm - as contrasted
with committed Catholic sociologist or with committed secularists. First, he asserts
sociology's autonomy over against theology: "Questions raised within the frame of
reference of an empirical discipline (and I would emphatically consider sociological
theory to be within such a frame of reference) are not susceptible to answers coming
out of the frame of reference of a non-empirical and normative discipline" (1967,
p. 179). But Berger's methodological stance does not stop here - if it did, it would not
differ from the usual positivist stance. Theology cannot pronounce on sociology; but
sociology cannot pronounce on theology either. On the one hand, "sociological theory
must, by its own logic, view religion as a human projection". On the other hand,
however, "to say that religion is a human projection does not logically preclude the
possibility that the projected meanings may have an ultimate status independent of
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
207
man" (1967, p. 180). And Berger bolsters his explanation through the example of
mathematics. Mathematics are, quite as obviously as religion, a projection of the
human mind. But "so far nobody has suggested that therefore modern science is to be
regarded as a great illusion" (1967, p. 181). The practical methodological precept
which follows from these considerations is that, in the course of sociological inquiry,
the ultimate status of religious definitions of reality must be bracketed, and that the
sociologist must practice a methodological atheism.
Bryan Wilson
Bryan R. Wilson was born in 1926 in Leeds, England. He received his B.Sc.
(Econ.) from London University264 in 1952, and his Ph.D. from the London School of
Economics in 1955265 - one year after Berger, and one year before Luckmann. At the
L.S.E. he read sociology and economics, but these courses included nothing specifically
on the sociology of religion. How, then, did the agnostic Wilson come to devote the
whole of his graduate work - very much to the dismay of his professor of economics266 to the study of sects? The answer is not easy to give in view of the written documents.
Wilson's own explanation, as he gave it to me in the interview, is the following: "I knew
people who belonged to different religious groups. And they were very different people,
they were acquaintances who were not close, but friends of a kind, in a loose sense of the
word. And I was interested in the differences between these people, and they were very
different people, and I knew them all, and they had different religions, and my curiosity
was aroused".
A complementary answer to this question can perhaps be gained by a paper
published by Wilson in 1959. In 1957 and 1958, Wilson was a fellow at the University of
California at Berkeley. While at Berkeley, he wrote a paper on sect development which
was published in the American Sociological Review (Wilson 1959). The opening lines of
the abstract read as follows: "The maintenance of original value orientation and of
pristine character is a crucial problem area encountered by institutions, particularly in the
face of changing external or internal social circumstances. The tensions engendered in
such conditions are clearly evident in sects, which provide a valuable institutional type for
analysis, in that they have an explicit value commitment, are clearly circumscribed
264
But Wilson had prepared for this degree at the University College, Leicester - then a college of London
University (Bryan Wilson, personal communication).
265
Contemporary Authors, New Revision Series, Vol 19, p. 485.
266
Interview with Bryan Wilson.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
208
organizations, and are precisely conscious of their relations with the wider society" (1959,
p. 3). Thus, in a way, sects can be regarded as providing the opportunity for a microsociological analysis of the impact of social change on value orientations, a problem
Wilson for some reason was interested in267.
There is no doubt that, as an individual, Wilson is rather appalled by the moral
situation of the modern world. There is no trace, in his works, of an enthusiastic
endorsement of secularization. Living in a secular society, he tells us, is "painful" (Wilson
1976a, p. viii). Even though his writing always remains remarkably non-committed, when
it comes to assessing the ultimate consequences of secularization and, more broadly, of
modernization, Wilson's tone sometimes verges on catastrophism: "The growth of crime,
of vandalism, and of neurosis and mental breakdown; the growing disruption of marriage;
the increase in various types of addiction, whether to drugs, alcohol, or gambling: and the
incidence of personal isolation, loneliness, and suicide, all provide a commentary on the
points at which the rational social organization apparently fails. Indeed, not only does the
system fail to cope with these disruptions, it appears that they arise partly as a
consequence of its normal operation" (Wilson 1982, p. 46; see also 1976a, p. 102; 1976b,
p. 276). A few pages later, he asserts that these problems are such that "the future of
western civilization itself may be put into jeopardy" (1982, p. 88).
In 1966, Wilson published his first book, Religion in Secular Society. The Times
Literary Supplement estimated that this book was "read by more people than has any
other British book on the sociology of religion"268. The first part of the book was entitled
"The Pattern of Secularization", and started with an analysis of statistical data, which
Wilson considered, at this time, as providing evidence of the decline of religion. But
Wilson's views on secularization have evolved somewhat over the next few years. This
evolution has been summarized best by Wilson himself in the interview: "I wouldn't hold
to all the propositions I put forward then, I think my conception of secularization has
somewhat changed. [...] I would now want to make a distinction between [secularization
and decline]. [...] The major shift is perhaps away from, or giving less importance, to
church statistics as an evidence, and in regarding secularization more explicitly as
something involved in the system rather than as something involved in human
behaviour". These shifts, however, did not affect the basic structure of Wilson's
267
The same interest is evident from the concluding sentence of a paper published the previous year in
French: "De même que l'individu nerveusement marginal est susceptible d'éclairer le processus mental des
autres hommes, ces sectes contemporaines ne pourraient-elles pas illustrer le malaise social de notre
temps?" (Wilson 1958, p. 150).
268
Quoted in Contemporary Authors, New Revision Series, vol. 19, p. 485.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
209
argument: his theory is remarkably consistent. I will therefore present it as a whole, with
only minimal qualifications with regard to the different periods.
Wilson is the most assertive of all the carriers of the CISR paradigm. In is view,
secularization is clearly an evolutionary process (Wilson 1976a, p. vii), and he has no
doubts about the secular nature of modern society: "It has become fashionable among
sociologists of religion to dispute the contention that this is a secular age. [...] Yet it
seems to me true to assert that this age in the West is secular in a sense that has never
been true of any previous historical period - all the new marginal manifestations of
religious curiosity notwithstanding" (Wilson 1976b, p. 259). Wilson's confidence in the
inevitability of secularization is such that - like Berger in the 60s - he ventures to predict
the future: "Religion in secular society will remain peripheral, relatively weak, providing
comfort for men in the interstices of a soulless social system of which men are the halfwilling, half-restless prisoners" (1976b, p. 276)269.
These bold assertions are made possible by a rather restrictive terminology. For
Wilson, religion must be defined in terms close to everyday usage and to institutional
embodiments270, and secularization must be understood as a transformation occurring
exclusively at the structural level (Wilson 1966, p. xiii; p. xviii). He never relinquished
the definition of secularization he gave in his first piece of writing on the subject: "By
secularization we mean the process by which religious thinking, practice and institutions
lose social significance" (1966, p. xiv). Compare this definition with the ones he gave in
later writings: "Secularization relates to the diminution in the social significance of
religion" (Wilson 1982, p. 149); "By secularization I shall understand the process
whereby religion loses significance for the social system" (Wilson 1987a, p. 169). The
only shift, which is consistent with what was mentioned above, is that the notion of
secularization as a phenomenon related to the individual's religiosity is abandoned.
So much for "secularization". But what about "secularization theory"? Wilson
takes the trouble to clarify the methodological status of this notion: "Secularization is a
word which, for sociologists, is as much a concept as a mere descriptive term. The phrase,
the secularization thesis, denotes a set of propositions, often loosely stated, which amount
almost to a body of theory concerning processes of social change that occur over an
unspecified period of historical time. Obviously, the details of such processes might be
set out in varying degrees of specificity, and in application to different historical epochs"
269
Lately, however, he somewhat softened his stance: "Certainly, it is an open question whether
secularization is reversible" (Wilson 1985b, p. 17).
270
At several points, he explicitly refuses Luckmann's notion of "invisible religion" (see for instance Wilson
1976a, p. 4).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
210
(Wilson 1982, p. 148). Consistent with this definition, Wilson explicitly shrinks from
defining necessary relations between historical processes: "These phenomena [a list of
historical manifestations of secularization] are likely to be causally linked, and yet they
occur in varying order, and with different degrees of rapidity. In what measure, or in what
period they occur, is an empirical question for each case, and cannot be settled a priori"
(1982, p. 149)271.
Although Wilson never provided an all-encompassing presentation of
secularization theory, he came very close to this on the occasion of a paper read in Japan
(Wilson 1976b). For the sake of an audience presumably not very familiar with the
history of Western sociology, Wilson stressed that his views on secularization were
nothing but the reformulation of a venerable theory, which underlay much of the early
sociologists' writings, namely, the community-society dichotomy272. Indeed, on another
occasion, he presented secularization theory under the title "The Inherited Model"
(Wilson 1985b), remaining apparently deliberately ambiguous as to what in his
presentation must be attributed to "the inherited model", and what must be attributed to
the author himself. This "equivalence" between secularization theory and the
community/society dichotomy at first sight poses a problem: If there really is an identity
between the two, in what sense does Wilson's theory differentiate itself from Becker's? If
secularization is nothing but the transition from community to society, does Wilson's
theory deserve to be classified as belonging to the CISR paradigm?
The answer to this question must be positive. To understand why, we must take a
closer look at the way Wilson expressed himself in Japan. "My thesis is that
secularization is the decline of community: secularization is a concomitant of
societalization" (Wilson 1976b, pp. 265-66). As we can notice, this statement is
ambiguous. On the one hand, Wilson states that secularization is the decline of
community. But on the other hand, he goes on to say that secularization is a concomitant
of the decline of community. Taking into account Wilson's views on secularization, it
clearly appears that only the second statement applies. Secularization is clearly one of the
dimensions of societalization or modernization - not the whole process itself. What
Wilson wanted to stress was the following: Secularization is a necessary consequence of
societalization, and this thesis has been repeatedly expressed by sociologist in the
classical tradition. On other occasions, he expressed himself more clearly; for instance:
"Secularization occurs in association with the process in which social organization itself
271
This position most likely reflects Wilson's personal dislike for grand theory more than any uncertainties
about the process of secularization.
272
In the interview, Wilson repeatedly stressed this point.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
211
changes from one that is communaly-based to a societally-based system" (Wilson 1982,
p. 153).
We can now turn to a brief reconstructed account of Wilson's secularization
theory. This is a difficult task. Wilson's is the most complete of all secularization
theories; unfortunately, it is also the least systematic. It could be reconstructed in a
number of different ways. The following account is therefore not to be considered as
necessarily the best and most faithful way to present the unfolding of the process. But I
belive that the main components entering into it are presented truthfully.
The initial situation* is "community". In this type of society, which was based on
affectual motives, religion fulfilled very important latent functions, most notably social
control, social integration, the legitimation of the group's ends, the interpretation of the
cosmos, and the canalization of the emotions. It also fulfilled one manifest function, in
that it provided means of salvation (Wilson 1976b, p. 266). Although "community" does
not refer to any historical period in particular, in the West, it can be roughly situated in
the Middle Ages. This does not imply that the Middle Ages were an age of faith, but
simply that "life was effectively regulated, at least in its public concerns, by the demands
of the Church. The Church controlled not only the moral fabric of society (perhaps the
least of all), but the formal processes of political, juridicial, commercial, and social
intercourse - the institutional operation of society. [...] Even for that age, 'the age of faith'
is perhaps a misnomer: we should refer only to the age of religiously-prescribed social
order" (Wilson 1976a, pp. 9-10).
The rupture* from this situation was caused by a number of different factors, and
was very spread out in time. Some of the causes of the rupture* are to be found in religion
itself, some others are extrinsic to it. In his early writings, Wilson stated that it was not
possible to tell which were preponderant a priori (Wilson 1966, p. 36). In his later
writings, however, he tended to consider that the preponderant factors were extrinsic to
religion, and were merely expressed in a religious language: "Religion spoke the language
that men already knew, and so new ideas had to be expressed in terms of the old. [...]
Thus it was that radically secularizing developments were first enunciated within the
framework of religious discourse" (Wilson 1976b, p. 261).
Rationalization (first part)
Before discussing the role of rationalization in the process of secularization,
we must briefly present Wilson's conception of rationality. In Wilson's scheme,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
212
rationality is not simply, nor even primarily, an application of reason. "Modern
society certainly depends pre-eminently on rational procedures but [...] it does so not
solely, perhaps not even mainly, by recourse simply to reason. Its recourse is rather to
abstract and institutionalized rationality, embraced not so much by the minds of
sentient citizens as in the planned framework of organizational techniques" (Wilson
1985a, p. 330). Wilson's concept of rationality273 is definitely more dependent upon
technology than upon reason as such: "The process of rationalization has had various
sources, but the most fundamental and pervasive, and the one of increasingly global
significance, is the process of technologization" (Wilson 1987a, p. 170).
Applying this conception of rationality to the problem of secularization,
Wilson argues that the factors which are most fundamental in causing the rupture* are
all related to scientific and technical evolution. "As scientific orientations increase,
and in particular those of the organizational and behavioral sciences, so we can expect
conceptions of society itself to become increasingly affected by rationalistic
preconceptions" (Wilson 1966, p. 37). Why is that so? Because, Wilson argues,
"technology demands the development of much more rational modes of thought. [...]
If [the individual] drives a car, he learns to be rational and to stop when the traffic
signals are against him - no matter how urgent his business" (Wilson 1982, p. 43).
This evolution leads to the breakdown of community: "Technical evolution disrupted
the old moral consensus and the strength of local community" (Wilson 1985a, p. 324).
"Societal organization is itself the result of a process of rationalization" (Wilson 1982,
p. 156).
Does this mean that Wilson's view is the one denounced by Berger as naively
assuming that the modern world view is intrinsically superior? Wilson refuses to be
put into this category: "All this is not to suggest that the confrontation of science and
religion [...] was in itself harmful to religion, or even that there was an incompatibility
between them. Indeed, religion and science can coexist as alternative orientations to
the world" (Wilson 1966, p. 43). Wilson goes out of his way to stress that the XIXth
century "conflict" between science and religion was a false debate (1966, p. 46). Why,
then, was the scientific world view important? The only - and not very convincing explanation provided by Wilson is that science undermined the status of religious
functionaries as compared with scientists and technicians (1966, pp. 74-85). But what
should have caused this loss of prestige, if not the demise of religion itself with the
273
His conception of rationality is not very articulate, nor very original. Even in the introduction to the
volume on Rationality he edited (Wilson 1970), he did not come forward with any clear-cut conception of
his own going beyond Weber.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
213
rise in the prestige of science? Wilson's explanation is problematic and, on numerous
other occasions, he reverts himself. For example: "Christianity, with the impact of
scientific and social scientific hindsights, has lost general theological plausibility"
(Wilson 1968, p. 86; see also 1982, p. 54).
Why, then, is Wilson so eager to dispel the impression that he should view
science as intrinsically superior to religion? Because, I would contend, this would
allow critics to put him into the same bag as the XIXth century evolutionists and
positivists274, for whom the warfare between science and religion was the most
important aspect of "secularization". To express the dilemma in my own terminology:
Wilson was too much aware that "scientization" was not a "exemplar" that should fit
into the CISR paradigm to recognize putting it forward.
To summarize: Wilson's theory is that the prime factor in the initial decline of
community life is a form of instrumental rationality informed by technical
conceptions. In this view, "reason" itself, as a basis for scientific development and for
attacks against theology played a secondary, albeit not entirely negligible role.
Obviously, rationalization was not the only factor that caused the rupture. Wilson
himself warns that "it would be very easy to exaggerate the significance of purely
ideological developments in the process of secularization" (Wilson 1966, p. 54). Wilson
refuses to set forth a hierarchy of influential factors, and most often contents himself with
presenting a list of the factors which undermined the social standing of religion. Among
these, we can mention briefly the birth of autonomous institutions (differentiation*; 1966,
pp. 56-57), the emergence of modern democracy, the world view offered by the mass
media and the entertainment industry, and the birth of autonomous art forms (1966, pp.
36-58). Among the factors intrinsic to religion, we can mention confessional diversity
(Wilson 1976a, p. 11; p. 30). Thus rationalization is not the only cause of secularization.
The problem, however, is that it is the only factor that clearly emerges from Wilson's
discussion as being of primary importance in its own right. As for the other factors just
mentioned, we will discuss them more at length later on: they all occupy a place in
Wilson's theory, but not really as primary factors. They always appear inseparably as
274
Indeed, Wilson told me that he had written Religion in Secular Society in a matter of weeks because of
what, tongue-in-cheek, he referred to as a "threat" from Watts, his publisher: Wilson's book was scheduled
to be published at the same time as a book by Julian Huxley (apparently a reedition of Religion Without
Revelation published by Watts in 1967). As Wilson absolutely wanted to avoid giving the impression that
he was a "secularist" (like Huxley) he wrote his book very quickly so that it could be published before
Huxley's (Interview).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
214
products and as factors of secularization. Before discussing these factors, however, we
must turn to the consequences rationalization had on religious movements themselves.
Worldliness*
Wilson develops an analysis of the rise of new denominations - most notably
Methodism - in XVIIIth and XIXth century England. From this analysis, it appears that
these new denominations were more worldly than the religions which preceded them.
But in which sense exactly? Here, Wilson follows Weber's lead. After describing the
puritan spirit of "this-worldly asceticism", he remarks: "In this orientation, reflecting
necessarily the qualities which the man of business himself needs in the pursuit of his
livelihood, there is a beginning of the secularization process" (Wilson 1966, p. 23).
(Note the implication: for Wilson, as for Luckmann and for Berger, secularization has
religious roots*; see Wilson 1982, p. 150, n. 2; p. 168.) Now, Methodism was deeply
influenced by this spirit, and fulfilled a definitely worldly* function, in that it
"accomplished the dissemination of a work ethic to new social strata"275 (Wilson
1966, p. 24). "Christianity's genius was in its adaptability to new classes throughout
processes of social change. It was only as these new classes showed a firm disposition
to self-discipline and organization and to establish and maintain effective social
control, that permanent organizations - 'denominations' - emerged" (1966, p. 21).
But increased worldliness* is not apparent only in the denominations; it is also
apparent in society in general: "The proportion of the Gross National Product devoted
to the supernatural has diminished in the course of the centuries. [...] It is a plausible
hypothesis that the more developed the economic techniques of a society, and the
more affluent its circumstances, the lower the proportion of its productive wealth will
be devoted to the supernatural. If that hypothesis is not disconfirmed, it might be
taken as our best indicator of secularization, showing what man chooses to do with
his resources, his energies, and, by implication, his time" (Wilson 1976a, p. 25).
Pluralization*
275
Other examples of tendencies toward worldliness are evident in the "absorption of the Churches by the
society, and their loss of religious content" (Wilson 1966, p. 114) in America, and in the tendency toward
ecumenism, which provides a pretext for adjusting the denominations to secular values (1966, p. 130).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
215
Wilson's account of pluralization is not as detailed as Berger's276. For the most
part, Wilson rests content with the idea that the emergence of the new denominations
we just mentioned further undermined the power of religious institutions: "In creating
institutionalized expression of social differences and division, [and] in extending
choice, [the new denominations] allow[ed] some to make no choice at all" (Wilson
1966, p. 30). Wilson considers that pluralism, as it exists in America, exhibits a logic
which can best be understood in the framework of secularization theory: "For a
commodity with as little relevance to everyday American life as religion, competition
may function to maintain the interest and the affiliation of a wide clientele" (Wilson
1968, p. 78).
Thus, rationalization obviously had an impact as early as two centuries ago. For
the most part, however, Wilson's discussion of the consequences of rationalization bears
on the present situation*. The consequences of the process of societalization for religion
can first all be brought together under one heading: autonomization*. This development,
however, can take place only after differentiation has occurred. On the other hand,
autonomization* can be further divided in four manifestations: decline in practice,
unbelief*, rationalization, and sociologization*.
Differentiation
Differentiation is itself one of the results of rationalization - in the limited
sense of technical evolution: "Secularization is associated with the structural
differentiation of the social system - separation of different areas of social activity
into more specialized forms. This process occurs with the development of technique
and the extension of the division of labour" (Wilson 1976a, p. 40). As a result,
"whereas once the clergyman, if he was a diligent incumbent, was also the educator,
the guardian of community morals, the social worker, at times even the magistrate,
the sick visitor (when not actually a medical adviser), today, these roles have been
taken over by others" (1976a, p. 16). Clearly, differentiation is one of the ways in
which the transition from community to society can be described. And in this
disappearance of the homogeneous community - what Berger would call the "social
276
Unless we were to put all the considerations on the effects of the newly emerging institutional spheres on
religion under the heading of pluralization, instead of considering them as part of the process of
autonomization (which is the course of action I follow, as it seems to me to better reflect Wilson's own
intentions).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
216
basis supporting the plausibility of the religious world view"277 - Wilson sees one of
the causes of secularization.
Autonomization*
Wilson's very definition of secularization - like Berger's - is centered on the
idea of autonomization* (Wilson does not use this term, although he speaks of the
institutional spheres having become more "autonomous" [see below]). To repeat,
secularization is "the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose
social significance" (Wilson 1966, p. xvi). In the early phase of his thinking, Wilson
tended to rely on statistics for evidence of this process. Thus for instance, the
diminution of the influence of the church can be assessed by the decline in the
proportion of children attending Sunday school, and by the decline in the proportion
of religious publications as over against secular publications (1966, p. 5).
Wilson very explicitly links autonomization* and differentiation. "The process
of structural differentiation [...] has led not only to the eradication of religious
involvement in other areas of activities [...], but also to the loss of the presidency
which religion once exercised over practically all of man's doings" (Wilson 1982,
p. 41). Autonomization means, quite simply, that society no longer needs religion: all
the latent functions which it fulfilled have been taken over by other institutions. Even
salvation, the one explicit function of religion, is no longer as much needed as before:
"Since life has itself been more thoroughly regulated; since we expect to be able to
solve our human and social problems by science and planning; since the hardships we
suffer are no longer 'unexplained' and 'unpredictable', so there is less thought of a
compensatory life hereafter" (Wilson 1976b, pp. 267).
As each of the new institutional spheres developed, they freed themselves, in
their own domains, from religious tutelage. But these new spheres did not rest content
with their newly acquired autonomy: they increasingly entered in competition with
religion. Thus for instance, the entertainment industry "was from the outset a
challenge to religion, offering diversion, other reinterpretations of daily life, and
competing for the time, attention and money of the public. [...] From being a very
277
Wilson's argument is obviously very close to Berger's: The plausibility of religion declined because its
social base had disappeared: "Christianity was an effective religious system as long as cultural constraints
were solemnized in community life. But once anonymity and impersonality became the dominant
experience of man in western society, so Christianity, like any institutionalized religion, lost its grip on
culture" (Wilson 1976a, p. 103).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
217
powerful voice in the local community, the clergyman became one of several voices
with divergent religious messages" (Wilson 1966, pp. 40-41).
Another example is provided by art. Once it has freed itself from religious
supervision, Wilson tells us, art becomes a very dangerous competitor for religion.
"Art deals, as religion deals, in emotional responses, in meaningful communications,
in interpreting, evaluating, evoking responses and inviting the individual's
participation in a complex set of conceptions and feelings" (1966, p. 43). Therefore,
the development of autonomous art forms further encroaches upon the claims
religious institutions lay on the conduct of the individuals' lives and thoughts.
Other institutional spheres which have become autonomous are law (1966,
p. 62), education, and politics (1966, pp. 58-59). Wilson also discusses these spheres
in some detail. But since the two examples just given seem sufficient to make the
point, I will refrain from discussing them.
Decline in Practice
As already mentioned, Wilson's views on the role of practice as an index of
secularization evolved over time. This change reflects a similar change in the
paradigm itself. In the early life of the paradigm, practice tended to play a more
considerable role than later on - if only because of the influence of Catholic sociology.
As criticisms against secularization theory developed, and as Catholic sociology as a
distinctive approach definitely disappeared, it became apparent that religious practice
was not as reliable an index of secularization as first thought. But as the idea of
decline of practice is congruent with the general logic of the paradigm, I will present
Wilson's early position.
Wilson recognizes that "the meaning of religion cannot be completely
assessed by numerical means, either by head-counting or attitude surveys" (1966, p.
1). This qualification having been made, he goes on to assert that "the decline in
organized religious participation indicates a way in which the Churches are losing
direct influence over the ideas and activities of men. [...] We can regard the evidence
of the statistics as an index of secularization in the sense of the decline of religious
influence and religious organization" (1966, p. 2). Wilson's figures, based on the
Church of England's own statistics (1966, p. 7, n. 1), are presented in several tables
(the only instance of the presence of statistical tables in any secularization theory in
the CISR paradigm). All indicators point to a declining involvement in religious rites:
decline of infant baptism rates, of the rate of confirmations, of Sunday school
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
218
attendance, of church enrollment, of Easter Day Communicants, and of religious
marriages (1966, pp. 5-16).
Unbelief*
Wilson expressed his views in relation to the notion of unbelief* in the
framework of the 1969 Conference on Unbelief organized by Berger and the Vatican
in Rome. Wilson finds the concept problematical, in the sense that in community,
where individual choice did not really exist, the very idea of "unbelief", as an
individual choice, did not really apply278. As a result, "over most of the historical past,
belief may be readily regarded less as a matter of individual choosing than of the
culture in which individuals lived" (Wilson 1971, pp. 247-48).
This having been said, however, secularization clearly has an impact on the
beliefs of individuals. The decline of practice must not be considered simply as a
phenomenon in the social structure; something has changed in the consciousness of
individuals, too. "It is not merely that the Churches have lost members, but that men
have largely ceased to think - or to respond - to the world with a sense of mystery and
awe" (Wilson 1966, p. 57). The reason for this change is directly linked to
rationalization. In principle, Wilson tells us, rational society "is an intellectually
comprehensible world, but it is not a world with which humans readily establish
emotional rapport. It is a world that can be comprehended, but which cannot be
understood" (Wilson 1971, p. 266). Thus, unlike Luckmann and Berger, Wilson
contends that unbelief* is linked to rationalization, and not to differentiation: "Actual
belief [...] appears to decline, and belief is only the most conspicuous aspect of
supernaturalist thinking. The rational structure of society itself precludes much
indulgence in supernaturalist thinking in the normal performance of social roles"
(Wilson 1975, p. 81).
But unbelief* does not affect just religion. As the rise of new cults like
scientology suggests, "many people have lost all faith in external systems of
knowledge, whether science, political theory, ideology, of religion. The cults suggest
that you can save yourself; and no one else, and nothing else, can" (Wilson 1976a,
p. 67).
278
This point is very close to the one made by Berger (see the section on unbelief* in the presentation of
Berger's theory above).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
219
Rationalization (second part)
As noted above, rationalization was the single most important cause for the
rupture*. But in a sense, rationalization can also be viewed as one of the
consequences of autonomization. The freedom society takes to apply rational criteria
is in itself an indication of the measure to which it has become autonomous from the
norms edicted by the church. Thus, society, which is a rationally planned pattern of
social life, sets the framework for the present situation* of religion.
Society distinguishes itself from the community in that social control is
realized through juridical and technical (vs. moral) procedures, in that social cohesion
is prescribed in constitutions (vs. resting in religion), in that the interpretation of the
world is made in scientific (vs. religious) terms, and in that the canalization of the
emotions is achieved through the entertainment industry. "Society [...] involves the
interaction of unknown role-players. [...] Society is a centralized, rationally articulated
system, increasingly organized and consciously planned. It is increasingly dominated
by instrumental values" (Wilson 1976b, p. 264). "The old control, with its 'letters of
testimony' [...] relied on a man's general disposition to industriousness, punctuality,
thrift, sobriety, willingness and reliability: the new control demand nothing of his
'character' - the conveyor-belt could exact from him all the control that was needed,
Industry has thus passed from internalized 'character' values, to mechanical
manipulation. Thus it has turned from religious socialization to technical devices for
the means of regulating the work situation and the productive process" (Wilson 1966,
p. 48). In other words, "societal organization demands the mobilization of intellectual
faculties: it contrasts with the requirements of community organization, which relies
on the mobilization and manipulation of affective dispositions" (Wilson 1976b, p.
260).
Wilson's view of modern society is nothing but rosy279: "Control has become a
matter for mechanical and bureaucratic devices. It has become impersonal and
amoral, a matter for routine techniques and unknown officials. Our world has been
de-moralized" (Wilson 1976a, pp. 19-20). As a result, "widespread and intensive
moral socialization of children has become cost inefficient" (Wilson 1985a, p. 321).
279
In his stress on the discontents brought about by secularization, Wilson is very close to both Luckmann
and Berger. Berger also laments the "loss of community" (see for instance Berger [1976] 1977, p. 60), and
his general anti-modernist stance in Facing up to Modernity (1977) is very similar in its intent, if not in its
tone, to Wilson's chapter on "Secularization and its Discontents" (Wilson 1982, pp. 148-179). While he
does not as explicitly share this stance, Luckmann seems to agree with Wilson's general appreciation on the
decline of the role of socialization (see for instance Luckmann 1979, p. 135).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
220
Sociologization*
As already noted, Wilson lies great stress on the "rational", bureaucratic aspect
of modern societies. Modern societies, he explains, are rational, and hence, they can
be subjected to rational planning. In other words, secularization fosters a situation in
which men feel that they are able to use a rational view of the world (for instance
sociology) to determine which social arrangements are to be preferred, and to
implement the chosen arrangements. On the very first page of Contemporary
Transformations of Religion, we read: "Perhaps the most significant aspect of our
conception of what it means to be modern, is the idea that we can consciously change
the character of society and the condition of our lives. [...] We are committed to the
idea that we can make the future, by conscious planned activity. [...] When once we
thought that consequences were God's will, we now deliberately programme, regulate,
and organize our own future - in family planning" (Wilson 1976a, p. 1). In this
framework, sociologists play a very important role: "Societalization[280] [...] is the
process by which the apparently 'accidental' effects of particular social arrangements,
which remained undiscovered until sociologists discovered them, are subjected to
rational thought and deliberative action" (Wilson 1976b, p. 268).
But sociologization* is not only one of the consequences, but also one of the
factors promoting further secularization. "The very conception that social
arrangements, distributions of power, wealth, prestige, life chances and the general
pattern of life circumstances, can be affected by instrumental action, and primarily by
mass decision-making (or decision-making in the name of the masses) has in itself
gradually altered man's recourse to demands for supernatural intervention in his
affairs" (Wilson 1966, p. 36). However, there remains a paradox: this does not mean
that individuals have become more rational. Even though in the early phase of his
thinking, Wilson tended to believe to a certain extent in rational man, this belief was
always subordinated to an emphasis on the rational organization: "Men may have
become more rational, and their thinking may have become more matter-of-fact, as
Veblen expressed it, but perhaps even more important is their sustained involvement
in rational organizations [...] which impose rational behaviour upon them" (1966, p.
37; see also 1971, p. 266).
280
"Societalization" is a word coined by Wilson himself (Wilson 1982, p. 154, n. 6).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
221
Secularization does not imply disappearance
As Wilson is the most assertive of all carriers of the CISR paradigm, I have
chosen to pick him to support my case that this paradigm does not imply the
disappearance of religion. Wilson explicitly recognizes that, in spite of secularization,
and even though religion has become socially irrelevant, humans continue to need it.
But the reason they still need religion is not related to one of the explicit functions of
religion, but to one of its latent functions: the need for community life. In our cold,
impersonal society, religion provides a kind of ersatz for the vanished community.
The kind of togetherness provided by traditional religion, however, is itself empty,
nearly anonymous (Wilson 1968, p. 79). It is in this context that the rise of the new
religious movements must be understood: "There is no doubt that men hanker after
the benefits of community, seek contexts in which they are personally known, and in
which they share responsibilities with others. New religious movements can supply
precisely this context in a way that no other social agency can do" (Wilson 1982, p.
134; see also 1976a, p. 96). Even though this type of remark is most typical of
Wilson's later writings, it is also to be found in his early works, before the new
religious movements had become a popular topic. Thus in 1968, he asserted:
"Prophets arise in times of social distress, and distress in contemporary society
appears to be very widespread" (Wilson 1968, p. 100). In 1969 in Rome he observed:
"Sectarianism has frequently been associated with secularization. New religious
movements are an expression of man's needs for religious gratifications and religious
accommodation that arise in circumstances where old religions have ossified"
(Wilson 1971, p. 268).
Wilson's secularization theory explicitly refutes the idea that religion is in the
process of disappearing: "What [my] definition [of secularization] does not imply is
that all men have acquired a secularized consciousness. It does not even suggest that
most individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion, even though that may
be the case. It maintains no more that religion ceases to be significant in the working
of the social system. [...] Religion's loss of significance may cause men to gain
psychological or individual independence from it, but that is a matter to be
investigated, since there may be other mon-religious constraints which operate to hold
men to religious institutions or to persuade them to go through the motions of
religious rituals" (Wilson 1982, pp. 149-50). To summarize: "Religion is not
eliminated by the process of secularization, and only the crudest of secularist
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
222
interpretations could ever have reached the conclusion that it would be" (Wilson
1987b, p. 8).
In conclusion, I would like to stress the coherence, on the logical level, of
Wilson's model. For reasons already mentioned, this coherence does not appear in neatly
organized patterns. But on some occasions, it clearly emerges in sentences which
crystallize, as it were, this coherence. Witness the following utterance, in which the three
core exemplars of the paradigm, worldliness*, rationalization, and differentiation, are
brought together: "The laicization [read: worldliness*] and incipient rationalization that
have occurred in Christianity is wholly consonant with the steadily growing influence of
science and technology [read: rationalization] in western cultures generally, and with the
way in which society itself has been systematically reorganized [read: differentiated]"
(Wilson 1982, p. 81).
David Martin
David A. Martin was born in London in 1929281. After teaching for seven years in
primary schools, he earned an external degree in sociology from the University of London
through private part-time study282. He received his Ph.D. from the London School of
Economics in 1964. In 1965, Martin burst into the secularization "debate" with a paper
entitled "Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization" (Martin [1965] 1969, pp. 922). The paper started with a warning: "This is a work of 'demolition'". True to his word,
Martin systematically attacked the "utopian elements" of the notion of secularization.
Briefly stated, Martin's argument rests on the idea that there can be no yardstick allowing
us to measure anything which could be designated as secularization. All the notions - like
"this-worldliness", or "religion" - which could be put to this use are much too ambiguous
and shifting with regard to different historical circumstances to allow for comparison283.
Secularization theory must therefore be understood as expressing a variety of counterreligious ideologies - most notably rationalism, Marxism, and existentialism. In other
papers reprinted in The Religious and the Secular, Martin continued to undermine the
281
The International Authors and Writers Who's Who.
Some of these informations appear on the dust jacket of Martin 1969.
283
Martin's argument rests mainly on the assumption that, as "worldliness", for example, can be defined in a
number of different and incompatible ways, it is not a meaningful concept. Martin furthermore argues that
one cannot even resort to the alternative of selecting one of these definitions at the expense of the others,
since this course of action would lead to "unintelligibility. For example, an analytic definition which
identified the secular in terms of an acceptance of power and wealth would require the growth of the
Christian Church and its subsequent dominance to be taken as illustrating a process of successful
secularization" (Martin [1965] 1969, p. 13).
282
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
223
secularization thesis, pointing to its diverse "utopian aspects" (1969, pp. 23-36), and
underscoring the polysemy of the concept (1969, pp. 48-57).
In the following years, Martin joined the scholarly community vindicating the
secularization paradigm. From 1975 through 1983, he acted as president of the CISR.
During the same period, he appeared to retreat from his former position. In 1978, he
published a book under the title A General Theory of Secularization. The title of the
book, however, is rather deceiving. By "general", Martin does not refer to some universal
process, but rather to a series of considerations qualifying an unduly universalistic theory:
"The general theory is general in that it relates 'universal processes' which are empirically
quite well established to a typology of cultural contexts and then specifies the type of
refraction[284] which the processes then undergo" (Martin 1978, p. 3).
Martin's position on secularization is not easy to understand. In 1965, he wanted
to eradicate "secularization" from the dictionary (although later on, he explained that he
wanted to "open a debate rather than to banish a word"; 1978, p. viii), but in 1978, he
proposed a secularization theory under the most ambitious title ever. To give another
example of apparent inconsistency, the concluding sentence of the 1965 essay read:
"Secularization should be erased from the sociological dictionary" (Martin [1965] 1969,
p. 22); but the next essay reprinted in the same book (written four years later!) started
with these words: "Christianity has experienced at least two major types of
secularization" (Martin 1969, p. 23). These apparent contradictions often draw gently
ironical remarks from his colleagues285. Martin answers by describing these two analyses
as running "along two lines" (Martin 1978, p. vii) which are not contradictory. There is
indeed good evidence that Martin did not really shift his views, but held them
concomitantly. The first chapter of the General Theory, which constitutes its blueprint,
was written as early as 1968 (1978, p. vii) - three years before the publication of an article
in which he essentially reasserted the conclusions of his 1965 iconoclast paper (Martin
1971). Martin's position with regard to secularization can best be understood if one
considers that he is opposed to the notion of secularization as a unilinear, irreversible
process, but agrees with the idea that secularization is a complex and ambiguous process.
The writings of Martin probably provide the most typical example of "moppingup" work in the framework of the secularization paradigm. At the onset of his General
Theory, Martin accepts the pattern of secularization, as laid out, among others, by his
284
Martin's vocabulary is very picturesque. Witness for example this alternative formulation of the same
idea: "Certain 'general' processes in modern society are funnelled through varied patterns which alter their
form, color, pace and detailed impact" (Martin 1978, p. viii).
285
This happened fairly often in the interviews.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
224
friend Bryan Wilson (Martin 1978, p. 12). But he remains rather vague about this
underlying process. "Certain broad tendencies towards secularization in industrial society
have already been fairly well established. They are of the following kind". What follows
is a list of seven quite classical items (like industrialization, urbanization, differentiation,
etc.), the seventh of which reads: "And so on. There is a wide variety of such
propositions" (1978, p. 3). To my knowledge, the most detailed analysis286 of the
underlying process attempted by Martin is to be found on pages 115-17 of The Religious
and the Secular (Martin 1969). I would contend that this apparent sloppiness is possible
precisely because Martin works in the framework of an established paradigm287, and that
his concern is not to revise or re-state the basic features of this paradigm, but to bring it in
closer harmony with empirical (i.e., historical) evidence. This, in other words, is exactly
what Kuhn calls a "mopping-up operation".
Starting from this "universally" acknowledged process, Martin then proceeds to
introduce some qualifications. In other words, Martin contends that the exemplars would
apply only if all other things were equal. "But things are not equal - ever - and [...] they
are most conspicuously not equal with respect to the particular cultural [...] complex
within which they operate" (Martin 1978, p. 3). In light of this fact, Martin introduces
very numerous qualifications into secularization theory. In his commitment to a complex
view of the secularization process, he often seems to somehow abandon the general
thread of his argument to inquire into multi-faceted variations of the pattern. As a result,
his typologies are not always consistent, his terminology is shifting, and many things
remain implicit. I will not even try to be exhaustive in my presentation of Martin's
argumentation, but will rather stick to the most general contours of his theory.
Martin's qualifications bear primarily on two exemplars: pluralization* (Martin
speaks only of pluralism), and differentiation. Pluralism is the most important of the two.
It is treated in the General Theory as an independent variable, whereas differentiation
appears as one of the dependant variables. Martin's central idea is that the degree of
pluralism in a given country will have a very powerful effect on the outcome of the
secularization process. The countries analyzed can all be situated on a continuum which
runs from those where religion is organized on a monopolistic model (Spain and
286
This analysis contains nothing original. Its main elements are: 1) differentiation; 2) the impact of
science; 3) a variety of other processes, like social mobility and technical change.
287
Of course, one could contend that sloppiness can be explained on account of the author's failures. In the
case that interests us, however, what must be noted is that Martin's theory has been very well received by
the scientific community (a fact that particularly struck me in my interviews: Everyone admires Martin's
theory very much) in spite of its "sloppiness". This fact, I would contend, can only be understood against
the paradigm background.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
225
Portugal) to the country where religion is the most pluralistic (the United States). Along
this continuum, three broad categories emerge: 1) Catholic Monopoly; 2) CatholicProtestant Duopoly, or the Mixed Pattern; 3) Protestant Pluralism.
In the case of the Catholic monopoly, the transition to "modernity" is assisted by
the Enlightenment (1978, p. 8). The gist of Martin's argument is that, as a result, society
splits into two warring halves: Catholicism comes to be identified with the antecedent
system of authority. In other words, there appears a bipartition between Catholicism and
secularism, and the Church becomes an ally of the political right - so much so that even
some religious groups (Protestants, Jews) may find themselves pressed into an alliance
with irreligion. A vicious circle ensues, in which religion becomes a bone of political
contention. By contrast, in the case of Protestant pluralism, this vicious circle never starts.
The transition to "modernity" having been assisted by Calvinism, religion as such never
becomes a political issue. There is no inherent conflict between "progressive" secular
forces and "reactionary" religious forces, and the political and the religious
establishments are from the start clearly differentiated. The plurality of the confessions
makes possible the adaptation to the different political attitudes and status levels: "The
universalization of dissent permits religion to take on as many images as there are social
faces" (1978, p. 30). Religion dilutes itself into civil society, and a vague "civil religion"
emerges to legitimize the state. With the intermediate, or "mixed" pattern, the situation is
more complex. On the one hand, two quasi-monopolies (in the approximate "60/40" ratio)
vie for domination. Generally, Protestantists are the majority, while Catholicism is a
powerful minority (the best example being the Netherlands). This situation could lead to a
fratricide confrontation. But on the other hand, this very danger forces every side to make
compromises in order to maintain unity. Thus, a pattern of tolerance emerges, which
crystallizes itself in a federalist structure. Furthermore, the Catholic Church contributes to
this "beneficent circle"288 by appearing politically on the left or on the center, thus
removing the issue of religion from the political arena.
This basic tripartite typology is rendered much more complex as Martin examines
some other factors, like the relation of religion to nationalism (which can affect the
Catholic pattern, as in the case of Poland), the existence of large minorities concentrated
in a particular geographical area, or the "secular monopolies of the left" (communist
countries). I will refrain from discussing these further complications, since they would
carry me too far away from my concerns.
288
As opposed to the "vicious circle" obtaining in Catholic monopolies.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
226
The second exemplar where Martin brings major qualifications is
differentiation289. Martin's strategy is to "[run] the impact of differentiation [...] through
the refracting elements of the various patterns [on the monopoly/pluralism continuum]"
(1978, p. 69). Differentiation is thus in a way treated as a dependent, or at least as an
intervening variable: what, given a certain pattern of pluralism, is the further impact of
differentiation on secularization? Martin analyzes this impact with respect to different
dimensions of differentiation: between church and state, in politics, in the unions, in
voluntary associations, and with respect to cultural identity. The most interesting for our
purposes is the differentiation between the church and the state. In Catholic countries, one
finds "enormous pressures toward the separation of church and state, of Christianity and
civil religion, simply on account of the immense split over religion per se" (1978, p. 71).
As one moves in the direction of pluralism, the extent of the separation becomes less
marked: in Sweden, some degree of association between the church and the state obtains but it is minimal, because Sweden's pluralism is also minimal, in that it is limited to
internal dissent (1978, p. 33). In more genuinely pluralistic countries, like for instance
England, one finds a strong church-state relationship. But what about the polar case, the
United States? In a sense, this case seems exceptional. "However, as was argued earlier, it
is just this explicit separation of church from state that enables a pluralistic religion-ingeneral to buttress the higher-level legitimations of American society" (1978, p. 70). In
other words, the American state is not as differentiated from the church as appears on
paper, because it is firmly grounded in civil religion.
The upshot of these considerations is that secularization is far from being an
universal or unilinear process. What the secularization paradigm has gained through
Martin's work is a further refinement and distance from the mechanistic XIXth century
evolutionary assumptions. Another interesting feature of Martin's analysis results from his
ambiguous position with regard to secularization, a position which has consequences for
one of the most important exemplars: generalization*. As noted above, the acceptance or
rejection of this exemplar rests largely on an a priori decision: the definition of religion.
People like Luckmann (and, as we will see, Parsons and Bellah), who work with a
sufficiently large definition of religion, accept the idea of generalization*. These theorists
are also the most inclined to reject "secularization", precisely because they estimate that
the idea of generalization* is incompatible with the notion of a decline of religion. On the
other hand, people like Berger and Wilson, who work with a much narrower definition of
289
Differentiation is defined by Martin as "the process whereby each social sector becomes specialized"
(Martin 1978, p. 69).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
227
religion and pass a more severe judgment on its fate tend to refuse the idea of
generalization*. Martin takes an intermediate position in this context. He accepts both
secularization and generalization*. And he shows why the two must be linked: "Any
characterization of the United States must emphasize the fact that it represents a very high
degree of differentiation in that church is formally separated from the state and even
religion from the school, and yet the overall social order is legitimated by a pervasive
civil religion. The differentiating impulse presses a sociological retro-rocket, and in
America this is exemplified by its civil religion as described by Robert Bellah and
William [sic] Herberg" (1978, pp. 28-29). No matter what justified reservations one may
have concerning the notion of "sociological retro-rocket", the link between differentiation
and generalization* is clearly brought out: If religion takes as many forms as there are
social interest groups, it can no longer function as a unifying world view, therefore some
kind of national myth has to emerge to foster unity (1978, p. 36).
Richard Fenn
Richard K. Fenn was born in the early 1930s. After an original training in
theology, he became a minister of the Episcopal Church. Very soon, however, having
read Bonhoeffer and Bultmann, Fenn concluded that they were right, and decided to live
in the world "as though God were dead". He left the congregation, and became a
sociologist290. Thus, Fenn clearly came to the study of secularization through secular
theology. In one of his first papers (Fenn 1968), he analyzed the death of God theology as
the symptom of an ideological crisis in American society. From these concerns with
theology, he quickly moved to the problem of secularization as posed in sociology. In
1969, he published a paper where he lay the foundations for "attempt[ing] to develop a
testable theory of secularization" (Fenn 1969, p. 112). After breaking down the
"religious" and the "secular" orientations into different dimensions of normative
orientation, Fenn challenged the conventional labeling of certain activities as "religious",
and of others as "secular", thus laying the groundwork for his later approach.
But Fenn's first major contribution to the secularization debate came in the form
of an attack on Parsons entitled "The Process of Secularization: A Post-Parsonian View"
(Fenn 1970). Fenn's dissenting opinion is based on an alternative view on the process of
differentiation. Differentiation, Fenn argues, does not result simply in the specialization
of different institutions, but also in a separation between the different levels which
290
Interview with Richard Fenn.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
228
Parsons considers as congruent: culture, social structure, and personality. The very fact
that culture, as well as social structure, have become internally differentiated makes
congruence impossible: "How [is] congruence [...] to be achieved if incongruence obtains
within the culture itself and if subvalues proliferate on the structural level [?]" (1970, p.
131). In making his intervention, Fenn recognizes that he enters a debate that has been
going on for some time, and he explicitly refers to Luckmann: "What [...] distinguishes
Parsons is the basic premise of congruence, whereas a writer such as Luckmann begins
his analysis with the frank recognition of incongruence in modern society" (1970, p. 129).
As a result of this position, modern society cannot be considered to be based on a moral
order; the sources of its integration must lie elsewhere291. The essay concludes on an
outline of a theory based on a totally different model, in which the conflicts, at the
cultural as well as at the social level, constitute the theoretical focus.
This first sketch was developed further two years later in a paper in which Fenn,
influenced by Daniel Bell292, argued that not only did modern societies depend much
more on partial than on total ideologies, but that these partial ideologies were increasingly
limited to pragmatic interests and utilitarian norms: "It appears to be characteristic of
modern societies to avoid conflict over matters of value and to reduce conflict to the level
of instrumental concerns, to matters of fact" (Fenn 1972, p. 20). Modern societies are
viewed by Fenn as moving toward a dual model, in which, in view of the fact that a large
minority is chronically unemployed, it could be advantageous, rather than deleterious, to
decrease the level of motivational commitment: "Modern societies [...] will be able to
afford higher levels of motivational noncommitment and may even seek to raise the level
of noncommitment in order to 'cool out' overmobilized segments of the population"
(1972, p. 29). The general conclusion with regard to secularization is very close to
Wilson's293: "Secularization therefore does not drive religion from modern society, but
rather fosters a type of religion which has no major functions for the entire society"
(1972, p. 31).
Although these considerations were developed again in a somewhat different form
in a later paper (Fenn 1974), this new formulation did not include any dramatic shifts. In
1978, basing himself on these first sketches, Fenn put forward a complete formulation of
a secularization theory, under the modest title: Toward a Theory of Secularization. As
291
For a detailed discussion of Fenn's position on social integration as contrasted with Parsons', see
Tschannen 1989.
292
Bell was not mentioned in the 1970 paper.
293
Fenn does refer to Wilson, but rather on the subject of sects.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
229
this piece of writing contains the most explicit and complete treatment of the subject, we
can turn directly to it to present the theory.
Fenn's secularization theory comprises five steps. These steps, however, are not
strictly chronological. Even though step two, for instance, cannot take place as long as
step one has not happened, there is not a clear-cut transition from step one to step two.
For one thing, even when step two has started, the processes characteristic of step one are
not abolished: The different steps can exist simultaneously. Furthermore, there is no
necessary pattern leading from one step to another, but a return to a previous step is
always possible. Fenn's secularization theory is the most open-ended of all those analyzed
in the present work. "We must [...] be prepared to see the process of secularization in
complex patterns: as a cause as well as an effect of religious groups, movements, and
institutions; as proceeding according to a variable sequence of events and leading
toward no single outcome; and as involving a number of reversals and simultaneous but
contradictory developments at different levels of a single society" (Fenn 1978, p. 29).
This having been said, it remains true that Fenn's five steps are arranged in a roughly
chronological order, and that his theory needs almost no reconstruction to fit my own
diachronic scheme.
Fenn does not explicitly discuss the initial situation* with regard to religion before
the onset of secularization. But this situation is clearly assumed to be a form of religion in
which there are no religious specialists. Step one of the process, which corresponds to the
rupture*, is the emergence of the clergy. This first step is described very rapidly: half a
paragraph on pp. xvii-xviii, and one paragraph on p. 32 (1978). From this, we gather that
a clergy, as clearly distinct from the "cultural or political center of a community" (1978,
p. xviii), first appeared "several millenia ago" in the primitive communities, and that this
event "lies at the origins of secularization" (1978, p. 32). This process of differentiation,
however, does not only lie at the origins of secularization; it constitutes one of the aspects
of secularization itself. During the whole process of secularization, well after the next
steps have come into effect, distinct religious institutions continue to emerge. Thus, step
one of the process remains effective all along. In other words, Fenn's view is based on the
idea that the basic phenomenon underlying secularization (both in the sense of having
started it, and of constituting its continuous underlying frame) is differentiation.
However, the resulting process can be reverted in certain historical circumstances: Just as
new religious institutions can appear, so they can disappear, giving rise to a greater
homogeneity (1978, p. 32).
The second step in Fenn's process is the "demand for clarification of the boundary
between religious and secular issues" (1978, p. 32). This step is also very rapidly
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
230
described, in less than one page. The demands for clarification represent the correlate, on
the ideational level, of differentiation on the social-structural level: "The separation of
religious from secular issues often takes longer than the separation of religious from
secular structures" (1978, p. 33). In a sense, up to this point, Fenn's theory is exactly the
opposite of Luckmann's. As we remember, Luckmann argues that societies became
differentiated first on the level of culture, and that from this initial event, a further
differentiation on the cultural level arose. In other words, although Fenn uses the same
exemplar as Luckmann, he uses it in a theoretical framework that is so singular that the
end result is markedly different in some respects294. As the issue of the clarification
between the religious and the secular issues lies at the very heart of Fenn's conception of
secularization, a few clarifications as to this notion are in order. As an introduction to this
approach, we must briefly mention one aspect of Fenn's broader approach.
Fenn's secularization theory is inserted in a sociology of sociology perspective.
One of the results of secularization is to "undermine [...] confidence in our belief that a
social whole exists which is more than the sum of its [...] parts" (1978, p. xiii). In other
words, to speak of "American society", for example, can be no more than a convenient
metaphor. In the Durkheimian tradition (as continued most notably by Edward Shils),
however, this metaphor is taken at its face value. This tradition of sociological analysis
can be understood only as a response to the anxiety about the weakening of the
metaphysical status of "society" as a category: "The sociologist, like the priest, takes the
fragments of everyday life and displays an underlying, moral order" (1978, p. ix). Fenn
refuses this tradition which, following Ernst Cassirer, he calls "mythical sociology", and
places himself in the discursive tradition (as continued, most notably, by Daniel Bell):
"The tradition of Simmel and Weber [...] represents a far more secularized,
demythologized stage in the development of social theory. [...] Just as nineteenth and
early twentieth century sociologists demythologized religion, cannot the sociology of the
twentieth century demythologize sociology?" (1978, p. 6).
From this general perspective, Fenn draws the conviction that it is not the
sociologist's task to give a definition of the sacred, nor of religion. "Religion", or the
"sacred" do not exist as such; they are constructed by concrete human agents in a
continuing struggle for the legitimation of claims to social authority of different groups.
"To establish arbitrary semantic limits for the sake of analytical clarity would make
analysis all the more difficult since our terminology would fail to orient us to the highly
294
This again illustrates how a thinking in terms of paradigm, rather than in terms of theoretical
frameworks, allows us to understand the common infrastructure of different approaches.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
231
ambiguous and contestable boundary between the sacred and the secular. That boundary
is continually contested, expanded, obscured, and contracted in the process of
secularization" (1978, pp. 24-25). "Sociological language may offer premature clarity by
defining what is socially ambiguous, thus missing the sociological point" (1978, p. 29).
Indeed, as already noted on several occasions, sociologists who give a broad definition of
religion tend to refuse the idea of secularization, whereas those who work with a narrower
definition tend to accept it. In Fenn's view, this choice is not only a choice faced by the
sociologist, but a choice present in actual social life. Therefore, by choosing one or the
other of these definitions, the sociologist takes sides in the social contest, and thereby
incapacitates himself as an observer.
In other words, Fenn contends that sociologists fail to draw all the conclusions
contained in the notion of differentiation. As society has becomes structurally
differentiated, it has also lost its cultural homogeneity. As a result, the sacred is defined
differently by actors located in different institutional spheres. These different actors all
attempt to use "the sacred" to bolster their claims to social authority. Thus, secularization
is not caused by "impersonal or abstract forces like technology or education, but [by]
living and active human agents" (1978, p. xii). The conflicts between these agents must
not be brushed aside by definitional fiat, but rather taken as the very starting point of the
theory, placed at its very center: "My own approach is to regard these sources of
ambiguity as the essential ingredients of a theory that will locate and order them as
elements of a complex, indeterminate process" (1978, p. xvi). The aim of the theory must
not be to remove this dilemma, but rather to "articulate" it (1978, pp. 27-28). As a result
of this conception, Fenn uses a definition of secularization which is neutral with regard to
the definition of the scope of the sacred: "Secularization is a process in which the parts of
a society seek to define their relationship to each other and to the larger society" (1978, p.
29). Thus, although he uses the same exemplar as Luckmann, Fenn incorporates it in a
very different theory of religion. Religion is no longer a universal anthropological
foundation, but the result of a social struggle. As we will see, however, with regard to
secularization, the result is very similar: religion becomes at the same time generalized
and privatized, and the individual's relation to the social order undergoes a radical
transformation.
Step three in Fenn's scheme is the emergence of civil religion (generalization*).
This development comes as a response to the process of differentiation. Civil religion is a
creation which allows society to transcend the potential conflict between its different
constituent parts. In a way, this development constitutes a desecularization, in that one
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
232
level of society which was hitherto secular becomes encapsulated in religion. However,
this desecularization is, in large part, illusory. Fenn is definitely a critic of Bellah's civil
religion hypothesis. He considers this type of political religion to be merely "inauthentic
rhetoric" (1978, p. 43). Why, then, does he include civil religion in his scheme? Because
it constitutes one of the prime examples of the underlying process which lies at the heart
of secularization: the conflict over definitions of religion295. With civil religion, political
authorities use a religious legitimation as a basis for their claim to be taken seriously. But
they can do this only by redefining the boundary between the religious and the secular so
as to encompass the hitherto secular state into a religious conception. Thus, Fenn
considers that a complete secularization theory can be formulated only by combining
insights from the "mythic perspective" - of which he is rather critical - with insights from
the "discursive perspective" (1978, p. 10). Indeed, it is one of Fenn's basic aims to
disclose the "basic theoretical factors" that lie "beyond differing perspectives" (1978, p.
30). As we will see later on, this concern is characteristic of the mature phase in the life
of the paradigm.
Step four synthethizes all that has been said thus far. The struggle over the
boundary between the religious and the secular becomes general. Not only the clergy (as
in step two) and the state (as in step three), but a wide variety of groups, some of which
are very small, enter the contest, and redefine religion in their own terms. This new
development in the process of secularization first took place with the advent of the
Reformation, which, in giving the "sanctions of the sacred to private religious judgment",
started to "blur the line between the sacred and the profane that had been so carefully
drawn over centuries of conflict between church and state" (1978, p. 57). As a result, we
witness a dispersion296 of the sacred: "The dispersion of the sacred has given legitimacy
to a wide range of actors in modern societies: to charismatic individuals, to the people as
a whole, to elites with access to scarce or transcendent knowledge, and to large, powerful
institutions. [...] There is no single whole that can lend authority to particular parts
without being challenged by another part. [...] It is difficult to know whom to take
seriously because each part of the society may appeal to sacred or quasi-sacred sources of
authority" (1978, p. 37). A good example of such conflicts involving definitions of the
295
In characterizing civil religion as "inauthentic rhetoric", Fenn is not being faithful to his own principles:
he implicitly draws on a definition of religion that must be his own, personal definition, instead of leaving
that decision to the social actors. If we follow Fenn's own methodology, the question whether civil religion
is authentic or not can only be decided by the social struggle over the boundaries of religion.
296
The notion of the dispersion of the sacred is taken from Edward Shils (Fenn 1978, p. 36).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
233
sacred is the Jehovah's Witnesses refusal to salute the flag. In this context, decisions over
the boundaries of the sacred increasingly tend to befall to the courts.
This step again constitutes at once a move forward, and a move backward in the
process of secularization. On the one hand, the sacred becomes dispersed, and thus loses
some of its potency; but on the other hand, a growing number of groups, organizations
and people resort to the sacred to legitimize their claims at being taken seriously, thus
putting the sacred to a new use. As a result, uncertainty over the location of social
authority grows dramatically: "Demands to be taken seriously (claims to social authority)
therefore multiply as uncertainty increases regarding the sacred bases of such claims.
Indeed, the sacred becomes so widely dispersed, and the boundary between the sacred and
the profane so uncertain that societies develop acute uncertainties about the nature and
location of any social authority" (1978, p. 55).
Step five in Fenn's process defines the present situation*. Modern society is
characterized by a deep separation between the individual and the collective spheres. In
other words, "the boundary between what is personal and what belongs to the
requirements of institutional roles becomes another fluid boundary between the sacred
and the secular. Corporate goals and values become increasingly secular, while
individuals pursue values which they, at least, hold sacred" (1978, p. 64). Fenn takes from
James Coleman the idea that, in modern society, two parallel worlds co-exist: the
powerful world of the corporate actors, and the increasingly irrelevant world of the
individuals. So much so that "the individual, as an individual, is not part of the
relationship among corporate actors. He may fill a role in an institution, but it is the role,
not the individual, that is part of the corporate world" (1978, p. 66).
But what is, in this general context, the situation of religion? Roughly speaking,
the more a religious group accepts this dichotomy, the better it will be adapted to secular
society. More precisely, the position of the different religious groups can be ascertained
by the combination of two variables: the scope assigned to the sacred, and the degree of
integration between corporate and private value-systems. The four types defined by the
combination of these two variables can in turn be arranged on a continuum ranging from
the least to the most adapted forms of religion in a secular society. The least well adapted
type, which is exemplified by mainline Protestantism as well as by traditional
Catholicism, combines a wide scope of the sacred with a high degree of integration
between corporate and individual values. At the other end of the continuum, the religious
forms best adapted to secular society combine a rather limited scope of the sacred with a
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
234
low degree of integration between these two types of values297. The best examples of this
type are magical and occult religions (1978, p. 69). The two intermediate types are
represented by sectarian religions like Mormonism (limited scope of sacred/high
integration) and evangelical religions (wide scope of sacred/low integration). The general
conclusion reached by Fenn as to the fate of institutional religion in secular society is very
close to Wilson's: "The process of secularization, then, is compatible with esoteric or
occult religious culture. In fact, secularization may foster these forms of religion as a
reaction to pervasive routinization and rationalization in social and political
organizations" (1978, p. 72).
To conclude, as the reader may have noticed, while Fenn's secularization theory is
firmly grounded in exemplars contained in the secularization paradigm, he also puts
forward ideas which definitely go beyond this paradigm. Fenn is one of the major carriers
of the paradigm, but he may also be regarded as one of its most brilliant critics.
Karel Dobbelaere
Karel Dobbelaere was born in 1933298. After studying at the Catholic University
of Louvain (Belgium), he worked on a number of empirical research projects in the
sociology of religion. Already in these first empirical studies, Dobbelaere resented the
absence of a sound theoretical framework to guide his steps. In 1963-64, he did
postgraduate work at the UC at Berkeley299. In 1968, back in Belgium, he published a
trend report on the state of sociology of religion, and expressed his dissatisfaction with its
narrowly empirical focus. He concluded by welcoming Berger and Luckmann's recent
attempts at theoretical formulation (Dobbelaere 1968). As already mentioned, Dobbelaere
early became a very active member in the CISR300, and one of the most fierce opponents
of the rearguard of Catholic sociologists. At the 1969 CISR meeting, together with his
colleague Jan Lauwers, he again hailed Berger and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge
as a promising new approach allowing to move beyond sociologie religieuse (Dobbelaere
and Lauwers, CISR 1969, p. 123).
297
This argument is reminiscent of Luckmann's notion of privatization. Both hinge on the idea that the
individual is free to choose his own religious world view, precisely to the extent that this world view is
irrelevant to the workings of the institutional order. Like Luckmann, Fenn shows that modern society is
characterized by a new relationship of the individual to the social order.
298
Social Compass 37 (1), 1990, p. 44.
299
Interview with Karel Dobbelaere.
300
The first meeting he attended was in 1962, just before leaving for the United States (Interview).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
235
Dobbelaere's original position with regard to secularization was less than
enthusiastic. In a paper written with Lauwers, he expressed reservations about different
types of secularization theories, uncovering a variety of ideological elements in them
(Dobbelaere and Lauwers 1973, pp. 547-51). In spite of these different interventions, by
the end of the 70s, Dobbelaere was not, as yet, a significant figure in the study of
secularization. His contribution to the paradigm hinges mainly on one work, the trend
report written at Wilson's All Souls College in Oxford in 1977, which appeared in 1981
under the title Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept (Dobbelaere 1981). As the
title and the genre indicates, this report did not aim at presenting a new theory, nor even
an original contribution. And indeed, Dobbelaere's contribution to the secularization
debate is limited to matters of systematization and conceptual clarification. This, of
course, is no menial task; moreover, for our present concerns, this contribution is
particularly important. As a matter of fact, Dobbelaere's contribution has perhaps been the
most efficient of all in promoting the secularization issue to a paradigmatic status. By
offering an overview of the field, by mapping the terrain, identifying the most important
names in a quasi-official manner, and organizing them into a clear pattern, Dobbelaere
has transformed a somewhat shapeless "debate" into a quasi-institutionalized arena.
Dobbelaere's most important theoretical innovation is conceptual. He proposed to
consider secularization a multi-dimensional concept, which could be broken down in
three separate dimensions: laicisation (societal level), religious change (institutional
level), and religious involvement (individual level). In a later paper, however, he
acknowledged that his choice of the term laicisation had been rather unfortunate: "From
reviews and discussions with colleagues, I became aware that the term 'laicisation', which
I used in the sense of the French term, laïcisation, was confusing. [...] I now return to the
term 'secularization'" (Dobbelaere 1984, p. 200). Preferring, in the present context,
precision to historical accuracy, I will follow the same path, and replace "laicisation" by
"secularization" in the discussion of the 1981 trend report.
To repeat: Secularization must be considered as a multi-dimensional concept,
referring to three separate dimensions. When these three dimensions are considered
together (which is rare, and does not really make much sense in terms of a sociological
analysis), Dobbelaere refers to "secularization in general" (1984, p. 200). These
terminological discussion are important for our purposes. I would contend that
"secularization in general", as a somewhat unwieldy multi-dimensional concept,
corresponds to the pre-paradigmatic phase of secularization theory. "Secularization", as
one of the three dimensions, purged, as it were, of parasitic accompanying phenomena,
corresponds to the paradigmatic phase of secularization theory. In other words, by
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
236
"secularization" (or "laicisation" in the 1981 report) as over against "secularization in
general" (or "secularization" in the 1981 report), Dobbelaere, borrowing Shiner's (1967)
somewhat confusing terminology, refers to the most central exemplars of the paradigm:
"desacralization [rationalization*301], differentiation, and transposition [generalization*]"
(Dobbelaere 1981, p. 11). The two other dimensions, "church involvement" and "religious
change", which were very important in the pre-paradigmatic phase, have become
definitely peripheral in the CISR paradigm.
Let us start by taking a brief look at the two dimensions which were, as it were,
discarded by Dobbelaere302. First, "religious change" refers to all the changes, generally in
the direction of a modernization of religion (worldliness*) occurring inside religious
groups. The classical expression of this approach is the church-sect dichotomy, which
was so central to the sociology of religion for several decades. In proposing to replace the
notion of secularization with that of religious change, Dobbelaere follows in the steps of
Yinger303 (Dobbelaere 1981, p. 7), and answers a long-standing complaint by many
sociologists to the effect that it is wrong to judge negatively the adaptation of religion to
worldly values. Second, "religious involvement" refers mainly to changes in religious
practice, as measured in surveys. This dimension, which was central in the period of
sociologie religieuse, is considered by Dobbelaere not to be a very reliable indicator of
secularization. Thus, Dobbelaere's conceptual clarification essentially amounts to this:
Secularization must be considered a phenomenon occurring at the societal level.
Phenomena taking place at the institutional level (religious change) or at the individual
level (religious involvement) can be no more than accompanying dimensions within the
phenomenon of secularization in general.
As Dobbelaere's main contribution consists in the drawing of the map of the field
in which the secularization debate is held, we must take a close look at the structure of the
central part of his trend report, devoted to secularization. The chapter is divided into five
sub-chapters. The first deals with the problem of the "historical base-line": If we want to
assert that society has become secularized, we must contrast this state of affairs with
some previous historical period, in which society was not secularized. Quoting Martin,
Parsons, Gabriel Le Bras, Jean Delumeau, Mary Douglas and Wilson, Dobbelaere argues
301
Dobbelaere does use the term rationalization, but not in this particular passage.
I would not like to give the impression that Dobbelaere did not discuss these aspects. He devoted 34
pages to religious change, and 20 pages to religious involvement (as compared with 65 pages devoted to
secularization). But he discussed secularization first, and the main thrust of the report was clearly more on
this first dimension: "Although both topics, religious change and involvement, extend beyond the compass
of this study, I will discuss them in so far as they are related to laicisation" (1981, p. 14).
303
For a presentation of Yinger's argument, see chapter 10.
302
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
237
that the secularization thesis does not imply that we have fallen from some previous
golden age of religion: The Middle Ages, for instance, were certainly not as unanimously
Christian as sometimes thought. The second sub-chapter concerns the definition of
religion. After discussing the functional definitions (Yinger, Andrew Greeley, Parsons,
Bellah), Dobbelaere argues in favor of the use of a substantive definition. Next, he turns
to the problem of social integration, and presents the arguments of people like Parsons
and Bellah, who think that modern society needs religion for its integration, and of people
like Wilson, Fenn, and Luhmann, who think that it does not. Dobbelaere sides with the
latter, and concludes: "According to my definition, civil religion is not a 'religion'" (1981,
p. 48). The fourth sub-chapter is devoted to the question of the unilinearity of the
secularization process. Referring mainly to Martin and to Fenn, Dobbelaere shows that
secularization must not be construed as a unilinear, straightforward evolutionary process.
The last sub-chapter puts forward a distinction between two lines of analysis in
secularization theory: the "Durkheimian" line (Bellah, Parsons, and, to a certain extent,
Luckmann), and the "Weberian line" (mainly Wilson and Berger). Finally, Dobbelaere
briefly considers some other approaches, most notably Daniel Bell's, Niklas Luhmann's,
and Joachim Matthes'.
Dobbelaere's general argument can be summarized as follows. First, there are a
number of misconceptions concerning secularization that must be cleared away. On these
points, discussion is not possible: Secularization is not equivalent to a fall from grace, it
is not a process of religious pathology, and it is not an unilinear evolutionary process.
Second, there are a number of points on which discussion is possible. Religion can be
viewed either as necessary to social integration, or as not necessary. The first approach
considers secularization from a Durkheimian point of view; the second approach takes a
Weberian perspective. Finally, there is one rather peculiar point, concerning the definition
of religion. Dobbelaere argues that all working definitions of religion are substantial; that
even people who define religion functionally resort to a substantial definition once they
settle down to write an historical account, and that therefore, it is best to opt for an
explicitly substantive definition.
On this basis, Dobbelaere decides who has put forward "good" secularization
theories, and who has put forward "bad" theories, which must be rejected (of course, he
does not quite present the choice in these terms; but that is what he in effect does). In
doing this, he draws the boundaries of the CISR paradigm. Let us first take a closer look
at the people who are rejected. First, of all, and most importantly, Catholic sociologists,
as well as Marxists, were wrong because they equated secularization with decline in
practice: "We should make a clear distinction between secularization on the one hand and
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
238
religious participation on the other" (1981, p. 4). Similarly, a number of researchers in the
area of religion (for instance Harold Pfautz) were wrong because they equated
secularization with religious change. Finally, among those who did none of these
mistakes, Sorokin was wrong because his historical base-line was unacceptable.
Among the people who are right, we find, first of all, those who work with a
substantive definition, and in a Weberian line of analysis: Wilson, Fenn, and Martin.
Fenn's and Martin's theories are especially adequate since they underscore the complexity
of the secularization process. People working in the Durkheimian line - Luckmann,
Parsons, and Bellah - are not as close to doing "good" theory as those working in the
Weberian line, but, given certain qualifications, their accounts can also be accepted. Their
only mistake is that they pretend to be working with a functional definition. Fortunately,
however, they revert to a substantive definition once they settle down to do historical
work.
Dobbelaere's contribution thus represents the most explicit recognition of a
tendency characteristic of the mature phase in the life of the paradigm. Whereas in the
first phase (Luckmann, Berger, and Wilson), theorists refused or ignored the civil religion
hypothesis, in the second phase, as we saw first with Martin, then more clearly with Fenn
and with Dobbelaere, civil religion became an accepted constituent part of secularization
theory. Now of course, Parson's generalization theory, as well as the first formulations of
civil religion theory by Herberg and Marty, were all published well before the first
secularization theories of the CISR paradigm. The reason I chose to defer discussion of
Parsons and of Bellah's hypotheses to the end of this presentation is that I wanted to avoid
giving the spurious impression that there was any historical continuity from Parsons and
Bellah to Berger and Wilson. As a matter fo fact, quite the reverse is true. Even though
Berger and Wilson were, of necessity, acquainted with Parsons' work, their actual sources
of inspiration were quite different. Parsons and Bellah were drawn into the paradigm
against their will, and at a later stage, most notably by Dobbelaere's intervention. We will
therefore presently turn to Parson and Bellah. Before that, however, a few more words on
Dobbelaere are in order.
It is not necessary to engage into a more detailed discussion of Dobbelaere's trend
report. The bulk of it consists in detailed presentations of the arguments of the
secularization theorists. Since I have already presented them, I could only repeat myself.
It is clear, however, that Dobbelaere's reconstruction is different from mine: instead of
highlighting the exemplars, he highlights a number of theoretical questions. Although the
general picture is different, I would contend that our accounts are not at odds, but rather
complementary.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
239
In later papers (Dobbelaere 1984; 1985; 1987a; 1987b), Dobbelaere essentially
reiterated the arguments put forth in his 1981 report. In the first two of these papers, he
adopted a somewhat different approach, looking for divergences - in terms of different
"paradigms"304 - among secularization theorists instead of looking at convergences. The
list of important secularization theorists was reduced to four: Berger, Luckmann, Wilson,
and Luhmann305. However, Fenn and Martin were eliminated only for reasons of
expediency: they were not really necessary for the purpose at hand (1985, p. 383). The
only theoretical shift that is noticeable as far as Dobbelaere's conception of secularization
goes is an increased stress on differentiation as a central theoretical element - which is
probably the reason why Luhmann (see chap. 3) was brought into the picture (or the result
of his being brought in).
Talcott Parsons
The two carriers of the secularization paradigm which have not been discussed yet
are Parsons and Bellah. These two men developed their approaches in close cooperation,
and acknowledged their mutual debts in several places306. Their links with theorists
explicitly working in the framework of the paradigm, however, are almost nonexistent307. Starting with Parsons - some of whose early writings were already discussed
in chapters 9 and 10 - we will discuss only that small fraction of his later writings which
bears directly on two exemplars: differentiation and generalization.
Differentiation
Differentiation is not specifically a part of Parsons' sociology of religion, but it
is fundamental to his whole sociological approach. According to Parsons,
differentiation is an "evolutionary universal", that is, "a complex of structures and
associated processes the development of which so increases the long-run adaptative
capacity of living systems in a given class that only systems that develop the complex
can attain certain higher levels of general adaptative capacity" (1964, pp. 340-41). In
304
I have discussed this approach, and my reasons for disagreeing with it, in chapter 1.
Dobbelaere's late attempt to include Luhmann into the paradigm seems not to have been very successful
thus far (Luhmann was mentioned in the 1981 report, but rather as someone exemplifying a different
approach).
306
See for instance Bellah 1970, p. 20; Parsons 1974, p. 204.
307
The only reference known to me is a cursory remark by Parsons to the effect that "the story [is not even]
fully told in the usual sense of the term 'secularization' as used even by so sensitive a student as Peter L.
Berger" (Parsons 1974, p. 203).
305
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
240
other words, Parsons draws an analogy between the "human" and the "sub-human", or
biological realms, and argues that in both, any major transformation that will
dramatically increase the society's, or the organism's, adaptative capacity, is very
likely to occur, and will do so even in different evolutionary branches that are
maintained separated. Thus for instance, vision developed independently in the
molluscs, in the insects, and in the vertebrates.
In this framework, Parsons distinguishes three types of differentiation. The
two first types (vertical and horizontal differentiation) occur at the social-structural
level; the third occurs between the social and the cultural levels. Vertical
differentiation, which he also refers to as stratification, occurs when members of cadet
lineages in the kinship system, for instance, are put into subordinate positions.
Horizontal differentiation is a process which allows for the concentration of
responsibilities for certain functions of vital importance - most importantly politics
and religion (1964, pp. 342-43). The best example of the emergence of a distinctly
religious sphere is the emergence of the notion of "church", which "constituted the
differentiation of Christianity as a religious system (a cultural system) from the
conception of a 'people' as a social system" (1963a, p. 40).
As we can see, the notion of differentiation is not limited to a division of labor
in society, but also includes a differentiation between the "cultural" and the "social"
spheres. To understand this, we must start from the idea that "the differentiation
inherent in stratification creates new sources of strain and potential disorganization"
(1964, p. 345), and that this strain in the social system can be eased only by the rise of
cultural legitimations explaining the "necessity" of this incipient stratification. Thus,
legitimation itself becomes a distinctively differentiated social function:
"Legitimation is the differentiation of cultural definitions of normative patterns from a
completely embedded, taken-for-granted fusion with the social structure" (1964, p.
346). One precise example of such differentiation is the emergence of a "moral order"
during the Reformation. With this moral order, the individual was no longer
controlled directly by the Church hierarchy, but by the "normative order of secular
society" (Parsons 1962, pp. 148-150).
Generalization
The first sketch of Parsons' generalization thesis was put forward in 1957, in
an article we discussed in chapter 10. Rather than presenting this early version again, I
will directly present the theory in its mature form, as it appeared, most notably, in
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
241
Christianity and Modern Industrial Society (Parsons 1963a). In this paper, Parsons
proposes to consider that, although religion has to a large extent become privatized as
a result of differentiation - a fact which can be interpreted as a loss for religion - this
is compensated for by another, complementary process: generalization. To quote a
formulation used by Parsons in another paper, "there is indeed now a sense in which
church religion has come to be largely privatized, but concomitantly religious or
quasi-religious significance generalized to an immense range of what previously were
defined as more of less purely secular concerns" (Parsons 1971, p. 230). Privatization
"need not [...] imply that 'religion' has declined. It has, to be sure, assumed a more
restricted place in the cultural and social system, but this may in fact strengthen rather
than weaken its strategic importance" (Parsons 1966, p. 125).
By generalization, Parsons refers to the idea that, in the course of its
development, Christianity succeeded in institutionalizing in society at large a number
of originally religious values, thus giving them a more general significance and a
larger applicability. This process started with early Christianity, and was much
furthered by the Reformation (Parsons 1963a, p. 51). For our own purposes, it will
suffice to consider the last stage in this process, that of American denominational
pluralism: "From a religious point of view, [the voluntary principle and
denominational pluralism represent] the discrimination of two layers of religious
commitment. One of these is the layer which defines the bases of denominational
membership [...]. The other is a common matrix of value-commitments which is
broadly shared between denominations, and which forms the basis of the sense in
which the society as a whole forms a religiously based moral community" (1963a, p.
62). In other words, the American situation of fragmentation in different
denominations can continue to exist only because of the existence of another, nonfragmented level of commitment, which makes for the possibility of tolerance and
allows individuals to transfer from one denomination to another (Parsons 1966, pp.
136-38). This is the view which justifies the use of the term "generalization"308.
Not only is the religious commitment thus generalized, but the religious and
the secular spheres become closer to each other. If the secular world were regarded as
radically evil, the tolerance demanded by pluralism could never be attained. "For such
a religious constitution to function, on the institutional level the society must present
not a less but a more favorable field for the Christian life than did the society of
308
"The main common normative structure has come to be placed on a level of higher and higher
generalization if it was to include wider ranges of pluralistic diversity" (1966, p. 138).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
242
earlier periods of Western history; its moral standards must in fact be higher. [...] In a
whole variety of respects modern society is more in accord with Christian values than
its forebears have been" (Parsons 1963a, p. 65).
Thus, Parsons uses the term "secularization" with a meaning exactly opposite
to the usual. As he himself remarks, he is being "deliberately paradoxical in
attributing to the concept secularization what has often been held to be its opposite,
namely not the loss of commitment to religious values and the like, but the
institutionalization of such values" (Parsons 1971, p. 217, n. 11). Thus, in a moral
community characterized by what Parsons, following Bellah (Parsons 1968, pp. 44243), calls a "civil religion", every individual - even a "secular humanist" (Parsons
1971, p. 228) - can be considered a believer (1971, p. 224). Another consequence of
this view is that Marxism can be viewed as another form of religion, and that the cold
war can be interpreted as a new "war of religion" (Parsons 1974, pp. 207-09).
Robert N. Bellah
As noted above, Bellah's approach was developed in close cooperation with
Parsons'. Not surprisingly, it is also very close theoretically to the latter's. Both
approaches are based on an evolutionary view which involves two complementary
processes: privatization, and generalization. In Parsons' theory, the complementarity of
these two processes is clearly set forth. In Bellah's work, it is only latent309. The first half
of the picture is contained in a paper entitled Religious Evolution (Bellah 1970, pp. 2050); the second half is contained in the paper on American Civil Religion (Bellah [1967]
1970, pp. 168-89).
Privatization*
Bellah's paper on religious evolution represents an explicit effort at reviving
an evolutionary approach to the study of religion (1970, pp. 20-21). In keeping with
Parsons, Bellah defines evolution as "a process of increasing differentiation and
complexity of organization that endows the organism, social system, or whatever the
unit in question may be with greater capacity to adapt to its environment" (1970, p.
309
The only place to my knowledge where Bellah hints at the complementarity of the two approaches is
found in the paper on Religious Evolution. In this paper, where he gives an account of the process of
privatization*, he also mentions the institutionalization of religious values in society at large - without,
however, explicitly referring to civil religion (Bellah 1970, p. 39).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
243
21). Unlike Parsons, however, he applies this idea not to the evolution of the social
system, but to that of religion as a symbol system that "relate[s] man to the ultimate
conditions of his existence" (1970, p. 21). The resulting evolutionary view applies
exclusively to the structure of this particular system: "Neither religious man nor the
structure of man's ultimate religious situation evolves [...], but rather religion as a
symbol system" (1970, p. 21).
Religious evolution thus conceived combines two trends: complexification
and individualization. On the one hand, starting from an early undifferentiated
cosmos, religious symbolization first becomes dualistic (with a distinction between
this world and another world), then splits into an "infinitely multiplex" structure
(1970, p. 40). On the other hand, starting with the first rejections of the world around
the first millenium B.C., the human self starts to become conscious of itself. The
ultimate consequence of this rise of individual consciousness is the privatization* of
religion in modern society. These two trends are analyzed in terms of a succession of
five stages: primitive, archaic, historic, early modern, and modern religion.
For our present purposes, it will suffice to make some comments on the last
stage of this evolution. According to Bellah, since we are becoming increasingly
aware of the nature of symbolization itself and subject it to systematic intellectual
inquiry, it is doubtful whether we can even speak of a modern religious symbol
system. Hierarchic dualism has completely collapsed, as has become evident in the
works of theologians like Tillich, Bultmann, and Bonhoeffer. This breakdown,
however, has not entailed a return to what would be an equivalent of primitive
monism. Humans do not look at themselves in an unfragmented mirror: "It is not that
a single world has replaced a double one but that an infinitely multiplex one has
replaced the simple duplex structure. It is not that life has become again a 'one
possibility thing' but that it has become an infinite possibility thing. The analysis of
modern man as secular, materialistic, dehumanized, and in the deepest sense
areligious seems to me fundamentally misguided, for such a judgment is based on
standards that cannot adequately gauge the modern temper" (1970, p. 40).
In this new situation, the task of religious symbolization of the world "is no
longer the monopoly of any groups explicitly labeled religious" (1970, p. 42). What
we have, instead, is a recognition of the fact that every individual must interpret the
received tradition in a personal manner. "The fundamental symbolization of modern
man and his situation is that of a dynamic multidimensional self capable, within
limits, of remaking self-transformation and capable, again within limits, of remaking
the world, including the very symbolic forms with which he deals with it" (1970, p.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
244
42). These trends must not be interpreted as a "secularization", but as a new way of
producing religious symbolization, in which it is the individual, and no longer the
group, which must "work out his own ultimate solutions" (1970, p. 43).
Generalization*
Bellah's views on generalization* are almost entirely contained in the paper on
civil religion310 ([1967] 1970, pp. 168-89). The civil religion hypothesis is very close
to several earlier formulations, most notably Herberg's notion of operative religion311
(see chap. 10). Bellah's thesis is that "there actually exists alongside and rather clearly
differentiated from the churches an elaborate and well-institutionalized civil religion
in America" ([1967] 1970, p. 168). To sustain his claim, Bellah analyzes excerpts
from presidential speeches and from the Declaration of Independence. He notices that
they contain very frequent references to God - but not to the God of any denomination
in particular, only to an anonymous God. Through this reference, political power
comes to be responsible not only before the people, but also before God - thus gaining
a new legitimation, which is in some ways superior to democratic legitimacy. But
marks of religious symbolization in American public life are not limited to this
reference. Civil religion is a very complex entity, which can be described as "a set of
beliefs, symbols, and rituals" ([1967] 1970, p. 171). As for the beliefs, they are
centered on the idea that America is God's chosen people - a new Israel. American is
called to "carry out God's will on earth" ([1967] 1970, p. 172). The symbols of the
civil religion are mostly drawn from the Bible: "Exodus, Chosen People, Promised
Land, New Jerusalem, and Sacrificial Death and Rebirth" ([1967] 1970, p. 186).
Finally, good examples of national religious rituals are Thanksgiving Day, which
serves to "integrate the family into the civil religion" ([1967] 1970, p. 179), and the
inauguration of a new president.
American civil religion has always been closely tied to the unfolding of
American history. Religion, and particularly the idea of God, played an important part
in the thought of early American statesmen. Until the Civil War, "the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution were the sacred scriptures and Washington the
divinely appointed Moses who led his people out of the hands of tyranny" ([1967]
310
For the brief summary provided here, it is not necessary to rely on the more detailed, but also more
ambivalent, account given in The Broken Covenant (Bellah 1975).
311
However, there is at least one major difference: Herberg's "common faith" has a private, as well as a
public dimension (Herberg 1955, p. 89).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
245
1970, p. 176). With the Civil War, new themes entered the civil religion: death,
sacrifice, and rebirth. Lincoln, the assassinated president, was likened to Jesus, and
the huge number of war casualties led to the establishment of national cemeteries,
around which a new rite, Memorial Day, came to be performed. Thus, although civil
religion is not a religion in the conventional sense, it has "its own prophets and its
own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and
symbols" [1967] 1970, p. 186).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
246
CHAPTER 13
THE SECULARIZATION "DEBATE"
As can be expected, the formulation of the CISR paradigm did not bring the
discussion around the notion of secularization to an end. As a matter of fact, even though
secularization as a subject-matter is no longer as popular as it was in the late 60s and in
the 70s, the secularization question is still vigorously discussed today. These discussions
are sometimes referred to as the "secularization debate". However, as we will see
presently, this characterization is inadequate.There has never really been a debate around
secularization. Of course, this is not to dey that this question has produced a lot of heat: In
the last two decades, literally hundreds of papers and books related to secularization have
been published by scholars not directly related to the CISR scholarly community. I will
not even attempt to be exhaustive in discussing this literature, but will concentrate on the
most famous of these pieces of writing. In doing this, my assumption is not that the most
famous papers are the best (indeed, as I will show, some of them are rather poor). The
reason for this choice is that I am trying to consistently follow the principles of my
historical analysis. The CISR paradigm has been defined by an analysis of the opinion of
the members of the profession themselves; the sociologists who are considered to be its
opponents must be defined in the same fashion. I have therefore concentrated on certain
writings which I was attracted to because I often encountered references to them in my
study of the literature.
In 1969, the first international Conference on Unbelief held in Rome (Caporale
and Grumelli 1971) had been dominated by a positive assessment of "secularization
theory". The second conference, held in Vienna in 1975, signaled a change in mood: The
impression that prevailed this time was that secularization theory was in serious need of
revision (Caporale 1976, pp. 11-16). Thus, the CISR paradigm was challenged even
before it was to be fully established by the publication of Dobbelaere's 1981 trend report.
Before turning to the works of Greeley, Hadden, Stark and Bainbridge, Luhmann, and
Bell, which constitute the most famous of these challenges against secularization theory, I
would like to review a few more obscure works. Starting with the approaches most
sympathetic to the notion of secularization, we will progressively move our way out to
those that are more hostile.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
247
Inside, Outside, and Beyond the Paradigm: A Brief Overview
The works which can most legitimately be viewed as situated inside the paradigm
itself are those which explicitly or implicitly take the CISR paradigm as a basis for
normal research. Thus for example, in 1974, Alois Hahn expanded the reach of the
paradigm by incorporating into it a more detailed analysis of certain of its aspects, most
notably a discussion of the problems of personal identity and meaning-construction posed
by secularization (Hahn 1974). In 1975, Jean Delumeau demonstrated, in a brilliant
historical analysis312, that the thesis of a continuous decline of Christianity starting in the
middle ages was an optical illusion: In reality, the period extending from the XVIth to the
XVIIIth centuries was much more Christian in character than the previous period, which
was rather pagan (Delumeau 1975). In 1976, François-André Isambert stressed that
secularization was not only an effect of the impact of modern society on religion, but
must also be considered at least partially the result of an internal transformation of
religion (sécularisation interne313) based on a mythical view of primitive religion
(Isambert 1976).
But perhaps the best example of a research implicitly carried out inside the
framework of the paradigm is an empirical mopping-up operation carried out by Robert
Wuthnow. The different steps of Wuthnow's analysis exactly correspond to Kuhn's
account of such an operation. First, through an analysis of empirical findings, Wuthnow
uncovers a (well-known) "anomaly": contrary to the predictions of linear secularization
theory, religious decline has not been continuous, but discontinuous. To account for this
anomaly, Wuthnow proposed an ad hoc explanation, based on Mannheim's notion of
"generation units". A generation unit is more than an age cohort, in that it is "bound
together by a common structural location, a common cultural system, self-consciousness
as a social unit, and social interaction and solidarity among its members" (Wuthnow
1976, p. 851). Thus, as Wuthnow's detailed empirical analysis suggested, the religious
"decline" of the 60s (as opposed to the "revival" of the 50s) could be understood as an
effect of the counterculture of the generation unit of the young in late 60s. Having
established this empirical explanation, Wuthnow went on to suggest the corresponding
modification in secularization theory: "Discontinuities in the secularization process need
to be acknowledged as the rule, not the exception, in religious change. Theories of
secularization cannot rest content in focusing on only the more continuous effects of
312
313
The same type of analysis had already been put forward by Le Bras (1964).
As we can see, this term was not used by Isambert in the sense as by Luckmann.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
248
modernization or gradual evolutionary processes within religious institutions" (1976, p.
863). Finally, this corrective to secularization theory having been put into place,
Wuthnow concluded that the anomaly had been accounted for (to use a terminology
Wuthnow himself did not use: the anomaly had been eliminated as a threat to the
paradigm, and normal research could continue): "Fluctuations in religious trends need not
be discounted as embarrassing departures from sociological principles, but can be brought
within the realm of systematic sociological observation" (1976, p. 862). But this
successful mopping-up operation was not quite complete yet. As any good such
operation, it required and encouraged further refinement, as is evident from the literature
subsequently devoted to a reanalysis of Wuthnow's paper (see for example Rigney et al.
1978). Indeed, normal research in this domain is still going on.
But the attitudes of sociologists of religion discussing secularization are not
always as positive toward the paradigm. Most other people explicitly referring to the
CISR paradigm are much more critical of it. Many of these attempts boil down to not-sowell informed and largely ritual denunciations of the "mythological" aspect of
secularization theory (see for example Ferrarotti 1984). Others are better informed. Thus
for example, Enrica Rosanna concludes a book-long study of secularization theory by
arguing that sociologists have underestimated the resilience of historical religions (that is:
religions which contain in them an extra-human force, as opposed to a conception of
religion as a purely cultural product), and that we must consider the modifications
religions have gone through not only in negative terms, but as dynamic contributions of
religion to society (Rosanna 1973). Therefore, she argues, we should not speak about the
secularization of religion, but about its "transfunctionalization" (trasfunzionalizzazione).
Another well-informed, and much more sociologically inspired attempt, has been made
by Peter Glasner. In a dissertation written at the London School of Economics under the
direction of David Martin, Glasner attempts to show that "no scientific theory of the
secularization process has been developed" (Glasner 1977, p. vii), and that secularization
theory is based on "generalizations from limited empirical findings used by sociologists
to bolster an implicit ideology of progress" (1977, p. 64). The problem with Glasner's
approach is that he arbitrarily reduces all the theories to one of their dimensions. Thus for
example Wilson's theory is categorized as a theory of "decline" - but this categorization
rests only on the statistical aspect of Wilson's work, which we know to be of only
secondary significance. On the other hand, Wilson is excluded from the "differentiation"
category, where we find only Parsons and Bellah. Briefly, Glasner's classification of the
theories - which constitutes his basis for the claim that no theory has been formulated - is
the result of an attempt to impose on secularization theory an external and preconceived
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
249
frame of reference. By being too intent to uncovering what is "implicit" in the theories,
Glasner engages in a rather doubtful whiggish reconstruction reflecting mainly his own
interests, and not much of the authors' original intentions.
Two other contributions to secularization theory which must briefly be mentioned
are those by Sabino Acquaviva (1961) and by Alasdair MacIntyre (1967). Both these
theories were put forward before the formulation of the paradigm: Acquaviva's book,
which was revised and expanded several times, was first published in 1961, and the
lectures on which MacIntyre's book is based were delivered in 1964. Acquaviva's starting
point is psychological. Religion is bound to decline is modern society because technical
society is not compatible with the psychological underpinnings that sustain religion.
Desacralization (Acquaviva's equivalent for secularization) is an individual phenomenon
first, and a social phenomenon only derivatively. The history of desacralization is the
history of a global change in human psychology. This theory, one of the most radical
secularization theories, has never been taken very seriously by sociologists outside of
Italy314. As for MacIntyre's theory, it proposes only a fragmented view of secularization,
presented as a result of the breakdown of community life and of the emergence of
differentiated classes in the wake of the industrial revolution and of urbanization.
MacIntyre's central point is that industrialization did not directly cause secularization, but
rather that industrialization caused a moral decline, which in turn resulted in
secularization. As a result, it is useless to attempt to restore morality by restoring the
power of religion. MacIntyre's approach has never been considered very seriously either
by sociologists. The reason for the relative unsuccess of these two approaches must
probably be sought in the quasi-simultaneous emergence of the much more complete and
sociologically compelling works of Luckmann, Berger, and Wilson and their subsequent
crystallization in the CISR paradigm.
At this point in the analysis of the post-paradigmatic work, and before turning to a
more detailed analysis of more famous writings, I would like to stress that these (and
some of the following) somewhat skeptical comments on the research performed outside
the CISR paradigm do not imply that the paradigm is flawless, nor even very satisfactory.
They only imply that the paradigm remains the most satisfying tool to date for an
understanding of the historical evolution of religion in the western world. Obviously,
sooner or later, the paradigm will be superseded. But at present, approaches which really
314
One of the main reasons for that may be the exasperatingly disorganized pattern of the work. The
accumulation of details makes almost impossible the emergence of any global picture of the phenomenon
the author is trying to describe. This is a pity, since the psychological aspect of a technologized society,
which cannot be denied, has hardly been discussed by secularization theorists.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
250
allow sociology to move in that direction are very rare. Ironically, the most interesting
attempt yet to my knowledge to move beyond the paradigm is provided by one of the
carriers of the paradigm himself: Richard Fenn. As I have already extensively discussed
Fenn's work, I will not engage in a detailed presentation of his latest research. Some of
the original dimensions of his approach were already evident in his refusal to define
religion, and in his very open-ended reconstruction of the secularization process. Since
these early writings, he has moved on to explorations of the conflict of religious and
secular languages which break new ground (Fenn 1982; 1986; 1987). Fenn is the first
sociologist of religion I am aware of who, by shifting his empirical field from surveys and
church statistics to the secular courts, and his theoretical references from standard
sociology to speech-act theory, anarchist thought, and psychoanalysis, succeeds in
escaping from the narrow boundaries of functionalist sociology.
A Skinnerian Approach to Theoretical Misunderstandings
Let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of a few rather prominent sociologists
who very explicitly proposed alternative accounts of the secularization process. As we
will see, some of them are very critical of "secularization theory". But their criticisms
almost all miss their target, simply because the "alternative" view they propose is no
alternative at all: it is the very same view under a superficial terminological disguise. The
rest of this chapter will therefore be devoted mainly to the study of what could be viewed
as a big misunderstanding. Quite naturally, one is led to wonder how such a
misunderstanding was possible in the first place. How can people arguing against each
other fail to notice that they in fact agree?
As a matter of fact, the way I just put this question is rather misleading. In reality,
it is not so much the participants in the debate who are mistaken - although some of them
seem to be - as the observers of the debate. Noticing that one party puts forward
something called "secularization theory", while another party attacks something called
"secularization theory", the observer is almost bound to draw the conclusion that there is
a "secularization debate". This impression is compounded by the fact that the
pronouncements around secularization are often referred to as a "debate". This formula is
used by virtually everyone: by leading secularization theorists as well as by casual
observers. Witness for example the title of one of Wilson's papers: "The Debate Over
'Secularization': Religion, Society, and Faith" (Wilson 1975). Or the following assertion
by an external observer, Keiichi Yanagawa: "In the latter part of the sixties and all
through the seventies, there were various positions and extremely lively debates
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
251
concerning 'secularization' in the sociology of religion" (Yanagawa 1987, p. 1). Or, again,
the following title of a paper by Yves Lambert: "Un paradigme inspiré de Weber: pour
contribuer à renouveler le débat sur la sécularisation"315. Numerous other examples could
be presented316. But even when the word "debate" is not actually used, the verbal
behavior of some sociologists strongly suggests that such a debate is going on. Jeffrey
Hadden proposes to "desacralize" secularization theory (see below), a project to which
Frank Lechner answers by offering a "rebuttal" of the "case against secularization"
(Lechner 1990). Wilson asserts that "over the last twenty years, [...] secularization has
been the single most prominent issue engaging the minds of those who participated [in
the CISR conferences]" (Wilson 1987b, p. 5). And Luckmann asserts that "religion is not
disappearing from modern society and [...] is anything but shrinking. What did shrink is
the span of transcendence with which modern religions are primarily concerned. This
assertion is not in accord with the widely accepted notion that modern societies are
'secularized' and that secularism is an essential part of modern life" (Luckmann 1990, pp.
127-28).
However, as we will see, on closer inspection, it turns out that the "opponents" are
in fact not speaking of the same thing. Even in the rare cases where they nominally attack
each other, they are in reality not attacking the other's position, but merely trying to make
a point they consider very important. Thus, I will be arguing that the "secularization
debate" is mostly an optical illusion. There has never been such a debate. All there has
been is different groups of people interested in different issues, and all trying to make
their point by using the very convenient term "secularization".
The most important point which must be established in order to avoid the pitfall
of considering secularization a "debate" is: What was each group interested in when they
used the term secularization? To use a Skinnerian terminology, what were the different
groups doing in using the term secularization? As for the people explicitly working in the
framework of the paradigm - Berger, Wilson, Martin, Fenn, and Dobbelaere - the answer
is quite clear: they were trying to give a theoretical account of the transformations of
religion over a long historical period, thus establishing a foundation for the claim that
modern society was essentially secular, and must be understood in secular, and not in
religious terms. By doing this, they established the foundation for a sociology of religion
radically separated from theological concerns, resting on the insights of the "founding
315
In Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 61 (1), 1986.
To give a list which is far from being exhaustive: see the titles of contributions by Elio Roggero (1979)
and Jan Swyngedown (in the Journal of Oriental Studies 26 (1), 1987), the introductory text to the CISR
conference on secularization (CISR 1987, p. 7), and Robertson 1971, p. 297.
316
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
252
fathers", and incorporated in modern academic sociology. As we will see, people who
challenge secularization theory are all motivated by very different interests.
Homo Religiosus: Andrew Greeley
There have been several attempts to criticize secularization theory by putting
forward the idea that man's nature is essentially religious. We have already mentioned
several of these approaches, for example Eliade's and Luckmann's. But these criticisms
were expressed before the emergence of the CISR paradigm - in fact, Luckmann's
criticism was itself one of its foundations. In this section, I will concentrate on one writer
I take to be typical of this approach, and who was the first to directly challenge the CISR
paradigm: Andrew Greeley, a Catholic priest turned sociologist (as well as a very
successful writer of popular novels!).
The core of his argument was developed in a book published in 1972 under the
title Unsecular Man: The Persistance of Religion. Greeley has, to this day, remained a
staunch opponent to secularization theory, and does not miss one opportunity to denounce
it317. Indeed, according to Martin Marty, the critique of secularization theory is "the most
consistent motif" through Greeley's career (Marty 1974, p. 87).
A number of the criticisms levelled against theories close to Greeley's have
focused on the problem of the definition of religion. If religion is defined in very broad
terms as being part of human nature, it is argued, then of course any evaluation of
religious changes is bound to fail. This is not the line of argument I am going to follow. It
seems to me that religion can be defined in a number of different ways, all of which can
be legitimate as long as they are not reified. What I am going to argue, instead, is that
Greeley's argument to the effect that religion is a part of human nature does not run
counter the CISR paradigm.
As noted above, in order to understand what a theorist is saying, we must
understand his intentions. In other words, we must determine what this particular writer
was interested in. The main animus of Greeley's reaction against the secularization thesis
seems to be secular theology, most notably as represented by Harvey Cox318, whom
317
Greeley is an enormously prolific writer: as long as fifteen years ago, he had already published "forty
books and over one hundred articles in sixteen years" (McNamara 1974, p. 79). In 1972 alone, the year in
which Unsecular Man appeared, he published seven books. Greeley's most recent rebuttal of secularization
theory of which I am aware was published in 1989 under the title Religious Change in America (see the
review by Daniel V.A. Olson in AJS 95 (4), pp. 1099-101).
318
Even though Greeley was already speaking out against secularization theory before 1965, the appearance
of Cox's book seems to have dramatically bolstered his motivations.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
253
Martin Marty calls Greeley's bête noire (Marty 1974, p. 88). Indeed, Greeley reacted very
rapidly and vehemently to the Secular City. His hasty comments, included in The Secular
City Debate (Callahan 1966), hinge on the notion that Cox's thesis rests on a misreading
of the sociological literature. Greeley argues that Cox has taken at face value the theory of
mass society, a "pop" version of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft thesis: "secular man is a
theologian's romanticized version of mass man - and he doesn't exist either" (Greeley, in
Callahan 1966, p. 101). It is hard to get by the impression that this charge itself rests on a
very superficial reading of Cox's book319 - as Cox himself easily demonstrates in his reply
(Cox, in Callahan 1966, pp. 113-120).
In reality, polemics put aside, it seems that what Greeley dislikes most in Cox's
book is his theology320, and that he uses sociological arguments only to try to corner
him321. As a matter of fact, when faced with a different audience, Greeley changes his
appreciation of Cox. The very same year these comments were published, in his
presidential address before the ACSS, he tried to convince his fellow-religionists that the
Catholic Church must fight the traditionalists and adapt its practice in order to fulfill the
need of modern man to find again the "warmth and fellowship of a tribal society"
(Greeley 1966, p. 126). To bolster his argument, he did not hesitate to use Cox, and his
secularization theory: "The Catholic Church is becoming secularized, secularized not in
the sense of secularism as it was condemned repeatedly by the American bishops but
rather secularized in Harvey Cox's sense of the word" (1966, p. 119). In other words,
what Greeley was fighting in Cox's views was not so much his description of
secularization (which he apparently deemed applicable at least to the Catholic Church) as
the positive evaluation which accompanied it. Thus, the prime animus of Greeley's
intervention in the "secularization debate" was not really sociological, but related to a
problem of Church policy: By showing that modern man still needed the warmth of the
religious congregation, he was fighting theological liberalism as well as conservativism.
Turning to more directly sociological concerns, how can we assess Greeley's
intervention as far as the challenge to the CISR paradigm is concerned? In Unsecular
319
As a matter of fact, Greeley often resorts to the strategy he used in criticizing Cox's book: he gives such a
caricatural picture of his opponent (see for instance his caricatural characterization of the "theory of organic
evolution" in his rebuttal of it: "There was absolutely nothing in the social structure of England that
generated the Norman invasion" [Greeley 1972, p. 25]) that the work of demolition becomes very easy
indeed.
320
That "Americanized version of Bishop Robinson's marriage of Bonhoeffer and Tillich" (Greeley, in
Callahan 1966, p. 101; see also p. 125).
321
Witness for example the following menace: "Theologians like Mr. Cox and Mr. Callahan had better
beware; if sociology becomes a locus theologicus, [theologians will have to argue] with obstreperous
sociologists who will want to question the sociological assumptions that theologians will be making"
(Greeley, in Callahan 1966, p. 101).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
254
Man (1972), Greeley starts from the assumption that "the basic human religious needs
and the basic religious functions have not changed very notably since the late Ice Age"
(Greeley 1972, p. 1). This, he asserts, has repeatedly been ignored by the proponents of
secularization theory, who are unable to grasp the significance of religion in the daily
lives of ordinary people322 because they spend their lives on university campuses - the
only place, perhaps, where "secular man" can be found (1972, p. 3).
So far, Greeley's argument does not seriously challenge secularization theory: it
remains on the level of individual religiosity. But what about the social level? Greeley
reports that, in a private conversation, Peter Berger323 remarked: "But something must
have changed!" (Berger, quoted in Greeley 1972, p. 14). Certainly, Greeley admits,
something has changed. But what exactly? The five items listed by Greeley in answer to
that question correspond fairly accurately to three of the main exemplars of the CISR
paradigm324: 1) autonomization* ("Religion has no direct influence over the large
corporate structures which have emerged in the last four hundred years"); 2)
rationalization* ("A considerable number of phenomena which once received a directly
religious interpretation now can be explained by rational science" and "Man's
development of his capacities for abstract thought and expression means that myths are
no longer self-sufficient and must be interpreted" [see also p. 50]); 3) and
privatization*325 ("Religion is a more explicit and individual matter now than it has ever
been in the past" and "Religious commitment is, at least to some extent, a matter of free
choice" [see also p. 52]).
It thus seems that there is little difference, if any, and certainly no incompatibility,
between Greeley's macro-structural view on religion and the secularization paradigm.
One difference, however, must be acknowledged. Greeley argues that Gesellschaft has
not totally replaced Gemeinschaft: the latter continues to survive in the midst of the big
city. This is not a very original position. The originality lies in the further development he
322
Besides theories put forward by historians of religion like Eliade, the main evidence of the persistence of
religious sentiment presented by Greeley are statistics. These figures, however, concern almost exclusively
America (1972, pp. 8-13).
323
The only secularization theorists working in the modern paradigm Greeley directly attacks is Peter
Berger. The quotation used, however, comes from one of Berger's theological writings, and concerns a
rather peripheral classic statement: unbelief* (1972, p. 5).
324
Referring to these same five items, Martin Marty (who is not unsympathetic to Greeley's claims)
remarks: "Does not his comment on religious continuity die the death of a thousand qualifications because
of the depth of the trauma occasioned by these five changes in the modern times alone?" (Marty 1974,
p. 89).
325
However, Greeley's view of privatization is not negative. He argues that "the need to decide about
religion makes religion a more central and explicit question than it has ever been before" (1972, p. 15). This
is probably true in a sense, but only, it seems, at the individual level.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
255
gives to this thought: the number of relationships a given individual can have is not
strictly limited. The fact that he has more Gesellschaft-type relations does not necessarily
imply that he has fewer Gemeinschaft-type relations: "A vast network of gesellschaft
relationships has become a superstructure based on an infrastructure of persisting
gemeinschaft relationships. [...] The large corporate structures which constitute the
gesellschaft technological society represent additions to the pool of human relationships
and not substitutions for the old relationships" (1972, p. 31).
This is an original view, which is not to be found in the writings of any carrier of
the CISR paradigm. Furthermore, it is an interesting hypothesis, which merits careful
consideration. But what are its implications as far as the secularization paradigm is
concerned? All secularization theorists recognize that community and the need for it have
not entirely disappeared. As we know, the "longing for community" is very central for
instance in Wilson's theory. What is asserted in the CISR paradigm is that the societal,
technological sphere of social life is more powerful than the community sphere - hence
the demise of religion, associated with community. The divergence thus boils down to a
question of emphasis. The secularization paradigm emphasizes the losses suffered by
religion (in trivial terms: the glass is half empty), while Greeley emphasizes all it has left
(the glass is half full). Now, such differences of emphasis are the stock in trade of the
researcher working in the framework of normal science. The evaluation of such
divergences is precisely what "mopping-up operations" consist of; it hardly signals a
paradigm shift, let alone an intellectual revolution.
The final assessment of Greeley's approach must take into account the fact that the
very concerns which it addresses (the possibilities of religious affirmation in the
framework of the Catholic Church) are different from those that lay at the roots of the
CISR paradigm. We must therefore distinguish two levels of analysis. On the one hand,
we have Greeley's whole argument about the persistence of religious sentiment. This
concern hardly intersects the CISR paradigm: in fact, on this level, the two approaches are
incommensurable. On the other hand, however, Greeley's argument does intersect the
secularization paradigm whenever he speaks of transformations of religion at the macrosocial level. On this level, as noted above, although his emphasis differs, the basic
structure of his argument is very similar to that found in the secularization paradigm. This
aspect of his theory does not constitute a challenge to the paradigm, but merely to some
aspects of normal research carried out in its framework.
The Search for a New Paradigm: Phillip Hammond and Jeffrey Hadden
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
256
The two writers I will discuss in this section are probably the best representatives
of a broad movement inside American sociology of religion which seeks to move beyond
the secularization paradigm. Hammond's contribution consists mainly in the edition of
readers which aim at establishing an agenda for the new approach (Glock and Hammond
1973; Hammond 1985). Hadden's contribution centers more on the political impact of
fundamentalist revivals (Hadden 1971; Hadden and Shupe 1986; 1988). The two
approaches differ very much in style: Hammond's is rather gentle and constructive;
Hadden's is much more aggressive.
Hammond's aim is to establish a new paradigm for the scientific study of religion.
According to Hammond, the present paradigm is centered on the notion of secularization.
This paradigm, he argues, is not yet ready to be discarded: "While we are [...] not yet
ready to replace the secularization paradigm with some other master scheme, we are
prepared to look at secularization and the sacred through new lenses" (Hammond 1985,
p. 2). Up to this point, it could seem that Hammond's approach is very close to the one I
take in the present paper. There is, however, a fundamental difference, which hinges on
different definitions of what is to be understood as the "secularization paradigm". In
Hammond's terminology, this expression refers to a thesis which, failing to establish a
difference between the "sacred" and "religion" (as an institutional expression of the
"sacred"), is unable to take notice of the present resurgences of the sacred, simply because
they take place outside conventional religion. Furthermore, it refers to a thesis which
implies a one-directional process. As we know, this is not the approach I am taking in the
present study. What I take to be the "secularization paradigm" is a broader approach
which need not be one-directional, and which need not postulate that there are no
manifestations of the sacred outside conventional religion. The very notions of
generalization and of privatization precisely imply such a survival of the "sacred" even
though "conventional religion" is on the wane.
As a matter of fact, Hammond does not differ very much in his approach from
what I call the secularization paradigm. The clearest evidence for this comes from a paper
which he wrote for a volume devoted to a discussion of Berger's sociology (Hammond
1986). This paper is all the more interesting since it is almost entirely devoted to a
discussion of Berger's secularization theory. To assess Hammond's position with regard to
this theory, I am not going to rely on the praises with which he opens his paper.
Obviously, given the circumstances for which the paper was written (a Festschrift), there
is no way of telling the degree to which these praises might be conventional. What I will
do instead will be to discuss Hammond's assessment of the theory itself.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
257
This assessment is quite positive. Throughout the whole essay, the only problem
Hammond sees with the theory concerns the definition of religion on which it rests. In
other words, we are brought back to the problem mentioned before: What Hammond
dislikes in secularization theory is the equivalence put forward between the "sacred" and
"religion", or the "supernatural": "Where most see the supernatural as a subset of the
sacred, Berger sees the sacred as a subset of the supernatural. Put another way, most
sociologists of religion operate with a functional definition: Whatever results from
encounters with the sacred, if it is systematic and institutionalized, is religion, whether or
not it is expressed in supernatural terms" (1986, p. 156). Thus, all that Hammond
advocates is a functional, rather than a substantive definition of religion. In doing this, he
is at odds with Berger, but not with what I call the secularization paradigm as such: as we
know, the latter includes exemplars based on functional, as well as on substantive,
definitions of religion.
We must thus clearly differentiate the approach taken by Hammond from the
harder approach we will discuss later on, taken by people like Stark and Bainbridge.
Hammond argues that we must move beyond secularization theory not because it is
wrong, but because it is incomplete. He does not envision a "return of the sacred" in
terms similar to Stark's. Indeed, pondering the meaning of the later Berger's predictions of
a return of the sacred, Hammond declares: "Is Berger, in contemplating a reversal of
secularization, suggesting a reversal in either [pluralization and subjective secularization]
or both of these forces? This is unlikely since little or no empirical evidence would
support such suggestions; society is not becoming less pluralistic nor is religious
explanation of events on the upswing" (1986, p. 155). What, then, is the nature of the
revision proposed by Hammond? To use his own words, his aim is to define a framework
allowing us "to understand the sacred in societies clearly continuing to secularize" (1986,
p. 158). This, I would contend, can easily be done in the framework of the secularization
paradigm as I have defined it, and need not await the formulation of a new master
scheme.
As we will see, essentially the same conclusion applies to Hadden's approach.
There is, however, a substantive difference between Hammond and Hadden. Where
Hammond seems to be pondering secularization theory and the ways to go beyond its
formulations, Hadden seems to be at war with it. Although the end result is essentially the
same, Hadden's approach is much more aggressive, and takes the form of a work of
demolition. But what, exactly, does it demolish?
In a paper entitled Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory, Hadden declares:
"Secularization theory has not been subjected to a systematic scrutinity because it is a
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
258
doctrine more than it is a theory. Its moorings are located in presuppositions that have
gone unexamined because they represent a taken-for-granted ideology rather than a
systematic set of interrelated propositions" (Hadden 1987, p. 588). What evidence does
Hadden present to support this claim? First, he explains, the works of Thomas Kuhn have
showed that the thought processes of scholars are shaped by the communities in which
they are embedded. Up to this point, I obviously have no quarrel with Hadden. Especially
when he writes: "Accounting for the persistence of religion in the midst of the secular
takes on the character of 'normal science' in Kuhn's framework - a 'mopping-up' operation
wherein scholars fill in the details of the theory and account for the anomalies" (Hadden
and Shupe 1986, p. xii).
Where Hadden and I depart, however, is when he considers that the hold of the
paradigm is illegitimate, and that the persistence of religion precisely cannot be accounted
for by mopping-up operations. We must thus pose the same question again: What
evidence does Hadden put forward to further his claim that the secularization paradigm is
merely ideological? Curiously, the first evidence he cites is not drawn from the writings
of the theorists he is attacking, as one would expect, but from the writings of those who,
like himself, are attacking the theory. He thus quotes Lenski: "From its inception
[sociology] was committed to the positivist view that religion in the modern world is
merely a survival from man's primitive past, and doomed to disappear in an era of science
and general enlightenment" (quoted in Hadden 1987, p. 587). He also quotes Stark and
Bainbridge: "At least since the Enlightenment, most Western intellectuals have
anticipated the death of religion" (quoted in Hadden 1987, p. 587). Leaving aside for a
moment the question whether these claims are true, one can wonder why Hadden did not
choose to quote one or several of these early scholars. Surely, this would have provided
more solid evidence. But the main problem lies elsewhere. As I we know (see chap. 7),
these claims are gross oversimplifications. It is true that some scholars did hold these
views. But by putting them all into the same bag, Hadden falls prey to the very type of
one-sided appraisal he denounces in "linear secularization theory". Surely, if Hadden had
read Spencer's section on "The Unknowable" contained in the First Principles (Spencer
1864b, pp. 3-126), he would not have ventured to write that Spencer was "adamantly
antagonistic to religion" (Hadden 1967, p. 592). Thus, the first type of evidence presented
by Hadden must be dismissed: it is so caricatural as to do more damage to its author than
to the scholars attacked.
But this is not all. For even if Hadden were right in his appraisal of XIXth century
evolutionism, this factor would not be very relevant. After all, we are no longer living in
the XIXth century. As Hadden quotes Dobbelaere's trend report (Hadden 1987, p. 599),
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
259
we must assume that he knows enough about modern secularization theory to leave the
"founders of the discipline" out of the debate. So, to pose the question again, what
evidence does Hadden put forward to support his claim? He gives four grounds for
dismissing secularization theory. First, the theory is "a hodgepodge of loosely employed
ideas rather than a systematic theory. Second, existing data simply do not support the
theory. Third, the effervescence of new religious movements in the very locations where
secularization appears to cut deeply into established institutional religion suggests that
religion may really be ubiquitous in human cultures. Fourth, the number of countries in
which religion is significantly entangled in reform, rebellion, and revolution is everexpanding" (1987, p. 598). The fourth claim is the most serious, and we will come back
to it at the end of this section. As for the third claim, we sill see in some detail in the
section devoted to Stark and Bainbridge why it does not constitute a challenge to
secularization theory. The second claim is not wrong, but hardly challenges secularization
theory, which does not rest on statistical data, but on a broad historical analysis.
Furthermore, as Hadden himself remarks, if secularization theory cannot be proven by the
data, "one must also add the caution that neither can the data disconfirm the process"
(1987, p. 600). Let us thus for the moment examine more closely the first claim, to the
effect that "the theory has not been systematically stated" (1987, p. 599).
Having just devoted 60 pages to demonstrate that there indeed is a coherent and
systematic set of propositions (if not a theory) in the secularization paradigm, I find it
emotionally hard to agree with Hadden. But strictly speaking, Hadden is right: although
there is a paradigm, there is no unified theory. "Secularization theory" as a collective
enterprise does not really exist. This, however, does not provide sufficient evidence to
assert that there is "no theory". For it is nowhere said that the theory to which Hadden
refers to must be a collective construction; it can also be an individual construction. The
question that has to be answered is: is there such a thing as a single, or several different
coherent secularization theories put forward by individual theorists? As noted above,
Hadden has read Dobbelaere's trend report326. He thus knows of the existence of the
theories of Berger, Wilson, and Fenn. These are the sociologists who should have been
discussed to support the claim that the theory has not been stated systematically.
Unfortunately, none of them is cited, nor even mentioned, in the paper. Not even Berger,
326
But whereas Dobbelaere's intention, in writing the report, had been to clarify the concept in order to
make it more operational, Hadden draws from the report the opposite conclusion without clearly indicating
that Dobbelaere's own conclusion was different: "Dobbelaere's analysis is extremely useful. More clearly
than anyone else, he has illuminated the sad fact that in the exercise of sociological inquiry, 'secularization
means whatever I say it means' [these quotation marks are especially disturbing: they seem to suggest that
this was Dobbeleaere's own conclusion!]" (Hadden 1987, p. 595).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
260
whose Sacred Canopy Hadden has read and commented upon rather positively a few
years before (Hadden 1971, pp. 6-8). Hadden thus (apparently purposefully) presents a
totally misleading picture of secularization theory. By failing to discuss the most explicit
and systematic of the theories which he knows to exits, he disqualifies himself, leaving
his claim unsupported.
We are thus left with the last of the challenges, concerning the role of religion in
political movements all around the world. Strictly speaking, in the framework of the
present study, I should not discuss this claim. As stated in the introduction, I have
bracketed the question of the empirical validity of the secularization theories. However, I
will here make an exception since, being the prime animus of Hadden's criticism327, this
item is particularly interesting. Broadly speaking, there are three types of evidence of the
entanglement of religion and politics: 1) religious strifes, as in Ireland or in India; 2)
fundamentalist revolutions, as in Iran; 3) the rise of fundamentalist religion and its
involvement in politics in the United States. As we know, Martin's theory accounts for the
first case: Whenever religion becomes entangled in problems of national identity, the
pattern of secularization is very likely to become altered. The second case does not really
constitute a challenge for secularization theory; although some imprudent previsions have
been made by certain carriers of the CISR paradigm, the theory itself clearly links
secularization to industrialization, and is thus hardly applicable outside the western
world. We are thus left with the last case. It is indeed one of the central tenets of
secularization theory that politics become independent from religion. If this were proven
not to be the case in the United States, the paradigm would enter into a crisis, and an
intellectual revolution would become inevitable. But to what extent is religion really
becoming an important factor in politics in the United States?
I would not like to appear to belittle this issue. It seems to me that, of all the
challenges faced by the paradigm, this is one of the most serious. I am not going to argue
that it can simply be brushed off. All that I am going to argue is that the available
evidence does not as yet allow us to decide of the severity of the challenge. On the one
hand, the sudden political impact of fundamentalist movements in the United States in the
70s and 80s really did come as a surprise. Obviously, no one - least of all secularization
theorists - expected this to happen. On the other hand, by the accounts given in the
readers published by Hammond (Johnson 1985) and by Hadden and Shupe (Roof 1986)
themselves, one is left with the impression that the impact of the new fundamentalism
327
The two readers recently published by Hadden together with Anson Shupe center on this hotly debated
issue (Hadden and Shupe 1986; 1988).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
261
was not as strong as it seemed at first sight. For one thing, contrary to expectations,
"follow-up studies suggest that evangelical votes were not a decisive factor in the [1980]
election" (Johnson 1985, p. 310). For another, this new fundamentalism appears
remarkably "tame"; it is not opposed to "the world", but set on a course of
accommodation (Roof 1986, p. 30). In other words, Luckmann's solution to the
"American paradox" seems to apply again: Fundamentalism gained a foothold in public
life only to the extent that it had become "internally secularized".
It should also be remarked that the new political religions - which represent the
only evidence that could constitute a challenge to the paradigm - do not carry the brunt of
Hammond and Hadden's arguments. This topic is far outweighed, in their readers, by the
problems of religion in the Third World. Finally, even if the new fundamentalism turned
out to be a really important factor in American politics - which might after all be the case
- it remains to be seen what the nature of the challenge posed to the paradigm would be.
As we know, the paradigm leaves much room for non-linear developments. It allows for a
complex development of secularization, and leads to no single evolutionary outcome.
Furthermore, the notion of generalization implies that a certain form of religiosity
(perhaps not unlike the new "accommodated fundamentalism" just discussed) will always
hold a certain sway on public life. Thus, even if the final evaluation of the importance of
political religion in American must be left open, the charge brought against the paradigm
seems very exaggerated.
(Here, critics of my approach could argue that the CISR paradigm is so flexible
that it cannot be falsified. But this criticism, although true, would miss the point. A good
theory can be falsified, but a paradigm is not a theory, and it is by definition not amenable
to falsification. It is precisely the main originality of Kuhn's approach that paradigm
becomes obsolete not through an intellectual operation [falsification], but through a social
movement inside the scholarly community [revolution]. The accumulation of anomalies
in research carried out in the framework of the paradigm must be such as to convince
scholars to abandon it. I am not arguing that the CISR paradigm should not be abandoned
- maybe it should [although I do not see by what it would be replaced] - all I am arguing
is that this has not as yet happened.)
To conclude, Hadden's dismissal of secularization theory is very superficial, and
can be understood only from a Skinnerian perspective, by taking into account his own
intentions and interests. Being very interested in the entanglement of religion and politics
- which is quite a legitimate posture - Hadden mounted a make-believe attack on the
dominant paradigm to increase the reader's interest and to orient the sub-discipline as a
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
262
whole to this new topic328. The best evidence that the attack is only make-believe is that
Hadden himself believes in secularization theory. Witness the following paragraph drawn
from the very paper which seeks to demolish secularization theory: "I used to think it
terribly important that every significant figure in the founding generation of social
scientists wrote at length about religion. But when one recognizes the fact that they had
lived in a world that had been dominated by religion for centuries, one can readily ask
how could they have written a theory of society without considering religion" (Hadden
1987, p. 591). Apparently, Hadden thinks that modern society is no longer "dominated by
religion", since he precisely laments the fact that contemporary social scientists tend to
neglect it!
New Religious Movements: Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge
Stark and Bainbridge are among the most well-known and vocal students of new
religious movements329. From the emergence of these movements in the late 60s, they
draw the conclusion that "secularization theory" is wrong - or at least partially wrong.
However, as we will see, this challenge to the paradigm again misses its target. Stark and
Bainbridge's failure to take into account what the secularization paradigm is really saying
is prototypical of the attitude of countless other sociologists who consider the emergence
of new religious movements a falsification of the "secularization thesis". In other words,
they are the most typical representatives of the unjustified "mood of triumphalism"
(Robbins 1988, p. 53) that the rise of the new religious movements raised among certain
sociologists of religion. In order to illustrate the problem raised by this type of misreading
of the paradigm, I will concentrate my analysis on the discrepancies between Stark and
Bainbridge on one hand, and Wilson on the other. I will present the arguments of the two
sides in a schematic and simplified way, in the sense that I will deal with only two points:
1) the definition of secularization; 2) the evaluation of the impact of the new religious
movements on secularization.
1) Definitions of secularization. For Stark & Bainbridge, secularization is a
decline in belief, generally located at the individual level - although they are not always
328
This aim is put forward quite explicitly by Hadden and Shupe: "Shortly after we began working together
on the project, Hadden was elected president of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. Shupe
agreed to be Program Chair for the 1985 Annual Meetings of the society. By identifying 'Religion and the
Political Order' as our Program Theme, we hoped we could entice some of our colleagues to pick up our
quest" (Hadden and Shupe 1986, p. xv).
329
For an overview on new religious movements, see Robbins 1988.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
263
very clear about this point330. For Wilson, secularization is a structural process situated at
the social level331.
2) Impact of the new religious movements. For Stark and Bainbridge, new
religious movements provide evidence that the secularization process is self-limiting
(1985, pp. 429-30). In Wilson's view, new religious movements are a mere by-product of
the secularization process, and do not run counter to it332.
So far, so good. There is no problem in sociologists' taking different views on the
secularization process. The problem arises, however, when Stark and Bainbridge, after
having defined their own position, go on to describe their opponent's view. For although
they list all of Wilson's works which we will be using here in their bibliography, the
account they give of Wilson's position is not faithful - or maybe the confusion merely
stems from the fact that they do not always specify to which author they refer when they
attack "secularization theory". Thus for example, on page 438 (1985), they write: "[we]
can test our theory through a geographic hypothesis: Cults will abound where
conventional churches are weakest. To follow the logic of the dominant view of
secularization leads to a contradictory prediction. Secularization is seen as an unstoppable
trend. If we mean by secularization a decline in the credibility of all systems of thought
that postulate the existence of the supernatural, then it follows that secularization
produces people who resist supernatural explanations. To the extent that that occurs, there
will not exist a clientele for religion, whether new or old, or for magic. [...] This leads to a
hypothesis wholly opposite to the one we have advanced: Cults will be weakest where
conventional churches are weakest".
Now, whose position is this second hypothesis supposed to represent? Although
the authors do not give any names in this passage, the argument they develop is clearly
directed against "the prevailing wisdom, best expressed by Bryan Wilson [1975] and
330
"Modern writers [with whom the authors apparently agree on this point] use the term secularization to
mean the erosion of belief in the supernatural" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 429). At another place, to
show that secularization theory is wrong, they say: "Surely it is to deprive the concept of secularization of
coherent meaning if we describe persons deeply engrossed in supernatural beliefs and worships as secular"
(1985, p. 437).
331
"Secularization is the process in which religious thinking, practices, and institutions lose their social
significance" (Wilson 1975, p. 79). [...] "Religion simply does not matter socially, however much his own
religion may matter to the individual" (1975, p. 80).
332
"If we concede the abundance of the sects and cults, does this create any embarrassment for those who
support the secularization thesis? I hardly think so. These movements thrive precisely because the culture is
secularized: in a religionless society they could scarcely arise, or, if arising, survive. They are themselves a
religious response to the secularization of society, but they are essentially a marginal phenomenon" (Wilson
1975, pp. 81-82).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
264
Richard Fenn [1978]" (citation located less than two pages before Stark & Bainbridge's
hypotheses, 1985, p. 436). However, the approach to secularization which they use in this
passage is not Wilson's (nor - this is an even more fantastic assertion - Fenn's!). We may
even say that it is directly contradictory to Wilson's position. Stark and Bainbridge do not
seem to be aware (or are not interested in acknowledging) that there are two radically
different views on the secularization process. To use a distinction made by Thomas
Robbins, there is a theory of "institutional or systematic secularization" on one hand, and
there is an "atomistic, non-institutional" theory on the other (Robbins 1988, pp. 56 and
57). I would contend that Stark and Bainbridge have done a good job in defining their
opponent's point of view if, by "conventional wisdom", they mean the second type of
secularization theory (but this kind of theory is no longer conventional wisdom in
sociology, except for some uninformed sociologists who, for some reason, did not keep
abreast of the developments which occurred in the 60s and 70s), which is well
represented by Anthony Wallace, whom they cite on page 430.
However, Stark and Bainbridge have misrepresented their opponent's point of
view if, by "conventional wisdom", they mean a view which is close to Wilson's333.
Indeed, if we follow the logic of Wilson's argument, we will be led to predict, exactly as
Stark and Bainbridge do, that cults will be strongest where conventional religion is
weakest. For if, as Wilson maintains, church involvement can be used as an index of
secularization (Wilson 1966, p. 2; 1975, p. 79), and if, as Wilson also maintains, cults are
a consequence of secularization (1975, pp. 81-82), it follows quite logically that cults will
flourish where secularization is most advanced, that is, where churches are weakest. (I am
not here interested in the question of whether Wilson is right or wrong, but only in the
logic of his argumentation.) Therefore, the test designed by Stark and Bainbridge whatever its intrinsic validity, which we need not discuss here - does not falsify Wilson's
hypotheses, but only their own view of Wilson's hypothesis, in other words: the ghost of
XIXth century evolutionsim. As for Wilson's hypothesis, it is clearly confirmed along
with Stark and Bainbridge's, for there is no substantial difference between them.
To summarize. Although the opponents appear to disagree, in reality, they agree
as to the available evidence: 1) institutional religion has lost its dominant social
position334, although 2) faith remains very important in many individuals' lives335; 3) cults
333
The intrinsic logic of their text suggests that this latter possibility is the correct one.
This is Wilson's thesis, which Stark and Bainbridge also accept: "We acknowledge that secularization is
a major trend in modern times, but argue that this is not a modern development. [...] the dominant religious
organizations in any society are always becoming progressively more worldly" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985,
pp. 1 and 2). The restrictions brought to this thesis by Stark and Bainbridge need not concern us here, as
they still acknowledge secularization in modern society. In fact, they even implicitly recognize that this last
334
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
265
emerge when conventional religions decline, but are unable to fill the gap336; 4) which
shows that there is a correlation between secularization and the emergence of cults.
Now, what is the difference between these authors? Stark and Bainbridge call the
correlation set forth in 4) a "reaction" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 437), whereas
Wilson calls it a "response" (Wilson 1975, p. 82). The only difference between these two
words is that the first might have connotation implying that cults will ultimately be able
to assert themselves against secularization. And this is exactly what differentiates these
authors: Stark and Bainbridge are confident that cults will eventually become very
powerful337, whereas Wilson is convinced that they will not338. Clearly, these convictions
do not belong to the domain of sociology, but to prophecy. And this is exactly the point
which I would like to make: this is no longer a sociological divergence of views, but a
clash of opposite beliefs. Opponents in reality agree as to the facts - although they deny
it339 - but have a different evaluation of the facts.
But let us now abandon this rather pathetic "debate", and turn to Stark and
Bainbridge's own secularization theory, as it is exposed in their recent Theory of Religion
(Stark and Bainbridge 1987). Until now, we have been working our way through a nicely
organized (if imaginary) antagonistic field. On one side, we have found explicit advocates
of the secularization thesis, who all worked with a narrow, substantive definition of
religion. On the other side, we have found critics of the secularization thesis, who worked
with a broad, functional definition of religion. The equivalence between narrow definition
and secularization on the one hand, and between broad definition and refusal of
secularization on the other hand, has appeared almost axiomatical. Moreover, advocates
wave of secularization is qualitatively different from the previous ones, as they comment at length on the
consequences of the rise of science, and conclude that as a result of this rise, religions no longer include
magic in their offering (1985, pp. 432-433).
335
Stark and Bainbridge forcefully demonstrate this in their study, but Wilson never denied it. However,
Stark and Bainbridge and Wilson differ as to the reasons of this continuing importance. For them, religion
continues to be important because it provides "general compensators based on supernatural assumptions"
(Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 8), whereas for Wilson, religion can be important to individuals because it
can provide a communal form of life: "Religion in the past solemnized men's social relationships and their
community life. [...] Today, if these functions are to be fulfilled, that fulfillment must come from religious
organizations, and perhaps only new religious movements can provide it" (Wilson 1982, pp. 133-34 and
135).
336
This (the idea that cults are unable to fill the gap) is again Wilson's position, which is also accepted by
Stark and Bainbridge: "We are not suggesting that cult movements are currently filling the gap left by the
weaknesses of conventional religion" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 454).
337
"Hundreds of cult movements have arisen there, as our theory predicts. When one of them will achieve
real success, we cannot say" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 455).
338
"Religion in secular society will remain peripheral, relatively weak, providing comfort for men in the
interstices of a soulless social system of which men are the half-willing, half-restless prisoners" (Wilson
1976b, p. 276).
339
Stark and Bainbridge, at any rate, deny it.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
266
of the secularization thesis have tended to be either theologically liberal or agnostic,
whereas those who criticized the thesis tended to stress the perennial and universal quality
of belief. With Stark and Bainbridge, this nice pattern is completely subverted. Not only
are Stark and Bainbridge the first to seek to refute the secularization thesis with a very
narrow definition of religion; they are also the first to do so while admitting to be
"incapable of religious faith" (1987, p. 23). But the reversal of the situation is even more
spectacular. For decades, scholars sympathetic to religion have complained that most
sociologists tended to discard religion because of their positivistic, reductionistic views.
But today, Stark and Bainbridge claim to demonstrate the continuing significance of
religion through the use of the most reductionistic and positivistic perspective ever.
Stark and Bainbridge's Theory of Religion is a highly formalized deductive theory,
designed for the sole purpose of empirical testing and falsification. It is based on seven
axioms, which spell out the fundamental theoretical assumptions. In order to insure the
rigor of the deductive logic, the theory also contains 104 very brief and clear definitions.
Finally, a set of 344 propositions, all rigorously deduced from the axioms, form the
working basis for future empirical testing. It is not necessary, for our purposes, to go into
a detailed presentation of the theory. A few lines will suffice to outline its main features.
The most fundamental axiom is that "Humans seek what they perceive to be rewards and
avoid what they perceive to be costs" (1987, p. 325). The theory further states that,
whenever people are unable to obtain rewards which they think exist, they will accept
instead "compensators"340. "A compensator is the belief that a reward will be obtained in
the distant future or in some other context which cannot be immediately verified" (1985,
p. 6). Compensators can be specific (if they substitute for specific rewards), or general (if
they substitute for a cluster of rewards, or for rewards of greater scope). Religion, as
defined in the theory, precisely deals with such general compensators. As is stated in
Definition 22: "Religion refers to systems of general compensators based on supernatural
assumptions". The theory unfolds starting from the individual, then moves on to groups,
to end with the most macro-sociological aspect: the dialectic of secularization and
revival. To this aspect, we now turn.
Stark and Bainbridge's definition of secularization is consonant with the one given
in the CISR paradigm. Definition 104: "Secularization is the progressive loss of power by
religious organizations". Starting from the beginning of the theory, the first and only
fundamental divergence with the CISR paradigm must be acknowledged: "The chief
causes of secularization are to be found outside religion itself" (1987, p. 280). The rest of
340
For a critique of the reward/compensator dichotomy, see Wallis 1984, pp. 62-64.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
267
the theory is nothing but a rewording of the paradigm. (I do not want to give the
impression that I do not appreciate the significance of the theory. I understand that its
originality rests not so much on the formulation of new ideas, but on their very systematic
organization. But from our own vantage point, this aspect happens to be irrelevant.) The
whole argument rests on the notion that there are three main types of cultural system:
religion, politics, and science. Religion emerges first. It is the first form of explanation
which allows humans to satisfy their basic need: obtain rewards or compensators.
Religion can emerge early because it "does not have to wait until progress discovers
objectively correct explanations" (1987, p. 281). Politics is the second sphere to emerge.
Later on, it is followed by science. One thing, in this familiar description of the process of
differentiation341, seems not completely clear. At some moments, it seems as though the
three spheres each emerged out of a primordial common cultural ground (through the
actions of individuals evolving cultural specializations). But other passages leave the
reader with the impression that politics and science emerged out of religion. Thus for
instance, "the fact that politicians traditionally drew on religion to cap their political
theories with general explanations shows that politicians were unable to find efficacious,
distinctively political, general explanations. Reliance on religion to complete a political
ideology proves that the politics has not yet itself evolved into a cultural system" (1987,
p. 282).
Be that as it may, once differentiation has occurred, adverse effects on religion
make themselves felt. In other words, "progress [Definition 81: Progress is the gradual
improvement in the human ability to achieve desired rewards] has a direct corrosive
effect on religion" (1987, p. 280). The reason for this is that "religious traditions [...] tend
to contain many explanations vulnerable to disconfirmation by science and competition
from politics". Logically, "people will abandon compensators for the corresponding
reward when it is made available to them" (1987, p. 284). This view brings together the
two other core exemplars of the CISR paradigm: rationalization* (remember the
definition of "progress") and worldliness* (Proposition 18: "Humans prefer rewards to
compensators and attempt to exchange compensators for rewards").
Several other exemplars are contained in the subsequent unfolding of the theory.
The first is pluralism. "Proposition 67: The more cosmopolitan [Definition 36:
Cosmopolitan refers to the existence of plural cultures within a society] a society with
respect to religious culture, the lower the market value of any given general compensator"
341
Definition 34: Differentiation refers to cultural specialization at the level of groups rather than at the
level of individuals.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
268
(1987, p. 290). As in Berger's theory, pluralism results in a form of collapse. Of course, as
Stark and Bainbridge's theory is based on a view of man as an economic animal, in
contrast to Berger's, which rests on a view of man as a cognitive animal, there is a
difference at this level. For Stark and Bainbridge, in a situation of pluralism, "one will be
forced to conclude that the proffered compensators are uncertain in value, perhaps not
very valuable at all" (1987, p. 290). In spite of the economist slant, the argument is
familiar: When not founded on a stable social basis (in Stark and Bainbridge's
terminology: when the people on whose testimony we rely in evaluating general
compensators disagree), belief in the truth of a given religion becomes problematic.
Another exemplar contained in the theory is the decline of practice*. "Proposition 322:
Cosmopolitan societies tend to have rates of religious affiliation significantly lower than
the maximum permitted by other characteristics of the societies". It should be noted at
this point that, exactly as in the CISR paradigm, this exemplar has rapidly been weakened
(and, what is more surprising, by one of the authors of the theory himself!). In a 1988
paper written together with Roger Finke (Stark and Finke 1988), Stark reported that, in
one empirical case at least, religious pluralism did not result in a decline in religious
affiliation, but in an increase342.
Up to this point, it is fair to say that even Stark and Bainbridge would probably
not contend that their theory differs from the CISR paradigm. Where they see themselves
as disagreeing is in the second part of the theory, which bears on religious revival. The
first part of the theory deals only with "low-tension" religion (that is, religious groups in a
low state of tension with their socio-cultural environment). As for "high-tension" groups,
for example sects (Definition 57: A sect movement is a deviant religious organization
within traditional beliefs and practices) and cults (Definition 67: Cults are social
enterprises primarily engaged in the generation and exchange of novel compensators), the
outcome is different. Stark and Bainbridge's argument is based on the following idea:
"The fates of low-tension and high-tension religious groups are different at the stage
when churchly power begins to weaken. Indeed, the slow collapse of the churches gives
sects a new market to exploit" (1987, p. 301). Thus, sects (which appear first) and cults
(which appear at a later stage) are a product of secular society, if only because, "the very
342
Unfortunately this paper, which would constitute an interesting challenge for the paradigm if its findings
could be replicated (more because of its implications with regard to pluralism than because of its
implication for religious involvement, which is not a central element of the paradigm), has drawn sharp
criticism on both methodological and empirical grounds (see Breault 1989 and the subsequent debate
between Stark/Finke and Breault in the pages immediately following the article).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
269
cosmopolitanism of secularizing societies gives people greater freedom to switch
affiliations" (1987, p. 302).
Now in all this, there is still nothing incompatible with the CISR paradigm. But
what are the more general consequences of this evolution? Here, curiously, Stark and
Bainbridge lose much of their analytico-deductive rigor, and indulge in rather
impressionistic assessments: "While we cannot yet specify the mathematical functions
that would describe precisely the contrary trends, we can confidently observe that
secularization is self-limiting. The level of affiliation in a cosmopolitan society may be
lower than in culturally-monolithic society with tolerance for sects. But it may be high
compared with societies that prescribe religious diversity. A few lines later, the authors
add: "One striking consequence of secularization is a flowering of religion, not its
demise" (1987, p. 304). These passages are quite remarkable. First, witness the vagueness
of the terminology: The level of affiliation "may" be lower, but it is "substantial". It must
be remembered that P337, like the 344 other Propositions, was specifically designed for
empirical testing. But how could anyone possibly falsify the proposition that the level of
affiliation is "substantial"? Even more remarkable than the vagueness in this supposedly
rigorous theory are the semantic shifts. Secularization is "self-limiting". In Stark and
Bainbridge's theoretical framework, this expression sometimes refers to the idea that
secularization will some day be reversed. But strictly speaking, the notion of selflimitation only suggests that the process cannot become complete because it produces
antibodies. As long as even the tiniest minority resists secularization, it is limited. I think
that hardly anyone would contest this idea. But then, the affirmation shifts: The affiliation
rate becomes "substantial". This suggests that the tiny minority must, after all, be a
"substantial" minority. What if 2.6 million people in the United States turned out to be
"deeply religious"? Surely, this would be a "substantial" amount (it is roughly equivalent
to the "new underclass" the researchers on poverty tell us about, a strata which is not
considered unsubstantial). On the other hand, it would represent hardly 1% of the
population. From this uncertain middle ground, another, much stronger assertion
suddenly emerges: religion is "flowering". Surely, when one considers the number of
cults that emerged in the last two decades, the image may seem adequate. But it also
connotes something else. Secularization is not only self-limiting; religion is not only of
"substantial" importance: it becomes an irresistible force.
Thus one of the difficulties of Stark and Bainbridge's theory is to determine what
exactly they are saying. On empirical grounds, the notion that cults could "reverse" the
secularization trend (if this really is what Stark and Bainbridge are asserting) seems
unsupported. As Wallis remarks, "what is important [...] is not how many cults there are
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
270
per million of the population and the like, but the ratio of those recruited to new religious
movements relative to the total lost by the old faiths. Outside the Bay Area of California,
the evidence suggests that the new faiths have made negligible inroads into the mass of
the unchurched" (Wallis 1984, p. 61). Other sociologists have reached the same
conclusions (for an overview, see Robbins 1988, pp. 58-59). But the disagreement does
not seem to rest so much on empirical criteria than on a subjective assessment of the
future importance of these movements343. This, I would argue, is immaterial for our
concerns. Questions of measurement and semantic shifts set apart, the only question that
is relevant with respect to the CISR paradigm is the following: Have Stark and
Bainbridge proposed an alternative view? We are thus brought back to the conclusion put
forward above: Their view is not an alternative; as a matter of fact, it is the same as
Wilson's: New religious movements are a product of secular society, and help alleviate
some of the problems it brings in its wake.
As noted above, the general compensators offered by traditional religions are very
vulnerable to progress. But "other compensators may exist that progress has not yet
touched. Most importantly, it is not difficult to invent brand new compensators designed
to harmonize with the most recent political and scientific developments. [...] New cults
may easily be invented to avoid the anarchic and primitive notions of the world and crude
explanations invented by ancient religions" (1987, p. 308). Again, as with the problem of
pluralism, the only bone of contention with respect to Wilson's view is the different
underlying theoretical assumption: Wilson considers that religion first and foremost
brings an actual reward: community life. In contrast, Stark and Bainbridge start from the
idea that "the ultimate source of religion is the fact that humans greatly desire rewards
which are not to be found in this material world of scarcity, frustration and death" (1987,
p. 312). As both community life and compensation for death are very highly demanded
"goods" in secular society, both theories are compatible with the same exemplar.
One last apparent divergence between Stark and Bainbridge's theory and the CISR
paradigm must be disposed of. Stark and Bainbridge sometimes seem to advocate a
cyclical view of the secularization process. Secularization is "constantly going on in all
societies" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 2), and is always followed by its reversal,
religious revival. One reading of this formulation could be that there is no linear
development at all. Surely, this is not what Stark and Bainbridge mean. For they also
343
There is one exception to this pattern. In keeping with their theoretical framework, Stark and Bainbridge
argue that Nazism can be considered to have been a political sect (1987, pp. 306-307). According to them,
this proves that sects can be very powerful at the macro-social level. To me, it only suggests that their
theory ought to be revised.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
271
assert that, with progress, magic progressively became eliminated from religion (P311).
Moreover, they clearly indicate that one of the results of secularization was to durably
decrease the appeal of low-tension religions. Thus, they clearly acknowledge some
measure of linearity: The process may be circular, but the circles themselves move
forward along a spiral.
There remains one troubling question. If revival and self-limitation really are
compatible with the CISR paradigm, why have I not included an exemplar to that effect in
its description? The answer is simple, but might appear embarrassing: There is no such
exemplar in the paradigm. Of course, as we know, Wilson does argue that sects are a
product of secularization. But he mentions this en passant. As he is not interested in
showing that sects are important, and does not make this point very systematically344. Not
systematically enough, at any rate, for his statements to qualify as an exemplar by the
standards I use in this study.
But why not simply include Stark and Bainbridge in the paradigm? After all, they
would not be the first to have been enlisted in it against their will! I cannot include them
in the paradigm because, strictly speaking, I am not engaged in paradigm-building (which
is by definition a collective enterprise), but in the description of an existing paradigm. (Of
course, I am aware that, by the very fact of naming it, I contribute to the building of the
CISR paradigm. This, I cannot avoid; but I can avoid engaging in any other operation
beyond this simple ostension345.) As we remember, I have identified the carriers of the
paradigm through a historical analysis. Even though I consider that revival is logically
part of that paradigm, it is not in my power as an analyst to include this exemplar in it.
Beyond the Secularization/Revival Debate: Danièle Hervieu-Léger
In the framework of the paradigm, Wilson's and Stark and Bainbridge's views
positions are not incompatible. But the paradigm does not answer all questions. On the
question of the nature of the impulse that lies behind new religious movements, we have
noted that Wilson and Stark fundamentally diverge. This is the point at which Danièle
Hervieu-Léger enters the arena.
Hervieu-Léger's 40 pages on secularization (Hervieu-Léger and Champion 1986,
pp. 187-227) are the most complete account on secularization and new religious
movements to have appeared in France to date. This analysis allows us to replace the
344
Roy Wallis, who is one of Wilson's most devoted followers, has done so (Wallis 1984), but he is not one
of the "official" carriers of the paradigm.
345
On the notion of ostension, see chapter 1, and Barnes 1982, pp. 22-27.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
272
Wilson-Stark divergence in a somewhat broader perspective. On the European continent,
the debate in the sociology of religion mostly turns around the antinomy between
dechristianization and popular religion, whereas in the anglo-american world, the
antinomy, as we know, is between secularization and religious revival. Both these
antinomies, Hervieu-Léger argues, pose the problem of the nature of modernity.
Having carefully analyzed both the continental and the Anglo-American debate,
Hervieu-Léger proposes a solution of her own to the dilemma, thus explicitly positioning
herself beyond the two competing approaches. Her proposal hinges on the notion of the
paradoxical nature of modernity. Historically, modernity is a process which can be
described in terms of progressive rationalization. But at the same time, modernity
functions as a utopia showing humans the way for a better world346. These two processes
always occur simultaneously: the second permanently recreates what has been destroyed
by the first. "Modernity abolishes religion as a meaning system and as the motive behind
human efforts, but at the same time, it recreates a room in space and in time for a utopia
which, in its very structure, remains related to a religious problematic of accomplishment
and salvation. [...] This utopian space [...] constitutes a room for the permanent
redeployment of 'religious representations', which rationalism also permanently
decomposes. [...] Secularization is not the disappearance of religion confronted to
rationality: it is the process of permanent reorganization of the work of religion in a
society which is structurally unable to fulfil the expectations that must be raised for it to
exist. The analysis of this reorganization process could be the principal task of a
sociology of belief which, for our modern societies, has yet to be formulated" (HervieuLéger and Champion 1986, pp. 224-27; see also Hervieu-Léger 1990). In other words, to
use an expression proposed by Hervieu-Léger earlier in her book, secularization is a
process of permanent recomposition of the forces of religion in society (1986, pp. 140
and 213).
In a later paper, setting out to accomplish the program of the "sociology of belief"
proposed in her book, Hervieu-Léger not only refuses to side with either school in the
issue of secularization and revival: her refusal extends to the question of the definition of
religion. Escaping the functional versus substantive definition dilemma, she proposes a
new definition of religion that combines two simple elements: belief and tradition. "The
'religious belief' of modern societies refers neither to objects of particular belief, nor to
specific social practices, nor even to original representations of the world, but is
characterized by a particular mode of legitimation of the belief act, that is the appeal to a
346
This notion is largely based on her former studies of rural communities.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
273
tradition" (Hervieu-Léger 1989, p. 77). Hervieu-Léger thus escapes the fallacious
opposition between "religion" and "rationality" which, from the XVIIIth century to our
days, has caused an artificial division of the social scientific field in two parties, one side
claiming that rationality is in the process of eliminating religion, the other maintaining
that religion is back and will ultimately vanquish rationality. Building on the inherent
ambiguity of modernity, which was apparent as early as in the works and life of Comte,
founder of positivism and of a new religion, she proposes an approach which allows us to
understand that man is inseparably a rational and an irrational being, and that society
inevitably and simultaneously produces both rationality and new myths.
The Systems Theory Reformulation: Niklas Luhmann
As mentioned before, Luhmann is generally considered Habermas' prime
opponent in Germany. This is not surprising, since Habermas is an heir of the Frankfurt
school, whereas Luhmann is following in the steps of Parsons, whose systems theory he
seeks to update. In this paper, I will not dwell on this relationship, but rather concentrate
on the problem of secularization. Unlike Habermas, Luhmann examines the problem of
secularization in detail. One of the chapters of his Funktion der Religion (Luhmann
1977), over fifty pages in length, is entirely devoted to secularization. Moreover, he has
devoted a paper specifically to the problem of civil religion (Luhmann 1981). His
knowledge of the field appears wider than Habermas'. As a matter of fact, he often cites
the works of several carriers of the CISR paradigm: most prominently Fenn347, but also
Wilson, Berger, Dobbelaere, Bellah, and of course Parsons. He is also acquainted with
some of the peripheral literature. However, he does not really start from the formulations
of the CISR paradigm, as is evident from the fact that he does not acknowledge the
centrality of differentiation in this paradigm. When the totality of his very numerous
sources is taken into account, it appears that he is influenced at least as much by German
sociology of religion (Rendtdorff, Lübbe, Matthes, Schelsky, etc.) as by the angloamerican debate. Moreover, the essays contained in Funktion der Religion were written as
a basis for a debate with theologians (Luhmann 1977, p. 7). As a result of this peculiar
insertion, Luhmann presents himself as putting forward a "new" idea, to wit:
Secularization must not be considered a transition from the "sacred" to the "profane", but
a result of functional differentiation.
347
On the congruence between Fenn and Luhmann, see Tschannen 1989.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
274
Before discussing Luhmann's secularization theory, I must give a brief account of
his general approach to the problem of religion. Luhmann defines religion in functional
terms. However, his definition is different from those that attribute to religion an
integrating function, but also from those that attribute to religion an interpreting function
(1977, pp. 9-13). To understand how his functional definition differentiates itself from the
first tradition, we must understand his global systems theory. To understand how it
differentiates itself from the second tradition, we must turn to his theory of religion.
Starting with the systems theory, it must be noted at the outset that Luhmann's
views are very difficult to present - even more than Parsons'. In the latter case, the
problems posed by the abstractness of the theoretical system were greatly alleviated by
the fact that, when Parsons discussed religion, he usually came down from the analytic to
the historical level. In contrast, Luhmann never bothers with detailed historical analyses:
The historical examples he gives are nothing but convenient illustrations of his systems
theory. My attempt to present Luhmann's theory will therefore inevitably result in some
shortcuts and simplifications. Furthermore, as Luhmann's terminology never speaks for
itself, a certain amount of "translation" will also be necessary. I will therefore not be able
to stick as closely to Luhmann's own formulations as would be desirable.
Bearing this in mind, we can start with the notion of contingency. The world is
experienced by humans as contingent because it is largely unpredictable. Thus for
example, in a social relation, ego can never be certain what alter expects of him, and vice
versa (Kiss 1986, p. 4). Of course, in practice, this contingency is not total. It is largely
brought under control by social systems. Contingency can be reduced not only by
conforming to institutionalized behavior-patterns (as Parsons would have it), but also
through communication. Communication can act as a system-building mechanism (Kiss
1986, p. 5). This explains the pervasiveness of informal behavior models even in the
midst of the most rigidly institutionalized orders (Kiss 1986, p. 66).
Because the world is contingent, it is experienced by humans as complex
(Komplex). This means not so much that the world is complicated (Kompliziert) - which
would only mean that it consists of a great number of different elements - but that it offers
a variety of options for choice (Kiss 1986, p. 7). Every choice we make in life ipso facto
leaves out a number of alternative choices we could have made, and others around us may
be making. This consideration applies not only to the individual, but also to social
systems and subsystems. As soon as a given subsystem is no longer unequivocally related
to another subsystem, the system as such has become complex. In other words, any
particular buildup of a system necessitates a choice among a number of contingent
buildup possibilities.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
275
It is also necessary to briefly present Luhmann's view of "society". A society is not
made of individuals, nor even of interactions, but of communication (Kiss 1986, p. 17).
Society as a system does not include individuals (as psychological and as organic
systems). Individuals are part of the environment of the social system (Kiss 1986, p. 75).
Thus, the social system is not more, but less than a sum of individuals: it "contains" only
the communications between them. But even the notion that something is "contained" in a
system is misleading. A system is defined not by its parts, but by its border. Society is a
system to the extent that it marks the border separating the communications between a
number of persons on the one hand, and the environment (that is, everything that does not
belong to this system of communications: other communications, but also psychological
and organic factors) on the other hand (Kiss 1986, p. 19). By tracing this border, the
system ipso facto reduces the complexity of the environment. In other words, a social
system (which can be as small as a communication system between two persons348)
determines its very shape by excluding some possibilities, which are therefore relegated
to the environment. (Thus for example, the different subsystems become differentiated
when they develop each their own communication medium - "money" in the case of the
economy, "truth" in the case of science - which has no currency in the other subsystems.)
The environment is thus not a fixed entity: to each system corresponds a different
environment. And each system is always less complex than its environment.
We can now understand in which sense Luhmann's functional analysis of religion
differs from those that are based on the notion of integration. Luhmann considers that
society does not need religion to be integrated. However, he redefines integration in a
particular way: it is nothing more than the capacity to resist disintegration. As a result of
this definition, to solve the problem of integration, it is sufficient to ensure that "the
operations of a subsystem do not create insoluble problems in another subsystem"
(Luhmann 1977, p. 242). Briefly, in contrast to the Parsonian notion of integration, where
all subsystems are subordinated to a single element, Luhmann maintains that modern
society is characterized by the fact that the different subsystems cannot be subordinated to
a single principle, but must themselves work out ways to coordinate their actions. To use
a convenient image, integration does not come from "above", but from "below"349. The
"hold", or "grip" (Zugriffsform) of the system on the subsystems shifts from the
subsystems' structures to their intrasocietal environment. In other words, integration is
348
Luhmann distinguishes different types of social systems: interaction systems, which form spontaneously
when two persons meet, organizations, which are much more institutionalized, and societies
(Gesellschaftsysteme, as distinguished from Soziale Systeme).
349
For a more detailed analysis of this question, see Tschannen 1989.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
276
ensured by the fact that each subsystem constitutes a part of the environment of all other
subsystems (Luhmann 1977, p. 243). In the new formulation put forward by Luhmann in
the 1980s (which is not entirely compatible with his former views), this idea has been
reformulated: Social systems and subsystems are autopoietic (that is: they build
themselves autonomously). In other words, social subsystems are considered closed selfreferential systems (Kiss 1986, p. 83) that adapt themselves to each other350.
Let us now turn to Luhmann's theory of religion. As noted above, a system is
defined by its border, which allows it to control the difference in complexity between the
outside and the inside, thus allowing action to take place. The control of complexity by a
system (i.e., the choice it operates in the contingency of its environment) gives rise to
meaning (Sinn). Meaning is the element that relates a system to its environment. Through
the constitution of meaning, a given system constructs an image of "the world", that is, an
horizon in which the system itself and its environment are comprised and related to each
other (Luhmann 1977, p. 22). The social function of religion is related to the creation of
meaning. To understand how this creation is possible, we must start from the notion that
all that has been excluded from the system through complexity reduction nevertheless
remains present to the system, and can be referred to as that which is appresented, in
contrast to that which is represented351: "That among which the selection has been
operated remains as active appresented horizon" (Luhmann 1977, p. 22). The creation of
meaning typically involves two distinctive processes. First, some possibilities present in
the contingency are eliminated through self-reference. Any system (individual or social)
that acts in an environment perceives itself as acting in that environment. Therefore, it
can self-referentially take into account this appresented level. Thus for example, "when
one communicates on different themes in a social situation, one always keeps in mind
that the communication takes place in the given concrete situation among given partners
and must therefore take into account more than its theme" (Luhmann 1977, p. 23).
Second, that which is appresented can be brought back into the picture: it can be
represented. In other words, it is possible to discuss reflexively about problems of
meaning. However, these two procedures do not cover the whole range of the meaningconstruction processes empirically available in human societies. The reason for this
incompleteness is that there always remains some part of that which is appresented which
cannot be represented.
350
For a presentation of the notion of self-reference as applied to religion, see Luhmann 1985.
Luhmann expands Husserl's notion by incorporating in it not only alter's experiences, but all the other
situations where choices which were left out remain in the system's consciousness as refused potentialities
(Luhmann 1977, p. 22, n. 28).
351
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
277
Religion sidesteps this problem by using a different procedure. Religion is not
based on the dichotomy between representation and appresentation, but on an opposition
between representation and counter-representation (1977, p. 25). By this device, the
problem of the incompleteness of that which is appresented dissolves. That which is
represented possesses its exact, complete counterpart: the counter-representation (for
example: the counterpart of "this world" is the "other world"). Thus, religion possesses
the capability to deal with problems posed by the very act of representing. To
reformulate: the very act of representing presents certain risks. Choices among the
contingency can be operated through self-reference and through representation of the
appresented. But ultimately, these procedures are bound to fail, because that which is
appresented can never be completely represented. Religion reduces this specific risk by
replacing all that is appresented (all the contingent possibilities) by a counterrepresentation (that is: no longer a variety of contingent possibilities, but the counterpart
of that which is represented). Religion thus has a stabilizing function in the economy of
meaning. To use a later formulation, religion "deparadoxalizes" the world (Luhmann
1985, p. 8).
In modern societies, the function of religion remains the same as ever. "The
complexity of the world that can be represented and is accessible to operations based on
meaning can be enormously increased when the social system correlatively reaches an
adequate structural complexity. However, through this operation, the horizons that define
the problem of reference of religion are only pushed aside, not surpassed. The world that
is constantly implicit and taken into account in the processing of meaning through
appresentation remains impossible to formulate, and this is the precise point to which
religion's formulation problems refer" (Luhmann 1977, p. 25). As we can notice, although
the function of religion in Luhmann's theory superficially resembles the "interpretation"
thesis, it is much more specific.
Bearing these introductory remarks in mind, we can now turn to the problem of
secularization. Luhmann's secularization theory is based on the notion of differentiation,
which is another of the core elements of his broader theory. Although it is expressed in
rather complicated terms, Luhmann's notion of differentiation in itself is hardly original
(although some of its consequences are). In undifferentiated societies, religion was
equivalent with the social system as a whole, and religion's environment was
extrasocietal; in differentiated societies, religion has become a subsystem, whose
environment now is intrasocietal (Luhmann 1977, pp. 227-28). As a result of this
functional differentiation, intrasocietal communication - and the media through which
this communication is made possible - takes on a crucial importance. Thus for instance,
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
278
"money" as the economic subsystem's media, and "truth" as the scientific subsystem's
media, have gained extra significance for the functioning of the system.
Secularization is nothing but the consequence of this general process as seen from
the point of view of the religious subsystem. Secularization is not a process endogenous to
religion. It is not even primarily a transformation of religion itself - even though, as we
will see, it does induce some changes in religion. Secularization does not even result in a
transformation of the functions of religion: religion is as relevant for the social system
now as it was before. One of the results of this perspective is that secularization can be
studied independently from the definition of religion one is working with (1977, p. 227).
Strictly speaking (although Luhmann does not explicitly say so), secularization is not a
sociological category. It is a term used by members of the religious subsystem to describe
this evolution as they perceive it (1977, p. 229).
Historically, the first consequence of differentiation for religion was positive: as
religion took the form of a religion of faith (Glaubensreligion), it became itself one of the
intra-societal communication media, and took on a dominant position (1977, pp. 230-31).
As noted above, in this position, it fulfilled a very important function for the system as a
whole. Difficulties started when, as a result of further differentiation, this function itself
was drawn from the outside to the inside of the system (1977, p. 231). As a result of
complexification, a need for contingency-control appeared inside the system, because
each subsystem must now reduce the complexity of its (intrasocietal) environment. The
consequences of this development for religion are three-fold. I will express them in
standard terminology. First, the relationship of the individual to the social order is altered
(section II in Luhmann's chapter on secularization in 1977). Second, the integration of the
social system must be based on new premises (section III). And third, the religious
subsystem must modify itself in order to adapt to its complexified environment (section
IV).
Let us turn, first, to the problem of the individual's relation to the social order. As
a result of functional differentiation (as opposed to differentiation in terms of social
strata, or of social segments), it is no longer possible to ascribe each individual
authoritatively a role (1977, p. 236). At the same time, each individual must be
guaranteed access to all the subsystems. It is not tolerable, for example, that someone be
restricted his access to one subsystem (for example education) on the grounds of his
participation in another subsystem (for example a particular religion). (It should be noted
that this does not imply that everyone, for instance, can become a physician, but only that
everyone can become a patient [Kiss 1986, p. 40]) Now, it must be noted that this
problem is general, and does not exclusively concern religion. The ways in which the
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
279
problem has been solved for the economy (through the free market and the private
ownership of the means of production) and for the polity (through democracy) gives us a
clue to the solution applicable to religion. The solution consists in the individuation of
decisions352 (Privatisierung des Entscheidens). As this solution applies to all the
institutional spheres, and not only to religion, it must not be confused with the notion of
privatization*. The individuation of religious decisions does not imply that religion has
become irrelevant to the workings of the social system. Quite the contrary: it is exactly as
relevant as the economy or politics, where the individuation of decisions also applies.
Exactly as with the economic sphere's invisible hand, the individuation of religious
decisions guarantees the stability of the social system through the statistical
neutralization of individual decisions (1977, p. 238). However, the consequences of the
individuation of decisions are similar to those of privatization* to the extent that
individuation results in religion becoming part of the sphere of leisure (Freizeit), where it
is subjected to a harsh competition (1977, p. 239).
The second point concerns social integration. Luhmann's position with regard to
social integration has been described above, and is roughly equivalent to Fenn's. The only
point that must be briefly touched upon is the place of civil religion in this framework.
Civil religion does indeed play an integrative role, but only in the integration between the
political and the religious subsystems, not for society as a whole. In the period during
which societies became functionally differentiated, civil religion provided a much-needed
link between the newly segregated subsystems, in that it guaranteed every participant in
the political subsystem equal access to the religious subsystem, and vice versa (Luhmann
1981, pp. 294-300).
Finally, the last consequence of secularization concerns the inner transformations
of religion. As noted above, the complexification of society results in the emergence of
differentiated subsystems, which each have their own communication media (1977,
p. 251). The question that then arises is: To what extent has this brought with it a
transformation of the function of religion? Luhmann presents an answer which is not to
be found in the CISR paradigm, but which is reminiscent of secular theology: as a result
of differentiation, religion has become "purer" [eine Art Selbstreinigungsprozess der
religiösen Funktion ist im Gang]353 (1977, p. 39). As other subsystems have taken over
the secondary functions religion fulfilled, it is now possible to find answers to religious
problems which are no longer contaminated by considerations external to the sphere of
352
Here, I am borrowing Dobbelaere's translation (1984, p. 211).
On the other hand, another consequence of secularization is that the churches increasingly turn to social
preoccupations - thus reverting from primary to secondary function (1977, p. 264).
353
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
280
religion. Religion can find a new function in society if it evolves a dogmatic theology
(Dogmatik) adapted to the complexification of its environment (1977, p. 253).
To conclude, how does Luhmann's approach compare with the CISR paradigm?
The first difficulty with this comparison is that Luhmann does not use exemplars. His
pronouncements do not take the form of analogies which help to see the world in a new
way, but the form of formal definitions which, at least for those not thoroughly
acquainted with his system, rather tend to obscure any understanding of the real world.
Moreover, he is not preoccupied with puzzle-solving, but with system-building. As he
does not indulge in empirical research, he does not build up his theoretical concepts to
answer particular problems encountered in research, but to fit them into a preconceived
grand theoretical scheme. Finally, Luhmann is not primarily a sociologist, but a systems
theorist. He is interested in the social world only to the extent that this world can be
reduced to abstract systems applicable along the entire range of empirically available
phenomena. Therefore, in Luhmann's case, we must not ask which exemplars he uses, but
rather with which exemplars his system is compatible.
As noted above, Luhmann reads a lot. He is obviously familiar with most
exemplars used in the sociology of religion. Those that can fit into his scheme, he adopts
and, if necessary, modifies to suit his needs; the others, he rejects. We will not attempt to
follow all the theoretical ramifications of a particular exemplar adopted by Luhmann
throughout his theoretical system: All we need to be concerned with is the problem of
secularization. The most important exemplar used by Luhmann is obviously
differentiation. As noted above, even if the particular theoretical system in which it is
inserted is novel, the notion of differentiation itself as used by Luhmann is not original.
Several exemplars related to the notion of differentiation are also used, albeit in a
modified form. Thus, autonomization* takes place (but the idea is presented in a
theoretical framework it would have been tedious to present here); there are some
connections between the individuation of religious decisions and privatization*; and
Luhmann accepts a weakened formulation of the notion of generalization* (in his
discussion of civil religion). But Luhmann radically rejects the notion of religious roots*,
of rationalization, and of worldliness*. Finally, he adds to his theory another idea,
generally considered foreign to the sociological debate: the purification of religion.
To conclude, Luhmann's treatment of secularization is certainly one of the most
original of those we have examined. It is one of the very few that proposes ideas not fully
compatible with the CISR paradigm. How much of it can be integrated into mainstream
sociology of religion remains to be seen.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
281
Secularization as a Cultural Phenomenon: Daniel Bell
Bell's attack on secularization is very interesting for our purposes, since to my
knowledge it constitutes the one and only example of a direct confrontation between one
of the carriers of the paradigm - Wilson - and a theorist who proposed an alternative view.
Bell's attack, which is explicitly aimed at Wilson, "the best" representative of the
"Weberian belief" in secularization (Bell 1977, p. 421), was delivered on the occasion of
the 1977 Hobhouse Memorial Lecture. Wilson's answer was published in a 1979 article
appearing in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.
Bell starts from the idea that we must distinguish between the evolution of the
"social structure" and that of the "culture". Societies are not organic wholes, where the
culture is always tightly related to the structure. Quite the contrary is true: Societies are
highly disjunctive, and structure and culture often go separate ways, if only because
culture is not amenable to the principles of increased efficiency that determine the change
in the structure. In other words, a new, more efficient technology outroots a more
primitive one, but "Boulez does not replace Bach or serial music the fugue" (1977, p.
425). According to Bell, the problem with secularization theory is that it is based on the
premise that religious change can be studied adequately from a structural point of view.
Bell refuses this axiom, and replaces it by the opposite axiom: Changes in religion are
more likely to arise in the cultural sphere, because religion deals with meanings (1977, p.
423).
For these different reasons, Bell proposes to "restore the original meaning" of the
term secularization. This term must be used only with respect to changes in the social
structure. In Bell's definition, then, secularization "means the disengagement of religion
from political life, [...] the shrinkage of institutional authority over the spheres of public
life, the retreat to a private world where religions have authority only over their followers,
and not over any other section of the polity on society" (1977, p. 427). Up to that point,
Bell's notion of secularization closely conforms to the CISR paradigm. Whence, then,
does the disagreement stem from?
At first sight, Bell's answer seems clear enough: "When such secularization has
taken place, as has clearly been the case in the last two hundred years, there is no
necessary, determinate shrinkage in the character and extent of beliefs" (1977, p. 427). It
thus seems that what Bell refuses is the unbelief* exemplar. In other words: There is no
reason to assume that the secularization that occurred at the structural level has been
taken over into the cultural level. However, Bell soon wavers on this point. Only a few
lines below, he recognizes that "there has been, of course, in the culture of the last two
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
282
hundred years, the more dominant trend of disbelief" (1977, p. 427). What Bell is
contesting is not unbelief as a phenomenon, but the explanation which has been given to
this phenomenon. Unbelief did not rise out of the social-structural sphere, but its roots lie
"in somewhat autonomous tendencies in Western culture" (1977, p. 427). To summarize,
"there is [...] a double process at work. One is secularization, the differentiation of
institutional authority in the world, which is reinforced by the process of rationalization.
The second, in the realm of beliefs and culture, is disenchantment, or what I would prefer
to call, for the parallelism of the term, profanation. Thus, the sacred and secular become
my pair terms for processes at work within institutions and social systems, the sacred and
the profane for the processes within culture" (1977, p. 427).
What we have here is, for the first time, a criticism of the paradigm that really
does propose an alternative view. Bell's notion of a process of profanation rising
autonomously in the cultural sphere, independent from the concomitant process of
secularization in the structural sphere, is indeed incompatible with the CISR paradigm.
The paradigm in effect always postulates a close interaction between social structure and
culture. The fact that there really is a divergence here explains why Wilson took the
trouble to devote a whole paper, adequately entitled The Return of the Sacred (this, with a
question mark and a subtitle added, was also the title of Bell's paper), to a refutation of
his critic (Wilson 1979). Predictably, Wilson's answer hinges on the notion that it is
illusory to think that changes in the ideational realm can occur independently from their
social basis. Although I agree with Wilson's answer, I will not pursue this argument. In
the present work, I am not interested in demonstrating who is right and who is wrong, but
only in establishing who says what. From this point of view, Bell's paper indeed
represents an attempt to say something different. To this attempt, we now turn.
Bell defines culture as "the modalities of response by sentient men to the core
questions that confront all human groups in the consciousness of existence: how one
meets death, the meaning of tragedy, the nature of obligation, the character of love"
(1977, p. 428). As Bell himself indicates, this notion of culture is narrower than the
standard definition used in anthropology, but broader than the notion of "cultivated"
culture. Religion, Bell defines as the core of this "culture": "Religion is a set of coherent
answers to the core existential questions that confront every human group" (1977, p. 429).
Bell's thesis is that, apart from changes that occur "in reaction to changes in
institutional life" (which he unfortunately does not elaborate upon), changes in this realm
"relate to the changes in moral temper and sensibility, to expressive styles and modes of
symbolization, to the destruction of old symbols and the creation of new ones" (1977,
p. 428). These changes in culture, which happened between the XVIIIth and XXth
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
283
centuries, can be summarized under three headings: 1) the growth of individualism; 2) the
autonomization* of aesthetic norms from morality; 3) a changed understanding of death
and the rise of nihilism (1977, p. 430). Bell exemplifies these well-known trends by
examples that are sufficiently famous not to require elaboration. Rousseau's Confessions
exemplify the rise of individualism, the emergence of the unrestrained self. Baudelaire's
Fleurs du mal is taken as the paradigm of the explosion of a-moral forms of art. Finally,
starting from Hegel's reflections on the master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenologie des
Geistes, Bell shows that once men no longer belive in some form of life after death, the
"fear of nothingness" gives rise to "new forms of aggression and domination" (1977, p.
431).
In a certain sense, one could consider that the rise of these new cultural forms is
an example of the process of autonomization* of culture. As Bell himself indicates, "in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the culture, freer now from traditional restraints,
no longer tied in intellectual and expressive areas to the modalities of the religious
beliefs, began to take the lead, so to speak, in exploring the alternatives to the religious
answers" (1977, p. 432). But in fact, this procedure would be illegitimate. The notion of
autonomization*, as used in the CISR paradigm, is restricted to the consequences of
institutional differentiation: education, for example, becomes autonomous from the power
of the church. To that extent, we can say that the lay culture (as transmitted by education)
becomes autonomous from the religious culture. However, we can never say that culture
as such becomes autonomous. Every culture always remains tied to its institutional basis.
As Wilson remarks, with his notion of the autonomization* of culture, Bell seems not
only to accept secularization theory, but to accept it in a very radical form: "Whereas for
most exponents of the theory, secularization is still in process, for Bell it appears to have
run its full course; culture and structure are insulated from one another" (Wilson 1977, p.
277).
Bell stretches the autonomization* exemplar so far that it is no longer compatible
with the paradigm. On the other hand, however, Bell prognosticates the "return of the
sacred", on the grounds that "where religions fail, cults appear" (1977, p. 443). As we
know, the rise of cults hardly constitute a challenge to the CISR paradigm. But it remains
unclear what Bell exactly means by a "return of the sacred". On this point, I can only
conclude by quoting Wilson's own conclusion: "What is to be understood by 'the return of
the sacred'? Anything more than the likelihood that certain groups are likely to espouse
special interpretations of the world? And that the groups most disposed to do so are
typically comprised of those least enmeshed in the role structure of the economic system
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
284
[...]? If that is all, who will quarrel? But is that a return of the sacred?" (Wilson 1979,
p. 280).
CONCLUSION
There is no such thing as a modern "secularization theory", or a modern
"secularization thesis". The theories put forward to account for the situation of religion in
the modern world are, in many respects, divergent. Some of them see secularization
starting in a hypothetically reconstructed prehistorical past, while others place its onset as
late as the scientific revolution. Some secularization theories rest on a functional
definition of religion so broad that all that is human is, by definition, religious, while
others restrict religion to its institutions, and still others refuse to define religion
altogether. Some theories see secularization as a linear and unambiguous (if not
evolutionary) process, while others consider that this process proceeds in leaps and
circles, and can at any time be turned back. Some theories simply rely on standard
international sociology, while others are grounded in more exotic meta-theoretical
frameworks: the sociology of knowledge, or systems theory. Some secularization theories
even try to demonstrate that "secularization" has never happened.
The absence of a unified "secularization theory" has led some critics to the
conclusion that secularization is nothing but a quagmire in which any sociologist
senseless enough to let himself be lured is bound to get inextricably trapped. Nothing
could be further from the truth. In reality, the theories built around the notion of
secularization offer sociology what remains, to this day, the most powerful and
comprehensive framework for the understanding of the situation of religion in the modern
world. It is true that, while individual writers make efforts to propose coherent theories,
the different theories considered together cannot be considered to amount to a unified
"theory". However, they add up to a coherent paradigm. It is this paradigm which, below
all the theoretical formulations, and sometimes below the level of consciousness,
provides sociologists the routine cognitive background for their daily research activities what Kuhn calls the mopping-up operations carried out in the framework of normal
science. At the paradigmatic level, the theoretical divergences between the different
sociologists become largely immaterial. Luckmann and Fenn work with very different
definitions of religion, yet they both propose a view in which the individual's relation to
the social order is radically altered, and religion has become a private affair. Similarly,
although Fenn and Wilson are separated by important divergences concerning the
unfolding of the process of secularization, both conclude that the secularized world is
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
285
highly compatible with certain sectarians forms of religiosity. In other words, scholars
who live and work in different theoretical worlds are nevertheless apt to propose common
exemplars. It is from these exemplars - and not from the theories - that the modern
understanding of religion draws its strength.
And indeed, in spite of the lamentations of many of its practitioners, it is clear that
the modern approach to religion far outweighs in interpretive and explicative power most
of the preceding approaches. To document this progress, one only has to read (with a
purposefully whiggish slant) the works of many of our forebears. Not only has the
theoretical framework become more subtle - who would deny that Fenn's approach is
more subtle than Comte's or Spencer's? But the sheer wealth of empirical findings that
has accumulated in the second part of this century has forced many a painful and salutary
revision. The superior explicative power of the CISR paradigm stems from the fact that it
has a long history; that it has been constituted by the synthesis of the successive efforts of
several generations of researchers. In this study, we have witnessed the slow emergence
of the different exemplars that constitute the bedrock cognitive framework of the
paradigm. Comte and Spencer, the first contributors, have proposed two exemplars that
were, for a time, to dominate the whole secularization issue, but which took on a marginal
significance in the modern paradigm: scientifization and sociologization. Then, starting
with Spencer, generation after generation of sociologists have refined the exemplar that
was to become the central axis of the whole paradigm: differentiation. However, until
Parsons' very decisive intervention, this exemplar was not systematically related to the
situation of religion. Weber broadened the perspective by providing the intellectual tools
to transform the somewhat crude scientifization exemplar into the more acceptable
rationalization exemplar. A host of lesser exemplars emerged in the course of this history:
Ross first proposed autonomization, Sumner proposed pluralism, the Lynds proposed
worldliness, Catholic sociologists proposed decline in practice. Thus, progressively, the
material for a coherent vision of religion in modern society emerged from the largely
uncoordinated works of sociologists working in vastly different times and national
traditions, and with very different interests.
But even more important for the formation of the paradigm were a number of
transformations occurring at other levels. With Becker, and then Herberg,
"secularization" became transformed from a mere descriptive term into a concept charged
with a central theoretical significance. With the rise of functionalism, the problem of
religion ceased to be posed in term of disappearance, and was envisaged as a problem of
change of position and of function in the system. The same generation of American
sociologists sanctioned the abandonment of the autoreference tradition. Catholic
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
286
sociologists pioneered the empirical exploration of religion. European influence and the
American religious revival kindled the interest of American academic sociologists in
religion. Theologians operated a transmutation in the assessment of the notion of
secularization, interpreting it as a liberating development of modernity. Finally, the
intellectual revolution within the European CISR blended these elements together,
producing at one and the same time a new generation of scholars acutely aware of their
historical mission and an audience thirsty for the new vision. Subsequent "debates"
around the notion of secularization must be dismissed as not much more than Kuhnian
mopping-up operations or, more often, theoretical misunderstandings stemming from the
divergences in the interests of the different scholars engaged in the issue.
But unfortunately, the enthusiasm for the CISR paradigm that shows through
these lines must now be strongly relativized. In saying that this paradigm is, as yet, the
only coherent and comprehensive framework for the analysis of religion in the modern
world, I am not in any way implying that it is the only possible one. As a matter of fact,
we have noted in the last chapter a number of alternative formulations which, if not as
complete as the CISR paradigm, nevertheless point to some of its flaws. In the framework
of the present study, I have not conducted a systematic reflection on these problems. But I
would like to conclude briefly by mentioning what appears to me to be the most glaring
weakness of the CISR paradigm: its failure to address the phenomenon of globalization
(this issue has been addressed repeatedly by Roland Robertson [1985, 1987]).
With the exception of Luhmann's, all the approaches we have been examining
consider a number of processes occurring within an implicit structural framework: the
"global society". Whatever that global society may be (the United States or western
civilization), it does not reach beyond the boundaries of the "first world". Secularization
is a process completely endogenous to the capitalistic developed world. Our civilization
is completely insulated against all external influences. Now of course, we know that this
is not true. First, the fundamentalist eruptions that occur in the third world cannot be
understood without taking into account European expansion. And these eruptions present
to us an image of religion (as inherently reactionary) whose effects on our perception of
religious problems in our own countries cannot be underestimated. But even more
significantly, the discovery of other cultures and other ways of life that accompanied the
European expansion had a tremendous impact on our world view. One has only to
remember the discussions of the philosophes of the Enlightenment around the strange
cultures they were discovering. The failure of the CISR paradigm to take into account
these elements must be considered a severe shortcoming. Robertson argues that, if we
truly take into account the phenomenon of globalization, "the secularization-
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
287
desecularization problem is itself being transcended and subsumed" (Robertson 1987,
p. 31). In other words: the whole secularization issue becomes irrelevant.
I voluntarily refrain from discussing this problem any further. I would consider it
preposterous on my part to pretend to be able to bring an answer - or even the beginning
of an answer - to this complex question. My only purpose in introducing this last caveat
was to break with the mood of complacency that - very much against my will, since I
intended to be much more critical - pervades much of this study. In this final effort, I
hope to destabilize the reader, in order to prevent his coming away from the reading of
this book with the false impression that all the problems have been solved. Quite the
contrary is true: there is a tremendous need for new thinking in the field. If I should have
been able, through this study, to show that certain old problems have been settled, and
that we must therefore think and work in new directions, I would have achieved an aim
more important and gratifying than the mere overcoming of a ritual academic hurdle.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
288
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acquaviva, Sabino S. (1961) 1966. L'ecclisi del sacro nella civiltà industriale. Milano:
Edizioni di Comunità.
Acquaviva, Sabino S. and Guizzardi, Gustavo (eds). 1973. La Secolarizzazione. Bologna:
Il Mulino.
Aldenhoff, Rita. 1987. "Max Weber and the Evangelical-Social Congress". Max Weber
and his Contemporaries. Edited by Mommsen, Wolfgang J. and Osterhammel,
Jürgen. London: The German Historical Institute. Pp. 193-202.
Arbousse-Bastide, Paul. 1966. "Auguste Comte et la sociologie religieuse". Archives de
sociologie des religions 22, pp. 3-57.
Arendt, Hannah. (1954) 1977. Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political
Thought. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.
Aron, Raymond. 1967. Les étapes de la pensée sociologique. Paris: Gallimard.
Austin, J.L. (1962) 1975. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press.
Barnes, Barry. 1982. T.S. Kuhn and Social Science. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Becker, Howard. 1932. "Processes of Secularization: An Ideal-Typical analysis with
Special Reference to Personality Change as Affected by Population Movement".
Sociological Review 24 (2; 3), pp. 138-54; 266-86.
—. 1957. "Current Sacred-Secular Theory and its Development". Modern Sociological
Theory in Continuity and Change. Edited by Becker, Howard and Boskoff, Alvin.
New York: Dryden Press. Pp. 133-185.
Beckford, James A. 1985. "The Insulation and Isolation of the Sociology of Religion".
Sociological Analysis 46 (4), pp. 347-54.
—. 1990. "The Sociology of Religion 1945-1989". Social Compass 37 (1), pp. 45-64.
Bell, Daniel. 1971. "Religion in the Sixties". Social Research 38 (3), pp. 447-97.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
289
—. 1977. "The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion". British
Journal of Sociology 28 (4), pp. 420-49.
Bellah, Robert N. 1970. Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-traditional World.
New York: Harper & Row.
—. 1975. The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial. New York:
Seabury Press.
Bellah, Robert N. et al. 1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in
American Life. New York: Harper & Row.
Bendix, Reinhard. 1960. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday.
Benedict, Ruth. (1934) 1959. Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Berger, Peter L. 1954. "The Sociological Study of Sectarianism". Social Research 21 (4),
pp. 467-85.
—. 1955. "Demythologization - Crisis in Continental Sociology". The Review of Religion
20 (1-2), pp. 5-24.
—. 1959. "Camus, Bohhöffer and the World Come of Age". The Christian Century April
8 and 15, pp. 417-18 and 430-32.
—. 1961a. The Noise of Solemn Assemblies: Christian Commitment and the Religious
Establishment in America. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
—. 1961b. The Precarious Vision: A Sociologist Looks at Social Fictions and Christian
Faith. Garden City: New York: Doubleday.
—. 1963. "A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity". Social Research 30 (1),
pp. 77-93.
—. (1967) 1969. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
—. 1969. A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
290
—. 1974. "Some Second Thoughts on Substantive versus Functional Definitions of
Religion". Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 13 (2), pp. 125-33.
—. 1977. Facing up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion. New
York: Basic Books.
—. 1979. The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation.
Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
—. 1980. "From Secularity to World Religions". Christian Century Jan 16, pp. 41-43.
—. 1983. "From the Crisis of Religion to the Crisis of Secularity". Religion and America:
Spiritual Life in a Secular Age. Edited by Douglas, Mary and Tipton, Steven.
Boston: Beacon Press. Pp. 14-24.
Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas. 1963. "Sociology of Religion and Sociology of
Knowledge". Sociology and Social Research 47 (4), pp. 417-27.
—. 1964. "Social Mobility and Personal Identitiy". Archives Européennes de Sociologie
5 (2), pp. 331-44.
—. (1966a) 1984. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of
Knowledge. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.
—. 1966b. "Secularization and Pluralism". International Yearbook for the Sociology of
Religion 2, pp. 73-84.
Birnbaum, Norman. 1960. "The Sociology of Religion at the Fourth World Congress of
Sociology: Stresa, 8-15 September 1959". Archives de Sociologie des Religions 9,
pp. 111-12.
Bloor, David. 1976. Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bock, Kenneth. 1978. "Theories of Progress, Development, Evolution". A History of
Sociological Analysis. Edited by Bottomore, Tom and Nisbet, Robert. London:
Heinemann. Pp. 39-79.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1971. "Genèse et structure du champ religieux". Revue Française de
Sociologie 12, pp. 295-334.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
291
—. 1979. La distinction: critique sociale du jugement. Paris: Minuit.
—. (1976) 1984. "Quelques propriétés des champs". Questions de sociologie. Paris:
Minuit.
Bourdieu, Pierre et al. (1968) 1983. Le métier de sociologue: préalables
épistémologiques. Paris: Mouton.
Breault, Kevin D. 1989. "New Evidence on Religious Pluralism, Urbanization, and
Religious Participation". American Sociological Review 54 (6), pp. 1048-53.
Budd, Susan. 1977. Varieties of Unbelief: Atheists and Agnostics in English Society
1850-1960. London: Heinemann.
Bultmann, Rudolf et al. (1953) 1961. Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate. New
York: Harper & Row.
Burgess, Ernest W. 1948. "The Family in a Changing Society". The American Journal of
Sociology 53 (6), pp. 417-22.
Burrow, John W. 1966. Evolution and Society: A Study of Victorian Social Theory.
London: Cambridge University Press.
Callahan, Daniel (ed). 1966. The Secular City Debate. New York: Macmillan.
Cahnman, Werner J. 1977. "Tönnies in America". History and Theory 16, pp. 147-67.
Campbell, Colin. 1971. Toward a Sociology of Irreligion. London: Macmillan.
Camus, Albert. 1942. Le mythe de Sisyphe: Essai sur l'absurde. Paris: Gallimard.
Caporale, Rocco. 1976. "Nuovi dei o vecchi demoni? Riflessioni sul senso emergente
della religiosità contemporanea". Vecchi e nuovi dei: Studi e riflessioni sul senso
religioso dei nostri tempi, dagli atti del Secondo Simposio Internazionale sulla
Credenza organizzato dalla 'Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli' (Vienna, 7-11 gennaio
1975). Edited by Caporale, Rocco. Editoriale Valentino. Pp. 11-34.
Caporale, Rocco and Grumelli, Antonio (eds). 1971. The Culture of Unbelief: Studies and
Proceedings from the First International Symposium on Belief Held at Rome March 22-27, 1969. Berkeley: University of California Press.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
292
Castoriadis, Cornelius. 1982. "Institution de la société et religion". Esprit 5, pp. 116-31.
Cipriani, Roberto. 1981. "Sécularisation ou retour du sacré?". Archives de sciences
sociales des religions 52 (2), pp. 141-50.
Claval, Paul. 1980. Les mythes fondateurs des sciences sociales. Paris: PUF.
Collins, Randall. 1980. "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization".
American Sociological Review 45, pp. 925-42.
—. 1986. "Is 1980s Sociology in the Doldrums?". American Journal of Sociology 91 (6),
pp. 1336-55.
Comte, Auguste. (1822) 1970. Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour
réorganiser la société. Présentation et notes par Angèle Kremer-Marietti. Paris:
Aubier-Montaigne.
—. (1830) 1892. Cours de philosophie positive (Tome premier contenant les
préliminaires généraux et la philosophie mathématique). Paris: Société Positiviste.
—. (1839) 1975. Physique sociale (Cours de philosophie positive, leçons 46 à 60).
Présentation et notes par Jean-Paul Enthoven. Paris: Hermann.
—. (1844) 1969. Discours sur l'esprit positif. Bruxelles: Culture et civilisation.
—. (1852a) 1957. Catéchisme positiviste, ou sommaire exposition de la religion
universelle en treize entretiens systématiques entre une femme et un prêtre de
l'humanité. Rio de Janeiro: Temple de l'humanité.
—. (1852b) 1969. Système de politique positive, ou traité de sociologie instituant la
religion de l'humanité. Bruxelles: Culture et civilisation.
—. 1968. Auguste Comte: Textes choisis et présentés par Pierre Arnaud. Paris: Bordas.
Coser, Lewis A. (1971) 1977. Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and
Social Context. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
—. 1978. "American Trends". A History of Sociological Analysis. Edited by Bottomore,
Tom and Nisbet, Robert. London: Heinemann. Pp. 287-320.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
293
Cox, Harvey. (1965) 1966. The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in
Theological Perspective. New York: Macmillan.
—. 1968. "The Epoch of the Secular City". Social Compass 15 (1), pp. 5-12.
Delumeau, Jean. 1975. "Déchristianisation ou nouveau modèle du christianisme?".
Archives de sciences sociales des religions 40, pp. 3-20.
Dobbelaere, Karel. 1968. "Trend Report on the State of the Sociology of Religion: 19651966". Social Compass 15 (5), pp. 329-65.
—. 1981. "Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept". Current Sociology 29 (2).
—. 1984. "Secularization Theories and Sociological Paradigms: Convergences and
Divergences". Social Compass 31 (2-3), pp. 199-219.
—. 1985. "Secularization Theories and Sociological Paradigms: A Reformulation of the
Private-Public Dichotomy and the Problem of Social Integration". Sociological
Analysis 46 (4), pp. 377-87.
—. 1987a. "Some Trends in European Sociology of Religion: The Secularization
Debate". Sociological Analysis 48 (2), pp. 107-37.
—. 1987b. "Secularity and Religion: The Persisting Tension: Some Methodological
Suggestions". The Journal of Oriental Studies 26 (1), pp. 11-20.
—. 1989. "CISR, An Alternative Approach to Sociology of Religion in Europe: ACSS
and CISR Compared". Sociological Analysis 50 (4), pp. 377-87.
—. 1990. "Comments on Emile Poulat". Social Compass 37 (1), pp. 41-44.
Dobbelaere, Karel and Lauwers, Jan. 1973. "Definition of Religion: A Sociological
Critique". Social Compass 20 (4), pp. 535-51.
Dux, Günter. 1971. "Religion, Geschichte und sozialer Wandel in Max Webers
Religionssoziologie". Internationales Jahrbuch für Religionssoziologie Vol. II,
Pp. 60-94.
Eckberg, Douglas L. and Hill Jr., Lester. 1979. "The Paradigm Concept and Sociology: A
Critical Review". American Sociological Review 44, pp. 925-37.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
294
Edwards, David L. (ed). 1963. The Honest to God Debate: Some Reactions to the Book
"Honest to God". Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
Eliade, Mircea. (1957) 1965. Le sacré et le profane. Paris: Gallimard.
Femia, Joseph V. 1981. "An Historicist Critique of 'Revisionist' Methods for Studying the
History of Ideas". Meaning and Context. Edited by Tully, James. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 156-75.
Fenn, Richard K. 1968. "The Death of God: An Analysis of Ideological Crisis". Review of
Religious Research 9 (3), pp. 171-81.
—. 1969. "The Secularization of Values: An Analytical Framework for the Study of
Secularization". Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 8 (1), pp. 112-24.
—. 1970. "The Process of Secularization: A Post-Parsonian View". Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 9 (2), pp. 117-36.
—. 1972. "Toward a New Sociology of Religion". Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 11 (1), pp. 16-32.
—. 1974. "Religion and the Legitimation of Social Systems". Changing Perspectives in
the Scientific Study of Religion. Edited by Eister, Allan W. New York: John Wiley &
Sons. Pp. 143-61.
—. 1978. Toward a Theory of Secularization. Storrs, Connecticut: Society for the
Scientific Study of Religion (Monograph series number 1).
—. 1982. Liturgies and Trials: The Secularization of Religious Language. New York:
Pilgrim Press.
—. 1986. The Spirit of Revolt. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.
—. 1987. The Dream of the Perfect Act: An Inquiry into the Fate of Religion in a Secular
World. New York: Tavistock.
Ferrarotti, Franco. 1984. "Il mito della secolarizzazione". La Critica Sociologica 69,
pp. 11-22.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
295
Ferreux, Jean. 1988. "Un entretien avec Thomas Luckmann". Sociétés: Revue des
sciences humaines et sociales 21, pp. 39-42.
Fichter, Joseph H. 1960. Are We Going Secular? Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette
University Press.
Friedrichs, Robert W. 1970. A Sociology of Sociology. New York: Free Press.
Fürstenberg, Friedrich. 1966. "The Future Scope of the Sociology of the Parish". Social
Compass 13 (4), pp. 305-08.
Gallagher, Ralph H. (1938) 1989. "Presidential Address". Sociological Analysis 50 (4),
pp. 319-20.
Giddens, Anthony. 1972. "Positivism and its Critics". A History of Sociological Analysis.
Edited by Bottomore, Tom and Nisbet, Robert. London: Heinemann.
Giddings, Franklin H. 1896. The Principles of Sociology: An Analysis of the Phenomena
of Association and of Social Organization. New York: Macmillan
Glasner, Peter E. 1977. The Sociology of Secularisation: A Critique of a Concept.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Glock, Charles Y. 1959. "The Sociology of Religion". Sociology Today: Problems and
Prospects. Edited by Merton, Robert K. et al. New York: Basic Books. Pp. 153-77.
Glock, Charles Y. and Stark, Rodney. 1965. Religion and Society in Tension. Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co.
Glock, Charles and Hammond, Phillip (eds). 1973. Beyond the Classics? Essays in the
Scientific Study of Religion. New York: Harper & Row.
Goddijn, H. 1958-59. "La portée et le développement de la théorie en sociologie
religieuse". Sociaal Kompas 6 (1), pp. 18-31.
Gogarten, Friedrich. 1953. Verhängnis und Hoffnung der Neuzeit: Die Säkularisierung
als theologisches Problem. Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag..
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
296
Graf, Friedrich W. 1987. "Friendship Between Experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch".
Max Weber and his Contemporaries. Edited by Mommsen, Wolfgang J. and
Osterhammel, Jürgen. London: The German Historical Institute. Pp. 215-33.
Graham, Keith. 1981. "How do Illocutionary Acts Explain?". Meaning and Context.
Edited by Tully, James. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 14755.
Greeley, Andrew M. 1966. "After Secularity: The Neo-Gemeinschaft Society: A PostChristian Postscript". Sociological Analysis 27 (3), pp. 119-27.
—. 1972. Unsecular Man: The Persistence of Religion. New York: Schocken Books.
Groethuysen, Bernhard. 1934. "Secularism". Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by Seligman, Edwin R.A. New York: Macmillan. Vol. XIII-XIV, pp. 631-34.
Guizzardi, Gustavo. 1973. "Secolarizzazione: alcuni nodi essenziali". La
Secolarizzazione. Edited by Acquaviva, Sabino S. and Guizzardi, Gustavo. Bologna:
Il Mulino. Pp. 23-50.
Hadden, Jeffrey K (ed). 1971. Religion in Radical Transition. Transaction.
—. 1987. "Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory". Social Forces 65 (3), pp. 587611.
Hadden, Jeffrey K. and Shupe, Anson (eds). 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics:
Religion and the Political Order Vol. I. New York: Paragon House.
—. 1988. The Politics of Religion and Social Change: Religion and the Political Order
Vol. II. New York: Paragon House.
Hahn, Alois. 1974. Religion und der Verlust der Sinngebung: Identitätsprobleme in der
modernen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt: Herder & Herder.
Hammond, Phillip (ed.). 1985. The Sacred in a Secular Age: Toward Revision in the
Scientific Study of Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press.
—. 1986. "Religion in the Modern World". Making Sense of the Modern Times: Peter L.
Berger and the Vision of Interpretive Sciology. Edited by Hunter, James D. and
Ainlay, Stephen C. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pp. 143-58.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
297
Hargrove, Barbara. 1979. The Sociology of Religion: Classical and Contemporary
Approaches. Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson.
Hart, Hornell. 1942. "Religion". American Journal of Sociology 47 (6), pp. 888-97.
Heberle, Rudolf. (1937) 1966. "The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tönnies:
'Community' and 'Society'". An Introduction to the History of Sociology. Edited by
Barnes, Harry E. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hennis, Wilhelm. 1987. "A Science of Man: Max Weber and the Political Economy of
the German Historical School". Max Weber and his Contemporaries. Edited by
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. and Osterhammel, Jürgen. London: The German Historical
Institute. Pp. 25-58.
Herberg, Will. (1955) 1983. Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious
Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—. 1959. "There is a Religious Revival!". Review of Religious Research 1 (2), pp. 45-50.
—. 1962. "Religion in a Secularized Society". Review of Religious Research 3 (4) and 4
(1), pp. 145-58 and 33-45.
Heron, Alasdair I. C. 1980. A Century of Protestant Theology. Philadelphia: Westminster
Press.
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 1989. "Tradition, Innovation and Modernity: Research Notes".
Social Compass 36 (1), pp. 71-81.
—. 1990. "Religion and Modernity in the French Context: For a New Approach to
Secularization". Sociological Analysis 51 (s), pp. 15-25.
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle and Champion, Françoise. 1986. Vers un nouveau christianisme?
Introduction à la sociologie du christianisme occidental. Paris: Cerf.
Hill, Michael. 1973. A Sociology of Religion. London: Heinemann.
Hill, Reuben. 1947. "The American Family: Problem or Solution?". American Journal of
Sociology 53 (2), pp. 125-30.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
298
Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York:
Random House.
Holt, Arthur E. 1928. "Religion". American Journal of Sociology 34 (1), pp. 172-76.
House, Floyd N. 1936. The Development of Sociology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hughes, Everett C. 1928. "Personality Types and the Division of Labor". American
Journal of Sociology 33 (5), pp. 754-68.
Imse, Thomas P. 1989. "Catholic: Outside and Inside the ACSS/ASR". Sociological
Analysis 50 (4), pp. 403-08.
Isambert, François-André. 1976. "La sécularisation interne du christianisme". Revue
Française de Sociologie 17, pp. 573-89.
Johnson, Benton. 1985. "Religion and Politics in America: The Last Twenty Years". The
Sacred in a Secular Age: Toward Revision in the Scientific Study of Religion. Eidted
by Hammond, Phillip. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 301-16.
Jones, Robert A. 1977. "On Understanding a Sociological Classic". American Journal of
Sociology 83 (2), pp. 279-319.
—. 1983. "The New History of Sociology". American Sociological Review 9, pp. 447-69.
Kalberg, Stephen. 1980. "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the
Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History". American Journal of Sociology 85
(5), pp. 1145-79.
Kelly, James R. 1977. "Sociology versus Religion? The Case of the 1973 Introductory
Sociology Texts". Teaching Sociology 4 (4), pp. 357-68.
Kiss, Gabor. 1986. Grundzüge und Entwicklung der Luhmannschen Systemtheorie.
Stuttgart: Enke.
Kivisto, Peter. 1989. "The Brief Career of Catholic Sociology". Sociological Analysis 50
(4), pp. 351-61.
Kolb, William L. 1953. "Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion: The
Growth of a Moral Dilemma". Social Forces 31 (4), pp. 305-11.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
299
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962) 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
—. (1969) 1970. "Postscript". The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. Pp. 174-210.
Labbens, Jean. 1960. "Le rôle de la Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse".
Social Compass 7 (1), pp. 69-75.
—. 1964. "Déchristianisation ou sécularisation? Les mots et les réalités". Chronique
Sociale de France décembre, pp. 491-97.
Ladrière, Paul. 1986. "La fonction rationalisatrice de l'éthique religieuse dans la théorie
wébérienne de la modernité". Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 61 (1),
pp. 105-25.
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through
Society. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno and Woolgar, Steve. 1979. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of
Scientific Facts. Beverley Hills, California: Sage.
Lauwers, Jan. 1973. "Les théories sociologiques concernant la sécularisation - Typologie
et critique". Social Compass 20 (4), pp. 523-33.
Le Bras, Gabriel. 1963. "Déchristianisation: mot fallacieux". Social Compass 10 (6),
pp. 445-52.
Lechner, Frank J. 1990. "The Case Against Secularization: A Rebuttal". Social Forces ??.
Leif, J. 1946. La sociologie de Tönnies. Paris: PUF.
Lenski, Gerhard. (1961) 1963. The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's
Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday.
—. 1962. "The Sociology of Religion in the United States: A Review of Theoretically
Oriented Research". Social Compass 9 (4), pp. 307-37.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
300
Lerner, Daniel. (1958) 1964. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle
East. New York: Free Press.
Levine, Donald N. (1981) 1985. "Rationality and Freedom, Inveterate Multivocals". The
Flight from Ambiguity: Essays in Social and Cultural Theory. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. Pp. 142-78.
Lindberg, David C. and Numbers, Ronald (eds). 1986. God and Nature: Historical
Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Religion in America: What Religious Revival?". Review of
Religious Research 1 (1), pp. 17-24.
Loomis, Charles P. (1957) 1963. "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, As
Related to Other Typologies: The Typological Tradition". Community and Society
(by Ferdinand Tönnies). Edited and translated by Loomis, Charles P. New York:
Harper & Row. Pp. 12-29.
Lübbe, Hermann. 1964. "Säkularisierung als Geschichtsphilosophische Kategorie". Die
Philosophie und die Frage nach dem Vortschritt. Edited by Kuhn, Helmut and
Wiedemann, Franz. München: Verlag Anton Pustet. Pp. 221-39.
—. (1965) 1975. Säkularisierung: Geschichte eines Ideenpolitischen Begriffs. Freiburg:
Verlag Karl Alber.
Luckmann, Thomas. 1960. "Neune Schriften zur Religionssoziologie". Kölner Zeitschrift
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 12 (2), pp. 315-26.
—. 1963. Das Problem der Religion in der Modernen Gesellschaft: Institution, Person
und Weltanschauung. Freiburg: Rombach.
—. (1967) 1970. The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society.
New York: Macmillan.
—. 1971. "Belief, Unbelief and Religion". The Culture of Unbelief: Studies and
Proceedings from the First International Symposium on Unbelief Held at Rome,
March 22-27, 1969. Edited by Caporale, Rocco and Grumelli, Antonio. Pp. 21-37.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
301
—. 1977. "Theories of Religion and Social Change". The Annual Review of the Social
Sciences of Religion 1, pp. 1-28.
—. 1979. "The Structural Conditions of Religious Consciousness in Modern Societies".
Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 6 (1-2), pp. 121-37.
—. 1980. Lebenswelt und Gesellschaft: Grundstrukturen und geschichtliche Wandlungen.
München: Ferdinand Schöningh.
—. 1987. "Social Reconstruction of Transcendence". Secularization and Religion: The
Persisting Tension (Acts of the XIXth Interantional Conference for the Sociology of
Religion, Tübingen 1987, 25-29 August). Lausanne: CISR. Pp. 23-31.
—. 1988. "Religion and Modern Consciousness". Zen Buddhism Today: Annual Report of
the Kyoto Zen Symposium. Kyoto: Kyoto Seminar for Religious Philosophy. Pp. 1122.
—. 1990. "Shrinking Transcendence, Expanding Religion?". Sociological Analysis 50 (2),
pp. 127-38.
Luhmann, Niklas. 1977. Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
—. 1981. "Grundwerte als Zivilreligion". Soziologische Aufklärung: Soziales System,
Gesellschaft, Organisation. Vol. 3. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Pp. 293-308.
—. 1985. "Society, Meaning, Religion - Based on Self-Reference". Sociological Analysis
46 (1), pp. 5-20.
Lynd, Robert S. and Lynd, Helen M. 1929. Middletown: A Study in American Culture.
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
—. 1937. Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts. New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1967. Secularization and Moral Change. London: Oxford
University Press.
MacIver, Robert M. 1931. Society: Its Structure and Changes. New York: Ray Long &
Richard R. Smith.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
302
Maître, Jacques. 1960. "6e Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse, Bologne,
3-6 septembre 1959: La Religion et l'intégration sociale". Archives de Sociologie des
Religions 9, pp. 73-80.
Manuel, Frank. E. 1962. The Prophets of Paris. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Martin, David A. 1966. "The Sociology of Religion: A Case of Status Deprivation?".
British Journal of Sociology 17 (4), pp. 353-59.
—. 1969. The Religious and the Secular: Studies in Secularization. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
—. 1971. "The Problem of Secularization: Where Has All the Religiosity Gone?".
Encounter 36 (4), pp. 72-79.
—. 1978. A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Marty, Martin E. (1964) 1966. Varieties of Unbelief. New York: Doubleday.
—. 1974. "The Historical Focus (Review Symposium: The Sociology of Religion of
Andrew M. Greeley)". Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 13 (1), pp. 86-90.
Mascall, Eric L. 1965. The Secularisation of Christianity: An Analysis and a Critique.
London: Darton, Longman & Todd.
Masterman, Margaret. 1970. "The Nature of a Paradigm". Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of
Science. Edited by Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan. London: Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 59-89.
Matthes, Joachim. 1967. Religion und Gesellschaft.
Religionssoziologie I. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
Einführung
in
die
McCarthy, Thomas. 1978. The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
McGuire, Meredith B. 1987 (second edition). Religion: The Social Context. Belmont,
California: Wordsworth.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
303
McNamara, Patrick H. 1974. "A Theoretical Review (Review Symposium: The Sociology
of Religion of Andrew M. Greeley)". Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 13
(1), pp. 79-86.
Mehl, Roger. 1951. "La sécularisation de la cité". Le problème de la civilisation
chrétienne. Edited by Boisset, Jean et al. Paris: PUF. Pp. 13-53.
—. 1966. "De la sécularisation à l'athéisme". Foi et vie, revue de quinzaine 65, pp. 70-79.
Merton, Robert K. (1949) 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free
Press.
Mills, Charles W. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. London: Oxford University Press.
Minogue, Kenneth. (1981) 1988. "Method in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner's
Foundations". Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics. Edited by
Tully, James. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 176-93.
Mitzman, Arthur. 1969. The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber. New
York: Grosser & Dunlap.
Moberg, David O. 1962. "International Consultation-Conference on the Sociology of
Religion (Washington, September 8-10, 1962)". Social Compass 9 (5-6), pp. 566-74.
—. 1966. "The Sociology of Religion in Europe and America". Social Compass 13 (3),
pp. 193-204.
Mommsen, Wolfgang. 1986. "Max Webers Begriff der Universalgeschichte". Max
Weber, der Historiker. Edited by Kocha, Jürgen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht. Pp. 51-72.
Moore, Wilbert E. 1978. "Functionalism". A History of Sociological Analysis. Edited by
Bottomore, Tom and Nisbet, Robert. London: Heinemann. Pp. 321-57.
Morris, Loretta M. 1989a. "Association for the Sociology of Religion Turns Fifty".
Footnotes February, p. 3.
—. 1989b. "Secular Transcendence: From ACSS to ASR". Sociological Analysis 50 (4),
pp. 329-49.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
304
Mundie, Paul J. (1940) 1989. "The American Catholic Sociological Review".
Sociological Analysis 50 (4), p. 321.
Niebuhr, H. Richard. (1929) 1957. The Social Sources of Denominationalism. Cleveland:
World Publishing.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1958. Pious and Secular America. New York: Charles Scribener's
Sons.
Ogburn, William F. 1935. "Indexes of Social Trends and their Fluctuations". American
Journal of Sociology 40 (6), pp. 822-28.
Park, Robert E. 1950. Race and Culture. New York: Free Press.
Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W. 1921. Introduction to the Science of Sociology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Parsons, Talcott. (1937) 1968. The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory
with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers. 2 vols. New York:
Free Press.
—. (1944) 1954. "The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Religion: A Chapter
in the History of Modern Social Science". Essays in Sociological Theory. New York:
Free Press. Pp. 197-211.
—. 1951. The Social System. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
—. n.d. [1951-1952]. Religious Perspectives of College Training in Sociology and Social
Psychology. New Haven, Connecticut: Edward W. Hazen Foundation.
—. 1957. "Réflexions sur les organisations religieuses aux Etats-Unis". Archives de
sociologie des religions 3, pp. 21-36.
—. 1961. "Introduction". The Study of Sociology. (by Herbert Spencer). Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press. Pp. v-x.
—. 1962. "The Cultural Background of American Religious Organization". Ethics and
Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political, and Military (Conference on
Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life).
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
305
Edited by Cleveland, Harlan and Lasswell, Harold D. New York: Harper. Pp. 14167.
—. (1963a) 1967 . "Christianity and Modern Industrial Society". Sociological Theory,
Values, and Sociocultural Change: Essays in Honor of Pitirim A. Sorokin. Edited by
Tiryakian E. A. New York. Harper & Row. Pp. 33-70.
—. 1963b. "Introduction". The Sociology of Religion (by Max Weber). Boston: Beacon
Press. Pp. xix-lxvii.
—. 1964. "Evolutionary Universals in Society". American Sociological Review 29 (3),
pp. 339-57.
—. 1966. "Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society". Review of Religious Research 7 (3),
pp. 125-46.
—. 1968. "Christianity". International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol II,
pp. 425-47.
—. 1971. "Belief, Unbelief and Disbelief". The Culture of Unbelief: Studies and
Proceedings from the First International Symposium on Unbelief Held at Rome,
March 22-27, 1969. Edited by Caporale, Rocco and Grumelli, Antonio. Pp. 207-45.
—. 1974. "Religion in Postindustrial America: The Problem of Secularization". Social
Research 41 (2), pp. 193-225.
Peel, J.D.Y. 1971. Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist. New York: Basic
Books.
Pétursson, Pétut. 1983. Church and Social Change: A Study of the Secularization Process
in Iceland 1830-1930. Vänersborg: Vänersburgs Offset AB.
Pfautz, Harold W. 1955. "The Sociology of Secularization: Religious Groups". The
American Journal of Sociology 61 (2), pp. 121-28.
—. 1956. "Christian Science: A Case Study of the Social Psychological Aspect of
Secularization". Social Forces 34, pp. 246-51.
Pin, Emile. 1960. "La sociologie du catholicisme depuis la conférence internationale
(Louvain 1956)". Social Compass 7 (1), pp. 75-81.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
306
Popper, Karl R. (1934) 1968. The Logic of Scientific Discoveries. New York: Harper.
Portfield, Austin L. 1952. "Suicide and Crime in Folk and Secular Society". American
Journal of Sociology 57 (4), pp. 331-38.
Poulat, Emile. 1969. "Le Groupe de sociologie des religions: Quinze ans de vie et de
travail". Archives de sociologie des religions 28, pp. 3-92.
—. 1990. "La C.I.S.R. de la fondation à la mutation: réflexion sur une trajectoire et ses
enjeux". Social Compass 37 (1), pp. 11-33.
Redfield, Robert. 1941. The Folk Culture of Yucatan. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
—. 1947. "The Folk Society". American Journal of Sociology 52 (4), pp. 293-308.
Reiss, Paul J. 1970. "Science and Religion in the Evolution of a Sociological
Association". Sociological Analysis 31 (3), pp. 119-30.
Rigney, Daniel et al. 1978. "Is Secularization a Discontinuous Process?". Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 17 (4), pp. 381-87.
Ritzer, George. 1975. Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science. Boston: Allyn and
Bacon.
Robbins, Thomas. 1988. "Cults, Converts and Charisma: The Sociology of New
Religious Movements". Current Sociology 36 (1).
Robertson, Roland. 1970. The Sociological Interpretation of Religion. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
—. 1971. "Sociologists and Secularization". Sociology 5, pp. 297-312.
—. 1985. "The Sacred and the World System". The Sacred in a Secular Age: Toward
Revision in the Scientific Study of Religion. Eidted by Hammond, Phillip. Berkeley:
University of California Press. Pp. 347-58.
—. 1987. "From Secularization to Globalization". The Journal of Oriental Studies 26 (1),
pp. 28-32.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
307
Robinson, John A. 1963. Honest to God. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
Roggero, Elio. 1979. La secolarizzazione controversa. Milano: Franco Angeli.
Roof, Wade C. 1986. "The New Fundamentalism: Rebirth of Political Religion in
America". Prophetic Religions and Politics: Religion and the Political Order. Edited
by Hadden, Jeffrey K. and Shupe, Anson. New York: Paragon House. Pp. 18-34.
Rosanna, Enrica. 1973. Secolarizzazione o transfunzionalizzazione della religione:
rapporto critico su una discussione attuale in sociologia della religione. Zürich: Pas
Verlag.
Ross, Edward A. (1905) 1920. Foundations of Sociology. New York: Macmillan.
Rubanowice, Robert J. 1982. Crisis in Consciousness: The Thought of Ernst Troeltsch.
Tallahassee, Florida: University Press of Florida.
Salisbury, W. Seward. 1958. "Religion and Secularization". Social Forces 36 (3),
pp. 197-205.
Schmitt-Eglin, Paul. 1952. Le mécanisme de la déchristianisation: Recherche pastorale
sur le peuple des campagnes. Paris: Alsatia.
Schreuder, O. 1966. "Sociologie religieuse et recherche socio-ecclésiastique au cours de
la période 1962-1964". Social Compass 13 (3), pp. 205-35.
Séguy, Jean. 1967. "La sociologie des religions au 6e Congrès mondial de sociologie,
Evian, 4-11 septembre 1966". Social Compass 14 (4), pp. 301-04.
—. 1986. "Rationalisation, modernité et avenir de la religion chez Max Weber". Archives
de Sciences Sociales des Religions 61 (1), pp. 127-38.
Seidman, Steven. 1983. "Beyond Presentism and Historicism: Understanding the History
of Social Science". Sociological Inquiry 53 (1), pp. 79-94.
Seyfarth, Constans. 1980. "The West German Discussion of Max Weber's Sociology of
Religion since the 1960s". Social Compass 27 (1), pp. 9-25.
Shiner, Larry. 1965. "Toward a Theology of Secularization". The Journal of Religion
45 (4), pp. 279-95.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
308
—. 1966. The Secularization of History: An Introduction to the Theology of Friedrich
Gogarten. Nashville: Abingdon Press.
—. 1967. "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research". Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 6 (2), pp. 207-20.
Silverman, William. "Changes in Topics Regarded as Important by Sociologists of
Religion, 1929-1989". (Preliminary draft presented at the October 1989 annual
meeting of the SSSR). Unpublished.
Skinner, Quentin. (1969) 1988. "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas".
Meaning and Context. Edited by Tully, James. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press. Pp. 29-67.
—. (1972) 1988. "'Social Meaning' and the Explanation of Social Action". Meaning and
Context. Edited by Tully, James. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Pp. 77-96.
—. (1976) 1988. "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts". Meaning and
Context. Edited by Tully, James. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Pp. 68-78.
—. 1988. "A Reply to my Critics". Meaning and Context. Edited by Tully, James.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 231-88.
Sklare, Marshall. (1955) 1985. Conservative Judaism. New York: University Press of
America.
Small, Albion W. and Vincent, George E. 1894. An Introduction to the Study of Society.
New York: American Book Company.
Sombart, Werner. (1902) 1928. [Der moderne Kapitalismus: Historisch-systematische
Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur
Gegenwart; Dritter Band;] Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus;
Erster Halbband; Die Grundlagen - Der Aufbau. München: Duncker & Humbolt.
Sorokin, Pitirim. 1928. Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York: Harper &
Brothers.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
309
—. 1937. Social and Cultural Dynamics. Vol I: Fluctuations of Forms of Art (Painting,
Sculpture, Architecture, Music, Literature and Criticism). New York: American
Book Co.
—. 1966. "The Western Religion and Morality of Today". International Yearbook of the
Sociology of Religion Vol 2. Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag. Pp. 9-43.
Spencer, Herbert. (1854) 1891. "The Genesis of Science". Essays: Scientific, Political,
and Speculative. Vol II. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Pp. 1-73.
—. (1857) 1891. "Progress: Its Law and Cause". Essays: Scientific, Political, and
Speculative. Vol I. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Pp. 8-62.
—. (1864a) 1891. "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte". Essays:
Scientific, Political, and Speculative. Vol II. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Pp. 11844.
—. (1864b) 1898. First Principles. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
—. (1873) 1961. The Study of Sociology. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
—. (1876-96) 1969. Principles of Sociology. Abridged edition, edited by Stanislav
Andreski. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books.
—. 1882. The Data of Ethics. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
Stallmann, Martin. 1960. Was ist Säkularisierung? Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Stark, Rodney, and Bainbridge, William Sims. 1985. The Future of Religion:
Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
—. 1987. A Theory of Religion. New York: Peter Lang.
Stark, Rodney and Finke, Roger. 1988. "Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies:
Religious Mobilization in American Cities, 1906". American Sociological Review
53, pp. 41-49.
Steeman, Gualbert. 1958. "La conception de la sociologie religieuse chez Gabriel Le
Bras". Sociaal Kompas 6 (1), pp. 1-17.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
310
Stoetzel, Jean. 1957. "Sociology in France: An Empiricist View". Modern Sociological
Theory in Continuity and Change. Edited by Becker, Howard and Boskoff, Alvin.
New York: Dryden Press. Pp. 623-57.
Sumner, William G. (1906) 1940. Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of
Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals. New York: New American Library.
—. 1910. "Religion and the Mores". American Journal of Sociology 15 (5), pp. 577-91.
Swatos Jr, William H. 1989. "Religious Sociology and the Sociology of Religion in
America at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Divergences from a Common
Theme". Sociological Analysis 50 (4), pp. 363-75.
Tawney, Richard-Henry. (1926) 1947. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical
Survey (Holland Memorial Lectures, 1922). New York: Mentor Books.
Tax, Sol. 1941. "World View and Social Relations in Guatemala". American
Anthropologist 43, pp. 27-42.
Thomas, William I. and Znaniecki, Florian. (1918) 1958. The Polish Peasant in Europe
and America. 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications.
Tönnies, Ferdinand. (1887) 1957. Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft). Translated and edited by Loomis, Charles P. New York: Harper
Torchbooks.
Touraine, Alain. 1973. Production de la société. Paris: Seuil
Troeltsch, Ernst. (1911) 1958. Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the
Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
Tschannen, Olivier. 1989. "Anomie et intégration sociale: Luhmann, Fenn et le
paradigme néo-durkheimien". Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales , pp. 123-46.
—. 1990. "Le débat sur la sécularisation à travers les Actes de la CISR". Social Compass
37 (1), pp. 75-84.
Tully, James. 1988. "The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner's Analysis of Politics".
Meaning and Context. Edited by Tully, James. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press. Pp. 7-25.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
311
Van Buren, Paul. 1963. The Secular Meaning of the Gospel: Based on an Analysis of its
Language. London: SCM Press.
Wallis, Roy. 1984. The Elementary Forms of the New Religious Life. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Wallis, Roy and Brice, Steve. 1989. "Religion: The British Contribution". The British
Journal of Sociology 40 (3), pp. 493-520.
Ward, Lester F. 1883. Dynamic Sociology, Or Applied Social Science, As Based Upon
Statistical Sociology and the Less Complex Sciences. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton
& Co.
Weber, Max. (1904-05) 1988. "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des
Kapitalismus". Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I. Tübingen: J.C.B.
Mohr. Pp. 17-206. (E.t. [1930] 1976. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism. Translated by Parsons, Talcott. London: George Allen & Unwin.)
—. (1906) 1988. "Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus".
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Pp. 207-36.
(E.t. [1946] 1958. "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism". From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated and edited by Gerth, H.H., and Mills, C.W.
New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 302-22.)
—. (1913) 1988. "Ueber einige Kategorien der Verstehenden Soziologie". Gesammelte
Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Pp. 427-74.
—. (1915) 1988. "Zwischenbetrachtung: Theorie der Stufen und Richtungen religiöser
Weltablehnung". Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I. Tübingen: J.C.B.
Mohr. Pp. 536-73. (E.t. [1946] 1958. "Religious Rejections of the World and Their
Directions". From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated and edited by Gerth,
H.H., and Mills, C.W. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 323-59.)
—. (1919) 1988. "Wissenschaft als Beruf". Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre.
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Pp. 582-613. (E.t. [1946] 1958. "Science as a Vocation".
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated and edited by Gerth, H.H., and
Mills, C.W. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 129-56.)
—. (1920) 1988. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
312
—. (1922) 1985. "Religionssoziologie (Typen religiöser Vergemeinschaftung)".
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Pp. 245-381. (E.t. [1963] 1968
"Religious Groups [The Sociology of Religion]". Translated by Fischoff, Ephraim.
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Vol I. Berkeley:
University of California Press. Pp. 399-634.)
Wilson, Bryan R. 1958. "Apparition et persistance des sectes dans un milieu social en
évolution". Archives de sociologie des religions 5, pp. 140-80.
—. 1959. "An Analysis of Sect Development". American Sociological Review 24 (1),
pp. 3-15.
—. 1966. Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment. London: C.A. Watts.
—. 1968. "Religion and the Churches in Contemporary America". Religion in America.
Edited by McLoughlin, William G. and Bellah, Robert N. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Pp. 73-110.
—. 1970. "A Sociologist's Introduction". Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. viixviii.
—. 1971. "Unbelief as an Object of Research". The Culture of Unbelief: Studies and
Proceedings from the First International Symposium on Unbelief Held at Rome,
March 22-27, 1969. Edited by Caporale, Rocco and Grumelli, Antonio. Pp. 247-269.
—. 1975. "The Debate over 'Secularization': Religion, Society and Faith". Encounter
45 (October), pp. 77-84.
—. 1976a. Contemporary Transformations of Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
—. 1976b. "Aspects of Secularization in the West". Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies 3 (3/4), pp. 259-76.
—. 1979. "The Return of the Sacred". Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 18 (3),
pp. 268-80.
—. 1982. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 1985a. "Morality in the Evolution of the Modern Social System". The British Journal
of Sociology 36 (3), pp. 315-32.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
313
—. 1985b "Secularization: The Inherited Model". The Sacred in a Secular Age. Edited by
Hammond, Phillip. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 9-20.
—. 1987a. "Secularization in the Non-Western World: A Response". Secularization and
Religion: The Persisting Tension (Acts of the XIXth Interantional Conference for the
Sociology of Religion, Tübingen 1987, 25-29 August). Lausanne: CISR. Pp. 169-75.
—. 1987b. "Secularization and the Survival of the Sociology of Religion". The Journal of
Oriental Studies 26 (1), pp. 5-10.
Wuthnow, Robert. 1976. "Recent Patterns of Secularization: A Problem of
Generations?". American Sociological Review 41, pp. 850-67.
Yanagawa, Keiichi. 1987. "Introductory Thesis: Beyond the Secularization Theory". The
Journal of Oriental Studies 26 (1), pp. 1-4.
Yinger, J. Milton. 1957. Religion, Society and the Individual: An Introduction to the
Sociology of Religion. New York: Macmillan.
—. 1963. Sociology Looks at Religion. New York: Macmillan.
—. 1967. "Pluralism, Religion, and Secularism". Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 6 (1), pp. 17-30.
Acts of the Conférence Internationale de Sociologie des Religions (CISR)
CISR 1951. Etat présent de la sociologie religieuse: 3ème Conférence internationale de
sociologie religieuse [1951 Bréda]. Numéro spécial de Error! Reference source not
found..
CISR 1953. Sociologie religieuse, sciences sociales: Actes du 4ème Congrès international
[de sociologie religieuse - 1953 La Tourette]. Paris: Editions ouvrières.
CISR 1958a. Vocation de la sociologie religieuse, sociologie des vocations: 5ème
Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse [1956 Louvain]. Tournai:
Casterman.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
314
CISR 1958b. Paroisses urbaines, paroisses rurales: 5ème Conférence internationale de
sociologie religieuse [1956 Louvain]. Tournai: Casterman.
CISR 1960. "Actes de la 6ème Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse [1959
Bologne]". Social Compass 7 (1-2-3), pp. 7-266.
CISR 1965. L'appartenance religieuse: Congrès de Königstein 1962 [7ème Conférence
internationale de sociologie religieuse]. Bruxelles: Editions du CEP.
CISR 1966. "8ème Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse [1965 Barcelone]".
Social Compass 13 (1), pp. 5-68.
CISR 1967. Le clergé dans l'Eglise et la société: Actes de la 9ème Conférence
internationale [de sociologie religieuse] - Montréal 1-4 Août 1967. Rome: CISR.
CISR 1969. Types, dimensions et mesure de la religiosité: Actes de la 10ème Conférence
internationale [de sociologie religieuse] - Rome 18-22 Août. Rome: CISR.
CISR 1971. Religion et religiosité, athéisme et incroyance dans les sociétés urbaines et
industrialisées: Conférence internationale de sociologie religieuse - Actes de la
11ème conférence - Opatija - Yougoslavie - 20-24 septembre 1971. Lille: CISR.
CISR 1973. Métamorphose contemporaine des phénomènes religieux? Actes de la 12ème
Conférence internationale [de sociologie religieuse] - La Haye 26-30 Août 1973.
Lille: CISR.
CISR 1975. Changement social et religion: Actes de la 13ème Conférence internationale
[de sociologie religieuse] - Lloret de Mar - Espagne - 31 Août-4 septembre 1975.
Lille: CISR.
CISR 1977. Symbolisme religieux, séculier et classes sociales: Actes de la 14ème
Conférence internationale de sociologie des religions - Strasbourg 1977. Lille:
CISR.
CISR 1979. Religion et politique: Actes de la 15ème Conférence internationale de
Sociologie des religions - Venise 1979. Lille: CISR.
CISR 1981. Religions, valeurs et vie quotidienne: Actes de la 16ème Conférence
internationale de sociologie des religions - Lausanne 1981. CISR.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
315
CISR 1983. Religion et domaine public: Actes de la 17ème Conférence internationale de
sociologie des religions - Londres 1983. Paris: CISR.
CISR 1985. Religion et modernité, survie ou réveil? Actes de la 18ème Conférence
internationale de sociologie des religions - Louvain-la-Neuve [1985]. Lausanne:
CISR.
CISR 1987. Sécularisation et religion, la persistance des tensions: Actes de la 19ème
Conférence internationale de sociologie des religions - Tübingen 1987 - 25-29 août.
Lausanne: CISR.
Textbooks
TXT 1939. Lundberg, George A. Foundations of Sociology. New York: MacMillan.
TXT 1947. Hiller, Ernest Theodore. Social Relations and Structures: A Study in
Principles of Sociology. New York: Harper & Brothers.
TXT 1948. Davis, Kingsley. Human Society. New York: MacMillan.
TXT 1949. MacIver, Robert M. and Page, Charles H. Society: An Introductory Analysis.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
TXT 1950. McCormick, Thomas Carson. Sociology: An Introduction to the Study of
Social Relations. New York: Ronald Press.
TXT 1951. Martindale, Don and Monachesi, Elio D. Elements of Sociology. New York:
Harper & Brothers.
TXT 1952a. Gittler, Joseph Bertram. Social Dynamics: Principles and Cases in
Introductory Sociology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
TXT 1952b. Merrill, Francis Ellsworth and Eldredge, H. Wentworth. Culture and
Society: An Introduction to Sociology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
TXT 1953. DeGrange, McQuilkin. The Nature and Elements of Sociology. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
TXT 1954. Lundberg, George A. et al. Sociology. New York: Harper & Brothers.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
316
TXT 1955. Broom, Leonard and Selznick, Philip. Sociology: A Text with Adapted
Readings. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson & Co.
TXT 1956a (second edition). Green, Arnold Wilfrer. Sociology: An Analysis of Life in
Modern Society. New York: McGraw-Hill.
TXT 1956b. Rose, Arnold M. Sociology: The Study of Human Relations. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
TXT 1957. Fichter, Joseph Henry. Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
TXT 1960. Johnson, Harry M. Sociology: A Systematic Introduction. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World.
TXT 1961a. Bell, Earl H. Social Foundations of Human Behavior: Introduction to the
Study of Sociology. New York: Harper & Brothers.
TXT 1961b. Chinoy, Ely. Society: An Introduction to Sociology. New York: Random
House.
TXT 1962a. Bredemeier, Harry Charles and Stephenson, Richard M. The Analysis of
Social Systems. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
TXT 1962b (second edition). Young, Kimball and Mack, Raymond W. Sociology and
Social Life. New York: American Book Company.
TXT 1963a (second edition). Bierstedt, Robert. The Social Order: An Introduction to
Sociology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
TXT 1963b. Gouldner, Alvin W. and Gouldner, Helen P. Modern Sociology: An
Introduction to the Study of Human Interaction. New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World.
TXT 1963c. Quinn, James A. Sociology: A Systematic Analysis. Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott.
TXT 1964. Horton, Paul B. and Hunt, Chester L. Sociology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
TXT 1965. Mott, Paul E. The Organization of Society. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
317
TXT 1966a. Muzumdar, Haridas T. The Grammar of Sociology: Man in Society.
Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
TXT 1966b. Wilson, Everett Keith. Sociology: Rules, Roles, and Relationships.
Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press.
TXT 1967. Bertrand, Alvin L. Basic Sociology: An Introduction to Theory and Method.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
TXT 1969a. Biesanz, John and Biesanz, Mavis. Introduction to Sociology. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
TXT 1969b. Dressler, David. Sociology: The Study of Human Interaction. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
TXT 1969c. McKee, James B. Introduction to Sociology. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston.
TXT 1969d. Phillips, Bernard S. Sociology: Social Structure and Change. London:
Macmillan.
TXT 1970. Nisbet, Robert A. The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Society.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
TXT 1971a. Caplow, Theodore. Elementary Sociology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall.
TXT 1971b. Hodges Jr, Harold M. Conflict and Consensus: An Introduction to
Sociology. New York: Harper & Row.
TXT 1971c (second edition). McNall, Scott G. The Sociological Experience: A Modern
Introduction to Sociology. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
TXT 1971d. Roe, Richard L. (publisher). Society Today. Del Mar, California.
Communications Research Machines.
TXT 1972a. Berger, Peter L. and Berger, Brigitte. Sociology: A Biographical Approach.
New York: Basic Books.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
318
TXT 1972b. Rabow, Jerome. Sociology, Students and Society. Pacific Palisades,
California: Goodyear.
TXT 1973a. Storer, Norman W. Focus on Society: An Introduction to Sociology.
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
TXT 1973b. Tumin, Melvin M. Patterns of Society: Identities, Roles and Resources.
Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
TXT 1975a. Baldridge, J. Victor. Sociology: A Critical Approach to Power, Conflict, and
Change. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
TXT 1975b. Hammond, Phillip E. et alii. The Structure of Human Society. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Company.
TXT 1975c. Sites, Paul. Control and Constraint: An Introduction to Sociology. New
York: Macmillan.
TXT 1976a. Bensman, Joseph and Rosenberg, Bernard. Mass, Class and Bureaucracy:
An Introduction to Sociology. New York: Praeger Publishers.
TXT 1976b (second edition). DeFleur, Melvin L. et alii. Sociology: Human Society.
Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman & Company.
TXT 1976c. Demerath III, N.J. and Marwell, Gerald. Sociology: Perspectives and
Applications. New York: Harper & Row.
TXT 1976d. Kloss, Robert Marsh et alii. Sociology with a Human Face: Sociology as if
People Mattered. Saint Louis: The C.V. Mosby Company.
TXT 1977a. Boguslaw, Robert and Vickers, George R. Prologue to Sociology. Santa
Monica, California: Goodyear.
TXT 1977b. Robertson, Ian. Sociology. New York: Worth.
TXT 1978 (third edition). Anderson, Charles H. and Gibson, Jeffry Royle. Toward a New
Sociology. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press.
TXT 1979a (second edition). Denisoff, R. Serge and Wahrman, Ralph. An Introduction to
Sociology. New York: Macmillan.
olivier.tschannen@unifr.ch
319
TXT 1979b. Ritzer, George et alii. Sociology: Experiencing a Changing Society. Boston:
Allyn & Bacon.
TXT 1979c. Szymanski, Albert J. and Goertzel, Ted George. Sociology: Class,
Consciousness, and Contradictions. New York: D. Van Nostrand.
TXT 1984. Goode, Erich. Sociology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.