Protecting Indigenous Rights, implementing Canada’s Wild
Salmon Policy, and rebuilding wild sockeye in Babine Lake,
British Columbia
Lake Babine Nation's Submission to DFO for consideration in the
preparation of the 2014 Integrated Fisheries Management Plan
(IFMP)
Prepared by:
B. Johannes Edinger M.A., Spencer Britten M.A., Andrew Rosenberger B.Sc.,
Michael H.H. Price M.Sc., RP.Bio, Greg Taylor, M.R.M. and
Donna Macintyre, Fisheries Manager for Lake Babine Nation
February 22, 2014
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Abstract
Babine River sockeye salmon have experienced a long-term decline from an
estimated annual historical (1890-1910) abundance of greater than one
million to a contemporary (2007-2010) average annual abundance of
173,520; the 2013 escapement was less than 35,000. This appears to be
attributable to a combination of harvest pressure in the early period and a
long-term reduction in productivity that began in the 1970's soon after the
Babine Lake Enhancement Project commenced operations.
Babine River sockeye are vulnerable to high fishing pressure since their runtiming is similar to that of sockeye produced by spawning channels in Babine
Lake. Due to their run-timing, Alaskan exploitation rates in are consistently
higher on Babine River sockeye than the Skeena sockeye aggregate.
Canadian weekly commercial mixed-stock exploitation rate impacts on
Babine River sockeye can also be higher than on the aggregate. Cumulative
exploitation rates on Babine River sockeye are generally higher that total
exploitation rates on the Skeena aggregate.
The forecast return for Babine River sockeye in 2014 is expected to be
165,239 with a 95% prediction range of 56,057 to 663,774. Given predicted
Alaskan and First Nation harvest of Babine River sockeye in 2014 of 22,942
and 12,228, respectively, the estimated escapement, before a commercial
mixed stock fishery, of Babine River sockeye is expected to be 130,069;
which is below the Wild Salmon Policy lower benchmark for Babine River of
140,260.
Lake Babine Nation’s (LBN) proven and asserted Section 35 Treaty and
Aboriginal Rights provide LBN priority access to sockeye for food and trade.
Current management practices infringe on current and future access to food.
DFO currently allocates priority access to other commercial and recreational
users, and has denied LBN the Right to catch and sell fish at their traditional
fishing site (present day location of the Babine Fence), for more than a
century.
Lake Babine Nation believes that no Canadian mixed-stock commercial
harvest should be allowed on Babine River sockeye in 2014. Any such
harvest would be an infringement on LBN's Section 35 Treaty and Aboriginal
Rights. It is also contrary to Canada’s Wild Salmon Policy.
If DFO allows directed Canadian commercial mixed-stock fisheries, measures
are required to limit impacts on Babine River sockeye until they are rebuilt.
These should reflect performance measure precedents set out in
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management plans for endangered Fraser River sockeye CUs, Interior Fraser
coho, and Skeena River chums
Deep and meaningful consultation with LBN can only begin once the draft
Integrated Fisheries Management Plan has been released and DFO has
considered stakeholder input. It is only at this point that LBN can evaluate
the nature of the infringement on their Rights and Title.
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Report
Description of Babine River sockeye
Babine Lake has four sockeye stock groupings: three wild and one enhanced. The
three wild stock groups are early-timing, middle-timing, and late-timing. The latetiming group consists primarily of Babine River sockeye. Babine River sockeye were
once the predominant sockeye population in the Skeena watershed, supporting LBN
Section 35 fisheries, Canadian marine commercial mixed-stock fisheries, and FSC
fisheries. Abundance declined as the mixed-stock commercial fishery continued
through the 1950's. With the introduction of the Babine Lake Enhancement Project
in the late 1960s, harvest focus switched to enhanced stocks and along with a
concurrent decline in productivity, Babine River sockeye entered a relatively rapid
period of further decline (Appendix Figure 2). Babine River sockeye escapements in
the early 1900s often exceeded one million. The 2013 escapement was just over
30,000.
2014 Forecast of Babine River total abundance and abundance
before mixed-stock commercial harvests
Calculation of total abundance
Lake Babine Nation's Salmon Technical Team (LBNSTT) has revised its forecast of
Babine River sockeye after discussions with DFO in the February 12, 2014 LBN-DFO
Consultation meeting. LBNSTT has provided forecasts for Babine River sockeye
using two different methodologies: i) a five-year average return model whose point
estimate is derived from the median of a distribution of possible returns
parameterized by the average of the log abundance of the past five years for which
we have data, and the standard deviation of the log abundance of the past 5 years
for which we have data and, ii) a sibling model similar to DFO's sibling approach.
This second approach follows Cox-Rogers’ (2003) methodology used to generate
DFO’s projection for the Skeena sockeye aggregate. The models provide the
following point-estimates for the total return of sockeye to Babine River in 2014:
Five-year average model (2006-2010) - 181,304
Sibling model ‒ 165,239
The average of the approaches is 173,272. However, the LBNSTT believes the very
poor 2009 brood year, along with a large return of jacks in 2013, justifies the use
of the sibling model forecast as it will include the potential of higher productivity in
the 4-year-old return, and expected poor return from 2009 brood year. Hence, the
LBNSTT has recommended to LBN that the sibling model forecast be used, and the
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return to Babine River is expected to be 165,239 with 95% prediction interval of
56,057 to 663,774. This forecast was constructed using the method outlined in the
“Pre-season 2003 Stock Size Forecasts for Skeena River and Nass River Sockeye
Salmon”(Cox-Rogers 2003), with one additional assumption: that the age
composition of Babine River sockeye was similar to the age composition of the
Skeena aggregate in 2013.
Calculation of Alaskan and FSC harvests
Babine River sockeye are subject to Alaskan and FSC harvests. These harvests
need to be deducted from the projection of total abundance to estimate the
potential spawning escapement before Canadian commercial mixed stock harvests.
The LBNSTT estimates that Alaska will harvest 22,942 Babine River sockeye, or just
under 14% of the total return, based on the 2000-2010 average Alaskan
exploitation rates on Babine River sockeye (English 2013). DFO expressed some
concern over these exploitation rates in the February 12 consultation meeting with
LBN, despite the fact that these estimates are from three years of work DFO
engaged in with the Pacific Salmon Foundation. Furthermore, these exploitation
rates are based on the same run-reconstruction format and modeling that DFO has
supported within the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC) process for the last several
years. DFO did not offer an alternative in the February 12 consultation meeting, but
did agree that Alaskan exploitation rates on Babine River sockeye would be higher
than the Skeena average because Babine River sockeye have a later run-timing
than the Skeena aggregate. The difference in opinion may amount to around 2%.
FSC Exploitation rates on Babine River sockeye were estimated using a relationship
of FSC harvests and the total return of Babine River sockeye from 1982-2009. The
relationship estimates a 7.4% exploitation rate for the projected 2014 aggregate
return of Babine River sockeye. This would produce an estimated harvest of 12,228
Babine River sockeye.
Calculation of abundance before Canadian mixed stock commercial
harvests
The abundance of Babine River sockeye before mixed-stock commercial fishing is
estimated as follows:
2014 Forecast of Total Abundance:
165,239
Estimated Alaskan harvest:
22,942
Estimated FSC harvest:
12,228
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Estimated abundance before mixed-stock harvests:
130,069
DFO stated at the February 12 Consultation meeting that it accepted the
Wild Salmon Policy (WSP) lower benchmark proposed in Korman (2013) of
140,260. The expected abundance of Babine River sockeye before any
Canadian mixed-stock commercial harvest is therefore projected to be
below its lower WSP benchmark (in the red zone).
Figure 1: Assumes Canadian mixed-stock commercial fishery based on the 2009 harvest
schedule for the projected aggregate 2014 return of sockeye.
LBN Position
The Lake Babine Nation believes that no Canadian mixed-stock commercial harvest
should be allowed on Babine River sockeye in 2014. Alaskan and FSC harvests are
expected to drive the population into the WSP Red Zone. Any Canadian mixed-stock
commercial harvest would be an infringement on LBN's Treaty and Section 35
Aboriginal Rights including both commercial and FSC components.
DFO argued at the February 12th consultation meeting that it has attempted to
balance commercial mixed-stock interests and LBN Rights by not maximizing the
harvest of enhanced sockeye in mixed-stock fisheries. The results do not speak well
of the attempted balance. All Babine wild populations are depressed relative to their
status prior to the 1970’s, and Babine River sockeye has fallen below its WSP lower
benchmark. This has endangered LBN’s current and future access to food. LBN was
the only Nation on the Skeena that was prevented from harvesting sockeye for food
at its preferred location in 2013. A major reason is that in over-harvesting Babine
wild sockeye populations, DFO has created a situation where if the enhanced
populations fail, as they did in 2013, there are no alternative sources of food for
LBN. Further, since the enhanced populations exist at the pleasure of the Minister
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and DFO’s budget priorities, enhancement could be curtailed or eliminated in the
future. DFO has already reduced some production at the enhancement facilities to
reduce costs.
LBN have a commercial right to trade in sockeye as established in the Barricade
Treaty with Canada and its Section 35 Aboriginal Rights. By limiting the abundance
of sockeye in Babine Lake, allowing populations such as Babine River sockeye to fall
well below their upper WSP benchmark, and giving priority to all other users, DFO
is infringing on these proven and asserted Rights.
Furthermore, any directed Canadian commercial mixed-stock harvest fails to
honour DFO's own Wild Salmon Policy, which states:
"The presence of a CU in the Red Zone will initiate an immediate
consideration of ways to protect the fish, increase their abundance, and
reduce the potential risk of loss. Biological considerations will be the primary
drivers for the management of CUs in the Red Zone." WSP, p. 17
It also fails to comply with Canada’s “Fishery Decision-Making Framework
Incorporating the Precautionary Approach” that states that when a stock is in the
critical zone, “biological considerations will prevail”.
Why Babine River sockeye are vulnerable
Babine River sockeye are especially vulnerable to harvest impacts because:
1. The peak timing of the Babine River sockeye return is approximately one
week later than the peak of the enhanced return. The later timing of Babine
River sockeye makes them vulnerable to higher Alaskan impacts than the
Skeena aggregate. Additionally, because DFO has been concerned about
early timed Skeena wild populations, it has concentrated Canadian mixedstock commercial fishing into the last half of July, which effectively
concentrates the impacts within the time-frame when Babine River sockeye
are prevalent (Appendix Figure 3).
2. LBNSTT provided DFO information at the recent Consultation meetings
describing the inaccuracy of DFO's assumption that Babine River sockeye
abundance is directly correlated with the aggregate Skeena sockeye return.
In fact, large Skeena aggregate sockeye returns do not necessarily suggest
larger returns of Babine River sockeye (which is a primary assumption used
in Skeena sockeye management). Therefore, the assumption by DFO that
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Babine River sockeye are protected from the higher exploitation rates
associated with a larger aggregate return is flawed.
3. DFO acknowledged at the recent Consultation meetings that its 2009 harvest
schedule overfishes wild Babine sockeye CUs relative to the aggregate WSP
upper benchmarks at low to average aggregate Skeena sockeye returns. This
is of particular concern because most recent aggregate Skeena sockeye
returns have fallen within this range. Babine River sockeye are particularly
vulnerable due to its later run-timing and relatively higher Alaskan (Appendix
Figure 4) and Canadian commercial mixed stock exploitation rates (Appendix
Figure 5). It is likely that Babine River sockeye have suffered higher
exploitation rates than the Skeena aggregate, and have been over-harvested
relative to its WSP benchmarks, as described by Korman and English (2013,
p. vii).
4. Babine River sockeye run-timing is variable. Variable run-timing with a lack
of in-season abundance knowledge specific to Babine River sockeye leads to
uncertainty in the level of impacts in specific weeks. If on any given year,
Babine River run-timing is predominantly within the weeks of higher fishing
pressure, impacts to Babine River sockeye will be disproportionately large.
For example, in order to produce an exploitation rate of 20% on the
aggregate, which returns over many weeks, harvest rates in the few weeks
where mixed-stock fishing is allowed must be higher. If Babine River sockeye
are concentrated into those weeks as they have been frequently between
2000 and 2010 (Cox-Rogers 2012B), then they would experience higher
exploitation rates than the aggregate. By the same measure, if Babine River
sockeye return late, they may miss some of the high pressure fishing weeks.
5. There is evidence that productivity for Babine River sockeye has declined
recently (Britten, 2013). This would indicate that more spawners are needed
on the spawning grounds.
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Figure 2: Standardized stock-recruit residuals from the stock-recruitment model for
Babine River sockeye with productivity regimes indicated by the dashed line.
Protection of Babine River Sockeye in the 2014 IFMP
LBN told DFO at the February 12 Consultation meeting that any Canadian mixedstock commercial fishing in 2014 would be an unjustified infringement on LBN's
Section 35 Treaty and Aboriginal Rights. DFO commented that while they recognize
that there is a conservation concern for Babine River sockeye; they had to balance
this against the interests of stakeholders. DFO requested that LBN provide specific
written input in regards to two issues DFO is considering in the preparation of the
2014 IFMP:
1. Providing some protection for Babine River sockeye in the context of the harvest
schedule being developed for the 2014 IFMP.
2. Increasing commercial mixed-stock harvest rates in years with larger aggregate
returns of Skeena sockeye.
LBN proposal to limit impacts on Babine River sockeye
DFO told LBN that they intend to maintain the portion of the 2009 harvest schedule
on average and below average returns. DFO imposed the 2009 harvest schedule to
protect wild Skeena sockeye CUs based on advice provided by the 2008
Independent Science Review Panel.
However, the 2009 harvest schedule fails to achieve the same level of protection for
Babine River sockeye because it has a later run-timing than either the Skeena
aggregate or most other Skeena sockeye CUs. Therefore, while the current harvest
schedule estimates a 38.7% (Alaskan, FSC, and Canadian commercial mixed-stock)
exploitation rate for the Skeena aggregate based on the projected total return of
Skeena sockeye of 2.2 million, the expected total exploitation rate on Babine River
sockeye would be 39%, assuming that there is no Canadian commercial mixed
stock fishing in Week 8-1 (first week of August), that the Alaskan exploitation rate
is 13.9% (it ranges from 10% to 25%), and the run-timing for Babine River
sockeye does not peak during the last half of July.
LBN, as stated earlier, believes any Canadian mixed-stock commercial fishery in
2014 is an unjustified infringement of their Section 35 Rights and contrary to DFO's
WSP. However, if DFO chooses to overfish Babine River sockeye relative to its WSP
benchmarks; the 2014 Canadian commercial mixed-stock management plan must
mitigate the impacts on Babine River sockeye and LBN’s Section 35 Rights.
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Mitigation would explicitly recognize the vulnerabilities described above. This
requires:
1. Recognition that cumulative harvest impacts (Alaskan, FSC, and Canadian
commercial mixed-stock) can be greater on Babine River sockeye than they
are on the aggregate Skeena sockeye return. This can occur if:
(a) Alaskan exploitation rates are at the higher end of the 2000 -2010
range
(b) The peak of Babine River run-timing overlaps the last half of July as
it has done several times in the 2000 - 2010 period
(c) DFO fails to constrain Canadian commercial mixed-stock fishing in
week 7-5 (last week in July)
(d) DFO allows any Canadian commercial mixed-stock fishing in week
8-1 (first week in August)
2. Recognition that Babine River sockeye are not directly correlated with the
size of the Skeena aggregate return. A greater aggregate return does not
guarantee a larger than average Babine River return.
3. Recognition that the 2009 harvest schedule does not protect Babine River, or
many other later timing Skeena sockeye CUs, in years of below average
aggregate returns.
4. Recognition that by DFO focusing more on harvesting enhanced sockeye in
marine areas, rather than protecting and rebuilding wild Skeena CU’s, DFO is
ignoring the importance of maintaining a well-balanced “portfolio” of
populations as described in “Population diversity and the portfolio effect in an
exploited species”, Schindler, Hilborne et al, 2010. The loss of a portfolio of
abundant wild populations in Babine Lake threatens LBN’s Section 25 Treaty
and Aboriginal Rights.
LBN urges DFO to limit the potential impacts of its proposed 2014 fishing plan on
Babine River sockeye by following DFO precedent for protecting less abundant,
depressed, or not as productive CUs within an aggregate. There are several
examples where DFO requires exploitation or harvest rate limits on an aggregate
population to protect weak component CUs or populations, some examples are:
Early Summer Fraser sockeye
10% low abundance exploitation rate
Cultus Lake sockeye
20-30% exploitation rate
Interior Fraser coho (PSC)
20% exploitation rate (3% Canada)
Skeena River chums
10% harvest rate
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LBN proposal for a revised exploitation schedule for Skeena sockeye
that protects and rebuilds Babine River sockeye
DFO is considering increasing Canadian commercial mixed-stock exploitation rates
in years of larger aggregate returns. DFO has not yet identified what constitutes a
larger aggregate return, what the allowable Canadian commercial exploitation rate
might be, and how it would protect component CUs that cannot withstand the same
level of exploitation. LBN, as above, believes that the current harvest regime
unjustifiably infringes on their Section 35 Treaty and Aboriginal Rights. The
proposed change would only compound the situation.
The following table describes DFO’s assumptions underlying the proposed change,
assesses their validity, and provides reasons for the assessment.
Table 1: Addressing assumptions underlying DFO’s proposed harvest schedule change for
2014.
Assumption
Validity
Reasons
The abundance of component
CUs – including Babine River
sockeye – directly correlate with
aggregate abundance.
False
LBNSTT provided evidence to the contrary at the
February 12th Consultation meeting.
The current harvest schedule
protects component CUs at
lower abundances.
False
DFO stated, and provided evidence, at the February
12th Consultation meeting that wild CUs are
overexploited relative to their upper WSP benchmark
at aggregate returns between 1 and 2.4 million. The
situation is particularly acute for Babine River
sockeye due to its later run-timing. The problem
here, of course, is that if wild CUs are not protected
at lower aggregate returns, and subject to higher
ERs at larger aggregate returns, they are unlikely
ever to rebuild.
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DFO asserts that the proportion
of years with larger aggregate
returns will be relatively small;
therefore any negative impacts
will be transitory.
?
That any sockeye the Canadian
commercial marine mixed-stock
fishery is prevented from
harvesting due to conservation
concerns is “foregone”.
False
This assumption is an unknown. Just as there have
been several years of relatively poor aggregate
returns, there could be a future period with a
number of relatively strong aggregate returns.
Sockeye can be harvested in selective terminal
fisheries. All the sockeye caught in terminal fisheries
flows to BC processors. LBN operated the second
largest sockeye fishery in BC in 2011 and 2012.
LBNSTT presented a model (Appendix Figure 1) to DFO at the February 12th
Consultation meetings that assessed DFO’s current 2009 harvest schedule and
several harvest options DFO, and other stakeholders, have proposed for 2014.
(DFO failed to present what it calls its Very Simple Trade-off Model (VSTM) at the
Consultation meetings on February 12th, but LBN was able to obtain a copy from
someone who attended a DFO stakeholder meeting. DFO acknowledged the
existence, and their use, of the model).
LBNSTT assessed DFO’s 2009 harvest schedule , along with the other options that
DFO acknowledged are being considered, against the following performance metric:
whether Babine River sockeye would meet its Smsy (spawners necessary to
produce its maximum sustained yield) 80% of the time.
LBNSTT then employed the model to produce a harvest schedule that would meet
the above performance measure. The graphics (Figures 3 and 4) below describe the
results. The options further to the right and with the narrowest and highest
distribution in Figure 3 produce the best results relative to this performance
measure.
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Proposed by marine
interests
Alternative
options
LBNSTT
Worse
Better
Figure 3: Distributions of proportions of time in which escapement for Babine River sockeye
in each simulation trial was at or above Smsy. The area underneath a given curve between
two points on the abscissa represents the percentage of simulation trials (Ricker model
parameter draws) in which the percentage of simulated escapements for Babine River
sockeye that were above Smsy were between those two values. Thus distributions farther to
the right represent a higher expectation of achieving escapements above Smsy more often,
and narrower, more peaked distributions represent higher certainty that the proportion of
Babine River sockeye escapements will fall in a given range. Policies with distributions
farther to the right and more concentrated are thus preferred. The "VSTM", "Historical", and
"Walters" policies are from DFO's "Very Simple Trade-off Model". "Current IFMP" refers to
the current 2009 DFO harvest schedule.
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Figure 4: Policies assessed under the simulation model. Each policy assigns an aggregate
Canadian mixed-stock exploitation rate based on the aggregate run size. The "VSTM",
"Historical", and "Walters" policies are from DFO's "Very Simple Trade-off Model". "Current
IFMP" refers to the current 2009 DFO harvest schedule.
Conclusion on submission regarding management of Babine River
sockeye
Babine River sockeye are projected to be below their lower WSP benchmark before
any Canadian mixed-stock commercial fisheries are permitted. LBN believes that
any commercial mixed-stock fishing on this population in 2014 would be an
unjustified infringement on their Section 35 Treaty and Aboriginal Rights. DFO
should follow the precedent it has set in other BC salmon fisheries and set in place
targets specifying allowable impacts on component populations.
It is premature for DFO to consider changing the current 2009 harvest schedule.
LBN believes that the current harvest schedule already infringes on its Section 35
Rights. Increasing harvest rates in a revised harvest schedule would further infringe
on its Rights. Also, it would not honour the Crown’s obligation for meaningful
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consultation and accommodation before making any change which could impact
LBN’s proven and asserted Section 35 Treaty and Aboriginal Rights.
DFO is obligated by the Wild Salmon Policy and Industry’s Marine Stewardship
Council Certification of BC sockeye (2013 MSC Surveillance Audit) to provide
recovery plans for CUs that are in the red or critical zone. It would be inappropriate
for DFO to consider increasing exploitation rates prior to Recovery Plans being
completed.
Finally, DFO has failed to recognize the importance of a portfolio of abundant wild
sockeye stocks in Babine Lake to the Lake Babine Nation and its Section 35 Treaty
and Aboriginal Rights. Protecting and rebuilding all the wild sockeye populations is
of the highest priority to LBN.
Next steps in consultations
LBN stated in the February 12th consultations with DFO that the current submission
is part of the exchange of information expected between the Crown and a First
Nation, and is the starting point of a Consultation process. Meaningful
consultations, and discussions of any potential mitigation or accommodation,
cannot begin until DFO makes the Draft IFMP available to LBN. Not until the draft
IFMP is released will LBN be able to ascertain to what extent its Rights may have
been infringed.
Recommendations related to LBN s commercial fisheries
LBN asserts that it has Section 35 Treaty and Aboriginal commercial fishing Rights.
These Rights are being infringed upon by DFO restricting LBN’s access to
commercial fish at the Babine Fence, where it has harvested fish for sale for
generations. DFO claims that this is to protect Babine River sockeye.
Such a claim would be defensible if DFO did not allow other interests to harvest and
sell Babine River sockeye. While DFO allocates 100% of the Babine River
commercial exploitation rates to others in a marine mixed-stock fishery targeting
the abundant enhanced sockeye; they refuse to allow LBN to harvest either Babine
River or enhanced sockeye at their traditional fishing site at the Babine Fence.
DFO must manage the Skeena commercial fishery to provide LBN with
sufficient access to wild Babine sockeye, and to allow the Nation to harvest
enhanced sockeye at the Babine Fence.
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Similarly, LBN demands DFO allocate an equitable portion of the commercially
available aggregate sockeye return to LBN for its commercial harvest. Although LBN
may have access to ESSR (Excess Salmon for Spawning Requirements)
opportunities in some years; ESSR harvests are what (sometimes) remain after all
other users are granted access. ESSR opportunities are limited by:
1)
2)
3)
4)
DFO’s stated priority for commercial and recreational users.
ESSR's not being a defined share of the allowable commercial harvest
Harvest uncertainty in downstream commercial mixed stock fisheries
Absence of a commercial fishing plan in LBN territory that would provide inseason assessments and identify harvest opportunities
Due to the above reasons, DFO often does not allow LBN commercial access to the
sockeye produced in LBN territory. Even when DFO does declare an ESSR, it often
delays the opportunity until a significant proportion of the potential catch is
unmarketable.
DFO must manage Skeena sockeye in 2014 so that LBN is allocated an
equitable defined share of the aggregate sockeye return for commercial
purposes.
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Appendix
19
Appendix Figure 1: Flow chart diagram of simulation model implemented by Big
River Analytics.
20
Appendix Figure 2: All dark colours represent the annual escapement of Babine
River sockeye since 1961. Light colours are Alaskan, FSC, and Canadian commercial
catch. The different colours (green, yellow, red) represent the escapement of
Babine River sockeye relative to their Wild Salmon Policy Benchmarks: the blue
horizontal line is the WSP upper benchmark; the red horizontal line is the WSP
lower benchmark. Babine River escapement has been in the WSP red or critical
zone 9 out of 11 years since 2002. The bar on the far right composed of yellow,
red, and purple is the 2014 escapement forecast for Babine River sockeye. The
yellow component represents abundance, the red component represents AK and
FSC harvests. The purple component represents expected escapement if there is a
Canadian mixed stock fishery based on an aggregate return of 2.25 million sockeye,
and an aggregate 21% Canadian mixed stock ER implying an 18% Canadian mixed
stock ER on Babine River.
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Appendix Figure 3: This figure describes why Babine River sockeye are harvested
at higher rates in Canadian commercial mixed-stock (coastal) fisheries than other
Skeena sockeye CUs. Green is the run-timing for Babine River sockeye. Blue is the
run-timing for enhanced Babine (Pinkut/Fulton) sockeye. Red is the overlap
between Babine River sockeye and enhanced sockeye. The black polygon
represents harvest pressure from the Canadian coastal fishery. It covers the peak
of the Babine River sockeye run-timing. Any increase in the Canadian coastal
fishery will necessarily impact Babine River sockeye.
22
Appendix Figure 4: Babine River (BR) sockeye are fished at higher rates in Alaska
(AK) than other Skeena sockeye populations because of their later run-timing. The
top of the dark bars show the Alaskan exploitation rate on the Skeena aggregate.
The top of the light bars show the Alaskan exploitation rates on Babine River
sockeye. The blue line is the average Alaskan exploitation rate on Babine River
sockeye; the red line is the average Alaskan exploitation rate on the Skeena
sockeye aggregate. Babine River data are from English (2013), while the
aggregate data are from Cox-Rogers (2012A).
23
Appendix Figure 5: Alaskan and total exploitation rates on Skeena sockeye during
1970-2010. The blue line in all three graphs is Babine River sockeye. In most years
in Alaska Babine River sockeye have been harvested at higher rates than enhanced
sockeye. One reason for this is that Babine River sockeye return one week later
than do most other Skeena sockeye CUs. Both Alaskan and Canadian commercial
fisheries have been more intense later in July and early August. ata for these
graphs come from two sources: aggregate data are from Cox-Rogers (2012A), and
CU level data are from English (2013). Canadian mixed stock fishery data is not
comparable between these two sources so the comparison is omitted.
24