67
JAPAN’S CHALENGE TO THE STATUS QUO: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE PREWAR WASHINGTON TREATY SYSTEM
KAZUO YAGAMI
SAVANNAH STATE UNIVERSITY
The settlement of World War I did not move in the way that President Woodrow
Wilson hoped, shattering his vision of making the war to end all the wars. Despite the
enormous sacrifices and sufferings, the world remained to be the same. Colonialism and
imperialism continued to exist. With the failure of the Versailles settlement and the war
torn economy and politics exasperated by the yet escalating cost of the arms race in the
immediate postwar era, the world leaders found their surroundings in fact more unstable
than the prewar era. Although the political and economic goals and conditions the nations
faced differed from one nation to the other, they were on the same boat with regard to
sharing this sense of failure, disappointment, and urgency to do something to stabilize the
situation they were in, leading them to consensus that it would be everyone’s interest to
make sure that the world would never go through what they just experienced.
The culmination of such consensus was a series of the international agreements.
One was to reduce capacity of waging war of each nation by limiting the possessions of
arms and also to alleviate mountainous cost of the arms race, which was increasingly
becoming a further source of political and economic instability and a burden of their war
torn societies. Starting from the Five Power Naval Treaty (the United States, England,
Japan, France and Italy) followed by Geneva Conference in 1927 and London
Conference in 1930, the world went through a series of the arms reduction talks. They
also agreed to maintain the status quo with regard to their colonial possessions in Pacific
as reflected in the Four Power Treaty (the United States, England, Japan, and France).
Lastly, there was an establishment of stable world economy by promoting equal
opportunity and free trade. Pertinent to this stability of world economy, China emerged as
a focal point to achieve that goal. The international community led by the United States
shared the view that China was a key country in achieving stability not only economically
but also politically as well reflected on the Open Door Policy at the turn of century.
Enormous market potential was at stake. How to share such market among the world
powers in an equal and fair sense became a great issue. They saw that the welfare of their
nations would be to great extent determined by the fate of China. As historian Akira
Iriye, put it, the world powers thus came to the consensus that gradual establishment of
stable and prosperous China, a nation with 400,000,000 people, based on democracy and
capitalism would be benefit for all, not only economically but also politically as well.1 It
was this consensus led into the conclusion of the Nine Power Treaty (the nations in the
1
Iriye Akira, The Origins of The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987),
p.5.
68
Five Power Naval Treaty plus the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and China) to defend
and respect China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
Thus the 1921-1922 Washington Conference at which all the three treaties were
concluded set up a mechanism through which the world leaders desired to establish
stability of world setting. All the participants in the conference shared high expectations
on this mechanism, which historians later called “Washington Treaty System.” Japan was
no exception. Japan became the integral part of the system by signing all three treaties as
one of the major powers. Japan just like any other powers was facing the economic
difficulties in the postwar era. The Japanese economic prosperity during the war boosted
by the demands of war goods (Japan was one of the major suppliers of those war goods)
quickly ceased as the war ended. Japanese economic decline caused by the end of war
boom and compounded by the mounting cost of the arms race against the United States
and England put Japan into the instant economic recession and subsequent political
instability, creating a strong incentive of Japanese leaders to go along with the other
powers to have the arms reduction talks in order to alleviate the financial burden. Also
Japan as a major recipient of war spoils found it desirable to agree to the maintenance of
the status quo in order to secure her gains. As far as China, considering all above
mentioned circumstances, most of the leading figures of Japan came to sense that Japan
would be better off to follow the West as long as the West was willing to acknowledge
Japan’s historically significant status in China as claimed by Japan.
In addition, Japan’s becoming a signatory nation at the Washington Conference
had a symbolical meaning for her. That was a true recognition and acceptance of Japan
by the West as one of the major powers, which despite Japan’s success in her
modernization in the second half of the 19th Century and also the victories in two major
wars: the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, had
been slow coming.2 The success of Japan in modernization and the war victories naturally
earned some recognition and acceptance. In the eye of the Japanese leaders, they had only
token value, however, lacking real substance.
Thus, finding unquestionable merits on her participation in the Washington
Conference, Japan signed those treaties and showed her cooperative will in the world
affairs in order to go along with global trend of defending hard-earned peace by
maintaining status quo.3 This Japan’s will of cooperation, however, was short-lived. By
the late 1920s and the early 1930s, it turned from cooperation into defiance, violating her
This lack of substance is clearly shown in the response of the Western powers to Japan’s request for an
inclusion of ban on racial discrimination over immigration as part of covenant of Versailles Peace Treaty.
Japan wanted to use this request as a condition for her agreement to the treaty. The Western powers simply
ignored this Japan’s request, indicating that the West had no eagerness to accept Japan as truly equal
partner in world affairs. See Konoe Fumimaro, Seidanroku (The Talks on Politics) (Tolyo:ChiKura Shobo,
1936), p. 253
2
3
Thus, the Washington System, particularly with regard to Nine Power Treaty, is not something Japan was
imposed on. It was rather result of rational calculations over Japan’s Asian continent policy. See Japan
Association of International Affairs (ed.), Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (The Road to the Pacific War)
(Tokyo: Asahi Newspaper Co., 1962-3), pp. 36-7.
69
own pledges in these treaties and thus shattering the worldwide consensus to maintain
peace through the mechanism of the Washington Treaty System. Japan soon found
herself in the center of worldwide censure as she began to challenge her once and own
accepted status quo and advocate an establishment of “New Order.”
Why did Japan make such rather drastic turn of her will, undermining this newly
elevated her status as a truly recognized world power, jeopardizing all her material gains,
isolating herself from the world community, and leading into the fateful incident in 1931,
Japan’s further aggression in Manchuria, thus initiating her “journey” of the ultimate ruin
in 1945? This is a difficult and intriguing question to answer. It was the question that
U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, repeatedly asked in his talks with Japanese
counterparts during the turbulent periods of the late 1930s and early 40s in the U.S.-Japan
relationship. He asked that why Japan had to rely on the armed forces to get what she
wanted by making herself as a spoiler of world peace and thus isolating herself from
world community when she was able to insure all she had established and needed by
simply being cooperative and respectful to the international law and order.4
What might shed light on the above raised question is an examination of the
changes in the contemporary political and economical settings Japan confronted,
particularly in diplomatic sense. There was a sharp turnaround from the early 1920s to
the later years of the same decade, obliging Japan to alter the course of her diplomacy
from one end to the other. What best represents Japanese diplomacy during the time the
Washington Treaty System was established is “Shidehara Diplomacy.” Shedihara Kijuro,
who became Foreign Minister of the Kato Takaaki Cabinet in 1924 and served as Foreign
Minister for more than fives years until the end of the Second Wakatsugi Reijiro Cabinet,
became one of the symbolical figures in modern Japanese diplomacy. He said the
following in his speech at the Fiftieth Parliamentary Session on January 22, 1925:
“In general people in the world, denying narrow and self-centered politics, an abusive use
of force, and an act of aggression, seem to be moving toward a consensus of solving all
the international disputes through mutual understanding and cooperation of each nation.
This trend leaves no doubt that it is time for the international cooperation not conflict.
The world does not evolve around just one nation. No matter how strong and how
wealthy a nation is, it cannot monopolize the world affairs by utilizing its national power
against the others. Such an attempt always destines to a miserable failure. History proves
that. True and lasting benefit of a nation can be secured only through an establishment of
fair and cooperative understandings with the others.”5
As well indicated by this statement, Shidehara, believing that going along with the
West would best serve Japan with regard to the national welfare and security, became a
leading figure in promoting the international cooperation and harmony as an effective
means to defend the national interests and maintain world peace. This Shidehara’s line of
4
Cordell Hull, The Memoir of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 1066-7.
5
Japan Association of International Affairs (ed.), The Road to the Pacific War, pp. 39-40.
70
diplomacy to go along with the Western powers fit the mood and need of the nation in the
early 1920s as stated earlier, finding the strong and wide supports form prominent
individuals such as pro-Western Saionji Kinmochi, a sole surviving genro and a political
mentor for future prime ministers of Japan, Konoe Fumimaro, or General Ugaki
Kazushige who strongly favored Japan’s decision to adopt the Washington Treaty
System, believing that having England and the United States as enemies was absolutely
unwise. In short, although by no means unopposed, the nation as whole was eager to
follow Shidehara Diplomacy.
Such eagerness was quickly fading, however, as the decade of the 1920s was
coming closer to an end. In the late 1920s, Shidehara Diplomacy found itself in the center
of criticisms as the favorable circumstances that bolstered Shidehara diplomacy began to
crumble. One such change of circumstances was the growing threat to Japan’s interest
and rights in China. Although Shidehara was known for his cooperative diplomacy to go
along with the West by following the international law and order, it did not mean that he
disagreed with those who claimed Japan’s rights and interests in China. In fact he was
one of the strong defenders for such interests and rights of Japan. What basically
separated him from the others is that Shidehahra believed that Japan should defend her
interests and rights in China through rational diplomacy without going beyond legal
limits of the international law and order rather than relying use of force. Such diplomatic
approach based on harmony and cooperation in dealing with China that seemed feasible
in the early 1920s was increasingly, however, becoming unfeasible and accordingly
unacceptable to many leaders of Japan in the late 1920s.
Since the winning of the war against China in 1895, Japan as a newly emerging
power engaged in her imperialism in dealing with China, gaining concessions from China
one after another such as Japan’s establishment of her colonial power in Manchuria and
Korea after the winning of the war against Russia in 1905, the acceptance of Japan’s
notorious 21 demands by deeply divided China under Yuan Shi-kai in 1915, and Japan’s
acquisition of German colonial position in China, Shandong, in the WW I settlement.
Such acts of Imperial Japan understandably created steady sentiment of anti-Japan in
China throughout the early 20th Century as well represented by the strong anti-Japanese
movement in 1919 so called the May Fourth Movement led by Chinese students and
intellectuals who were outraged by the WW I settlement regarding the clearance of
German colonial positions.
This anti-Japan sentiment, however, had never become a major threat to Japan.
With the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911and the establishment of Republic of China in
the following year under Sun Yat-sen, China emerged as a new nation. Despite this
epochal change of China and seemingly promising prospect of her future, China in reality
had never been able to establish any unity or stability to defend her territorial integrity
and national sovereignty from foreign threats. Instead, through the debacle of Yuan Shikai who was chosen by San Yat-sen to lead China but got a bizarre idea of reestablishing
a dynasty under him as Emperor, China was rapidly disintegrating, entering into the era
of warlords. What compounded this problem of disunity was the rise of Communism in
China. After the May Fourth Movement in 1919, rapidly rising new ideology, Marxism,
71
began to take a strong root in China where people were seeking to find a way and a new
leadership to end a series of humiliations and sufferings China had been going through
since the mid 19th Century. In 1921, the communist party of China under the leadership
of socialist scholars, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, was set up, thus initiating its challenge
as a counterpart against the nationalist government of China led by the Guomintang. With
it China found herself deeply divided ideologically and politically. Thus, contrary to the
expectation of the great leaders of China such as Sun Yat-sen and the leaders of the
international community to see China truly stabilized and prosperous under democracy
and capitalism, China was moving toward an opposite direction, creating favorable
circumstances for Japan’s imperial quest.
That was in the early 1920s. Japan saw quite different circumstances in the end of
the same decade. The favorable circumstances Japan had to defend her interests and selfclaimed rights in China in the early decade were rapidly dissipating. Despite the
continuous national division as seen in Chiang Kai-shek’s rather abrupt decision to end
the “temporal” alliance between the Guomintang party and the Communist Party to fight
common enemies to defend China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty by
setting aside ideological differences, China was on the horizon into strong nationalism
under the leadership of the Guomintang. Backed by the Washington Treaty System,
Chiang Kai-shek saw a great opportunity to end the long lasting misery and humiliation
of China and re-establish herself as a respected member of world community under his
leadership by taking a policy of pro-West. Such goal, however, could not be attained if
China remained to be divided. Chiang launched the so-called “Northern Expeditions” in
1926 to get rid of all the war loads from China, including one in Japanese controlled
Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin. By 1928, Chiang virtually succeeded in his quest. Only
remaining war load was Chang Tso-lin.
This strong surge of nationalism led by Chiang Kai-shek naturally raised a
growing concern in mind of national leaders of Japan, particularly Kwantung Army
officers in Manchuria. They felt that the special interests and rights in Manchuria that
Japan long established and hard earned since the turn of the century were at serious risk.
With the growing sense of nationalism, China under the leadership of the Chiang Kaishek was becoming more and more forceful and demanding with regard to respect and
enforcement of principles of the Nine Power Treaty and it was clear to the leaders of the
Kwantung Army that, behind such demand, getting rid of Japanese imperial acts was
major focus of Chiang.
To make the situation further detrimental to Japan, because of this rising
nationalism in China, Japanese imperialism in China was increasingly brought into
daylight, making it a central issue of the international politics with regard to the
principles of the Nine Power Treaty. The Western powers began to see this Sino-Japanese
dispute as a testing ground for the Nine Power Treaty and one of the key elements to
determine the overall success of the Washington Treaty System. They saw, therefore, no
reason to spare their effort to support China. At this point, the leaders of Kwantung Army
correctly understood that following faithfully Japan’s own pledge under the Nine Power
Treaty now meant only one thing, that is, forfeiting all the interests and self proclaimed
72
rights of Japan in China, an option, they believed, Japan absolutely could not take,
leaving nothing but defiance of the treaty as Japan’s only option.
What compounded this increasingly becoming unfavorable circumstance that
Japan faced in China as a factor for Japan’s defiance against the Washington Treaty
System was the issue of the arms reduction talks. Under the Five Power Naval Treaty the
world leaders came to an agreement with regard to the ratio of capital ships to reduce
mounting cost of the arms race but nothing was decided about the supplementary ships.
As a result, while the world powers engaged in naval arms reduction talks with regard to
capital ships, they found themselves eagerly competing against each other in the arms
race in terms of building supplementary ships, making the principle of the Five Power
Naval Treaty almost meaningless. Finding the League of Nations ineffective in dealing
with this alarming situation, on 10 February 1927 U.S. President Calvin Coolidge and
U.S. Secretary of State Frank Billings Kellogg, made a suggestion to Japan, England,
France, and Italy to hold the Five Great Naval Powers Arms Reduction Conference at
Geneva, Switzerland.
France and Italy decided not to participate in the conference. On June 20 1927,
Japan, England, and the United States gathered at the Headquarter of the League of
Nations in Geneva to have the Second Naval Arms Reduction Conference. The United
States suggested defining a cruiser, a destroyer, and a submarine as supplementary ships
and ratio of those ships as 10:10:6 -- the United States, England, Japan respectively.
Japanese delegation led by Saito Makoto, Governor General of Korea, demanded the
ratio of 10:10:7. Also, although agreed to the U. S. suggestion of the ratio, England was
not able to go along with the United State regarding the size and number of
supplementary hips (the United States demanding small number of larger ships vs.
England demanding large number of smaller ships). In the end, unable to find a common
ground to reach an agreement on the demands of each nation, they had to leave the
conference with an empty hand.
Then, soon after the debacle of the Geneva Conference, the voice of demanding
naval power expansion was emerging in the United States. In February1928, the bill for
building up massive number of war ships was submitted in U.S. Senate. According to the
bill, the United States would construct twenty-five cruisers, nine destroyers, thirty-two
submarines, and five aircraft careers, all together seventy-one war ships.6 The American
public negatively reacted to such massive arms expansion of the United States
particularly when England was showing her effort for arms reduction by canceling one of
the on going plans to construct new cruisers. Then on August 27, 1928, the KelloggBriand Pact was concluded in which the world powers agreed to denounce war as a
means for a settlement of an international dispute. The conclusion of this treaty became a
great opportunity to turn around the ongoing British – U.S. dispute regarding the
disarmament talks. Both nations, realizing that now with this treaty the voice for arms
expansion was increasingly becoming unsustainable, saw a great possibility to reach an
agreement between them. They expressed their wills to take actions promptly for arms
6
The Japan Association of the International Affairs, The Road to Pacific War, p. 53.
73
reduction talk. Herbert Hoover, newly elected U.S. President, expressed in his
inauguration address on March 4, 1929 his strong belief in merit of arms reduction and
his firm commitment to British-U.S. disarmament talks. Prime Minister of England,
Ramsay MacDonald, who formed his second cabinet on June 7 by defeating Conservative
Party with the platforms of pro American policy and pursuance of arms reduction,
responded to Hoover favorably. He visited the United States to see Hoover on October 10
and signed on the preliminary agreement on arms reduction with Hoover. During his stay
in the United States, England sent invitations to Japan, the United States, France, and
Italy for having a conference on arms reduction in January 1930 in London, later known
to be the London Naval Arms Reduction Conference. Now once again desire of an
establishment of arms reduction was on full swing.
Japan had little reason to reject the invitation from London but plentiful incentive
to accept. As stated earlier, the Japanese economy promptly went into recession when the
war came to an end. Then in 1923 such ailing economy of Japan was devastated by the
natural calamity. Japan was hit by one of the most catastrophic earthquakes in her history
that almost completely destroyed Tokyo and surrounding areas, core areas of Japanese
industries. Thus, it cannot be an overstatement that Japanese economy, even before the
New York stock market crash in 1929, which led into the worldwide economic
depression, was on the verge of total collapse. In order to deal with this economic crisis
and establish stable national economy, Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi shortly after
forming his cabinet in July 2, 1929 announced his economic policy to take rather drastic
measures such as an establishment of more efficient industrial production through heavy
working conditions (fewer workers and lower wages for the same production) and going
back to the gold standard in order to prevent Japanese currency from further going down
in terms of value. Along with his foreign minister, Shidehara Kijuro, Hamaguchi believed
that it was vital for Japan to go along with the in this arms reduction talks if such radical
policy of his economic plans were to be successful. So Hamaguchi had nothing but
eagerness to see Japan as a participant of the London Conference.
The Japanese delegation led by former Prime Minister Wakatsugi Reijiro arrived
London on December 27, 1929. The conference began on January 21, 1930. Like Geneva
Conference, the participating nations: Japan, England, the United States, France, and Italy
disagreed with each other regarding how to achieve the arms reduction—whether it
should be done by type of ships or total number of tons and also what ratio each nation
should be given. While the compromise was made about the former, the latter became a
standing block for the agreement, particularly between Japan and the United States.
While Japan demanded the ratio of 10:10:7 (the United States, England, and Japan
respectively), the United States demanded 10:10:6. Both nations were determined to stick
to their demand but finally after the intensive negotiations they agreed to make a
compromise, According to the compromise, Japan was given the ratio of 6.97 with the
United States and 6.79 with England.
As these numbers indicates, it was a rather significant concession made by the
United States, giving Japan almost as much as she wanted. Understanding that there was
little room for Japan to get any further concession from the United States, Wakatsugi
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after his meeting with U.S. Secretary of States, Henry L. Stimson, on March 12 about the
U.S.- Japanese compromise plan sent the report to Foreign Minister Shidehara, telling
him that he made an agreement with the United States. When the report of this
agreement reached Japan, the leaders of Japanese navy, particularly Admiral Kato Kanji,
however, vehemently opposed it. On November 18, 1929, shortly before the conference,
Kato said to Prime Minister Hamaguchi, “The ratio of 10:10:7 is the lowest ratio Japan
can afford to accept and it is matter of life and death for the Japanese Navy. If it is not
accepted, Japan has no choice but reject the treaty.”7
Despite such fervent opposition from the navy to the government’s decision to go
along with the U.S. - Japanese compromise plan, Prime Minister Hamaguchi had no
intention to give in. He told his close subordinate on March 25 that, if he had to lose his
regime, his party, or even his life in order to see this arms reduction conference
successful, he was absolutely ready to do so.8 Fortunately for Hamaguchi, such strong
mindset of him was shared by other leading figures of Japan such as Genro Saionji
Kinmochi or Home Minister Makino Nobuaki.9 Emperor also expressed his strong desire
to see success of the conference for world peace and praised Hamaguchi’s effort.
With this strong backup and having going through a series of talks with the navy
to persuade them, Hamaguchi in the end succeeded in establishing national consensus to
accept the compromise plan of the conference. The leading officers of the navy, including
Kato, agreed to accept the compromise. On April 22, Wakatsugi signed the treaty of the
London Conference. It brought Japan the immediate benefits. Japan was able to save
herself from total economic ruin and also able to enhance her international reputation.
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stemson when he returned to the United States praised
Japan for signing the treaty, saying that the government of any nation would face very
difficult situation if it signed the treaty that allowed it nothing but only to maintain its
current arms power when the other nations might surpass that nation; the act of such
government took courage and well deserved respect.10
Such benefits Japan enjoyed, however, were far off set by the alarming
development of controversy of legality over Japan’s becoming a signatory nation of the
London Treaty. The article eleven of the Meiji Constitution stipulated that the Supreme
7
Ibid., p. 70.
8
Ibid., p. 75.
Saionji said, “In general, no matter how Japan tries, the end result would be Japan’s failure. Simply
Japan’s national strength is not enough to succeed. National armaments can be effective and maintained
only within the limit of national wealth. Going beyond the limits of national wealth makes national
armaments impotent. So, today Japan should accept even the ratio of 6 in order to lead the conference to
success. Such sincerity of Japan will help the nation to enhance her international status. By going along
with England and the United States [in this arms reduction talks] Japan can lead herself to favorable
circumstance. There will not be any benefit for Japan if go otherwise.” See Harada Kumao, Prince Saionji
Kinmochi and Political Situations (Tokyo: Iwamoto Shoten, 1951) Vol. 1, pp. 17-9.
9
10
The Japan Association of the International Affairs, The Road to Pacific War, p. 96.
75
Command should be interpreted as military tactics and guidance, and it had to be outside
of the legal authority of the minister of state affairs; so the army and navy possessed legal
authority over the Supreme Command. The article twelve of the same constitution
specified that the formation of the military and the size of troops had to be considered as
matters of the state affairs. It was the minister of the state affairs, therefore, who had a
legal authority to preside them. Rather understandably, the army and the navy had long
challenged over the interpretation of this article twelve, arguing that the formation of the
military and the size of the troops were integral part of the military affairs to determine
authority and power of military and so a right to preside them had to be attributed to the
army and the navy. They contended that it was not the state but the military affairs.
Signing the treaty of the London Conference flared up this familiar argument to
an unprecedented level, creating the grave separation of the civilian government and the
military over an interpretation of constitutionality of the Supreme Command. It was the
separation that turned out to be one of the crucial factors for the ultimate failure Japan
had to face in saving herself from the road to the ultimate ruin.11 While the military
contended that the act of Wakatsugi to sign the treaty was a clear violation of the
constitutionality of the Supreme Command, Hamaguchi cabinet supported by
consitutional scholars such as a prominent law professor, Minobe Tatsukichi, contended
by stating that any decision regarding the national defense and the size of military was
the matter of the state affairs and so had to be dealt with by the cabinet. In his effort to
support the government, Minobe expressed his academic theory on the constitutionality
of the Supreme Command. He argued that there had to be a clear distinction between the
Supreme Command for military execution and the Supreme Command for the formation
of the military; the formation of the military forces in the navy and the army and also
their sizes of the forces were closely linked with nation’s diplomacy and finance, and,
therefore, they were integral part of the state affairs; only the cabinet possessed a legal
authority to preside them; it was the nation that set up the military; although the military
was given its own right to determine its own activity as the military institution without
any intervention from the government, an act of setting up the military was clearly a
state affair.
Thus, along with the sense of growing threat by Chinese nationalism under
Chiang Kai-shek to Japan’s interests and rights in China, this sense of constitutional crisis
over the controversy of the arms reduction talks triggered by Japan’s impression of
mistreatment by the regarding the ratio of the arms possessions, became another source
for the growing sense of Japan’s defiance to the Washington Treaty System.
While these two controversial issues were severely undermining political stability,
Japan was also facing unprecedented level of economic crisis. It is perhaps correct to say
that what rendered this sense of defiance of the Washington Treaty System into the act of
actual defiance is the economic turmoil Japan faced in the late 1920s. As stated earlier,
the Japanese economy suffered from the recession right after the war came to an end and
11
It was this factor that Konoe Fumimaro as Prime Minister during the period of 1937-1941 could not
overcome in his effort to save Japan from ultimate ruin by ending the quagmire of Sino-Japanese war.
76
the catastrophic calamity of the great earthquake in 1923 was already on the blink of total
collapse by the late 1920s, leading into the afro-mentioned drastic measures by Prime
Minister Hamaguchi. Such measures of Hamaguchi were never given a chance, however,
to be fully tested because of the unprecedented world wide economic crisis, “the Great
Depression” triggered by the New York stock market crash in October 1929. As indicated
by this dire situation of Japanese economy, the Great Depression shattered the worldwide
consensus of establishing the free trade system under the spirit of the Washington
Conference almost overnight. In order to cope with this unprecedented economic crisis,
each world power had no choice but to adopt economic nationalism, meaning there was
absolutely no room for an economic cooperation but a protection of their ailing
economies as seen the U.S. hike in tariff to the staggering level of around 50 % followed
by the similar hikes by the other powers. Under this circumstance, it is almost impossible
to assess adequately the economic turmoil Japan was going through. Just like any other
nation, Japan severally suffered from the huge unemployment rate, the enormous
financial difficulty, and the devastated international trade. Although whole nation
suffered from such economic turmoil, it was the agrarian sector, which suffered more
than any other. It became almost a daily occurrence that a farmer who became desperate
to help his family to survive ended up selling his daughter to the brothel or saw his young
child dying from starvation.
So Japan unquestionably faced a dire economic crisis. In this situation, regarding
who should take blame for it, Hamaguchi government should not be singled out.
Although there was room to put some blame on the internal politics, which inclined to
focus on a power struggle rather than an effort to find a solution to the dire circumstance
the nation was facing, when it comes to what directly put Japan into such circumstance,
the government had little to do with. It was primarily due to the external factors such as
the failed settlement of WW I, the mounting cost of the postwar arms race among the
major powers, the natural calamity, the New York stock market crash, and the subsequent
worldwide depression. It had little do with the way Hamaguchi government handled
domestic economy. Accordingly, even the government tried to tackle the problems; there
was little prospect to do any good.
It sounded, however, only as an excuse to Japanese public, who were literally
going through the living hell for daily survival, particularly to young military officers,
who were mostly sons of the farmers and so knew in their first hands the unbearable pain
their loved ones were experiencing. To them the party politics was becoming a matter of
no merit. As they protested, two leading political parties: Minseito and Seiyukai were
only interested in how to utilize any crisis the nation faced for the benefit of the party to
get power rather than to solve it for the nation.
While this loss of the confidence of the young military officers on Japanese
politics was significant, leading into the rise of the rightwing nationalism in Japan, there
was the growing thought and concern among those officers about the merit of the
Washington Treaty System. As stated earlier, the system was designed to produce
stability of world politics and economy by maintaining status quo, engaging in the arms
reduction talks to relieve the financial burden of each world power, and establishing an
77
economic stability, particularly promoting the growth of Chinas as a nation of capitalism
and democracy. With regard to the arms reduction talks, although eventually each power
agreed to accept the compromise plan, it took an enormous turn and twist before the
agreement was reached, indicating the absence of true cooperative spirits among the
powers and also a serious lack of fairness and equality as claimed by Japan. It is true that,
due to the success in reaching the agreement, the world powers to some extent were
relieved from the financial burden. When it comes to a political stability, however, it
hardly produced as much as it was expected, as seen in the political turmoil Japan had to
go through because of the constitutional controversy over the arms reduction talks and
also in the British – American confrontation over how to achieve reduction. So while
having a sense of stability and accomplishment, the world powers concurrently shared
some sense of ominousness and even failure to some extent over the arms reduction talks,
particularly to the minds of the young military officers of Japan. With regard to economic
stability, it was a complete failure as seen the prompt measure of protectionism the world
powers adopted when they faced the unprecedented economic crisis caused by the world
depression. It was a clear indication that, despite the consensus the world leaders reached
to achieve economic stability by establishing the fair practice of the world commerce
based on the Washington spirit, there was little substance behind such consensus.
Thus, by the end of the decade of the 1920s, although most of the Western powers
did not share the idea, the Washington Treaty System seemed to be already falling apart
and becoming unsustainable. It was particularly so to the minds of the young Japanese
military officers. To them, the system was instead of being a solution, increasingly
becoming a source of the problems Japan was going through. Hence they began to see it
from different perspective. Instead of seeing it as a mechanism designed to establish a
political and economic stability, while maintaining the fundamentals in the existing status
quo, by eliminating the sources of financial burden and the trade barriers, now the young
military offices joined by some of the leading nationalist leaders of Japan began to see
the system designed only to protect the interests and rights of the Western powers by
maintaining status quo. To them it was not based on the idea of promoting world welfare
but based on the idea of maintaining the Western hegemonic powers.12
So, instead of keeping the cooperative diplomacy, Japan found herself before the
turn of the decade increasingly positioning itself to defy the status quo. Although the
group of peace advocates led by the individuals such as Shidehara Kijuro by no means
ceased to exist, they were now taking backseat in Japanese diplomacy, overshadowed by
this rapid rise of the right wing nationalism.
Such rise of the right wing nationalism brought the most turbulent decade of the
history of modern Japan. Starting from the attempt to kill Prime Minister Hamaguchi in
November 14, 1930, the decade witnessed a series of the riotous events such as the
Manchurian Incident in September 1931 or the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai
Tsuyoshi on May 15, 1932.
Konoe Fumimaro shared this viewpoint in his controversial article, “Reject Anglo-American Centered
Peace.” See Konoe Fumimaro, Seidanroku (The Talks on Politics) (Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 1936), pp. 24252
12
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While this turbulent era of the 1930s was unfolding, the expirations of both
Washington Treaty and London Treaty were coming closer – the end of 1936. Regarding
London Treaty, England held the preliminary conference in 1934 in order to discuss the
fate of the treaty after the expiration. Japan responded by sending a rear admiral,
Yamamoto Isoroku, as Japanese representative to London.
These efforts had almost no meaning, however. By this time there was nothing
that made it worthwhile to such effort to hold arms reduction conference or to maintain
the existing treaties. The fundamental circumstances of the international setting that made
it possible to conclude the Washington Treaty had been almost completely lost. Starting
from the New York stock market crash in 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression
shattered the trend of the widely shared international cooperation, followed by a series of
turbulent events one after another. As mentioned above, in 1931 the Manchurian Incident
broke out, resulting in Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. In
Europe, the Nazis took power in March 1933 with their political slogan of denunciation
of the Versailles Treaty in which they believed that Germany was clearly victimized by
being singled out to blame for the war.
Thus clearly the “Washington and London - System” was falling apart by the mid
1930s. Expectedly there was the rising concern in Japan about national defense. Japanese
Navy and Army shared such concern and began to voice up for arms expansion. The
preliminary talk for the London Treaty was still going on in London. There was no
prospect, however, for anything positive to come out. The talk went into adjourn. Under
this circumstance, the voice for abolishing the treaties began to emerge. In the end such
voice prevailed. On September 7, 1934, facing mounting pressure from the military and
the public, Okada Cabinet had no choice but made a decision to withdraw Japan from the
Washington Treaty. After receiving the formal sanction from the Emperor, Foreign
Minister Hirota telegrammed the report about the decision to Japanese Ambassador Saito
in the United States. On December 29 Saito handed it to United States Secretary of State
Cordell Hull.
Regarding the London Treaty, Japan sent General Nagano Osami and
Ambassador Nagi Shozo as the delegates to London when England informed Japan, the
United States, France, and Italy about holding the conference on December 2, 1935 in
order to discuss the aftermath of the forthcoming expiration of the treaty (1936). As
expected, there was no prospect of reaching any agreement from the outset. Japan
proposed an idea of establishing balance among the powers regarding the size of troops,
believing that such balance was essential to secure national defense. Both the United
States and England opposed it, arguing that the size of troops of a nation should be
determined according to degree of need of defense of each nation. England contended
that her territorial possessions were widely scattered, thus requiring more troops. The
United States claimed that, facing the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, the United
States were very vulnerable to foreign attack, making it essential to have considerable
size of troops. Both sides had no intention to give in even an inch.
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Seeing absolutely no prospect of reaching any agreement, on January 15, 1936
Japan withdrew from the London Arms Reduction Talks. Soon after that both
Washington and London Arms Reduction Treaties expired, bringing an era of no treaty
over the Pacific. Also symbolically it was an official end of the Washington System.
With regard to who should be blamed, expectedly Japan became almost
undisputed “villain.” As condemned, Japan was the first nation to violate the principle of
the Nine Power Treaty by carrying out her attempt to put the entire Manchuria under her
hegemony in 1931. Then in 1933, when Japan was officially condemned by the League
of Nations for the Manchurian Incident, Japan withdrew herself from the League of
Nations, further undermining the worldwide trend of will of cooperation to maintain
stability and peace, followed by Japan’s withdrawals from the Washington Treaty in
1934 and the London Treaty in 1936. This series of the acts of Japan defying the
international agreements in which Japan herself had been integral part seemed to be an
unequivocal proof for Japan’s guilt as proclaimed by some of world leaders.
Among those accusers of Japan, it was U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who
became unquestionably a leading figure in advocating Japan’s role as a spoiler of world
stability and peace. Hull attributed this series of Japanese acts of defiance to peace to
Japan’s ultimate goal of establishing her hegemony over the entire Pacific Ocean west of
Hawaii by eliminating all the Western involvements in the region.13
Hull argued that, in confronting this dire setting, there were two options the
United States could take: one was to do nothing to let Japan achieve her goal, which only
meant complete relinquishment of the rights of the United States including the rights to
protect the U.S. citizens residing in various areas of Asia, and more significantly it also
meant the complete set back with regard to maintaining world peace and the other was to
squarely confront Japan to prevent her from establishing her dominant and monopolistic
position in Asia in order to protect the rights of the United States and the rights of the
other Western powers in Asia and maintain the hard-earned peace mechanism. As Hull
wrote in his memoir and history unfolded, the United States chose the latter.14
Hull’s argument sounds viable and seems difficult to dispute. As the above close
examinations of the background of Japan’s defiance to the existing status quo and peace
mechanism indicate, in reality it is rather easy to refute. To Konoe what brought Japan to
defiance was not the imperial will of Japan but, as examined, Japan’s reaction to the
changing circumstances in order to protect interests and rights in China, which were
considered to be vital for Japan’s national survival. The Manchurian Incident in 1931
supports Konoe’s assertion. Contrary to Hull’s assertion, the incident was unmistakably
brought by the unprecedented economic crisis and compounding problem of the rapid
increase of Japanese population. It was the necessity of alleviating such dire situation of
Japan that caused the Japanese military officers to act in a way they did. Konoe asserted
13
Cordell Hull, The Memoir of Cordell Hull p. 290
14
Cordell Hull, The Memoir of Cordell Hull, pp. 290-1.
80
that what they did was unquestionably imperialistic and should be condemned
accordingly but not a ramification of Japan’s imperial ambition to establish Japan’s
hegemonic power over Asia.
Konoe believed that Japan’s economic turmoil and the world wide economic
crisis as a whole were fundamentally attributed to the failure of the World War I
settlement to achieve Wilsonian Democracy by eliminating the fundamental causes of the
conflicts and the subsequent ill designed treaty systems that were supposed to make up
the failure of the WW I settlement but, as claimed by Konoe and his followers, turned out
to be only the mechanism to maintain status quo to secure the interests of protecting the
Western imperial powers. Accordingly they argued that Japan’s acts of defiance had to be
seen as Japan’s challenge to this status quo in order to not only find a way to cope with
the dire crisis Japan faced but also even more importantly end the unfairly structured
world economy and politics.
So, crystal clear was the contrast between Hull and Konoe regarding the
Washington Treaty System. While Hull saw it as a peace maintaining mechanism and
blamed Japan as a villain to undermine such mechanism, Konoe saw the Washington
Treaty System as only a device of the Western powers to maintain the status quo in order
to protect their imperial interests, thus leaving the world unchanged. To Konoe, therefore,
it was not Japan but the Western powers that were the main architects for the world
problems.