Politics in China’s Las Vegas:
Political Development and Participation
in the Macao Special Administrative Region
Eilo YU Wing-yat
Department of Government and Public Administration
University of Macau
(This paper is from the research project entitled “Social Groups and Organizations in
Macao: Formal and Informal Politics” funded by the Research Committee, University
of Macau, Cativo No.: 2495. This is a draft, please do not quote.)
1
Introduction
The development of Macao has attracted international attention since its return to
motherland China in 1999. Before the handover, Macao suffered an economic recession;
for example, the GDP showed negative growth in 1998 and 1999, -7.8 percent and -4.2
percent, respectively.1 Due to the Asian Financial Crisis, the number of tourists to
Macao dropped dramatically. 2 The gaming industry, which is the major sector of
Macao’s economy, encountered difficulties in the casino business. Gangster fights and
violence were triggered because of the vested interests from lucrative casinos and VIP
rooms.3 Consequently, stability was under fire as bombs and assassinations were taken
into the streets. The poor economy was perceived as the source of Macao’s instability
before the handover; thus, the MSAR government urged economic revitalization as a
way to retain and maintain territorial stability. On one hand, the Macao government
decided to liberalize the gaming industry by introducing three gambling concessions for
the operation of casinos. That measure broke the 3-decade monopoly of the Socidade de
Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM). The government believed that competition
would encourage the gaming industry market and contribute to Macao’s rapid economic
growth. On the other hand, the central government of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) has allowed many more mainlanders to travel to Macao after the handover that
stirred the region’s economic development.4 Since 2002, Macao’s economy has enjoyed
double-digit growth,5 which in 2003 reached 30 percent. In 2006, Macao’s GDP per
capita surpassed that of Hong Kong, and its gambling income outstripped the Las Vegas
Strip, up to 6.99 billion US dollars. Macao can be deemed a Las Vegas in China and will
probably become the greatest gaming city in the world in terms of gambling volume.
Many people believed that Macao’s amazing economic growth would ease the
socioeconomic difficulties of the masses and thereby attribute to social harmony.
1
See the website of the Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government, available at http://
http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/indicator/c_pib_indicator.html
Date of access: 9 October 2007.
2
In 1997 and 1998, there were -14.1 percent and -0.7 percent drops in tourists traveling to Macao,
respectively. See the website of the Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government, available at
http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/indicator/c_tur_indicator.html
Date of access: 9 October 2007.
3
For a discussion on gangster fights and violence due to casino interests in Macao before the handover,
please see Lo Shiu-hing, “Gambling and Organized Crime: Towards the End of the Stanley Ho
Connection?” China Perspectives, No. 26 (Nov./Dec. 1999), pp. 56-65.
4
According to Antonio Ng, a legislator of MSAR, many more tours were allowed by the central
government just after the handover in order to sustain the economy of Macao; personal interview with Ng,
16 November 2004. On the other hand, Beijing introduced the individual travel policy in June 2003,
which said that mainlanders no longer needed to visit Hong Kong and Macao by joining travel tours, but
could make their private trips to the two SARs by applying for individual travel certificates from the
mainland authorities. As a result, the number of mainland travelers to Macao increased drastically and
Macao’s economy received a boost.
5
See the website of the Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government, available at http://
http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/indicator/c_pib_indicator.html
Date of access: 9 October 2007.
2
However, rapid economic growth brought greater social discontent in the MSAR.
Demonstrations and protests had not been prevalent in Macao society in the past.
However, they have recently been organized more frequently, and they tend to be
confrontational against the authorities. The two May 1 demonstrations in 2006 and 2007
marked the public’s anger against the government over the rapidly changing
socioeconomic circumstances. Paradoxically, economic development did not help social
harmony and stability improve in Macao’s case; instead, it intensified social conflict. In
Chinese society, many people believe that economic development is conducive to social
and political stability. However, the situation in Macao disproves this typical Chinese
belief. Why should Macao suffer such instability as a result of the breathtaking
economic development after the handover? What elements contribute to the unrest in
Macao’s society?
This paper will adopt Huntington’s theory on political modernization to explain the
phenomenon of instability in Macao. According to Huntington, rapid economic
development will bring instability, rather than contribute to stability in a modernizing
society. Drastic economic development comes with rapidly changing sociopolitical
circumstances in a developing society because new social and political forces emerge
and challenge the authorities, which are monopolized by a small group of elite.6 The
political institutions are not strong and well enough organized to accommodate
sociopolitical demands from the masses. Political confrontation, disorder, and instability
will be the result.7 This paper delineates why and how rapid economic growth is linked
to the instability in Macao society, along with the political challenges from the new
social and political forces encountered by the MSAR authorities. It argues that Macao
society is on its way to modernization—urbanization, rapid economic development, and
an increasingly educated population. The traditional political institution, which is a
closed system and restricted to a minority power elite, is incapable of handling new
social and political demands from residents. Social harmony suffers and instability
results. This paper will conclude that to cope with instability in the wave of
modernization, the MSAR has to steer the process of political modernization and
institutionalization in a way that accommodates the demands of mass participation in
the regime.
Rapid Economic Development vs. Political Modernization
According to Mancurr Olson, Jr, rapid economic growth:8
1. “disrupts traditional social groups (family, class, caste), and thus
6
Samuel Paul Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1968), p. 4.
7
Ibid., p. 5.
8
Mancur Olson, Jr, “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 23 (Dec.
1963), p.532; citied from Ibid., p.49-50.
3
increases the number of individuals who are declass … and who
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
are thus circumstances conducive to revolutionary protest.”
produces nouveaux riches who are imperfectly adjusted to and
assimilated by the existing order and who want political power and
social status commensurate with their new economic position;
increases geographical mobility which again undermines social ties,
and, in particular, encourages rapid migration from rural areas to
cities, which produces alienation and political extremism;
increases the number of people whose standard of living is falling,
and thus may widen the gap between rich and poor;
increases the incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively
and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order;
requires a general restriction of consumption in order to promote
investment and thus produces popular discontent;
increases literacy, education, and exposure to mass media, which
increase aspirations beyond levels where they can be satisfied;
aggravates regional ethnic conflicts over the distribution of
investment and consumption;
increases capacities for group organization and consequently the
strength of group demands on government, which the government
is unable to satisfy.
Olson’s indication has demonstrated that rapid economic development leads to social
mobilization, which generates new political demands from the community toward the
authorities. Social mobilization refers to a process in which “major clusters of old social,
economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken, and people become
available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.” 9 In other words, social
mobilization means the change in societal attitudes from old and traditional values to
the standards of modern society. Economic development improves literacy and
education, and the emerging nouveaux riches demand their rights in the political
institutions from which they are currently excluded. At the same time, other sectors of
the population will suffer from rapid economic growth, and therefore, income inequality
will become a serious problem. Although some people may enjoy an absolute increase
of income, their purchasing power will decline because of inflation. In a society that is
undergoing socioeconomic modernization, inequality is prevalent in that the power elite
manipulates, if not controls, the mechanism of resource distribution. These inequalities
Karl W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review,
vol. 55 (Sept. 1961), p. 494; cited from Ibid., p. 33.
9
4
in resource distribution will become obvious.
Furthermore, social mobilization refers to a shift in the majority’s attitude towards
corruption. Paternalism was prevalent in pre-modern society, and the masses might have
paid more attention to government performance and policy outcomes than to the
decision process. Dynamics between authorities and the power elite, which might have
involved unethical trading and corruption, were given less heed. Perhaps the general
population’s conceptions about these unethical phenomena were vague. However, social
mobilization will inspire a public outcry against corruption and other unethical behavior
in the polity.10 It frees individuals’ dependencies on patrons and authorities and drives
the human spirit for self-actualization.11
As those who have suffered under economic development become inspired to
participate in the regime and fight for their interests, they make new demands on the
authorities.12 The authorities are pressured to institutionalize the polity and extend
opportunities for mass participation in the policymaking process. The goal is for the
public to be able to influence and determine government policy for the sake of the
general interest. In sum, the disruptive effects of social and economic modernization on
political institutions are twofold. 13 First, new social classes emerge because of
socioeconomic development; they tend to be independent from authorities and patrons
and try to challenge the old, traditional leaders. Second, new values and norms are
nurtured and confront the old ones. Conflicts between traditional and new, emerging
groups will intensify, accompanied by the inevitable political struggles.14
As a result, demands for political participation will be encouraged as the inspired
masses become more independent from the authorities and mobilize to fight for their
own interests. If the political institutions do not have the capacity to facilitate channels
for public participation, the populace will become more confrontational and challenge
authorities outside of the institutions. Hence, these circumstances will lead to political
instability. In other words, if the political demands generated because of social
mobilization cannot be accommodated into the political institutions with sufficient
channels for participation, people will become frustrated. They will distrust the
traditional institutions, which are dominated by power elite. Thus, they will mobilize
politically and confront the authorities. The result is that social harmony will be
undermined. Huntington further argued that the political decay of institutions could
10
Robert N. Kearny, Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Schenkman
Publishing, 1975), pp. 3-4.
11
Scott C. Flanagan and Lee Aie-Rie, “Value Change and Democratic Reform in Japan and Korea,”
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 33, no. 6 (June 2000), pp. 632-633.
12
Samuel Paul Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1968), p. 57.
13
Ibid., pp. 37-39.
14
Claude Ake, “Modernization and Political Instability: A Theoretical Exploration,” World Politics, vol.
26, no. 4 (July 1974), p. 583.
5
occur if authorities fail to respond to pressure for political reform. He remarked
Modernization and social mobilization, in particular, thus tend to
produce political decay unless steps are taken to moderate or restrict
their impact on political consciousness and political involvement.
Most societies, even those with fairly complex and adaptable
traditional political institutions, suffer a loss of political community
and decay of political institutions during the most intense phases of
modernization.15
In other words, if social frustration cannot be eased in rapid economic development, it
will generate a demand for political participation.16 Political modernization will be
propelled by rapid economic development. Political institutions are expected to open to
mass participation; otherwise, political instability and decay will be the consequences.
To Huntington, the polity has to be institutionalized in order to cope with political
demand and participation in the wave of modernization. He indicated that political
institutionalization involves four elements: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and
coherence.17 First, adaptability refers to the ability of the organization to respond to the
changing environmental circumstances. Organizational procedures, as well as
management, can change correspondingly to cope with environmental demands and the
higher level of institutionalization. Second, the more complicated organizational
structure means its capacity to deal with various demands from society. Third,
organization has to be independent from various social and political forces. In other
words, the authorities should not pay excessive attention to particular social groups or
forces when making policy.18 Fourth, organizational coherence means the unity of
institutions that resolve problems and disputes. Institutions must be unified during
modernization in order to deal with complex social demands and interests. The
disarticulation of various units inside government institutions undermines their capacity
to deal with the many social demands that arise due to socioeconomic modernization.
Organizational coordination is crucial and must be enhanced within the government.19
In sum, the institutionalization of the governing body has to achieve an open,
transparent, fair, and coherent organization that accommodates the demands for public
participation. In this way, the government will be able to resolve the disputes and
conflicts that result from socioeconomic modernization.
15
16
17
18
19
Ibid., p. 86.
Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., pp. 12-24.
Ibid, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 23.
6
Macao’s Rapid Economic Development and Social Mobilization
After its return to the motherland in 1999, Macao has experienced rapid economic
growth. Between 1996 and 1999, during the years just before the handover, Macao’s
economy was stagnant and experienced negative growth (see Table 1). Due to the Asian
Financial Crisis, the number of travelers to Macao dropped significantly and the casino
business suffered. Gangsters fought for their interests in casinos, and gangland violence
triggered a governance crisis for Portuguese rulers. Politically and economically, Macao
society went through a rough patch during the late transition.
Table 1: Number of Mainland and Hong Kong Travelers to Macao and their Per Capita
Spending in Macao, 1996-2006
Overall
Mainland
Hong Kong
No. of
Annual
Travelers Growth
No. of
Travelers*
Per Capita
Spending
No. of
Travelers*
Per Capita
Spending
(Million) Rate
(Million)
(MOP)
(Million)
(MOP)
1996
8.2
5.1%
0.6(7.4%)
5.2(63.9%)
1997
7.0
-14.1%
0.5(7.6%)
4.7(67.2%)
1998
6.9
-0.7%
0.8(11.6%)
2896
4.7(68.0%)
884
1999
7.4
7.1%
1.6(22.1%)
2661
4.2(56.8%)
386
2000
9.2
23.1%
2.3(24.8%)
2401
5.0(54.1%)
934
2001
10.3
12.2%
3.0(29.2%)
2648
5.2(50.6%)
937
2002
11.5
12.2%
4.2(36.8%)
2655
5.1(44.2%)
957
2003
11.9
3.1%
5.7(48.3%)
2847
4.6(38.9%)
947
2004
16.7
40.2%
9.6(57.2%)
2991
5.1(30.3%)
969
2005
18.7
12.2%
10.5(55.9%)
3078
5.6(30.0%)
898
2006
22.0
17.6%
12.0(54.5%)
3215
6.9(31.6%)
955
2007
27.0
22.7%
14.9(55.2%)
3142
8.2(30.4%)
1078
Note: ‘*’ The number in parenthesis is the portion of Mainland/Hong Kong travelers out
of the total number of travelers to Macao.
Source: The website of Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government which is
available at “http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/indicator/c_pib_indicator.
html”. Date of access: 4 March 2008.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government introduced various measures that
contributed to the prosperity of the MSAR after the handover. On one hand, the
People’s Liberal Army (PLA) was deployed to Macao to help maintain the public
security and keep order when necessary. Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, a legislator of
MSAR, indicated that the gangsters were pressured and stopped their fights on the street
7
because of the PLA’s threatened maneuvers.20 Indeed, the gangster war disappeared
after the handover, and public order was recovered in Macao society. On the other hand,
the central government introduced policies that were favorable for the revitalization of
MSAR’s economy. For instance, it allowed an increasing number of mainland tourists to
visit the territory. Before the handover, less than a million mainlanders traveled to
Macao annually. However, the number of travelers from the mainland rose drastically
after the handover. When the Chinese government introduced the scheme for individual
travelers and allowed mainlanders to visit Hong Kong and Macao without joining
organized tours in 2003, the mainland become the dominant source of visitors to Macao
(see Table 1). The number of mainland visitors to Macao has increased from 2005
onwards; in that year, it reached over 10 million. Importantly, mainland visitors outspent
travelers from other regions of origin (see Table 1).
Furthermore, the extension of casino franchises in 2001 has been beneficial for
Macao’s economy. The liberalization of the gaming industry has attracted foreign
capital investments in Macao. For example, the American Venetian and Wynn groups
received concessions for casino operation and invested in the gaming and tourism
sectors in the territory. The gaming industry became the dominant economic sector that
contributed half of Macao’s GDP (see Table 2). In addition, over half of the government
revenues came from the gaming tax (see Table 3). The gaming industry has become the
backbone of Macao’s economy, the means for stimulating rapid economic growth, and
the main sector that contributes financially to the MSAR government. Macao’s
economy enjoyed remarkable growth along with the boom in its gaming industry. The
employment situation also improved significantly as the unemployment rate dropped
from 6.8 percent in 2000 to 3.8 percent in 2006 (see Table 4). At the same time,
employees enjoyed better wages. The median monthly income of Macao residents
increased from MOP$4,914 in 1996 to MOP$6,701 in 2006, a 36.4 percent growth. At
the end of 2007, the unemployment rate dropped further to 2.9 percent as the median
monthly income rose to over MOP$7,900.21 The liberalization of the gaming industry
not only helped revitalize Macao’s economy by absorbing foreign direct investment, but
the economic miracle also bolstered the legitimacy of Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s
first term in governing the MSAR.
20
According to Ng, local gangsters worried about their vested interests in Macao and the Mainland that
might be affected by the possible maneuvers of the PLA and Beijing. Therefore, they halted their fights in
the street. Personal interview with Ng, 6 November 2004.
21
Macao Daily News, 28 February 2008, A12.
8
Table 2: The GDP of Macao, 1996-2006
GDP
(Billion MOP)
GDP Per Capita
(Thousand MOP)
GDP Contributed from Gaming Industry
(Billion MOP)
1996
52.8 (1.0%)*
127.2
-
1997
53.2 (0.8%)*
127.6
-
1998
49.4 (-7.3%)*
116.9
-
1999
47.3 (-4.2%)*
110.6
-
2000
49.0 (3.6%)*
113.7
-
2001
49.7 (1.5%)*
114.5
-
2002
54.8 (10.3%)*
125.1
22.8 (41.6%)#
2003
63.6 (16.0%)*
142.8
29.5 (46.4%)#
2004
83.0 (30.5%)*
181.6
43.5 (52.4%)#
2005
92.9 (12.0%)*
195.2
47.1 (50.7%)#
2006 114.4 (23.0%)*
227.5
57.5 (50.3%)#
Note: ‘*’ The number in parenthesis is the annual GDP growth rate.
“#” The number in parenthesis is the percentage of gaming income to the GDP.
Source: The website of Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government which is
available
at
“http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/indicator/c_pib_indicator.html”. Date
of access: 9 October 2007.
Table 3: MSAR Government Revenue, 2001-2006
Government Revenue
(Billion MOP)
Government Revenue from Gaming Tax
(Billion MOP)
2001
15.6
6.3 (40.4%)
2002
15.3
7.8 (50.9%)
2003
18.4
10.6 (57.6%)
2004
23.9
15.2 (63.5%)
2005
28.2
17.3 (61.3%)
2006
37.2
20.7 (55.6%)
2007
40.7
29.3 (72.0%)
Source: The data between 2001 and 2006 are from the Macao Statistics Yearbook,
various years. The 2007 figure is from the website of the Finance Service Bureau,
MSAR Government: “http://www.dsf.gov.mo/Con_Pub/c_ConPub_Fs.htm”. Access
Date: 4 March 2008.
9
Table 4: Macao’s Unemployment Rate and Median Monthly Income, 1996-2006
Unemployment Rate
Median Monthly Income (MOP)
1996
4.3%
4,914
1997
3.2%
5,221
1998
4.6%
5,050
1999
6.3%
4,920
2000
6.8%
4,822
2001
6.4%
4,658
2002
6.3%
4,672
2003
6.0%
4,801
2004
4.9%
5,167
2005
4.1%
5,773
2006
3.8%
6,701
Source: The website of Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government
which
is
available
at
“http://www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/indicator/c_pib_indicato
r.html”. Date of access: 9 October 2007.
Indeed, Edmund Ho’s administration enjoyed a fruitful period in ruling the MSAR
during his one-and-a-half terms. Its success in liberalizing the gaming industry
revitalized the economy of Macao and legitimized the rule of the MSAR government.
However, the revitalization of Macao, along with the growth of the gaming industry,
triggered new challenges for the ruling authorities. Demonstrations and protests took
place more frequently in Ho’s second term. The two May 1 demonstrations in 2006 and
2007 signified the public discontent with ruling authorities. Thousands of residents
participated in these demonstrations that were radically provocative against the
authorities. The police-demonstrator confrontations turned to chaos. A gunshot from a
policeman in the 2007 Labor Day demonstration marked the MSAR government’s
failure to manage public grievances and the rising grudge against authorities. 22
Disregarding their patriotic sentiments, thousands of Macao residents demonstrated on
the anniversary day of Macao’s handover to the PRC, and on the National Days in 2006
and 2007. Paradoxically, just as Macao began to enjoy incredible economic
development with better job opportunities and salaries, the general public became
critical and confrontational with authorities.
22
In the demonstration, the protesters were urged to walk through the central business and tourist areas.
The police forces tried to stop them out of fear that the demonstration would disrupt business activities.
Finally, the marchers clashed against the police roadblock and a policeman opened fire to halt the
procession.
10
The various demonstrations in 2006 and 2007 reflected the growing social
frustration triggered by rapid economic development. Macao residents encountered
problems and difficulties spurred by rapid economic growth. On one hand, many felt
that the environment had worsened and the quality of life had decreased. For instance,
economic development brings environmental pollution. The various gambling licensees
invested in numerous casino and hotel projects; many construction sites appeared in the
Macao territory and brought air and noise pollution. Moreover, the neon light displays
of the casinos created light pollution. In addition, the transportation system could not
keep up with the economic growth. Neither the road system nor the public
transportation system had the capacity to fulfill the proliferating demands. People
complained that buses and taxis were never available during serious traffic jams; yet the
flood of tourists generated tremendous demands and burdens for public transportation.
Many newly rich residents bought their own vehicles to ease their transportation needs.
A vicious cycle in the transportation system was observed as a result. Residents also
complained that casinos and slot machine shops had penetrated into the residential areas,
becoming menaces to public order and sowing the seeds of gambling problems in the
local community. Undoubtedly, Macao residents encountered challenges and problems
in the face of rapid economic development.
In another area, although many Macao residents enjoyed better incomes and
salaries in the booming economy, others found that they did not benefit from the boom.
Workers in the labor class complained that they still could not found jobs. They alleged
that the companies tried to import labor; some recruited mainlanders to work illegally in
Macao because their pay was lower. The local labor force grumbled that they were only
substitutes for migrant workers. 23 Once a company applied for import labor from
elsewhere, it would probably lay off the local people. Indeed, many local laborers
participated in the 2006 and 2007 demonstrations and voiced their grievances about
unemployment. Furthermore, economic development set off high inflation rates. The
property market experienced a hyper rise of prices. Although many residents had
absolute increases in their incomes, they could not afford to buy their own apartments.
In addition, many small and medium-sized enterprises also suffered during rapid
economic development as they encountered the problem of wage increases. The casinos
could provide higher pay to attract personnel, but the smaller businesses were
financially incompetent. At a result, they could not recruit the appropriate people to fill
vacancies. Many business owners also contended that they could not receive import
labor quotas, as most were granted to big corporations.24 Finally, some owners decided
23
The author talked to many demonstrators who were from the labor class in the May 1 and October 1,
2007 demonstrations. Many of the protesters complained about the import labor policy of the MSAR
government, as well as its incapability to fight against importation of illegal workers.
24
Macao Daily News, 16 November 2006, A3.
11
to end their businesses because they lacked human resources. Despite the fact that
economic development helped improve the income of some people, many Macao
residents failed to benefit.
According to the Macao Quality of Life Survey conducted by the University of
Macau, the University of Hong Kong, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong in
2005, most residents were not happy with various social phenomena such as income
inequality, juvenile delinquency, problem gambling, drug abuse, and prostitution.25 The
survey result indicated that only 28.5 percent of the respondents felt satisfied with their
quality of life; the majority (61.2 percent) only considered it a fair situation.26 In other
words, most Macao people did not really feel that their lives had improved to the level
of satisfaction. Rapid economic development created new problems in society; these
included inflation, hyper rise of property prices, transportation problems, and income
inequality. Interestingly, the emerging middle class tended to be less happy with the
changing circumstances. Respondents from younger generations, as well as those with
better educations, shared lower satisfaction ratings of their quality of life.27 In addition,
they were less satisfied with the MSAR government’s performance, corruption, social
fairness, and inequality.28 Similarly, the lower class was less satisfied with their quality
of life compared with other social classes; they were also dissatisfied with the level of
social fairness and inequality.29 Although the emerging middle class may have enjoyed
better income salaries, they encountered other social problems that the government did
not tackle. As with the lower class, the entire middle class may not have benefited—and
some possibly even suffered—from Macao’s economic development; they also
considered that they were not treated equally and fairly by the authorities. Public
satisfaction with the MSAR government may have been attributed primarily to
economic achievements. However, the unresolved social problems could intensify social
conflict and become a time bomb for the explosion of social unrest, hence wounding the
governance of MSAR.
With the growth of the economy, Macao residents tended to have higher
expectations for the government to solve the various social problems. However, the
25
In the 2005 Quality of Life Household Survey, Wan, Wong, and Law indicated that over half the
respondents showed their dissatisfaction with these phenomena in Macao society. See Wan Po-san,
Timothy Wong, and Law Wing-kin, “Shehui Suzhi (Quality of Society),” in Wong Siu-lun, Yeung
Yue-man, Wan Po-san, and Zheng Wan-tai, eds., Aomen Shehui Shilu: Cong Zhibiao Yanjiu Kan
Shenghuo Suzhi (The Reality of Macao Society: Understanding Quality of Life with Social Indicators;
Hong Kong: Asia-Pacific Institute, Chinese University Press, 2007), p. 48.
26
Ibid., p. 39.
27
Ibid., p. 43.
28
Ibid., pp. 43-45.
29
In Wan, Wong, and Law’s survey, they used a 5-point scale (1 is very dissatisfied, 2 is dissatisfied, 3 is
fair, 4 is satisfied, and 5 is very satisfied) to measure public satisfaction regarding various issues. The
average scores from the lower class respondents were 2.88 and 2.62 on the questions of social fairness
and social inequality. Ibid.
12
MSAR political institutions seemed to lack the capacity to meet such demands. As a
result, public grievances stirred political participation, and people took to the streets to
fight for their interests and demands. In the past, Macao society had always been
associated with the concept of social harmony. Residents tended to avoid confrontation
with the authorities. Their goal was to maintain stability, and they believed that a stable
society was conducive to economic development. In various studies, Yee and his
colleagues adopted the categorization developed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba30
to measure the mass political culture in Macao. Yee et al. argued that the majority
adhered to “subject” type: minimal participation, in which citizens were both aware of
public and government affairs and subject to the output of government institutions.31
People in Macao did not actively participate in politics; they tolerated, if not accepted, a
paternalistic government. In their various studies on Macao’s political culture, Yee et. al.
consistently argued that residents in Macao have always felt politically powerless and
considered themselves incapable of influencing government policy. 32 To ease the
problems of daily life, many residents relied on services provided by social groups and
their own personal networks with authorities.33 However, it should be noted that the
political inactivity of people in Macao does not necessarily imply their satisfaction with
the region’s political system and institutions. In their 1991 and 2006 surveys, Yee et. al.
indicated that 30 percent of the respondents always expressed dissatisfaction with
Macao’s political and legal systems.34
In addition, Macao’s residents have been socialized politically by the Hong Kong
mass media.35 Many people in Macao read Hong Kong newspapers and watch TV news
reports from that region. The Hong Kong mass media have been trying to play the role
of watchdogs of the government. In the Tung Chee-hwa regime, the Hong Kong
30
For a discussion of Almond and Verba’s categorization of political culture, please see Gabriel A.
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
31
Yee and other scholars conducted surveys in various years to measure the political culture of Macao’s
people. See Herbert S. Yee, Liu Bolong, and Ngo Tak-wing. “Macau’s Mass Political Culture,” Asian
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 15, no. 2 (1993); Herbert S. Yee, “Mass Political Culture in Macau:
Continuity and Change.” Issues & Studies, vol. 35, no. 2 (1999); Herbert S. Yee and Liu Kwok-man,
“Dazhong Zheng zhi Wenhua (Mass Political Culture),” in Wong Siu-lun, Yeung Yue-man, Wan Po-san,
and Zheng Wan-tai, eds., Aomen Shehui Shilu: Cong Zhibiao Yanjiu Kan Shenghuo Suzhi (The Reality of
Macao Society: Understanding Quality of Life with Social Indicators; Hong Kong: Asia-Pacific Institute,
Chinese University Press, 2007).
32
In their three surveys on Macao political culture, Yee et al. reached a similar conclusion that Macao’s
people were politically inactive and felt powerless to influence the government.
33
Personal interview with Leong Kam-chun, a legislator in colonial Macao, 22 January 2005.
34
Herbert S. Yee and Liu Kwok-man, “Dazhong Zheng zhi Wenhua (Mass Political Culture),” in Wong
Siu-lun, Yeung Yue-man, Wan Po-san, and Zheng Wan-tai, eds., Aomen Shehui Shilu: Cong Zhibiao
Yanjiu Kan Shenghuo Suzhi (The Reality of Macao Society: Understanding Quality of Life with Social
Indicators; Hong Kong: Asia-Pacific Institute, Chinese University Press, 2007), p. 304.
35
Sonny Lo Shiu-hing and Herbert S. Yee, “Legitimacy-Building in the Macau Special Administrative
Region: Colonial Legacies and Reform Strategies,” Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, no.1 (June
2005), p. 57.
13
government encountered problems due to various crises. The media reported the public
criticisms and demonstrations against the authorities and tried to make the government
become more accountable to the public. The appearance of the Hong Kong media
cultivated the political sensibility of Macao audiences and encouraged the latter to voice
their demands through political participation. Therefore, Macao residents were spurred
to become more politically active because of their own inclinations toward public
grievances, as well as from the cultivation by the Hong Kong media. Learning from
their Hong Kong counterparts, people in Macao began to raise their concerns regarding
the openness, fairness, transparency, and accountability of the government.
Rapid economic development has created new problems and challenges for
Macao’s population. They have not adapted to the changing environmental
circumstances and have higher expectations of the government concerning their
livelihood issues. They have become cautious toward the internal governmental
resource distribution mechanism, which was a nontransparent, relatively closed system.
Many people in Macao argued that the system was biased in favor of the power elite and
those who maintained good relationships with them. The Ao Man-long case reinforced
public perceptions about the corruption of government officials at both the grassroots
and senior levels. Ao, the former Secretary of Transportation and Public Works, was
arrested for taking bribes from land developers and government project contractors. In
the court trails, officials responsible for land projects and government project tenders
indicated that their superiors, who were instructed by Ao, required them to adjust the
grading of particular bidders arbitrarily so that the latter could win contracts on
government projects. Ao’s case shed light on the huge amount of bureaucratic discretion
and the lack of proper institutional mechanisms for checks and balances within the
Macau government.
In another example, the Audit Commission of the MSAR investigated the financial
accounts and management of the Organizing Commission of the East Asian Games.
This commission was fully funded for the 2005 East Asian Games in Macau by the
MSAR government. The Audit Commission alleged that various malpractices by the
Games’ organizer resulted in serious over-budgeting problems. According to the
Commission’s report, the overall expenditure for the Games was MOP$4.4 billion, 50.6
percent over the budget. Moreover, the Games’ organizer was found to have wasted
governmental resources. Many facilities for the Games had to be reconstructed due to
the poor quality of the original designs. Some people argued that the reconstruction
work would provide opportunities for contractors to make extra money. Indeed, the
public generally perceived that the power elite took advantage of governmental
institutions for their own benefit, while the masses suffered from various social
problems due to rapid economic development. Thus, they began to spotlight the
problems inherent in governmental institutions in attempts to foster fair and equal
14
mechanisms for distributing public resources. As stated above, the rapid economic
growth in Macao and its attendant social problems have prompted the social
mobilization of its citizens. At the same time, their Hong Kong counterparts, who
tended to be critical toward the authorities, encouraged their participation in the protests.
The general population in Macao became more active in influencing government
processes.
Macao’s Institutional Deficiency and Political Participation
Macao’s political institutions have been plagued by performance problems since
the colonial era. The civil service has always been criticized for its inefficiency and poor
quality of service. On one hand, the quality of many civil servants was questionable, as
nepotism and the influence of personal relationships were obvious within the
bureaucracy.36 The Portuguese tried to appoint their friends and supporters in reward
for political support. A merit system has not yet been established in Macao’s civil
service, and many workers are poorly educated. On the other hand, government officials
retain huge discretionary powers and are subject to fewer checks and balances from
external bodies. Choy has argued that corruption became part of the daily activities in
the colonial Macau bureaucracy. 37 Performance problems and bureaucratic
irregularities were not eased; instead, they were automatically transferred to the MSAR
government. Unfortunately, the performance of the MSAR government has suffered
further due to the inexperience of its officials. In the colonial government, Portuguese
officials occupied all senior positions. Macanese, who are hybrids of Portuguese and
Chinese, filled the middle-ranking posts. Local Chinese citizens merely worked within
the lower governmental levels.38 The Portuguese authorities accelerated the localization
of civil service and promoted more local Chinese to higher ranking levels in the late
transition. As a result, many low-ranking Chinese officials were promoted to senior
positions to fill the vacancies left by the Portuguese, years before the handover.
However, many of them did not have sufficient management experience to operate the
administration. For instance, the MSAR authorities explained that the malpractice and
over-spending in the East Asian Games was primarily due to the inexperience of
officials. The MSAR government administration has encountered problems of quality
among civil service workers, many of whom were poorly educated and lacked proper
training and experience. The problems have been further compounded because a system
36
Lo Shiu-hing, Political Development in Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), pp.
120-127.
37
Choy, Chi-keung, “Guoduqi Aomen de Gonggong Xingzheng” (Macau’s Public Administration during
the Transition Period), in Herbert Yee, ed., Aomen: Chaoyue 99 (Macau: Surmounting 99; Hong Kong:
Guang Jiao Jing, 1993), p. 59.
38
Herbert Yee, Macao in Transition: From Colony to Autonomous Region (New York: Palgrave, 2000),
pp. 41-56.
15
for checks and balances has not yet been established to regulate bureaucratic behavior.
Furthermore, the MSAR government institutions are disarticulated, rather than
being internally coherent; they also lack the capacity for interdepartmental cooperation
and coordination. The protection of sightlines around the Guia Fortress is an example.
Virtually no communication existed between the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Land,
Public Works, and Transport Bureau to balance land development initiatives with the
protection of Macau’s World Heritage. The latter approved a land project to erect
skyscrapers that would probably block the view of the Guia Lighthouse, part of Macau’s
World Heritage. The Cultural Affairs Bureau, which is responsible for watching over
Macau’s World Heritage, did not interfere with the event until the civil society
generated tremendous noise against the project and complained to the United Nations.
The event proved that the two departments did not coordinate to protect Macau’s World
Heritage. In another instance, the Labor Affairs Bureau, Judiciary Police, and Gaming
Inspection and Co-ordination Bureau failed to cooperate in a fight against the
phenomenon of illegal workers in casinos. Although each of the three departments has
jurisdiction, they passively resisted enforcing the law in the casinos and instead tried to
shift the responsibility to the others. In addition, the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau,
Land, Public Works, and Transport Bureau, and Public Security Police Force should
share the task of improving the traffic situation. However, transportation issues continue
to worsen as the three departments fail to cooperate. The promotion of the new Road
Traffic Law is another example that illuminates the incoherence within governmental
institutions. Various departments and units have different interpretations of the new law
that managed illegal parking.39 Departments are able to ignore the existing institutional
regulations and develop their own administrative practices. Obviously, the Macau
government has been burdened with problems of parochialism and ethnocentricity, in
that departmental communication and cooperation are not channeled to improve
performance.
Politically, the Macao government was heavily dependent on informal politics,
which emphasized interpersonal networks, to rule the territory. No political party exists
in the polity. Instead, social groups have been the key actors in the informal politics.40
39
It is noted that many Macao residents did not pay fines for tickets for illegal parking because there
were no penalties or sanctions for their failure to pay ticket fines. However, the MSAR government
introduced the new Road Traffic Law on 1 October 2007, which stated that residents could no longer
renew their vehicle licenses if they failed to clear their fines for parking tickets. Many questioned whether
this measure would only apply for those tickets issued after the implementation of the new Road Traffic
Law; or if it meant that all parking tickets had to be counted, no matter when they were issued—before or
after the new Law. However, the authorities had different explanations. The police forces only mentioned
that drivers had to clear the fines for all their tickets, which could be interpreted as that tickets issued
before and after the new Law would be counted. Some legislators explained that the legislation was only
effective for tickets issued after the new Law. Yet, there was no united view on the new Law by the
authorities.
40
Herbert Yee, Macao in Transition: From Colony to Autonomous Region (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p.
16
Some traditional patriotic organizations have built up networks inside the government,
as well as at the grassroots level, since the colonial era. Particularly, to an extent, they
substituted for the role of government and served residents at the grassroots. During the
colonial era, the Macao Chinese community depended on the various social services
provided by pro-Beijing groups, as the colonial government tried to pay a minimal role
in society. Their middleman role between government and the local Chinese community
was legitimized because of their substantive social and grassroots works. After the
handover, the MSAR government absorbed these pro-Beijing forces into the
government institutions. For instance, the Kaifong Association, Federation of Trade
Unions (FTU), Women’s Association of Macao (WAM), and Macao Chamber of
Commerce (MCC) were dominant pro-Beijing organizations in Macao. Their
representatives serve in various government agencies. In 2005, 10 out of 29 members,
who were from these pro-Beijing organizations, were selected into the legislature. In
addition, their representatives serve in the Executive Council, which is the top
policymaking body of the MSAR. The MSAR government appointed many members
from these organizations into its consultative committees. Among the 40 government
consultative committees, at least 20 consist of members from the four dominant
pro-Beijing organizations. 41 There were 157 representatives (37.7%) from these
organizations out the total 416 appointed members in all consultative committees (see
Table 5). In addition, the MSAR government provided huge amounts of financial
support to these organizations. It is noted that the MSAR governmental departments and
foundations subsidize individuals, social groups, and public agencies for their social
services and activities. In 2006 and the first three quarters of 2007, the four dominant
pro-Beijing organizations received MOP$85.8 million and MOP$109.9 million,
respectively (see Table 6). Although the government funded over 1,000 individuals and
organizations annually, these four organizations received 4.1% and 8.1% of total
government subsidies in the above periods. Yet, the MSAR government granted
privileges to these pro-Beijing organizations as they formed coalitions with the
authorities to support the latter politically.42 Lou noted that the MSAR government has
adopted a corporative approach to managing the various forces in Macao society.43 The
traditional pro-Beijing groups were treated as the leading organizations that coordinated
159; see also Yu Wing-yat, “Formal and Informal Politics In Macao Special Administrative Region
Elections 2004-2005, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 16, no. 52 (August 2007), pp. 417-441.
41
The author sorted the member lists of all government consultative committees and could identify 20
out of the 40 organizations that consisted of representatives from pro-Beijing organizations.
42
Au Kam-san, a pro-democracy legislator in Macao, questioned whether the government’s providing a
huge subsidy to the pro-Beijing group was fair, or if it was biased toward them. Journal Va Kio, 10
September 2007, p. 2.
43
Lou Sheng-hua, Zhuanxing Shiqi Aomen Shetuan Yanjiu: Duoyuan Shehui Zhong Fatuan Zhuyi Tizhi
Jiexi (A Study of Macao’s Social Groups during the Transitional Period: Corporatism in a Pluralistic
Society; Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2004).
17
different interest groups in the community. In other words, the authorities tried to
incorporate most social groups into the political institutions through the coordination of
pro-Beijing organizations.
Table 5: Number of Representatives from Pro-Beijing Organizations in Government
Consultative Committees
Number of members in government
consultative committee
Kaifong Association
23
Federation of Trade Unions
30
Women Association of Macao
12
Macao Chamber of Commerce
92
Sub-total
157 (37.7%)*
Total number of government appointees
416
Note: “*” The percentage in parenthesis is the pro-Beijing groups’ portion of the total
number of members appointed into government’s consultative committees.
Source: The author collected the name lists of consultative committees from the MSAR
Government Gazette, various issues.
Table 6: MSAR Government Subsidy to Pro-Beijing Organizations, 2006-2007
(Million)
2006
2007 (1st-3rd Quarter)
Kaifong Association
51.9
54.2
Federation of Trade Union
25.1
38.6
Women Association of Macao
8.8
17.1
85.8 (4.1%)*
109.9 (8.1%)*
2,081.8
1,359.2
Sub-total
Total government subsidy to individuals
and organizations for social activities
Note: “*” The percentage in parenthesis is the pro-Beijing groups’ portion of the total
government subsidy to individuals and organizations
Source: The author collected the subsidies of government departments and foundations
to individuals and organizations from the MSAR Government Gazette, various issues.
However, the roles and functions of these traditional groups can no longer
accommodate the various sociopolitical demands at the grassroots level that spring from
18
the economic modernization of MSAR. Many residents believe that the traditional
pro-Beijing groups no longer represent their interests because these groups became part
of the authorities. They did not oppose the government in the fights for the public
interests. For instance, the riot in 2000 marked the failure of the FTU to help the labor
class. A group of unemployed took to the streets voluntarily in April and May of 2000
and demonstrated against the government for its failure help them obtain jobs and
subsidies. The demonstration was confrontational and clashed against police roadblocks.
Finally, the police fired tear gas to disperse the masses. Jeremy Lei Man-chow, who was
a participant and became a union leader, indicated that the unemployed converged on
the street of their own accord with no mobilization involved.44 The demonstration
emphasized the point that the pro-Beijing FTU could not help the unemployed people
who finally confronted the authorities. Besides, the FTU withdrew from organizing the
May 1 demonstration in 2006. According to Jeremy Lei, who was one of the organizers
of that demonstration, the FTU held discussions with his groups at the very beginning
about organizing the demonstration.45 However, due to the pressure from authorities, it
withdrew and only held a conference for the protection of labor interests. In addition, it
failed to represent teachers in dealing with their difficulties at school. A group of
teachers participated in the October 1, 2007 demonstration. A leader from a pro-Beijing
group indicated that the FTU recognized the problems and difficulties of school
teachers. 46 However, it could not convince school management and government
departments to provide more support for them. On the other hand, the Kaifong
Association was also criticized of its helplessness with the grassroots sector. In the
October 1, 2007 demonstration, some protestors criticized the Kaifong Association as
being “noble at the grassroots,” meaning that it was no longer interested in helping the
lower class people because it had already been co-opted by the government. 47
Corporatism on the part of MSAR authorities seemed to be incapable of managing the
proliferation of interests from economic growth. Conflict between capitalist and labor
classes tended to widen. The MCC and FTU, which represented the businessmen and
labor, respectively, no longer managed their relationships with supporters. Their
middleman role seemed to be dysfunctional in that it failed to balance the cross-class
interests. Because of the fact that the Kaifong Association and the WAM provided
different social services in the local community, they could not accommodate the
proliferation of demands by Macao residents for social services.48
The media in Macao was relatively weak in checking on government authorities
and protecting public interests. First, the local media was not professional enough to
44
45
46
47
48
Personal interview with Lei, 28 October 2005.
Personal interview with Lei, 9 October 2006.
Personal interview with a leader from a Pro-Beijing group, 4 October 2007.
The author talked to some participants in the October 1, 2007 demonstration.
Journal Va Kio, 14 May 2007, p. 14; see also, Journal San Wa Ou, 17 May 2007, p. 2.
19
handle the news. Many of the reporters did not investigate cases but were dependent on
the information from authorities.49 Second, the media lacked resources. All Chinese
newspapers receive subsidies from the government. Therefore, they tended to maintain
good relationships with the authorities. Furthermore, the Macao Daily News dominated
the newspaper market, as its circulation shared 80 percent of the market and absorbed
90 percent of newspaper advertisements.50 It was a pro-Beijing newspaper and avoided
being critical of the MSAR authorities. Lee Kin-yun, a pro-democarcy union leader,
condemned the Macao Daily News. He charged that it was working for Beijing and did
not report activities and news about either his group or the democrats.51 Wan argued
that the media impeded the development of civil society in Macao.52 According to the
survey by Yee et al., public satisfaction with the freedom of speech and press in Macao
had declined. In the 1991 survey, only 18.5 percent of the respondents were not satisfied
with the situation, but 33.5 percent participated in the 2006 survey.53
However, Macao’s political institutions lacked channels for the public expression
of demands, as well as for citizens’ political participation. In the past, the masses tended
to tolerate, if not accept, the institutional deficiencies and accepted the paternalistic rule
by authorities. However, Macao residents have undergone a social mobilization process
under rapid economic development. Their attitude toward the paternalistic government
transformed as they became more active in their demands for political participation.
Various new independent groups emerged along with Macao’s social mobilization,
and they fought together for the interests of particular groups of people. For instance,
after the 2000 riot, some social activists and unemployed organized various labor
groups to fight for the interests of lower class. They were independent of the
pro-Beijing groups and were excluded from government institutions, with no members
participating in government consultative committees. Therefore, they always took to the
streets and struggled for grassroots interests outside of the government institutions.
Consequently, demonstrations and protests were mobilized, and the grassroots
movement became confrontational against the authorities. This institutional exclusion of
new social groups led to instability in Macao, and the MSAR government encountered
tremendous political pressures from the economic modernization. Many other social
forces organized themselves and participated in the polity. Some civil servants’ unions
Yin De-gang, “Aomen Dazhong Chuanmei Xianzhuang Yu Fazhan” (Macao’s Mass Media and its
Development), in Macao 2002 (Macao: Macao Foundation, 2002), p. 425.
50
The figures were based on a 2003 marketing survey.
51
Personal interview with Lee, 4 October 2007.
52
Yin De-gang, “Aomen Dazhong Chuanmei Xianzhuang Yu Fazhan” (Macao’s Mass Media and its
Development), in Macao 2002 (Macao: Macao Foundation, 2002), p. 425.
53
Herbert S. Yee and Liu Kwok-man, “Dazhong Zheng zhi Wenhua (Mass Political Culture),” in Wong
Siu-lun, Yeung Yue-man, Wan Po-san, and Zheng Wan-tai, eds., Aomen Shehui Shilu: Cong Zhibiao
Yanjiu Kan Shenghuo Suzhi (The Reality of Macao Society: Understanding Quality of Life with Social
Indicators; Hong Kong: Asia-Pacific Institute, Chinese University Press, 2007), p. 304.
49
20
stood up and fought for their interests. For example, when the government proposed a
new pension scheme for all civil servants in 2005, the Macao Civil Servants’
Association and other unions demonstrated against the new scheme. Police groups
openly urged the government to improve their wages and fringe benefits. In addition,
individuals organized themselves and held the government accountable for its actions.
To protect the sightline of Guia Lighthouse, as mentioned above, activists mobilized the
public to write complaints to the United Nations that the MSAR government had failed
to shield Macao’s World Cultural Heritage. A group of teachers mobilized themselves in
the October 1, 2007 demonstration and urged the authorities to square up to their
problems and difficulties in school teaching. Au Kam-san, a pro-democracy legislator,
indicated that Macao residents placed higher expectations on legislators to monitor the
authorities. 54 Indeed, a civil society had emerged in Macao along with the rapid
economic development. Individuals and independent groups tended to become more
active in holding authorities accountable. The development of civil society implied that
Macao’s political institutions were relatively weak in accommodating public demand;
civil society activity became the alternative to politics for angry residents.55
In sum, the political institutions of MSAR could no longer deal with the
complicated sociopolitical circumstances caused by economic modernization.
Sequentially, public grievances against the administration turned their frustrations to the
institutions, and hence, they mobilized against the authorities. Political instability would
be inevitable in accordance with Huntington’s prediction.
Political Modernization and Democratization
Facing tremendous political pressure from the public, the Macao government
introduced social policies to ease its residents’ difficulties, and institutional reforms to
assuage public discontent. First, the government aims to increase expenditure in social
welfare so as to satisfy the inclining public demand. For instance, it implemented
15-year free education, provided an interest-free loan scheme to university students, and
increased subsidies to the elderly and the poor.56 It promised to build more public
housing to meet demands from the lower and middle classes, and it planned to establish
a pension scheme for all citizens. The government also decided to construct subways in
the territory in order to improve the transportation system. Second, to ease the problem
of nepotism inside the government bureaucracy, a new appraisal system was
54
Personal interview with Au, 8 November 2007.
Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and Political Institutionalization,” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 40,
no. 5 (March/April 1997), p. 573.
56
Government Policy Plan for the Year 2008 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region
of the People’s Republic of China, MSAR Government, 13 November 2007; Government Policy Plan for
the Year 2007 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China, MSAR Government, 16 November 2006.
55
21
implemented in 2006. The new system has introduced various elements to avoid the
effect of personal relationships and aims to motivate officials for performance
advancement with the use of carrot and stick-based appraisal results.57 In addition, the
Macao government proposed a centralized recruitment mechanism in the Roadmap for
Public Sector Reform. It aimed to strengthen internal checks and balances in the
recruitment process and eliminate the effect of personal relationships.58 Third, the
government suggested various measures to control and restrict the power of department
heads in order to avoid corruption. For example, a job rotation system has been
recommended to all agency heads to give them the opportunity to explore jobs in
various units every three to five years and enrich their experience within the
administration.59 To an extent, job rotation can help avoid bureaucratic corruption
because individuals cannot easily construct loopholes or build up their personal
networks in a department. Fourth, to prevent bureaucratic corruption, the Commission
Against Corruption, the anti-corruption agency in the MSAR, initiated programs with
over 50 government departments that were designed to implement internal regulations
and check mechanisms against irregularities.60
Fifth, the MSAR government encouraged interdepartmental cooperation and
organizational reconfiguration to cope with various public and social issues. For
example, a transport bureau would be established to manage and design transportation
policy. In the past, several departments and units such as the Land, Public Works, and
Transport Bureau, the police forces, and the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau were
involved in traffic affairs. The government decided to reconfigure the functions of the
three units and centralize the transportation policy to a single bureau. Moreover, the
Culture Affairs Bureau and the Land, Public Works, and Transport Bureau established a
mechanism for their cooperation in protecting Macao’s World Culture Heritage.
Resident Service Centers were installed in some districts in Macau, whereby residents
could receive services from various departments. Sixth, the MSAR government tried to
improve its public consultative mechanisms in order to incorporate public opinion into
the policymaking process. For example, government departments issued consultative
papers and proposals to gather public opinion. Furthermore, with the Resident Service
Centers, the Macao government hopes to set up consultative committees in different
districts. Residents would be appointed into these committees, and their opinions on
57
Chan, Iuk-Va, Aomen Tequ Zhengfu Gongwuyuan Pinghe Zhidu Gaige zhi Yanjiu (A Study of the
Reform of the Macau Civil Service Appraisal System), unpublished master’s thesis, Department of
Government and Public Administration, University of Macau, Macau, 2007.
58
Roadmap for Public Sector Reform, Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, MSAR
Government, 2007.
59
Consultative Paper for the Amendment of “General Principles for Leaders and Directors,” SAFP
(Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau) and CRJ (Juridical Reform Bureau), MSAR
Government, 2007.
60
Journal Va Kio, 16 November 2007, p. 22.
22
district affairs would be collected.
These measures by the MSAR government would result in a more complicated and
coherent institution that regulates bureaucratic behavior, promotes interdepartmental
cooperation, and extends public participation in policymaking. However,
democratization is still a myth in Macao’s political modernization. The authorities have
been reluctant to initiate discussion about the development of democracy. The MSAR
government has taken no initiative to democratize the polity in terms of universal
suffrage elections. It is noted that the Chief Executive of MSAR is selected by a
300-member Election Committee which is selected by social groups and political elites
while the Legislative Assembly consists of 12 directly-elected seats, 10
indirectly-elected seats and 7 appointed members by the Chief Executive. To respond to
the demand from some democrats for accelerating the pace of democratization, the
MSAR authorities have only consulted the public about the improvement of elections in
dealing with vote-buying and other electoral irregularities.61 The government explained
that the quality of elections was the foundation of a democratic polity because Macao’s
elections have long been criticized for the serious problems of vote-buying and
corruption. 62 In addition, pro-government elites resisted to democratic reform of
government institutions. For instance, when the two pro-democracy legislators Antonio
Ng and Au Kam-san tried to discuss the possible establishment of District Councils in
order to improve public participation in the MSAR, they were severely criticized by the
pro-government elites that their suggestion violated the Macao’s Basic Law and should
not be discussed in the legislature. District Councils, which is mainly composed
directly-elected seats, have been already established in the Hong Kong for over two
decades and continued in the SAR era. Ironically, the Basic Laws of Hong Kong and
Macao share similar articles. It is not understandable that the establishment of District
Council violates the Macao’s Basic Law when the same system continues in the Hong
Kong counterpart. Au Kam-sun explained that the pro-government elite opposed to
District Council was obviously because they were lacking of capacity in run District
Councils elections and their political significance would inevitably be undermined.63
In Beijing’s eyes, suppressing corruption is far more important for Macao’s
development than holding universal suffrage elections. One would argue that if the
61
In February 2008, the Macao government issued a consultative paper for the amendment of the Voter
Registration Law, Chief Executive Election Law, and the Legislative Assembly Election Law. In the paper,
the government only suggested how to avoid corruption and irregularities in elections but did not touch
on the issue of universal suffrage elections and the extension of public participation in the Chief
Executive and legislative elections. See Endeavor for Higher Quality of Elections, Firm for Democracy
Development: Consultative Paper for the Amendment of Voter Registration Law, Chief Executive Election
Law, and Legislative Assembly Election Law, SAFP (Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau) and
CRJ (Juridical Reform Bureau), MSAR Government, February 2007, p. 4.
62
Yu Wing-yat, “Formal and Informal Politics in Macau Special Administrative Region Elections
2004-2005,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol.16, no. 52 (August 2007), pp. 417-441.
63
Personal interview with Au, 8 November 2007.
23
authorities could not suppress money politics and electoral corruption, politics would
only be a game for the economically powerful elite if universal suffrage elections were
introduced. Wang Zhenmin, member of the Macao Basic Law Committee, contended
that the lack of democracy was not the source of the problem in Macao politics; instead,
money politics and corruption have to be tackled in order to forge fair elections and
shape the political culture.64 He further asserted that the “One Country, Two Systems”
implemented in Macao was different on the mainland institutions, and that the MSAR
had to expend efforts to eliminate corruption.65 In other words Beijing sees corruption
as a deeply rooted problem that hinders Macao’s political development. Accelerating the
pace of implementing democracy would only lead to a vicious cycle, in that the
extension of political participation in public elections would cause corruption and
money politics to flourish.
In fact, Macao’s society seems to be even less enthusiastic about the pace of
democratization. In July 2007, the New Macao Society, led by pro-democracy
legislators Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong and Au Kam-san, published a political reform plan
and suggested an incremental model for the democratization of the Macao polity,
borrowing from the plan used in HKSAR. However, the local community paid little
attention to the reform plan, and there was a lack of discussion about Macao’s political
reforms. Some independent unionists might not support the New Macao Society’s plan.
For instance, Jeremy Lei, an independent union leader, agreed that further
democratization of Macao would merely nurture money politics and wound the political
development of Macao. 66 He further argued that Macao’s population merely cares
about the livelihood issues and has not yet recognized the demand for democracy.
Another independent unionist, Wong Pui-lam, also remarked that due to his poor
educational background, democracy seemed to be distant for him. 67 Au Kam-san
recognized that many independent union activists were less educated and might not
articulate a need for democracy in their union activities.68 He noted that despite the
general apathy toward democratic reform, he and Antonio Ng would continue the
movement for democracy and pressure the authorities for reform. The pro-democracy
forces in Macao seem to be weak in pushing for democratic reform in the polity.
In view of MSAR authorities’ measures in response to social and political
pressures from civil society, the government seemed to borrow from colonial Hong
Kong’s experience. After the riots in the late 1960s, colonial Hong Kong Governor
MacLehose introduced various plans to improve the social welfare. His goal was to
meet the public’s demands and ease social unrest on issues such as public housing and
64
65
66
67
68
Macao Daily News, 15 December 2007, B5.
Macao Daily News, 16 December 2007, B12.
Personal interview with Lei, 22 February 2008.
Personal interview with Wong, 30 October 2007.
Personal interview with Au, 8 November 2007.
24
free education. 69 Moreover, he expended efforts toward fighting corruption by
inaugurating the Independent Commission Against Corruption. In addition, the Hong
Kong colonial government called for public sector reform in order to improve the
performance of government administration. 70 Facing political pressure from the
demonstrations in 2006 and 2007, the MSAR government improved the social welfare
and aimed to strengthen internal mechanisms for checks and balances against
bureaucratic corruption as well as to improve administration performance by public
sector reform.
Furthermore, it borrowed colonial Hong Kong’s consultative mechanism to expand
public participation in government institutions. After the 1966 and 1967 riots, the Hong
Kong government introduced a City District Office Scheme and set up offices in various
districts. The city district offices not only provided information to citizens on public
services, but they also coordinated government departments to identify livelihood
problems in the districts in attempts to find solutions by working hand in hand. At the
same time, various district advisory committees were established. Elites at the
grassroots level would be recruited into these committees and would be allowed to
express their opinions and demands concerning residents’ problems of livelihood. The
Hong Kong government has tried to expand the participation channels in order to
appease public frustration with the administration. Ambrose King labeled this strategy
“the politics of administrative absorption.”71 The MSAR government tried to follow
such Hong Kong practices by introducing Resident Service Centers and district
consultative committees. Hence, it facilitated institutional channels for its
communication with the masses, certainly not only with the traditional patriotic groups,
but also with the new emerging social organizations that were independent of the
traditional groups. The political institutions facilitated a platform to deal with the radical
populations, instead of excluding them in the wave of modernization. Some independent
unionists indicated that they would like to join the consultative body if the government
invited them.72 The establishment of a public consultative system was, to an extent, an
extension of the MSAR authorities’ patronage to include the emerging independent
forces within the polity. In fact, the government selectively increased its subsidies to
individual groups. For example, the monthly subsidy to the Workers’ Unions, which was
69
Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford, 1997),
pp.18-20.
70
Colin Sankey, “Public Sector Reform: Past Developments and Recent Trends,” in Jane C.Y. Lee and
Anthony B.L. Cheung, eds., Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Key Concepts, Progress-to-date and
Future Directions, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), pp. 15-38.
71
Ambrose Y. C. King, “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the
Grass-Roots Level,” in Ambrose Y. C. King and Rance P. L. Lee, eds. Social Life and Development in
Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981), pp. 127-146.
72
Personal interview with Jeremy Lei and Hoi Hing-kuo, who were leaders of the independent union, 9
October 2007.
25
led by Jeremy Lei and Ho Hing-kuo, had a double increase in 2007.73 It is noted that
the MSAR government subsidized social groups and organizations for their daily
operations every month; government departments set the amount on an individual basis.
However, the various institutional reforms by the MSAR did not necessarily mean the
expansion of space for political participation; rather, it extended the scope of
co-optation by the authorities.
It seems that political modernization and institutionalization in MSAR are
increasingly “hongkongized,” as Lo observed about colonial Macao.74 Hong Kong’s
economic development after World War II resulted in the emergence of a civil and
pluralistic society.75 To address the political and social demands, the colonial Hong
Kong government institutionalized the system in a way that enhanced the performance
of government administration and improved its communication with the civil society.
Yet, democracy, in terms of universal suffrage elections, was not necessarily on the
reform agenda. Similarly, MSAR has been experiencing rapid economic development
after the handover as the society becomes pluralistic and a civil society emerges. To
accommodate political pressures from the civil society, the Macao authorities borrowed
from colonial Hong Kong practices to modernize and institutionalize the political
system, hence improving government performance. However, democratization is not
regarded as the pillar and remedy for political straits. Hunter et. al. indicated that
political modernization may not necessarily result in democratization and argued that it
is the mass political culture steering to democratic reform.76 Nevertheless, after the
political chaos in the Tung era, Beijing recognized that democratization would be
inevitable for the political development of HKSAR. This shift in attitude became
evident when the National People’s Congress Standing Committee announced that the
Chief Executive of Hong Kong could be selected by universal suffrage elections in
2017.77 Do those events imply that Macao will have to experience several waves of
political instability as the polity becomes democratized?
The fascinating economy does generate the political dynamics for the
modernization of Macao governmental institutions after the handover, but the society
does not have a strong demand for democratization. However, it is noteworthy that
when Macao liberalized its gaming industry, the globalization of Macao accelerated at
73
Lei and Ho indicated that in 2006, the government’s monthly subsidy to their group was MOP$3,000
in 2006. It was increased to MOP$6,000 after the May 1 demonstration 2007. Personal interview with Lei
and Ho, 9 October 2007.
74
Lo Shiu-hing, Political Development in Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), pp.
12-13.
75
Ming K. Chan, “Decolonization without Democracy: The Birth of Pluralistic Politics in Hong Kong,”
in Edward Friedman, ed., The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Boulder,
San Francisco, Oxford: Westview, 1994), pp. 161-184.
76
Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik eds., Modernization, Democracy, and Islam, (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 2005).
77
Ming Pao, 29 December 2007, A1.
26
the same time. Foreign governments, investors and international media would pay more
attention on the MSAR and pressure its political institutions. Particularly, the U.S.
government has already placed its eyes on Macao as the American capital has already
penetrated into the casino business in the MSAR. It is worrying the involvement of U.S.
businessmen in money laundry and organized crime. In 2005, the U.S. government
charged that three Macao banks, namely the Bank of China, the Seng Hang Bank and
the Bank of Asia Delta, involved in money laundry for the North Korea government,
and pressured the MSAR government to act correspondently against cross-border
crime.78 For another example, there was report that the corruption case of Ao Man-long,
the former Secretary for Transportation and Public Work, was first identified by the
British authorities and the latter transferred the case to the Hong Kong government.79
International labor organizations raised their concern on Macao’s labor interests after
the May 1 2007 demonstration. Some independent unions approached external forces
and sought advices for labor movement in the MSAR. For instance, the Workers Union
seeks aids from the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Union which tries to connect to
international labor organizations and helps the movement in Macao.80 Lee Kin-yun,
another pro-democracy unionist, is backed up by with Leung Kwok-hung, who is a
Hong Kong legislator and provocative politicians for democracy movement, for social
and political movement in Macao.81 Moreover, the Hong Kong media has paid closer
attention on Macao’s development because many Hong Kong people become to look for
job and investment opportunities there due to the booming economy. For instance, a
Hong Kong’s newspaper Apple Daily constantly has pages covering Macao and it is
critical to authorities. The Hong Kong newspapers are penetrating into the Macao
market. Macao readers are socialized by Hong Kong newspapers and tend to be
independent and critical to the authorities. Yet, Macao’s economic development also
implies its migration to the global community while the MSAR political institutions
have to be responsive to the external demand and adapt to globalization.
Furthermore, the increase of social welfare and the cooptation of independent
unions and groups may encourage the public as well as independent unionists to
demand more from the government. Their discontent may steer their political
mobilization against the authorities that pushing the government to do more for them.
As a result, the emerging civil society will continue mobilize and challenge the
authorities whenever and whatever their demands are not fulfilled. Au Kam-san marked
that although some unions received more subsidy and support from the government,
they could keep their independency from the authorities and checked the latter
78
Macao Daily News, 9 September 2005, B10.
Business Intelligence, no. 16, December 2006, p.12-16.
80
Personal interview with Personal interview with Jeremy Lei and Hoi Hing-kuo, who were leaders of
the independent union, 9 October 2007.
81
Personal interview with Lee, 4 October 2007.
79
27
continuously. 82 Despite the fact that the mass of Macao has not yet prioritized
democracy in political modernization, it does not mean that they will not demand for in
the future. According to Huntington, the modernization and democratization process
will be prolonged due to the deeply rooted traditional values and culture, as in the case
of Europe.83 Perhaps other waves of social mobilization will be processed in parallel
with the sustainable economic development, and then the civil society of Macao will
cultivate a demand for a democratic polity.
Conclusion
Huntington’s theory of modernization can be applicable to the situation in Macao.
Economic development has triggered instability in Macao. Macao’s political institutions
do not possess the capacity to accommodate changing socio-economic circumstances.
Public grievances and frustration with the authorities have been intensifying while
demand for greater participation in the formal political institutions is increasing.
However, Macao’s politically exclusive institutions have neither assuaged mass
frustration nor met demands for more comprehensive political integration; instead they
have escalated social instability within Macao. To resolve the governance crisis of the
MSAR, political modernization must keep pace with rapid economic development. The
institutionalization of government organizations, that is, the extension of public
participation and organizational re-articulation, is essential. To an extent, Macao has
borrowed its political modernization strategy from Hong Kong. Hence, Macao’s
political development may follow Hong Kong’s process of democratization. The
“Hongkongization” of the Macao polity will become increasingly possible. Political
modernization may result in democratization, but bouts of political instability may be
the inevitable corollary to the process.
Macao’s political modernization may also have implications for mainland China.
There has been rapid economic development on the mainland. Although many
mainlanders receive higher salaries and enjoy a better standard of living, many also
suffer from the ills of rapid development such as inflation, pollution, and income
inequality. Several regions have experienced social unrest. To accommodate the
changing socioeconomic situations, political modernization and institutionalization
would be expected. Macao’s polity shares certain characteristics with the mainland’s.
First, the political system is dominated by the pro-Beijing elite and social groups.
Second, the media tend to be less critical of the authorities. Third, bureaucratic
corruption is a concern. Fourth, personal and informal political networks provide the
main access to political participation. Fifth, social harmony has always been
82
Personal interview with Au, 8 November 2007.
Samuel Paul Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1968).
83
28
emphasized. Macao’s management of its own modernization process may affect
mainland authorities’ treatment of the growing political demands in China. Perhaps it is
too bold to say Macao’s modernization may serve as a model for reform in the mainland.
However, Macao’s experience can certainly serve as a testimony to reconciling rapid
economic development with emergent political demands. On the other hand, Beijing’s
recognition of demands for further democratization in the HKSAR implies that, in the
long run, the Hong Kong model may be the one that is favored in mainland China’s own
road to democratization. In this way, the “One Country, Two Systems” approach not
only serve the purpose for Taiwan’s reunification but also aids in the political reform of
mainland China.
29