REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
SENATE
SITTING AS THE IMPEACHMENT COURT
IN THE MATTER OF THE
IMPEACHMENT OF RENATO C.
CORONA AS CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME
COURT
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
CASE NO. 002-2011
REPRESENTATIVES NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA,
LORENZO
R.
TAÑADA,
III,
REYNALDO V. UMALI, ARLENE J.
BAG-AO, et al.,
Complainants.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
COMMENT / OPPOSITION
(to Respondent’s MOTION TO SUPPRESS
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE)
The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, through its PROSECUTORS, respectfully
states:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.
On 27 February 2012, the Prosecution Panel received a copy of the
Respondent’s Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence (Re: Subpoenae
2
dated 6 February 2012 and 9 February 2012 to PSBank Katipunan Branch
Manager).
2.
On 28 February 2012, the Prosecution filed a Manifestation
indicating that it will file a Comment/Opposition to the aforesaid Motion on or
before 5 March 2012. The same was approved by the Impeachment Court during
the hearing on the same day.
3.
In his Motion, respondent stated that during the hearing on 9
February 2012, Mr. Pascual Garcia III (hereinafter “Mr. Garcia”), President of
PSBank, appeared before the Honorable Impeachment Court and testified that
the portions of the photocopies of the PSBank records attached to the
Prosecution’s Supplemental Request for Subpoenae contained discrepancies and
are not copies of the bank’s documents. (par. 6, p. 4, Respondent’s Motion)
4.
Furthermore, respondent stated that during the hearing on 13
February 2012, Ms. Anabelle Tiongson, the Branch Manager of PSBank Katipunan
Branch, appeared before the Honorable Impeachment Court and testified that the
document attached as Annex “A” (hereinafter “Annex “A””)to the Prosecution’s
Supplemental Request for Subpoenae is a fake document.
There
has
been
no
final
determination that Annex “A” is a
fake document.
5.
It bears emphasis that the respondent misappreciated the
statements made by witnesses in Court. His conclusion that Annex “A” is fake is
3
belied by the conflicting testimonies of both Tiongson and Garcia.
6.
At the outset, there has been no final determination that Annex “A”
is a fake document. No judicial proceedings have categorically declared that
Annex “A” is indeed fake. Furthermore, Tiongson and Garcia’s testimonies on this
point were vague, indefinite and contained inconsistencies.
7.
First, they merely concluded that the document was fake because it
contained certain dissimilarities to the original document.1
However, they
likewise admit that Annex “A” had similarities, in form and in the entries, with the
original document they had in their custody. Second, all of the account numbers
contained in Annex “A” are confirmed to have existed in the Katipunan branch of
PS Bank. Lastly, the allegation that Annex “A” is fake is inconsistent with their
subsequent allegation that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) (which purportedly conducted an audit of PSBank
sometime in September to December 2010) had “leaked” the document. If Annex
“A” was indeed fake, then it could not have been “leaked” by BSP and AMLC.
Needless to say, if it was a “leaked” document originating from PSBank, how can
it be fake? A fake document could not have been illegally obtained.
8.
Evidently, Tiongson and Garcia are not even sure if Annex “A” is fake.
On one hand, they state that it was fake and on the other, they state that it was a
“leaked” document. Both statements are mutually exclusive. Therefore, we
cannot rely on the mere testimonies of Tiongson and Garcia because they
1
P. 23-25, TSN, February 15, 2012 and p. 43-45, TSN, February 15, 2012.
4
themselves are not convinced that annex “A” is fake. This is precisely why the
Senate, acting in its legislative capacity, is conducting its own investigation on the
matter. Indeed, a final determination of whether or not Annex “A” is fake may
require extensive and full-blown administrative and court proceedings with the
testimony of expert witnesses.
9.
Even the Senator-judges are not convinced that Annex “A” is fake.
During the hearing on 15 February 2012, Senator-Judge Ejercito “Jinggoy” Estrada
voiced out his opinion that the document was a faithful reproduction of the
original:
“Senator Ejercito Estrada. It is not the signature of your tellers or – No.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, I just would like to put on record my own personal opinion
that this particular document that was allegedly leaked from the PSBank
is, I think, a faithful reproduction of the original.
That is all Mr. President.”2 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
10.
Senator-Judge Panfilo “Ping” Lacson also expressed his reservations
regarding the allegation that the document was fake and suggested that the
questioned document be submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory or the NBI for
examination to finally settle all the speculations regarding the document. He
clarified:
“Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I would like to clarify that. I am not being
partial to the Prosecution. I just want this Court to get to the bottom of this
issue. Because right not, as I said, we are all speculating. And lahat tayo
nagiging handwriting expert, which we are not. So that is the reason why I
2
p. 23, TSN, February 23, 2012.
5
submitted that proposition, Mr. President.”3 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
11.
The Senate’s subsequent action belies respondent’s allegation that
Annex “A” is fake. Currently, there is an ongoing investigation being undertaken
by the Senate Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions on how the
document reached the Court. The opening statement of the Chairman of the
Committee, Senator-Judge Sergio R. Osmena III, echoes the statements of
Tiongson and Garcia that Annex “A” may have been a “leaked document” and
may not have been fake, thus:
“This hearing by the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies is hereby called subject to the resolution unanimously passed on
the floor, asking the Committee to look into the expose or allegation by Ms.
Annabelle Tiongson that the leak of the signature card – the master
signature card of Chief Justice Renato Corona happened through the –
happened during or because of the examination receipt of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Anti-money Laundering Council at the PSBank.
The concerns of the Senators are that this could be a violation – a gross
violation of the Banking Secrecy Act and the other provisions of the charter
of the Bangko Sentral and the General Banking Act. We would like to hear
the side of those who have been accused or implicated in this and try to
pinpoint the blame if we can, indeed, pinpoint the blame today.”4
12.
Moreover, in the midst of the Senate investigation, Senate President
Juan Ponce Enrile stated that BSP examiner Jerry Leal obtained the document
during his audit of PSBank.5
The allegation that the document is fake is
inconsistent with the Senate President’s theory that the document was leaked by
the BSP examiner.
p. 77-76, TSN, February 20, 2012.
p. 1, TSN, February 27, 2012, Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
5
Enrile Eyes Source of Leak, Malaya, available at http://www.malaya.com.ph/03022012/news1.html (last accessed
4 March 2012).
3
4
6
13.
In fine, the testimony of Mr. Garcia, taken as a whole, will prove that
Annex “A” was not a fake document as alleged by respondent but actually had
similarities with the original document under their custody and therefore could
not have been fake.
14.
During the hearing on 15 February 2012, Mr. Garcia testified that the
form in Annex “A” is the same as that of the bank and that the signatures in the
said document are similar to that which are included in the original of the
document, thus:
“The Presiding Officer. Do you have this kind of document?
Mr. Garcia. As to the form, yes, we do, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Presiding Officer. Precisely, do you have this kind of a form?
Mr. Garcia. The form I have declared, Your Honor, we do have.
The Presiding Officer. You have?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Presiding Officer. They are different. Okay.
The signatures appearing on this document, are they similar to the
document you have?
Mr. Garcia. They appear to be similar, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. They appear to be similar.
Mr. Garcia. They appear to be similar. There are highlights here on
the document that are not present. There is - even this particular
7
document, it is not clear, the date of 2000 ...I think
mentioning 2000 -
you are
The Presiding Officer. In other words, you say there are similarities
and there are basic differences.
Mr. Garcia. That is what we have been saying, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Just say so. Answer my question,
please.
Mr. Garcia. Yes Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Just listen.
Now, there is another document. Below the document that I already
described, and the letters are very small, and it is difficult for the
Presiding Officer to read them, but I will try to read them to you.
“Account name, family name, first name, middle name or company
name.” Another column, “Customer number,” and then another
column, “Account number,” et cetera, and there are entries. Do you
have this kind of document in your bank?
Mr. Garcia. We have this kind of document with those details.
The Presiding Officer. Now, are the details in that document that
you have in your bank the same as the details now appearing in this
Annex “A” to the supplemental request for a subpoena of the
prosecution?
Mr Garcia. If you are speaking of this what we indicated, Your
Honor, there are similarities. But with respect to the other
indications here, like dollar The Presiding Officer. There are similarities?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Are there dissimilarities?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Presiding Officer. Okay. Now, I call your attention to a portion
of this document where there is apparently a word, a phrase that
8
was attempted to be snopaked or erased which reads “existing
client.” And then, in parenthesis, in the annex, it says “PEP”. You get
the annex and tell me if this is correct.
Mr. Garcia. It is similar, Your Honor, except that it is highlighted.
The Presiding Officer. When you said highlighted, it was disturbed.
Mr. Garcia. The original does not show any markings.
The Presiding Officer. Or any highlighting.
Mr. Garcia. Or any highlighting.
The Presiding Officer. Alright. But it has the word “PEP.”
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.” (TSN, p. 43-45, February 15, 2012)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
15.
After testifying that the signatures and the details in Annex “A” are
similar with those appearing in the original document, Mr. Garcia, on 20 February
2012, again affirmed that the entries in Annex “A” are similar to the entries in the
original document and that ALL the account numbers are accurate, viz:
“Senator Legarda. Yes, there are differences. Quite a number. Yes - on the
signatures.
Annex A, just for the record, came from prosecution, but it had the same
number of accounts and the same account numbers as those on the
original document which the photocopy of which I am holding now.
Mr. Garcia. That is correct, Your Honor.
Senator Legarda. Yes. The name of the account is the same, the address
which you said can be access publicly based on any public record.
However, the information, the account numbers and the signatures of your
staff, who did their signatures beside the account numbers are the same
personnel. Right?
Mr. Garcia. Similar, Your Honor.
9
Senator Legarda. Similar. No, the same names, similar signatures but
there are modifications, alterations.
Mr. Garcia. We believe so, Your Honor.
Senator Legarda. However, is the information on the account numbers
accurate?
Mr. Garcia. It is accurate, Your Honor.
Senator Legarda. Is there any one number in any account number that is
different?
Mr. Garcia. Not that we have noted, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator Legarda. But the information on the bank account numbers are
accurate?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, they are accurate, Your Honor
Senator Legarda. They are all accurate?
Mr. Garcia. They are.
Senator Legarda. There is no single number that is out of place that is
different?
Mr. Garcia. Not that I know of, Your Honor.” (pp.59 – 61, TSN, February
20, 2012) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
16.
Aside from testifying that the entries in Annex “A” are similar to
those appearing in the original document, Mr. Garcia likewise confirmed that all
the accounts indicated in Annex “A” exist and that they are found only in the
Katipunan branch of PS Bank, viz:
“The Presiding Officer. All right. I’ll ask you and listen carefully.
Account No. 089-121011957, does this account exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. It existed in our records, Your Honor...
10
The Presiding Officer. Does it exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. For the year 2007, yes, Your Honor ...
The Presiding Officer. Just tell me, yes or no, if it exist or not exist.
Does it exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Account No. 089-141008145, does
that account exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Your Honor, ...
The Presiding Officer. Does it exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. This pertains to a dollar account.
The Presiding Officer. I’m only asking whether it exist in your record.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, it exists, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. 089-141007469, does this account
exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. 089-141007129, does this exist in
your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. 089-121021681, does this account
exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. I’m sorry, Your Honor, which particular account?
The Presiding Officer. Account No. 089-121021681, does this exist in
your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Account No. 089-121020122, does
this exist in your record?
11
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Account No. 089-121019593, does
this exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Then, next, Account No. 089121017358, does that exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Account No. 089-131002826, does that exist
in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Lastly, Account No. 089-191000373,
does that account exist in your record?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right. Explain how would these accounts
come to the possession of the prosecutors to enable them to ask this
court to issue a subpoena if these were not drawn from your
account, from your records.
Mr. Garcia. The information on these accounts were not drawn from
us.
The Presiding Officer. Would this account number exist in other
banks?
Mr. Garcia. Other banks, Your Honor?
The Presiding Officer. Yes.
Mr. Garcia. We cannot comment on other banks because we do not
really know what their account numbers ...
The Presiding Officer. Would these records be found in your central
office, in Metrobank for instance, which is your mother company.
Mr. Garcia. No, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Would they exist only in your bank?
12
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer.
Katipunan?
Would they exist only in your branch in
Mr. Garcia. I cannot comment on that, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Why not?
Mr. Garcia. Some of these accounts are dollar accounts, and ...
The Presiding Officer. No, but I am only asking whether this would
exist only in—these accounts would only be recorded in your
Katipunan Branch.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. All right, tapos. So, it can only be—the
conclusion could only be that this leak came from your Katipunan
Branch.
Mr. Garcia. Your Honor. I honestly believe, it did not.
The Presiding Officer. What is the basis of your belief?
Mr. Garcia. For the peso accounts?
The Presiding Officer. Yes.
Mr. Garcia. For the peso accounts, our original documents actually
have differences.
The Presiding Officer. But you agree that these accounts only—are
only recorded in the Katipunan Branch of your bank.
Mr. Garcia. For the peso account, Your Honor, yes.
The Presiding Officer. Okay. It will not appear in the record of other
branches of your bank.
Mr. Garcia. For the peso accounts, yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. For the peso accounts?
Mr. Garcia. For peso accounts, yes.
13
The Presiding Officer. How about the dollar accounts?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. Garcia. Your Honor, when an account is opened in one branch, it
is domiciled in that branch and will not exist in other branches.
The Presiding Officer. Thank you. Thank you. I am done. (pp. 32-35,
TSN, February 9, 2012)
17.
Through the abovequoted testimonies of Mr. Garcia, it now becomes
incontrovertible that all the accounts indicated in Annex “A” exist and all the
important information indicated in Annex “A” are similar to those appearing in
the original document. Anent thereto, since the all information indicated in the
purported fake document are confidential in nature and is only known to the
bank, a presumption arises that the document came from the bank and is in fact
genuine. It cannot be declared as fake absent any concrete proof showing
otherwise.
18.
It is likewise interesting to note that Mr. Garcia admitted that there
are two original copies of the document:
“Senato Guingona. I see. Tapos, Mr. Garcia, iyong cards ninyo, ilan po ang
original niyan,iyong ipinakita ninyong mga cards na may signature.
Mr. Garcia. Only two, Your Honor.
Senato Guingona. Dalawa lang.
Mr. Garcia. Dalawa.
Senato Guingona. Some of my Senator-Judges are saying it’s three.
14
Mr. Garcia. Your Honor, yes, the owner could maintain a copy of his for his
records, yes, but the bank would have two.” (p. 71, TSN February 20, 2012)
19.
In this light, it must be emphasized that during the course of the
proceedings, Mr. Garcia only produced one of the two originals to which he based
his conclusion that the document attached as Annex “A” to the Supplemental
Request was not a photocopy of the original copy. For all intents and purposes,
Annex “A” could have been a photocopy of the second original copy. This further
raises doubts to respondent’s allegation that Annex “A” is a fake document.
20.
Moreover, the Prosecutors have always come in good faith before
this Honorable Court. In fact, it was indicated in the Supplemental Request for
Subpoenae that “[w]hile it cannot vouch for the authenticity of the documents,
the prosecution believes that it is its duty to submit the documents to this
Honorable Impeachment Court, as they may have a bearing on the Court’s
resolution of the pending request for subpoena.”6
21.
Finally, even the Senate Sitting as an Impeachment Court, through
the Office of the Solicitor General,7 admitted that the issuance of the Subpoenae
covering CJ Corona’s foreign currency accounts was valid and therefore all the
evidence proceeding therefrom is admissible and cannot be excluded. To support
this statement, it cited the case of Joseph Victor G. Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) and People of the Philippines.8
6
Supplemental Request for Subpoena/Reply dated 03 February 2012, par. 12, p. 6.
Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti (With Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order) dated
February 28, 2012 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 43-44
8
G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006.
7
15
22.
By the statements of the Honorable Impeachment Court itself, it has
already taken the position that the evidence sought to be suppressed, excluded,
and expunged by the respondent is valid and admissible.
23.
In fine, there has been no final determination nor concrete evidence
to show that the document attached as Annex “A” to the Supplemental Request
for Subpoena filed by the Prosecutors was fake. Thus, there is no basis for the
suppression, exclusion, and expunging from the record of the evidence in relation
to the Subpoenae dated 6 February 2012 and 9 February 2012.
24.
The final words of the Senate, through the Office of the Solicitor
General is instructive, thus:
“In sum, CJ Corona has no constitutional or statutory right to privacy and
confidentiality of his bank deposits because of the impeachment
proceedings against him. On the contrary, he is constitutionally obligated to
publicly disclose them as the highest Magistrate in the land. The Subpoenae
issued by the Impeachment Court simply seek to enforce the constitutional
command of public accountability. Thus, these must be upheld.”9
The Subpoenae validly issued by the
Honorable Impeachment Court does
not constitute as an unreasonable
search.
25.
Respondent alleges that the Subpoenae dated 6 February 2012 and 9
February 2012 amounted to an unreasonable search. He stated that under Rule
21, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a subpoena duces tecum “shall
also contain a reasonable description of books, documents or things demanded
9
Supra note 7 at p. 44.
16
which must appear to the court prima facie relevant and that under Rule 21,
Section 4 directs the quashal of a subpoena duces tecum “if it is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear.”10
26.
Proceeding from the argument of respondent, in order for a
subpoena duces tecum to be quashed, it must be unreasonable, oppressive, and
irrelevant.
27.
It must be emphasized that the bank accounts of the respondent
(including his bank accounts in PSBank) has been ruled as RELEVANT to Article II.
In the Resolution dated 06 February 2012, the Impeachment Court ruled that:
“After an examination of the documents sought to be produced in both
requests, this Court is of the strong view that the production of documents
pertaining to the bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona should be closely
related to the filing of his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(“SALN”) inasmuch as the funds in said bank accounts may be considered
as his personal properties which are required to be properly and
truthfully declared in the SALN..Xxx” (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
28.
This finding was reiterated by the Presiding Officer in his
pronouncement during the 14 February 2012 hearing:
“The Presiding Officer. That is correct. But the understanding of this Chair
is that, all evidence that is going to be presented will be in connection with
paragraph 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II; 2.2 being disclosure of the SALN; and 2.3
being non-inclusion of assets. The purpose of allowing those documents
will only be limited to the determination of whether there are assets or
peso assets, currency assets, cash assets of the respondent for the specific
years covered that were not included in his SALN. And not to be authorized
to be used in connection with 2.4, for in the mind and understanding of this
10
Par. 15, p. 11 of the Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence
17
Presiding Officer, paragraph 2.4 of Article II is actually non-existent
allegation that is capable of being proven by any evidence that will be
presented in the course of this trial.” (p. 24, TSN, February 14, 2012)
29.
Likewise, the validity of the subpoenae has already been affirmed by
the Honorable Impeachment Court when it denied the Reiterative Motion to
Quash the Subpoena filed by the respondent. The Presiding Officer ruled as
follows:
“Senator Sotto. The counsel for Chief Justice Corona filed a Reiterative
Motion to Quash the Subpoena issued by the Court to PS Bank branch
Manager Ms. Annabelle Tiongson. May I move that the Presiding Officer
rule on the Motion?
The Presiding Officer. Well, just like what the Chair said yesterday, since
the bank account deposit number is a peso account, the Chair reiterates its
ruling given yesterday that our purpose here is to find out whether the
Respondent has not included in his SALN and assets that sprang from the
account like the one before us, the Philippine Savings Bank. And so, it is
removed from the ambit of the TRO given by the Supreme Court it being a
peso account, so therefore, it is open for examination.
SO ORDERED.” (pp. 3-4, TSN, February 15, 2012) (Underscoring supplied)
30.
Verily, the Honorable Impeachment Court has been consistent in its
position that the bank accounts are relevant to the paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of
Article II which will aid the Honorable Impeachment Court in the determination of
whether there are assets or peso assets, currency assets, cash assets of the
respondent for the specific years covered that were not included in his SALN.
31.
More importantly, by publicly admitting that he owned several
currency deposit accounts and declaring that he will disclose them in due time,
respondent impliedly admits that the bank accounts are relevant to Article II of
18
the Impeachment Complaint. As correctly stated by the Impeachment Court in its
Comment on the Petition filed by the respondent before the Supreme Court:
“CJ Corona has publicly admitted ownership of several foreign currency
deposit accounts and vowed to disclose them “in due time.”11 He is not,
however permitted to dictate when he will publicly disclose his assets,
liabilities and net worth. In issuing the Subpoenae, the Impeachment Court
only sought to enforce CJ Corona’s constitutional obligation to fully declare
and publicly disclose his assets.”12
32.
Secondly, the subpoena issued by the Honorable Impeachment Court
is NOT unreasonable and oppressive. The cases13 cited by the respondent, cannot
be applied to the instant case because the subpoena subject of the said cases
involved a general inquisitorial examination of books, documents and papers.
33.
To be more specific, in H.C. Liebenow v. The Philippine Vegetable Oil
Company14 the Court nullified the subpoena because it required the production of
great piles of material which amounted to a general inquisitorial examination of
ALL the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to
ascertain whether something of value may not show up. In Jose Sy Jong Chuy v.
Pablo Reyes,15 the Court quashed the subpoena on the ground that it is far too
sweeping and pertains not only to a single contract/s but to ALL understandings,
contracts, or correspondence. This was also the ratio decidendi in Federal Trade
Commission v. American Robacco Co16 where the Court held that the right of
11
“Disclosures in Due Time, Says CJ”, The Philippine Star, February 11, 2012, p.1.
Supra note 6, Comment, p. 38.
13
H.C. Liebenow v. The Philppine Vegetable Oil Company (G.R. No. L-13463, 9 November 1918); Jose Sy Jong v.
Pablo Reyes (G.R. No. L-38375, 22 December 1933; Botd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Federal Trade
Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
14
Supra.
15
Supra.
16
Supra.
12
19
access given to the Federal Trade Commission to ALL of respondent’s records or
records, relevant or irrelevant, is contrary to the first principles of justice.
34.
As can be readily gleaned from the cases cited by respondent, a
subpoena which pertains to ALL documents, without any qualifications or
indications of specificity, cannot be declared as valid.
35.
In contrast, the Subpoena in the instant impeachment proceedings
enumerate specific bank accounts under the name of respondent which are
within the custody of PSBank, to wit:
a. Subpoena dated 6 February 2012
-
089-191000373
089-131002826
089-121017358
089-121019593
089-121020122
089-121021681
089-141007129
089-141007469
089-141008145
089-121011957
b. Subpoena dated 09 February 2012
-
36.
089-121017358
089-121019593
089-121020122
089-121021681
089-121011957
Since the two (2) Subpoenas issued to PS Bank list specific bank
accounts of respondent, it cannot be considered as a general inquisitorial
20
examination of the bank accounts of the respondent within the purview of the
cited cases.
37.
Likewise, the case of Boyd v. United States17 is not applicable to the
circumstances prevailing in the instant case. In Boyd, the defendant was required
to produce in court his private books, invoice and papers and thus fell under the
proscription against self-incrimination. In the instant case, the subpoena was
issued against PSBank and NOT the respondent. It is PSBank which is required to
bring the documents NOT the respondent. It would have been different if the
Subpoenae was issued to the respondent himself as in the case of Boyd.
However, such is not the case here.
38.
Furthermore, respondent’s allegation that the subpoena was general
in nature is not supported by the prevailing circumstances. For one, PSBank had
no problem producing the documents requested of them. The bank readily
submitted all the documents subject of the subpoena without requesting for
additional time to search for the same. As the addressee of the subpoena, the
proper party to protest and oppose the subpoena on the ground that it is general
should be PSBank, as in the cited case of Boyd. However, PSBank did not
interpose any objections or protests that the subpoena was general in nature and
was actually able to present all documents required by the subpoena (except for
the dollar accounts that were covered by a TRO). Consequently, the cases cited
by respondent have no applicability to the instant case.
17
Supra.
21
The Motion to Suppress Illegally
Obtained Evidence raises issues
which have already been ruled upon
by this Court and is therefore in a
form
of
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration which is prohibited
by the Rules.
39.
The issues in respondent’s Motion to Suppress Evidence have already
ruled upon by this Honorable Court. As discussed above, respondent’s argument
in his Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence that the bank accounts are
irrelevant, unreasonable, and oppressive has already been raised by respondent it
its Motion to Quash Subpoena and its subsequent Reiterative Motion to Quash
Subpoena which have already been ruled upon by this Impeachment Court in its
Resolution dated 6 February 2012 and the rulings of the Presiding Officer in open
court on 14 February and 15 February 2012.
40.
As regards the secrecy of bank deposits, the Court has already ruled
that the impeachment case against respondent is an exception to the rule on
bank secrecy. It stated:
“However, the Court has taken due notice of the fact that the
Supreme Court has, in several decisions, relaxed the rule on the absolute
confidential nature of bank deposits, even foreign currency deposit
accounts, in the cases of Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No 94723, August 21, 1997 and China Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006 and Ejercito v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006. The majority is
of the view that the present impeachment proceedings present a valid
exception to the general rule on confidentiality of information on bank
accounts even for foreign currency bank accounts. The Court would like to
emphasize that the non-disclosure of information relating to the bank
22
accounts of individuals is still the general rule and it has no intention of
going against the public policy on this matter. However, the Court is only
issuing the subpoena relating to the bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona
because of the pendency of the present impeachment proceedings and
for no other reason.”18
41.
This was further affirmed by the Impeachment Court in its Resolution
dated 9 February 2012 when it denied Senator-Judge Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
Motion for Reconsideration. These resolutions were likewise affirmed by the
Senate, through the Solicitor General, in its Comment Ad Cautelam ex
Superabundanti.19
42.
Without a doubt, the Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence
is a mere reiteration of arguments already raised in respondent’s Motion to
Quash Subpoena dated 7 February 2012 and Reiterative Motion to Quash
Subpoena dated 15 February 2012.
It is in the form of a Motion for
Reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under Rule VI of the Rules of
Procedure on Impeachment Trials20 and should therefore be denied.
43.
Moreover, the arguments raised by the respondent were likewise
raised in his Petition for Certiorari filed before the Supreme Court where
respondent sought to have any and all evidence arising from the subpoena to be
stricken off the proceedings. Clearly, respondent is resorting to forum-shopping
in the hopes that he will obtain a favorable decision in one or both fora which is
frowned upon by our judicial processes. Its immediate denial is in order.
18
Resolution of the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, dated 6 February 2012.
Supra note 7.
20
Resolution No. 39, approved by the Senate on March 23, 2011.
19
23
Even assuming arguendo that Annex
“A” was illegally obtained, the evidence
presented in court is still admissible.
44.
Respondent alleges that Annex “A” was illegally obtained and thus,
all the evidence proceeding therefrom is likewise illegal and should not be
admitted. This argument does not find any basis in fact and in law.
45.
It must be emphasized, time and again, that the prosecution never
marked Annex “A” as evidence nor was it ever presented as evidence in court.
The Prosecution did not present it as evidence because they “cannot vouch for
the authenticity of the documents” which they admitted in their Supplemental
Request for Subpoenae where it was attached as a mere supporting document.21
The Prosecutors treated the document with extreme caution considering that it
came from an unknown source and could have been fictitious. They submitted
the document because they honestly believed that it is its duty to submit the
documents to this Honorable Impeachment Court, as they may have a bearing on
the Court’s resolution of the pending request for subpoena.22
46.
On the contrary, the evidence regarding the bank accounts of the
respondent was validly presented by the prosecution through the compulsory
process of a subpoena. These were produced in court by no less than the
witnesses from PSBank who certified that these documents were genuine,
authentic, and came from the bank itself. Verily, the evidence presented by the
21
22
Supplemental Request for Subpoena/Reply dated 03 February 2012, par. 12, p. 6.
Supplemental Request for Subpoena/Reply dated 03 February 2012, par. 12, p. 6.
24
PSBank officers was validly obtained and cannot be suppressed, recalled, nor
expunged.
47.
Nonetheless, even assuming that Annex “A” was illegally obtained, it
cannot affect the legality of the evidence presented in court which was validly
submitted by PSBank through the legal process issued by this Honorable Court.
The doctrine of the fruit of the
poisonous tree only applies to search
and seizure cases and not to
subpoenas.
48.
Respondent obviously tries to confuse this Honorable Court by
applying rules which are only applicable to search warrants. In order to remove
all confusion, a distinction between a search warrant and a subpoena must be
made. This was already extensively discussed in the Memorandum (re: Subpoena
and Search Warrants) dated 20 February 2012 submitted by the Prosecution.
49.
When a search warrant is quashed, the evidence obtained thereby
may be suppressed upon motion. This is expressly sanctioned by Rule 126,
Section 14.23 “Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and
should be excluded.”24 This exclusionary rule is based on the assumption that
“the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence [is] the only practical means of
23
“SECTION 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a
search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court
where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and
resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.”
24
People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010.
25
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”25
50.
In contrast, there is no exclusionary rule or exclusionary effect when
a subpoena is quashed. A subpoena does not constitute a “search and seizure,”
so any defect in the subpoena does not taint the evidence resulting therefrom.
Rule 21, Section 4, on the quashal of subpoena, does not provide for the exclusion
or suppression of evidence resulting from a quashed subpoena:
“Section 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a
subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any
event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does
not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued
fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.
“The court may quash a subpoena ad testificandum on the ground
that the witness is not bound thereby. In either case, the subpoena
may be quashed on the ground that the witness fees and kilometrage
allowed by these Rules were not tendered when the subpoena was
served (emphasis supplied).”
51.
Notably, Rule 21, Section 4 provides that a motion to quash
subpoena may only be made “at or before the time specified therein,” which
implies that the subpoena can no longer be quashed after it has already been
implemented or complied with (e.g., when the witness has already testified or
when the documents have already been brought). After a subpoena has already
been implemented, the opposing party can no longer ask for its quashal or for the
suppression or exclusion of the evidence yielded by the subpoena.
In this
instance, the defense has already cross-examined the witnesses and even marked
25
People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 129035, August 22, 2002.
26
as their evidence some of the subpoenaed documents as evidence. By doing so,
respondent waived his right to question the admissibility of the evidence and is
already estopped from questioning the same. Thus:
“Estoppel arises when one, by his acts, representations, or
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts
on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted
to deny the existence of such facts.”26
52.
The opposing party is not devoid of remedy. If he believes that the
evidence yielded by the subpoena are irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, his
remedy is to raise such objections when the said evidence are formally offered.27
As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify. Documentary and object evidence shall be offered
after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done
orally unless allowed by the Court to be done in writing.28
53.
As to the testimony of Garcia, the formal offer of testimonial
evidence was made at the time the witness is called to testify on February 8,
26
Huyatid v. Huyatid 47265-R, Jan. 4, 1978
As the Honorable Senate President explained on February 6, 2012, questions of admissibility are premature at
this point because the prosecution has not yet made a formal offer of documentary evidence —
27
“The Presiding Officer. x x x I would like to explain that the Resolution of this Court was
simply to authorize the issuance of a subpoena, and whether those evidence subpoenaed are
admissible evidence given the fact that they apparently appeared in violation of existing laws
is a question that must be resolved in due course. I hope that is understood. We are not
prejudging the admissibility or non-admissibility of this evidence. And this issue will come up at
that point when the subpoenaed material and testimonies are offered in evidence. And all of
these incidental issues will be opened for scrutiny at the proper time. X x x” (Pages 35 to 36 of
the February 6, 2012 Record of the Senate Sitting As An Impeachment Court; Emphasis supplied)
28
Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 35.
27
2012. However, respondent did not raise any objection when Garcia’s testimony
was offered. 29
54.
As to the documentary evidence, the proper remedy is to object to
the offer of evidence when it is made and not to file a motion to suppress
evidence. The Prosecution was ordered to file its Offer of Evidence on March 2,
2012. Thus, the action of respondent is not only incorrect but also premature.
55.
Likewise, if respondent believes that there has been a violation of the
law in the request for the subpoena (e.g., violation of secrecy of bank deposits, if
any), he may file a complaint for such violation in the proper forum. The criminal
liability of the violator cannot be used as a ground for the exclusion, suppression,
and expunging of the evidence.
56.
The fruit of the poisonous tree as an offspring of the exclusionary
rule may only be applied to limit the powers of the State in its exercise of police
power. It is made applicable to Section 3 paragraphs 1 and two of the 1987
Constitution
which
states
that
“the
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the Court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law” and that
29
p. 38, TSN, February 8, 2012:
“Mr. Custodio. May I state my purposes, Your Honor?
This witness is offered to prove two things, Your Honor. Number one, that chief Justice Corona is the
holder and owner of the 10 account that are the subject of the subpoena; and that he will also testify on
the ending balances of these 10 accounts for the years 2007, 2009, 2009, and 2010. And towards that
purpose, Your Honor, he will be identifying and authenticating certain bank documents, your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Proceed.
Mr. Custodio. Thank you, Your Honor.”
28
“any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding”30 (otherwise known as the
exclusionary rule).
57.
In the commentary of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, he explained that “[t]o
come under the exclusionary rule, however, the evidence must be obtained by
government agents and not by private individuals acting on their own. In People v.
Andre Marti,31 a private firm engaged in the business of forwarding packages,
opened boxes entrusted to it by a customer for final inspection as part of
standard its operating procedure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Posts or Bureau of Customs. Finding dried marijuana leaves inside a package, the
firm took samples to the NBI, who verified that the dried leaves were marijuana
leaves. When presented by the NBI as evidence for prosecution for violation of
drug laws, its admissibility was challenged on the ground that it was fruit of an
illegal search. Brushing aside such defense the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable seach and
seizure cannot be involed for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extened to acts
30
31
Const. art. III, sec. 3 par. 1 and 2
193 SCRA 57, 67-68 (1991); Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997.
29
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
58.
In the instant case, the Annex “A” was obtained by the Prosecution
through anonymous sources as explained in their Supplemental Request for
Subpoena dated 3 February 2012 and the Compliance (re: Annexes to
Supplemental Request – Bank) dated 15 February 2012. It was not the
Prosecutors who obtained the document from the bank. Thus, it cannot be
considered as an illegal search within the purview of the constitutional
proscription. Nonetheless, as previously stated, Annex “A” was never presented
nor marked by the Prosecution as its evidence.
59.
It must be made clear, however, that while the Bill of Rights applies
only to actions taken by state officials, it does not necessarily mean that a private
individual cannot violate the liberty of another. A private entity or person may
still be held liable for illegal search under Article 32 of the Civil Code32 but it does
not have the constitutional consequence of applicability of the exclusionary rule.
60.
Respondent alleges that the copies given to the Prosecution was
obtained through the audit made by BSP and AMLC alleging that the
Government’s publicly declared desire to impeach CJ Corona is the motivation for
the search on these accounts and presentation of the documents in said search to
this Honorable Court. This purported motivation is highly incredible considering
32
Bernas, Joaquin, SJ., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, Quezon City: Rex
Printing Company, Inc. 2009. P.229-230
30
that the audit was conducted in September 2010 or more than a year before the
respondent was impeached in December 2011.
61.
It bears emphasis that there has been no proof that BSP and AMLC
obtained these documents. What was merely alleged by the witnesses is that an
audit was made by BSP. In fact, in the hearing on 20 February 2012, it was shown
that AMLC did not even conduct an audit, thus:
“Senator Guingona. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. Garcia, you said that it was an audit by the AMLA. But, Mr. Garcia, are
you aware that AMLC does not do regular audits on banks? It has not. It
only visits a bank, number one, upon a court order; number two, upon
existence of a predicate crime. You mean PS Bank is regularly audited by
the AMLC?
Mr. Garcia. Only - as far as I know, Your Honor, it’s only at this particular Senator Guingona. Mr. Garcia, you are under oath.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
The Presiding Officer. Please let the witness answer before youMr. Garcia. As far as I know and I have reviewed at least as far as the last
examination is concerned, there were AMLC findings that were Senator Guingona. Mr. Garcia, in the AMLA Law, there is a provision or I
think it’s in the IRR that the BSP is authorized to routinely audit banks just
to ensure that they are complying with the AMLA laws.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
Senator Guingona. For example, the reportorial requirements, ano po?
And in those regular audits by the BSP they have what they call an “AMLA
specialist”.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
Senator Guingona. Opo. And those AMLC specialists are members of the
BSP and not members of the AMLC. I am not asking you, I’m telling you.
31
Mr. Garcia. It’s possible.
Senator Guingona. And so is it possible that you are confused, that this is
not upon the existence of a predicate crime, upon the existence of a court
order, it is just a regular BSP audit and it so happens there is what you call
an “AMLA specialist” just to make sure that the AMLC laws are being
complied with.
Mr. Garcia. That is precisely what was the case, Your Honor, and I
responded, it’s just an audit of the process.
Senator Guingona. Hayun. So ganon po.
Mr. Garcia. It is just an audit of the process.
Senator Guingona. Of the Bangko Sentral and not the AMLC.
Mr. Garcia. I will have to verify from the records and the BSP whether it
can be classified with… but is within the Bangko Sentral auditors.
Senator Guingona. Yes. I think an answer from you is very, very necessary
because it does not make sense that the AMLC will regularly audit banks.
The BSP, yes. And as I said, there is somebody there who just make sure
that banks when they are audited are complying with the AMLC
requirements.
Mr. Garcia. They may be designated as examiner for AMLC.
Senator Guingona. Well, Mr. Garcia, during the break, I did call AMLC
Mr. Garcia. Okay.
Senator Guingona. And they categorically denied that they did audit you.
So I am just stating that.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
Senator Guingona. let’s not argue, I’m just stating that.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Your Honor, for clarifying.” (pp. 69-70, TSN,
February 20,2012) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
32
62.
In any case, even assuming without conceding, that the leak came
from a government agency such as BSP, there is no link that the BSP gave the
same to the prosecution. In fact, there is even no allegation made by any of the
witnesses (Tiongson and Garcia) that Annex “A” was leaked by BSP to the
Prosecutors. At this stage, there is no legal conclusion on the circumstances
which will point out the link between the BSP and the Prosecution.
63.
To emphasize, there has been no proof that Annex “A” came from an
audit made by the BSP, if any was even undertaken. The primordial interest of
the public to uncover the truth and exercise their constitutional right to make
their public officials accountable cannot, in justice, be imperiled by statements
which are hinged upon conjectures and surmises. Nonetheless, as previously
stated, Annex “A” was never presented nor marked by the Prosecution as its
evidence.
Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Annex “A” was
obtained in violation of the law, the
rules on bank secrecy does not
provide for an exclusionary rule.
64.
Applicable to the instant case is the administrative case of Tolentino
vs. Mendoza.33 In the said case, the Supreme Court pronounced that the
exclusionary rule only applies to evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or
seizure. In cases where the evidence was obtained in violation of a law or
33
ADM. CASE NO. 5151, October 19, 2004
33
regulation (i.e. Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993), while the violator may
suffer the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine, it doesn’t make the
document so issued inadmissible as evidence absent any provision to the
contrary.
“With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe that they are
competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The
exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence
applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of illegal
searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal
search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order
No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of
imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so
issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present
case. Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which are duly certified birth certificates are
therefore competent evidence to show paternity of said children by
respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (emphasis ours).
65.
In the same vein, the laws on bank secrecy34 do not contain a
provision on the exclusionary rule and the Courts cannot read such a provision in
the act. This was the subject of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ejercito v.
34
An Act Prohibiting Disclosure Of Or Inquiry Into, Deposits With Any Banking Institution And Providing Penalty
Therefor. (R.A. 1405)
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, EXCEPT upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
An Act Instituting A Foreign Currency Deposit System In The Philippines, And For Other Purposes. (R.A. 6426)
Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under
this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD
No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether
judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private; Provided,
however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No.
1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977)
34
Sandiganbayan35 (which was also cited by the Senate, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, in its Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundati to the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the respondent before the Supreme Court):36
“Petitioner's attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable
to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere
provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall
render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that ‘[a]ny violation of this law will
subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not
more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand
pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.’
xxx
xxx
xxx
The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson:
. . . When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its
acts, courts generally presume that it engaged in the necessary
balancing of interests in determining what the appropriate penalty
should be. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing cases); Frazin, 780
F.2d at 1466. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it
is not appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into the
act.” [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
66.
From the foregoing jurisprudence, even assuming without conceding,
that the document was obtained in violation of R.A. 1405, the evidence obtained
on the basis thereof cannot be excluded because there is no exclusionary rule in
R.A. 1405.
67.
The same principle applies to foreign currency denominated bank
accounts of Chief Justice Corona.
Similar to RA No. 1405, there is no
exclusionary rule under RA No. 6426 and thus, any evidence obtained in
violation thereof will still be admissible.
35
36
G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006
Supra note 7.
35
68.
On a final note, an order or a subpoena is not even necessary in the
disclosure of peso deposits in cases of impeachment. As correctly noted by
Senator-Judge Allan Peter Cayetano, in impeachment case of former president
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo was allowed despite
appearing without an order or subpoena because the law clearly states that one
of the exceptions to the bank secrecy is in cases of impeachment, viz:
“Senator Cayetano (A). Mr. President, magandang hapon po. Mr. Garcia,
magandang hapon.
Mr. Garcia. Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Sen. Cayetano (A). You know, we sympathize and empathize with you ‘no,
the banking industry is in the center of our economy. Hindi naman kayo
ang on trial dito, ‘yung Chief Justice. But siguro naiintindihan niyo naman
kung gaano kaimportante yung impormasyon na ito. And we know there is
conflict between theory; there is conflict between the law and in reality.
Ibig sabihin po, kahit required kayo by law na ibigay, halilmbawa, yung peso
accounts, you have to be very careful kung ano ang sensitivities ng inyong
depositors. We understand that. Puwede kaming magsalita nang magsalita
dito na hindi aalis ‘yan or whatever, but you know that better than us.
I just like to ask you, ano ba ang pagkaintindi ninyo sa 1405, doon sa
exception na pagka Impeachment Court? Do you think that you need a --in your belief or your opinion of the law, kailangan ninyo pa ng subpoena or
ng order bago niyo ilabas tungkol sa peso accounts?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor. That is our understanding.
Senator Cayetano (A). Okay. Because I’d like to bring to your attention in
the Journal of January 2, 2000 and December 22, 2000, Clarissa Ocampo
came here to the Senate and gave testimony, and she did not have a
subpoena. And I will not go-- I only have a limited time ‘no, when they
were asked, sabi niya, tinanong niya sa external counsel nila. At since sinabi
nung external counsel na pwede dahil impeachment case, ibinigay na lang
ito. I am saying that because this all started with the little lady and the big
Congressman, Congressman Umali or the tall Congressman ‘no. Kasi kung
pwede namang ibigay sa kanya dahil impeachment case naman ito at wala
namang bawal doon, ay wala ng allegations of a “fairy tale” or kung totoo
ito o hindi. Pero alam natin na kahit ganoon yung batas masama sa bangko
‘yon, hindi ba? Because any bank na may allegations na will freely give the
36
information, medyo aalma yung mga depositors even if it is allowed by law,
tama po ba iyon?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
Senator Cayetano (A). Meaning, you are in a position that you want to
follow the law, you want to be very cooperative here, but you also have to
be very careful of the sensitivities of your depositors.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor, but if I may just add? It is not just the
sensitivity-- sensitivities of our depositors. If we disclose anything, even on
a peso account that is not covered by an order of this court, we will actually
be violating Republic Act No. 1405, which specifies that we are not
supposed to disclose anything except to an Impeachment Court, and that is
through an order. And that is why we have to be extremely careful. And
besides, even on the subpoena, Your Honor, there were 10 certain accounts
specified there, and so we respond on the basis of what we are being
ordered to respond.
So if we will respond or give information or details or anything that is not
within the specific instructions of the Court, we will be opening up
ourselves or we will be violating the law on confidentiality.
Senator Cayetano (A).
depositors...
No, I am trying to help you explain to your
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Your Honor.
Senator Cayetano (A). Because your understanding of the law is an
interpretation already. You said you need an order of the Impeachment
Court. That is not what the law says. The law says, “....except upon
written permission of the depositor or in cases of impeachment.” It
doesn’t say that you need an order of the Impeachment Court. That is
why in the case of Clarissa Ocampo, she came here walang order, and
tinanong siya, “bakit mo binibigay iyong impormasyon?” Ang sagot niya,
“Tinanong ko sa external counsel namin.” Sabi ng counsel nila, “ pwede.”
My only interpretation of that is because they interpreted “in case of
impeachment” to mean anything that has to do with the impeachment
proceeding. Meaning, if one of your bank officials go to the Prosecution
and says “Eto ‘yung bank accounts niya.” They will not be liable under the
law under that precedent ‘no, under what---I will not argue that point now
because that is not---I was just simply trying to ask you your opinion and I
will ask the Defense----- the Prosecution Counsel the same thing, but I was
just trying to help you also--- because, you know, we are being monitored
here. We are being watched ng ating mga kababayan. All banks are also,
probably, watching your situation, and I would like to show you that
37
although we ask you tough questions, we are not insensitive to the
situation of your bank and the banking industry, Sir.
Mr. Garcia. I thank you for that, Your Honor. And if I may just add. In the
case of Clarissa Ocampo, precisely, when she did disclose without a court
order or no direction from the court, or for that matter a consent from the
depositor, the bank suffered significantly right after that.
Senator Cayetano (A). Yes.
Mr. Garcia. Deposits got eroded..
Senator Cayetano (A). Precisely. That’s what I was pointing out. Yun po
‘yung practice. Yun po yung actual na nangyari. Pero hindi po siya
nakasuhan at wala pong penalty ang Bangko Sentral sa kanila, at
conditionally, tinanggap yung ebidensya dito sa Impeachment Court
because nga, eto ‘yung kaibahan ng batas sa actual. Ang batas, payagan
man kayong magbigay ng impormasyon, actually, it causes jitters sa mga
depositors.
Mr. Garcia. Opo.
Senator Cayetano (A). So, I will not ask you and will not debate on the
law. But I will agree with you that the mere fact that—Mr. President, just
thirty seconds to finish...
The Presiding Officer. Proceed. (Gavel)
Senator Cayetano (A).
But I will agree with you, that’s why to the
depositors who are watching, I wanted to send them the message that you
don’t have a choice kapagka impeachment proceedings ito no.
May I ask the prosecution counsel, same question, anong interpretation
nyo sa 1405? Kailangan orderan pa yung bangko na dalin ditto? or the
mere fact that na may pumunta sa inyo na kahit anong opisyal ng bangko at
sinabing, “impeachment case ‘to, eto yung dokumento”?
Atty. Custodio. I would like to agree with the position of Your Honor, and
precisely, as one of the exceptions to the prohibition, an impeachment by
the very nature of the proceeding is in essence, an opportunity to deviate
from the prohibition. And on that premise, we agree that as long as it is an
impeachment, the witness or the bank official may be compelled and may
disclose details pertaining to that bank account.
Senator Cayetano (A). I will give the Defense a chance to say their opinion.
But one follow-up question there. Then it wouldn’t matter kung
38
anonymous, kung ang nagbigay ng tip ay kilala o hindi? It’s more of kung
taga-bangko kasi ‘yung nagbigay. And let me now state here, there are
many possibilities as the bank officials have been saying. In fact, it could be
the client’s copy. I mentioned the Udong Mahusay case here where the
client, allegedly, the First Gentleman, nasa alalay niya yung mga papeles, at
tinakbo yung mga papeles kaya eto ang ibinigay. The bank manager said
that they also went through some audits. So, not to point fingers here, but
there are one thousand and one possibilities But the point is, kung kung
saan man nanggaling,----- if ‘yung Clarissa Ocampo precedent is correct and
if the interpretation of 1405 is correct, it doesn’t really matter kung sino’ng
nagbigay because this is an impeachment case.” (pp. 57-59, TSN, February
15, 2012)
69.
By providing the exception of impeachment cases, the law makes it
clear that there is a very important public interest involved in impeachment
cases. Respondent’s bank deposits ceased to be absolutely confidential from the
very moment he became a public officer subject of an impeachment case.37 The
rule on absolute confidentiality of bank deposits must give way to more
paramount public interests such as the accountability of public officers and
employees.38 Thus, any bank deposit which is the subject of an impeachment
trial, such as respondent’s account in PSBank, may be validly inquired upon by the
impeachment court.
70.
An impeachment proceeding, serves a higher public interest, i.e., to
hold high public officers accountable, under the Constitutional principle that
public office is a public trust. The overriding public interest in impeachment cases
is evident from the fact that the Law on Secrecy of Deposits expressly carves out
impeachment cases as an exception to the general rule of confidentiality of bank
37
38
See Comment Ad Cautelam, note 7, p. 39.
Supra, p. 40.
39
deposits. As correctly pointed out by the Senate, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, “[t]he rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits cannot be used to obstruct proceedings and processes seeking to
enforce public accountability. To do so would be a great and rank injustice to the
Filipino people.”39
71.
The untruthfulness of the declarations in respondent’s SALN is an
impeachable offense. Applicable to the case is the impeachment of District Court
Judge Harry Claiborne. The Senate convicted Claiborne of “willfully falsifying his
income on his Federal tax returns for 1979 and 1980, has betrayed the trust of the
people of the United States and reduced confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal courts and
the administration of justice by the courts.” (132 Cong. Rec. 29870-873 (1986))
72.
In the same vein, the willful non-declaration of his bank accounts in
his SALN amounts to a betrayal of trust of the Filipino people and reduced the
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Furthermore, by
making false declarations in his SALN under oath, respondent likewise committed
perjury which is an act that amounts to a betrayal of public trust. (see
Impeachment of District Court Judge Walter Nixon, 135 Cong. Rec. 27101-104
(1989)).
39
Supra, p. 43.
40
73.
In consideration of the foregoing, we are reminded of the basic rule
in statutory construction which states that when the interpretation of a statute
according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or
mischievous consequences, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of
the law.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Motion
to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence filed by the respondent be DENIED.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Pasay City, Manila. 5 March 2012.
41
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Republic of the Philippines
Prosecution Panel Secretariat
Ambrosio Padilla Hall
2nd Floor, GSIS Building
Pasay City, Manila
By:
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
Lead Prosecutor
Copy furnished (By Personal Service):
JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS (RET), ET AL.
Counsel for Respondent Chief Justice Renato Corona
Suite 1902 Security Bank Centre
6776 Ayala Avenue
Makati City, Philippines 1226