The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48
Author(s): Melvyn P. Leffler
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 346-381
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association
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AHR Forum
The AmericanConceptionof NationalSecurity
and theBeginnings
of theCold War,1945-48
MELVYN P. LEFFLER
IN AN INTERVIEW with Henry Kissingerin 1978 on "The Lessons of the Past,"
WalterLaqueur observedthatduringWorldWar II "fewifany people thought...
of the structureof peace thatwould followthe war except perhaps in the most
general termsof friendship,mutual trust,and the other noble sentimentsmentioned in wartimeprogrammaticspeeches about the United Nationsand related
topics."Kissingerconcurred,notingthat no statesman,except perhaps Winston
Churchill,"gave any attentionto what would happen afterthe war." Americans,
Kissingerstressed,"weredeterminedthatwe weregoingto base thepostwarperiod
on good faithand gettingalong witheverybody."'
politicswere
That twosuch astuteand knowledgeableobserversof international
so uninformedabout Americanplanningat the end of the Second World War is
testimony
to the enduringmythology
of Americanidealismand innocencein the
areas
worldof Realpolitik.It also reflectsthestateof scholarshipon theinterrelated
of strategy,economy,and diplomacy.Despite the publicationof severalexcellent
overviewsof the origins of the Cold War,2despite the outpouringof incisive
monographson Americanforeignpolicyin manyareas of the world,3and despite
Researchon thisarticlewas made possibleby generoussupportfromthe WoodrowWilsonInternational
and the VanderbiltUniversity
Center,the Councilon ForeignRelations,the HarryS. Truman Institute,
ResearchCouncil.The authorwishesto expresshis gratitudeforthe incisivecommentsand constructive
criticism
of Samuel Walker,MichaelHogan, WalterLaFeber,Thomas G. Paterson,CharlesEagles,Cecilia
Stiles,EduardMark,RobertPollard,RajonMenon,ErnestMay,and AndrewGoodpaster.Specialthanksgo to
documentspertaining
to declassify
to atomicstrategy.
David Rosenbergforhisunceasingefforts
' Kissinger,
1977-1980(Boston,1980), 123-24.
Statements,
FortheRecord:Selected
2 For recentoverviews
of theoriginsof the Cold War,whichseek to go beyondthe heatedtraditionalistStates
andthe
L. Gaddis,TheUnited
ofthe 1960sand early1970s,see,forexample,John
revisionist
controversies
Peace: TheOrigins
oftheColdWarand the
Origins
oftheColdWar(New York,1972); Daniel Yergin,Shattered
NationalSecurity
State(Boston,1978); Thomas G. Paterson,On EveryFront:TheMakingoftheColdWar(New
York,1979); and RoyDouglas,FromWartoColdWar,1942-48 (New York,1981).
3 For someof themostimportant
and mostrecentregionaland bilateralstudies,see,forexample,Bruce
and
in Iran,Turkey,
andDiplomacy
oftheColdWarin theNearEast: GreatPowerConflict
Kuniholm,TheOrigins
inGreece
(NewYork,1982);AaronMiller,
Greece
American
Intervention
1980); LawrenceS. Wittner,
(Princeton,
Foreign
Policy,
1939-1949(ChapelHill,N.C., 1980);MichaelB.
Search
SaudiArabianOilandAmerican
forSecurity:
onForeign
Oil,1941-47 (NewHaven,1980);
a National
Policy
TheSearchfor
Security:
Stoff,
Oil,War,andAmerican
(Westport,
Organization
Atlantic
oftheNorth
Alliance:TheOrigins
theEntangling
TimothyIreland,Creating
Treaty
346
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
347
some first-rate
studies on the evolution of strategicthinkingand the defense
establishment,4
no comprehensiveaccount yet exists of how American defense
officials
definednationalsecurityinterestsin the aftermathof World War II. Until
recently,
the absence of such a studywas understandable,forscholarshad limited
access to records pertaining to national security,strategicthinking,and war
planning.But in recentyearsdocumentsrelatingto theearlyyearsof theCold War
have been declassifiedin massivenumbers.5
Conn., 1981); William W. Stueck,Jr., The Road to Confrontation:
AmericanPolicytozward
China and Korea (Chapel
Hill, N.C., 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol:AmericanForeignPolicy,t.heCold War, and Korea,
1945-50 (Kent,Ohio, 1981); DorothyBorg and Waldo Heinrichs,eds., Uncertain
Years:Chinese-American
Relatio , 194 7-50 (New York, 1980); Robert J. McMahon, Colonialismand Cold War: The UnitedStatesand the
Strugglefor IndonesianIndependence(Ithaca, N.Y., 1981); Robert M. Blum, Drawing theLine: The Originof the
AmericanContainment
Policyin East Asia (New York, 1982); Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American
Relationsin Asia,
1945-1954 (Norman, Okla., 1981); Bruce Cumings, The OriginsoftheKorean War: Liberationand theEmergenceof
SeparateRegimes,1945-47 (Princeton, 1982); Geir Lundestaad, America,Scandanavia, and theCold War, 1945-49
(New York, 1980); Kenneth Ray Bain, March toZion: UnitedStatesForeignPolicyand theFoundingofIsrael (College
Station, Texas, 1979); Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine:flow the U.S. Came to RecognizeIsrael (Stanford,
1979); Robert M. Hathaway, AmbiguousPartnership:Britainand America,1944-47 (New York, 1981); Ierry H.
Anderson, The UnitedStates,GreatBnrtain,and theCold War, 1944-47 (Columbia, Mo., 1981); Edtard Mark,
"AmericanPolicytowardEastern Europe and the Originsof the Cold War, 1941-46: An Alternative
Interpretation,"Journal
ofAmerican
History[hereafter,JAHM,
68 (1981-82): 313-36; MichaelSchaller,"Securing
theGreatCrescent:OccupiedJapanand theOriginsof Containment
in SoutheastAsia,"ibid.,69 (1982-83):
392-414; ScottJackson,"Prologueto theMarshallPlan,"ibid.,65 (1978-79): 1043-68; and MichaelJ. Hogan,
"The Searchfora 'CreativePeace': The UnitedStates,EuropeanUnity,and theOriginsoftheMarshallPlan,"
Diplomatic
History,
6 (1982): 267-85.
4 For recentworkson strategy,
the nationalmilitary
establishment,
and the emergenceof the national
securitybureaucracy, see, for example, Richard Haynes, The AwesomePower: HarryS. Trumanas Commanderin
Chief(BatonRouge,La., 1973); AlfredD. Sander,"Trumanand theNationalSecurity
Council,1945-1947,"
JAH, 59 (1972-73): 369-88; Michael S. Sherry,Preparingfor theNext War: AmericanPlans for PostwarDefense,
1941-45 (New Haven, 1977); Brian L. Villa,"The U.S. Army,Unconditional
Surrender,and the Potsdam
Declaration,"JAH,
63 (1976-77): 66-92; JamesF. Schnaebel,TheHistorvoftheJoint
ChiefsofStaff:TheJointChiefs
ofStaffand NationalPolicy,volume 1: 1945-1947 (Wilmington,Del., 1979); Kenneth W. Condit, TheHistoryofthe
JointChiefsof Staff:TheJointChiefsof Staffand National Policy,volume 2: 1947-49 (Wilmington,Del., 1979);
Gregg Herken, The WinningWeapon: The AtomicBomb and theCold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980); David
Alan Rosenberg,
"AmericanAtomicStrategy
and the HydrogenBombDecision,"
JAH,66 (1979-80): 62-87;
Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat:StrategicAir Power and Containment
beforeKorea (Westport,Conn., 1982);
Mark Stoler,"From Continentalism
to Globalism:General StanleyD. Embick,theJointStrategicSurvey
Committee,
and the Military
View of AmericanNationalPolicyduringthe Second WorldWar,"Diplomatic
6 (1982): 303-21; WalterS. Poole,"FromConciliation
History,
to Containment:
The JointChiefsof Staffand
theComingoftheCold War,"Military
Affairs,
42 (1978): 12-16; ThomasH. Etzold,"The Far EastinAmerican
Strategy,1948-1951," in Etzold, ed., Aspectsof Sino-American
Relationssince 1784 (New York, 1978), 102-26;
Paolo E. Coletta, The UnitedStatesNavyand DefenseUnification,
1947-1953 (East Brunswick,N.J., 1981); Douglas
Kinnard,TheSecretary
ofDefense(Lexington,Ky., 1980); Anna K. Nelson,"NationalSecuLrity
I: Inventinga
Process,1945-1960,"in Hugh Heclo and Lester M. Salamon,eds., TheIllusionofPresidential
Government
(Boulder,Col., 1981),229-45; LarryD. O'Brien,"NationalSecurityand the New Warfare:DefensePolicy,
War Planning,and NuclearWeapons,1945-50" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Ohio StateUniversity,
1981);john T.
Greenwood,"The Emergenceof thePost-WarStrategic
AirForce,1945-1955,"paperdeliveredat theEighth
Military
HistorySymposium,
held at the UnitedStatesAir ForceAcademyin October1978; and RobertF.
Futrell,Ideas, Concepts,Doctrine:A HistoryofBasic Thinkingin theUnitedStatesAir Force,1907-1964 (Maxwell Air
ForceBase, Ala., 1971).
5 For the recordsof the JointChiefsof Staff,
see Record Group 218, NationalArchives,Washington
(hereafter,
RG 218); fortherecordsof theOfficeof theSecretary
ofDefense,see RecordGroup330,National
Archives,
Washington
(hereafter,
RG 330); and, fortherecordsof theNationalSecurity
Council,see Record
Group273,Judicial,Fiscal,and SocialBranch,NationalArchives,
of
Washington.
(I used thisspecialcollection
declassified
NationalSecurityCouncildocumentspriorto theirreceiving
a recordgroupnumberwithinthe
Judicial,Fiscal,and Social Branchof the NationalArchives.)There are important
NationalSecurityCouncil
materials
in the HarryS. TrumanPapers,President's
Secretary's
File,HarryS. TrumanPresidential
Library,
IndependenceMissouri(hereafter,
HTL, HSTP, PSF), boxes 191-208.Forassessments
bytheCIA, including
thosepreparedformeetings
oftheNationalSecurity
see ibid.,boxes249-60, 203-07.
Council(NSC), especially
For a helpfulguideto War and Armydepartment
recordsin theNationalArchives,
see Louis Galambos,ed.,
348
AHR Forum
This documentationnow makes it possible to analyze in greater depth the
perceptions,apprehensions,and objectivesof those defense officialsmost concerned withdefiningand defendingthe nation'ssecurityand strategicinterests.6
This essayseeks neitherto explainthe processof decisionmakingon any particular
issue nor to dissectthe domesticpoliticalconsiderationsand fiscalconstraintsthat
narrowedthe optionsavailableto policymakers.Furthermore,it does not pretend
to discernthe mnotivations
and objectivesof theSovietUnion.7Rather,thegoal here
is to elucidatethe fundamentalstrategicand economicconsiderationsthatshaped
the definitionof Americannationalsecurityinterestsin the postwarworld.Several
of these considerations-especiallyas they related to overseas bases, air transit
rights,and a strategicsphere of influencein Latin America-initiallywere the
logical resultof technologicaldevelopmentsand geostrategicexperiencesrather
than directlyrelated to postwarSoviet behavior.8But Americandefense officials
The Papers ofDwightDavid Eisenihower,
9 vols. (Baltimore, 1970-78), 9: 2262-70. Of greatestutilityin studying
the viewsof civilianiand militaryplanners in the Armyand War Department are Record Group 165, Records of
the Operations Division (OPD), and Records of American-BritishConversations (ABC); Record Group 319,
Records of the Plans and Operations Division (P&O); Record Group 107, Records of the Officeof the Secretary
of War, Robert P. Patterson Papers (RPPP), safe file and general decimal file,and Records of the Officeof the
AssistantSecretaryof War, Howard C. Peterson Papers (HCPP), classifieddecimialfile;and Record Group 335,
Records of the Under-Secretary of the Army, Draper/Voorhees files, 1947-50. The records of the navy's
StrategicPlans Division (SPD) and the Politico-MilitaryDivision (PMD) are divided into many subseries; helpful
indexes are available at the Naval Historical Center (NHC). The center also contains, among many other
collections,the records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO, double zero files) as well as the
mantuscriptcollections of many influentialnaval officers,inicludingChester Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Louis
Denfeld, and Arthur Radford. For air force records, I tried-with only moderate success-to use the following
materialsat the National Archives: Record Group 107, Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretaryof War
for Air, Plans, Policies, and Agreements, 1943-47; Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretaryof War for
Air, Establishmentof Air Fields and Air Bases, 1940-45; and Incoming and Outgoing Cablegrams, 1942-47;
and Record Group 18, Records of the Officeof the Chief of Air Staff,Headquarters Army Air Forces: Officeof
the Air AdjutanitGeneral, confidentialand secretdecimal correspondence file,1945-48. For the records of the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its successor, the State-Army-Navy-AirForce Coordinating
Committee, see Record Group 353, National Archives, Washington, and, for the important records of the
Committee of Three (meetings of the secretaries of state, war, and navy), see Record Group 107, RPPP, safe
file.
6 I use the termn
"defense officials"broadly in thisessay to include civilianappointees and militaryofficersin
the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in the officeof the secretaryof defense, in the armed
services, in the intelligence agencies, and on the staffof the National Security Council. While purposefully
avoiding a systematicanalysis of career diplomats in the Department of State, who have received much
attentionelsewhere, the conclusionis I draw here are based oIi a consideration of the views of high-ranking
officialsin the State Department, includingJames F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, and Robert
Lovett. For an excellent analysis of the views of career diplomats, see Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacyof Silence:
The AmericanForeign Service,the Soviet Union, anld the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980). Also see, for
example, Robert L. Messer, "Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternativesto
Containment, 1945-1946," DiplomaticHistory,1 (1977): 297-319; and W. W. Rostow, The DivisionofEurope after
WorldWar II: 1946 (Austin, Texas, 1981). Many of the references in note 3 deal extensivelywith the views of
State Department officials;see pages 346-47, above.
7For recent studies of Soviet policy during this era, see, for example, Adam Ulam, The Rivals: Americaand
Russia sinceWorldWar II (New York, 1971), 3-151, and Stalin: TheMan and His Era (New York, 1973), 604-99;
William Zimmerman, "Choices in the Postwar World, 1: Containment and the Soviet Union," in Charles Gati,
anidtheCold War (Indianapolis, 1974), 85-108; Vojtech Mastny,Russia'sRoad to
ed., Caging theBear: Containment
the Cold War (New York, 1979); William 0. McCagg, Stalin Embattled,1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978); William
Taubman, Stalin's AmericanPolicy: From Ententeto Detenteto Cold War (New York, 1982); Werner G. Hahn,
Postwar Soviet Policies: The Fall of Zmd anov and theDefeat of Moderation(Ithaca, N.Y., 1982); and Alvin Z.
Rubinstein,SovietForeignPolicysince WorldWar II: Imperialand Global (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 2-70.
8 Any assessment of postwar national securitypolicy must also take note of the role of the atomic bomb in
U.S. strategyand diplomacy. But, since nuclear weapons have received extensive attentionelsewhere, I deal
with this issuLe rather briefly; see pages 371-72, below. For excellent work on the atomic bomb, see, for
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
349
also considered the preservationof a favorablebalance of power in Eurasia as
fundamentalto U.S. nationalsecurity.This objectiveimpelleddefenseanalystsand
intelligenceofficersto appraise and reappraisethe intentionsand capabilitiesof the
SovietUnion. Rathermodestestimatesof theSoviets'abilityto wage war againstthe
United Statesgeneratedthe widespreadassumptionthatthe Sovietswould refrain
frommilitaryaggressionand seek to avoid war. Nevertheless,Americandefense
officialsremained greatlypreoccupied with the geopoliticalbalance of power in
Europe and Asia, because thatbalance seemed endangeredbycommunistexploitation of postwar economic dislocation and social and political unrest. Indeed,
Americanassessmentsof the Soviet threatwere less a consequence of expanding
Soviet militarycapabilitiesand of Soviet diplomaticdemands than a result of
growingapprehensionabout the vulnerability
of Americanstrategicand economic
interestsin a world of unprecedented turmoiland upheaval. Viewed from this
perspective,the Cold War assumed many of its most enduring characteristics
during 1947-48, when American officialssought to cope with an array of
challengesby implementingtheirown conceptsof nationalsecurity.
OFFICIALS FIRST BEGAN to think seriouslyabout the nation's postwar
securityduring 1943-44. Militaryplannersdevisedelaborateplans foran overseas
base system.Many of these plans explicitlycontemplatedthe breakdownof the
wartimecoalition. But, even when strategicplanners postulated good postwar
relationsamong theAllies,theirplans called foran extensivesystemof bases. These
bases were defined as the nation's strategicfrontier.Beyond this frontierthe
United States would be able to use force to counterany threatsor frustrateany
overtacts of aggression.Withinthe strategicfrontier,
Americanmilitarypredominance had to remain inviolate.Althoughplans for an overseasbase systemwent
throughmany revisions,theyalways presupposed Americanhegemonyover the
Atlanticand Pacificoceans. These plans receivedPresidentFranklinD. Roosevelt's
endorsementin early 1944. Afterhis death, army and navy planners presented
theirviews to PresidentHarry S. Truman, and ArmyChief of StaffGeorge C.
MarshalldiscussedthemextensivelywithSecretaryof StateJamesC. Byrnes.9
AMERICAN
example, MartinJ. Sherwin,A WorldDestroyed:
TheAtomic
Bomband theGrandAliance (New York, 1973); BartonJ.
Bernstein,
"The Quest forSecurity:AmericanForeignPolicyand International
Controlof AtomicEnergy,
60 (1973-74): 1003-44; Herken,TheWinning
Weapon;and Rosenberg,"AmericanAtomic
1942-1946,"JAH,
Strategy
and theHydrogenBombDecision."For older,butstillveryimportant
accounts,see P. M. S. Blackett,
Fear, War,and theBomb(New York, 1949); Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar G. Anderson, TheNew World:A History
of theUnitedStatesAtomicEnergnCommission,
1939-1946 (UniversityPark, Pa., 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and
Francis Duncan, AtomicShield:A Historyof theUnitedStatesAtomicEnergyCommission,
1947-52 (UniversityPark,
Pa., 1969); Gar Alperovitz,
Atomic
Diplomacy:
andPotsdam
(New York,1965); and HerbertFeis,The
Hiroshimna
AtomicBomband theEnd of WorldWar II (Princeton, 1966).
9PlansforAmerica'soverseasbase systemmaybe foundin RG 218, CombinedChiefsof Staff(CCS) series
360 (12-9-42):JointStrategicSurveyCommittee[hereafter,
JSSC], "Air Routesacrossthe Pacificand Air
Facilities
forInternational
PoliceForce,"March15, 1943,JSSC 9/1;JointChiefsof StaffUCS], "UnitedStates
November2,
Military
Requirements
forAir Bases, Facilities,
and OperatingRightsin ForeignTerritories,"
1943,JCS 570/2;JointWar PlansCommittee[hereafter,
JWPC],"OverallExaminationof the UnitedStates
Requirements
forMilitary
Bases,"August25, 1943,JWPC361/4;andJWPC,"OverallExamination
of United
States Requirementsfor MilitaryBases," September 13, 1945, JWPC 361/5 (revised).For Roosevelt's
endorsement,
see RoosevelttotheDepartment
ofState,January7, 1944,ibid.,
JWPC361/5;forcivilian-military
350
AHR Forum
Two strategicconsiderationsinfluencedthe developmentof an overseas base
system.The firstwas the need for defense in depth. Since attacksagainst the
United Statescould only emanate fromEurope and Asia, theJointChiefsof Staff
concluded as early as November 1943 that the United States must encirclethe
WesternHemispherewitha defensiveringof outlyingbases. In the Pacificthisring
had to include the Aleutians,the Philippines,Okinawa, and the formerJapanese
mandates.Recognizingthe magnitudeof thisstrategicfrontier,
AdmiralWilliamE.
Leahy, chiefof staffto the president,explained to Truman that thejoint chiefs
were not thinkingof the immediatefuturewhen,admittedly,
no prospectivenaval
power could challengeAmericanpredominancein the Pacific.Instead,theywere
contemplating
the long term,when the United Statesmightrequirewartimeaccess
to theresourcesof southeastAsia as wellas "a firmlineof communications
fromthe
West Coast to the Asiaticmainland,plus denial of thisline in timeof war to any
potential enemy."'0 In the Atlantic,strategicplanners maintained that their
minimumrequirementsincluded a West Africanzone, withprimarybases in the
Azores or Canary Islands. Leahy wenteven further,insistingon primarybases in
West Africa itself-for example, at Dakar or Casablanca. The object of these
defensivebases was to enable the United Statesto possess completecontrolof the
"I
Atlanticand Pacificoceans and keep hostilepowersfarfromAmericanterritory.
Defense in depth was especiallyimportantin lightof the Pearl Harbor experience, the advance of technology,and the development of the atomic bomb.
Accordingto theJointChiefsof Staff,"Experiencein the recentwar demonstrated
mustbeginbeyondits
conclusively
thatthedefenseof a nation,ifitis to be effective,
frontiers.The advent of the atomic bomb reemphasizesthis requirement.The
fartheraway from our own vital areas we can hold our enemy through the
possession of advanced bases...,
the greater are our chances of surviving
successfullyan attack by atomic weapons and of destroyingthe enemy which
employs them against us." Believing that atomic weapons would increase the
incentiveto aggressionby enhancingthe advantageof surprise,militaryplanners
never ceased to extol the utilityof forwardbases fromwhich Americanaircraft
could seek to interceptattacksagainstthe United States.'2
discussionof base requirements
followingthe president'sdeath,see OPD, "Extractof Conversation-Adm.
Duncanand Gen. Lincoln,"June
18, 1945,RG 165,OPD 336 (topsecret);OPD, Memorandum
fortheRecord,
June 30, 1945,ibid.;GeneralGeorge A. Lincoln,"MemorandumconcerningU.S. Post-WarPacificBases,"
June30, 1945,ibid.;and GeorgeC. MarshalltoJamesF. Byrnes,
July23, 1945,ibid.
'? For Leahy'sexplanation,
see JCS,"Strategic
Areasand Trusteeships
in thePacific,"
October10, 18, 1946,
forAir Bases,"
RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-9-42),JCS 1619/15,19;JCS,"UnitedStatesMilitary
Requlirements
November2, 1943; JCS, "OverallExaminationof UnitedStatesRequirements
Bases and Base
forMilitary
Rights,"
October25, 1945,ibid.,JCS 570/40.
"JCS, "UnitedStatesMilitary
Requirements
forAir Bases,"November2, 1943;JCS, Minutesof the 71st
meeting,
March30, 1943,RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-9-42);Leahy,MemorandumforthePresident,
November
15,1943,ibid.;Nimitz,Memorandum,
October16,1946,ibid.,
JCS 1619/16;andJointPlanningStaff[hereafter,
JPS],"Basis for the Formulationof a Post-WarMilitaryPolicy,"August20, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381
(5-13-45),JPS 633/6.
'2JCS,"Statement
of Effect
ofAtomicWeaponson NationalSecurity
and Military
Organization,"
March29,
1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 471.6 Atom (8-17-45),JCS 477/10.Also see JCS, "Guidanceas to the Military
Implications
of a UnitedNationsCommissionon AtomicEnergy,"
January12, 1946,ibid.,JCS 1567/26;and
JCS, "Over-AllEffectof AtomicBomb on Warfareand Military
Organization,"
October30, 1945,ibid.,JCS
1477/1.
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
351
The second strategicconsiderationthatinfluencedthe plan fora comprehensive
overseas base system was the need to project American power quickly and
effectively
againstany potentialadversary.In conductingan overallexaminationof
requirementsfor base rightsin September 1945, theJointWar Plans Committee
stressedthatWorld War II demonstratedthe futility
of a strategyof staticdefense.
The United States had to be able to take "timely"offensiveaction against the
adversary'scapacityand will to wage war. New weapons demanded thatadvance
bases be establishedin "areas well removedfromthe United States,so as to project
our operations,withnew weapons or otherwise,nearer the enemy."Scientists,
like
of thesenew weapons
VannevarBush, argued that,"regardlessof the potentialities
[atomic energy and guided missiles],they should not influencethe number,
location,or extentof strategicbases now consideredessential."The basic strategic
concept underlyingall American war plans called for an air offensiveagainst a
prospectiveenemyfromoverseasbases. Delays in the developmentof the B-36, the
firstintercontinental
bomber,onlyaccentuatedthe need forthese bases.'3
In October 1945 the civilianleaders of the War and Navydepartmentscarefully
reviewedthe emergingstrategicconcepts and base requirementsof the military
planners.Secretaryof the NavyJames Forrestaland Secretaryof War Robert P.
Pattersondiscussed them with Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,and
Secretaryof State Byrnes.The civiliansecretariesfullyendorsed the conceptof a
far-flung
systemof bases in the Atlanticand Pacificoceans thatwould enhance the
offensivecapabilitiesof the United States.'4Having expended so much blood and
effortcapturingJapanese-heldislands, defense officials,like Forrestal,naturally
wishedto devise a base systemin the Pacificto facilitate
the projectionof American
influenceand power. The Philippineswere the keyto southeastAsia, Okinawa to
the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the industrialheartlandof northeastAsia.
Fromthesebases on America's"strategicfrontier,"
the UnitedStatescould preserve
itsaccessto vitalraw materialsin Asia, denytheseresourcesto a prospectiveenemy,
help preservepeace and stability
in troubledareas, safeguardcriticalsea lanes,and,
of any
if necessary,conduct an air offensiveagainst the industrialinfrastructure
Asiaticpower,includingthe Soviet Union.'5
1? For the emphasis on "timely"action, see JWPC, "Overall Examination of Requirements for MilitaryBases"
(revised), September 13, 1946; for the need for advance bases, see JCS, "StrategicConcept and Plan for the
Employmentof United States Armed Forces," September 19, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5-13-45), JCS 1518;
for Bush's view, see JWPC, "Effectof Foreseeable New Developments and Counter-Measures on a Post-War
StrategicConcept and Plan," August 22, 1945, ibid.,JWPC 394/1/M.Also see, for the evolution of strategicwar
plans, many of the materials in RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46).
14 For the discussions and conclusions of civilian officials,see Leahy to Patterson and Forrestal, October 9,
1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret); Robert Lovett to Chief of Staff,October 12, 1945, ibid.; Patterson to the
Secretaryof Navy, October 17, 1945, ibid.; and Forrestal to Byrnes, October 4, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360
(12-9-42). For Forrestal's views, also see Forrestal to James K. Vardaman, September 14, 1945, Mudd Library,
Princeton University,James Forrestal Papers [hereafter ML, JFP], box 100; Forrestal to Byrnes, October 4,
1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42); and Vincent Davis, PostwarDefensePolicyand theU.S. Navy, 1943-1946
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), 157-206, 259-66.
15 For the Philippines, see, for example, Strategy Section, OPD,
"Post-War Base Requirements in the
Philippines,"April 23, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret),and "Report on the MilitaryBase Requirements in
the Philippines," October 20, 1945, ibid. For Okinawa, see JCS, "Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands," September 10, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-942),JCS 1619/9;JCS, "Reviewof United StatesControl Needed over the
Japanese Islands," August 26, 1947, ibid.,JCS 1619/24; and Lincoln, "Memorandum concerning U.S. Post-War
Pacific Bases," June 30, 1945.
352
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Controlof the Atlanticand Pacificoceans throughoverseasbases was considered
indispensableto the nation's securityregardlessof what might happen to the
wartimecoalition.So was controlover polar air routes.AdmiralLeahy criticizeda
JointStrategicSurveyCommitteereportof early 1943 thatomittedIceland and
Greenlandas primarybase requirements.When General S. D. Embick,the senior
member of that committee,continued to question the desirabilityof a base in
Iceland, lestit antagonizethe Russians,he was overruledby AssistantSecretaryof
WarJohnMcCloy.McCloychargedthatEmbickhad "a ratherrestricted
conceptof
whatis necessaryfornationaldefense."The firstpostwarbase systemapproved by
both theJointChiefsof Staffand the civiliansecretariesin October 1945 included
Iceland as a primarybase area. The JointWar Plans Committeeexplained that
Americanbases must controlthe air in the Arctic,preventthe establishmentof
enemy militaryfacilitiesthere,and support America'sown strikingforces.Once
Soviet-American
relationsbegan to deteriorate,Greenlandalso was designatedas a
primarybase for American heavy bombers and fightersbecause of its close
proximityto the industrialheartlandof the potentialenemy.As the United States
sought rights for bases along the Polar route in 1946 and 1947, moreover,
Americandefense officialsalso hoped to thwartSoviet effortsto acquire similar
rightsat Spitzbergenand Bear Island.'6
In theimmediatepostwaryearsAmericanambitionsforan elaboratebase system
encounteredmanyproblems.Budgetaryconstraints
compelledmilitary
plannersto
drop plans for many secondaryand subsidiarybases, particularlyin the South
Pacificand Caribbean. These sacrificesmerelyincreasedthe importanceof those
bases thatlay closer to a potentialadversary.By early 1948, thejoint chiefswere
willingto foregobase rightsin such places as Surinam,Curacoa-Aruba,Cayenne,
Nounea, and Vivi-Levu if 'joint" or "participating"rightscould be acquired or
preservedin Karachi,Tripoli,Algiers,Casablanca,Dharan, and Monrovia.Budgetary constraints,
then,limitedthe depth of the base systembut not the breadthof
Americanambitions.'7Furthermore,the governmentsof Panama, Iceland, Denmark,Portugal,France,and Saudi Arabia oftenrejectedor abolishedthe exclusive
rightsthe United States wanted and sometimeslimitedthe numberof American
personnelon such bases. Washington,therefore,negotiateda varietyof arrangementsto meetthe objectionsof hostgovernments.By early 1948, forexample,the
base in Iceland was operated by a civiliancompanyunder contractto the United
16 For Leahy'sviews,see JCS, Minutesof the 71stmeeting,
March30, 1943. For the differences
between
Embickand McCloy,see EmbicktoJohnHickerson,
June8, 1945,RG 165,OPD 336 (topsecret);and HarrisonA.
of Iceland and Greenlandas
Gerhardt,MemorandumforGeneralHull, June16, 1945,ibid.For the utility
bases,see JWPC,"Attributes
of UnitedStatesOverseasBases," November2, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360
(12-9-42),JWPC 361/10;NSC, "Reportby the NSC on Base Rightsin Greenland,Iceland,and theAzores,"
November25, 1947,ibid.,NSC 2/1;and AlbertC. Wedemeyer
toSecretary
ofDefense,March6, 1948,RG 330,
box 19,CD 6-1-44(decimalcorrespondence
file).And,forthedilemmaposed byprospective
Sovietdemands
forsimilarbase rightsat Spitzbergen,
see,forexample,JCS,"ForeignPolicyoftheUnitedStates,"February10,
1946,RG 218,ser.CCS 092 US (12-21-45),JCS1519/2;Department
ofState,Foreign
Relations
oftheUnited
States
[hereafter,
FRUS], 1947, 8 vols. (Washington,1971-73), 1: 708-12, 766-70, and 3: 657-87, 1003-18; and
Lundestad, America,Scandanavia, and theCold War, 63-76.
17 See, forexample,Reportof the Director,
JointStaff,March 18, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42),
JointStrategic
PlansGroup [hereafter
JSPG]503/1.For thespecialemphasison NorthAfricanbases,see, for
example,Forrestalto Truman,January6, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 156. And, for furtherevidence
regardingplansforthedevelopment
of thebase systemin 1947-48,see notes70-71, below.
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
353
States Air Force; in the Azores, the base was manned by a detachmentof
Portuguesemilitarypersonnel operatingunder the Portugueseflag,but an air
forcedetachmentservicedthe Americanaircraftusing the base. In Port Lyautey,
thebase was under thecommandof the Frenchnavy,butunder a secretagreement
an American naval team took care of American aircrafton the base. In Saudi
Arabia,theDharan air stripwas cared forby300 U.S. personneland was capable of
in
handlingB-29s. Because these arrangementswere not altogethersatisfactory,
mid-1948 Secretaryof Defense Forrestaland Secretaryof the Army Kenneth
Royall advocated using American economic and militaryassistanceas levers to
acquire more permanentand comprehensivebase rights,particularly
in Greenland
and NorthAfrica.18
Less well knownthanthe Americaneffortto establisha base system,but integral
to the policymakers'conceptionof national security,was the attemptto secure
military
air transitand landingrights.Military
plannerswantedsuch rightsat critical
locationsnot onlyin the WesternHemispherebut also in NorthAfrica,the Middle
East, India, and southeast Asia. To this end they delineated a route from
Casablanca through Algiers,.Tripoli, Cairo, Dharan, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta,
Rangoon,Bangkok,and Saigon to Manila.'9 In closingout theAfrican-MiddleEast
theater at the conclusion of the war, General H. W. Aurand, under explicit
instructions
fromthe secretaryof war,made preparationsforpermanentrightsat
seven airfieldsin North Africaand Saudi Arabia.20Accordingto a studyby the
JointChiefs of Staff,"Militaryair transitrightsfor the United States along the
NorthAfrican-Indianroutewere mostdesirablein order to provideaccess to and
familiarity
withbases fromwhichoffensiveand defensiveactionmightbe conducted in the eventof a major war,and to providean alternaterouteto China and to
United States Far Eastern bases." In other words,such rightswould permitthe
rapid augmentationof Americanbases in wartimeas wellas therapid movementof
Americanair unitsfromtheeasternto thewesternflankof theU.S. base system.In
order to maintainthese airfieldsin a stateof readiness,the United Stateswould
have to relyon privateairlines,whichhad to be persuadedto locatetheiroperations
in areas designatedessentialto militaryair transitrights.In thisway,airports"in
being" outside the formalAmericanbase systemwould be available for military
operationsin timesof crisisand war.AssistantSecretaryMcCloyinformedtheState
18 For the situation
in Iceland,the Azores,and PortLyautey,see EdmondT. Wooldridgeto theGeneral
Boardof theNavy,April30, 1948,NHC, Recordsof theGeneralBoard 425 (ser.315); forSaudi Arabia,see
duringRecentTripto theMediterranean-Middle
Observations
Reporton Pertinent
G. R. Cooperetal., "Joint
on theDharanbase,
EastArea,"September25, 1948,NHC, SPD, centralfiles,1948,A8; formoreinformation
"KeepingtheDoor Open inSaudi Arabia:The U.S. and the
alsoseeFRUS, 1948,5: 209-63; JamesL. Gormly,
4 (1980): 189-206; and, for aspirationsto secure more
History,
Dharan Airfield,1945-46," Diplomatic
28, 1948,RG 330,box 1 9, CD 27-1-21;
see Royallto Forrestal,July
baserights,
and comprehensive
permanent
concernwithbase rightsin Icelandand
and Forrestalto Royall,August7, 1948,ibid.The StateDepartment's
pact;see FRUS, 1948,3: 169-351.For
talkson a security
theexploratory
Greenlandwas evidentthroughout
NorthAfrica,also see ibid.,682-715.
Basesand Rights,"
forMilitary
September27,
of UnitedStatesRequirements
'9JCS,"Over-AllExamination
forTransit
of Requirements
1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-942),JCS 570/34;JPS,"Over-AllExamination
Air Bases in ForeignCountries,"January8, 1946, ibid.,JPS 781; and JCS, "Over-AllExaminationof
June30, 1946,ibid.,
JCS 570/52.
forTransitAirBasesand AirBase Rightsin ForeignCountries,"
Requirements
Library,
Abilene,Kansas
20Aurandto Patterson,
February7, 1946,DwightDavid EisenhowerPresidential
ofState,March17, 1946,ibid.
of Warto Secretary
[hereafter,
DDEL], H. S. AurandPapers,box 28; Secretary
354
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Departmentat the beginningof 1945 that a "strongUnited States air transport
system,internationalin scope and readilyadapted to military
use, is vitalto our air
powerand futurenationalsecurity."Even earlier,thejoint chiefshad agreed not to
include South American air bases in their strategicplans so long as it was
understoodthatcommercialfieldsin thatregionwould be developed witha viewto
subsequentmilitaryuse.2'
In Latin America,Americanrequirementsforeffective
nationalsecuritywentfar
beyondair transitrights.In a reportwritteninJanuary1945 at AssistantSecretary
McCloy'sbehest,the War Departmenturged Americancollaborationwith Latin
American armed forces to insure the defense of the Panama Canal and the
WesternHemisphere. Six areas withinLatin America were consideredof special
significanceeither for strategicreasons or for their raw materials:the Panama
Canal and approaches within one thousand miles; the Straits of Magellan;
northeastBrazil; Mexico; the river Plate estuary and approaches within five
hundred miles; and Mollendo, Peru-Antofagusta,
and Chile. These areas were so
"important,"
Secretaryof War Pattersonexplained to Secretaryof StateMarshallin
early 1947, "thatthe threatof attackon any of themwould forcethe United States
to come to theirdefense,even thoughit were not certainthatattackon the United
Statesitselfwould follow."The resourcesof theseareas wereessentialto the United
States,because "it is imperativethatour war potentialbe enhanced... duringany
"22
nationalemergency.
Whilepayinglip serviceto the United Nationsand worryingabout the impactof
regionalagreementsin the WesternHemisphereon Sovietactionsand American
influencein Europe, theJointChiefsof Staffinsistedthatin practicenon-American
forceshad to be kept out of the WesternHemisphereand the Monroe Doctrine
had to be keptinviolate."The WesternHemisphereis a distinctmilitary
entity,the
integrity
of whichis a fundamentalpostulateof our securityin theeventof another
worldwar."23 Developmentsin aviation,rockets,guided missiles,and atomicenergy
had made "thesolidarity
of the Hemisphereand itsunitedsupportof theprinciples
of the Monroe Doctrine"more importantthanbefore.Pattersontold Marshallthat
effectiveimplementationof the Monroe Doctrine now meant "thatwe not only
refuse to tolerate foreign colonization,control,or the extension of a foreign
politicalsystemto our hemisphere,but we take alarm fromthe appearance on the
continentof foreignideologies,commercialexploitation,cartelarrangements,or
21JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirements for Transit Air Bases . . .," January 20, 1946, RG 218, ser.
CCS 360 (10-9-42), JPS 781/1; and McCloy, Memorandum to the Department of State, Jan-uary31, 1945,
RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret). Also see JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirements for Transit Air Bases,"
January 8, 1946; and, for the joint chiefs' view on South American air fields, see JCS, Minutes of the 69th
meeting, March 23, 1943, RG 218, CCS 360 (12-9-42).
22 P&O, "The Strategic Importance of Inter-American MilitaryCooperation" [January 20, 1947], RG 319,
092 (top secret). Also see H. A. Craig, "Summary,"January 5, 1945, RG 107, Records of the AssistantSecretary
of War for Air, Establishment of Air Fields and Air Bases, box 216 (Latin America); and War Department,
"Comprehensive Statement" January 1945], ibid.
23JCS, "Foreign Policy of the United States," February 10, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 United States
(12-21-45), JCS 1592/2; and JCS to the Secretaryof the Navy and Secretaryof War, September 19, 1945, ibid.,
ser. CCS 092 (9-10-45),JCS 1507/2. ForJCS views onithe Western Hemisphere, also seeJCS to the Secretaryof
the Navy and Secretary of War, February 11, 1945, ibid., ser. CCS 092 (1-18-45); JCS, "International
Organization for the Enforcement of World Peace and SecuLrity,"
April 14, 1945, ibid.,ser. CCS 092 (4-14-45),
JCS 1311; andJCS, "Guidance as to Command and Control of the Armed Forces to be Placed at the Disposal of
the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations," May 26, 1946, ibid.,JCS 1670/5.
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
355
other symptomsof increased non-hemisphericinfluence.... The basic consideration has alwaysbeen an overridingapprehensionlesta base be establishedin this
area by a potentiallyhostileforeignpower."The United States,Pattersoninsisted,
musthave "a stable,secure,and friendlyflankto the South,notconfusedbyenemy
penetration,political,economic,or military."24
The need to predominatethroughoutthe WesternHemispherewas not a result
of deterioratingSoviet-Americanrelationsbut a naturalevolutionof the Monroe
Doctrine,accentuated by Axis aggression and new technologicalimperatives.25
Patterson,Forrestal,and ArmyChiefof StaffDwightD. Eisenhowerinitiallywere
impelledless by reportsof Sovietespionage,propaganda, and infiltration
in Latin
Americathanby accountsof Britisheffortsto sell cruisersand aircraftto Chile and
Ecuador; Swedish sales of anti-aircraft
artilleryto Argentina;and Frenchoffersto
build cruisersand destroyersfor both Argentinaand Brazil.26To forecloseall
foreigninfluenceand to insure United Statesstrategichegemony,militaryofficers
and the civilian secretariesof the War and Navy departmentsargued for an
extensivesystemof United States bases, expansion of commercialairlinefacilities
throughoutLatinAmerica,negotiationof a regionaldefensepact,curtailment
of all
foreignmilitaryaid and foreignmilitarysales, trainingof Latin Americanmilitary
officers
in the United States,outfitting
of Latin AmericanarmieswithU.S. military
equipment,and implementation
of a comprehensivemilitary
assistanceprogram.27
The militaryassistanceprogram,as embodied in the Inter-AmericanMilitary
CooperationAct,generatedthe mostinteragencydiscord.Latin Americanexperts
in the State Department maintained that militaryassistance would stimulate
regionalconflicts,
dissipateLatin Americanfinancialresources,and divertattention
fromeconomicand social issues.Before leavingoffice,Byrnesforcefully
presented
the State Departmentpositionto Forrestaland Patterson.Instead of dwellingon
the consequencesof militaryassistanceforLatin America,Byrnesmaintainedthat
such a programwould be too costlyforthe UnitedStates,would focusattentionon
a region where American interestswere relativelyunchallenged, and would
underminemore importantAmericaninitiativeselsewhereon the globe. "Greece
and Turkeyare our outposts,"he declared.28
21 For Patterson's views, see P&O, "Strategic Importance of Inter-American MilitaryCooperation" Janutary 20, 1947]; and Patterson to Byrnes, December 18, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3.
25 This evaluation accords with the views of Chester J. Pach, Jr.; see his "The Containment of United States
MilitaryAid to Latin America, 1944-1949," DiplomaticHisto7y,6 (1982): 232-34.
26 For fears of foreign influence, see, for example, [no signature] "MilitaryPolitical Cooperation with the
Other American Republics," June 24, 1946, RG 18, 092 (International Affairs),box 567; Patterson to the
Secretary of State, July31, 1946, RG 353, SWNCC, box 76; Eisenhower to Patterson, November 26, 1946,
RG 107, HCPP, general decimal file,box 1 (top secret);S. J. Chamberlinto Eisenhower,November 26, 1946, ibid.;
Minutes of the meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, December 11, 1946, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,
box 3; and Director of Intelligence to Director of P&O, February 26, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 091 France. For
reports on Soviet espionage, see, for example, Military Intelligence Service [hereafter, MIS], "SovietCommunist Penetration in Latin America," March 24, 1945, RG 165, OPD, 336 (top secret); and MIS,
"Summary of a Study ... on Soviet-Communist Penetration in Latin America," September 27, 1945, ibid.
27 See, for example, Craig, "Summary,"January 5, 1945; JPS, "MilitaryArrangements Deriving from the Act
of Chapultepec Pertainingto Bases," January14, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (9-10-45),JPS 7661/3;Pattersonto
Byrnes, December 18, 1946; and P&O, "Strategic Importance of Inter-American Military Cooperation"
January 20, 1947].
28 Minutesof the meetingof the Secretariesof State, War, and the Navy, December 18, 1946, April 23, May 1,
1947, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3; and M. B. Ridgway, Memorarndum for the Assistant Secretary of War,
February 1947, ibid.,HCPP, 092 (classified).
356
AHR Forum
The secretaryof stateclearlydid not thinkthatCongresswould authorizefunds
for Latin America as well as for Greece and Turkey. AlthoughTruman favored
militaryassistanceto Latin America,competingdemands for Americanresources
in 1947 and 1948 forcedbothmilitaryplannersand U.S. senatorsto givepriority
to
WesternEurope and the Near East. In June 1948 the Inter-AmericanMilitary
CooperationAct died in the Senate. But thissignifiedno diminutionin American
nationalsecurityimperatives;indeed, it underscoredByrnes'sstatementof December 1946 thatthe "outposts"of the nation'ssecuritylay in the heartof Eurasia.29
FROM THE CLOSING DAYS OF WORLD WAR II, Americandefenseofficials
believedthat
theycould not allow any prospectiveadversaryto controlthe Eurasian land mass.
This was the lesson taught by two world wars. Strategicthinkersand military
analystsinsistedthatany poweror powersattemptingto dominateEurasia mustbe
regardedas potentiallyhostileto the United States.30Their acute awarenessof the
importanceof Eurasia made Marshall,Thomas Handy, George A. Lincoln,and
other officerswaryof the expansion of Soviet influencethere. Cognizant of the
growthin Sovietstrength,GeneralJohn Deane, head of the United Statesmilitary
missionin Moscow, urged a tougher stand against Soviet demands even before
World War II had ended. While acknowledgingthatthe increasein Sovietpower
stemmedprimarilyfromthe defeatof Germanyand Japan,postwarassessmentsof
the JointChiefs of Staffemphasized the importanceof deterringfurtherSoviet
aggrandizementin Eurasia.3' Concern over the consequencesof Russian dominaPach, "MilitaryAid to Latin America," 235-43.
This view was most explicitlypresented in an army paper examining the State Department's expostulation
of U.S. foreign policy. See S. F. Giffin,"Draft of Proposed Comments for the AssistantSecretary of War on
'Foreign Policy"' [early February 1946], RG 107, HCPP 092 inter-nationalaffairs(classified). The extent to
which thisconcern withEurasia shaped Americarimilitaryattitudesis illustratedat greater length below. Here I
should note that in March 1945 several of the nation's most prominent civilian experts (Frederick S. Dunn,
Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers)
prepared a study,"A SecurityPolicy for Postwar America," in which theyargued that the United States had to
preventany one power or coalition of powers fromgaining controlof Eur-asia.America could not, theyinsisted,
withstandattackby aniypower that had firstsubdued the whole of Eturopeor of Eurasia; see Frederick S. Dunn
et al., "A Security Policy for Postwar America," NHC, SPD, ser. 14, box 194, A1-2.
The postwar concept of Eurasia developed out of the revival of geopolitical thinkingin the United States,
stimulated by Axis aggression and strategic decision making. See, for example, the re-issued work of
Sir Halford F. Mackinder. Mackinder, Democratic
Ideals and Reality(1919; reprintedn., New York, 1942), and
"The Round World and the Winning of Peace," Foreignr
Affairs,
21 (1943): 598-605. Mackinder's ideas were
modified and widely disseminated in the United States, especially by intellectuals such as Nicholas John
Spykman. Hans W. Weigert, Robert Strausz-Hupe, and Isaiah Bowman. Spykman flatlytook exception to
Mackinder's dictum, "Who controls eastern Europe rules the heartland; who rules the Heartland rules the
World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the World." Instead, Spykman emphasized, "Who
controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the wvorld."Spykman, Tlhe
ofPeace (New York, 1944), 43. Also see Spykman, America'sStrategy
itnWorldPolitics:ThleUtitedStates
Geography
and theBalance ofPower (New York, 1942); Weigert, Generalsand Geographers:The Twilightof Geopolitics(New
York, 1942); Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics:The Strqgglefor Space antdPower (New York, 1942); RtussellH. Fifield
and G. Etzel Pearcy, Geopolitics
in Principleand Practice(Boston, 1944); and Alfred C. Eckes, ThleUnitedStates
and theGlobal StruggleforMinerals (Austin, Texas, 1979), 104-08.
31 For views of influentialgenerals and army planners, see OPD, Memorandum, June 4, 1945, RG 165,
OPD 336 (top secret). Also see the plethora of documents from May and June 1945, L.S. MilitaryAcademy,
West Point, New York [hereafter,USMA], George A. Lincoln Papers [hereafter,GLP], War Departmenitfiles.
For Deane's advice, especiallysee Deane, "Revisionof PolicywithRelation to Russia,"April 16, 1945, RG 218, ser.
at lWartimeCo-operation
CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JCS 1313, and The Stranrgee
Alliance: The StoryofOtirEfforts
uwithi
Ru,ssia(New York, 1946), 84-86. For theJCS studies,see, forexample,JPS, "StrategicConcept and Plan for the
29
30
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
357
tionof Eurasia helps explain whyin July1945 thejoint chiefsdecided to oppose a
Sovietrequestforbases in the Dardanelles; whyduringMarchand April 1946 they
supporteda firmstand againstRussia in Iran, Turkey,and Tripolitania;and why
in the summerof 1946 Clark Cliffordand George Elsey,two WhiteHouse aides,
argued thatSovietincorporationof any partsof WesternEurope, the Middle East,
China, or Japan into a communistorbitwas incompatiblewithAmericannational
security.32
Yet defenseofficialswere not eager to severthe wartimecoalition.In early 1944
Admiral Leahy noted the "phenomenal development"of Soviet power but still
hoped for Soviet-Americancooperation. When members of the Joint Postwar
Committeemet with theircolleagues on the JointPlanningStaffin April 1945,
Major General G. V. Strongargued againstusing U.S. installationsin Alaska for
stagingexpeditionaryforces,lest such a move exacerbate Russo-Americanrelations.A few monthslater Eisenhower,Lincoln,and otherofficersadvised against
creatinga centraleconomicauthorityforWesternEurope thatmightappear to be
an anti-Sovietbloc.33The American objective, after all, was to avoid Soviet
hegemonyover Eurasia. By aggravatingSovietfears,the UnitedStatesmightfoster
whatitwishedto avoid. Americanself-restraint,
however,mightbe reciprocatedby
the Soviets,providingtime for WesternEurope to recoverand for the Britishto
reassertsome influenceon the Continent.34
Therefore,many defense officialsin
1945 hoped to avoid an open riftwiththe SovietUnion. But at the same timethey
were determinedto preventthe Eurasian land mass fromfallingunder Sovietand
communistinfluence.
Studies by the JointChiefs of Staffstressedthat,if Eurasia came under Soviet
domination,eitherthroughmilitaryconquest or politicaland economic "assimilation," America's only potentialadversarywould fall heir to enormous natural
resources,industrialpotential,and manpower. By the autumn of 1945, military
plannersalreadywere worryingthatSovietcontrolover much of EasternEurope
and its raw materialswould abet Russia's economic recovery,enhance its warmaking capacity,and deny importantfoodstuffs,
oil, and mineralsto Western
Europe. By the earlymonthsof 1946, SecretaryPattersonand his subordinatesin
the War DepartmentbelievedthatSovietcontrolof the Ruhr-Rhinelandindustrial
complex would constitutean extreme threat. Even more dangerous was the
Employment
of UnitedStatesArmedForces,"September14, 1945,RG 218,ser.CCS 381 (5-13-45),JPS744/3;
and JCS,"UnitedStatesMilitary
Policy,"September17, 1945,ibid.,JCS 1496/2.
32 For the decisionon the Dardanelles,see the attachments
to JCS, "UnitedStatesPolicyconcerningthe
Dardanellesand Kiel Canal" July1945],RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (7-10-45),JCS 1418/1;forthejoint chiefs'
positionon Iran,Turkey,and Tripolitania,seeJCS,"U.S. SecurityInterestsin theEasternMediterranean,"
March1946,ibid.,ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1641 series;and Lincoln,MemorandumfortheRecord,
April16, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 336 Russia(8-22-43);and,fortheClifford
memorandum,
see ArthurKrock,
Memoirs:SixtyYears on theFiringLine (New York, 1968), 477-82.
33 Leahy,excerptfromletter,
May 16, 1944,RG 59, lot54D394 (Recordsof theOfficeof EuropeanAffairs),
box 17. For Strong'sopinion,see JPS, Minutesof the 199thmeeting,April25, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 334
(3-28-45);and, fortheviewsof Eisenhowerand Lincoln,see Lincoln,MemorandumforHull,June24, 1945,
USMA, GLP, War Dept. files;and Leahy,Memorandumforthe President[lateJune 1945],ibid.
34 Fortheemphasis
on expediting
recovery
in WesternEurope,see,forexample,McCloy,Memorandumfor
MatthewJ.
Connelly,April26, 1945,HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 178;and,fortheroleofBritain,see,forexample,
JointIntelligence
Staff[hereafter,
JIS], "BritishCapabilitiesand Intentions,"
December5, 1945,RG 218, ser.
CCS 000.1 GreatBritain(5-10-45),JIS 161/4.
358
AHR Forum
prospect of Soviet predominance over the rest of Western Europe, especially
France.35Strategically,this would undermine the impact of any prospective
American naval blockade and would allow Soviet militaryplanners to achieve
defensein depth. The latterpossibility
had enormousmilitary
significance,
because
American war plans relied so heavilyon air power and strategicbombing,the
efficacyof which mightbe reduced substantially
if the Sovietsacquired outlying
bases in WesternEurope and the Middle East or ifthey"neutralized"bases in Great
Britain.36
Economic considerationsalso made defense officialsdetermined to retain
Americanaccess to Eurasia as wellas to denySovietpredominanceover it.Stimson,
Patterson,McCloy, and AssistantSecretary Howard C. Peterson agreed with
Forrestalthatlong-termAmericanprosperityrequiredopen markets,unhindered
accessto raw materials,and the rehabilitation
of much-if not all-of Eurasia along
liberal capitalistlines. In late 1944 and 1945, Stimsonprotestedthe prospective
industrialemasculationof Germany,lest it undermineAmerican economic well
being, set back recoverythroughoutEurope, and unleash forcesof anarchyand
revolution.Stimsonand his subordinatesin the Operations Divisionof the army
also worriedthatthe spread of Sovietpower in northeastAsia would constrainthe
functioningof the free enterprisesystemand jeopardize American economic
interests.A report prepared by the staffof the Moscow embassyand revisedin
mid-1946by Ambassador (and formerGeneral) WalterBedell Smithemphasized
that"Sovietpower is by nature so jealous thatit has alreadyoperated to segregate
fromworldeconomyalmostall of theareas in whichithas been established."While
Forrestaland the navysoughtto containSovietinfluencein the Near East and to
retain American access to Middle East oil, Pattersonand the War Department
focused on preventingfamine in occupied areas, forestallingcommunistrevolution,circumscribing
Sovietinfluence,resuscitating
trade,and preservingtraditional
American markets especially in Western Europe.37 But American economic
35Joint
LogisticPlansCommittee
[hereafter,
JLPC],"RussianCapabilities,"
November15, 1945,RG 218,ser.
CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JLPC35/9/RD;
Military
Intelligence
Division[hereafter,
MID], "Intelligence
Estimate
of theWorldSituationand Its Military
Implications,"
June25, 1946,RG 319, P&O 350.05 (top secret);Joint
Intelligence
Committee[hereafter,
JIC], "Intelligence
EstimateAssumingthatWarbetweentheSovietUnion
theNon-SovietPowersBreaksOut in 1956,"November6, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC
374/1;andJIC,"Capabilities
and Military
Potential
of Sovietand Non-Soviet
Powersin 1946,"January
8, 1947,
ibid.,JIC 374/2.For concernwiththe Ruhr-Rhineland
industrialcomplex,especiallysee Pattersonto the
ofState,June10, 1946,RG 107,HCPP, 091 Germany(classified);
Secretary
and,fortheconcernwithWestern
Europe,especiallyFrance,see, for example,JCS, "UnitedStatesAssistanceto Other Countriesfromthe
Standpoint
of NationalSecurity,"
April29, 1947,inFRUS, 1947, 1: 734-50,esp. 739-42. Alsosee theGeneral
Board, "National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto for the Next Ten Years," Enclosure D, June 25,
1948, NHC, General Board 425 (ser. 315).
36 See, for example, JIS, "MilitaryCapabilities of Great Britain and France," November 13, 1945, RG 218,
ser. CCS 000.1 Great Britian (5-10-45), JIS 211/1; JIS, "Areas Vital to Soviet War Effort,"February 12, 1946,
ibid.,ser.CCS 092 (3-27-45),JIS226/2;andJIS,"Supplemental
Information
Relativeto Northern
and Western
Europe," April 18, 1947, ibid.,JIS 275/1.
37 Moscow embassy staff,
"Russia's International Position at the Close of the War withGermany,"enclosed in
Smith to Eisenhower,July 12, 1946, DDEL, Dwight David Eisenhower Papers, file 1652, box 101. Also see, for
example, Stimson to Roosevelt, September 15, 1944, ML, JFP, box 100; Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945,
HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 157; McCloy, Memorandum for Connelly, April 26, 1945, ibid., box 178; MID,
"Intelligence Estimate of the World Situation,"June 25, 1946; numerous memoranda, June 1945, USMA,
GLP, War Dept. files; numerous documenits, 1946 and 1947, RG 107, H(C1P, 091 Germany (Classified);
and Rearmament Subcommittee, Report to the Special Ad Hoc Committee,July 10, 1947, RG 165, ser. ABC
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
359
interestsin Eurasia were not limitedto WesternEurope, Germany,and the Middle
East. Militaryplanners and intelligenceofficersin both the army and navy
expressed considerable interestin the raw materialsof southeastAsia, and, as
alreadyshown,one of the purposesof thebases theywantedwas to maintainaccess
to thoseresourcesand deny themto a prospectiveenemy.38
fearedthe loss of Eurasia, theydid
Whilecivilianofficialsand militarystrategists
conquest.In the earlyCold War
notexpectthe SovietUnion to attemptitsmilitary
years,therewas nearlyuniversalagreementthatthe Soviets,whileeager to expand
their influence,desired to avoid a militaryengagement. In October 1945, for
example,theJointIntelligenceStaffpredictedthatthe SovietUnion would seek to
avoid war forfiveto ten years.In April 1946, whileSoviettroopsstillremainedin
Iran, General Lincoln,the army'sprincipalwar planner,concurredwithByrnes's
viewthatthe Sovietsdid not wantwar. In May,when therewas deep concernabout
a possiblecommunistuprisingin France,military
intelligencedoubted the Kremlin
would instigatea coup, lestit ignitea fullscale war. At a high-levelmeetingat the
WhiteHouse in June, Eisenhowerstatedthathe did not thinkthe Sovietswanted
war; only Forrestaldissented.In August,when the Sovietnote to Turkey on the
circles,General
Dardanelles provoked consternationin American policy-making
Hoyt Vandenberg, directorof centralintelligence,informedPresidentTruman
thattherewere no signsof unusual Soviettroopmovementsor supplybuild-ups.In
March 1947, while the Truman Doctrine was being discussed in Congress, the
directorof armyintelligencemaintainedthat the factorsoperatingto discourage
Sovietaggressioncontinuedto be decisive.In September1947, the CIA concluded
thatthe Sovietswould not seek to conquer WesternEurope for several reasons:
theywould recognizetheirinabilityto controlhostilepopulations;theywould fear
triggeringa war with the United States that could not be won; and theywould
preferto gain hegemonyby politicaland economic means. In October 1947, the
JointIntelligenceStaffmaintainedthat for three years at least the Soviet Union
would take no actionthatwould precipitatea militaryconflict.39
Even the ominous developmentsduringthe firsthalfof 1948 did not alterthese
assessments.Despite his alarmistcable of March 5, designed to galvanizecongressional support for increased defense expenditures,General Lucius Clay, the
400.336(3-20-47).For Forrestal's
concernwithMiddleEasternoil,see,forexample,"Notesin Connectionwith
Navy's'Line' on ForeiginOil" [late 1944 or early 1945], ML, JFP,box 22; Minutesof the meetingof the
Secretaries
of State,War,and theNavy,April17, 1946,RG 107,RPPP,safefile,box 3; and WalterMillis,ed.,
The ForrestalDiaries (New York, 1951), 272, 356-58.
38 Strategy
April23, 1945;JCS,"Strategic
in thePhilippines,"
Section,OPD, "Post-WarBase Requirements
Areas and Trusteeshipsin the Pacific,"October18, 1946; MID, "PositiveU.S. ActionRequiredto Restore
NormalConditionsin SoutheastAsia,"July3, 1947,RG 319, P&O, 092 (topsecret);and LaurisNorstadto the
Directorof Intelligence,
July10, 1947,ibid.
October25, 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/10;
Capabilities,"
39JIS, "RussianMilitary
Lincolnto M. B. Gardnerand F. F. Everest,April10, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 336 Russia(8-22-43);0. S. P.,
fortheRecord,June
Memorandum
forHull,May3, 1946,ibid.,ser.ABC 381 (9-145);S. W. D., Memorandum
12,
1946, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);Vandenberg,Memorandumfor the President,August24, 1946,
March 27, 1947, RG 165,
HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; Chamberlin,"Reevaluationof SovietIntentions,"
Recordsof theChiefof Staff,
091 Russia(topsecret);CIA, "Reviewof theWorldSituationas It Relatesto the
Securityof the UnitedStates,"September26, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 203; and JIC, "SovietMilitary
Objectivesand Capabilities,1947-50,"October27, 1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 381 USSR (3-2-46),JIC 391/1.
360
AHR Forum
Americanmilitary
governorin Germany,did notbelievewar imminent.A fewdays
later,the CIA concluded thatthe communisttakeoverin Czechoslovakiawould not
increaseSovietcapabilitiessignificantly
and reflectedno alterationin Soviettactics.
On March 16, the CIA reportedto the president,"The weightof logic,as well as
evidence,also leads to theconclusionthattheSovietswillnotresortto military
force
withinthe next sixtydays." While thisassessmentwas far fromreassuring,army
and navyintelligenceexpertsconcurredthatthe Sovietsstillwantedto avoid war;
the questionwas whetherwar would eruptas a resultof "miscalculation"
by either
the United States or Russia. Aftertalkingto Foreign MinisterV. M. Molotov in
June, AmbassadorSmithconcluded thatSoviet leaders would not resortto active
hostilities.During the Berlin blockade, army intelligencereported few signs of
Sovietpreparationsforwar; naval intelligencemaintainedthatthe Sovietsdesired
to avoid war yetconsolidatetheirpositionin East Germany.In October 1948, the
MilitaryIntelligenceDivisionof the armyendorsed a Britishappraisal that"all the
evidenceavailable indicatesthatthe SovietUnion is not preparingto go to war in
thenear future."In December ActingSecretaryof StateRobertLovettsummedup
the longstandingAmerican perspectivewhen he emphasized that he saw "no
evidence thatSoviet intentionsrun towardlaunchinga sudden militaryattackon
the westernnationsat thistime.It would not be in characterwiththe traditionor
mentalityof the Soviet leaders to resort to such a measure unless they felt
themselveseitherpoliticallyextremelyweak, or militarily
extremelystrong."40
AlthoughAmericandefenseofficialsrecognizedthatthe Sovietshad substantial
militaryassets, they remained confidentthat the Soviet Union did not feel
extremelystrong. MilitaryanalystsstudyingRussian capabilitiesnoted that the
Sovietswere rapidlymechanizinginfantry
unitsand enhancingtheirfirepowerand
mobility.It was estimatedduring the winterof 1946-47 that the Soviets could
mobilizesix milliontroopsin thirty
daysand twelvemillionin six months,providing
sufficient
manpower to overrunall importantpartsof Eurasia. The Sovietswere
also believedto be utilizingGerman scientists
and Germantechnologicalknow-how
to improve their submarine force, develop rockets and missiles,and acquire
knowledgeabout the atomicbomb. During 1947 and 1948, it was reportedas well
thatthe Sovietswere makingrapid progressin the developmentof high performance jet fightersand already possessed several hundred intermediaterange
bomberscomparableto the AmericanB-29.41
40 CIA, "SpecialEvaluationNo. 27," March 16, 1948,
RG 319, P&0, 350.05 (topsecret);MID, "Intelligence
DivisionDailyBriefing,"
October18, 1948,ibid.;and LovetttoJohnL. Sullivan,December20, 1948,NHC,
double zero files,1948, box 2. Also seeJean Edward Smith, The Papers ofGeneralLucius D. Clay: Germany,
1945-
1949,2 vols.(Bloomington,
March10,
Ind.,1974),2: 564-65,568-69,602; CIA, "ReviewoftheWorldSituation,"
1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 203; R. H. Hillenkoetter,
Memorandumforthe President,March 16, 1948,
ibid.,box 249; Chamberlin,Memorandumto the Chiefof Staff,March 14, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top
secret);Thomas B. Inglis,Memorandumof Information,
March16,September28, 1948,NHC, SPD, central
files,1948,A8 and EF30; Smithto Kennan,June 11, 1948,ML, GeorgeF. KennanPapers[hereafter,
GFKP],
box 28; and CarterClarketo theChiefof Staff,August6, 1948,RG 330, CD 2-2-2,box 4.
41 For reports
on Sovietmobilization
capabilities
and conventional
strength
on the land,see, forexample,
Chamberlin,
Memorandumto the Chiefof Staff,March 14, 1948; CarterClarke,"PresentCapabilityof the
U.S.S.R. ArmedForces,"September16, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 091 Russia(topsecret);and P&O, "Capabilities
(Ground)and Intentionsof the USSR forOverruningNorthernand WesternEurope in 1947, 1948, and
1949,"February28, 1947, ibid.,350.05 (top secret).The war plans of theJointChiefsof Staffoutlinethe
extensivegroundcapabilities
of Sovietforces.See especiallythedocumentsin RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
361
Even so, Americanmilitaryanalystswere mostimpressedwithSovietweaknesses
and vulnerabilities.
The Soviets had no long-rangestrategicair force,no atomic
bomb, and meager air defenses. Moreover, the Soviet navy was considered
ineffective
except for its submarineforces.42The JointLogisticPlans Committee
and the MilitaryIntelligenceDivisionof the War Departmentestimatedthat the
SovietUnion would requireapproximatelyfifteenyearsto overcomewartimelosses
in manpowerand industry,ten yearsto redressthe shortageof technicians,fiveto
ten yearsto develop a strategicair force,fifteento twenty-five
yearsto constructa
modern navy,ten years to refurbishmilitarytransport,ten years(or less) to quell
resistance in occupied areas, fifteento twentyyears to establish a military
infrastructure
in the Far East,threeto tenyearsto acquire theatomicbomb,and an
unspecifiednumberof yearsto removethe vulnerability
of the Sovietrail-netand
petroleumindustryto long-rangebombing.43For severalyearsat least,the Soviet
capabilityfor sustained attackagainst North America would be verylimited.In
January1946 theJointIntelligenceStaffconcluded that"the offensivecapabilities
of the United Statesare manifestly
superiorto those of the U.S.S.R. and any war
betweenthe U.S. and the USSR would be farmore costlyto the SovietUnion than
to the United States."44
Key American officialslike Lovett, Clifford,Eisenhower,Bedell Smith and
Budget DirectorJames Webb were cognizantof prevailingSovietweaknessesand
potentialAmerican strength.Despite Soviet superiorityin manpower, General
Eisenhowerand Admiral ForrestE. Sherman doubted thatRussia could mounta
surprise attack, and General Lincoln, Admiral Cato Glover, and Secretaries
Pattersonand ForrestalbelievedthatSovietforceswould encounteracute logistical
problemsin tryingto overrun Eurasia-especially in the Near East, Spain, and
Italy.Even Forrestaldoubted reportsof acceleratingSovietair capabilities.American expertsbelievedthatmostSovietplanes were obsolescent,thatthe Sovietshad
insufficient
airfieldsand aviationgas to use theirnew planes,and thattheseplanes
had seriousproblemsin theirinstrumentation
and construction.45
(3-2-46);forinformation
on Sovietuse ofGermanscientists,
see,forexample,JIS,"Capabilities
and Intentions
oftheUSSR in thePostwarPeriod,"July9, 1946,ibid.,ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/26;MID, "Ability
Enemiesto AttacktheContinental
ofPotential
UnitedStates,"August8, 1946,RG 319, P&O 381 (topsecret);
andJIC,"SovietCapabilities
to LaunchAirAttacks
againsttheUnitedKingdom,"November29, 1946,RG 218,
in Sovietair power,see, for
ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC 375/1.For assessments
of the improvements
example,Pattersoin
to Truman,June 23, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 157; JIC, MoscowEmbassy,"Soviet
Intentions,"
April1, 1948,RG 330, box 4, CD2-2-2.
42 See, forexample,JIS,"RussianMilitary
Capabilities,"
October25, 1945;JIS, "Estimateof SovietPostwar
Military
Capabilities
and Intentions,"
November8, 1945,RG 218,ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS80/14;JIS,
"Military
Capabilities
ofGreatBritainand France,"November13,1945;JWPC,"Military
PositionoftheUnited
Statesin Lightof RussianPolicy,"
January8, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JWPC416/1;anid
Inglis,Memorandumof Information,
January21, 1946,ML, JFP,box 24.
43JLPC,"RussianCapabilities,"
November15, 1945;and MID, "Intelligence
EstimateoftheWorldSituation
fortheNextFiveYears,"August21, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (topsecret).Fora contemporary
analysisof
the Soviettransportnietwork,
also see Paul Wohl,"Transportin the Developmentof SovietPolicy,"Foreign
24 (1946): 466-83.
Affairs,
44JIS, "SovietPost-WarMilitary
Policiesand Capabilities,"
January15, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR
(3-27-45),JIS 80/24;MID, "Ability
of PotentialEnemiesto Attackthe Continental
UnitedStates,"August8,
1946; and P&O, "Estimateof the SituationPertainingto the NortheastApproachesto the UnitedStates,"
August12, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 381 (top secret).
45For theviewsof Eisenhowerand Sherman,see S. W. D., Memorandumforthe Record,June 12, 1946;
Galambos,PapersofDwight
DavidEisenhower,
to the President,"
7: 1012-13, 1106-07; Sherman,"Presentation
362
AHR Forum
In general,improvementsin specificareas of the Soviet militaryestablishment
did not mean thatoverallSovietcapabilitieswere improvingat an alarmingrate. In
July 1947, the MilitaryIntelligenceDivision concluded, "While there has been a
slightoverallimprovementin the Sovietwar potential,Sovietstrengthfortotalwar
is not sufficiently
greatto make a militaryattackagainstthe United Statesanything
but a mosthazardous gamble."This viewprevailedin 1946 and 1947, even though
the American nuclear arsenal was extremelysmall and the American strategic
bombing force of limited size. In the spring of 1948 the Joint Intelligence
Committeeat the Americanembassyin Moscow explained whythe United States
ultimatelywould emerge victoriousshould a war erupt in the immediatefuture.
The Soviets could not win because of their "inabilityto carry the war to U.S.
territory.
Afterthe occupationof Europe, the U.S.S.R. would be forcedto assume
the defensiveand await attacksby U.S. forces which should succeed primarily
4
because of the abilityof the U.S. to outproducethe U.S.S.R. in materialsof war."4
Awarenessof Sovieteconomic shortcomingsplayed a key role in the American
interpretationof Soviet capabilities. Intelligence reports predicted that Soviet
leaderswould investa disproportionateshare of Russianresourcesin capitalgoods
industries.But,even ifsuch Herculean efforts
enjoyedsome success,theSovietsstill
would not reach the pre-WorldWar II levelsof the UnitedStateswithinfifteento
twentyyears. Technologically,the Soviets were behind in the criticalareas of
aircraftmanufacturing,
electronics,and oil refining.And, despiteRussia'sconcerted attemptsto catch up and to surpass the United States,Americanintelligence
expertssoon startedreportingthatSovietreconstruction
was laggingbehind Soviet
ambitions,especiallyin the electronics,transportation,
aircraft,constructionmachinery,nonferrousmetals,and shippingindustries.Accordingly,throughoutthe
years 1945-48 American militaryanalystsand intelligenceexpertsbelieved that
Soviettransportation
bottlenecks,
industrialshortcomings,
technologicalbackwardness,and agriculturalproblemswould discouragemilitaryadventurism.47
January 14, 1947, NHC, Forrest E. Sherman Papers, box 2; for the views of Lincoln, Glover, Patterson,
Forrestal,and others on Soviet logisticalproblems, see JPS, Minutes of the 249th meeting, May 22, 1946, RG
218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); Glover to Lincoln and Kissner,June 24, 1947, NHC, SPD, ser. 4, box 86;
Louis Denfeld, Memorandum, March 29, 1948, ibid.,central files, 1948, A16-3 (5); and Millis, The Forrestal
Diaries, 272. For assessments of Soviet air power, see, for example, JIS, "Estimate of Soviet Postwar Military
Capabilities and Intentions," November 8, 1945; JIC, "Soviet Capabilities to Launch Air Attacks against the
United Kingdom," November 29, 1946; Office of Naval Intelligence [hereafter, ONI], "A Study of B-29
Airfieldswith a Capacity in Excess of 120,000 Pounds" [Spring 1948], NHC, General Board 425 (ser. 315);
General Board, "National Security and Navy," Enclosure B, June 25, 1945, ibid., page 16; Forrestal and
Clarence Cannon, Excerpt of Conversation, April 9, 1948, ML,JFP, box 48; Inglis to Op-30, December 1, 1948,
NHC, SPD, central files, 1948, A8; and Robert Lovett, Diary Entry,December 16, 1947, New York Historical
Society, Robert Lovett MS Diaries. For a recent assessmeiit of Soviet conventional strength,see Matthew A.
Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," Inter tionalSecurity,7 (1982-83): 110-38.
46 MID, "Estimate of the Possibilityof War between the United States and the USSR Today from a
Comparison with the Situation as It Existed in Septenmber1946," July 21, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top
secret); and JIC, Moscow Embassy, "Soviet Intentions,"April 1, 1948.
47 For assessments of the interrelationshipsbetween the state of the Soviet economy and Soviet military
capabilities, see, for example, JIS, "Postwar Economic Policies and Capabilities of the USSR," November 1,
1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JIS 80/12; JIS, "Soviet Postwar Economic Capabilities and
Policies,"January 8, 1946, ibid.,JIS 80/22;JIS, "Soviet Post-War MilitaryPolicies and Capabilities,"January 15,
1946; W. B. Shockley, "Relative Technological Achievements in Weapons Characteristicsin USSR and USA,"
January 30, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file, box 6; MID, "Abilityof Potential Enemies to Attack the United
States," August 8, 1946; U.S. MilitaryAttache (Moscow) to Chamberlin, March 21, 1947, NHC, Operations
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
363
IF AMERICAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS DID NOT EXPECT a Sovietmilitary
attack,why,then,
were theyso fearfulof losingcontrolof Eurasia? The answerrestsless in American
assessmentsof Sovietmilitary
capabilitiesand short-term
military
intentionsthanin
appraisalsof economicand politicalconditionsthroughoutEurope and Asia. Army
officials
in particular,because of theiroccupationrolesin Germany,Japan,Austria,
and Korea, were aware of the postwarplightof these areas. Key militarymenGenerals Clay, Douglas MacArthur,John Hilldring,and Oliver P. Echols and
Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel-became alarmed by the prospects of famine,
disease, anarchy,and revolution.They recognizedthat communistpartiescould
exploitthe distressand thatthe Russianscould capitalizeupon it to spread Soviet
influence.As early as June 1945, Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, the American
commissioner
in Italy,wrotethatwartimedevastationhad createdfertilesoilforthe
growth of communism in Italy and the enlargement of the Soviet sphere.
MacArthuralso feared that,if theJapanese economyremainedemasculatedand
reformswere not undertaken,communismwould spread. Clay, too, was acutely
aware thatGermancommunistsweredepictingthemselvesand theirbeliefsas their
country'sonly hope of salvation.In the springof 1946 militaryplanners,working
on contingencyplans for the emergencywithdrawalof American troops from
Germany,should war with Russia unexpectedlyoccur, also took note of the
economic turmoil and political instabilityin neighboringcountries,especially
France. Sensitivity
to the geopoliticaldimensionsof the socioeconomiccrisisof the
postwarera impelled Chief of StaffEisenhowerto give high priorityin the army
budgetto assistanceforoccupied areas.48
Civilianofficialsin the War, Navy,and Statedepartmentsshared theseconcerns.
In theautumnof 1945, McCloywarned Pattersonthatthe stakesin Germanywere
immenseand economicrecoveryhad to be expedited.During the firsthalfof 1946
SecretaryPattersonand AssistantSecretaryPetersoncontinuallypressed the State
Departmentto tacklethe problemsbeleagueringoccupationauthoritiesin Germanyand pleaded forStateDepartmentsupportand assistancein gettingtheTruman
administration
to provide additionalreliefto the devastatedareas of Europe. On
Peterson'surging,Acheson wroteTruman in April 1946, "We have now reached
themostcriticalperiod of theworldfood crisis.We musteitherimnmediately
greatly
increasetheexportsof grainfromthe UnitedStatesor expectgeneraldisorderand
politicalupheaval to develop in [mostof Eurasia]."49Forrestalhad alreadypressed
Division,ser. 2 (secret and under), box 33, EF 6 1; JIC, "Soviet MilitaryObjectives and Capabilities,"October 27,
1947; and JIC, Moscow Embassy, "Soviet Intentions,"April 1, 1948.
48Stone to Admiral H. R. Stark,June 25, 1945, NHC, double zero files,1942-47, folder 23. For MacArthur's
view,see J. W. Dower, Empireand Aftermath:
YoshidaShigeruand theJapaneseExperience(Cambridge, Mass., 1979),
292-303; for the situation in Germany, see Patterson to Byrnes, February 25, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, general
decimal file, box 8; materials in RG 165, ser. ABC 387 Germany (12-18-43), sects. 4D, 4E; Smith, Papers of
GeneralLuciusD. Clay, 1: 165-66, 184, 187-89, 196-98, 201-02, 207-08, 217; Galambos, Papers ofDwightDavid
Eisenhower,7: 892; and, for the relationship betweenithe situation in France and American war planning, see,
for example, JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings, May 22, 29, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR
(3-2-46). For evolving war plans in the Pincher series, see ibid.,sects. 1, 2; also see Forrestal,"French Situation,"
May 6, 1946, ML, JFP, box 20; and FRUS, 1946, 5: 434-40; and, for Eisenhower's concern, see Galambos,
Papers ofDwightDavid Eisenihower,
8: 1516-20.
49 Acheson to Truman, April 30, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, general subject file, box 1. Also see McCloy to
Patterson,November 24, 1945, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,box 4. For pressure on the State Department, see Patterson
364
AHR Forum
for a reassessmentof occupation policies in Germanyand Japan. In May, Clay
suspended reparationpaymentsin order to effectan accord on Germaneconomic
unity.In June,Pattersonbegan to supportthe mergerof the Americanand British
zones. The man most responsiblefor thislatterundertakingwas WilliamDraper,
Forrestal'sformerpartnerin Dillon, Read, and Co., and Clay's chief economic
assistant.Draper firmlybelieved that "economic collapse in either [France or
Germany] with probable political break-down and rise of communism would
seriouslythreatenAmericanobjectivesin Europe and in the world."50
American defense officials,militaryanalysts,and intelligenceofficerswere
extremelysensitiveto the politicalferment,social turmoil,and economicupheaval
throughoutpostwarEurope and A%ia.In theirinitialpostwarstudies,the Joint
Chiefsof Staffcarefullynoted the multiplicity
of problemsthatcould breed conflict
and provide opportunitiesfor Soviet expansion. In the spring of 1946 army
planners,includingGeneral Lincoln,were keenlyaware thatconflictwas mostlikely
to arise fromlocal disputes (for example, in Venezia-Giulia)or fromindigenous
unrest(for example, in France), perhaps even againstthe willof Moscow. A key
War Departmentdocumentsubmittedto the State-War-Navy
CoordinatingCommitteein April 1946 skirtedthe issue of Sovietmilitary
capabilitiesand argued that
the Soviet Union's strengthemanated fromtotalitariancontrolover its satellites,
fromlocal communistparties,and fromworldwidechaoticpoliticaland economic
conditions.In October 1946 theJointPlanningStaffstressedthatforthe next ten
yearsthe major factorinfluencingworldpoliticaldevelopmentswould be the EastWest ideologicalconflicttakingplace in an impoverishedand strife-torn
Europe
and a vacuumof indigenouspower in Asia. "The greatestdanger to the securityof
of economic
the United States,"the CIA concluded in mid-1947,"is the possibility
collapsein WesternEurope and the consequentaccessionto power of Communist
"51
elements.
to Byrnes,December 10, 1945, RG 165, Civil AffairsDivision [hereafter,CAD], ser. 014 Germany; Pattersonto
Byrnes, February 25, 1946; OPD and CAD, "Analysis of Certain Political Problems Confronting Military
Occupation Authorities in Germany," April 10, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); and
"Combined Food Board" file,spring 1946, ibid.,HCPP, general subject file,box 1.
5() William Draper, Memorandum [early 1947], RG 107, HCPP,
091 Germany (classified); and Forrestal to Acheson, January 14, 1946, ML, JFP, box 68. For Clay's initiative,see Smith, Papers of General
Lucius D. Clay, 1: 203-04, 213-14, 218-23; JohniF. Gimbel, The AmericanOccupationof Germany:Politicsand the
Military,1945-1949 (Stanford, 1968), 35-91; John H. Backer, The DecisiontoDivide Germany:AmericanForeign
Policy in Transition(Durham, N.C., 1978), 137-48; and Bruce Kuklick, AmericanPolicy anrdthe Division of
Germany:The Clash wit/iRussia overReparations(Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), 205-35. For Patterson's concerns and his
suppoit of Bizonia, see Pattersonto Byrnes,June 11, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); Patterson
to Truman, November 20, 1946, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,box 4; Minutes of the War Council meeting,December 5,
1946, ibid.,box 7; and Patterson to Palmer Hoyt, December 27, 1946, ibid.,box 4. For the merger of the zones,
also see FRUS, 1946, 5: 579-659; Smith, Papers of GeneralLucius D. Clay, 1: 245, 248-49; and, for Draper's
importance, also see Carolyn Eisenberg, "U.S. Social Policy in Post-War Germany: The Conservative
Restoration," paper delivered at the Seventy-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Organization of American
Historians, held in April 1981, in Detroit.
51 CIA, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," September 26,
1947. Also see, for example, JCS, "Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed
Forces," Appendix A, September 19, 1945; JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings; Lincoln to Wood,
May 22, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 381 (9-1-45); [Giffin(?)] "U.S. Policy with Respect to Russia" [early April
1946], ibid.,ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43); JPS, "Estimate of Probable Developments in the World Political Situation
up to 1956," October 31, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (10-9-46), JPS 814/1; MID, "World Political
Developments Affectingthe Securityof the United States during the Next Ten Years," April 14, 1947, RG 319,
P&O, 350.05 (top secret).
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
365
In brief,during 1946 and 1947, defense officialswitnesseda dramaticunravelling of the geopoliticalfoundationsand socioeconomicstructureof international
affairs.Britain'seconomic weaknessand withdrawalfromthe eastern Mediterranean, India's independence movement,civilwar in China, nationalistinsurgencies
in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, Zionistclaims to Palestineand Arab
resentment,German and Japanese economic paralysis,communistinroads in
France and Italy-all were ominous developments.Defense officialsrecognized
but believedthatSoviet
thatthe SovietUnion had not created thesecircumstances
leaders would exploit them. Should communiststake power,even withoutdirect
Russian intervention,
the Soviet Union, it was assumed, would gain predominant
controlof the resourcesof these areas because of the postulatedsubservienceof
communistpartieseverywhereto the Kremlin.Should nationalistuprisingspersist,
communistsseize power in underdeveloped countries,and Arabs revoltagainst
Americansupport of a Jewishstate,the petroleumand raw materialsof critical
areas mightbe denied theWest.The imminentpossibility
existedthat,even without
Soviet militaryaggression,the resources of Eurasia could fall under Russian
control.With these resources,the Soviet Union would be able to overcome its
chroniceconomic weaknesses,achieve defense in depth,and challengeAmerican
power-perhaps even by militaryforce.52
Americanassessmentsof Sovietlongtermintentionswere transformed.When World War II ended, militaryplanners
initiallylooked upon Soviet aims in foreignaffairsas arisingfromthe Kremlin's
view of power politics,Soviet strategicimperatives,historicalRussian ambitions,
and Soviet reactionsto moves by the United Statesand Great Britain.American
discussedSovietactions
intelligenceanalystsand strategicplannersmostfrequently
in EasternEurope, the Balkans,the Near East,and Manchuriaas efforts
to establish
an effective
securitysystem.Despite enormous Sovietgains duringthe war, many
assessmentsnoted that,in fact,the Sovietshad notyetachieveda safesecurityzone,
especiallyon theirsouthernperiphery.While Forrestal,Deane, and most of the
planners in the army's Operations Division possessed a skeptical,perhaps even
viewof Sovietintentions,
the stillprevailingoutlookat theend of 1945 was
sinister,
to dismissthe role of ideologyin SovietforeignpolicyyetemphasizeSovietdistrust
of foreigners;to stress Soviet expansionismbut acknowledge the possibilityof
accommodation;to abhor Sovietdominationof EasternEurope but discussSoviet
policieselsewherein termsof power and influence;and to dwell upon the Soviet
preoccupationwith securityyet acknowledgedoubt about ultimateSoviet intentions.53
IN THIS FRIGHTENING
POSTWAR ENVIRONMENT
52 See, for example,JIS, "SovietPostwarEconomicCapabilities,"
January8, 1946; MID, "Intelligence
EstimateoftheWorldSituation,"
June25, 1946;JCS,"Presidential
RequestforCertainFactsand Information
RegardingtheSovietUnion,"July25, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1696; H. D. Rileyto
Op-30,February7, 1947,NHC, SPD, ser.5, box 111,A16-3(5); MID, "Capabilities
(Ground)and Intentions
of
the USSR for OverruningNorthernand WesternEurope,"February28, 1947; P&O, "StrategicStudyof
Westernand NorthernEurope,"May21, 1947,RG 319,P&O, 092 (topsecret);and WooldridgetotheGeneral
Board,April30, 1948.
53 For assessments
of Sovietintentions,
see, forexample,JIC, "Estimate
of SovietPost-WarCapabilities
and
Intentions,"
February2, 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 000.1 USSR (10-2-44),JIC250/2;JohnS. Wiseto Hull,April
366
AHR Forum
This orientationchanged rapidlyduring 1946. In January,theJointWar Plans
Committeeobservedthat"the long-termobjective[of the SovietUnion] is deemed
to be establishment
of predominantinfluenceover the Eurasian land mass and the
strategicapproaches thereto."Reportsof the new militaryattachein Moscow went
further,claimingthat "the ultimateaim of Soviet foreignpolicyseems to be the
dominanceof Sovietinfluencethroughoutthe world"and "the finalaim ... is the
Kennan's"longtelegram"was
destructionof thecapitalistsystem."Soon thereafter,
widelydistributedamong defense officials,on whom it had considerableimpact.
Particularlysuggestivewas his view that Soviet leaders needed the theme of
capitalistencirclementto justifytheirautocraticrule. Also influentialwere Kenauthority
nan's convictionsthatthe Sovietleadersaimed to shattertheinternational
of the United Statesand were beyond reason and conciliation.54
During the springand summerof 1946, defense officialsfound these notions
persuasive as an interpretationof Soviet intentionsbecause of the volatile
international
situation,therevivalof ideologicalfervorwithinthe SovietUnion,and
the domesticpoliticalatmosphereand legislativeconstraintsin the United States.
PresidentTruman wishedto stop "babyingthe Soviets,"and his predilectionfora
tougherpostureprobablyled his subordinatesto be less inclinedto givethe Soviets
thebenefitof any doubt when assessingRussianintentions.55
Forrestalbelievedthe
Sovietcommunistthreathad become more seriousthan the Nazi challengeof the
1930s; GeneralJohn E. Hull, directorof the OperationsDivision,assertedthatthe
Sovietswere "constitutionally
incapable of being conciliated";and Clark Clifford
and George Elsey considered Soviet fears "absurd." A key subcommitteeof the
State-War-Navy
CoordinatingCommitteedeclared thatSovietsuspicionswere "not
susceptibleof removal,"and in July 1946 the JointChiefs of Staffdeclared the
Soviet objectiveto be "world domination."By late 1946 it was commonplacefor
intelligencereportsand militaryassessmentsto state,withoutany real analysis,that
the "ultimateaim of Soviet foreignpolicyis Russian dominationof a communist
3, 1945, RG 319, P&O, 350.05, State Department red file(top secret); JSSC toJCS, April 5, 1945, RG 218, ser.
CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45); Deane, "Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia," April 16, 1945 (UCS 1313);
Secretary of War to Secretary of State [early July 1945], RG 165, ser. ABC 093 Kiel (7-6-45); Marshall to
McCloy, July 3, 1945, ibid.,OPD 336 (top secret); OPD, "Soviet Intentions,"July 6, 1945, ibid.,ser. ABC 092
USSR (11-15-44); JCS, "United States Policy concerning the Dardanelles" July1945]; JCS, "MilitaryPosition of
the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," October 8, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),
JCS 1545; JIS, "Soviet Postwar Foreign Policy," October 25, 1945, ibid.,JIS 80/9; JIS, "Russian Military
Capabilities," October 25, 1945; Ritchie,"Report of the United States Mission to Moscow, 18 October 1943 to
31 October 1945" [October 31, 1945], RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret); ONI, "Basic Factors in World Sittuation,"
December 1945, NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106, A8; JIS, "Capabilities and Intentionsof the USSR in the Post-War
Period,"January 2, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JIS 80/20; Forrestal,Notes for remarks to the
Harvard Club, January 18, 1946, JL, JFP, box 29; Inglis, Memorandum of Information,January 21, 1946;
Stoler, "Continentalismto Globalism," 315-21; and Sherry,PreparingfortheNext War, 159-90.
54JWPC, "Military Position of the United States in Light of Russian Policy,"January 8, 1946; and U.S.
MilitaryAttache (Moscow), "Estimate of the Situation as of February 1," February 18, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC
381 Germany (1-29-43). For Kennan's telegram, see FRUS, 1946, 4: 696-709; and, for the distributionof
Kennan's telegram,see R. L. Vittrup,Memorandum for Craig, February 26, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box
5; Vittrupto Lincoln, March 1, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 350.05, State Department red file (top secret); and Bruce
Hopper to Kennan, March 29, 1946, ML, GFKP, box 28.
55 Robert L. Messer, ThleEnd of an Alliance:JamesF. Byrnes,
Roosevelt,Truman,and theOriginsof theCold War
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), 152-94, and "Paths Not Taken," 297-319.
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
367
world."56There was, of course, plentifulevidence for this appraisal of Soviet
ambitions-theSovietconsolidationof a sphereof influencein EasternEurope; the
incendiarysituation in Venezia Giulia; Soviet violation of the agreement to
ofJapanesearmsto the Chinese
withdrawtroopsfromIran; Sovietrelinquishment
communists;the Soviet mode of extractingreparationsfromthe Russian zone in
Germany;Soviet diplomaticoverturesfor bases in the Dardanelles,Tripolitania,
and the Dodecanese; Sovietrequestsfora role in the occupationofJapan; and the
of
Kremlin'srenewed emphasis on Marxist-Leninist
doctrine,the vulnerability
capitalisteconomies,and the inevitability
of conflict.
evidence.
Yet these assessmentsdid not seriouslygrapple with contradictory
While emphasizingSovietmilitarycapabilities,strategicambitions,and diplomatic
intransigence,
reportsliketheClifford-Elsey
memorandumof September1946 and
memorandum
theJointChiefsof Staffreport1696 (upon whichthe Clifford-Elsey
heavilyrelied) disregardednumeroussigns of Soviet weakness,moderation,and
circumspection.During 1946 and 1947 intelligenceanalystsdescribed the withdrawalof RussiantroopsfromnorthernNorway,Manchuria,Bornholm,and Iran
(from the latter under pressure, of course). Numerous intelligencesources
reported the reductionof Russian troops in Eastern Europe and the extensive
demobilizationgoing on withinthe Soviet Union. In October 1947 the Joint
IntelligenceCommitteeforecasta Soviet army troop strengthduring 1948 and
1949 of less than two million men. Soviet militaryexpendituresappeared to
and
moderate.Other reportsdealt withthe inadequacies of Soviettransportation
bridgingequipment for the conduct of offensiveoperationsin Eastern Europe.
And, as already noted, assessmentsof the Soviet economy revealed persistent
problemslikelyto restrictSovietadventurism.57
hostile
Experiencesuggestedthatthe SovietUnion was by no means uniformly
56Forrestal
to ClarenceDillon,April11, 1946,ML,JFP,box 11; Hull to TheaterCommanders,
March21,
1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 336 (8-22-43);fortheClifford-Elsey
Yearson the
viewpoint,
see Krock,Memoirs:
Scxty
Firing
Line,428; and SWNCC,"ResumeofSovietCapabilities
and PossibleIntentions,"
August29, 1946,NHC,
SPD, ser. 5, box 106,A8. For the SWNCC estimate,see JCS, "PoliticalEstimateof SovietPolicyforUse in
ConnectionwithMilitary
Studies,"April5, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),
JCS 1641/4;andJCS
"Presidential
RequestforCertainFactsand Information
RegardingtheSovietUnion,"July25, 1946.Someof
themostthoughtful
studieson Sovietintentions,
likethatof theJointIntelligence
Staffin earlyJanuary1946
(JIS80/20),werewithdrawn
fromconsideration.
See theevolutionof studiesand reportsin RG 218, ser.CCS
092 USSR (3-27-45),sects.5-7.
57 For the withdrawal
of Soviettroops,see, for example,MID, "SovietIntentionsand Capabilitiesin
Scandanaviaas of 1July1946,"April25, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05(topsecret);and [Giffin
(?)] "U.S. Policy
withRespectto Russia"[earlyApril1946].For reportson reductions
ofRussiantroopsin EasternEuropeand
demobilization
withinthe SovietUnion,see MID, "Reviewof Europe,Russia,and theMiddleEast,"December 26, 1945, RG 165, OPD, 350.05 (top secret);Carl Espe, weeklycalculationsof Soviettroops,MaySeptember1946,NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106,A8; MID, "SovietCapabilities
in Germanyand WestEurope,"
December26, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (topsecret);JIC, "Movement
of RussianTroopsOutsideof USSR
exceptin the Far East,"December31, 1946,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC Memorandumof
Information
no. 237; MID, "Estimateof the Possibility
of War,"July21, 1947; and JIC, "SovietMilitary
Objectives
and Capabilities,"
October27, 1947.Forreferences
to Sovietmilitary
expenditures,
see Patterson
to
JuliusAdler,November2, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 5; and AbramBergson,"RussianDefense
Expenditures,"
Foreign
Affairs,
26 (1948): 373-76. And,forassessments
oftheSoviettransport
system,
see R. F.
Ennis,Memorandumforthe P&O Division,June 24, 1946,RG 165, ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43);U.S. Military
Attache(Moscow)to Chamberlin,
March21, 1947;Op-32 to theGeneralBoard,April28, 1948,NHC, General
Board425 (ser.315); and Wohl,"Transportin theDevelopmentof SovietPolicy,"475-76, 483.
368
AHR Forum
or unwillingto negotiatewiththe United States.In April 1946, a fewdays aftera
State-War-Navy
subcommitteeissued an alarmingpoliticalestimateof Sovietpolicy
(for use in American militaryestimates),Ambassador Smith reminded the State
Departmentthatthe Soviet press was not unalterablycriticalof the United States,
thatthe Russianshad withdrawnfromBornholm,thatStalinhad givena moderate
speechon the UnitedNations,and thatSovietdemobilizationcontinuedapace. The
next month General Lincoln, who had accompanied Byrnes to Paris for the
meetingof thecouncilof foreignministers,
acknowledgedthattheSovietshad been
willingto make numerousconcessionsregardingTripolitania,theDodecanese, and
Italian reparations.In the spring of 1946, General Echols, General Clay, and
SecretaryPatterson again maintained that the French constitutedthe major
impedimentto an agreementon unitedcontrolof Germany.At the same timethe
Sovietsceased pressingforterritorial
adjustmentswithTurkey.Afterthe diplomatic exchangesover the Dardanelles in the late summerof 1946 the Sovietsdid not
again ask for eithera revisionof the MontreuxConventionor the acquisitionof
bases in the Dardanelles. In early 1947 centralintelligencedelineatedmore than a
half-dozeninstancesof Soviet moderationor concessions.In April the Military
IntelligenceDivision noted that the Soviets had limitedtheirinvolvementin the
Middle East, diminished their ideological rhetoric,and given only moderate
supportto Chinese communists.In the monthsprecedingthe Truman Doctrine,
Sovietbehavior-as noted by Americanmilitary
officials
and intelligenceanalystshardlyjustifiedthe inflammatory
rhetoricAcheson and Truman used to secure
congressionalsupportforaid to Greece and Turkey. Perhaps thisis whyGeneral
Marshall,as secretaryof state,refrainedfromsuch language himselfand preferred
to focuson the socioeconomicaspectsof the unfoldingcrisis.58
In their overall assessmentsof Soviet long-termintentions,however,military
planners dismissed all evidence of Soviet moderation,circumspection,and restraint.In fact,as 1946 progressed,these planners seemed to spend less time
analyzingSoviet intentionsand more timeestimatingSovietcapabilities.59
Having
accepted the notion thatthe two powerswere locked in an ideologicalstruggleof
58 FortheSWNCC estimate,
seeJCS,"Political
EstimateofSovietPolicy,"
April5, 1946;forSmith'sdespatch,
see Smithto theSecretary
of State,April11, 1946,RG 165,Recordsof theChiefof Staff,
091 Russia;and, for
Sovietnegotiating
concessions,
see Lincoln,MemorandumfortheChiefof Staff,May20, 1946,USMA, GLP,
WarDept.files;JamesF. Byrnes,Speaking
Frankly
(NewYork,1947),129-37; PatriciaDawsonWard,TheThreat
of Peace: JamesF. Byrnesand theCouncil of ForeignMinisters(Kent, Ohio, 1979), 95-102. For the situation in
Germany,see OPD and CAD, "Analysisof CertainPoliticalProblemsConfronting
MilitaryOccupation
Authorities
inGermany,"
April10,1946,RG 107,HCPP,091 Germany
Patterson
toTruman,JuneI 1,
(classified);
1946,RG 165,Recordsof theChiefof Staff,091 Germany.For Clay'sreferencesto Frenchobstructionism,
see, forexample,Smith,PapersofGeneral
LuciusD. Clay,1: 84-85, 88-89, 151-52, 189-90,212-17, 235-36;
forAmericanperceptions
ofthesituation
inTurkey,see MelvynP. Leffler,
"Strategy,
Diplomacy,
and theCold
War:The UnitedStates,Turkey,and N.A.T.O.," paperdeliveredat theSeventy-Fifth
AnnualMeetingof the
Organization
ofAmericanHistorians,
heldin April1983,in Cincinnati;
foroverallintelligence
see
assessments,
CentralIntelligence
Group[hereafter,
CIG], "RevisedSovietTacticsin International
6, 1947,
Affairs,"
January
HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 254; MID, "WorldPoliticalDevelopments
Affecting
theSecurity
of the UnitedStates
duringthe NextTen Years,"April 14, 1947; and WalterE. Todd to the Directorof P&O, April25, 1947,
RG 319,P&O, 350.05 (topsecret);forbackground
on theTrumanDoctrine,
see Joseph
Wees
jones, TheFifteent
(NewYork,1955),esp. 138-70; and, forMarshall'semphasison theeconomicrootsoftheEuropeancrisis,see
ibid.,203-06, 220-24; and Charles Bohlen, The Transformation
of AmericanForeignPolicy (New York, 1969),
87-89.
and thequalityofJCS studieson Sovietintentions
59 Boththequantity
seemto havedeclinedduring1946.
In "Military
PositionoftheUnitedStatesin Lightof RussianPolicy"(January
8, 1946),strategic
plannersofthe
JointWarPlansCommittee
maintained
thatitwasmoreimportant
to focuson Sovietcapabilities
thanon Soviet
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecuri4)
369
indefinitedurationand consciousof the rapid demobilizationof Americanforces
and the constraintson Americn defense expenditures,theyno longer explored
waysof accommodatinga potentialadversary'slegitimatestrategicrequirementsor
pondered how Americaninitiatives
mightinfluencethe SovietUnion'sdefinitionof
its objectives.60Informationnot confirmingprevailingassumptionseither was
ignoredin overallassessmentsof Sovietintentionsor was used to illustratethatthe
Sovietswere shiftingtacticsbut not alteringobjectives.Reflectiveof the emerging
mentality
was a reportfromtheJointChiefsof Staffto the presidentin July1946
thatdeleted sectionsfrompreviousstudiesthathad outlinedSovietweaknesses.A
memorandumsent by SecretaryPattersonto the presidentat the same time was
designedby General Lauris Norstad,directorof the War Department'sPlans and
Operations Division, to answer questions about relationswith the Soviet Union
"withoutambiguity."Truman, Clark Cliffordobserved many years later, liked
thingsin black and white.61
DURING
1946 AND EARLY 1947, the conjunctionof Soviet ideological fervorand
socioeconomicturmoilthroughoutEurasia contributedto the growthof a myopic
viewof Sovietlong-termpolicyobjectivesand to enormous apprehensionlest the
SovietUnion gain controlof all the resourcesof Eurasia, therebyendangeringthe
nationalsecurityof the United States.Americanassessmentsof Soviet short-term
military
intentionshad not altered;Sovietmilitarycapabilitieshad not significantly
increased,and Soviet foreignpolicypositionshad not greatlyshifted.But defense
officialswere acutelyaware of America'sown rapidlydiminishingcapabilities,of
Britain'sdecliningmilitary
strength,
of the appeal of communistdoctrineto mostof
the underdeveloped world,and of the opportunitiesopen to communistparties
throughoutmostof Eurasia as a resultof prevailingsocioeconomicconditions.War
Departmentpapers, studiesof thejoint chiefs,and intelligenceanalysesrepeatedly
describedthe restivenessof colonial peoples thathad sapped Britishand French
strength,
the opportunitiesforcommunistpartiesin France,Italy,and even Spain
to capitalizeupon indigenousconditions,and the abilityof theChinesecommunists
to defeatthe nationalistsand make the resourcesand manpowerof Manchuriaand
NorthChina availableto the SovietUnion. In thisturbulentinternational
arena,the
survivalof liberalideals and capitalistinstitutions
was anythingbut assured. "We
intentiorns.
During a key discussion at the White House, Admiral Leahy also was eager to dismiss abstract
evaluations of Russian psychologyand to focus on Russian capabilities; S. W. D., Memorandum for the Record,
June 12, 1946. My assessment of the quality ofJCS studies is based primarilyon my analysisof the materials in
RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45); ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); and
NHC, SPD, central files, 1946-48, A8.
60 During 1946 it became a fundamental tenet of American policy rnakersthat Soviet policyobjectiveswere a
function of developments within the Soviet Union and not related to American actions. See, for example,
Kennan's "long telegram,"in FRUS, 1946, 4: 696-709; JCS, "Political Estiinateof Soviet Policy,"April 5, 1946;
JCS, "Presidential Request," July 25, 1946; and the Clifford/Elseymemorandum, in Krock, Memoirs,esp.
427-36.
6' For Norstad's comment, see Norstad, Memorandum, Jtly 25, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For
references to shifting tactics and constant objectives, see Vandenberg, Memorandumn for the Pr-esidlenit,
September 27, 1946, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; CIG, "Revised Soviet lFactics,"January 6, 1947; and, for the
JCS report to the president, compare JCS 1696 withJIC 250/12. Both studies may be founidin RG 218, ser
CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45). For Clifford'srecollection,Clark Clifford,HTL, oral history,170.
370
AHR Forum
could point to the economic benefitsof Capitalism,"commentedone important
War Deprtmentpaper in April 1946, "but these benefitsare concentratedrather
thanwidespread,and, at present,are genuinelysuspectthroughoutEurope and in
manyotherpartsof the world."62
In thisenvironment,therewas indeed no room for ambiguityor compromise.
Actionwas imperative-actionaimed at safeguardingthose areas of Eurasia not
alreadywithinthe Sovietsphere.Even beforeKennan's "long telegram"arrivedin
withthe Soviet
Washingtonthejoint chiefsadopted the positionthat"collaboration
Union should stop shortnot onlyof compromiseof principlebut also of expansion
of Russian influencein Europe and in the Far East."63During the spring and
summerof 1946, GeneralLincolnand AdmiralRichardL. Conolly,commanderof
Americannaval forcesin the easternAtlanticand Mediterranean,workedtirelessly
to stiffenByrnes's views, avert American diplomaticconcessions,and put the
squeeze on the Russians.64"TheUnitedStates,"armyplannersexplained,"mustbe
able to prevent,by forceif necessary,Russiandominationof eitherEurope or Asia
to the extentthatthe resourcesof eithercontinentcould be mobilizedagainstthe
United States." Which countriesin Eurasia were worthfightingover remained
unclear during 1946. But army and navy officialsas well as the joint chiefs
programof foreigneconomicassistancecoupled withthe
advocateda far-reaching
refurbishment
of Americanmilitaryforces.65
During late 1946 and early 1947, the Truman administrationassumed the
initiative
by creatingGerman Bizonia, providingmilitaryassistanceto Greece and
Turkey, allocating massive economic aid to Western Europe, and reassessing
62 [Giffin]
Draftof Proposed
"U.S. PolicywithRespectto Russia" [earlyApril 1946]. Also see Giffin,
CommentsforAssistantSecretaryof War on "ForeignPolicy,"[earlyFebruary1946]; MID, "Intelligence
October
in theWorldPoliticalSituation,"
Estimate,"
June25, 1946;JPS,"Estimateof ProbableDevelopments
of SWNCC,"Studyon U.S.
31, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 (10-9-46),JPS 814/1;SpecialAd Hoc Committee
Assistanceto France,"April9, 1947, RG 165, ser. ABC 400.336 France(3-20-47);MID, "WorldPolitical
April 14, 1947; JWPC,"The SovietThreatagainstthe IberianPeninsulaand the Means
Developments,"
465/1;and CIA, "Reviewofthe
Requiredto MeetIt,"May8, 1947,RG 218,ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JWPC
September26, 1947.Withregardto China,theJointChiefsofStaffstressedtheimportance
WorldSituation,"
were fully
of Sovietaid to Chinesecommunistforcesin late 1945. But both naval and armyintelligence
forcesand of the indigenousappeal of theChinese
and ineptnessof nationalist
cognizantof thecorruption
wasthatChinese
of Americandefenseofficials,
point,fromtheperspective
communist
party.The important
victories
wouldoffertheSovietscontrolovercriticalresourcesand enablethemto achievegreater
communist
Noteson CabinetMeeting,August2,
defensein depthin partsof AsiaticRussia.See, forexample,Patterson,
of State,War,and Navy,
1946,RG 107, RPPP, safefile,box 2; Minutesof the meetingsof the Secretaries
forthe
SeptemberI1, 1946,February12, 1947,June20, 1947,ibd.,box 3; Lincoln,ProposedMemorandum
of War and Navy[September1946],NHC, SPD, ser. 12, box 158,C2 (4); RichardM. Phillips.
Secretaries
of Information,
June3, 1947,ibid.,
Memorandum,
September6, 1946,ibid.;CharlesJ.Rend,Memorandum
16,1947,RG 218,
ser.5, box 110,A8; NimitztoJCS,June9, 1947,ibid.,box 109,A1;JWPC,"Moonrise,"June
ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JWPC476/1;MID, "SovietInfluencein China,"June 16, 1947,RG 319, P&O,
350.05(topsecret);and SWNCC,"UnitedStatesPolicyTowardChina,"June11,1947,FRUS,1947,7: 838-48.
63JCS,"ForeignPolicyof theUnitedStates,"February10, 1946.
64 Lincolnto Hull [April1946],RG 59, Office
forthe
box 17; Lincoln,Memorandum
of EuropeanAffairs,
Record,April16, 1946; Lincolnto Hull,April16, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 092 USSR (11-15-44);Lincolnto
(Columbia,1960),293-304;
Cohen,June22, 1946,ibid.,ABC 381 (9-1-45);RichardL. Conolly,oral history
Lincoln,MemorandumforChiefof Staff,May 20, 1946; and Lincoln,MemorandumforNorstad,July23,
files.
1946,USMA, GLP, War Department
65 Giffin,
"Draftof ProposedComments"[earlyFebruary1946].Alsosee,forexample,JCS,"ForeignPolicy
"U.S. PolicywithRespectto Russia"[earlyApril19461;JCS,
of theUnitedStates,"February10, 1946; [Giffin]
March17, 1946,
forForrestal,
April5, 1946;and Sherman,Memorandum
ofSovietPolicy,"
"Political
Estimate
ML,JFP,box 24.
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
371
economicpolicytowardJapan. These initiatives
were aimed primarilyat tackling
the internalsources of unrest upon which communistpartiescapitalizedand at
rehabilitatingthe industrialheartlands of Eurasia. American defense officials
supportedtheseactionsand acquiesced in the decisionto givepriority
to economic
aid rather than rearmament. Service officersworking on foreign assistance
programsof the State-War-NavyCoordinatingCommitteesupported economic
aid, showedsensitivity
to the socioeconomicsourcesof unrest,and recognizedthat
economicaid was likelyto be the mostefficaciousmeans of preservinga favorable
balance of power in Eurasia.66Because theyjudged Americanmilitary
powerto be
superiorand war to be unlikely,Forrestal,Lovett,and Webb insistedthatmilitary
spendingnot interferewiththe implementation
of the MarshallPlan,rehabilitation
of Germany,and revivalofJapan. "In the necessarilydelicateapportioningof our
availableresources,"wroteAssistantSecretaryof War Peterson,"thetimeelement
permitspresentemphasison strengthening
the economicand social dikes against
Sovietcommunismratherthanupon preparingfora possiblyeventual,but notyet
inevitable,war."67
Yet if war should unexpectedlyoccur, the United States had to have the
capabilityto inflictincalculable damage upon the Soviet Union. Accordingly,
Truman shelved (after some serious consideration)proposals for international
controlof atomicenergy.The Baruch Plan, as itevolvedin thespringand summer
of 1946, was heavilyinfluencedby defenseofficials
who wished
and serviceofficers
to avoid any significantcompromise with the Soviet Union. They sought to
perpetuateAmerica'snuclearmonopolyas long as possiblein order to counterbalance Sovietconventionalstrength,
deterSovietadventurism,
and bolsterAmerican
negotiatingleverage. When negotiationsat the United Nations for international
controlof atomicenergylanguishedforlack of agreementon itsimplementation,
the way was clear for the Truman administration
graduallyto adopt a strategy
based on air power and atomic weapons. This strategywas initiallydesigned to
destroythe adversary'swill and capabilityto wage war by annihilatingRussian
industrial,petroleum,and urban centers.68Aftercompletingtheir studyof the
66 See, forexample,SWNCC, "Policies,
and Costsof Assistance
Procedures,
bytheUnitedStatesto Foreign
to Other
Countries,"
April21, 1947,FRUS, 1947, 3: 204-20; ibid.,1: 725-34; JCS,"UnitedStatesAssistance
Countries,"
ibid.,734-50, 762-63; and Lincolnto Peterson,May2, 1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 400.336(3-20-47).
Alsosee themanySWNCC subcommittee
reportson individual
countries,
ibid.:Reportof theWorkingGroup
on EconomicAid to the Special Ad Hoc Committeeof the SWNCC, "ForeignNeeds for UnitedStates
EconomicAssistanceduringthe Next Three to Five Years" [July1947],RG 353, box 134; and Reportof
Rearmament
Subcommittee
toSpecialAd Hoc Committee,
July10,1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 400.336(3-20-47).
67 Peterson,
as quotedin ChiefofStaff,
MemorandumJuly1947],RG 165,ser.ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45).
Alsosee,forexainple,Lovettdiaries,December16, 1947,January
5, 15,1948;BaruchtoForrestal,
February
7,
1948, ML, JFP,box 78; Forrestalto Baruch,February10, 1948,ibid.;and Excerptof Phone Conversation
betweenForrestaland C. E. Wilson,April2, 1948,ibid.,box 48.
68 These generalizations
are based on the following
materials:Stimson,Memorandumforthe President,
September11, 1945,RG 107,RPPP,safefile,box 1; Forrestal,
Memorandum,
September21, 1945,ML,JFP,
box 48; MathiaF. Correa to Forrestal,September27, 1945,ibid.,box 28; Forrestal,Memorandumforthe
President,
October1; 1945,HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 158;documents
in HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 199;RG 165,ser.
ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45);"Briefof LettersAddressedto Mr. BaruchbyEach of theMembersof theJCS"
June1946],BernardBaruchPapers[hereafter,
BBP], ML, box 65; Dennison,DraftReplyto LetterfromMr.
oftheSecretaries
of
Baruch,June
4, 1946,NHC CNO, doublezerofiles,folder31; and Minutesofthemeeting
at the United
State,War,and Navy,January29, 1947,RG 107,RPPP,safefile,box 3. For the negotiations
Nations,see FRUS, 1947, 1: 327-614; also see Herken,Winning
Weapon;LarryG. Gerber,"The BaruchPlan
372
AHR Forum
1946 Bikini atomic tests,the Joint Chiefs of Staffin July 1947 called for an
enlargementof the nuclear arsenal. While Truman and Forrestalinsistedon
limitingmilitaryexpenditures,governmentofficialsmoved vigorouslyto solve
problemsin the productionof plutonium,to improvenuclearcores and assembly
devices,and to increasethe numberof aircraftcapable of deliveringatomicbombs.
the GeneralAdvisoryCommitteeto the
Aftermuch initialpostwardisorganization,
AtomicEnergyCommissioncould finallyreportto the presidentat theend of 1947
that"greatprogress"had been made in the atomicprogram.FromJune 30, 1947,
toJune 30, 1948, the numberof bombsin the stockpileincreasedfromthirteento
fifty.
Althoughat the timeof the BerlincrisistheUnitedStateswas notpreparedto
launch a strategicair offensiveagainstthe Soviet Union, substantialprogresshad
been made in the developmentof the nation'sair-atomiccapabilities.By the end of
1948, the United States had at least eighteennuclear-capableB-50s, four B-36s,
and almostthreetimesas manynuclear-capableB-29s as had been availableat the
end of 1947.69
also respondedto pleas of
During late 1947 and early 1948, the administration
theJointChiefsof Staffto augmenttheoverseasbase systemand to acquirebases in
to the SovietUnion. Negotiationswere conductedwiththe British
closerproximity
to gain access to bases in the Middle East and an agreementwas concludedforthe
acquistionof air facilitiesin Libya. AdmiralConolly made a secretdeal withthe
French to secure air and communicationrightsand to stockpileoil, aviationgas,
and ammunitionin NorthAfrica.70Plans also were discussed forpostoccupation
and constructbases inJapan,and considerableprogresswas made in refurbishing
ing airfieldsin Turkey.During 1948 the Turks also receivedone hundredeighty
C-47 cargo planes.The
thirtyB-26 bombers,and eighty-one
F-47 fighter-bombers,
F-47sand B-26s,capable of reachingthevitalPloestiand Baku oil fields,weremore
likelyto be used to slow down a Sovietadvance throughTurkeyor Iran, thereby
and theOriginsoftheCold War,"Diplomatic
6 (1982): 69-95; Bernstein,
"QuestforSecurity,"
1033-44;
Histoiy,
and Rosenberg,
"HydrogenBomb Decision,"66-71.
69For theviewsof theGeneralAdvisory
Committee,
see RobertOppenheimerto Truman,December31,
1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 200; forthe viewsof theJCS, see, forexample,JCS, "Guidanceon Military
Aspectsof UnitedStatesPolicyto Be Adoptedin Eventof Continuing
Impassein Acceptanceof International
ControlofAtomicEnergy,"July
14, 1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45),JCS1764/1;and Leahyto
theSecretaries
ofWarand theNavy,August13, 1947,NHC, CNO, doublezerofiles,1947,folder13; and,for
the size and qualityof the stockpileand the numberof nuclear-capable
aircraft,
see especiallyDavid Alan
Rosenberg,
"U.S. NuclearStockpile,1945to 1950,"Bulletin
ofAtomic
38 (1982); 25-30. The numberof
Scientists,
nuclear-capableB-29s grew withgreat rapidityat the end of 1948. One memorandumin early 1949
enumeratedeighty-three
such planes;see 0. S. Picher,MemorandumforColonelPage, February14, 1949,
RG 330, box 126, CD 33-1-4.Both Borowskiand Rosenberghave stressedthe problemsbeleagueringthe
StrategicAir Commanduntilthe Korean War, but theirworkalso illustrates
the significant
changesand
improvements
thatbegan to occur late in 1947 and especiallyduring1948. See Borowski,HollowThreat;
David Alan Rosenberg,"The Originsof Overkill:NuclearWeaponsand AmericanStrategy,
1945-1960,"
International
7 (1983): 11-27.
Security,
70 For negotiations
withthe BritishoverMiddleEast strategy
and bases,see FRUS, 1947, 5: 485-626; and
Sullivanto theActingSecretary
of State,September26, 1947,NHC, SPD, ser.5, box 110,A14; forfacilities
in
Libya,see,forexample,LeahytotheSecretary
ofDefense,March18,1948,RG 319,P&O, 092 (topsecret);and
FRUS, 1948, 3: 906-07; and, fornegotiations
withthe French,see Spaatz to Symington,
[October1947],
to Spaatz,October
RG 107,Officeof theAssistant
of War forAir,1947,090, box 187B; Symington
Secretary
30, 1947,ibid.,Wooldridge,
MemorandumforOp-09,October13, 1948,NHC, CNO, doublezerofiles.1948,
box 4 (29); and Wooldridge,
MemorandumforOp-09,October25, 1948,ibid.,SPD, centralfiles,1948,A14.
For bases in NorthAfrica,see Forrestalto Truman,January6, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 156; also see
FRUS, 1948, 1: 603-04, 674-76.
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurit
373
affordingtime to activatea strategicair offensivefrom prospectivebases in the
Cairo-Suez area.71
Despite these developments,thejoint chiefsand militaryplannersgrewincreasinglyuneasy with the budgetaryconstraintsunder which they operated. They
realized thatAmericaninitiatives,
howevernecessary,placed the Soviet Union on
the defensive,createdan incendiarysituation,and made war more likely-though
still improbable. In July 1947, intelligenceanalysts in the War Department
maintainedthat the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had resultedin a
more aggressive Soviet attitude toward the United States and had intensified
tensions."These tensionshave caused a sharperline of demarcationbetweenWest
and East tending to magnifythe significanceof conflictingpoints of view, and
reducingthe possibilityof agreementon any point." Intelligenceofficersunderstood thatthe Sovietswould perceiveAmericaneffortsto build strategichighways,
constructairfields,and transferfighterbombers to Turkey as a threatto Soviet
securityand to the oilfieldsin the Caucuses. The latter,noted the directorof naval
intelligence,"lie withineasy air strikingrange of countrieson her southernflank,
and the Sovietleaders willbe particularly
sensitiveto any politicalthreatfromthis
area, howeverremote."Intelligenceanalystsalso recognizedthatthe Sovietswould
viewthe MarshallPlan as a threatto Sovietcontrolin EasternEurope as well as a
death-knellto communistattemptsto capturepowerpeacefullyin WesternEurope.
And defenseofficialswere well aware thatthe Sovietswould reactangrilyto plans
forcurrencyreformin German Trizonia and to preparationsfora West German
republic. "The whole Berlin crisis,"army planners informedEisenhower,"has
arisen as a resultof. .. actionson the part of the WesternPowers."In sum, the
Sovietclampdownin Eastern Europe and the attemptto blockade Berlin did not
come as shocks to defense officials,who anticipatedhostileand defensiveSoviet
reactionsto Americaninitiatives.72
civilian
The real consternation
of theJointChiefsof Staffand otherhigh-ranking
and militaryofficialsin the defense agencies stemmed from their growing
convictionthat the United Stateswas undertakingactionsand assumingcommitmentsthatnow required greatermilitarycapabilities.RecognizingthatAmerican
initiatives,
aimed at safeguardingEurasia fromfurthercommunistinroads,might
71 For references to Japanese bases, see, for example, "Discussion of Need of Obtaining
Long-Term Rights
for a U.S. Naval Operating Base in Japan" (approved by Nimitz) [Autumn 1947], NHC, SPD, ser. 4, box 86;
Nimitz to Under Secretaryof the Navy, December 12, 1947, ibid.,ser. 5, box 110; and Denfeld, Memorandum
for Schuyler, February 20, 1948, ibid.,central files, 1948, box 245, EF37; for the transferof planes to Turkey,
see Report No. 29, March 12, 1949, RG 59, 867.00/5-1249; and, for the uses of militaryassistance to Turkey,
see Leffler,"The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-52."
72 MID, "Estimate of the Possibilityof War," July 21, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); Op-32 to
General Board, April 28, 1948, NHC, General Board 425 (serial 315); and "National MilitaryEstablishment
Views on Germany" [appended to memorandum for Maddocks], June 30, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top
secret). For the repercussions of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, see Chamberlin to Chief of Staff,
July 9, 1947, RG 165, Records of the Chief of Staff,091 Greece; and Hillenkoetter,Memorandum for the
President,November 7, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; and, for a similarview in the State Department, see
FRUS, 1947, 1: 770-75. For prospective Soviet reactions to American assistance to Turkey, also see General
Board, "National Securityand the Navy," enclosure D,June 25, 1948; and Conolly to CNO, December 4, 1947,
NHC, Operations Division, ser. 1, A4/FF7. For assessments of Soviet reactions to Westerin initiatives in
Germany, also see Hillenkoetter, Memoranda for the President, March 16, 1948, and June 9, 1948, HTL,
HSTP, PSF, box 249; CIA, "Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany," April 28, 1948, ibid.,box
255; and Inglis, Memorandum of Information,April 3, 1948, NHC, Operations Division, ser. 1. box 3.
374
AHR Forum
be perceivedas endangeringSoviet interests,it was all the more importantto be
readyforanyeventuality.
Indeed, to theextentthatanxietiesabout theprospectsof
war escalatedin March and April 1948,thesefearsdid notstemfromestimatesthat
the Sovietswere planningfurtheraggressiveactionafterthe communistseizureof
apprehensionsthatongoingAmericaninitiatives
powerin Czechoslovakiabut fromn
mightprovokean attack.On March 14 General S. J. Chamberlin,directorof army
intelligence,warned the chief of staffthat "actions taken by this countryin
opposition to the spread of Communism ... may decide the question of the
outbreakof war and of its timing."The criticalquestion explicitlyfaced by the
intelligenceagencies and by the highestpolicymakerswas whetherpassage of the
SelectiveServiceAct,or of universalmilitarytraining,or of additionalappropriationsfor the air force,or of a militaryassistanceprogramto WesternEuropean
countries,or of a resolutionendorsing American support for West European
Union would triggera Soviet attack.Chamberlinjudged, for example, that the
Sovietswould not go to warjust to make Europe communistbut would resortto
war if theyfeltthreatened.The great imponderable,of course, was what,in the
Sovietview,would constitutea securitythreatjustifyingwar.73
but fearingSoviet
Recognizingthe need to move ahead withplanned initiatives
countermeasures,the newlyformedstaffof the National SecurityCouncil undertook itsfirstcomprehensiveassessmentof Americanforeignpolicy.During March
1948, after consultingwith representativesof the army, navy, air force, State
Department,CIA, and National SecurityResources Board, the National Security
Council staffproduced NSC 7, "The Positionof the United StateswithRespectto
Soviet-DominatedWorld Communism."This studybegan withthe commonplace
assumptionthatthecommunistgoal was "worldconquest."The studythenwenton
to express the omnipresenttheme behind all conceptionsof American national
securityin the immediatepostwaryears."Betweenthe UnitedStatesand the USSR
thereare in Europe and Asia areas of greatpotentialpower whichifadded to the
existingstrengthof the Sovietworldwould enable the latterto become so superior
in manpower,resources,and territorythat the prospect for the survivalof the
United Statesas a freenationwould be slight."Accordingly,
the studycalled, first,
forthe strengthening
potentialof the UnitedStatesand, second,for
of the military
the armingof the non-Sovietworld,particularlyWesternEurope. Althoughthis
staffstudywas neverformallyapproved,the nationalsecuritybureaucracyworked
during the spring and summer of 1948 for West European unity, military
assistanceto friendlynations,currencyreformin Trizonia, revitalizationof the
Ruhr,and the foundingof the Federal Republicof Germany.74
73 For Chamberlin's views, see, for example, Chamberlin, Memoranidum to the Chief of Staff,March 14,
1948; and Chamberlin, Memorandum for Wedemeyer, April 14, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For the
view from Moscow, sce JIC, "Soviet Intention-s,"April 1, 1948 (extracts of this report are printed in FRUS,
1948, 1: 550-57); also see, for example, Hillenkoetter,Memorandum for the President,March 16, 1948; CIA,
Special Evaluation No. 27, March 16, 1948; Inglis, Memorarndum of Information, March 16, 1948; CIA,
"Possibilityof Direct Soviet MilitaryAction during 1948," April 2, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; and CIA,
"Review of the World Situation," April 8, 1948, ibid.,box 203.
7- For NSC 7, see FRUS, 1948, 1: 545-50; for reactions and reservationsof the State Department and the
JCS, see ibid., 557-64; and, for the support of Western Union, see ibid., 3: 1-351. Also see, for example,
materials in R(; 218, Leahy Papers, boxes 5, 6; ibid., ser. (,(C,S 092 Western Europe (3-12-48). For military
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
375
The priority
accorded to WesternEurope did not mean thatofficials
ignoredthe
restof Eurasia. Indeed, the sustainedeconomic rejuvenationof WesternEurope
made access to Middle Eastern oil more importantthan ever. Marshall,Lovett,
Forrestal,and other defense officials,including the joint chiefs, feared that
Americansupportof Israel mightjeopardize relationswithArab nationsand drive
themintothe hands of the SovietUnion. AlthoughTruman acceptedthe partition
of Palestineand recognized Israel, the United Statesmaintainedan embargo on
armsshipmentsand soughtto avoid too close an identification
withtheZioniststate
lest the flowof oil to the West be jeopardized.75At the same time,the Truman
administration
moved swiftlyin June 1948 to resuscitatethe Japanese economy.
Additional funds were requested from Congress to procure importsof raw
materialsforJapanese industryso thatJapanese exportsmightalso be increased.
Shortlythereafter,Draper, Tracy S. Voorhees, and other armyofficialscame to
believe that a rehabilitatedJapan would need the marketsand raw materialsof
and
SoutheastAsia. They undertooka comprehensiveexaminationof the efficacy
utilityof a Marshall Plan for Asia. IntegratingJapan and SoutheastAsia into a
viable regional economy,invulnerableto communistsubversionand firmlyensconced in the Westerncommunity,assumed growingsignificance,
especiallyin
viewof the prospectof a communisttriumphin China.76But communistvictories
in China did not dissuade policymakersfromsupporting,for strategicas well as
domestic politicalconsiderations,the appropriationof hundreds of millionsof
dollarsin additionalaid to the Chinese nationalistsin the springof 1948. And the
Americancommitment
to preservethe integrity
of South Korea actuallyincreased,
despitethe planned withdrawalof occupationforces.77
assistance,
see FRUS, 1948, 1: 585-88; also see materialsin RG 330, boxes22 and 24, CD 6-2-46and 6-2-49;
RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);LawrenceS. Kaplan,A Community
ofInterests:
NATO andtheMilitary
Assistance
Program,
1948-1951 (Washington,
1980); Condit,History
oftheJCS,2: 409-36; and ChesterJ. Pach,"Arming
theFreeWorld:The OriginsoftheUnitedStatesMilitary
Assistance
Program,1945-1949"(Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern
University,
1981). For Germany,see especiallyFRUS, 1948, 2: 1-1340; and Smith,Papersof
General
LuciusD. Clay,2: 527-969.
75See,forexample,FRUS, 1948,5: 545-54, 972-76, 1005-07,1021-22,1380-81; CNO to theSecretary
of
theNavy,January
24, 1948,NHC, CNO, doublezerofiles,1948,box 2; Leahy,Memorandum
fortheSecretary
of Defense,October10, 1947,RG 330, box 20, CD 6-1-8;Millis,Forrestal
Diaries,344-49, 356-65, 376-77;
Bain,MarchtoZion,137-213; and Miller,Search
forSecurity,
173-203.
76 For therehabilitation
ofJapan,see SpecialAd Hoc Committee
[ofSWNCC],CountryReporton Japan,
August8, 1947,RG 353, box 109; Blum to Ohly,December22, 1947,RG 330, box 9, CD 3-1-9;Blum to
Forrestal,
December29, 1947,ibid.;Royallto Forrestal,
April28, 1948,ibid.;Royall,Memorandumforthe
Secretary
of Defense,May 18, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 182; and CIA, "Strategic
ImportanceofJapan,"
May24, 1948,ibid.,box 255, Alsosee FRUS, 1948,6: 654-56, 694-95, 712-17,733-34, 750-51,964-65. For
Japanand SoutheastAsia,see Ad Hoc Committee,
"Studyof a UnitedStatesAid ProgramfortheFar East,"
February16, 1949,RG 319, P&O, 092 Pacific(topsecret);and Schaller,"SecuringtheGreatCrescent,"
392414.
77 In recentyearsscholarshave shownthatthe limited
aid to China was notsimplya consequenceof the
influenceof the China lobbyand the administration's
concernwiththe legislativefateof the European
Recovery
Program.Some policymakers
(especially
military
officers)
also weremotivated
byfearofthestrategic
and geopoliticalconsequencesof a communisttakeoverin China,even thoughtheyfullyrecognizedthe
ineptitude
of theChinesenationalists.
See, forexample,JohnH. Feaver,"The ChinaAid Billof 1948:Limited
Assistance
as a Cold War Strategy,"
Diplomatic
5 (1981): 107-20; RussellD. Buhite,"MajorInterests:
History,
AmericanPolicytowardChina,Taiwan,and Korea, 1945-50,"Paciflc
47 (1978): 425-51; and
Historical
Review,
ThomasG. Paterson,"If Europe,WhyNotChina?The Containment
Doctrine,1947-49,"Prologe,13 (1981):
19-38. Fora fineanalysisofdevelopments
31-1 10;
in bothChinaand Korea,see Stueck,RoadtoConfrontation,
and, foraid to China,also see FRUS, 1948, 8: 1-269,442-601.
376
AHR Forum
The problemwithall of these undertakings,however,was thattheycost large
and necessitated
sums,expanded the nation'sformaland informalcommitments,
larger militarycapabilities.Yet on March 24, 1948, just as NSC 7 was being
finished,Truman's Council of EconomicAdvisorswarnedthatacceleratingexpenditures might compel the president "to set aside free market practices-and
substitutea rathercomprehensiveset of controls."Truman was appalled by this
possibilityand carefullylimitedthe sums allocated for a build-up of American
forces.78Key advisers,like Webb, Marshall,Lovett,and Clifford,supported this
budget,expectedthe
approach because theyperceivedtoo much fatin the military
Sovietsto relyon politicaltacticsratherthan militaryaggression,postulatedlatent
U.S. militarysuperiority
over the SovietUnion, and assumed thatthe atomicbomb
trump card. For many American
constituteda decisive,if perhaps short-term,
policymakers,moreover,the Iranian crisisof 1946, the Greek civilwar, and the
ongoing Berlin airliftseemed to demonstratethatRussia would back down when
confrontedwithAmericandetermination,even if the United Statesdid not have
superiorforces-in-being.79
As secretaryof defense, however, Forrestal was beleaguered by pressures
emanatingfromthe armed servicesfora build-upof Americanmilitaryforcesand
by his own apprehensionsover prospectiveSovietactions.He anguishedover the
excruciatingly
difficultchoices that had to be made between the imperativesof
assistance,domesticrearmament,and fiscal
foreigneconomicaid, overseasmilitary
orthodoxy.In May,June, and July1948, he and his assistantscarefullypondered
intelligencereportson Sovietintentionsand requesteda special State Department
studyon how to plan Americandefenseexpendituresin viewof prospectiveSoviet
policies. He also studied carefullythe conclusionsof an exhaustivestudyof the
navy'scontributionto national securityundertakenby the General Board of the
navy under the direct supervisionof Captain Arleigh Burke. Still not satisfied,
Forrestalasked the presidentto permitthe National SecurityCouncil to conduct
another comprehensive examination of American policy objectives. Forrestal
clearly hoped that this reassessmentwould show that a larger proportionof
resourcesshould be allocated to the militaryestablishment.80
78
Edwin G. Nourse, Leon Keyserling,and Clark to Truman, March 24, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 143;
Truman to Nourse, March 25, 1948, ibid.; Statement by the President to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretariesof the Three Departments, and the Three Chiefs of Staff,May 13, 1948, ibid.,box 146; and Truman
to Forrestal,July 13, 1948, RG 330, box 18, CD 5-1-20.
79 For the views of Lovett and Webb, see Lovett diaries, December 16, 1947, January 15, 1948, April 21,
1948; for Clifford's view of the importance of the atomic bomb, see Clifford,Oral History, 88; and, for
Marshall's reliance on the atomic bomb, see McNarney, Memorandum for the JCS, November 2, 1948, HTL,
HSTP, PSF, box 114. Also see Policy Planning Staff[hereafter,PPS], "Factors Affectingthe Nature of the U.S.
Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies,"June 23, 1948, RG 330, box 4, CD 2-2-2; and Lovett to
Forrestal,June 25, 1948, ibid. For the lessons derived from crisis decision making over Iran, Greece, and
Turkey, see John R. Oneal, ForeignPolicyMaking in Timesof Crises(Columbus, 1982).
80 For the conflictingpressures on
Forrestal and his own uncertainties,see, for example, Excerpt of Phone
Conversation between Forrestal and C. E. Wilson, April 2, 1948, ML, JFP, box 48; Excerpt of Phone
Conversation between Forrestal and Cannon, April 9, 1948, ibid.; and Forrestal to Ralph Bard, November 20,
1948, ibid., box 78; for Forrestal's intense interest in the assessments of Soviet intentions,see Forrestal to
Charles A. Buchanan [July1948], RG 330, box 4, CD 2-2-2; and John McCone to Forrestal,July7, 1948, ibid.,
for Forrestal'srequest for a State Department study,see Lovett to Forrestal,June 25, 1948; for the naval study
and Forrestal's interest therein, see General Board, "National Security and Navy," June 25, 1948; Arleigh
TheAmerican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
377
The PolicyPlanningStaffof the Departmentof State prepared the initialstudy
that Forrestalrequested and Truman authorized.Extensivelyredraftedit reappeared in November1948 as NSC 20/4and was adopted as thedefinitive
statement
of American foreignpolicy. Significantly,
this paper reiteratedthe longstanding
estimatethattheSovietUnion was notlikelyto resortto war to achieveitsobjectives.
But warcould eruptas a resultof "Sovietmiscalculation
of thedetermination
of the
UnitedStatesto use all the means at itscommandto safeguarditssecurity,
through
Soviet misinterpretation
of our intentions,and through U.S. miscalculationof
Soviet reactionsto measures which we mighttake." Immediatelyfollowingthis
appraisal of the prospects of war, the National SecurityCouncil restated its
conceptionof American national security:"Soviet dominationof the potential
power of Eurasia, whetherachieved by armed aggressionor by politicaland
subversivemeans,would be strategically
and politically
unacceptableto the United
States."8'
Yet NSC 20/4did not call fora largermilitary
budget.Withno expectationthat
war was imminent,the report emphasized the importanceof safeguardingthe
domesticeconomy and leftunresolvedthe extentto whichresourcesshould be
devoted to militarypreparations.NSC 20/4 also stressed"that Soviet political
warfaremightseriouslyweaken the relativepositionof the United States,enhance
Sovietstrengthand eitherlead to our ultimatedefeatshortof war,or forceus into
war under dangerouslyunfavorableconditions."Accordingly,
the NationalSecurityCouncil vaguelybut stridently
propounded the importanceof reducingSoviet
powerand influenceon the peripheryof the Russianhomelandand of strengthening the pro-Americanorientationof non-Sovietnations.82
Language of thissort,whichdid not defineclear prioritiesand whichprojected
Americaninterestsalmost everywhereon the globe, exasperatedthejoint chiefs
and othermilitaryofficers.They, too, believedthatthe United Statesshould resist
communistaggressioneverywhere,"an overall commitmentwhichin itselfis allinclusive."But to undertakethisgoal in a responsibleand effective
fashionit was
necessary"to bringour militarystrengthto a levelcommensuratewiththe distinct
possibility
of globalwarfare."The JointChiefsof Staffstilldid notthinktheSoviets
wantedwar. But, giventhe long-termintentionsattributedto theSovietUnion and
givenAmerica'sown aims,the chances forwar,thoughstillsmall,weregrowing.83
Particularlyworrisomewere studies during 1948 suggestingthat,should war
Burke,Oral History,NHC, 2: 30; and, forForrestal's
requestand fora comprehensive
studyof American
policyand Truman'sresponses,
see Trumanto Forrestal,July
13, 1948,RG 330,box 18,CD 5-1-20;Trumanto
Forrestal,
July15, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 150; and FRUS, 1948, 1: 589-93.
81 NCS 20/1and 20/4maybe foundin Gaddisand Etzold,Containment,
173-211 (thequotationsappearon
page 208). Also see FRUS, 1948, 1: 589-93, 599-601, 609-11, 615-24, 662-69.
82 Gaddisand Etzold,Containment,
209-10.
83
NSC 35, "ExistingInternational
Commitments
Involvingthe PossibleUse of ArmedForces,"November
17, 1948,FRUS, 1948, 1: 656-62. For assessments
and the prospectsof war,see the
of Sovietintentions
of DirectSovietMilitary
Actionduring
in note 74, pages 374-75, above; also see CIA, "Possibility
citations
1948-49,"September16, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; CIA, "Threatsto the Securityof the United
States,"September28, 1948,ibid.,box 256; COMNAVFORGER, Intelligence
Report,September30, 1948,
NHC, SPD, centralfiles,1948, box 245, EF61; JSPC, "RevisedBriefof Short-RangeEmergencyPlan:
Fleetwood,"
October14, 1948,RG 218,ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JSPC
877/23;and FRUS, 1948, 1: 648-50,
and 5: 942-47.
378
AHR Forum
occur, the United States would have difficultyimplementingbasic strategic
undertakings.Although the armed servicesfoughtbitterlyover the divisionof
funds, they coincurredfullyon one subject-the $15 billion ceiling on military
spending set by Truman was inadequate. In November 1948, militaryplanners
argued that the $14.4 billionbudget would jeopardize Americanmilitaryoperations by constrictingthe speed and magnitude of the strategicair offensive,
curtailingconventionalbombing operations against the Soviet Union, reducing
America'sabilityto provide naval assistanceto Mediterraneanallies,undermining
the nation's abilityto control Middle East oil at the onset of a conflict,and
weakeninginitialoverall offensivecapabilities.On November 9, the joint chiefs
informedthe secretaryof defense that the existingbudget for fiscal 1950 was
"insufficient
to implementnationalpolicyin any probablewar situationthatcan be
foreseen."84
From the viewpointof the national militaryestablishment,the deficiencyof
forces-in-being
wasjust one of severalproblems.ForrestaltoldMarshallthathe was
more concerned about the absence of sufficient
strengthto supportinternational
negotiationsthan he was about the availabilityof forcesto combat overt acts of
aggression,whichwere unlikelyin any case. During 1948, thejoint chiefsalso grew
and
increasingly
agitatedover the wideninggap betweenAmericancommitments
interestson the one hand and American militarycapabilitieson the other. In
Novemnber,
the JointChiefs of Staffsubmittedto the National SecurityCouncil a
thatalreadyhad been
comprehensivelistof the formaland informalcommitments
incurredby the United Statesgovernment.Accordingto thejoint chiefs,"current
possible use of armed
United States commitmentsinvolvingthe use or distinctly
themeitherpromptly
forcesare verygreatlyin excessof our presentabilityto fulfill
or effectively."
Limitedcapabilitiesmeant that the use of Americanforcesin any
specificsituation-for example, in Greece, Berlin, or Palestine-threatened to
emasculatethe nation'sabilityto respond elsewhere.85
HAVING CONCEIVED
OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY in termsof Westerncontrol
and of American access to the resources of Eurasia outside the Soviet sphere,
American defense officialsnow considered it imperativeto develop American
militarycapabilitiesto meet a host of contingenciesthat might emanate from
84JCS, Denfeld, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, November 8, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 370
(8-19-45), JCS 1800/14. For the impact of the $14.4 billion budget on strategicplans, see JCS, "Allocation of
Forces and Funds for the FY 1950 Budget," November 22, 1948, RG 330, box 16, "Draper: BuLdgetFile,"
JCS, 1800/18; for overall problems facing strategic plan-ners,see the voluminous studies in RG 218, ser.
CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); and, for a few examples of the problems in implementingstrategicplans, see JLPG,
"Quick FeasibilityTest of JSPG 496/4," March 19, 1948, ibid.,jLPG 84/5; ICS, "Ihe Logistic Feasibilityof
Doublestar," August 12, 1948, ibid.,JCS 1844/15; JLPG, "SuLpplyPriorities,for Fleetwood," October 15, 1948,
ibid.,JLPG 84/31; and JLPC, "The Correction of Deficiencies Revealed by the LimnitedFeasibilitytest of
ABC 101," December 23, 1948, ibid.,JLPC 416/36. In late 1948 and 1949 the navy challenged fundamental
aspects of the strategic air offensive. See the studies in ibid., ser. CCS 373 (10-23-48); also see Rosenberg,
"HydrogeniBomb Decision," 71-75. For service rivalriesarid the budgetary process, see, for example, Warner
R. Schillinig,"The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling et al., Strategp,Politics,anidDefense
Budgets(New York, 1962), 5-266.
85 For the position of the JCS, see NSC 35, "Existing International Commitments," November 17, 1948,
FRUS, 1948, 1: 656-62. For Forrestal's view, see ibid.,644-46. For background, see William A. Knowlton,
TheAmenican
Conception
ofNationalSecurity
379
furtherSovietencroachmentsor fromindigenouscommunistunrest.Such contingencieswere sure to arise because Americanstrategydepended so heavilyon the
rebuildingof Germanyand Japan, Russia's traditionalenemies,as well as on air
Such contingencies
power,atomic weapons, and bases on the Soviet periphery.86
also were predictablebecause American strategydepended so heavily on the
restorationof stabilityin Eurasia, a situationincreasinglyunlikelyin an era of
Althoughthe
nationalistturmoil,social unrest,and risingeconomicexpectations.87
desire of the national militaryestablishmentfor large incrementsin defense
expendituresdid not prevailin the tightbudgetaryenvironmentand presidential
electionyearof 1948, the mode of thinkingabout nationalsecuritythatsubsequentin Asia was
ly acceleratedthe arms race and precipitatedmilitaryinterventionismi
alreadywidespreadamong defense officials.
Indeed, thedynamicsof theCold War after1948 are easierto comprehendwhen
one grasps the breadthof the Americanconceptionof nationalsecuritythathad
emergedbetween 1945 and 1948.88 This conceptionincludeda strategicsphere of
influencewithinthe WesternHemisphere,dominationof the Atlanticand Pacific
oceans, an extensivesystemof outlyingbases to enlarge the strategicfrontierand
projectAmericanpower,an even more extensivesystemof transitrightsto facilitate
the conversionof commercialair bases to militaryuse, access to the resourcesand
marketsof mostof Eurasia, denial of those resourcesto a prospectiveenemy,and
it must
the maintenanceof nuclearsuperiority.
Not everyone of theseingredients,
be emphasized,was considered vital. Hence, American officialscould acquiesce,
howevergrudgingly,to a Sovietsphere in EasternEurope and could avoid direct
interventionin China. But cumulativechallenges to these concepts of national
securitywere certainto provokea firmAmericanresponse.This occurredinitially
in 1947-48 when decisionswere made in favorof the Truman Doctrine,Marshall
Plan,military
assistance,Atlanticalliance,and Germanand Japanese rehabilitation.
Soon thereafter,
the "loss"of China, the Sovietdetonationof an atomicbomb,and
the North Korean attackon South Korea intensifiedthe perceptionof threatto
prevailingconcepts of national security.The Truman administrationresponded
withmilitaryassistanceto southeastAsia, a decision to build the hydrogenbomib,
directmilitaryintervention
in Korea, a commitmentto stationtroopspermanently
in Europe, expansionof the Americanalliancesystem,and a massiverearmament
program in the United States. Postulatinga long-termSoviet intentionto gain
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,October 21, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret); for the reference to
Greece, see JCS, "'The Position of the United States withRespect to Greece," April 13, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS
092 Greece (12-30-47), JCS 1826/8.
86 See, for example, the citations in notes 72-73, pages 373-74, above.
87 See, for example, CIA, "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for U.S. Security,"
September 3, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; CIA, "Review of the World Situation," Septemiber 16, 1948;
and Inglis, Memorandurrm
of Information, February 16, 1949, NHC, SPD, central files, 1949, box 249, All.
88 The view presented here of the expansive Arnerican conception of national securityconflictsin part with
A CriticalAppraisalofPostwarAmericanNational
the one presented byJohn L. Gaddis's Strategiesof Containment:
Security
Policy(New York, 1981), 3-88. Gaddis's argument is thoughtf'uland insightfulbut relies too heavilyon
the recommendations of Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff. Indeed, the adoption of NSC 68 and the
massive militarybuild-up that accompanied the Korean War are miucheasier to undeistand( if one grasps the
expansive conception of national securitythat was pervasive in defense circles after WorldlWar II.
380
AHR Forum
based on geopolitworlddomination,theAmericanconceptionof nationalsecurity,
ical and economic imperatives,could not allow for additional losses in Eurasia,
could not risk a challenge to its nuclear supremacy,and could not permitany
infringement
on its abilityto defend in depth or to projectAmericanforcefrom
areas in close proximityto the Soviet homeland.
To say this is neither to exculpate the Soviet governmentfor its inhumane
treatmentof its own citizensnor to suggestthatSoviet foreignpolicywas idle or
benign. Indeed, Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe was often deplorable; the
Sovietssought opportunitiesin the Dardanelles, northernIran, and Manchuria;
the Sovietshoped to orientGermanyand Austriatowardthe East; and the Soviets
sometimesendeavored to use communistparties to expand Soviet influencein
areas beyondthe peripheryof Russian militarypower. But, then again, the Soviet
Union had lost twentymillion dead during the war, had experienced the
thousand factories,and one
destructionof seventeenhundred towns,thirty-one
hundred thousandcollectivefarms,and had witnessedthe devastationof the rural
economywiththeNazi slaughterof twentymillionhogs and seventeenmillionhead
of cattle.Whatis remarkableis thatafter1946 thesemonumentallossesreceivedso
littleattentionwhen Americandefense analystsstudiedthe motivesand intentions
of Sovietpolicy;indeed, defenseofficials
did littleto analyzethethreatperceivedby
the Soviets. Yet these same officialshad absolutelyno doubt that the wartime
experiencesand sacrificesof the United States,thoughmuch less devastatingthan
thoseof SovietRussia,demonstratedthe need forand entitledthe United Statesto
oversee the resuscitationof the industrialheartlandsof Germany and Japan,
dominatethe Eurasian
establisha viablebalance of power in Eurasia, and militarily
rimlands,therebysafeguardingAmericanaccess to raw materialsand controlover
all sea and air approaches to NorthAmerica.89
To suggesta double standardis importantonlyinsofaras it raises fundamental
questionsabout the conceptualizationand implementationof American national
securitypolicy.If Soviet policywas aggressive,bellicose,and ideological,perhaps
America'srelianceon overseasbases, air power,atomicweapons,militaryalliances,
and the rehabilitation
of Germanyand Japan was the bestcourse to follow,even if
the effectmay have been to exacerbateSoviet anxietiesand suspicions.But even
when one attributesthe worstintentionsto the Soviet Union, one mightstillask
whetherAmerican presuppositionsand apprehensions about the benefitsthat
would accrue to the SovietUnion as a resultof communist(and even revolutionary
nationalist)gains anywherein Eurasia tended to simplifyinternationalrealities,
magnifythe breadth of American interests,engender commitmentsbeyond
American capabilities,and dissipate the nation's strengthand credibility.And,
89 For Soviet losses, see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky,A History
ofRussia (3d edn., New York, 1977), 584-85. While
Russian dead totaled almost twentymillion and while approximately 25 percent of the reproducible wealth of
the Soviet Union was destroyed,American battlefieldcasualties were three hundred thousand dead, the index
of industrial production in the United States rose from 100 to 196, and the gross national product increased
from$91 billion to $166 billion. See Gordon Wright,The Ordeal ofTotal War (New York, 1968), 264-65. For an
analysis of Soviet threat perception in the aftermathof World War II, see Michael McGwire, "The T hreat to
Russia: An Estimate of Soviet MilitaryRequirements" (manuscript in preparation at the Brookings Institution
[titletentative]).
TheAmerican
ofNationalSecuiity
Conception
381
perhapseven more importantly,
ifSovietforeignpoliciestended to be opportunist,
reactive,nationalistic,
and contradictory,
as some recentwritershave claimedand as
some contemporaryanalystssuggested, then one might also wonder whether
American capabilities,and dissipate the nation's strengthand credibility.And,
engender anxietiesand to provoke countermeasuresfrom a proud, suspicious,
insecure,and cruelgovernmentthatwas at thesame timelegitimately
apprehensive
about the long-termimplicationsarising from the rehabilitationof traditional
enemies and the developmentof foreignbases on the peripheryof the Soviet
homeland.To raise such issues anew seems essentialin the 1980s, when a correct
understandingof an adversary'sintentions,a shrewd grasp of an adversary's
perceptionsof vitalinterests,and a sound assessmentof America'sown national
securityimperativesseem to be indispensableprerequisitesfor the avoidance of
nuclearwar and the establishment
of a saferclimateforgreatpower competition.