Case Studies:
The Elyssar Reconstruction Project
The Ministry of the Displaced
The Economic and Social Fund for Development
Lebanon 2007
1
Report Author
Nadine Khayat
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)
Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS)
Founded in 1989, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) is an independent,
non-profit public policy research institute and think tank based in Beirut. The main
purpose and objective of LCPS is to analyze and improve public policy and sociopolitical and economic development in Lebanon. To that end, the LCPS, over the last
decade, has undertaken research projects, published studies, arranged training
workshops and organized conferences concerned with political, social and economic
development in Lebanon and the Arab world.
The scope of the research activities of LCPS includes major issues of governance and
public policy in post-war Lebanon, electoral and parliamentary studies, administrative
decentralization and reforms; judiciary reforms; state-civil society relations; budget
analysis and fiscal policies; labour relations; industrial, agricultural and environmental
policies; civic education; conflict resolution and reconciliation; gender studies; and
globalization and its impact.
LCPS has established and grounded itself in the research community in Lebanon and
the region through its sound research practices, quality work as well as the networks
of working relations with government actors, International organizations, civil society
and academics to ensure effective policy influence and implementation follow-up.
Tiri
Tiri is an international NGO based in London that partners with civil society,
governments, and business to create networks of committed change agents dedicated
to strategic integrity reform. Tiri is an incubator and facilitates innovative reforms and
provides a critical learning platform to disseminate cutting-edge experiences.
This paper is part of a series of eight studies of post-war reconstruction countries
commissioned by Tiri and funded by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
the Foundation Open Society Institute. All studies are accessible on www.tiri.org
Eight local policy centres undertook research using a shared terms of reference. The
countries covered are Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon,
Mozambique, Palestine, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste. The research is the basis for an
advocacy and monitoring agenda to promote integrity in reconstruction both within
the eight countries and internationally. Together, these groups form the Network for
Integrity in Reconstruction (NIR).
All material contained in this survey was believed to be accurate as of January 10th,
2007. Every effort has been made to verify the information contained herein,
including allegation. Nevertheless, Tiri does not accept the responsibility for the
consequences of the use of this information for other purposes or in other contexts.
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Khayat, Nadine (2007) Case Studies: The Elyssar Reconstruction Project; The
Ministry of the Displaced; The Economic and Social Fund for Development, Lebanon
2007. Beirut: LCPS; London: Tiri
© 2007 Tiri
3
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6
The Elyssar Reconstruction Project ............................................................................... 7
The Ministry of the Displaced ..................................................................................... 16
Promoting community participation in the Council for Development and
Reconstruction’s development plans and strategies .................................................... 23
4
List of Acronyms
Elyssar
Public Agency for the planning and Development of the South Western
suburbs of Beirut
CBO
Community Based Organization
CDR
Council for development and Reconstruction
ESFD
Economic and Social Fund for Development
LDP
Local Development Plan
MC
Municipal Council
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
Solidere
Company for the development and reconstruction of the Beirut Central
District
5
Introduction
The Reconstruction Survey provided an overview of the conflict and post conflict
period in Lebanon, the process of reconstruction that was undertaken, the main actors
involved, as well as the argument that the prevailing corruption in Lebanon is the
result of the consensus and the prevailing confessional system that was established at
the end of the civil war.
After a gruelling 15 year civil war, Lebanon suffered a devastating destruction of
human and physical resources. The settlement and the end of the civil war took the
shape of a political accord known as the Tae’f Accord (it was signed by Lebanese
politicians in the Saudi city of Tae’f). The Accord was viewed as an important step
for national reconciliation, as well as an initiative for launching both the physical and
institutional rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. However, the Ta’ef
Accord, instead of constructively paving the way for reconstruction, further
complicated the interrelated political, economic and administrative systems and failed
to end political and communal groups’ differences1 . The resulting status quo has
hindered the reconstruction and national reconciliation process up until the time of
this writing. This hindrance is largely due to the political differences and the
overlapping political, economic and administrative systems which make it difficult to
effectively conceive and implement reconstruction projects unless the different
communal groups represented by their respective leaders in the Lebanese government
“get a piece of the pie” . The status quo of post-war reconstruction thus may be
deemed dependent on informal networks, relations and settlements between
politicians themselves as well as with businessmen; these networks are ultimately
linked to Lebanon’s Tae’f political settlement and the “fragmentations between and
within confessional communities.” 2 By emphasising participation in the decisionmaking process of the three main groups of Maronites (the President) ,Shiites (the
Speaker) and Sunnis (the Prime Minister), the Ta’ef enforced the need for political
bargaining between these three posts for bills to be passed, reform to be implemented,
and for public policy to be made. This is also replicated at lower ranks of
administrations and agencies.
The case studies, a continuation of the reconstruction survey, aim to provide examples
of both ‘successes’ as well as highlight cases of ‘failures’ in Lebanon’s post-war
reconstruction. It is important to note that the goals of the presented case studies are
not to highlight corruption3 per se, but more importantly to (1) highlight the benefits
of local ownership in reconstruction projects, which in the long run, may increase
accountability; (2) link the relationship between stakeholders to the broader frame of
the post-war consensus; and (3) pinpoint bottlenecks in reconstruction projects, to
serve the purpose of providing policy recommendations.
1
For a more detailed on the political reform and a reading of its implications see collection of articles
in in The document of National Accord: a critical review , The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies ,
2000 and see Salem Paul “ Two years of Living Dangerously: General Awn and Lebanon’s ‘Second
Republic’ in The Beirut ReviewVol 1 No1 , 1991 LCPS, pp77-86.
2
Leenders, R “Nobody Having too Much to Answer for: ‘Laissez-Faire’, Networks and Post-War
Reconstruction in Lebanon” pp177
3
Corruption here is defined as abuse of entrusted power for private gain.
6
The case studies also serve to highlight issues of accountability and ways to possibly
avoid corruption risks in post-war reconstruction projects. Post-war reconstruction
projects financed by donors are predominantly approached with reluctance and
concerns of accountability and transparency. However, elements that can be extracted
from the case studies aim to show that possible partnerships in reconstruction projects
may prove to be more effective in curbing corruption. The key is to promote
participation and local ownership of reconstruction projects thus rendering the
projects more accountable to the people, which in turn would challenge the prevailing
system and curb corruption in the long run.
Three cases were chosen to illustrate the above aims. They are: The Elyssar
Reconstruction Project; the experience of the Ministry of the Displaced and the Fund
for the Displaced; and, lastly, the Economic and Social Fund for Development
(ESFD) within the framework of The Council for Development and Reconstruction
(CDR). The case studies are not strictly defined as “successes” or “failures” as in each
project instances or phases may be analysed positively as well as negatively thus
providing possible policy recommendations of what works and what is liable to fail.
The Elyssar Reconstruction Project
The Public Agency for the Planning and Development of the South Western suburbs
of Beirut is commonly known as The Elyssar Reconstruction Project. The Elyssar
project area is situated about 3.5 km south of the Beirut Central District; it is well
placed in relation to major planned highways and other developments in the
Metropolitan area. The project area extends over 586 hectares (ha) from the
Summerland Resort and Sports City in the North to the boundary of Beirut
International Airport in the South. From the East it is bound by the Airport road and
from the West by the Mediterranean Sea. The southern suburbs of Beirut constitute an
area of very specific social and economic make-up. To many, it may invoke the
pictures of “slums” and “illegal settlements”; this is attributed to the years of civil war
as well as the absence of adequate housing and planning policies. The residents are
predominantly Shiite squatters, though in earlier years, a more bourgeois class settled
there. The majority of Shiite residents agglomerated in the southern suburbs as a
result of their relocation from the north-eastern suburbs in 1975, rural to urban
migration during both the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, and the Israeli
occupation of the south during 1978 until 2000. The southern suburbs are also
occupied by international refugee groups (Palestinians, Armenians, Syriacs, Kurds)
and international labourers (Syrians, Sri Lankans, Ethiopians) The area is a stronghold
of the Shiite political Hizb’allah4 and Amal Movement5. The Lebanese state has
4
Islamist political party formed in 1982 when Iran dispatched 1000 members of its revolutionary guard
to Lebanon in order to pre-empt Israeli influence in the country. Adopting Iranian radical ideology the
party grew in number by recruiting young Lebanese militants from different factions such as Amal
movement and Al-Da'wa. Source: http://www.meib.org/articles/0202_l1.htm
5
Created in 1974 by Sayyed Moussa Sadr, it is a Shiite political movement whose ideology is fairer
distribution of services for the impoverished Shiite population. It is now headed by house speaker
Nabih Berri. Also for an understanding of the specific economic, spatial and religious specificity that
make up the dayhiye or the suburbs of Beirut see Harb M. "La Dahiye de Beyrouth: parcours d'une
stigmatization urbaine, consolidation d'un territiore politique" 2003
7
mostly continued to adopt a non-interventionist strategy towards these areas in Beirut;
in fact, many describe the southern suburbs of Beirut as a state within the state,
having its own conservative jurisdictions 6 that may arguably be excluding factions
and other communal groups present in Lebanon.
Before the Public Agency was enacted, the contention over the private agency which
was originally submitted to the council involved three years of political debates
between Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement and the House Speaker,
Hizb’allah, under the pretext of the majority of Shiites inhabiting the affected areas,
and the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. For example, the House Speaker and leader
of the Amal movement, Nabih Berri, advocated against the creation of a real estate
company in 1993, preventing it from passing in parliament. It took three years to
debate the form of the company, its aims and plans. When the draft of a public
agency was prepared by the late Prime Minister Hariri, it was given to Mr. Berri for
his review, as well as the Minister of Public Works “who refused to sign the decree
until political consensus was reached.”7 The private agency proposal was dropped in
1994, as a result of heavy criticisms from Hizb’allah and the Amal movement who
claimed that the inhabitants had the right to not be relocated. Many observers also
attributed this vehement opposition from Amal and Hizb’allah against creating a real
estate agency to the effects of physical separation and demographic changes. Such
separation and changes would ultimately lead to weakening the parties’ influence in
the area as well as their electoral base, should a reconstruction plan be implemented.
Hizb’allah’s MP Hajj Ali Amar, in relaying concerns about Elyssar to al-Shira’a
magazine, stated that “we are against any demographic change in the area; not due to
religious or political reasons, but to national interest lending credit to the role of these
people in maintaining Lebanon’s unity”8
After much negotiation and talks, the agency was created as a public agency in 1996
as per Decree No 9043 dated 30/08/1996, with administrative and financial autonomy,
and commercial real estate development prerogatives to fulfill its mission under the
direct supervision of the Prime Minister. The agency had six board members and one
director; their appointment mirrored major religious groups in the country: Maronite,
Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze. Four of its board members were
designated according to influential government ties keeping with the confessional
system of the country (as established by the Tae’f Accord); other delegates
represented the two present political parties Amal and Hizb’allah who are deemed to
represent the residents of the south-western suburbs of Beirut. Several criticisms were
directed at the agency’s board members since the power balance within the board was
in favour of the Hariri Movement, with only two delegates for Amal and Hizb’allah
(Shiite) to represent inhabitants. The problem of this composition is that decisions
could not be made if members of the board did not agree. Another point against the
board was its unequal sectarian representation (only two Shiites) given that the
majority of the areas’ religious inhabitants are Shiites. The last point against the board
was its limiting of the residents’ representation to members of Amal and Hizb’allah,
thus restricting the “Shiite representation” to these two parties only. As some noted,
6
Toufiq F “‫ ”ب الد هللا ال ض ي قة‬Dar al-Jadid: Beirut, Lebanon .2005
Amine, Ibrahim. “After Solidere …Elyssar for tidying the southern suburbs of Beirut” As-Safir 16
August 1994.
8
Al-Shira’a magazine pp. 16. na, nd.
7
8
“the original inhabitants of the suburbs are not represented” 9 because although a
minority, not all Shiites can de facto be claimed to support Amal and Hizb’allah.
The agency has the following aims of execution for all primary and secondary roads
with related utilities: provision of all necessary infrastructure and public services; the
construction of approximately 10,120 units of affordable housing over a 14-year
period; the creation of around 100,000 m2 of light manufacturing, parks, warehouses
and workshop centers; transfer of local residents from illegal settlements to new and
affordable units; equipping and promoting the sale or investment of the newly created
parcels to recover some of the costs associated with expropriation, relocation of
families, provision of housing and infrastructure. The project has three broader goals:



Ensure the economic development of the area by improving the living
standard of local residents in the area when relocating them to newly
constructed dwellings.
Provide the possibility for future growth by optimizing land redistribution and
allowing for a normal and planned growth of urban activities in the future.
Complement the planning efforts associated with the rest of Beirut by creating
development opportunities by the sea front along 3 Km of sandy beaches and
by upgrading the infrastructure installations and public services around the
metropolitan area.
9
Meeting today on the organ gram and the people ask 250 questions concerning the future: Amal and
Hizb’allah dialogue with the people”. An-Nahar 11 August 1995. na
9
Figure 1: depicting the project’s execution per phase, the years of execution are not indicated
given that the projects’ timeline since the inception in 1996 is 14 years.
Source: http://www.elyssar.com/overview.html
In order to accomplish these three objectives the agency set as its priorities: 1)
evacuate areas of major arteries from the South into Beirut; 2) implement
infrastructure projects including highways, construct low cost housing units, shops
and workshops and 3) relocate illegal settlements10. The table shows that the priorities
of the agency were to establish affordable housing units, shops and workshops in
order to provide alternatives for the population inhabiting the neighbourhoods
included in its jurisdiction.
It is worth noting that the public discourse on slums and squatters is predominantly
referred to as an outcome of the war and the people as “temporarily displaced” whose
jurisdiction lies with the Ministry of the Displaced created in 1992. In fact, when
Elyssar was created as a public agency it was one of the few public agencies that
recognized the entitlement of a dweller, as one residing in the area, regardless of his
legal or illegal status. The importance of this point is that it attempted to change, or at
least challenge,
10
The mandate, goals, aims and phases of the agency are found on its website, link:
http://www.elyssar.com/
10
the public discourse on slums, squatters and informal settlements widely viewed as
“illegal”, thus necessitating the relocation of populations11.
After its inception, the agency began to build the infrastructure in the area and
complete the infamous Ouzaii Bridge. It was previously agreed by the members of the
board that the residents would not be evicted except after providing them with
alternative housing units. It was also agreed that monetary compensation would not
be paid for people to relocate, as the housing units would provide an alternative. For
example, the Ouzaii area within the jurisdiction of the Elyssar project was given
evacuation notices by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to
empty lot number 3908 (approximately one million square meters) to make way for
the Ouzaii bridge. The evacuation of the residents was to be implemented in return for
compensation. The debate over the Ouzaii Bridge went on from 1995 until 2002 and
culminated in the completion of two end sections and the abandonment of the median
section of the bridge. During that period, the government was intent on building the
Bridge while members of Amal and Hizb’allah on the board were against it because it
threatened the demographics in the area, had repercussions for the electoral base, and
was unfair to the inhabitants. The Amal movement also demanded an increase in the
compensation paid for residents from four million to 10 million USD for the whole
plot. Hizb’allah and Amal MP’s expressed their solidarity with the people “because
they have been impoverished and displaced during the war and came and settled here
from the South and Bekaa and today the prime minister and Elyssar want to disrespect
the people by paying 175,000 LP/square meters for both commercial and residential
space which is robbing peoples’ rights”12. This example may indicate the
powersharing relationship between stakeholders and the attempt to redefine the power
balance within the board as each group endeavoured to use their leverage but
ultimately blocked the project. It also reflects the overlap of responsibilities between
agencies where CDR intersects with Elyssar, resulting in ambiguous responsibilities
As a public agency directly under the Prime Minister’s supervision, current Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora presented the suggestion of converting the public agency into
a real estate development agency akin to Solidere13,thus re-initiating negotiations with
Hizb’allah. In fact, these negotiations had also been suggested back in 2004 by the
late PM Hariri, given his supervisory role vis-à-vis the agency. He had planned on
transforming the agency into a private real estate development agency, presenting
members of the board with an alternative plan which was commissioned to Dar alHandasah back in 2004. The 2004 negotiations were hindered due to Hizb’allah’s
Fawaz Mona and Isabelle Peillen “Understanding Slums: Case studies for the global report on human
settlements 2003 - The case of Beirut, Lebanon” 2003. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpuprojects/Global_Report/pdfs/Beirut.pdf
12
Akil, Radwan “Maramil day passes peacefully and the bulldozers did not move” An-Nahar 18 Feb
1997. n.p
13
Solidere, the private the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut City
Center or Solidere was established upon Law 117 of 1991, which allowed for the creation of a private
company to rebuild the heavily bombarded areas of the Beirut Central District in the aftermath of the
15 years of Civil War. On the reconstruction of the central district see Makdisi S., (1997) “Laying
Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere”, The University of
Chicago, pp661-704
11
11
fierce opposition to the alternative plan as well as the political clout (contention?) in
September 2004 over the controversial extension of the President’s mandate14.
In a newspaper article in As-safir dated 14 April 2006 the new Dar al-Handasah map
shows the plan for the previously removed Ouzaii Bridge (a bridge the late PM Hariri
was intent on building andfor which the loan for construction amounted to US$28
million). Amal’s MP states in that article that the bridge was an action driven by
political spite against the monetary compensations Hizb’allah and the Amal
movement asked for on behalf of the relocated population. The new plans removed
the social housing units in Maramil, Horsh el Qatil, Sabra and Chatilla and the Golf
Club that were previously alternative social units for the dislocated residents of Jnah,
Ouzaii, Maramil, Horsh el Qatil, and Sabra. (all of these neighbourhoods are located
in the southern suburbs of Beirut)
The political clout is also evident in the same article where the author discusses that
Hizb’allah are open for discussions again since “there is no fear of changing the areas
demographics”15. This statement stems from the fact that the initial Elyssar project
plan physically segregates the area using a variety of infrastructural projects, mainly
highways, thus physically affecting and segregating the community, possibly
weakening political control in the area, causing the party delegates to oppose the
project.
Land Use
Area in ha % of Total Area
1. Private residential Developments by Elyssar
185.1
31.6
2. Planned Residential Developments by Elyssar
61.7
10.7
3. Commercial and residential (city wide)
11.1
1.9
4. Commercial centers / markets
7.6
1.3
5. Major institutional
22.0
3.5
6. Light industrial / workshops
9.6
1.7
7. Mixed use development
27.8
4.7
8. Major Sports facilities
54.9
9.4
9. Local open space / cemeteries
16.5
2.8
10. Beach development
25.0
4.3
11. Maritime domain areas
14.0
2.4
12. Circulation (roads + pedestrian)
150.7
25.7
Total
586.0
100.0
Figure 2: Land use table of the area
Source: the Elyssar website: http://www.elyssar.com/planning.html
The land use table shows the extent of roads and pedestrian circulation the project
allocates to the area, traffic which would have contributed to physically segregating
the area under Elyssars jurisdiction. It is also shown in the map below where
residential units would have been segregated and where an extended network of
Yaghi, Zeinab. “Elyssar : from public agency to a real estate development company” in As-Safir
14/04/2006.
15
Yaghi, Zeinab. “Elyssar : from public agency to a real estate development company” in As-Safir
14/04/2006.
14
12
circulation would further contribute to dividing the area. In the end, the Ouzaii bridge
was not constructed and alternative plans were suggested so that the area would not be
segregated.
Figure 3 map depicting the land use of the area
While Hizb’allah and Amal delegates previously stressed the importance of Elyssar as
a public agency because it allowed for the local participation of the concerned
community and the importance of consulting with the community in the
reconstruction process, both Hussein Khalil and Ali Hassan Khalil thought it was
unreasonable to expect the residents to stay and plan the area. Khalil even stated
“around 60% of the area needs to be demolished for building hospitals, schools, and
roads”.
The case study aims to show that Elyssar, while at first masterminded by the late
Hariri private office, whose members later became members of the board of the
private subcontractors or other planning agencies (Elyssar, Solidere…), failed to
fulfill its mission of constructing public housing units, favouring instead the building
of highways and large-scale facilities, such as the Sports City16, because of the postwar political status quo of powersharing17. The case study shows how political elites
manipulate information and quickly abandon prerogatives when it is in their best
Harb M., (2000) “Post-War Beirut: Resources, Negotiations, and Contestations in the Elyssar
Project”, The Arab World Geographer, Vol.3, no.4, p. 117
17
Harb talks about Hariri office which was made up of planners and engineers who masterminded
possible projects in Lebanon later submitting them in Parliament and then subcontracting them to
prominent contractors in the country such as Dar al Handasah, Khatib and Alami and Ace, after the
office was dismantled in 1996 most of these members became directors of these projects in these
prominent companies. Harb M., (2000) “Post-War Beirut: Resources, Negotiations, and Contestations
in the Elyssar Project”, The Arab World Geographer, Vol.3, no.4, p. 117
16
13
interest to do so. It is not pinpointing corruption per se but exemplifying how the
political status quo in Lebanon leads to hindering development plans. For example,
the House Speaker and leader of the Amal movement pushed against the creation of a
real estate company in 1993, negotiating instead for a public real estate company in
the south-western suburbs and in 1996 Elyssar was announced. Elyssar focused on
large scale development and on highways, while limiting its social component (public
housing units)18. Thus, the residents of the areas did not benefit from reconstruction
plans in terms of either economic revitalization or better housing plans. The public
agency also failed to promote residents’ participation in the reconstruction plan as the
country’s politics dictated that the residents were represented by the two major Shiite
political parties: Amal and Hizb’allah. The tug of war between stakeholders is
evident in different instances and the shifting positions are apparent throughout the
project. In the end, Elyssar only succeeded in being an excuse for building highways
while it failed in its mission of providing housing alternatives for the affected
populace. Finally, Elyssar failed as a public agency which attempted to redefine postwar reconstruction in Lebanon (one view prevails) because the salient discussions
pertain to the fact that it is being turned into a private real estate agency akin to
Solidere.
Contrary to Solidere, Elyssar as a public agency was an attempt to give voice to the
affected population and provide for more local participation in public planning
policies. Elyssar was also an attempt to challenge the private company for the
reconstruction of downtown Beirut. Theoretically, Elyssar’s vision had many
advantages over Solidere because it was seen to have given voice to the affected
population. Practically, it should have provided alternative housing, public spaces as
well as an integrated economic revitalization plan. This attempt, however, proved
unsuccessful. The drawback of Elyssar was its post-war reality of sectarian bickering
and political settlements prevalent in the composition of its board.
Solidere, on the other hand, was formed under law 117 which was passed in 1991
after the late PM Hariri lobbied for his vision of the central Beirut District. He was
perceived as a positive source of energy in post- war Lebanon. At that time, Hariri
had emerged as a major stakeholder and an affluent businessman with influential ties
and later became Prime Minister in 1992. Solidere was created in 1994, after an
amendment to the constitution, as a private real estate company gaining control over
180 hectares of the central district. Its founder owned 7% of its shares. Under the
legislation, the company was exempt from taxes for 10 years and compensated by the
Lebanese government for all infrastructure-related work it would perform in the area.
The company expropriated the property rights of the entire Beirut Central District and
gained control over the property rights owners. The company gave precedence to
speed and profit maximization over transparency and accountability. The company
succeeded in quickly reconstructing the central district by avoiding long bureaucratic
procedures and eliminating the original property owners19.
Harb M., (2000) “Post-War Beirut: Resources, Negotiations, and Contestations in the Elyssar
Project”, The Arab World Geographer, Vol.3, no.4, pp272-289
19
“Reconstructing Beirut” Kennedy School of Government –case program, Massachusetts, Unites
states ofd America, 2001.
18
14
Both models were prey to self-serving interests and political networking. Both models
provide a high risk of corruption because they serve politicians’ self interest. Solidere
allowed a private construction agency to build the Beirut central District, a historic
place that otherwise symbolised the socially and economically diversified fabric of
the city. Solidere allowed one vision of reconstruction to prevail, while also
destroying many historic buildings in favour of revenue and office space in a
historically preserved city centre. Despite the failure of both models to hinder
corruption, the debate on Elyssar, as a public agency with a diversified and conflicted
board of representatives, prior to and after its inception, was more prominent and
visible in the newspapers than the debate on Solidere. Also, by being a public agency,
it is directly accountable to the supervisory bodies in the Lebanese government such
as the court of audit, the central inspection board…etc. Solidere, as a private agency,
is not accountable to the Lebanese government. What happened in practice is that
Solidere succeeded in reconstructing the central district while Elyssar did not fulfil its
mandate. Given the failures of both models to inhibit corruption and promote
accountability, what could work is a partnership20 coupled with the consultation and
participation of concerned members of civil society, since ownership by communities
and participation would promote more accountability to the community themselves.
Post-war reconstruction projects and reconstruction priorities should be initiated,
conceptualized and implemented jointly with the active participation of civil
society21. This promotes the feeling of local ownership of reconstruction projects,
based on the notion that if people have stakes in the project they would have more
interest in its success and provide more regulation and accountability. The
participation of civil society in reconstruction projects also serves the purpose of
strengthening and building trust between citizens and the government as well as
making the government more accountable to stakeholders.
Partnerships may include public-private partnerships, or public –local based partnerships.
Satterthwaite D. "From Professionally Driven to People driven poverty reduction: reflections on the
role of Shack/Slim dwellers International" Environment and Urbanization Vol 13 No 2 2001.
20
21
15
The Ministry of the Displaced
The Lebanese Civil war and the Israeli invasions (1978 and 1982), combined with
Israeli aggression in the South, resulted in the displacement of over 1 million
people22. After the end of the civil war in 1999, around 500,000 remained internally
displaced. The most recent estimates of the number of the displaced persons in
Lebanon vary between 50,000 and 600,00023.
The displacement in Lebanon happened intermittently throughout the internal civil
strife, Israeli invasion and sporadic aggressions, fighting between militias as well as
the participation of the Syrian forces and Palestinian factions.
According to the United Nations Development Programme program for the Displaced
(UNRSRD), since the outbreak of the war in 1975, and up to its end in 1990, 810,000
citizens were affected by waves of forced displacement as follows:
1975 - 1976 = 300,000 persons
1977 - 1981 = 150,000 persons
1982 - 1985 = 200,000 persons
1989 - 1990 = 160,000 persons
Table 1: Table showing the number of damaged villages and towns in the five
muhafazat in Lebanon
Source: Ministry of the Displaced “the return of the displaced in Lebanon” 1996.
Damaged
towns
and
villages
Affected by
displacement
Total
destruction
Partial
destruction
Destroyed
and damaged
houses
Partial
destruction
Total
destruction
Damages
Mount
Lebanon
South
Lebanon
Beirut
North
Lebanon
Bekaa
Total
404
274
-
162
109
949
45
24
-
1
1
71
81
17
-
2
3
103
Mount
Lebanon
South
Lebanon
Beirut
North
Lebanon
Bekaa
Total
6,410
4,424
573
673
235
12,315
14,778
4,845
2,576
1,053
409
23,661
4,630
3,231
344
499
340
9,044
22
This study was undertaken prior to the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and as such these
numbers disregard the recent waves of displacements and mass exodus.
23
The numbers of the displaced vary from one source to the other, the Ministry of the Displaced the
number is 675,000 displaced after the year 1990, while the UNDP maintains that some 450,000 were
displaced making up around 90,000 families of which 70,000 would be genuinely concerned. From
“profile of internal Displacement: Lebanon, compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee council. Norwegian refugee council/Global IDP Project. 2004.
16
The most affected areas in the country in terms of displacement have been the Mount
Lebanon region, specifically the Cazas of Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda, with the
percentage of displaced families reaching up to 80%. Today, the displaced are
among the poorest echelons of the Lebanese society, due to the loss of their houses
and income. Over 50% of the Displaced are not able to meet their basic needs and
12.5% live in absolute poverty. Many families still illegally occupy the homes of
other households.
The following can be distinguished in the displaced: families genuinely concerned
with return; families illegally occupying other households; and families inhabiting
non-residential quarters (commercial, industrial, public, or non-safe construction...)
Displacement has political, economic and social repercussions which radically altered
the geographical distribution of Mount Lebanon's multi-confessional population
where previously Christians, Muslims and Druze had lived together. This caused a
decrease in population in many rural areas and an increase in density in other areas.
Displacement affected social cohesion and split up areas on the basis of sectarian and
religious ideologies. Many of the displaced lost their homes, properties and their
livelihood sources, leading to an increase in the rates of unemployment and
immigration. Displacement also had negative repercussions on all sectors of
agriculture, industry and commerce since the number of people working in the
agricultural sector decreased and many businesses were destroyed or illegally
occupied. The displacement resulted in many legal rights problems due to illegal land
occupation, and many legal issues related to citizenship and residency (occupation,
tampering with cadastral maps, construction without building and zoning
regulations….). Last, but not least, the displacement phenomena left the Lebanese
population with negative psychological effects resulting from the disintegration of
family ties, difficulties in adapting to situations, poverty and other effects of violence
and war24.
With the end of the civil war, the Lebanese government in October 1991 reviewed the
displacement situation in order to find solutions to deal with the problems. This
included a survey of the displaced families, an overall assessment of the magnitude of
the problem as well as its political, economic, humanitarian, and geographical
ramifications. Following these efforts, the Ministry of the Displaced was established
in 1992 to implement the return plan and the fund for the displaced was established to
finance the plans and projects put forth by the ministry. The policies, plans and
reconstruction projects were defined by the Minister and translated by the Ministry
into execution plans, which were then funded by the fund for the displaced. The
Ministry could not directly disperse the funds; it went over the files of the displaced
and submitted the approved file to the fund, thus requiring good relations between
both the Ministry and the Fund.
Feghali, Kamal “Displacement in Lebanon: a strategy for return and development” The Lebanese
Center for Policy Studies 1997. pp. 10-16
24
17
The Ministry for the Displaced formulated a work programme for this purpose that
attempts to achieve the following:




Removal of rubble and rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the villages of
return;
Evacuation of occupied houses and their return to lawful owners;
Assisting returnees in repairing and rebuilding their houses; and
Arranging reconciliation in the villages and areas of return to provide the
psychological climate needed for confidence - building and stability.
The Ministry of the Displaced was headed by Anwar al-Khalil-?Druze from 1998 to
2000; Walid Jumblat, Druze leader and head of the Socialist Progressive Party (1992),
Marwan Hamade, Druze leader and current member of Parliament, who occupied
various ministerial posts (2000), and Antoine Andraos Greek Orthodx, closely
affiliated to the late Rafiq al-Hariri hired by his Oger company and later headed the
Ministry. The majority of the Ministers were Druze since most of the displacements
occurred in Druze areas, hence the requirement of a Druze political leader to associate
with reconciliation plans. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), there were still around 600,000 internally displaced people in
2004 in Lebanon25. According to the Ministry of the Displaced there were 300,000
internally displaced in 2001 and 68,000 in 200426. In fact, the estimates according to
different organizations on the number of internally displaced people in Lebanon vary
from 50,000-600,000.
Political terms in office also had repercussions on the work of the Ministry of the
Displaced. Articles in the press touch upon the shifts in policy of the Ministry of the
Displaced depending on the person in the office. Every term the Minister in question
would submit a different plan for return, budgets and supporting documents to
parliament for approval. Former Minister al-Khalil stated that the new policy of the
Ministry “will provide equality and equity for all citizens, contrary to the situation in
the previous term.”27 The predominant norm is for every plan to start from scratch
without taking into account plans that have already been executed and previous
payments.28
Ministry of the Displaced budgets for years 1997 and Amount
1999
1997
LBP1,888,178,310,000.00
LBP2,456,178,000,000.00
1999
Source: An-nahar 24 May 1999
2004 figure according to “profile of internal Displacement: Lebanon. compilation of the information
available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee council. Norwegian refugee
council/Global IDP Project. 2004. UNHCR is not involved in displacement in Lebanon the number was
cited in an UNHCR operations report.
26
“Profile of internal Displacement: Lebanon”. Compilation of the information available in the Global
IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee council. Norwegian refugee council/Global IDP Project. 2004
27
Kosseifi, Hyam. “No relation to previous plans and increase of 30% and 60% in expenditures” AnNahar 24 May 1999.
28
Ibid
25
18
Although budgets in the Ministry should have been steadily decreasing given the
accomplishments over a budget cycle, the expenditure kept increasing29.
Table 2: Estimates of internally displaced people in Lebanon according to the
different sources and years.
Source: “Profile of internal Displacement: Lebanon”. Compilation of the
information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee
council. Norwegian refugee council/Global IDP Project. 2004
Organization
Year
Estimated figure used
indicating number of
people still in a situation
of displacement
50,000 to more than
500,000
US Committee for Refugees
“Although Lebanon set the end of 2002 as
the target for the return of all
displaced, estimates of those still displaced
at the end of 2003 range from 50,000
to more than 500,000.” (USCR, 24 May
2004)
2003 2004
US Committee for Refugees
“Although it was not known how many
internally displaced persons were actively
seeking to return to their homes, USCR
believed that between 250,000 and
300,000 Lebanese remained internally
displaced in 2001." (USCR, 2002)
20012002
250,000 -350,000
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)
20032004
Operations
report cites the estimated
figure of 600,000 IDPs in
Lebanon
The term “political money” is a term frequently used in newspapers in association
with the work of the Ministry of the Displaced and the central fund for the displaced.
Cases point to money spent on areas of political stronghold that may have been used
for reinforcing voter preferences and increasing their popularity. In a report published
in 1999 detailing and assessing the work done by both agencies, it was clear that there
are disparities and inequalities in the published numbers especially given that the fund
had dispersed billions since its creation in 1992-1993 with little result on the ground
in the areas of the displaced. The numbers also showed that many expenditures were
unaccounted for and that 61.40 % of gross expenditures were spent on the evacuation
29
It is noteworthy that progress reports are not disclosed; these reports were not given by the Ministry,
and tend to be classified. The report “Ministry of the Displaced” published in 1996 and found in the
closed folio section in the American University of Beirut does not contain budget figures; it focuses
instead on the history of the war, displaced villages, and social aspects of displacement.
19
of occupied houses, almost doubling the amount spent on the removal of rubble and
rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the villages of return (38.10 %) . Details of
expenditure until 31 January 1999 are as follows:
Table 3: Expenditure of the central fund for the displaced from 1997 until 31
January 1999.
Source: An-Nahar 15 March 1999.
Compensations for evacuations
Compensations for rehabilitation
Compensations for reconstruction
Compensations for infrastructure
rehabilitation
Compensations for removal of rubble
Compensation for reconciliation and victims
Compensations for social assistance
Total
LBP 751,747,451,125
LBP 213,660,279,006
LBP 128,574,265,143
LBP 112,430,821,260
LBP 13,653,780,250
LBP 6,551,714,000.000
LBP 719,817,025.000
LBP 752,467,268,150.000
Table 4: Compensation allocated according to regions. Source: An-Nahar 15
March 1999.
Mount Lebanon
LBP 623,399,623,160.000
Beirut
LBP 495,298,328,370.000
The north
LBP 21,729,485,573.000
Bekaa
LBP 15,334,025,000.000
The South
LBP 13,252,839,122.000*
*Report notes that expenditure on the south stopped since the council of the south
took over in 1994
Table 5: Table showing the number of beneficiaries. Source: An-Nahar 15
March 1999.
Evacuations
Rehabilitation
Reconstruction
Social assistance
Reconciliation and victims
Total
73593.00 pax
27473.00 pax
7035.00 pax
198.00 pax
208.00 pax
73801.00 pax
The percentage spent on evacuations reached 67.82 % while the rest (rehabilitation,
reconstruction, and social assistance) amounted to 32.18 % of the expenditure, raising
questions regarding the amount of money spent to increase political and voter
popularity rather than to ensure the effective return of the displaced. “The widespread
corruption that surrounded the return issue: the money allocated to the fund for the
displaced was used by some officials in charge of the Fund for personal political
20
reasons, which resulted in spoiled money benefiting one part of the population at the
expense of the other.” 30
In the report published by An-Nahar, the central fund for the displaced spent
26,538,600,000 LP (US$ 17,494,133.158) on military personnel in all areas of
Lebanon, 8,892,850,992 LP on rehabilitation of schools and places of worship, and
18,604,923,523 LP on miscellaneous expenditures. Aggregate figures on expenditure
were not published and the report itself mentions that the displaced file is a political
file subject to political and party pressures. The report also goes beyond that point to
mention that some employees in the Ministry of the Displaced have been appointed
due to political, sectarian and religious affiliations and pressures, pointing to poor
administrative procedures and organization in the central fund, the lack of contracts
with employees and subcontractors, as well as discrepancies in salaries for the same
job, as, for example, one driver gets 400,000 and another driver with the same
qualifications receives 1,300,000 LP31
Another complaint regarding the expenditure of the fund for the displaced was in
regards to the compensation paid for evacuations in the Beirut Central District, an
area under the jurisdiction of The Lebanese Company for the Development and
Reconstruction of Beirut City Centre32 also known by its French acronym Solidere.
These complaints were against amounts of money that were paid to fake families and
amounts paid to families who were not displaced in the first place. Priority was given
to evacuations in Beirut’s Central District, with compensation reaching ten times the
amount paid to those living in other areas.33 For example, Wadi Abu Jamil in the
Solidere area, an area formerly occupied by populations displaced from the South and
Bekaa due to Israeli invasion and aggressions, came to be known as Wadi el Dahab or
Valley of Gold because of the higher amount of compensation approved by the
Ministry of the Displaced. The brokers (linked to the political party) taking over the
compensations in the area, the payment to fictitious families as well as the overestimation of the number of families residing in one apartment all point to corruption,
waste and mismanagement of funds.
At the political level, the work of the Ministry of the Displaced has been linked to the
minister serving his political term and the CFD under the jurisdiction of the Prime
Minister. As such, good relations between the head of these two offices are a pre30 “Profile of internal Displacement: Lebanon”. Compilation of the information available in the Global
IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee council. Norwegian refugee council/Global IDP Project.
2004pp 51
31 Nassif Nicholas “this was how the millions in the central fund for the displaced were gone:
“political money” a new file is waiting” An-Nahar 15, March 1999.
32 The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut City Centre or Solidere
was established upon Law 117 of 1991. Few people were in support of a private agency to take over
the property rights in the central district but the idea was endorsed by Hariri, Fadl Shalaq head of
OGER (private engineering firm owned by the late PM Hariri was appointed as head of the Council for
Development and Reconstruction (CDR), all these factors allowed for the creation of a private
company to rebuild the heavily bombarded areas of the Beirut Central District in the aftermath of the
15 years of Civil War, for more on this read Makdisi S., (1997) “Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban
Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere”, The University of Chicago, pp661-704
33
See Feghali, Kamal “Displacement in Lebanon: a strategy for return and development” The
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies 1997. pp. 33-36 and Nassif Nicholas “this was how the millions in
the central fund for the displaced were gone: “political money” a new file is waiting” An-Nahar 15,
March 1999.
21
requisite for the actual implementation of plans. Both sides have been accused on
numerous occasions of wasting money and mismanaging funds34. Also, the reality of
the religious and sectarian rifts in the society resulted in the belief that the political
and religious weight of political leaders is needed to establish reconciliation at the
grassroots level; some Ministers claimed that the issue of the displaced will suffer
without strong (?) leadership 35
Brih, Chouf
Brih as a village located in the Chouf. Back in the 80’s, its population consisted of 14
Christian Maronite families (1516 persons) and 12 Druze families (600 persons). Today
there are no Christian families in Brih although dislocation occurred 30 years ago and
reconciliation has allegedly already been accomplished in most of the Chouf villages. The
municipality in Brih according to tradition is headed by Christians in the village but there
haven’t been any Christians inhabiting Brih for 22 years and as such there is no municipality
in Brih. This village is one of many in the Chouf area where reconciliation and the right of
return were not fully realised, either physically or emotionally. People from Brih recount the
incident which started the feud that occurred in 1977 differently depending on their sect.
Christians would say it was the Druze who started it while the Druze would say the opposite.
After the Christians fled the village and after the Civil war, the Druze built a two-story
community house that the Christians claim was built in place of the Church. Many tried to
negotiate tearing down the community house, even Chouf leader Walid Jumblatt, but the
Druze population in Brih refused. Reconciliation in the Chouf village was not solved by
political leadership; neither sect is willing to step down and admit the right of “the other” 36
Another point in the issue of displacement is the rooted sectarian ideology dominating
the return process. This ultimately is tied to the sectarian make-up of the country
which was further solidified in the Taef Accord as well as the political discourse in
the country. As author Monir Bou Ghanem notes:
Relations between major political figures are almost always mirrored in
the communities. When relations of politicians are good, this is reflected
at the grassroots level, like when Patriarch Sfeir in August 2001, toured
the predominantly Druze Shouf region of Mount Lebanon and visited
Moukhtara, the ancestral stronghold of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. The
visit signified a historic reconciliation between Maronites and Druze and
was translated on the ground37.
The Maronites and the Druze fought a bloody war in 1983-84 , the
repercussions of which are still deeply rooted in people’s minds to this day.
The case of the Ministry of the Displaced again shows the intertwined nature of
reconstruction projects with politics and the misuse of public funds. The funds may
Nassif Nicholas “this was how the millions in the central fund for the displaced were gone: “political
money” a new file is waiting” An-Nahar 15, March 1999.
35 Dick, Marlin “Jumblatt claims displaced issue will suffer without his presence” the Daily Star,
Thursday December 17, 1998.
36
Al-Balad newspaper 29 May 2006. p.8
37 Interview conducted by author with Monir Bou Ghanem, Director of the Mediterranean Forest
Development and Conservation Center of Lebanon (MFDCL)
34
22
have been misused in some areas and not in others, in order to increase politicians’
popularity in the privileged area38. The model of the Ministry, similar to the board of
Elyssar, is not accountable nor is it transparent; the status quo of post war
reconstruction dictates that the head of the Ministry and the head of the fund be on
good terms in order for procedures to run smoothly. Funds were also siphoned off
because there was no comprehensive plan for the return of the displaced, as each
ministerial plan worked independently of a larger country effort targeting the
displaced. Large funds were allocated for compensations instead of providing housing
alternatives. This contributed to the increase in demand of rent, which, in the absence
of proper planning and housing policies, contributed to an increase in informal
settlements and illegal buildings. Funds were unfairly distributed due to favouritism
and political interest. Their mismanagement is also largely due to the strength of the
networks backing it as well as the weakness of the regulatory bodies, lack of
transparency and accountability in the funding procedures, and the lack of political
will to reform.
The incentive for reform remains weak and requires strengthening. As such, donor
funded reconstruction projects may focus on initiatives at the local level which would
challenge the prevailing system. An alternative may also be a partnership with the
ministry and the local population39. The benefits of such a partnership would be to
increase civil society’s ownership in such projects and initiatives through direct
participation, which in turn will affect accountability, and challenge the prevailing
system, as donors provide for more regulation and accountability vis-à-vis the public
agency and the local population aids in raising awareness and increasing their
responsibility towards the success of the project.
Promoting community participation in the Council for
Development and Reconstruction’s development plans and
strategies
The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is a public institution
established in 1977. It is directly linked to the Council of Ministers. The CDR is
responsible for the planning and programming of reconstruction/rehabilitation
projects in all sectors across Lebanon. It is also mandated to develop a master plan for
urban planning. Almost 85% of all funds earmarked for reconstruction transit through
the CDR. It has been often accused of lack of transparency, fund mismanagement as
well as corruption, and thus may not be the best example illustrating a “successful”
case-study.
According to the agency’s website, the Council for Development and Reconstruction
is mandated to provide the following40:

Prepare a general plan for the country, investment and implementation
programs for reconstruction and development projects.
Nassif Nicholas “this was how the millions in the central fund for the displaced were gone: “political
money” a new file is waiting” An-Nahar 15, March 1999.
39 This may be a community based organization or a local municipality depending on the poroject and
its locality.
40
Council for Development and Reconstruction website: http://www.cdr.gov.lb/indexe.html
38
23



Mobilize external financing for priority projects within the investment
plans.
Implement projects by appointment from the Council for Ministers.
Take action in rehabilitating the public administration and reconstruction
of the infrastructure and negotiate foreign financing agreements.
CDR relies on both public and external financing for the implementation of its
projects. Public funding is obtained from concerned ministries while external funding
comes from Arab countries, Europe and the World Bank. CDR’s projects are
predominantly in the sectors of Power, Health, Education, Water and Waste,
Telecommunications, Transportation, Roads and Highways. For the implementation
of its projects, the CDR follows public tendering procedures and awards contracts
according to the bidding procedures of the Lebanese government, the funding agency
and bilateral governmental agreements. After the civil war, the CDR was given far
reaching authorities such as negotiating and receiving funding for reconstruction
projects, an increase in the scope of activities in the above mandate, as well as an
autonomous status relieving it of the scrutiny of auditing, supervision, and the central
inspection agency41
In its effort to create a human and social dimension to its efforts, the CDR established
the Social and Economic Planning department. Through this department, the CDR, in
cooperation with governmental and international agencies, secures funds for the
implementation of several projects which aim to raise the living standards of
marginalized groups thus leading to a significant change at the national level42.
Within this department, there are two projects which translate the councils’ will to
promote and build a collaborative relationship with various community stakeholders:
the Community Development project (CDP) and the Economic and Social Fund for
Development (ESFD).
The Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD) was initiated in 2002 with
the general objectives of poverty alleviation, promoting social development strategies,
locating effective mechanisms to create job opportunities and local development, and
allocating funding to be established as an independent entity of CDR. ESFD
constitutes a part of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and is funded through a 25
million Euro grant from the European commission and a 6 million Euro contribution
from the Lebanese government. These funds, initiated on 11 June 2002, are
characterized as being fast, efficient, transparent, equitable, and independent. Support
from the European commission will be terminated on 31 December 2009, by which
time the ESFD is expected to have strengthened itself and become established as an
entity independent of the CDR.
The ESFD is designed to alleviate poverty in Lebanon. It mobilizes partners at the
local level in order to implement poverty alleviation action through job creation and
community development. As such, ESFD considers self-help assistance, active
participation, sound ownership, sustainability, gender equity and ecological sensitivity
see Leenders Reinoud “in search of a state: the politics of corruption in Post war Lebanon” for an
account of political corruption as well as a full account of money mismanagement and allegations
concerning CDR.
42
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) progress report, July 2005.
41
24
inherent to the success of identified projects. Projects are implemented in areas of
agriculture, health, and infrastructure43…Each project cycle constitutes two years
through which the ESFD focuses on the possibility of identifying projects in areas
constituting “poverty pockets” in Lebanon. Since its inception in 2002, ESFD has
implemented 21 projects out of which six were completed. ESFD closely monitors
and evaluates all projects. Contrary to the CDR, the ESFD unit does not have the
privilege of being an autonomous entity which is not subject to audits. In addition to
the EU yearly audit, ESFD may be subject to audits from the various Lebanese public
auditing agencies. ESFD was chosen as a case study because it implements projects
that do not cost a lot of money, involves the community, and opens channels of
communication with stakeholders at the local level (overcoming local conflicts) , and
contributes to enhancing the community’s trust vis-a- vis CDR .
The ESFD partners with municipal councils in the chosen areas due to the ability of
these locally elected councils to work closely with community based organizations,
notaries, and community stakeholders (women, youth, political parties..), creating
working groups in order to formulate an integrated vision for medium term local
development. The key element in the ESFD projects is the active participation of
citizens working together in order to identify and prioritize the local development
needs of the area in question. Adopting a participatory approach in development
projects is inherent to planning theories and approaches which began to develop
during the 1980's. Contrary to radical planning theories widely prevalent in the
1940’s calling for a top-down approach, these more recent theories call for the active
involvement of citizens in the planning and development processes. A participatory
approach would endorse "listening to the voices of change"44, thus attempting to tilt
the balance of the pendulum in favour of citizen’s participation as opposed to an elitist
approach in planning.
The ESFD identifies “poverty pockets” in Lebanon, which are areas in dire need of
improving living standards and economic revitalization. After the identification of the
area, the ESFD wields a partnership with the municipality, signs a memo of
understanding (MOU) if the municipality is interested, and then launches a local
development planning process. According to the ESFD, “local development planning
is a participatory process comprising the successive steps of: community
mobilization, creation of structures for dialogue, situation analysis, detailed problem
analysis, objective analysis and strategy analysis.”45
Beginning in 2003, members of the Mishmish community and its elected municipality
partnered with the ESFD, after conducting a problem analysis and overview of
solutions, to create a local development plan. This plan identified the following
projects as priorities for interventions:

Completion of a bridge in Mishmish
43
Interview conducted by author with Rouba Dabbagh community development manager on 20
December 2005 in CDR’s offices.
44 For a sketching of planning theories and practices see Sandercock L (1998) "the death of Modernist
planning: radical praxis for a post-modern age in Cities for citizens " in Cities for Citizens eds Douglas
and Friedmann (1998)
45
Interview conducted by author with Rouba Dabbagh community development manager on 20
December 2005 in CDR’s offices
25




A communal maternity centre
Solid waste management project
The municipal centre for agriculture and artisan trade
The municipal centre for education and culture
The purpose of the bridge was to reduce the time, distance and transportation cost
between two river banks in the area and thereby increase investment opportunity in
agriculture on the other side of the village (previously not connected to the bridge).
The cost of the bridge was estimated at 39,000 EUR of which the ESFD contributed
30,000 and the municipality of Mishmish 9,000 EUR. There was a public request for
bids from the municipality of Mishmish where a local contractor won the bid. The
project was completed at the end of the year 2004. Municipalities in Lebanon are
considered as an administratively decentralized unit; they are elected directly by their
constituencies and have a president and a council. The degree of accountability within
a municipality in Lebanon invariably depends on how active the community is in the
municipality in question. In addition to being accountable to the community which
elects them, municipalities are accountable to the Ministry of Interior and Municipal
Affairs, Civil Service Board, Court of Audit, etc46 However, many municipalities in
Lebanon are active and involve their community in consultation and decision making
in different forms of participation, such as elections, objections and open public
meetings..
The ESFD continues to establish its mission through such projects funded by the
European Union. The upside of this is that even though ESFD is part of the public
CDR, it is in fact subject to EU funding requirements. As such ESFD is subject to
both administrative and financial auditing as well as to supervision of the European
Union’s court of audit. Auditors show up at ESFD unannounced for audits and
checkups. Such auditing of the ESFD and municipality partners challenges norms of
corruption at the grass root levels and “contributes to municipalities getting used to
audits, contracts and development work. When they sign a contract they are getting
used to the idea of audit as well as gaining more experience and the ESFD helps
municipalities in addition to supervision. True, the ESFD provides grants, but it’s not
without obligations”47. According to Mr. Handal Hussein, the bridge contributed to
considerably decreasing transport cost as well as to linking the village together: “it
was a very positive experience. The idea was that of the village residents and the
municipal council, we contributed 20% of the cost and they contributed 80%”48 .
This case study shows that adopting a participatory approach in development
processes proves to be more effective and sustainable in the long-run as well as being
more transparent and accountable to the people. It is possible to extract from this case
study that donor funded reconstruction projects may be deemed successful when
proper audits and controls are exercised by the donor. The partnership of the ESFD
unit with the municipal council also contributed to increasing transparency and to
challenging the concepts of corruption at the local level, so that it is no longer a built46
For more on fiscal decentralization, governing bodies and an analysis of benefits of fiscal
decentralization in lebanon see Atallah, Sami “How well is Lebanon fiscally decentralized? Paper
presented and published in Mediterranean Development Forum , MDF4.
http://www.worldbank.org/mdf/mdf4/papers/atallah.pdf
47
Interview with Dima Sader, social development officer, ESFD October 12, 2006 in CDR’s offices.
48
Interview with Mr. Handal Hussein head of mishmash municipal council on October 12, 2006.
26
in norm. Moreover the case study may be considered as a success model where a unit
within a public institution functions in partnership with local constituencies without
enjoying the autonomy or the privileges of the larger institution.
The collective case studies have portrayed the intertwined nature of politics and
sectarianism with reconstruction projects. They have also shed light on the practices
prevailing in the post war reconstruction plans in Lebanon.
One of the
recommendations that can ensue from analysing the cases is that donor funds would
be better channelled through NGO’s working at the community level, municipalities,
public-private partnerships or through small-scale governmental programs working at
the local level (similar to the ESFD unit). Furthermore, caution should be exercised as
to the need to address the exact ways by which local ownership and participation can
promote integrity and limit corruption practices in specific projects to that end. It is
also advised that donors set proper mechanisms of control.
It is also crucial for post-war reconstruction plans to be implemented after a
meticulous understanding of the country in question as well as an intricate
understanding of the networks and personal interests at play that would contribute to
country specific programs. Post war reconstruction plans must also take into
consideration the specific local practices, and the population’s needs when addressing
post war reconstruction. Projects that are processed through the central state agencies
tend to undergo a drawn-out bureaucratic process and be subject to favouritism in
implementation. The sectarian based status quo of post war reconstruction is a deeply
rooted phenomenon at all levels in the country; public agencies which requires
thorough research in order to surpass it in the long run and move forward in
reconstruction and development plans.
The discourse of who gets what and why based on informal networks with
government and ties to prominent politicians also needs to be addressed. The
prevalence of feudal links and informal networks is another practice that requires
challenging; raising people’s awareness that these practices are not the norm is an
essential requirement to move forward in reconstruction and development plans.
Political accountability should be further enforced in Lebanon on all levels. The
country can also benefit from better voter political awareness since it is through votes
that politicians are able to further root their patron-feudal- client exploitation.
Exchange of information between governmental agencies requires enhancing and
strategic planning remains futile as long as every new government ministerial plan is
initiated from scratch.
In the first two cases politics superseded accountability, and self-serving interests the
public good. The cases have also shown that speed, expediency and self interest have
been preferred over transparency and accountability. How and why can a different
way of implementing reconstruction projects work? As it stands in Lebanon, many
reconstruction projects have failed; to suggest a single, infallible solution seems futile.
One can, however, initiate a change that would ultimately lead to challenging the way
things are done. While partnerships in planning and development take more time in
implementation, they still provide people with more incentive for success. The active
participation of civil society in the form of municipalities, NGO’s or concerned
groups would enhance participation and ownership of projects. Such participation
and ownership would then enhance transparency and accountability because when
27
people have stakes in the outcome, they will question projects and the way things are
done.
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