Cultural Drift: A Primary Process of Culture Change
Author(s): Henry C. Koerper and E. Gary Stickel
Source: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter, 1980), pp. 463-469
Published by: University of New Mexico
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CULTURAL DRIFT: A PRIMARY PROCESS OF CULTURE CHANGE
Henry C. Koerper
Department of Anthropology, University of California at Riverside,
Riverside, CA
E. Gary Stickel
Environmental Research Archaeologists, Los Angeles, CA
The term "drift" is often conceptualized as a primary process of culture change. Whether or not
perceived as a cultural analog of biology's genetic drift or similar sampling phenomena, "drift" is
generally vaguely definedand/or used nonproductively. This incorrect usage often masks the proper
processes, which might more clearly elucidate particular change phenomena. This paper posits, by
reference to examples of change, a clear exposition of "cultural drift" as a necessary contribution
toward a unified genetic analog model of culture change.
CULTURE CHANGE MODELS based on analogies between biological and cultural
evolution may be termed genetic analog models. At present such models are variously
regarded as lacking utility (e.g., Harris 1971:150), as heretofore incomplete but
potentially useful (e.g., Leone 1972:26), or as advantageous to analysis of culture
change (e.g., Schneider 1977). If a genetic analog model of culture change is ever to
be meaningful, the relations between primary processes of culture change and cultural
development must first be clearly shown to parallel the relations between the
mechanisms of biological evolutionary change and the phylogenetic development of
breeding populations.
In our unified genetic analog model for culture change (Koerper and Stickel 1978)
we propose that parallels between culture development and phylogenetic evolution
should begin with the units of cultural information, or ideas (which provide for
cultural behavior), being conceptualized as analogous to the units of hereditary
information, the genetic codes. Further, just as changes in gene frequencies in
breeding populations through time constitute phylogenetic evolution, so changes in
the frequencies of cultural information in a culture through time define cultural
development. Additionally, the basic mechanisms of biological evolution which
change gene frequencies are analogs for the primary processes of culture change
which change idea frequencies in a culture.
Genetic analog models in anthropology make essentially four analogies between
cultural processes and phylogenetic processes; in brief, these are as follows (for a
more extensive discussion, see Koerper and Stickel 1978): (1) Invention/discovery
might be likened to mutation, for both are initial sources of variation for cultures
and breeding populations respectively. This cultural process is termed "cultural
mutation" (Koerper and Stickel 1978; cf. Plog 1974:50). (2) Various scholars recognize, at least implicitly, a correspondence between selection for cultural phenomena
in culture change contexts (i.e., cultural adaptation) and natural selection for favorable traits in a species's biological adaptation (e.g., Binford 1968; Plog 1974:50).
(3) Diffusion is occasionally seen as an analog of gene flow (e.g., Dunn 1970:1042).
(4) A cultural analog is occasionally made with genetic drift (e.g., Fagan 1975:312)
or other similar sampling phenomena (e.g., Dunn 1970:1042, or Schneider 1977:18).
463
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JOURNALOF ANTHROPOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
The subject of our paper is this last analog, "cultural drift." Cultural drift is
used here as the generic term for all sampling phenomena which cause culture change.
Under this general rubric we will refer to "cultural drift proper" and "cultural founder
effect" as causes of certain types of variability in the archaeological record.
In the literature of anthropology and archaeology, drift (i.e., "drift," "cultural
drift," "style drift," and "inevitable variation") is often conceptualized as a process
of culture change. Whether perceived as a cultural analog of sampling phenomena in
phylogenetic evolution (e.g., genetic drift, founder effect) or not, drift is usually
only vaguely defined and used improperly. This misuse often masks those primary
processes which would more properly elucidate specific change phenomena. A clear
understanding of "cultural drift" as an analog of biological phenomena would facilitate our understanding of culture change.
The concept of "drift" as a cultural process is a hoary one in the anthropological
literature. Sapir gave the concept chapter-length elaboration in his classic work,
Language (1921). As Sapir uses it, "drift" is both a synonym for language change in
the direction of dialect variation and a change process. Drift is caused by individual
variations, "not ultimately random ... only relatively so," and by the "unconscious
selection on the part of its speakers of those individual variations that are cumulative
in some special direction" (1921:165-66).
Herskovits's term "drift" (1951:581-82)
is an adaptation of Sapir's linguistic
drift, and therefore it too is directional and cumulative. Herskovits' concept refers
to small cultural variations which "tend to be random variations in the sense that they
represent all kinds of departures from all sorts of norms." It is clear from his examples of drift that selective factors determine the direction of change.
The "randomness" which Sapir and Herskovits speak of is not the randomness
of sampling phenomena. In the language of our genetic analog model, Sapir's and
Herskovits's drift would be applicable to change situations in which the mechanisms
of change are a combination of "cultural mutation" and "cultural selection."
In the archaeological literature, some efforts to elucidate cultural drift exhibit
direct historical roots from Sapir and Herskovits. Brian Fagan (1975:312),
for
instance, writes:
Inevitable variation is somewhat similar to the well-known phenomenon of genetic drift in
biology. As people learn the behavior patterns of their society, inevitably some minor differencesin learnedbehavior will appearfrom generationto generation,which, minor in themselves, accumulateover a long time, especiallyif the populationsare ratherisolated.
In Fagan's quote "minor differences" are not properly ascribed to cultural mutation, nor does Fagan acknowledge the random cause of drift. Thus Fagan has not
described a valid cultural analog to genetic drift.
In another instance, Hole and Heizer present (1973:464), by a hypothetical example, their attempt to describe the analogy:
The population that moves into a new environment with a new set of techniques develops
further along lines laid out by the initial invention. The invention is the "kick"in the system,
which is amplified by continued use and elaboration.Metaphoricallyand physically the population drifts fartheraway from the parentgroup.
In the present analysis, Hole and Heizer's "drift" is the result of cultural mutation ("initial invention") and cultural selection ("continued use and elaboration"),
and seemingly has nothing to do with a random process. Their example of drift is
CULTURALDRIFT
465
puzzling, particularly in light of the fact that Hole and Heizer state earlier in the
same work (1973:81) that a culture change process which could be analogous to
genetic drift would necessarily have to be "random."
In archaeology, cultural drift was first proposed conceptually by Binford (1963).
Binford is, at least superficially, close to a proper cultural analog for genetic drift,
but some important clarifications are desirable. Binford properly recognizes that
"cultural drift" is generally a phenomenon of small groups, but he does not draw a
clear analogy between a breeding population and a culture. He seems to liken the
pool of genetic variability to the range of variation in such things as the "manner of
execution of stylistic norms appropriate to the manufacture of particular items,"
or "the use of certain decorative and stylistic modes" (1963:91). Rather, genetic
variability should be likened to the variability of ideas behind, say, the execution of
particular styles. Binford writes that the pool of variability on the individual level is
subject to such error (1963:91). It would appear that the individual has been likened
to the breeding population, when clearly only individuals collectively, if they share
a given culture, might be likened to a breeding population. According to Binford
(1963:92):
In cases of decreased generational continuity and stability we would expect minor variations
to arise in the relative frequencies for different modes of normative execution between parent
and daughter communities. Such variation should arise simply as a result of random sampling
error in the degree to which individual variants are disproportionately represented between
the parent and descendent populations.
This passage embodies a tautology. If the variants are disproportionately represented between a parent and descendent population, the variation is already present,
and can hardly be said to have arisen from the variation. He continues (1963:92):
Changes arising in this manner automatically result in a slightly modified statistical norm in
the daughter community. Such a shift may remain a purely statistical phenomenon or may,
under selection for maximizing the material means of group identification, be objectified and
elaborated, thereby serving the functions of enhancing group solidarity. It is then suggested
that there could arise real differences between social units in the range and frequency of
specific formal characteristics of material items which are simply a function of random
sampling error between generations in small and segmentary social units.
Binford seems to be saying that observable ("real") differences between mother
and daughter communities may depend on selection, but in the next breath such differences might be due solely to random sampling error. Binford avoids letting his
reader know precisely how a sampling error might occur. Perhapswe have not done
justice to Binford's essay, but the lack of clarity in his writing style leaves us uncertain of many of his points.
Charles Cleland (1972) defines "style drift," which he calls a process, as "change
within a design set"; it is "characteristically a matter of progressive element loss
from an original basic design which is composed of many discrete elements." One
example of "style drift" used by Cleland is the style change of Celtic British coins
from Macedonian Greek prototypes, a phenomenon studied originally by Sir John
Evans in 1849.
The British gold and electrum coins (see Fig. 1) derive from the "Phillipus," a
gold stater of Phillip II of Macedonian Greece.1 Celtic die cutters copied the Greek
coin, and subsequent generations of artisans from Gaul and Britain produced coin
motifs which became increasingly abstract in design, until the final coins in this
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JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Figure 1. The style Change from the Reverse of the "Phillipus" Gold Stater (Charioteer and
Biga at Left) Through the Increasingly Disjointed Horses of Gaul and Britain.
developmental series hardly seem, on purely stylistic grounds, to have had any
historical connection with the Greek staters.
The style of the Gaulish copies of the "Phillipus" are often referred to as "degraded" (Mack 1964:xi). "Degraded" is an unfortunate term, for it implies a devolution
rather than an evolution of the artifact; the middle first century B.C. British gold
and electrum staters are no more "degraded" than an abstract Picasso painting.
In terms of primary cultural processes, it seems that less realistic, increasingly
abstract motifs resulted first from diffusion (cultural flow) across cultural boundaries, and second from innovative motif changes (cultural mutations), coupled with
cultural selection for those more abstract designs over time. These were not random
processes. Given Cleland's numismatic example, the term "style drift" is nothing
more than a synonym for stylistic change; the term can hardly be said to stand for a
process, much less a random process which "drift" implies. Similarly, James Ford's
"cultural drift" also seems to be merely a synonym for slow and even stylistic change
(1954:52).
Had Cleland chosen a motif progression from a primitive to a more realistic
style, the role of cultural mutation and cultural selection would have been more
readily apparent. For instance, there is another ancient numismatic example where a
satyr and nymph motif on Greek Thasian silver staters changed from Archaic to
Classic style (Fig. 2) during the sixth through the fifth centuries B.C.
The major subject of Cleland's research is a sixty-year period of change (rearrangements, additions, and/or deletions) of discrete design elements in French Jesuit
finger ring motifs, which he attributes to the "passive process" of "style drift,"
coupled with "positive selection," which involves an "active" cultural choice (1972:
210).
Cleland's illustrations (1972:Figs. 1, 2, and 3) of the various changes in Jesuit
finger rings leave little doubt that a reduction of structures, a true degradation, occurred over time. To reinterpret Cleland, these "style drift" examples, then, actually
describe the effects of cultural mutations within the context of relaxed selective
pressure, and as such, this "style drift" recalls biology's primary mutation effect.
CULTURAL DRIFT
467
Figure 2. The Archaic to Classic Style Change on the Obverse of the Thasian Satyr and Nymph
Silver Stater from Circa 520 B.C. (Far Left) to Circa 407 B.C. (Far Right).
In other words, while the process of "styl drift" is said by Cleland to characterize
the British coinage and Jesuit finger ring phenomena, in each case it is really two
other primary processes (cultural mutation and cultural selection) which best account for the various motifs in transition. No drift, in the sense of a random process,
is operative for either example. And finally, the two phenomena exhibit some significant differences, differences which would not have been perceived without the more
comprehensive frame of reference which is provided by a unified genetic analog
model of culture change, employing properly conceived primary processes of cultural mutation, cultural selection, cultural flow, and cultural drift.
Against this background of inadequate conceptualizations of a cultural analog
of drift, we offer the following thoughts.
It is reasonable to suggest that the differential reproductive rates of families
(which generally are the primary enculturative institutions) might contribute to
shifts in idea frequencies within small human populations (i.e., small cultures). This
could occur in cases where ideas associated with certain cultural characteristics vary
between families. For those ideas which are unrelated or very remotely related to
the selective factors contributing to some family's greater reproductive success, the
shifting frequencies may be seen to drift due to chance.
We offer a hypothetical example of a small culture in which painted pottery is
produced by women who learn the craft from their mothers. Preference between
two sets of design factors for a particular pottery type differ among some small
number of nuclear families. One family might produce a disproportionate number of
daughters due to a chance fluctuation of the expected sex ratio or a less stringent
acceptance of female infanticide. A family might produce larger numbers of children
to include many females because of factors that have made it reproductively more
successful than other families. Whatever the case might be, the family with more female offspring could be enculturating girls to make a preferred design factor unique
to that nuclear family. The greater frequency in subsequent generations of the ideas
behind a certain design factor and the corollary, greater frequency of the behavior
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JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH
for and the manifestation of the type or factor, would be attributable to "cultural
drift."
Cultural drift in the above example is an analog of "genetic drift" proper, which
is subsumed under the rubric of sampling phenomena, along with the "founder
effect" (also referred to as the "bottleneck effect"). The founder effect, unlike genetic drift proper, is included in Sewall Wright's (1955) category 13, the category of
random unique events. A cultural analog of the founder effect is presented below.
It is reasonable to suggest that when a small population segment consciously
removes itself spatially from a larger population, that segment may then not be
culturally representative of the larger parent population, especially in terms of at
least some of its idea frequencies. Thus, within the migrant population the frequency
of those ideas (not directly related to the reasons for the small segment's departure)
would be due to another sampling phenomenon, one akin to biology's "founder
effect," or "bottleneck effect." Dunn (1970:1042) is close to a correct notion of a
cultural founder effect in his example of colonists bringing from a parent population
to their new settlement only some fraction of the total cultural variation available to
them. Unfortunately, Dunn did not conceive of this process in a frame of changing
idea frequencies.
Schneider (1977:18), in an attempt to follow Dunn, offers a morbid example of
another random unique event. An atomic war occurs in which all citizens of the
United States are killed, except for a small enclave of illiterate sharecroppers.The
subsequent culture would then lack writing. Unlike Dunn's example, a disaster has
caused this unique reduction of population numbers. But like Dunn's example, a
model of fluctuating idea frequencies, which would add clarity and insight to the
example, is lacking.
Generally, in our estimation, cultural drift has the least impact of the four primary processes on culture change; nevertheless, it is undoubtedly a source of some
of the observable cultural variability in past and present cultures.
To summarize and conclude, the term "drift" implies randomness, and cultural
drift may be conceptualized as an analogy with similar sampling phenomena in biology. The examples of drift previously presented in the literature rarely describe
change relatable to random processes. Rather, most of those change examples are
better explained, if analogies are to be invoked, by reference to cultural mutation
and cultural selection. "Drift," then, seems often to be a confusing misnomer in
such attempts to describe culture change.
Our hypothetical example of cultural drift proper, and clarification of the cultural founder effect examples presented in Dunn (1970:1042) and Schneider (1977:
19), make it reasonable to suggest that some amount of culture change is relatable
to random process. Testing for occurrences of change attributed to cultural drift
using the indirect evidence of archaeological data would be, however, a difficult
task. This should hardly be cause for any great concern, for the larger picture of
adaptation is one in which cultural selection is ultimately the basic historical explanatory process, and no conceivable amount of cultural drift will appreciably sway
the course or courses of basic adaptive patterns in the evolution of culture.
CULTURAL DRIFT
469
NOTE
1. We wish to thank Elaine Scott for her
rendering of Figures 1 and 2.
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