Hume’s account of the will
The will is not a power, capacity, or ability.
It is just a feeling we sometimes have
(a type of impression)
— specifically a feeling that we are
conscious of when we “knowingly
give rise” to a body motion or an idea
of imagination
Since our body motions are direct
responses to pleasure and pain,
and it accompanies them,
it is like a direct passion.
But it is not “properly speaking” an
impression of reflection
(Why not? — Particularly if all
occurrences of the feeling of will are
consequences of the perception of
pleasure or pain or of some
motivating passion or reason)
Is the will free?
Hume considered the notion of a free will to
be either absurd or unintelligible.
Absurd:
Because we think the motions of
material things are all causally
necessitated.
But all our reasons for taking the actions
of material things to be necessitated
and what we mean by “necessity”
in conjunction with the motions of
matter
(constant conjunction + mental
compulsion)
are reasons for taking the will to be
necessitated in this same sense.
Unintelligible:
Because we have no notion of necessity
apart from
constant conjunction
a mental compulsion to infer an
idea from an impression
So we can’t mean anything by denying
“necessity” in any other sense.
(Side note)
Hume thought better of the “unintelligibility”
of any other sense of freedom when he
wrote the Enquiry.
There he recognized that an action might
be said to be free when it is accompanied
by the feeling of will
and constrained when it is not
accompanied by that feeling.
This position is compatible with still thinking
that the will is determined …
… though it allows that the notion of
liberty is not either false or unintelligible
So the change of mind is a change from
“hard” determinism to “compatiblism”
Hume’s reasons for insisting on parity
between material motions and acts of will
When we say that material motions are
necessitated, we never mean that we
perceive some power or force in their
causes that makes them come about
We only ever mean:
• that the causes regularly precede the
material motions
• that when we perceive the causes we
feel a compulsion to form a lively idea of
the material motions
But:
• human actions are just as regularly
preceded by causes
• when we perceive those causes we feel
a compulsion to form a lively idea of the
actions
More on the first point
Given a certain type of person
and given certain circumstances in
which that person is placed
the person’s actions follow as a
matter of course.
The extent to which human actions are
unpredictable is no greater than the extent
to which material motions are unpredictable
in both cases careful reasoners
attribute the inconstancy to the
operation of hidden causes
The greatest unpredictability is found in the
actions of the insane, yet they are
considered to have no freedom.
More on the second point
Given a certain type of person that we have
to deal with
and give a knowledge of the
circumstances in which that person
is placed
we cannot resist forming a lively idea
of what the person is going to do
next.
In ordinary deliberations we make no
distinction between material necessity and
human action, but instead rely on both as
equally determined.
Reasons why it is so widely supposed that
the will is free
1. A failure to distinguish between the
liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of
indifference.
Liberty of spontaneity: when the
impression of will accompanies an
action, as opposed to the action
being determined by a cause
contrary to the desires of the agent
Liberty of indifference: when an
effect has no cause (esp. when a
determination of the will has no
cause)
In the case of liberty of spontaneity, the
impression of will can be determined, yet
we consider ourselves to be free because
we are doing what we want and (correctly)
think we could have done otherwise had we
willed differently.
We confuse this liberty of spontaneity with a
liberty of indifference, and (incorrectly) think
that nothing made us will to do what we did.
All that is in fact the case is that we
were in a situation where,
had it been the case that something
else would have determined the will
to do the opposite,
nothing external would have
prevented us from doing the
opposite.
Reasons why it is so widely supposed that
the will is free, cont.’d
2. We have a false sensation or experience
of liberty of indifference that arises from our
“1st person” point of view of our own
actions.
When someone else views our
actions, they see them as the regular
consequence of our character and
circumstances.
But when we view the causes of our
own actions, we don’t get the same
lively idea of their effects.
This is because we sense
that, had we been provoked,
we could have done
otherwise.
(though provocation is itself a cause, and one that
would lead another person aware of it to infer that
we would behave contrary to our usual practice, …
… for us the sense of the ability to do
otherwise if provoked creates a sense of
looseness over the connection between our
actual motive and the actual action that
resulted from it
We mistake this looseness for an ability of
the will to occur independently of any cause
…
… though in fact it is strictly
determined whatever it does.
Reasons why it is so widely supposed that
the will is free, cont.’d
3. It is supposed to be required by religion
and morality.
Hume’s initial response:
It is unphilosophical to reject a
position that is founded on good
argument simply because it has
unpalatable consequences.
Hume’s second response:
Far from it actually being the case
that religion and morality are
invested in the freedom of the will,
the opposite is true.
Here is why:
• when we say that human actions are
determined, we do not mean that there
is something that forces them happen
 we just mean that they regularly
follow from certain antecedent
events
 and that is something that
everyone tacitly accepts
• indeed they count on it
 e.g., in relying on the deterrent
effect of punishment
Even if we suppose that God does not
punish to deter, but only to avenge, …
we ought to accept that a just and
wise judge would only avenge
actions that are deliberate effects of
an evil will,
not those that are capricious
and accidental
But the only way an action can be
considered to be a deliberate effect of an
evil will is if there is regularity in the
succession of cause and effect.
That means that the person has to
be the sort of person who would
regularly do that sort of evil thing in
those tempting circumstances.
i.e., it means the will is caused.
Precisely to the extent that the
person isn’t the sort of person who
would regularly behave that way
(because the action follows from ignorance,
inattention, haste, strong passion, etc.)
we think they aren’t responsible and
don’t deserve such severe
punishment.