SECURITY COUNCIL RESEARCH REPORT—QUESTION OF RUSSIAN
INVOLVEMENT IN UKRAINE
I. Introduction of Topic:
In early 2014, Russian President Vladamir Putin challenged the basis of
modern day international law by annexing Crimea, a territory of a fellow
sovereign state, Ukraine.
Russia’s respect of Ukraine as an autonomous and independent nation has
always been a contentious issue.
The two were both united under the USSR, with the Soviet Union’s fall,
Ukraine was still considered a Russian satellite until 1991. In fact, Ukraine traded
their nuclear weaponry for a Russian guarantee to withhold invasion, basically an
additional measure to ensure that Ukraine was respected as an independent nation.
Despite the modern precautions taken to create the independent Ukrainian
state, it still remains very closely linked to Russia (by choice or not), due to the
similarities in the two country’s cultures, histories, and thus interlinked economic
development.
The question of Russian involvement in Ukraine does not just encompass
the two nations involved; it really is representative of themes that challenge the
basis of international law, from equality, power division, respect, and enforcement.
Putin could possibly set a precedent to hold (or rather, disregard) international law
for generations to come.
II. Background:
The tensions between Russia and the Ukraine hail from the collapse of the
Soviet Union, where both were members of the USSR. In the state-hood division,
Ukraine became it’s own sovereign nation. Although now a separate entity, many
Ukrainians held roots in Russia. Therefore, despite the border-based division, the
loyalties of many Eastern Ukrainians often remained- and still remain- partial to
Russia.
The tensions accelerated when Ukraine was given jurisdiction over Crimea.
Crimea had been the home of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet since 1783. In particular,
the strategic placement of the peninsula allowed Russia to protect her security
interests in the region.
Despite this uneasy air, Ukraine and the Russian Federation continued to work
somewhat peacefully. Many Russaphones welcomed closer relations with Russia,
as many ethnic and national identities of sections of Eastern Ukraine remained
Russian; today, Crimea still has a 60% Russian population. Militarily, Crimea
continued to house the Black Sea Fleet. Economically, Russia supplied Ukraine
with the majority of its oil and gas, continuing contracts that utilized pipelines
from Soviet days.
In more modern times, economic interests, particularly oil, have been both
sharp weapons, used to box Ukraine into Russian policies, or served as signs of
renewed friendship and respect. For example, as a show of friendship in 2003,
Russia cut Ukraine’s natural gas prices by 33%. However, when Russia felt that
Ukraine was betraying them by supplying Georgia with weapons in the 2008
Russo-Georgian war, Russia simply cut the gas supply.
While building relations with Russia, Ukraine also built alliances with the
West, particularly the European Union. As a natural neighbor of the EU, Ukraine
was included in the European Union’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),
whereby the EU maintains alliances with it’s bordering countries. This partnership
was made official in 2005.
However, with the public acceptance of the ENP, Ukraine started moving
towards deeper economic and political integration with the EU, with Ukraine even
being considered for possible EU membership. Ukraine, acting as a sovereign
body, started acting even more independently, and in the case of the
aforementioned Russo-Georgina war, in an anti-Russian way.
Ukraine is not only a contentious area for Russia due to their long-standing
history, but also for its implications as a sphere of influence. Ukraine’s friendship
with the West is looked upon as an anti-Russian move: for the Federation, a threat
to their status as a superpower.
These tensions escalated violently in recent years. In 2010, Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovich, who heavily promoted EU- Ukraine integration,
passed several policies furthering EU partnerships that created massive protests.
Eventually, these protests caused the downfall of his regime in February 2014. The
2014 Ukrainian revolution left the country so vulnerable that it plunged Ukraine
into the 2014 Crimean crisis, for the Putin took advantage of the situation and
annexed Crimea.
The situation not only threatened theoretical International law, but directly
affected the global political sphere when the recent M-17 Malaysian Airline flight,
flying from Holland, was shot down over Crimea by pro-Russian rebels, who were
allegedly funded by Putin.
On one hand, Putin does (correctly) argue that large parts of Ukraine feel or
want to be Russian, whether it is for economic or ethnicity based reasons. This
sentiment is heavily supported, statistically, by Western Ukraine. However, others
feel that this is a huge infringement on Ukrainian sovereignty and international
law, especially those of Eastern Ukraine.
III. Relevant International Agreements, Conventions, Organizations and
Resolutions:
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1994: The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurance was signed by
Ukraine, the United States, Britain, and Russia, to protect Ukraine’s
territory and sovereignty after it’s soviet nuclear weapons were removed.
This was a diplomatic document, though, not a formal treaty, with moral
obligations as opposed to concrete enforcement measures.
December 17th, 2003: Russia lends Ukraine $15 billion dollars of financial
aid and a 33% discount on natural gas prices
2005: Ukraine and EU sign the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy)
2009: Russia cuts the natural gas lines of Ukraine
2013: According to the March RATING, 50% of Ukraine voted for EU
membership
2014: Putin annexes Crimea for the Russian Federation
2014: The M-17 plane is shot down while flying over Crimea
2014: Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement
IV. Main Issues
Russian Intentions:
First and foremost, the basic Russian intentions in being involved in Crimea
must be analyzed. Parts of Crimea are very strong in their support for Russia, with
several non-Ukrainian state acting groups being formed simply to reiterate this
view, such as Donetsk. One could argue that Putin is simply intervening to support
Eastern Ukrainian self-determination. Furthermore, it can be looked at from a
more historical point of view, in that Russians look at the situation as aiding
peoples who they were always united with- culturally, ethnically, and now
nationally.
However, one cannot forget the nearly half-century game of spheres of
influence between the West and Russia. Ukraine could just be another pawn in this
eternal power game. Currently, Russia holds Ukraine by the strings economically,
especially through it’s gas/ oil dependency. With the incoming winter, Russia
gains even more power over Ukraine. Its ruthless use of this power tool
demonstrates perhaps the more clinical and power-oriented aspects of Russian
intentions.
Manipulation of Economic Interests:
Russia’s greatest tool is currently it’s economic contracts with Ukraine.
Controlling its oil and gas supply, Ukraine is heavily dependant on the Russian
state. Should Russia turn off the supply, Ukraine does not currently have another
alternative to turn to. Furthermore, Ukraine has been receiving this oil at a
subsidized rate for years; to switch back to a higher price in the current global
economy could have catastrophic implications, domestically, for Ukraine.
Furthermore, the same pipeline provides oil and gas to other nations, like
Germany, who are thus cut off from their supply due to Russo-Ukrainian tensions.
It should also be taken into consideration that with winter coming, this issue is
extremely time-sensitive.
Legitimacy of International Law:
Obviously, Russia is breaching any respect for independent sovereignty of the
Ukrainian state. One could perhaps link it to the breaches on Manchuria and
Abyssinia by Japan and Italy during the reign of the League of Nations- the
historical starting points for that international organization’s downfall, being
dubbed as a “toothless” institution.
The UN, especially the Security Council, cannot stand by and allow Russia to
get away with this. It undermines the legitimacy of the system and violates several
tenets of the charter. Yet, in the name of respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty, the UN
must be sure it respects Ukraine’s wishes. 50% of the country seemed heavily
invested in the EU integration, whereas the other half self-identifies as Russian.
The problems here may be more domestic in nature, and involving
international law may destroy the true self-determinism of these people.
Human Rights Watch:
Since the fall of the Yanukovich regime, violence has still sporadically raged
between pro and anti Kiev crowds. Many of the non-state actors, such as Luhansk,
do take extremely violent stances, being armed groups that call themselves “self-
dense units”. These groups seize and occupy administrative buildings, demanding
several things, depending on the individual actor. Everything from the creation of
an independent Ukrainian federation, to succession of various Ukrainian regions,
to a union with Russia has been asked for. However, this wrecks havoc on the
lives of innocent civilians.
The domestic violence has become international, through contributions on both
sides. Putin has armed 40,000 troops against the Ukrainian border, and allegedly
funded the separatist rebel groups that shot down the M-17 plane in July.
P5 considerations:
As a member of the Security Council, Russia is likely to block any definite
action. However, secretary-general Ban Ki Moon did specifically urge Russia to
not take any action that could “further escalate the situation”. On their part, Russia
has asked for the annexation to be accepted and for the fighting to cease in the
area.
Many nations, notably the United States, have passed major sanctions against
Russian goods and businesses. Economic measures seem to be running out
though- is force the next option? The EU in many of these economic precautions
also backs the US.
NATO:
Although Ukraine was part of possible talks with NATO prior to the Crimean
invasion, they never went through. However, NATO did say that it would back
any move to ensure Ukraine’s borders.
V. Web Sites/ Documents:
The Council on Foreign Relations, a non-partisan, non-governmental organization,
provides a clear history of the twenty-first century escalations in Russo-Ukrainian
relations, including considerations of both sides concerns:
http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/ukraine-crisis/p32540
An extensive, multi-faceted analysis that links to several studies that give provide
legal basis for support and reprimands against Russia’s actions in Ukraine:
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/ukraine-use-of-force-debate-map
A 60 second overview on the Ukrainian and Russian militaries and their relations
to the UN:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26437359
The Official United Nations Guide to the Situation in Ukraine:
http://research.un.org/en/ukraine
It is advisable, before starting any research on specific issues on the agenda, to browse
extensively the <WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs resources>, one of the best
portal with scores of valuable links: http://www2.etown.edu/vl/ and of course the main
UN portal: http://www.un.org/ as well as the invaluable UN cyber-school-bus website:
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/ . The THIMUN website, http://www.thimun.org/
also has an extensive and efficient <Research> section worth browsing. For
comprehensive
academic
documents
on
international
crisis:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/ has numerous reports in PDF format.
Procedural Reminder
Delegates are reminded that at PAMUN conference, they are not expected to arrive with fullfledged resolutions. One or two solid clauses with which to caucus and kick-off the debates is all
that is required. These clauses should arise from the <Main Issues> section in the Research
Reports, which aims at directing the attention of the delegates to the pending issues which are
in need of finding a solution, which is what the debates in the committees seek to achieve. At
PAMUN, Resolutions are expected to emerge from the clause by clause debates in the
committees.