D JDLEY KNOX NAVAL POST61 WY ^o 1001 } Dv. N/ NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS DIRECT FIRE SYNCHRONIZATION by Robert W. Lamont • September 1992 Thesis Advisor: Approved for public release; Harold distribution is J. Larson unlimited Unclassified ECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION NCLASSIFIED 1b. a. i. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. OMB RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT for public release; distribution Approved >. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION aval Postgraduate c. ADDRESS lonterey, i. is unlimited DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) a. No. 0704-0188 OFFICE SYMBOL) MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION 7b. ADDRESS OR School (City, State, 6b. 5. and ZIP Code) (City, State, and ZIP Code) CA 93943-5000 NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION :. 1. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT ELEMENT NO. ACCESSION NO 10. NO. NO. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) TITLE (Including Security Classification) HRECT FIRE SYNCHRONIZATION PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Lamont 3 TYPE OF REPORT 13b. /tester's thesis FROM 2 obert W. TIME COVERED 14. TO 1992, 15. SEPTEMBER Page Count 75 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTATION he views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position )epartment of Defense or the U.S. Government. 7. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by Synchronization, Defense in Sector, Direct Fire SUB-GROUP FIELD GROUP 6. 9. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if of the block number) necessary and identify by block number) in sector missions adapted from the National Training Center and conducted with the Janus(A) high resolution combat model to check for relationships which influence direct fire synchronization. This analysis should enhance the monitoring of unit performance in the area of concentration or massing of fires consistent with the commander's intent. The combat fighting vehicle, which combines the characteristics of mobility This thesis analyzes defense volumes of firepower, dominates the desert battlefield and is the focus of this study. Graphical methods and analytic techniques are developed to describe the battle in terms of direct fire synchronization and a mission measure of effectiveness (MOE). This research is being conducted under the U.S. Army's Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodologies (BEAM) study, which is developing objective doctrinal AirLand battle measures and visuals displays to enhance training analysis. The thesis also describes the training environment of the NTC, defense in sector doctrine for both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps with emphasis on asymmetries, and threat offensive with high doctrine. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILTIY OF (Xl UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED !2a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE Harold J. 1473, 1a. SAMEASRPT.n INDIVIDUAL Larson DD Form ABSTRACT DTIC REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified 22b. TELEPHONE (408)646-2473 JUN 86 Previous editions are obselete. S/N0102-LF-0 14-6603 (Include Area Code) 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL OR/La SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Direct Fire Synchronization by Robert W. Lamont Major, United States Marine Corps BS, United States Naval Academy, 1978 y Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 1992 ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes defense in sector missions adapted from the National Training Center and conducted with the Janus(A) high resolution combat model to check for relationships which influence direct fire synchronization. This analysis should enhance the monitoring of unit performance in the area of concentration or massing of fires consistent with the commander's intent. The combat fighting vehicle, which combines the characteristics of mobility with high volumes of firepower, dominates the desert battlefield and is the focus of this study. Graphical methods and analytic techniques are developed to describe the battle in terms of direct fire synchronization and a mission measure of effectiveness (MOE). This research is being conducted under the U.S. Army's Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodologies (BEAM) study, which visual displays to is developing objective doctrinal AirLand battle measures and enhance training environment of the NTC, defense analysis. The thesis also describes the training in sector doctrine for both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps with emphasis on asymmetries, and threat offensive doctrine. in TABLE OF CONTENTS I. II. III. INTRODUCTION 1 A. BACKGROUND 1 B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 2 C. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS 3 TERRAIN AND OPPOSING DOCTRINES 5 A. TERRAIN 5 B. THREAT OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE 7 C. FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE 12 THE EXPERIMENT 17 A. THE SCENARIO B. TACTICAL 17 PARAMETERS AND MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS IV. V. STATISTICAL OF 20 METHODOLOGY 25 A. STRATEGY AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 25 B. HOMOGENITY OF VARIANCE 26 C. DATA ANALYSIS 30 THE MODEL 36 A. DEVELOPMENT 36 B. VEHICLE OPERATIONAL LETHALITY INDEX 36 IV DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOI MONTEREY CA 93343-5101 VI. LIST C. THE DISPLAY 44 D. MODEL ANALYSIS 54 CONCLUSIONS 60 A. FINDINGS 60 B. RECOMMENDATIONS 61 C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 61 OF REFERENCES INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 63 65 Dv W M LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1. BARTLETTS TEST SUMMARY 28 TABLE 2. ANOVA RESULTS 31 TABLE 3. NONPARAMETRIC ANOVA RESULTS 33 TABLE 4. OPENING RANGE SUMMARY 58 VI LIST OF FIGURES Scenario Manuever Areas 7 9 9. Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) Echelon Attach Concept Blue Force Task Organization Blue Force Defense in Sector Dispositions OPFOR Plan of Attack Experiment Design Janus (A) Simulation Results Experimental Cells Box Plots 10. ANOVA Summary 11. Operational Lethality Index Factors 27 30 37 12. Gun-Missile Paradox 38 Figure 13. Figure 14. 40 43 Figure 15. Threat Organizational Factors Example M-l Tank P(hit) Curve Missile P(hit) Curve Figure 16. Combat 47 Figure 17. Historical Scenario at Start Figure 18. Figure 19. Engagement Area Positioning Scheme HAW-MAW-LAW Approach at Start Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7. Figure 8. Figure Figure Figure Figure MOE of MOE Results TOW Potential Surface Concept at Start 10 15 18 19 21 25 45 48 50 51 Figure 20. Historical Scenario at 120 minutes 52 Figure 21. Engagemet Area Scenario 53 at 120 minutes Figure 22. HAW-MAW-LAW Figure 23. Optimum Opening Range Problem 55 Figure 24. Operational Lethality Index (OLI) 57 Scenario at 120 minutes vn 54 D. N M I. A. INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND The National Training Center (NTC) First, the located in the high desert of southern NTC, California. Since the establishment of the tasked with a twofold mission. is NTC in is June 1981, the center has been to provide visiting units with the most demanding training environment, short of war, that limitations. This mission is is Second, data array located consistent with safety accomplished with a dedicated opposing force emulate soviet to is style tactics (OPFOR) whose during free-play, force-on-force exercises. collected from these engagements by an extensive instrumentation on both combat assess unit organization, In 1986 a potential of the forces and the surrounding terrain weapons systems, tactics, had not been realized. was being met, but illuminated some It be used to and doctrine. Government Accounting Office (GAO) study NTC to is stated that the full acknowledged that the first objective shortfalls with respect to the second. These included both an inability to use objective data for assessment of organizations and to obtain solutions to battlefield deficiencies. study called Battle U.S. Army's The Battle at help overcome these limitations the Enhanced Analysis Methodologies (BEAM) was TRADOC Analysis goal of the (ALB) To initiated at the Command-Monterey (TRAC-MTRY). [Ref BEAM program is to develop objective l:p. 2] measures of AirLand doctrine tenets to resolve deficiencies in the data collection required Combat Training Centers and improve identification of key performance weaknesses in the doctrine are by BEAM The use of tactical AirLand Battle doctrine. agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. four tenets of ALB The measures developed are envisioned as being graphical in nature, to be used in doctrinal training analysis during or after a show the warfighter how well the combat simulation. The underlying concept battle is going with respect to the ALB tenets. to is [Ref l:p. 3] The U.S. Army's Janus(A) combat model is a high resolution computer simulation that allows both interactive and systemic operations. Developed by researchers at the Janus(A) entities. is Center, Livermore National Laboratory, an event scheduling, stochastic model that defines weapon systems as Each of these combat model weapon Combat Simulation entities has its own characteristics that defines within the as a whole. This precise level of modelling allows such factors as capabilities, ammunition and fuel represented in a realistic manner. This high investigate the effects of 2:p. 9] it Janus(A) is new weapons and used extensively status, fidelity tactics to and terrain effects, be to modelling allows Janus(A) to produce plausible in this research to results. [Ref. generate the data required to investigate the issue of direct fire synchronization. B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE Analysis efforts in direct subjective in nature. No fire synchronization at the formal study has been done on NTC have so far been this subject. Observer- Controllers and analysts have recognized shortfalls in unit direct fire synchronization but quantitative analysis of "what happened" to support the study of these trends is lacking. [Ref. 18] This thesis presents a quantitative analysis of direct synchronization based on Janus battles using an actual this study is commander to quantify direct fire synchronization in determining if his forces are NTC scenario. performance complying with The fire goal of to assist the unit his intent and vision of the battle. The scope of this thesis is limited by the following constraints and assumptions: o The Janus(A) combat model is representative of actual attrition and battlefield effects. o Battles were conducted on desert terrain represented environment of the NTC's Siberia training area. by the o The same defense in sector mission was used as the basis for conducted in this research. all physical battles o Mechanized forces of both sides were operating consistent with the organization equipment mixes and doctrine employment schemes outlined in the second chapter. The analysis procedure can easily be extended to other battles, missions, and forces but extrapolation of the analysis results outside the above constraints could lead to false conclusions. C. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS Two key problems must be addressed in this research. First, synchronization be captured as envisioned by the impact, if BEAM any, does varying the battlefield in time synchronization? The above questions provide hypothesis investigated in this thesis. project? can direct fire Second, what and space have on direct fire the required structure to advance the The following hypothesis will be tested for validity using data analysis: given a model under task force defense in sector mission conducted with the Janus(A) there conditions, a exists relationship between synchronization and the mission's outcome. synchronization is best achieved mutual support and execution is study. two step approach First, parameters, is of direct fire further hypothesized that this are positioned for decentralized consistent with the commander's displayed graphically, for direct A is degree when subordinate elements Such a relationship could lead intent. that is It the NTC to a quantified task force training standard, fire synchronization in the defense. utilized to investigate the problems advanced in this a simulation and data analysis will be conducted to see which tactical when systematically varied in a scenario, that appear to impact battle outcome will influence the MOE. Parameters then be modelled in such a way that the warfighter will be able to change the input parameters based on his operational scheme. The second step of the study will utilize this model to build a display that graphically shows a unit their synchronization potential level or display will include the combat information human combat power. This factors engineering required to provide relevant to the warfighter. TERRAIN AND OPPOSING DOCTRINES II. A. TERRAIN NTC Because the is used to establish the scenario under investigation, a knowledge of desert terrain and how is it impacts the weapons systems of both sides key to understanding the interactions between tactical parameters in the study. The following are the military aspects of terrain: observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. Terrain analysis focuses on these factors [Ref 3:p. 4-9]. While observation involves target acquisition systems, both optical and electronic, this a unit's paper focuses on horizontal or point of field fire. Overlapping these fields to point visibility described of fire is a prerequisite for the concentration of combat power and implies a potential for direct Line-of-sight on the flat and open areas of the by fire synchronization. NTC is only interrupted on the slopes, which are cut with wadies formed from drainage patterns of the surrounding high ground. This results in correctly, is many areas where a weapon's combat power, largely limited only by the maximum range to which it when positioned can reach and the accuracy associated with that range. [Ref 4:p.2] Concealment effects of fire. [Ref military operations. is protection from observation. Cover 3:p. 4-9] Vegetation is is protection from the a historical source of concealment for At the NTC, ground covering is extremely sparse. Available vegetation is composed of eighty-five percent creosote brush scrub percent Joshua tree woodland shade scale scrub. Cover for vehicles and fifteen limited to is wadies and the rolling nature of the valley floor or rock outcroppings. [Ref 4:p.l] The lack of cover and concealment emphasizes the importance of accurate long range fires. [Ref 5:p. 1-1] Rapid change NTC. The in elevation is the chief obstacle to mechanized lack of precipitation, four inches permanent water obstacles. [Ref 4:p. 2] on average per Man-made earthworks construction. Limitations on time, areas of the battlefield being an environment is lift, year, movement at the means there are no obstacles include minefields and and barrier material result in large wide open to movement by mechanized forces. Such conducive to the concentration of combat power for both the attacker and defender. Key terrain are those points on the battlefield that provide a marked tactical advantage to the side that controls them. The number of points that constitute key terrain in a desert environment are limited. mountains and hills are areas through which High ground has the potential of units that occupy it. Choke enemy movement can be to increase line-of-sight, The value of terrain is points or defiles between more and in turn, the likely to controlled. combat power be defined in terms of fighting positions for individual vehicles or small units rather than geographic formations on whose control would hinge a battle. [Ref 5:p. 5-1] desert warfare is the destruction of the enemy. synchronization takes on additional importance. To this The end the value of focus for direct fire National Training Center (South) f N Terrain GO SLOW GO NO GO KILOMETERS $Q Figure 1. Lastly, They vary Scenario Maneuver Areas avenues of approach in size from a width of thirty to forty-two kilometers. at the six to The NTC are formed by well defined corridors. twelve kilometers and range in length from result is a maneuver area that supports the doctrinal styles of both U.S. and soviet-style forces. [Ref 4:p. 2] southern end of the B. NTC Figure 1 shows the area where the scenario was conducted. THREAT OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE The recent demise of the Soviet Union significantly reduces the likelihood of any direct conflict with them. However, the degree to which they have trained and equipped potential adversaries, notably in the oil rich deserts of the Persian Gulf, means soviet-style doctrine motorized NTC rifle remains a threat. This section describes the soviet regiment's offensive doctrine, organization, and tactics used in the scenario under investigation. Threat forces view offensive operations as the basic form of combat action. Striking speed and force opponent be overwhelmed. will size are considered as the To implement primary mechanisms by which the on the this battlefield, soviet doctrine emphasizes the following operational concepts: rapid concentration and dispersal of combat power, using multiple axes of advance, deep. [Ref 6:p. 2-2] The into tactical reality is hitting at weak points, and attacking organizational level at which these concepts are transferred the motorized While the soviet motorized regiment. rifle rifle regiment (MRR) is change, Figure 2 outlines the basic composition of a typical This force structure is representative of many undergoing consistent MRR. of the formations that have been exported to the third world through the proliferation of soviet operational doctrine and of the OPFOR at the NTC. The MRR's the 130 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (MRBs), forty tanks, combat power of the three motorized is located in rifle battalions and twenty-four self-propelled howitzers. Tactical employment of these weapons are the [Ref (BMPs) principal means by which soviet operational concepts are achieved. 7:p. 163] The following are the fundamentals of soviet tactical thought: aggressive reconnaissance, echelonment of forces, and adherence to march discipline. reconnaissance is conducted at all levels, for the soviet 8 While ground commander division X III H II A II - 1 • i & 1 1 1 1 1 X 1 ® Figure 2. Motorized Rifle Regiment and regimental reconnaissance influenced. fifty A T\ (MRR) assets provide a direct means by which the battle is reconnaissance battalion precedes the Motorized Rifle Division by kilometers. They proceed on multiple routes and rely on stealth to collect information on the enemy's dispositions. This intelligence forms a basis on which the regiment can formulate its plan of attack. The regimental reconnaissance company precedes the advance guard by twenty-five kilometers and uses similar techniques as the divisional reconnaissance unit. prior to contact with the The concept main They serve to confirm it battlefield attack. [Ref 6:p. 2-4] of deploying units in echelons Echelonment makes and update the is key to soviet offensive tactics. possible to achieve numerical superiority without massing all the required forces from the on The line. result effects of nuclear strikes weapons. The first to reduce the vulnerability of the attacker is and the improving accuracy of echelon of an attacking unit is conventional normally comprised of two of its component elements reinforced by strong attachments. These two elements then advance abreast to the regimental objective. [Ref 7:p. 24] This concept is illustrated in Figure 3. The threat, or soviet style force, emphasizes pressuring the enemy by retaining contact with the maximum number tactical units to permit the second echelon to accomplish tasks that Western units of troops. Numerical superiority is counted on by 1 X 1 / -"* X M II FIRST ECHELON II <+) X w III X II SECOND ECHELON 1 1 Figure 3. 1 1 Echelon Attack Concept 10 CP n cr> (-) ANTITANK RESERVE would use focus is whose their reserves for. In general, soviet doctrine uses small reserves on anti-tank operations. [Ref 7:p. 24] By combining the concepts of echelonment and attack frontage, the threat forces are able to achieve the correlation of forces that they view are required to win. A superiority of at least three to one in tanks, in motorized rifle enemy can be ratios can strength is six to one in artillery, and four However, viewed as desirable for the attack. one to if the neutralized with fire support, or surprised by maneuver, then these fall to the point one. [Ref 7:p. 24] where the threat outnumbered by is as much as three to This adds a degree of unpredictability to the threat operational scheme. March formations and techniques provide commander fights his unit. The regiment reinforcing three rifle battalions with a a company size anti-tank reserve. the tactical glue by which the normally organized for the march by is company from These reinforced echeloned as described above. The regiment will forced to deploy laterally into prebattle formation. on the enemy, the commander will elect to the enemy situation is units then remain As five to ten kilometers in march along two routes march formation is the regiment continues to close commander will A accomplished by placing a reinforced Combat Reconnaissance 11 in prebattle task his forward forward of the battalion. This company Forward Security Element (FSE). until his unit into attack formation. vague, the regimental MRB to push forward security elements. This company the tank battalion and forming push through the opposition formation to retain speed, or continue to deploy If MRR will act as a Patrol (CRP), consisting of a reinforced platoon, front of the first The mission is enemy is ensure favorable deployment of the main will gained. [Ref 6:p. 2-4] reconnaissance elements are able to pin-point the If threat This deployed approximately ten kilometers to the FSE. This advanced guard force once contact with the then the is element to strike the defensive line of the forward detachment accomplished by seizing key is may be terrain, the forward detachment. a choke point or high ground, on which is for the forward to pin elements of the defending force in place to allow the critical targets at detachment main body to concentrate on the ability of long- fraction of the defensive line. This concept hinges range reconnaissance patrols to identify defenses, to disrupt the continuity of the defense. the defensive positions are situated. Another technique on a smaller enemy which to strike. [Ref 7:p. 56.] C. FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE AirLand Battle Doctrine (ALB) combat power to the battlefield. articulates the Combat power is Army's method of applying generated by combining the following factors: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The first two factors are key to direct fire synchronization. [Ref. 3:p. 11] Maneuver is the alignment of friendly forces which obtains a positional advantage over the enemy. During offensive operations, or while counter attacking in the defense, movement of ground units can be used to achieve positional advantage. However, friendly defense, if the enemy is movement drawn is not a prerequisite to maneuver. In the into a disadvantageous position 12 where friendly fires are massed or his attack formation is disrupted, then mechanism without ground movement. Firepower ability and Maneuver can be will to fight. is reached. Firepower agility, used as a defeat used removing both the enemy's in when firepower movement and is used to thus insure a position be used independently of maneuver to forces. [Ref. 3:p. 12] battle doctrine recognizes the following four basic tenets: initiative, depth, and synchronization. framework can determine the enemy. also uncommitted enemy destroy, delay, or disrupt AirLand may is facilitated suppress the enemy's ability to counter friendly of advantage is [Ref. 3:p. 12] the destructive force which is maneuver Initiative is The ability under to successfully fight battlefield success. Agility this the ability to act faster than is seen as setting the terms of the battle. Depth is viewed as the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. Lastly, synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. [Ref. 3:p. 15-17] Synchronization includes concentration of forces and firepower and maneuver Corps doctrinal literature. understand of the communications seen as a recurring theme in both The integration of Army and Marine Such synchronization need not depend solely on the The commander extends his span of control beyond the physical explicit coordination. limitations is fires. communications his intent fail of his architecture operational by plans. and face-to-face coordination In is insuring the chaos impossible, coordination can provide the vehicle by which synchronization 13 his is subordinates of battle, if such implicit achieved. [Ref. 3:p. 17] For direct able to overlap effective systems achieve concentration, their fire forces to fires. Currently, the maximum weapon systems must be range of gun and missile MRR about four kilometers. The width of a zone of attack for a is extend from three to eight kilometers. [Ref. battalion to mass sufficient can This means that for a 9:p. 4-55] numbers of antiarmor weapons MRR, to defeat a its defensive sector should not exceed a width that would prevent the concentration of direct fire. Based on these physical limitations of the weapon systems allow for a frontage of four to eight kilometers. Thus, it is would seems that the battalion provides the highest organizational level at which direct achieved, and as such, this fire synchronization the focus of this study. While pure battalion organizations are assigned tactical missions, the cross- attachment of subordinate elements between infantry and tank battalions fundamental concept that increases mission result flexibility. The one of the ways to increase combat power. The company is is a units is the lowest level at which cross-attachment occurs and once complete the resulting organization A battalion that is synergistic effects that from combining the individual strengths and weaknesses of dissimilar as a team. is organized for a combat mission is is referred to called a task force. Figure 4 outlines the task organization used by the friendly force in the historical NTC scenario. [Ref. 8:p.l2] course of this study. Arms Heavy FM This organization remains constant during the 71-123 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Forces, outlines the doctrinal Combined employment of this task force (TF) during the defense in sector (DIS) mission. 14 TmA Tm Scout Scout Pit 2/A Armor Mech 3/A Mech 2/A Mech 3/A Armor 1 2 x Stinger TmF /A Armor 1/A 2/B Mech BCo Stinger D Co(-) TF Control 1/B Armor 2/D Armor Hqs Tk Sec 2/B Armor 3/D Armor A/- 3/B Armor 1/EAT Stinger Vul Figure The 4. Eng(-) 1/A/- Eng(-) Hvy Mtr (DS) Pit Pit Blue Force Task Organization battalion commander develops his direct fire plan by determining likely platoon battle positions. Forces are placed on the battlefield to insure a good line-ofsight, lateral positions. dispersion, Once cover and concealment, and mutual support between these positions are identified, platoons are combined into and team organizations to provide for the required command and company control. [Ref. 9:p. 4-72] Fire control is established over TF elements to insure the enemy the best terms. Direct fires are oriented on is target reference points engagement areas (EAs) where the commander plans to destroy the engaged on (TRPs) and enemy. Timing of the engagement can be either centralized or decentralized by using control 15 measures. Trigger lines allow subordinate elements to fire a set point on the battlefield. This means that weapons maximum range and of fire. until force the Another approach enemy into EA start enemy reaches engaging at their and ever-increasing volumes to hold the opening of the engagement fire into an may the to face concentric to fire control numerous weapons can that draws the enemy when is the EA. The US Army and masses fires prefers the technique simultaneously on him. [Ref. 9:p.4-73] The Marine Corps on prefers to when faced with a the other hand, open the anti-armor battle at maximum MRR range. This concept, which envisions long opening ranges for each class of anti-armor system, MAW-LAW. Each anti-armor weapon (AW) on range. Heavy AWs fill in fire at long range, light between the heavy and of the spectrum. to AWs The is light intent of this tactic to engage the enemy armor formation. [Ref. 16 is called HAW- broken down into a category based AWs fire at short systems with is sized threat, range, and medium some overlapping on each end maximize the amount of time available 6:p. 14] III. THE EXPERIMENT THE SCENARIO A. The historical scenario being investigated for the synchronization is purpose of studying direct a defense in sector mission by an armor-heavy task force. defensive concept divided the operation into two phases. Phase one reconnaissance battle and phase two commander's he would 10] intent fight The was to deceive the enemy is the counter- is task force as to the primary positions from which by conducting an aggressive counter-reconnaissance goal of this part of the battle to prevent the effort. [Ref. 8:p. OPFOR from using a forward detachment to unhinge the defense by blinding his reconnaissance If successful OPFOR it The The the defense in sector. is fire would deny the forward detachment an aiming point. efforts. The subsequent operating scheme reveals the task force failed to prevent the enemy from finding an objective for the forward detachment. Figure 5 shows the defender's dispositions for the second phase of the fight. In phase two of the defense the task force commander intended to destroy the enemy in EAs orient into SHARK and PIRANHA. Tm A was its fires into EA SHARK. B Co EA PIRANHA. move to BP occupying If the 34 and orient BP enemy its fires 25 and orienting its to occupy battle position (BP) 22 and had the mission to occupy BP 24 and orient attack developed in the south then on Red fires into 17 Pass. D B Co was to Co(-) had the responsibility for EA Shark. Furthermore, they had an on- National Training Center — 10r— ^cr^S7^*rr7>A V773 =T1 (South) ^ I t ^&ZZZ& N Terrain GO SLOW GO NO GO PL VICTORIA KILOMETERS 60 Figure Blue Force Defense in Sector Dispositions 5. order mission to redirect their through in the south vicinity of occupy BP Co EA CUDA The of the task force defense synchronization. This engagements will its is fires move to on EA CUDA. BP 31 and place commander's make due occur during key the enemy pushed the enemy attacked its fires our MRR. Tm F into was to in the EA PIRANHA enemy in the second of direct fire the fact that the majority of the direct fire this to If intent to destroy the phase if vehicles to the firing line in the and engage the second echelon of the 21 and orient their [Ref. 8:p. 10] EA PIRANHA. Lastly, D(-) was to reposition north then this team was to phase fires into in this part of the battle. 18 analysis Figure 6 outlines the key elements of the the enemy MRR was to conduct OPFOR attack plan. The mission of an attack with the purpose of penetrating the forward blue positions, destroy the majority of his combat power, and retain sufficient OPFOR combat power for a follow-on attack. Their concept of operations was to pin the defending enemy in the vicinity of Red Pass with the forward detachment. The MRR main body would then attack the center of the defensive sector to open a hole for the second echelon. Lastly, the following echelon echelon and continue moving to their would push through the final objective. National Training Center (South) t N Terrain GO Red Pass SLOW GO NO GO 60 Figure 6. OPFOR Plan of Attack 19 Kilometers first B. TACTICAL PARAMETERS AND MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS In 1914 F. combat attrition W. Lanchester formulated two under specific conditions. He models differential equation for contrasted a battlefield that was partitioned into a series of one-on-one duels with one in which firers could concentrate on surviving The scenario. illustrates the enemy from dispersed result of this effort in many low many-on-one was Lanchester's square law of combat which advantage of concentrating combat power. [Ref. 10:p. 63] combat models are useful imbedded locations to generate a While these in the study of warfare at the aggregated level, resolution simulations, they fail and are to capture the spatial aspects of the battalion level fight. Tactical parameters were selected to test the concept of concentration of force, and hence the influence of direct fire synchronization, in high where spatial aspects play a role in determining the battle start of the engagement and vehicle positioning are the two key resolution simulations outcome. Timing the doctrinal factors for effective direct fire. Figure 7 outlines the experiment in matrix form. Vehicle locations were became run from the historical scenario at the NTC. the baseline case against which other parameters could be tested. these runs companies it was noted that the initial direct fire battles changes in direct would be limited to these fire effectiveness to 20 This During were conducted by the two in the southern half of the defensive sector. It in vehicle dispositions limit first was decided that changes two companies. The goal was to the actual influence of moving vehicle TIME SPACE FREE TRIGGER FIRE UNE ( ON COMMAND HISTORICAL (NTC ROTATION) ENGAGEMENT AREA HAW-MAW-UWV Figure positions 7. Experiment Design and adjusting the engagement timing. This was insured by keeping the localized force ratios constant in the area of To first contact. further explore the spatial aspects of direct fire synchronization, Marine Corps doctrinal positioning techniques were companies were repositioned result of this the OPFOR to focus their direct fire utilized. weapons The southern two into EA CUDA. The change was a concave alignment of combat fighting vehicles, direction of attack, around the edge of were repositioned criteria of the in a linear fashion to support the Haw-Maw-Law approach. 21 EA CUDA. maximum Army and relative to Lastly, the forces range engagement Timing of the initial engagement was varied from no control through positive control by the battalion to open line, fire commander. The when an enemy vehicle came within strict free fire runs allowed the defender effective weapons range. The trigger used to evaluate the second timing approach, was Phase Line Lisa or any enemy vehicle that entered EA CUDA. This allowed the southern two companies to fire as independent elements when the situation permitted. Lastly, an on-command technique was tested to see the effects of starting an engagement only in self defense or when directed to do so by the battalion The tactical experiment. His parameters for the movement and commander. OPFOR attack plan, as outlined in the previous section, did not change. His vehicles were kept in a free engagement at were held constant throughout the fire status and allowed to start an any time the defender was observed within effective range. Again the idea here was to limit the impact of factors outside the parameters under investigation. To capture was developed levels the results of each simulation run a measure of effectiveness to reflect the on both synchronization. degree of direct sides provide The more fire a quantitative effectively that (MOE) synchronization. Changes in force method combat power for is measuring direct applied to the enemy fire the higher his losses will be. This destruction will in turn attenuate the effects of his direct fires and maximize the number of friendly forces that survive the 22 battle. The direct fire synchronization MOE is shown below. It includes the quantifiable BN/TFMOE=(a)%ENEMYKILLED+(\-a)%FRIENDLYSURVIVAL mission objectives of enemy force destruction and friendly force survival. of enemy killed is the total starting number of the sum enemy friendly of the combat vehicles destroyed in the battle divided by strength. Friendly survival combat vehicles and dividing by the The percent initial killed in the number of combat was found by subtracting the engagement from the vehicles. starting total These two aspects can be weighted by the commander using an a value between zero and one. During study, a was If set at .5 to equally run as a level out as this weight the two goals. [Ref. ll:p. 38] "fight-to-the-finish", the attrition results from the scenario tend to both sides drive each others combat power down toward zero. This in turn obscures the influence of the tactical parameters under investigation as other factors, such as the counter-attacking force and non-combat elements, impact the computation of the MOE. By tracking the temporal direct fire intensity, the battle can be partitioned into periods of interest. The two key periods, synchronization point of view, are the combat during the forward detachment and main body of the conducted in succession and end simulation. [Ref. 8:p. 45] for at MRR. initial from a direct fire contact with the These two key events are approximately 120 minutes into the Janus(A) This point in the battle was selected to compute the MOE each run. Hence, by limiting the factors external to the experiment, to the greatest extent that a controlled simulation 23 would allow, the tactical parameters of the study are reflected in the their influence on the battle MOE and statistical techniques can be used to analyze outcome. 24 STATISTICAL IV. A. METHODOLOGY STRATEGY AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS Each Janus(A) simulation run required three hours of run time for the battle to capture the events of interest. This placed a limit could be generated for tally the total number of runs For each of the nine combinations of this research. The parameters, five runs were conducted. provided the data to on the MOEs for each experimental cell. They are shown TIME HISTORICAL (NTC ROTATION) ENGAGEMENT AREA HAW-MAW-LAW FREE TRIGGER FIRE LINE .6512 .5304 .6527 .6996 .7036 .6539 .6586 .6112 .6277 .5629 .8659 .8917 .8884 .7576 .8567 .8179 .8417 .8764 .8917 .8667 .8812 .8041 .7631 .7236 .8667 .5562 .8443 .8212 .8495 .8631 Figure 8. Janus(A) Simulation MOE 25 tactical resulting killer-victim scoreboards below. SPACE that Results ON COMMAND .5086 .3701 .4982 .5236 .4751 .5329 .7233 .5579 .7762 .6315 .6226 .6217 .5520 .6079 .5867 The MOE result from the actual battle data was .3799. Only one of the forty- may runs was below the historical result. This five simulations differences in direct fire intensity attributable to human in part degradation during the In addition, the simulated battles were stopped after 120 battle. [Ref.8, p. 58] minutes into the battle while the historical engagement was run as a increased time available for attrition finish; this be due to may account fight to the for the lower MOE results during the rotation. This data will form a basis to test the interaction of the tactical parameters utilizing analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques. Because ANO VA methodology requires an underlying assumption of homogeneity of variance between variance of the output, as represented by the spread of the MOE Bartlett's test for approach fails, was studied using box homogeneity of variance. then the framework required by will plots. was investigated. the Initially, the This in turn was followed by the hypothesis underlying the ANOVA data will be transformed in an attempt to establish the ANOVA techniques. Lastly, each of the be developed to see which positively effect the interaction B. If MOE, cells, between the parameters of MOE tactical and if parameters there is any interest. HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE Figure 9 shows a box plot for each of the experimental cells outlined in chapter three. Each box plot is a visual representation of some statistical attributes of the data, collected during the simulation, as described by the of the box from end to end is the distance between the 26 first and MOE. The length third quartiles or BOX PLOTS FOR TACTICAL PARAMETERS 1 I ID UJ C> o 2 z o 4 6 CELL NUMBER Figure 9. Experimental Cells Box Plots interquartile range (IQR). within the box is The the mean. which the adjacent values line through the box is The Xs above and below fall. These points extend as the median and the the box mark far as 1.5 circle the points at IQRs beyond the range of the box and must end at a data observation. This explains the folding back effect of cell 8 seen as the circle representation sample which is is unduly influenced by the single below the box plot. [Ref. 17, p. 53.] that only the final size of five observations in the outlier. This point can be One drawback to the graphical outcomes are communicated. above 27 statistics, is masked Sensitivity to in the display. The assumption of homogeneity of variance appears to be doubtful length of the box plot in cell six cells are dropped from the is contrasted with that of cell seven. more the these two remaining box plots appear to be roughly analysis, the similar in size. This suggests a If when precise technique be employed to test the hypothesis of equal variance. Bartlett's test for MOE results. (number of The This homogeneity of variance was test uses cells less one). result of this test The significance level was set at a =.05. [Ref. 12, p. DoF if the variance could be stabilized. Chi -Sq Value Test* Bartlett's Chi -Sq Value Acceptance Outcome Original 8 25.56 15.50 Reject Arcsin 8 23.50 15.50 Reject SqRoot 8 26.46 15.50 Reject Log 8 28.40 15.50 Reject Data less Cells 8 & 7. 6 11.45 12.59 Ho: Equal Variance Less correction TABLE 1. 249] was rejection of the hypothesis of equal variance. This rejection Transforms * on the experimental a Chi-Square value, with eight degrees of freedom led to attempts to transform the data to see DATA/ utilized factor. BARTLETT'S TEST SUMMARY 28 Fail to Reject The MOE employed must lie between zero and one. The usual transformations for this type of data, to stabilize the variance, include arcsin, square root, First, the arcsin transformation was conducted and while from 25.56, with the original values, to 23.5 of fifteen. The square it fell 2 2 techniques may be used of 28.4 and Bartlett's test again rejected the statistic summarized to gain statistic value to 26.46. Lastly, the log hypothesis that the variance was the same across the experimental to transform the data are 2 log. well short of the acceptance level root transformation raised the % transform resulted in a % lowered the % it and some in Table 1. Thus, insights into trends it cells. The attempts appears that ANOVA between parameters but the associated statistical confidence limits that these procedures normally provide may not be valid. The tactical of large variability in cell six parameters that initial direct fire, as were received controller. of these that orders at the Human This combines the highest volume method of control. The "on command" fire status be allowed to level. tactical fire for self from the battalion commander company defense or to initiate the may have human when engagement increased the variability Conversely, the very small variance of cell seven by the complete lack of parameter This required manual input from the experiment induced judgmental decisions MOE results. cell represented by the mass achieved with the engagement area required that units on a hold was deemed partly be explained by the combination of this cell represents. technique, with the strictest it may interaction. 29 is explained S 0.8 Engagement Area 0.6 Haw-Maw-Law Li. S NTC Historical 0.4 0.2 Trigger Line On Command _L ANOVA Summary Figure 10. Removing Law the human element from MOE Results the process, when coupled with the positioning scheme, maximized the time available for each engage with direct C. of Haw-Maw- weapon system to fire. DATA ANALYSIS The results summarized in of an analysis Table 2. An of variance for the experimental important development from the ANOVA MOE table is are the apparent low level of interaction between the time and space parameters. This demonstrated graphically in Figure parallel the historical scenario 10. The top two tactical test results which indicates no interaction. 30 is tend to ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (MOE RESULTS) SOURCE DF SS MS Time 2 .3916 .1958 40.79 Space 2 .3094 .1547 32.23 Interaction 4 .0170 .0042 Error 36 .1729 .0048 F Ratio * 44 Total .8910 j TABLE 2. When ANOVA RESULTS analyzing the MOE to indicate that the free fire results in Figure 10 the experimental results command and control technique is superior seem when coupled with any of the positioning schemes. Furthermore, when the free technique is not used the engagement area positioning scheme approach. Combining the free Maw-Law This is positioning threat is least command and the preferred control approach with the Haw- the dominant tactical approach in the experiment. evident from Figure 9 as coupled with the It scheme fire is fire this cell's box plot has the highest MOE value apparent variance. should be noted that in the scenario under investigation the actions of the were held constant. The Marine Air Ground Task Force Antiarmor operations 31 manual (FMFM 2-12) warns that a chief drawback of the Haw-Maw-Law positioning scheme is engagements that early methodology before his full firepower MOE The [Ref. 6, p. 3-13] long range at against the defender if he may reveal the defender's operating weight can be brought to bear on the attacker. from our experiment does not capture any penalty fires early. The visual model of direct fire synchronization needs to incorporate the aspect of firepower density over both space and time. The make last aspect of our statistical analysis a difference that is statistically significant. to explore the hypothesis that the parameters equal. Notched box plots is The The if the tactical parameters strategy will be to use box plots have no impact and the medians are can provide a hypothesis of observations in the experiment. to see test that is sensitive to the number following formula was used to establish the ends of the notches. Median ±\.51x{IQRJsfn) When and comparing cell 6 with cell (.87, .89) respectively the difference in medians and is 7, the notched regions were bounded by (.48, .77) failed to overlap. This provides strong evidence that attributed to the tactical parameters and not random fluctuations of the data. [Ref. 14:p. 62.] Since the data set failed to conform to the constraint of equal variance required of classical statistical methodology, a nonparametric approach was also used. MOE outcomes were ranked and an analysis of variance was performed. paralleled the earlier ANOVA findings. Table 3 outlines the The results The results from this methodology. The P value for the interaction effects was .1889 and the alternative 32 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (NONPARAMETRIC) SOURCE DF SS MS F Ratio Time 2 3493.4 1746.7 28.83 Space 2 2358.5 1 1 79.3 42.70 Interaction 4 266.1 66.5 Error 36 1470.9 40.9 • 44 Total 7589.0 / TABLE 3. NONPARAMETRIC ANOVA RESULTS hypothesis of no interaction was accepted. The zero P values for both the space and timing factors indicated that they are significant and should again be included in our model of direct fire synchronization. Finally, the issue of which combinations of superior must be investigated. The strategy was tactical to use a pair-wise analysis of the data from experimental cells. selected to check the null hypothesis that the resulting cells. A parameters are nonparametric approach The Krusal-Wallis is test in was means were equal between confidence level of a = .05 was utilized throughout hypothesis statistically this procedure. If this rejected then the level of battlefield performance attributed to these 33 tactical techniques approach can be quantified and insight gained as to which operational preferred. is the First, NTC scheme was contrasted with the positioning historical engagement area and Haw-Maw-Law approach. In each significant. Either of the doctrinal positioning test the result was found concepts would have been preferred to those of the historical scenario. This finding suggests that the battalion investigation would benefit from increased weapon their systems. training Execution of current improved the performance, as defined by the under on the doctrinal employment of tactical MOE, methodology would have of the blue force in the NTC scenario. The engagement area technique was contrasted with positioning scheme for each of the board, no statistical difference in command and mean the Haw-Maw-Law control procedures. Across the MOE performance was detected between the two positioning approaches. Given a simulation in which the threat force scheme of maneuver remains unchanged, the engagement area approach of massing shorter duration of time was found indistinguishable from the Law more linear fires for a Haw-Maw- technique that maximized the time available to employ antitank weapons. Next, the influence of the various investigated. commander found to be mean MOE In all retained cases the on-command strict positive statistically different associated with this command and technique, control approaches was in which the battalion control over the direct fires of the task force, was from the two decentralized methods. The lower command and 34 control technique suggests that it is the least preferred approach for initiating a direct fire engagement. For the engagement area positioning scheme no difference detected when in mean MOE performance was the free fire approach was contrasted with using a trigger line to start the battle. Conversely, with the Haw-Maw-Law tactic the free fire method statistically out performed the trigger line approach. Thus, our nonparametric analysis has resulted in the identification of three dominant tactical approaches for this scenario. If either the free fire or trigger line good results. On the other hand, be coupled with a free fire if command and a control approaches utilized then seem then to yield it should control technique. This insight supports the original hypothesis of this study that the is is Haw-Maw-Law tactic is employed command and maximized when execution an engagement area MOE for direct fire synchronization is decentralized consistent with the commander's intent. 35 V. THE MODEL DEVELOPMENT A. The main focus of the BEAM project to is meaningful to the warfighter. The approach to produce diagnostic displays that are this problem will be to represent the time and space parameters of synchronization in a graphical display. This display must be ergonomically friendly training to interpret. characteristics of the to A to the warfighter combat potential armored Since this display will is killing fighting vehicles under investigation, can be utilized demand it the combat power is quantified. An be a widely disseminated product. This will require the classified probabilities of model development. that vehicle direct fire synchronization envisioned as a training tool, intended for inclusion in exercise after-action reviews, B. which models the surface, show the warfighter areas where the prerequisites of have been achieved. This in and require minimal additional hit, for various weapon alternative modelling technique combat potential surface is realistic and will systems, not be utilized is introduced to insure unclassified. VEHICLE OPERATIONAL LETHALITY INDEX Because the majority of the MRR's combat power fighting vehicles the U.S. which are embedded Task Force is in its is located in the armored organization, the antiarmor lethality of key to halting their attack. The two main platforms which influence the battle are the M-l Abrams tank and 36 the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. gun, The TOW principle antiarmor missile, and 25mm weapons on these vehicles Chain Gun. The factors that combat potential of these weapon systems are outlined Figure An it's 11. are: 120mm may tank main influence the in Figure ll.[Ref. 13:p. 83] Operational Lethality Index Factors Operational Lethality Index (OLI) for each vehicle will be developed to model ability to inflict damage. The OLI from our antiarmor weapons the time parameter to the The combat potential fired. weapon system Because it is expected number of vehicle one minute period. This method strategy to develop the Reliability of the rounds in a will reflect the is OLI is will serve to kills add surface. to explore the factors in Figure 11. a constant and will influence the number of a constant the net effect on our combat potential surface 37 would be to lower it by a uniform height. Given our small time interval of one minute the likelihood of failure is developed further. Apart from very small and this aspect of the model will not be reliability, the armament of tanks and APCs have distinctive characteristics. When modelling the traits of combat fighting vehicles the asymmetries of guns versus missiles must be included. Figure 12 outlines the general concept of the gunmissile paradox. Characteristics of both guns and missiles will influence the potential surface. GUNS P(Hit) MISSILES "~V f Range Range High Low Rate of Fire Accuracy Over Decreasing Range Figure 12. Gun-Missile Paradox 38 Increasing combat The number interval of rounds that a tank can fire at an armored target in one minute constant. This is fairly is driven by the fact that the main gun destroy vehicles with either light or heavy armor. tank may use main its fire characteristics of these battle is By changing ammunition control system in each of the engagements. 120mm basically the same. used to is types the The physical rounds are so similar that their handling time in The tank rate of fire set at three is rounds per minute, accounting for reload time, the interval of time for dust to settle between rounds, and gunner lay adjustments. These conditions do not hold for the APC. Both the M-2 Bradley and the BMP-2 are equipped with a dual main armament. Each APC carries a heavy anti-tank missile and a rapid fire cannon. This combination produces the at different rates, of each (T/O) fire for will the types of targets Figure 13 use anti-tank (AT) missiles APCs. This aspect of the model following example is lightly on the when is armored vehicles but is battlefield. It firing at tanks approach a Bradley platoon in the defense. assumed and reserve his APCs. used to explain the concept of the the micro battlefield for this discussion. is captured in threat organization factors that are used to adjust the lethality of The targets gunner both heavily and with the two different weapons. This makes the employment times weapon dependent on that each cannon ability to kill Both heavy and The T/O factors. light armored type of target density will determine, in an aggregated sense, the amount of lethality the platoon collectively discharges from its two weapon systems. Since two of the ten attackers are tanks, the TOW missile will add twenty percent of its 39 lethality to the combat potential surface. o o <> o oo o o <D> L_L I O O o BMP (Light Armor) <t> M-2 Bradley Tank (Heavy Armor) 1 1 Figure 13. Threat Organizational Factors Example The other eighty percent of the Bradley's lethality will be delivered by their chain guns. This procedure precludes double counting of expected time interval by preventing an gun APC from kills in the one minute simultaneously adding both tow and chain lethality for the full period. For the model these in the MRR by the total T/O factors combat fighting vehicles in the regiment. This yielded a fraction of .29 for the contribution of AT missiles were given a rate of fire required during firing, tracking, were found by dividing the number of tanks TOW lethality to the combat potential surface. of one per minute which accounted for the time and reloading. 40 A similar approach was used with the chain gun. If a Bradley was not firing at a tank, then the chain gun would add seventy-one percent of combat potential when firing than a tank, ability of the Because the chain gun produces surface. its rate of fire will tend to its less of lethality to the a dust signature be higher. This accounted for the chain gun to rapidly re-engage a target and apply burst-on-target techniques to walk rounds onto the enemy. Each APC was considered able to deliver four bursts per minute of well aimed fire with their chain gun. The range and accuracy form the probability of a that a target to remove a vehicle from have assumed gunners likelihood of a that, is hit and killed. given a hit times the probability of a kill damage factors of the vehicle's kill will may hit. is A explained as the probability kill is defined as sufficient further influencing the battle at hand. Since is it we on the fact combat subsystems of fire mechanisms will essentially one. This conclusion rests survive a hit, damage to the control and boresighting, communications, and the track mobility render to use the correct type of ammunition against the target, the given a hit while a vehicle This weapon systems combine not repairable before the battle will end. This result allows the model to focus on the probability of a hit to capture the factors of accuracy and range. Because probability of this hit data is restricted another approach was required to model aspect of the OLI. Seth Bonder proposed one method for attenuating Lanchester attrition coefficients over range using the formula below: 41 a(r)=a o x(l-(r/Rmax)r with a(r) being the Lanchester coefficient for the current range is the maximum and serves as an unclassified probability of a employment range of the weapon system. power 11 accounts hit in /* is currently used in the VECTOR is fifty is then percent, information which weapon systems this fit is part of is the maximum used as a shaping constant to on the fit the main armament. This method combat models. points of each curve are based weapon. The shaping coefficient a hit series of The for the range effects Rmax the model. probability of a hit curve to the characteristics of each The end [Ref. 10:p. 5-6] a^ value of the attrition coefficient at point blank range. the equation in parenthesis and raised to the is r. [Ref. 10:p. 91.] technical characteristics of the to the range at which the probability of available in unclassified form. For approach worked well to capture the effects of decreasing probability of a hit over range. Figure 14 portrays this approach for the M-l Bonder equation. Missile systems required a modification to the Seth gun tank. When a gunner fires a missile, the back blast and violent launch of the projectile briefly interrupt the tracking process. This period of gunner dazzle lasts approximately to two seconds. During meters per second. warhead's sixty-five this time, the missile is traveling When down range the effects described above are meter arming distance, the 42 result is at one two hundred combined with the a dead zone around the 120mm Gun -P(Hit) \J 0.8 • & 0.6 4 -Q j O £ 0.4 0.2 ^ .... i .... i .... 500 1000 1 i .... i . . . . i .... i .... i 500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 Range (Meters) Figure 14. Ml Tank P(Hit) Curve point of missile launch. This effect disappears as the missile gunner and normal tracking following change was made is resumed. to the Seth To capture these battlefield effects, the Bonder equation: 43 moves away from the a(r)=a -a o x(l-(r/Rmwc)r. The hit probability The TOW missile curve for the final operational lethality index is shown in Figure 15, with a = .9. is: OU= (RoF) xP(Hit) x(770). This value location is summed on the ground for all combat vehicles to define the combat potential combat potential surface increases so does the their fires. Whether this that have line-of-sight to a given combat potential is surface. As the height of the ability of the task force to realized or not synchronize may depend on factors external to this study. C. THE DISPLAY The use brain system of visual displays to present statistical information is is not new. The eye- the most sophisticated information processor ever developed, and through graphical presentation we can gain insight into the structure being studied. Large volumes of information can be conveyed with graphs since the eye-brain system can summarize information quickly and extract the key features. [Ref. 14:p. 1] The visual display technique and relationships inherent Since the product, it is BEAM is an effective method for communicating the patterns in the spacial aspects of direct fire synchronization. project the warfighter is geared to providing the warfighter with a usable who became the focus of our visual display design. Effective visual displays have the following properties: visibility, distinguishability, and interpretability. Visibility means insuring 44 all critical elements are seen. - P(Hit) TOW Missile : : ; i « J | 0.9 0.8 |/| ; 0.7 / ! | I I "ft I 1 0.5 Ql 0.4 O 0.3 0.2 0.1 | | £• 0.6 I | | | :/!!![ ;/ I ! ! l/ I I ! I | | 1 L.I..1..L.I 1 I L 1 I ! I ! I I I i |j 1 1 500 1000 I 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 ! t t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 , , , i t I IX 500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 Ranae (Meters^ Figure 15. TOW Missile P(Hit) Curve Distinguishability provides Interpretability 15:p. 205] means that all elements of the display can be separated. the parts and symbols of the display can be understood. [Ref. Interpretability is enhanced when information reference familiar to the user. 45 is placed in a frame of The frame of reference which about military operations their entry level is most accepted is to communicate information the map. All warfighters receive programs and are comfortable with this map medium. training during A map of the area of operations, overlaid with a grid system of measurement, will provide the backdrop to the display. This will provide the warfighter directly with the range parameter developed in the model. The time parameter shots" of the battlefield during the will be introduced by taking "snap- engagement. The battle can then be animated different points in time to depict direct fire synchronization. the visual display must show The general concept in the is the height of the 16. The picture combat potential on the Z the axis OLI, and line-of-sight (LOS) to based on combining vehicle is The considerations. serves as an indicator variable to turn on and specific point. combat potential surface presented in resulting formula for off The combat power based on picture on the right contour form. The small circle or high value of combat power, which radiates will illustrated OLI{x,y)xLOS{x,y). whether or not a vehicle can engage a the is is: Z=Y, units LOS surface. shows the three dimensional left nature of the combat potential surface. This surface position, the third aspect that combat potential surface for displaying the two pictures of Figure The at downward over is shows the top, range. This display be come the visual medium for communicating the model output with regards combat potential or direct fire synchronization. 46 Figure 16. Combat Potential Surface Concept The information presentation technique of small multiples uses a single display format and updates the data for repeated images. Since the same over the period of animation a warfighter has decoded the initial similar approach map may be will remain the utilized. Once the data design, he will only have to adjust his perception to the changes in the combat potential surface to comprehend his current level of direct fire synchronization. summary The use of small of data by providing the decision the major substantive theme. The problem that the multiples works as an efficient maker with complementary variations of [Ref. 16:p. 30] display must overcome is translating the three dimensional combat potential surface onto a two dimensional presentation media. 47 HISTORICAL NTC SCENARIO (COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE) BATTLE TIME: MINS ^nm4HBIcombat potential £ SCORE (F[k,tM min) Figure 17. Historical Scenario at Start Color can be an important channel for conveying information. the use of color in a display can reduce visual search time by and increase accuracy is at the overcome by contouring The same the time. [Ref. 16:p. 216] to fifty to seventy percent The presentation problem on a map provides a point for this approach. Theories of vision show that the Lastly, a familiar has been shown that combat potential surface based on a color scheme. warfighter's familiarity with elevation contours gives considerable It human cognitive processing and decisive weight to contour information. [Ref. frame of reference was used show hot areas with a large volume of to color starting 16:p. code the contours. Red is 94] used direct fire. Conversely, blue represented the 48 cool areas where combat potential is low. Green and yellow are used between these two extremes. links The assignment of color to the combat potential surface was tied to the synchronization requirement for the battalion. The task force is attempting to overlap commander the killing potential of the subordinate company/teams. If the successful in his positioning will as transitional scheme then the effective combat power of two teams range the same area where he intends to destroy the enemy. effective combat power is defined as half of the total expected For kills that this study, a company in an upper bound on scheme of forty-two. The red and yellow areas show battlefield locations potentially could inflict in a the coloring is where the expected one minute period. This resulted killing potential of two companies are massed. The blue and green areas represent points where the battalion can but only one company's killing potential is inflict damage on the enemy, present. This implies that the prerequisite conditions for direct fire synchronization have not been established at the battalion level. The final key component of the display battalion's defensive plan. This uses to visually conducted. The contours allocated within EAs the operational overlay of the common military symbols, show the commander's literature, is intent of found how how the battle will be of the combat potential surface will show if direct fires were according to the battalion commander's plan. This display can serve as a key tool in the after-action review process to help levels, visualize in the doctrinal commanders, at all well their elements performed direct fire synchronization. 49 ENGAGEMENT AREA MODIFICATION NTC SCENARIO (COMBAT POTENT! AL DENSITY SURFACE) MINS BATTLE TIME: Figure 18. Engagement Area Positioning Scheme at Start Figure 17 is historical scenario. and to a an example display based on the It lesser extent overlapped a vehicles can greatly increase the Haw- Maw-Law approach in battlefield is EA positions of the NTC EA Shark shows that the task force had massed some few areas in EA with the engagement area dispositions, Figure 18, achieved initial is it is combat potential captured in Figure Cuda. 19. in fires in When this is contrasted seen that the repositioning of EA Cuda. The nature of the While some massing of fires is Cuda, the increased width of the green band running across the representative of the piecewise linearization of with this technique. While these diagrams show 50 combat power associated some minor differences in the HAW-MAW-LAW MODIFICATION NTC SCENARIO (COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE) BATTLE TIME: Figure 19. Haw-Maw-Law Approach relative synchronization of fires they different MOE results noted in now shows the at Start do not appear to account for the statistically Chapter IV. The increment was updated Figure 20 for these three cases to 120 combat fires battle. of two companies overlapping. In the center of the task force holes have been opened by the as white areas minutes into the potential status under the historical positioning scheme. Nowhere on the battlefield are the These are shown MINS on the north side of 51 EA OPFOR Cuda. At first echelon. this point in the HISTORICAL NTC SCENARIO (COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE) BATTLE TIME: 45 46 47 48 49 56 55 SO 57 MINS 120 58 60 59 Figure 20. Historical Scenario at 120 minutes engagement the enemy has destroyed southern end of the sector and is the counter-reconnaissance forces well on his way to passing the from the second echelon through the defense. Contrast 21, at 120 this situation minutes into the been maintained unable to force battle. In this case the as indicated by the bright has been added behind enemy has been with the engagement area positioning scheme, in Figure EA able to his way Cuda roll synchronization in band running through as forces repositioned from EA back counter-reconnaissance forces across EA Cuda. 52 its EA Cuda center. has Depth Shark. While the as before, he was ENGAGEMENT AREA MODIFICATION NTC SCENARIO (COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE) BATTLE TIME: 120 MINS Figure 21. Engagement Area Scenario at 120 minutes Lastly, Figure While the 22 shows the end game position for the level of direct fire massing in engagement area scheme, the two EA Cuda is Haw-Maw-Law somewhat less figures look very similar. This than the was reinforced by the statistical analysis in chapter four that could not differentiate the for these Law two tactic as how can tactical MOE approaches. Since the starting points showed the results Haw-Maw- having a lower combat potential then the engagement area technique, the two tactical approaches finish with similar results? the different approach. command and The answer is with control approaches used. Since the free fire technique was coupled with the Haw-Maw-Law approach, 53 this resulted in a lower level of HAW-MAW-LAW MODIFICATION NTC SCENARIO (COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE) BATTLE TIME: 120 MINS J" Figure 22. Haw-Maw-Law Scenario at 120 minutes combat power applied against the enemy for a longer period of time. Conversely, the use of a trigger line with the engagement area provided a high volume of it was delivered D. for a shorter duration. The fire, but net result was very similar outcomes. MODEL ANALYSIS The last aspect of this thesis asks the question, does the model provide any insights into the tactical parameters? The investigated the effects of opening the degree to which the control of direct the distance to the enemy decreases command and engagement fires control parameters have at various ranges based on the were centralized. Before opening the probability of a hit will increase. 54 fire, Once as the battle is joined, the dynamics of the dispositions at on which the defense what opening range is the For gun based systems for the OLI is engagement established. The key It is assumed this is that due point to discover then, a classical optimization to enemy tactical problem of trading time hitting the enemy fire, his doctrine, the P(Hit) will stop increasing OU-(RoF) X Figure 23. IS once the battle (t) X P(Hit) BEST RANGE TO START ENGAGEMENT Optimum Opening Range Problem 55 he or any other G> r as counter actions, such as shifting the direction of the attack, suppressing the defense with artillery measures consistent with is value maximized? engagement versus an improving chance of approaches. rapidly alter the static will is joined. For the purpose of this analysis at the initial firing value. was not investigated If the OLI is assumed that the P(hit) remains fixed This model captures the active nature of the enemy which in the simulation scenario. expanded beyond the one minute organization factors are discounted as formula it is weapon system interval specific, and the threat then the resulting is: OLI=(Rof)x(t)xP(Hit). Time and current target range are the two variables in this scheme. process, time available for the engagement is To simplify the expressed as the opening range divided by the rate of enemy advance (RoA). The result of this substitution is: OLI=(Rof)x(-^-)x(l--^—y. RoA Rmax Figure 24 OLI for To is a graph of this function over opening range and shows the nature of the an engagement under these conditions. find the optimal range at which to start the derivative to zero and solved. It can be shown that engagement we set the first this results in the following expression, r _ Rmax "(i+n) These results yielded optimal systems. For the opening ranges for the two gun based weapon missile based systems this analysis was simplified by the these functions are monotonically increasing in form. Their 56 maximum will fact the occur at M-1 OLI 16 — 14 — ', ! J y/- !- ! — *<* 1 O 12 CD oc 10 8 ID CO 6 CO 4 c o 1— CD Q. O 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 Range (Meters) Figure 24. Operational Lethality Index (OLI) the non-zero end point or in this case the summarizes the or Table 4 results of this analysis. This appears to clarify the fire weapons maximum range. statistical outcomes in chapter four. Recall, the free command and control methodology when paired with either the engagement area Haw-Maw-Law positioning schemes and trigger line were not statistically different. 57 the engagement area Opening ranges for combined with the gun based systems WEAPON OPENING SYSTEM RANGE ^ 4b *» TABLE 2343 25mm GUN 1590 TOW 3750 MISSILE OPENING RANGE SUMMARY 4. tend to be 120mm GUN less than their maximum, thus discounting the use of free and control methodology. fire command Furthermore, the range disparity between missile based systems and their gun counterparts demand non-linear emplacement for maximum direct fire volley intensity at the point of first contact. This result tends to nullify the strengths of the Haw-Maw-Law approach. Thus, the engagement area positioning scheme, augmented with the trigger line command and control technique seems to offer a superior tactical approach for defense in sector missions. The high levels of the minimum which the initial direct fire, when coupled with reaction time afforded the enemy, result in a tactical alignment in direct fires of each weapon system can be optimized through 58 synchronization. This was demonstrated in the graphical displays associated with the BEAM project. 59 VI. CONCLUSIONS FINDINGS A. The following hypothesis was tested for validity. Direct fire synchronization in the defense is best achieved support and execution is when subordinate elements decentralized consistent with the commander's intent. Statistical analysis of simulation results, as MOE, measured by the battalion/task force confirmed the hypothesis. The best tactical approach for the defense in sector mission engagement area positioning scheme with the the are positioned for mutual enemy is trigger line execution faced with constrained freedom of action, then the approach holds some promise when coupled with the free enemy of the is fire to combine the methodology. Haw-Maw-Law technique. to shift his point of attack following initial contact will help whether intensity of the opening fires If The ability determine should be traded for increased engagement time. Capturing the influence of direct BEAM project fire synchronization as envisioned by the does indeed appear possible. The combat potential surface provides the warfighter with a familiar visual reference through which to objectively explore his tactical dispositions. power The commander can track the concentrations of his relative to the operational graphics to see complying with his intent. how combat well subordinate units are This should provide for centralized planning and 60 decentralized execution. These components two are key to battlefield synchronization. As an after action review tool, the combat potential surface holds great promise. Since the potential of the battalion can be tracked before the start of the engagement, locating battlefield is now shortfalls beyond the scope of possible in an objective manner. For example, through an area where direct to lack of fires if the tactical dispositions OPFOR is able to push have been massed then the problem can be traced gunnery technique or failure in boresighting vice inadequate vehicle positioning. B. RECOMMENDATIONS The Combat of the Potential Surface should be included in the instrumental upgrade NTC's data collection exportability of this display and processing equipment. The format, speed, make it well suited to the future training process of Army battalions during defense in sector missions. This display has further potential to be incorporated at C. Army schools that use Janus(A) in their instruction. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH While the Combat Potential Surface has done a good job mounted anti-tank weapon systems at capturing vehicle the dismounted side of task force operations has not been modelled. Further efforts could include adding infantry weapons such as the Dragon or other hand held weapons to the display. Furthermore, a display that focused on the dismounted aspects of the battle could provide insights into the 61 combat conducted in the potential of infantry Lastly, non-armor weapons weapons still in fight. This display would show the combat in closed terrain. development could be added to the display once their operating parameters had been determined. This would allow for the visualization of the battlefield contribution of systems like the Hyper-velocity Anti-Tank Missile. Various different tactical approaches could be modelled to gain insight as to the effect of weapon parameters and their input to 62 combat potential. LIST 1. OF REFERENCES United States General Accounting Office,"Report to the Secretary of the Army, Army Training-National Training Center's Potential has not been Realized.", Washington, D.C. July 1986. 2. Kowalkosky, S. A., "Parametric Sensitivity Analysis of the JANUS(A) High Resolution Combat Model", Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1991. 3. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, "Operations",H e ad quarters Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. May 1986 4. Shadell, M. Environment of the National Training Center and Characteristics of Data Collected from the NTC Battlefield during Fiscal Years 1986-1989", Draft Paper Presented at the National Training Center and Fort J., "The Irwin, 21 April 1989. 5. Department of the Army, Training Circular Desert Operations", U.S. Army Armor School, 90-3, "Training Armor Units for Fort Knox, Kentucky, September 1975. 6. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Fleet Marine Field Manual 211, "MAGTF Antiarmor Operations" (Coordinating Draft) Quantico, Virginia. 21 7. December Isby, D. C, "Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army", Jane's Publishing Inc, New York 8. 1990. 1988. Dryer, D., U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command, "Comparison of JANUS(A) Combat Model to National Training Center (NTC) Battle Data", Monterey, California. June 1991. 9. Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-123 (Coordinating Draft), "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combined Arms Heavy Forces", U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. June 1991. 10. Hartman, J. K., "Lecture Notes in Aggregated Combat Modelling" 1985. 63 11. Dryer, D.,"An Analysis of Ground Maneuver Concentration During Deliberate Attack Missions and its NTC Influence on Mission Effectiveness", Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., Sept 1989. 12. Cochran W. G. and Snedecor G. W., University Press, Ames, Iowa 1978. 13. Dupuy, T. N., "Statistical Methods", Iowa State "Understanding War", Paragon House Publishers, New York, NY 1987. 14. Chambers J. M., Cleveland W. S., Kleiner B., and Tukey P. A., "Graphical Methods for Data Analysis", Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, Ca. 1983. 15. Kantonitz B. H. and Sorkin R. D., York, NY 1983. 16. Tufte, E. R., "Envisioning Information", Graphics Press, Cheshire, CT. 1990. 17. Koopmans, Press, 18. L. H., "Introduction to Boston MA. "Human Factors", Wiley Contemporary Statistical KY New Methods", Duxbury 1987. "National Training Center Trend Line Analysis", U.S. Knox, and Sons, 1989. 64 Army Armor Center, Fort INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST No. Copies 1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 2. Library, Code 52 2 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5002 3. Professor Harold J. Larson, Code OR/La 1 Department of Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943 4. U.S. Army Tradoc Analysis Command, Monterey ATTN: ATRC-RDM (CPT Fernan) 1 Box 8692 Monterey, California 93943-0692 P.O. 5. Professor William Kemple, Code OR/Ke 1 Department of Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943 6. Commandant Code TE-06 of the Marine Corps 1 Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001 7. MAGTF ATTN: Warfighting Center (WF13) Maj. R. W. Lamont Marine Corps Combat Development Quantico, Virginia 22134 65 1 Command 8. Commander U.S. Army Training and ATTN: ATCD Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000 9. Chief ARI Field Unit P.O. Box 5787 Presidio of Monterey, California 93944-5011 10. U.S. Army Combined Arms Research ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L Library Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-7000 11. Deputy Undersecretary of the Army Operations Research for ATTN: Mr. Hollis 2E660, The Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-0102 Room 12. Director Army Lessons Learned (CALL) ATTN: ATZL-CTL (CPT Robinson) Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-7000 Center for 13. Commander Operation Group ATTN: ATZL-TAL-O Fort Irwin, California 92310-5000 14. Commanding General National Training Center and Fort Irwin Fort Irwin, California 92310-5000 15. Commander U.S. Army TRADOC ATTN: ATRC Analysis Command Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5200 66 (CARL) DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOI MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 GAYLORD S