Dimuat di: The Journal of Accounting, Management, and Economic Research Vol. 4
No.1, February 2004, page 95-110, CAMD, Faculty of Economics, UTY,
Yogyakarta.
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN INDONESIA
Suryawati K*
The 1998 Economic Crisis in Indonesia has reduced substantially the Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) flows to Indonesia. The reduction of FDI flow has significantly slow
down the Indonesian economic growth. However, observation into sectoral level,
revealed that the patern of FDI reduction between economics production sectors. From
the sectoral point of view, FDI to agriculture sector has relatively free from the
influence of the economic crisis. During the economics slow down, FDI flow to this
setor was relatively stable. Meanwhile, the economic crisis together with the
implementation of new law on “regional autonomy” has strongly influence the
distribution of FDI into the provinces in the East and Central part of Indonesia have
gained from the shifting FDI resulted from government decentralisation.
Keywords: Economic Crisis, Distribution of FDI, Government decentralization
I. Introduction
Investment and expenditures on the new capital both by private and foreign
sectors are believed by economists as one of the most important engines in developing
economy in Indonesia. The scarcity of economic growth target, has encouraged the
government to look for financial resources from abroad. At the same time, the
government implemented a policy to reduce its interventions in the economies. In line
with that, since 1984 the government started liberalizing the economies by
implementing investment policies to drive multinational corporation to invest in
Indonesia. The recent development shows that the openness of investment is getting
bigger. The foreign investors are permitted to hold 100 percent share in a holding
*
DJP Staff Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara
1
company. Beside that, the government also will permit to be a permanent civilian to
whom invest more than US$ 1 milion in Indonesia.
Economic crisis since 1997 has provided a lot of difficulties. The
multidimensional crisis caused social and political instabilities which in turn to
decrease economic stability. The economic uncertainty created many obstacles to
build the conducive climate for entrepreneurs to do business. This indirectly reduced
the investors to invest their fund in Indonesia. This paper aims at delivering the
pictures for foreign investment in Indonesia since 1967 to crisis in 1997 and its trend
after that to 2002. This paper also tries to identify the shifts and its patterns of the FDI
since 1997 to 2002. For this paper, FDI and domestic investment data are taken from
the BKPM Republic of Indonesia. Meanwhile, the main source of the data in this
paper is taken from the list of foreign and domestic investment project realizations
over the period of 1967-2002.
II. Factors Influencing The FDI Decision
FDI is one of the direct investment forms conducted by either foreign private
or state corporations in the overseas. In general, the FDI is conducted by multinational
corporations which have a wide network. By investing in the overseas, a multinational
corporation may get a various great benefits as follows:
1. Increasing economies of scale of the corporations in relation to the widen trade
throughout world.
2. Through investment multinational corporations will be capable to develop new
technology based on the home country.
3. Investors will be capable to eliminate the activity of competitors in the other
country
4. By FDI, multinational corporations could utilize the cheap resources which are
available abundant in the developing countries.
5. By FDI, multinational corporations could utilize many facilities, i.e. fiscal
protection, which is design by home country to encourage economic growth in the
associate country.
6. By FDI, multinational corporations could utilize the moment of economic growth
in the destination country. Generally, a particular country needs more additional
domestic capacity to maintain economic growth. This is an opportunity for
2
multinational corporations to invest. There are many other advantages for
multinational corporations to be obtained in developing countries including
Indonesia.
Table I below lists some consideration factors for multinational corporations
deciding to invest in the destination countries. It could be concluded that FDI is
complex cooperation. Unlike to the international trade, license, and other portofolio
investment, the FDI needs a long term commitment of the business environment in the
destination countries. The FDI frequently involves a number of assets and other
resources which are necessary to be coordinated and managed across country to fulfill
the principal investor’s requirement in order to be the success of the investment itself.
So, inviting the FDI into business environment in Indonesian is not a straight forward.
It needs various things influencing the conduct of investment project. Among other,
the main factor is the FDI policy frameworks implemented by the destination country
as shown in the first group (see Table I).
Table I. Factors Influencing FDI Inflow to a Country
Business Climate in the Destination Country
I. Policy Frameworks to the FDI
- Autonomy: socio-politics,stability
- Entry and Operating Regulations
- Policy standard for foreign affiliation
- Market Function and market structure (competition policy)
- International Arrangement FDI
- Privatization policy
- Trade policy (tariff and non tariff)
- FDI and trade policy
- Taxation policy
II. Economic Factors
FDI Classification by the destination Prinsipal determinant in the destination
country and TNC motivation
country
A. Market seeking
- Market size and per capita income
- Market growth
- Local consumer preference
- Market structure
B. Resource/asset seeking
-
Raw material
Low-skilled labor cost
Labor skill
Technological and other assets
innovation (such as brand creation
embodied in individuals, firms, and
clusters).
3
-
C. Efficiency-seeking
-
-
Physical infrastructures (portland,
roads,
energy,
and
telecommunication).
Resource and asset costs (as in B),
and labor productivity
Other input costs, such as
transportation and communication
Economic costs from and to the
destination
country
and
intermediate product costs
Membership in regional cooperation
(support to regional cooperation
inter-firm).
III. Business Facilities
- Investment promotion (including image creation and investment facilities
services).
- Investment incentives
- Unidentified costs (in relations to corruptions and administration efficiency
etc).
- Social amenities (bilingual schools, quality of life etc)
- Post investment services
Source : World investment Report, Trends and Determinants, 1998.
III. Investment in Indonesia in The Beginning of Economic Development
To finance development since the first Five Years Development Plan
Indonesia’s government has been depending in capital inflow from abroad. In the
second Five Year Development Plan (1967-1973), 59 percent of development
expenditures was financed by foreign debt and 14 percent of those was financed by
private sector. Whereas government and domestic private savings financed only 16
and 11 percent respectively. Those conditions occurred over the economic recovery in
the early New Order era. They finally were ended by oil boom in 1972/1973. Since
that, the surplus of international trade sharply increased so that it could cover the
government budget deficits. Unfortunately, it only occurred over the period of 19731983.
In 1983 OPEC suffered crisis. The crude oil price decreased from US$ 30 to
US$ 12 per barrel in the world market. This crisis absolutely affected to the
Indonesian economy. At the same time, industrialization in Indonesia was relatively
stagnant. To address this challenge, the government implemented deregulation in the
real sectors to encourage industrialization and induce foreign trade surpluses. The two
4
things are the main factor to stimulate national economy. Since that economic
liberalization in Indonesia became intensive to be conducted to encourage FDI. In
such a case, the government hoped that the national economy could grow through
increasing the role of private economic sector in term of FDI and domestic investment
as well.
Table II. Development of the Approved Investment
1967 / 1968 - 28 Februari 2003
Domestic Investment
Foreign Investment
Year
Project
(Rp. Billion)
Project
(US$ Million)
1967
-
-
13
210.6
1968
27
38.6
35
256.0
1969
73
36.6
37
127.5
1970
175
1,296.50
87
170.2
1971
216
218.3
64
310.4
1972
268
184.9
48
171.7
1973
301
492.4
70
338.5
1974
134
214.6
55
565.6
1975
79
160.1
24
1,153.9
1976
77
401.6
22
251.2
1977
157
490.2
21
187.3
1978
188
751.4
23
237.0
1979
167
628.4
13
237.0
1980
165
1,589.90
21
1,081.3
1981
164
2,384.90
24
747.0
1982
209
3,767.10
32
2,456.1
1983
341
6,574.20
46
3,436.8
1984
145
2,283.50
23
1,121.1
1985
245
3,790.10
46
913.1
1986
315
4,706.00
93
1,056,8
1987
571
10,682.90
141
1,918,1
1988
850
14,414.10
147
4,447,7
1989
869
19,639.50
308
4,898,3
1990
1,331
58,856.60
444
9,639,6
1991
808
41,210.80
390
9,030,2
1992
422
29,395.90
304
10,466,1
1993
547
39,715.90
330
8,153,8
1994
825
53,598.30
444
27,046,4
1995
793
69,844.70
782
39,891.6
1996
807
97,401
947
29,941,0
1997
723
119,877.20
781
33,788,8
1998
327
57,973.60
1,034
13,649,8
1999
237
53,540.70
1,177
10,884,5
2000
392
93,897.10
1,541
16,075.9
5
Domestic Investment
Foreign Investment
Year
Project
(Rp. Billion)
Project
(US$ Million)
2001
264
58,816.00
1,333
15,055.9
2002
185
25,328.10
1,147
9,795,5
2003
95
8,171.20
497
4,373,1
Source : BKPM, 2003.
The opened economic policy for both FDI and domestic investment was
started in 1967. At that time, the economic policy was encourage by deficit finance
implemented by the New Order government to fill the gap between saving and
investment. That policy was followed by the Law No. 1/1967 and law no. 6/1968.
Since that the government provided some incentives for investors through some
regulations that gave a great number beneficial. However, the policy had not been
effectively implemented because of political instability.
Table II showed that since 1967 the FDI and domestic investment significantly
increased. The decline of the oil and the principal export commodities prices in 1983
worsened Indonesia economy. To handle those problems, the government devaluated
the currency and implemented various policies in industry and trade to encourage
investment and export as well. The trade and industry policies included decreasing
barrier to entry and institutional deregulation to eliminate the high cost economy. In
relation to the FDI, the deregulation covered reducing the investment constraints so
that investment climate in Indonesia will be better.
The realization of the FDI during the period of 1980-1994 on the average
increased 11.7 percent a year, whereas that of the domestic investment increased
16.09 percent. The decrease of the FDI in 1984 was associated with the tax
reformation in the same year. Meanwhile, the decrease of the domestic investment in
1991 due to the tight money policy 1990 (well known as Gebrakan Sumarlin). Those
represent that both fiscal and monetary policies have always a particular impact on the
capital flows.
The share of the FDI in total investment in Indonesia increased about 15.79
percent during the period of the fifth Five Year Economic Plan (1989-1994). In 1989,
for example, the amount of the FDI project was only 308 (US$ 4,898.3 million) and it
increased to 444 (US$ 27,046.4 million) in 1994. The highest foreign investment
6
projects were achieved in 1996, that is 947 (US$ 33,788.8 million) including the new
and continued projects.
The data show that the tight money policy in fact did not really affect the FDI
inflow to Indonesia. The FDI inflow basically is rather influenced by interest rate
(such as LIBOR and SIBOR) and bussines climate in the destination country. In
broadly speaking, the investment decision is determined by structural factors, such as
industrial, administrative, and fiscal policies that in general secure the long term
investment. It is widely recorgnized that the socio-political climate in Indonesia in the
early 1990s was relatively stable and conducive. However, the decrease of the FDI in
1991 and 1992 was affected by external factors, such as world recession and war in
the middle east. Other factors were the accelerating competition among Asian
countries, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and India, to attract the FDI.
The deregulation in the real sectors which has been implemented by
government in 1993 seems quite successful. The value of FDI increased significantly
even though it did not hold in the domestic investment. From the domestic investor’s
point of view, the deregulation was not interesting even declined their monopoly
powers as well as extra profit when it compared with the previous deregulation.
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Dom
FDI
Figure 1: Development of The Approved Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Projects, 1967-2003
7
IV. FDI Over The Crisis Period, 1997-2002
Since the economic crisis in 1997, the investment climate in Indonesia has
been drastically decreasing. The political turbulance following the crisis significantly
decreased the amount and value of FDI in Indonesia. In 1997, for example, the value
of FDI was US$ 33,788.8 million. It decreased up to US$ 13,649.8 million in 1998,
US$ 10,884.5 million in 1999, and the least point was in 2002 US$ 9,795 million. In
2000 and 2001, it increased slightly US$ 16,075.9 million and US$ 15,055.9 million
respectively.
Table III. FDI According to Economic Sector, 1997-2003 (in US$)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
PRIMARY SECTOR
626.9
1,013,7
654
594
511.7
508.2
1
Planation & Horticulture
449.9
919.5
357
441.6
270.4
424.7
2
Cattle Breeding
2.3
22.8
83.3
38.6
13.5
21.6
3
Forestry
-
0.3
0.1
6.5
101.2
8.6
4
Fishing
25.6
27.7
37.2
49.5
6.9
4
5
Mining
149.1
43.4
146.4
58.6
119.7
49.3
23,021,8
8,529,4
6,907,6
10,760,1
5,148,3
3,258,2
I
II
SECONDARY SECTOR
6
Foof Product Manufacturing
676.4
383.7
670.1
759.5
289.1
267.4
7
Textile Product Manufacturing
178.1
193.6
166.9
205.5
329.9
93.3
8
Leather and Leather Product Other Fooywear
142.4
35.6
65.6
206.0
32.6
13.8
9
Plywood Manufacturing and Publishing
40.3
97.9
49.0
124.2
23.4
30.3
10
Paper Product Manufacturing and Publishing
5,337.2
44.8
1,387.40
90.4
742.1
10
11
Chemical and Farmacy Manufacturing
11,944.8
5,972.8
3,193.2
7,288.9
2,309.9
1,872.3
12
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing
316.9
221.0
95.8
166.4
225.5
283
13
Non-Metal Mineral Manufacturing
1,496.0
224.8
113.9
8.8
108.1
32.7
14
Metal, Machine, and Electrinics Manufacturing
1,325.6
885.9
998
1,524.0
653
349.1
15
Medical instrument, Optical and Jewelry Manufacturing
27.7
8.9
47.3
67.6
31
3.2
16
Vehicles and other tranportation Manufacturing
1,220.8
404.7
44.6
241.2
355.1
266
17
Other manufacturing
342.6
55.7
75.8
77.6
48.6
36.9
III
TERTIER SECTOR
10,140,1
4,106,7
3,322,9
4,721,0
9,395,9
6,028,9
18
Electrical, Gas, and Water
1,840.0
1,796.6
2,310.00
1.2
37.3
90.2
19
Construction
1,222.9
106.4
24.6
194.9
47.6
282.1
20
Trade & Reparation
12.3
261.3
286.6
1,975.4
340.8
876.1
21
Hotel and Restaurant
378.5
449.0
229.3
283.2
6,891.8
254.6
22
Transportation, Warehouse & Communication
5,574.7
44.2
97
1,163.4
376.4
3,713.3
8
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
23
Housing, Industrial & Office District
673.9
1,318.0
222.3
174.7
177.5
7.3
24
Other Services
437.8
131.2
153.1
928.2
1,524.5
805.1
33,788,8
13,649.8
10,884,5
16,075,9
15,055,9
9,795,3
Total FDI
Source : BKPM, 2003
The domination of the secondary economic sectors, i.e. manufacturing
industries, on the total FDI in 1997 was not different from that the previous period,
that is 64.24 percent (US$ 23,127.3 million). That is followed by the tertiary sectors
(30 percent or US$ 10,140.1 million). In the later the FDI in transportation was US$
5,5740.7 million or 16.49 percent and then in electricity, gas and water was 1,840.0
million or 5.44 percent in 1997.
In the later years all of them drastically decreased. In the secondary sectors, for
example, the FDI in 2002 was only US$ 3,258.2 million nor declined more than 85
percent compared with them in 1997. Those indicated how great the real sectors
decreased. The decreased in the FDI also continually affected to the labor absorption
in the corresponding sectors. The unemployment itself is one of the great obstacles in
this country since economic crisis.
The secondary sectors domination, i.e. manufacturing sectors, on total FDI in
1997 was not quite different from the previous, that is 64.24 percent (US$ 230,017.3
million). This followed by tertiary sectors, that is US$ 10,410.1 million (or 30
percent). In the tertiary sectors the FDI in electricity, gas and water supplies was US$
1,840 million or 5.44 percent, meanwhile the FDI in transportation was US$ 5,574.7
million or 16.49 percent of the total FDI in Indonesia.
In the following years all of the FDI value decreased drastically. In the
secondary economic sectors the value of FDI was US$3,258.2 million or decreased
more than 85 persent compared with the FDI in 1997. It implied how contrastive the
real sector was. This decrease in FDI obviously affected the labor absorption in the
corresponding sectors. Indeed, the open unemployment is one of the great obstacles
for any economy since the economic crisis.
In the tertiary sectors, i.e. electricity, gas and water supplies, were the greatest
drastic decline of the FDI. If in 1997 the FDI in these sectors was US$ 1,840 million,
in 2000 it dropped to US$ 1.2 million or decreased more than 100 percent even in
9
2002. This condition had serious implictaion to the economic recovery in the coming
years. If the investment in the associated sector does not recover, there must be an
electricity supply scarcity. Furthermore, it raised significantly the energy prices and
the cost of manufacturing goods (cost-push inflation). In short, the economic recovery
will be heavier.
Those figures, fortunately did not happen in the primary sectors. In that
sectors, the FDI increased proportionally. In 1998 the FDI in that sector was US$
626.9 million and increased to 1,013.7 million in 2002, sky rocketing more than 61.7
percent. In general, agricultural sectors have labor intensive techniques and close to
the labor pool. Those factors caused that the agricultural sectors can defend from the
negative impacts of the economic crisis. It implied thet economic crisis did not occur
parallel in the whole economic sectors.
V. Regional Concentration Shift of FDI in Indonesia
Since Economic Crisis
In the location perspective, over the fifth Five Year Development Plan, the
main investment target was in Java. This was because the infrastructures and the
availability of labor were generally better. Other locations that were chosen by
investors were due to natural resources abundant. Over the fifth Five Year
Development Plan, 80.89 percent of the total FDI were taken in Java, 11 percent in
Sumatera, 1.34 in Kalimantan, 1.51 percent in Sulawesi, and 5.05 in other islands. As
comparison, in the pre-crisis period, the domestic investment were concentrated in
Java (60.67 percent), Sumatera (33.02 percent), Kalimantan (3.11), Sulawesi (1.26
percent), and 1.94 percent in the rest islands. These figures seems to be correlated to
the regional economic disparities in the New Order era. It is also notable that the FDI
concentration towards economic crisis was changed to western, Sumatera, that is close
to the neighboring ASEAN countries.
Economic crisis since 1997 had significantly decreased the number of FDI in
Indonesia. The nominal value of the FDI in the period of 1997 to 2002 had dropped
more than 20 percent, from US$ 33,788.8 million to US$ 9,795.3 million. In the same
year, the proportion of FDI in Java was about 60.67 percent of the total FDI or US$
10
20,500.9 million. However, in 2002 the share was declined only into US$ 4,799.4
million or 48.99 percent.
In Sumatera island the value of the FDI was US$ 11,159.3 million or 33.02
percent in 1997. It was declined to US$ 2,070.3 million in 2002. In term of proportion,
it was also decreased 11.89 percent to 21.13 percent. The slight difference occured in
Sulawesi. In 1997, the value of the FDI in Sulawesi was US$ 426 million (1.26
percent). After crisis, it slightly declined to US$ 420.2 million. However, its share
increased up to 4.28 percent.
The big different condition experienced in Kalimantan. The FDI in 1997 was
only US$ 1,051.1 million. In contrast, in 2002 it remarkably doubled up to US$ 2,237
million or increased more than 112 percent. Looking at the FDI proportion in
Indonesia in the end of 1997, that in Kalimantan was only 3.11 percent, meanwhile
the same thing in 2002 was 22.83 percent. In Papua, the increase in the FDI only
occurred in 2001. In that year, the FDI increased up to US$ 6,069.1 million and highly
contributed 40.3 percent.
Overall, it seems that since economic crisis the FDI in Indonesia has decreased
drastically. However the decrease in the FDI did not hold equally across region. When
Sumatera and Java islands suffered the decrease, Kalimantan on the contrary
experienced the increase in the FDI significantly, that is from US$ 1,051.1 million in
1997 to US$ 2,237 million in 2002. Proportionally, the contribution of Kalimantan to
total FDI in Indonesia also increased more than 19 persent. That also occured in
Sulawesi.
In other words, the regional concentration of FDI in Indonesia shifted from
western to eastern. This is because the bottle-neck of infrastructure in western as well
as the implementation of the law No. 22/1999 that decentralized local authorities to
mobilize economic resources within the regions without any command from central
government. The one impact of the implementation of the law was widening
economic activities toward central and eastern including the FDI. This is of course
will encourage economic development equalization throughout Indonesia.
Looking at the sectoral shift of the FDI composition, there had been an
interesting trends since both the economic crisis and the law No. 22/1999. The
11
resistance economic sector since the two phenomena is the primary sector, i.e.
agriculture.
The biggest shift in mining sector was in Papua in 2001 when there was a new
additional FDI about US$ 6,069.1 million. In the previous year the value of the FDI in
that province was US$ 52.5 million.
Meanwhile, the FDI in manufacturing sectors decreased drastically. This is a
contrast when we compare with it in 2000. In 2000 the FDI in the seconday sectors
was about US$ 10,760.1 million. After the regional autonomy era the value of the FDI
in the related sectors decreased significantly up to about US$ 3,258.1 million. Among
others, this is because of uncoordinated investment regulations between center and
local governments.
The significant increases in the FDI since the regional autonomy in 2000 were
transportation and communication. The value of the FDI in those sectors increased
from US$ 97 to US$ 3,713.3 million in the period of 2000-2002. This implies that the
two sectors are basic needs for business interregions. They are also important
infrastructure for economic development, not only for private but also public sectors.
They are indeed “spaceless” so that they cannot be arranged by government since the
law of regional autonomy.
VI. Conclusions
FDI is one of the important factors to recover economy in Indonesia. However,
the FDI is an investment activity involving many institutions from both host and home
countries, so that in practice it requires a complex administration and cooperation
between them. Moreover, the FDI needs a long term commitment of business
environment in the destination countries. Also, the FDI frequently involves a number
of assets and other resources which are necessary to be coordinated and managed
across country to fulfill the principal investor’s requirement in order to be the success
of the investment itself. Regarding to the number of the requirement, the most
important factor is the policy framework in the destination country to facilitate the
FDI. The conducive government policy is the main requirement in facilitating the FDI
in a particular country.
Another problem which might be delivered in this paper is that the current
economic crisis in Indonesia, in fact, did not rise a parallel effect in the overall
12
economic sectors. The economic stagnation did not hold in the primary sectors
especially in the agriculture which generally has labor intensive nature and close to
the labor pool in the rural areas. At least, the FDI in the manufacturing industries in
2000 decreased dramatically compared to that in 1997 whereas in the agricultural
sector was relatively stagnant as the pre economic crisis. The economic crisis had a
little effect in the agriculture which was far from the government subsidy.
The decline in the FDI value in Indonesia in the post-crisis indicated that there
was disequilibrium across region. The decrease of the FDI drastically occurred in the
west regions, in contrast to the increase of the FDI held in the center and east regions.
This is probably because the public services quality decreased and the implementation
of the law No. 22/1999 about regional autonomy. The focus of investors shifted from
Java and Sumatera, onto Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other island in the east. This
implies the need to improve the infrastructure in those regions.
In principle, development of the sectoral FDI would remain growing as long as
the regional autonomy regulation associated with the law No. 22/1999 cannot
deteriorate the existence of the corresponding economic sectors. The two sectors that
cannot be distorted by local regulation and economic crisis were transportation and
communication. The existence of those sectors requires regulation coordination
among regional or even national government.
In this circumstance, the investment guidance in the era of regional autonomy
should be directed on the basic infrastructures such as transportation and
communication especially in the eastern regions of Indonesia. Also, development of
the investment should be directed on those that involving multiregions. This is one of
the investment opportunities because the regulation system in either municipal or
province cannot operate itself.
13
Table IV. The Development of the Approved FDI
According Location, 1997-2002
NO
I
LOKASI
SUMATERA
1997
1998
P
I
P
99
11159.3
150
1999
I
2000
P
I
P
1406.6
134
7640.4
161
2001
I
2002
P
I
P
I
3072.1
143
2356.7
106
2070.3
-
-
1
NAGGROE ACEH D
2
771.5
8
6.2
4
51.8
3
1811.1
2
6
2
SUMATERA UTARA
25
3508
21
209.5
27
102.7
25
160.2
28
106.5
3
SUMATERA BARAT
3
7.1
8
175.8
7
342.8
4
19
6
38.2
4
RIAU
59
6744.6
85
548.2
80
6946.5
98
374.5
87
5
JAMBI
-
6
SUMATERA SELATAN
7
BENGKULU
8
LAMPUNG
9
BANGKA BELITUNG
4
5
4
44.4
2095.2
83
1153
-
10
-
5
201.9
4
41.9
11
360.9
6
10.2
6
21.6
72.4
8
123
3
35.6
5
96
6
42.3
3
724.4
-
5
37.7
2
28.4
1
0.6
1
1.9
54.1
8
98.1
6
96.2
10
97.4
5
53.8
4
85.7
-
-
1
1.6
2
6.2
1
4.5
4
152.4
2
2.3
6
31.2
JAWA
318
20500.9
684
10881.4
855
2651.4
1195
11053.6
995
5741.8
896
4799.4
10
DKI JAKARTA
246
6124.8
330
1724.9
435
788.2
737
3257.1
605
1154.5
588
3378.6
11
JAWA BARAT
225
4100.4
159
1568.8
174
12444
210
1770.4
201
1190.9
164
897.6
12
JAWA TENGAH
19
2229.3
39
3074.3
58
68.1
38
3085.4
43
117.1
31
71.6
13
D.I. YOGYAKARTA
3
35.3
10
5.9
11
10.8
20
504.3
10
10.2
9
19.9
14
JAWA TIMUR
58
4172.9
67
580.7
67
283.5
61
1135.3
23
1680.6
22
271.1
15
BANTEN
67
3838.2
79
3926.8
110
258.8
129
1301.1
113
1588.5
82
160.6
BALI & NUSA TENGGARA
20
129.2
91
364.9
147
199.1
136
1614.4
129
524.9
97
208.7
16
BALI & NUSA TENGGARA
19
114.6
73
307.7
127
183.9
126
201.5
116
518.9
82
86.5
17
NUSA TENGGARA BARAT
1
0.6
14
19.3
19
13.8
8
1407.9
12
4.8
13
119.7
18
NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR
-
14
5
37.9
1
1.4
2
5
1
1.2
2
2.5
KALIMANTAN
24
1051.1
32
722.7
11
226.8
22
208.8
43
246.6
29
2237
28.2
17
251.2
6
102
2
2.9
6
21.8
1
1.4
II
III
IV
19
KALIMANTAN BARAT
5
20
KALIMANTAN TENGAH
1
6
17
0.4
2
50.3
5
74.7
3
11.9
2
8.9
21
KALIMANTAN SELATAN
6
438.7
8
73.4
1
30.3
2
3.1
6
9.7
1
34
22
KALIMANTAN TIMUR
12
578.2
20
397.7
2
44.2
13
128.1
28
203.2
25
2192.7
SULAWESI
15
426
28
257.8
25
141.8
23
74.4
16
81.1
16
420.2
41.2
V
23
SULAWESI UTARA
4
356.2
10
158.1
14
25.1
10
25.5
2
1.2
4
24
SULAWESI TENGAH
2
5.5
5
71.2
2
1.7
1
1.5
4
0.5
2
0.3
25
SULAWESI SELATAN
6
59.8
10
27.8
3
12.5
3
39.2
9
-
9
373.7
26
SULAWESI TENGGARA
2
3.5
1
0.6
6
102.5
1
8
1
9.3
1
5
27
GORONTALO
1
1
2
0.1
-
-
-
0.2
-
0.6
-
-
MALUKU
1
17.8
8
5.2
3
1.8
-
0.1
3
8.7
-
-
28
MALUKU
1
17.8
5
5.2
1
0.9
-
0.1
1
5.5
-
-
29
MALUKU UTARA
-
-
3
-
2
0.9
4
-
2
3.2
-
-
VII
PAPUA
4
504.5
10
11.2
2
23.2
4
52.5
4
6069.1
6
89.7
30
PAPUA
VI
4
504.5
10
11.2
2
23.2
4
52.5
4
6069.1
6
59.7
781
33788.8
1034
13649.8
1177
10885
1541
16075.9
1333
15045
1150
9795.3
Source : BKPM, 2003
14
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