SPECIAL REPORT |
Reporting on Cargo Theft in North America
As of August 25 2011
Introduction
1.
Cargo theft in North America is major concern. It is estimated that theft represents losses of at
least US $10 billion per year in the United States alone. The key word here is “estimate”. Unlike other criminal
activities, tracking cargo theft incidents is problematic. Though greatly improved over the past few years,
reporting continues to lack consistency in formatting and information provided. Ultimately, the credibility of the
reporting system and the resulting intelligence is questioned as a tool for effective decision-making for combating
cargo theft.
Geo-Political Issues
2.
In an ideal world, supply chains would be a closed system from the moment the supplier ships a
product to the time it is delivered to the customer. Globalization has rendered this ideal highly problematic
despite the multitude of security checks and balances that are in place.
3.
It is a given that the larger and more complex a supply chain is, the more likely it will have weak
links to one degree or another making it more prone to cargo theft. North America’s global supply chain is no
exception.
4.
The ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and New York / New Jersey alone handle over 19 million
TEU a year. In the United States, there are over 250,000 U.S. companies involved in importing or exporting goods.
Hundreds of thousands more ship or receive cargo within the country. This cargo is shipped over 600,000
kilometers of rail and roads. Cargo can be stolen at any point in between, compromising product integrity and
availability
5.
This road and rail system also crosses three national borders, and a multitude of law
enforcement jurisdictions. The US alone has almost 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies, roughly 16,000 of
which are local. Of the remaining 2,000 agencies, the vast majority represent special jurisdictions (port police,
university police, transit police, park police), followed by state agencies, and lastly by federal non-military
agencies. Out of 837,000 full-time sworn police personnel (armed with arrest authority), 74 percent work for local
agencies, 13 percent work for federal law enforcement, and 13 percent work for state or special jurisdiction law
enforcement agencies.
6.
The two largest components of US policing are both local – municipal police departments and
county sheriff’s offices. Two characteristics of these types of law enforcement agencies are absolutely essential for
understanding their capabilities and context – most are small (77 percent have fewer than twenty-five full-time
sworn officers), and they are all independent of each other. There is no chain of command in the police industry –
within individual agencies, yes, but among and between the 18,000 agencies, no.
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7.
In all three countries, policing operations at the national, regional and local levels are driven by
differing and, sometimes, conflicting priorities. At the national level, geo-political issues like terrorism dominate
law enforcement and intelligence operations. These issues tend to filter down to the local level to conflict with
local priorities.
8.
This is quite evident in Mexico. Cargo theft since 2007 has expanded greatly. This includes both
in volume and violence. However, the level of focus on cargo theft has declined as policing operations have been
directed against the drug trade.
9.
Regardless, historically, cargo theft hasn't been a high priority for law enforcement. In
southern Ontario (an area that is approximately the size of England), what is considered the trucking center of
Canada, less than half a dozen police officers work the cargo crime beat.
10.
The nature of a supply chain also dictates a criminal conspiracy, and some measure of
organization to be successful. Today’s criminal enterprises are diverse in structure, outlook and membership, and
operate at ease operating across national borders. Because such organizations are highly fluid and have a loose
structure, they are able to respond rapidly to law enforcement challenges.
11.
The point of all these observations is that the nature of supply chains and the structure of law
enforcement seem to conspire against an intelligence-led approach to combating cargo theft and the free flow of
information. Crime incident data, statistics and trend analysis that is needed to identify past trends and to raise
awareness of new threats and modes of operation is not readily available or accurate. There is still a lack of
systematic collection and sharing of
information.
By State
By Commodity
State
Information Sharing and Intelligence
Issues
12.
North America has
several private and non-government
sources involved in collecting and
analyzing cargo theft-related statistics.
An examination of three of these
sources and their intelligence products
are quite revealing. By State, California
is the only one that all sources can
agree on as having the most cargo
thefts. Florida has the largest
discrepancy in placement with a low of
three (3) and a high of eight (8).
S1
S2
S3
California
1
1
1
Food
Texas
4
3
2
Clothing and Accessories
3
4
2
New Jersey
2
2
3
Consumer Electronics
2
1
3
Georgia
5
5
4
Construction Supplies
4
4
Illinois
7
6
5
Automotive
8
5
Pennsylvania
8
7
6
Other
6
6
Tennessee
6
8
7
Drugs and Medical
Florida
3
4
8
Health and Beauty
7
Maryland
9
12
9
Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages
10
Ohio
NL
9
NL
Computers and Peripherals
North Carolina
10
11
NL
Prepared Foodstuffs and Beverages
13.
By Commodity highlites an even larger issue; there
is no standardized form of reporting, with commodities overlapping
with specific items. For example S3 reports “Base Metals” as
belonging to “Construction Supplies” while S2 identifies it as a
commodity.
Commodity
S1
S2
1
7
8
8
9
10
1
2
Unidentified
3
Base Metals
5
Plastics and Rubber Products
6
Machinery
7
Animal and Animal Products
9
Animal Oils and Fats
10
Pharmaceuticals
9
Home and Garden
5
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S3
11
2
14.
However, the most important issue lies in the number of cargo thefts that are reported – S3
(857), S1 (899), and S2 (1035). With the discrepancies noted, one could come to the conclusion that each player
has unique statistics. This could potentially push the number of incidents higher than 1035. However, unless all
three sources work together, there is no way of knowing.
15.
The overall impact of these discrepancies goes to the crux of the problem; intelligence-led
decision-making needs reliable sources of information that provide accurate information. In this case, there is no
evidence that the three sources accounted for these or any other discrepancies when they produced their reports.
Therefore, from an intelligence perspective, these sources are labelled as “single sources of information”.
Unfortunately, relying on single sources of information increases the level of risk because of inherent uncertainties
caused by the discrepancies noted above and others.
16.
The cargo theft intelligence process is also affected by the lack of reporting. There are two
sources of information - the “victims” themselves, and the police. Reportedly, as many as four out of five incidents
in Canada may go unreported. According to one Canadian industry source, “fleets have their reasons for keeping
a lid on the problem, ranging from fears of premium increases resulting from claims to the loss of customer
confidence. Nobody wants their customers to know they are being ripped off”. The situation is no different in the
United States and Mexico.
17.
When it is reported, the police treat it as a property crime. This makes it difficult for the police
to break out cargo theft because it is treated simply as theft. In the US, in response to federal legislation outlined
in the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program
began accepting cargo theft data from local, state, tribal, and federal agencies on January 1, 2010.
18.
The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program was conceived in 1929 by the International
Association of Chiefs of Police to meet a need for reliable, uniform crime statistics for the nation. In 1930, the FBI
was tasked with collecting, publishing, and archiving those statistics. Today, several annual statistical publications
are produced from data provided by nearly 17,000 law enforcement agencies across the United States.
19.
Although the FBI is mandated to collect cargo theft data, state and local law enforcement
agencies are not required to report cargo theft data to the national UCR Program. The FBI must rely upon the
“good faith” reporting efforts of its voluntary contributors to make the cargo theft data collection a reality.
Therefore, the FBI’s UCR Program encourages all NIBRS state UCR Programs and agencies to update their software
to incorporate this new data element for identifying incidents of cargo theft.
20.
The FBI anticipates that it could take 18 to 24 months for state UCR Programs and agencies to
implement these software changes. Even then, there is uncertainty that all states will participate. The
implementation of the new NIBRS data element must be consistent among all reporting agencies within a state.
Therefore, either all or none of the agencies that report NIBRS data within a state must report cargo theft data via
the new NIBRS data element.
Concluding Remarks
21.
There have been numerous initiatives over the last two years to combat cargo theft. Task forces
have been formed, and new reporting mechanisms implemented. Ironically, as more players become engaged in
the process, the more difficult it is going to be to coordinate the flow of information and its production into
actionable intelligence. This is particularly problematic for private sector businesses that have staked a claim in
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the reporting process. It is doubtful that these businesses will work together. More importantly, it is also doubtful
that law enforcement agencies will exchange “law enforcement sensitive” and “for official use only” information
and intelligence with private businesses. Consequently, as pointed out earlier, using these intelligence products is
going to be risky. The level of risk is contingent on the steps that these businesses take to account for gaps in their
intelligence collection process.
© InterPort Police – Special Report 2011 All Rights Reserved.
Not for disseminations with out permission. Unclassified – Open Source Matter.
E: helpdesk@srmx.info W: InterPortPolice.org | SRMX Portal: SRMX.org
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