Workers and Their Organisations
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Workers and Their Organisations in Post-Soviet Russia by Shih-Hao Kang A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology University of Warwick Department of Sociology May 2007 1 Abbreviation AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor – Confederation of Industrial Organisations AMP SPb St Petersburg Seaport Authority ASOP Association of Commercial Sea Ports ChSK Fourth Stevedoring Company CPSU Communist Party of Soviet Union Egida The affiliation of St Petersburg branch of AFL-CIO sponsored Solidarinost’ (until the end of 2003) ETS SSSR Unified Transport System of the Soviet Union FNPR Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia FPAD Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Unions FPALS Federation of Civil Aviation Pilots Unions GUP State unitary enterprise ISITO Institute for Comparative Labour Relations Research ITF International Transport Workers’ Federation KED Committee of United Action for Social and Labour Rights KRK Committee of Audit Commission KSP OZhD Confederation of Free Trade Unions of October Railway KTR Russian Confederation of Labour KTsP Leningrad Colour Printing Complex KT SPb i LO St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Confederation of Labour KUGI Municipal Property Committee LFP Federation of St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Trade Unions LMTP Leningrad Commercial Seaport LMZ Leningradskii metal’ zavod (Metal Factory of Leningrad) MKS Moscow Coordinating Council for the Socio-economic Defence of Railway Workers MPS Ministry of Railway Transport MROT Minimum working payment (monthly) NKPS People’s Commissariat of Ways and Communication NKK National Container Company NLMK Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine NPG Independent Miners’ Union NPGR Independent Miners’ Union of Russia NPRUP Independent Trade Union of Workers in the Coal-mining Industry NPZhiTC Independent Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport 2 Builders OTS Sectoral Tariff Agreement OZhD October Railway PEM Train electrician PerStiKo First Stevedoring Company PKT First Container Terminal PRVT Russian Trade Union of Water Transport Workers PSE OZhD Trade Union of the Electricians of October Railway PSRP OZhD Trade Union of Track Facility Workers of October Railway PTU Professional training college RKRP Russian Communist Workers’ Party ROSPROFZhEL Russian Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Construction Workers ROSUGLEPROF Russian Independent Coal Miners’ Union RPD Russian Trade Union of Dockers RPLBZh Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades of Railway Workers RPSM Seafarers’ Union of Russia RSFSR Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic RZhD Russian Railways SOTsPROF Association of Socialist Trade Unions (then was re-named as simply a name of the organisation) TEK Fuel-Energy Complex of St Petersburg TO RPLBZh OZhD Territorial Organisation of RPLBZh of October Railway USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VIKZhEL All-Russian Executive Committee of the Railway Trade Union VIKZhDOR All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers VKP General Confederation of Trade Unions VKT All-Russian Confederation of Labour VTsBK Vyborg Pulp and Paper Mill Company VTsIOM All-Russian Centre of Public Opinion VTsSPS All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions VSK Second Stevedoring Company ZAO Closed-stock company Zashchita truda Defence of Labour (a left-wing trade union alliance) 3 Content Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ 8 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 9 Part One Russian Labour Studies and the Research Design ........................................ 33 Chapter 1 Post-Soviet Labour Relations in Russia: history, review and the research approach... 33 1.1 The development of the new Russian labour movement ............................................................. 33 1.1.1 Labour organisation in the former Soviet Union ................................................................... 33 1.1.2 Confrontation between old trade unions and alternative unions ........................................... 44 1.1.3 Chaotic reform: the aftermath of parliamentary conflict ...................................................... 48 1.1.4 The new Labour Code: cooperation between the Government and FNPR ............................ 54 1.1.5 The characteristics of the Russian trade union movement since 1989 .................................. 60 1.2 Studies on Russian workers and their union organisations ......................................................... 71 1.2.1 The soviet-type social relations of production at the workplace ........................................... 72 1.2.2 Distinct explanations ............................................................................................................. 85 1.2.3 Parallel and positive move in historical sense ...................................................................... 87 1.2.4 The improvement of strategy and leadership ......................................................................... 90 1.2.5 Unresolved questions ............................................................................................................. 97 1.2.6 The theoretical approach of this study ................................................................................ 106 1.3 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 112 1.3.1 The research object ............................................................................................................. 112 1.3.2 The case study methods ....................................................................................................... 118 1.3.3 The advantages of my fieldwork .......................................................................................... 125 1.3.4 The challenges in the case-study field ................................................................................. 127 1.4 Labour organisations in St Petersburg ....................................................................................... 136 1.4.1 Who are the trade union activists? ...................................................................................... 137 1.4.2 Free / alternative union organisations ................................................................................ 141 1.4.3 The FNPR member organisations ....................................................................................... 144 1.4.4 Individual-based coordination and solidarity ..................................................................... 148 1.4.5 Into the case study stage ...................................................................................................... 152 Part Two Labour Relations in the Transport Enterprise: Two Case Studies in St Petersburg ....................................................................................................................................... 156 Chapter 2 Railway workers and their organisations ....................................................................... 156 2.1 Work in the Russian railway system .......................................................................................... 158 2.1.1 General background ............................................................................................................ 158 4 2.1.2 The organisational and management structure of Russian Railways .................................. 164 2.2 Workers and their working conditions on October Railway ...................................................... 171 2.2.1 Train (Engine) driver........................................................................................................... 174 2.2.2 Locomotive mechanics ......................................................................................................... 187 2.2.3 Train conductors ................................................................................................................. 190 2.2.4 Train electricians................................................................................................................. 198 2.2.5 Weak collective identity ....................................................................................................... 202 2.2.6 Grievances and conflicts ..................................................................................................... 213 2.3 Railway workers’ organisations ................................................................................................. 224 2.3.1 The history of Russian railway unions before the collapse of the Soviet Union .................. 224 2.3.2 ROSPROFZhEL - Russian Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Construction Workers ........................................................................................................................................ 227 2.3.3 RPLBZh - Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades of Railway Workers ................... 236 2.3.4 Collective actions of RPLBZh .............................................................................................. 257 2.4 ROSPROFZhEL vs. RPLBZh ................................................................................................... 266 2.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 270 Chapter 3 Exploring workplace resistance: TO RPLBZh and KSP OZhD................................... 274 3.1 Territorial Organisation RPLBZh OZhD ................................................................................... 275 3.1.1 Formation ............................................................................................................................ 275 3.1.2 Daily activities of the primary organisations ...................................................................... 279 3.1.3 The resource variation: relation with the administration and workers ............................... 293 3.1.4 Organisational work of TO RPLBZh OZhD ........................................................................ 295 3.2 Non-RPLBZh free trade unions ................................................................................................. 305 3.2.1 Interregional Trade Union ‘Zheleznodorozhnik’ (MPS ‘Zheleznodorozhnik’ ) .................. 306 3.2.2 The Trade Union of the Electricians of October Railway ................................................... 310 3.2.3 The Free Trade Union of Refrigerator Workers on Refrigerator Depot ‘Predportovaya’ .. 314 3.3 Unionism individualised: the Confederation of Free Trade Unions on October Railway ......... 316 3.3.1 Activity: weak mobilisation capacity ................................................................................... 319 3.3.2 The difficulties ..................................................................................................................... 323 3.3.3 The sign of doom ................................................................................................................. 327 3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 329 Chapter 4 St Petersburg dockers and their Organisations ............................................................. 346 4.1 Russian seaport transportation ................................................................................................... 348 4.1.1 General background ............................................................................................................ 348 4.1.2 Seaport of St Petersburg ...................................................................................................... 354 4.1.3 Dockers and their working conditions at St Petersburg Seaport ......................................... 360 4.1.4 Workers’ grievances ............................................................................................................ 377 5 4.2 Dockworkers and their union organisations............................................................................... 382 4.2.1 PRVT - Russian Trade Union of Water Transport Workers ................................................ 383 4.2.2 RPD - Russian Trade Union of Dockers .............................................................................. 387 4.2.3 Relations between RPD and PRVT ...................................................................................... 397 4.3 The port organisation of RPD at St Petersburg Seaport ............................................................. 399 4.3.1 History ................................................................................................................................. 399 4.3.2 Structure, member organisations and organisational work ................................................ 406 4.3.3 External relations ................................................................................................................ 428 4.3.4 The commitment to social partnership................................................................................. 433 4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 442 Chapter 5 St Petersburg dockers in 2004 and 2005: the union’s mobilisation for strike actions 450 5.1 The labour dispute in 2004: a prelude........................................................................................ 455 5.1.1 Taking collective action: ‘working to rule’ ......................................................................... 460 5.1.2 The situation in PKT ............................................................................................................ 465 5.2 The strike action in 2005 ........................................................................................................... 467 5.2.1 The course of the dispute ..................................................................................................... 467 5.2.2 Moving on to an ‘Italian strike’ ........................................................................................... 470 5.2.3 Moving on to a warning strike ............................................................................................. 472 5.2.4 Moving on to an indefinite strike ......................................................................................... 480 5.3 The characterisitcs of the dockers’ coordinated workplace unionism ....................................... 497 5.3.1 Deliberate mobilisation ....................................................................................................... 497 5.3.2 Social partnership in action................................................................................................. 501 5.3.3 Internal and external coordination ...................................................................................... 509 5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 515 Chapter 6 Conclusion: theorising the transition of Russian organised labour ............................. 523 6.1 The workers came to self-organisation ...................................................................................... 523 6.2 Rethinking the distinct forms of workplace trade unionism ...................................................... 528 6.2.1 How do the favourable and the unfavourable conditions matter? ....................................... 529 6.2.2 Local dockers’ resistance – an advanced model for unions’ strategy and leadership? ...... 535 6.2.3 Effective coordination vs. workplace fragmentation ........................................................... 537 6.3 Russia’s organised labour under fragile prospect ...................................................................... 542 Bibliography........................................................................................................................................ 547 Internet sources .................................................................................................................................. 561 Interviews list ...................................................................................................................................... 563 6 Table content Table 1.1: VTsIOM’s survey on workers’ trust in trade union……….…..…………67 Figure 2.1: Tendency of real wage and labour productivity of the Russian railway sector from 1992 to 2003 and projection to 2005……………..………..162 Figure 2.2: Average wage of the basic sectors in Russia Federation (April 2003)…163 Figure 2.3: The average wages in different Russian railways (2003)………………169 Figure 2.4: The railway structure of October Railway..…………………………….170 Figure 4.1: The share of total volume of cargo carried in the Russian transport system (2002)………………………………………………………...…………348 Figure 4.2: The scheme of St Petersburg Seaport......................................................354 Figure 4.3: A solidarity message posted on the port committee’s bulletin board…...421 Table 6.1: The basic organisational features of the two case studies (by 2005)….....535 7 Abstract The nature and prospect of Russian workers’ self-organisation has been interpreted variously since the re-birth of the Russian labour movement. Some analysts put the weight on structural characteristics, in which most particularly the inherited legacy of the soviet type of social relations of production, and suggest the continuation of such characters within the Russian labour relations remains the main obstacle to the transformation of Russian trade unions. By stressing the comparison of successful and failed post-soviet labour conflicts, other analysts, though recognising the force of objective conditions, argue that Russian workers have made a great step forward, by that their critical weakness would greatly depend on the capacity of the trade union. The central question of the thesis is therefore assigned to identify the role of work organisation and the social organisation of the workplace, on the one hand, and the capacity and strategy of union organisers, on the other, in encouraging or discouraging the formation of collective identity, on the basis of a comparative study of the new/alternative trade union organisations of railway workers and dockers in St Petersburg. This research explored the relations between the three aspects – work, union organisation and concrete collective activities – within the two research case studies. Unlike the majority of Russian workers, the struggles of train drivers and dockers in St Petersburg present meaningful and contrasting characteristics to review both sides of the arguments above. Through interviews, documentary research and participant observation, this research identifies the formal similarities of their work organisation and trade union, focusing on the networks of worker activists who form the core of the independent trade unions, those who are neither ambitious leaders nor passive workers, and reviews considerable differences between the two groups of workers. The case study firstly demonstrate that neither subjective nor objective conditions are sufficient to expect an effective workers’ organisation, there must be an original combination of both. Both the dockers and the railway workers have the subjective conditions (dedicated activists), but the railway workers face unfavourable objective conditions. The limitations of the dockers’ organisational coordination, however, show that the favourable objective conditions are not sufficient to guarantee a genuinely successful outcome. This thesis therefore contributes to, and hopefully, develops a substantive explanation of the ‘alienated collectivism’ and limitations of self-organisation and institutional channels of representation among Russian workers. 8 Introduction The development and possible transformation of Russian workers’ self-organisation in the transition of the country from the soviet planned system to a capitalist market economy has been a topic of considerable interest and debate. Massive media coverage of Russian workers’ strikes in the late 1980s impressed many observers around the world. Some researchers (Aves, 1992; Levchik, 2003) are convinced that the new Russian labour movement had emerged and played a critical role in the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Ironically, instead of benefiting from its assumed impact, the actors who brought about such an impressive historic change – Russian workers as a whole – suffered greatly from the reform policies introduced by the governments on which they had pinned their hopes. Was this a case of the Russian workers pressing demands at the wrong time, while the social conditions as a whole prevented them from receiving any benefit? Or was it the case that the workers did not really own the strength but something else to act for themselves? Analysts like Gordon and Klopov (2000) and Katsva (2002) suggest that the Russian labour movement should be treated as proceeding through two significant stages: the workers firstly mobilised in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but during the subsequent period workers lost faith in reform and the effectiveness of collective action, since the economic reform caused a sharp fall of their living standards. Another argument 9 (Clarke, 1996a) suggests that within the emerged protests or mobilisations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the workers’ demands was more often provoked (or organised) by their enterprise management rather than by the workers themselves. These arguments have driven fellow studies to answer what had really happened and what was really happening in the relations between the normal working people and the regime elites during the period of post-soviet transformation. My initial interest was to understand the effect of such bitter life experiences in their social lives, and to study the character and the general tendency of the Russian labour movement after 1988. The conclusion of my initial (MA) study led me to focus on the interpretation of the aftermath of the split of labour resistance, the radicalisation of small groups of workers and the failure to establish effective labour organization. With all its concrete description, the study, however, was not yet fully satisfactory. The original idea of the study was to employ a politico-economic approach in order to evaluate the role of the new Russian labour movement during the transition of the society. The conclusion, though, indicated the development of the movement has reached a critical point when Russian trade unions had to overcome their weakness in the changing Russian politics. The analysis ended on a rather abstract note, with a criticism of the problematic policy of the union leadership and of the strategy of those who were involved in the workers’ movement in Russia. Similar 10 views can also be found in many academic analyses. By revisiting these interpretations, I realised that such researches did not go through a further re-examination of the social context of such a strategic-oriented explanation; neither the dynamic nor the actual obstacles facing the workers’ movement can be properly comprehended in the understanding of the social transition in Russia. A concrete and in-depth investigation of the changes in the field of Russian labour organisation as well as labour relations at the enterprise level therefore turned out to be a fundamental task of my research interest. The academic interpretation and the confusion As most analysts agree, Soviet trade unions were bureaucratic organisations controlled by the Party and the industry managerial elites. In 1989-91 there was an upsurge of independent workers’ organisation, led by the miners which later on became the backbone of the development of alternative trade union in Russia. But the independent / alternative unions never grew strong enough to replace or to challenge the traditional unions; they rather survive as a few successful but isolated organisations representing some specific professional groups. Part of the explanation for this is the adaption of social partnership between FNPR and the government, and collaboration between traditional unions and management in the workplace, which 11 froze out and repressed the alternative unions (Connor 1996; Ashwin and Clarke 2002). Analysts who study the transition of post-soviet Russian society point out that the most fundamental characteristic of current Russian labour relations is that, even at the enterprise level, the unique social relations of production inherited from the Soviet economic system still maintain a strong influence and this has been the main barrier to forming a new type of labour organisation within the Russian labour movement (Clarke et al. 1993). The question remains of why some workers organise in alternative unions and others do not? It tends to be particular professional groups who form alternative unions, some of whom are well-paid and have some labour market power, but others are not (e.g. teachers and health workers). Crowley (n.d., p.1) pointed out that ‘the various studies have not reached a consensus on what they seek to explain, and some of the main questions remain contentious’. As I will show in Chapter One, the explanations proposed by these studies embrace different approaches and emphases in their estimations of Russian workers, and thus there are quite opposite views. 1 Generally, there are a number of analytical factors and arguments presented in these various interpretative approaches. A group of scholars 1 To take one clear example, Kivinen (2001) believed that the strength of the Russian labour movement and the Russian working class can grow through overcoming political and cultural obstacles, which means that a new ‘hegemonic project’ is required in order to dismantle the negative legacy of the old cultural forms and social institutions in Russia (p.159). He also criticised those analysts who focus on the transformation of the mode of production, as well as on production workers, as economic reductionism (p.107). Crowley, on the contrary, insisted that the concept of legacy (to explain labour’s weakness) is itself wanting, since it is unable to account for the extent of this weakness or the trends that have occurred in the region over time (n.d., p.1). 12 (Mandel 2000; Buzgalin et al. 2000; Maksimov 2001a) concluded that the critical problem derives from the weakness of trade union leadership and strategy and propose the need for reform of such leadership and strategy. In their view, Russian workers - especially their leaders - have not perceived the way of learning from either the failed or the successful workers’ struggles to overcome their weakness to develop an appropriate strategy which will enable them to build a stronger and more united labour organisation and labour politics. Such an approach eventually places the role of union (organisational) activities as the premier factor in the transformation of Russian labour relations and politics. The second argument, which has been developed on the basis of the widely acknowledged factor of the legacy of soviet social relations of production, points at the form of the ‘collective’ and ‘community’ as the determinant force in the character of workers’ self-organisation (Clarke et al 1993; Borisov 1996; Ilyin 1998; Ashwin 1999). According to such an account, that was why the miners could organise a relatively solid trade union organisation. And that is also why their active trade union organisation coexisted with the lack of self-organisation in the workplace. The third factor, which represents a mixture of arguments, is the impact of the environment of social organisation on the trade union movement (such as the effect of the new Russian Labour Code), which is the major factor underlying the development of Russian trade unionism. The definition of ‘environment’, however, 13 varies according to the context of the analysts’ conception. Some analysts extend it as a historical-cultural ‘tradition / phenomenon’ of the necessary process of democratisation (Gordon and Klopov, 2000). Others might also refer it to the common mentality of the Russian public after the bitter neo-liberal reform, such as the ‘consumption attitude’ of an individual solution (Kagarlitsky, 1999). Certainly, the factors described above have been employed in the research contexts not as a pure, theoretical model of explanation based on one single factor, but each factor is identified as one among many. The issue, however, is which is identified as the determinant factor in explaining the specific character of Russian trade unionism. In my view, a critical clarification of these explanatory factors – the dynamics of the interface of objective impact and subjective development, (i.e. the social relations at the workplace and the organisation of workers’ labour) – has not been properly treated in many investigations. Various studies, whether based on generalisation or individual cases, have not yet reached an effective answer to the limited dynamic of the characteristics of organised Russian labour. That is similar to the critical weakness within my previous work: little progress had been undertaken to distinguish the dynamic relations among the structural and subjective factors. To take one example, it would be fairly doubtful that in a society where the economic system is changing towards the capitalist mode of production, with the social relation of production 14 transformed, the pattern of workers’ self-organization itself will automatically foster struggles typical of those that Western workers have experienced. Not to mention that the content of industrial relations in each society have actually varied over its own history (Ferner and Hyman 1998). Moreover, it will be important to clarify, and then, to re-integrate the scenes lying behind the visible development of Russian trade union organisations. There are three distinct layers of the workers’ daily organisational network: (workplace) social relations, union organisation and campaigns (action). To take a concrete example, when the union president of the alternative union committee of the Vyborg Pulp and Paper Mill decided to take legal action against the process of ownership transfer, the union leader suggested that such a decision had been made because the atmosphere for the workers had changed. Or was it a more comfortable decision for the union leader, who would then not have to face the fact that there was a lack of organisational practice in the union? Each layer of the three could be observed separately, and then one could analyse how these factors relate to each other. It seems, however, that a mixture of the three distinguishable layers mentioned earlier is often seen in various studies. Such confusing or even simply missing aspects were partly due to the weakness of the research to stretch the observation further. Critical scenes behind those most visible features of industrial relations (such as the number of strike or dispute events, 15 the labour leadership, or the union’s formal functions) are barely confronted. More concretely, there has been a significant lack of observation of the lively-but-relatively-hidden networks of organised labour, which should firstly be distinguished into the acts of leaders, activists and ordinary workers. Their networks, and the effect on their organisations, usually underlie the most visible outcome but are not easy to reach for outsiders. Efficient investigation of the hidden networks could firstly help to distinguish the responses and choices of workers, the campaigns and capable forms of labour organisation, and finally the nature of the struggles. The benefit of such an investigation is that it could also provide a fresh insight for the analytic framework, in terms of the concern about what kind of role the subjective factor of union activities can play and what is the critical limit confronting their efforts. In other words, the understanding of networks can be expected to examine the boundary between the structures and the actors in concrete situations. Identifying the role of activist network As mentioned earlier, some observers once believed that the social unrest in the former soviet-socialist societies had energised the people to act for their own right. The scale and number of Russian workers’ strike events since 1988, literately, attracted my attention to the development of their experiences, when I was actively 16 participating in labour campaigns in Taiwan during 1991-1996. The experience in Taiwan inspired me to study the practical resource of organisational activities in other societies. It would not be difficult to see the changes of the two societies own different nature. The development of the labour movement in Taiwan, to some extent, had several interesting similarities compared to that of Russia. The ‘Law on Trade Unions’ in Taiwan was drawn up based on a reformed copy of the original Soviet version despite the ruling elites’ anticommunism doctrine. Labour conflicts and independent organisations had vanished for several decades until 1987-1988; the labour movement was associated with the call for ‘democratisation’; there the resources for independent labour organisations are insufficient; there people more often look for a saviour, a powerful politician rather than making self-organisation. In other words, the mechanism of institutionalisation of industrial action, like that found in the advanced countries, had just started on its way.2 In addition, the role of informal relations has 2 After the Second World War, any independent trade unions and labour movement in Taiwan had been completely banned by the KMT government, and they disappeared until the late 1980s (around the time when the 40- year-long Martial Law was finally abolished in 1987). Like the situation in Russia, the wave of labour unrest very soon died down, since 1993 union organisational strength has suffered from the impotence of mobilisation. My understanding of labour organisations largely comes from my participant experience in Taiwan, which also gives precious insight for the methodological reflection of this study. Taiwan is one of the Newly Industrialised Countries so, for example, the nature of its social relations of production might be considered to be closer to or more affected by the advanced capitalist economies, and to have developed far in advance of post-soviet Russian society. The general characteristics of labour relations in Taiwan, whether at enterprise level or at nationwide level, however, have little similarity to those of advanced capitalist countries. Firstly, over a long period workers in their individual struggles had got used to looking for governmental intervention rather than taking direct industrial action against the decisions of their employers. Furthermore, the perception of the struggle of their organisations for Taiwanese workers was very much mixed up with cultures of informal relationships within the enterprise. Informal access is commonly seen as a necessary method 17 always been reversible and controversial in the daily practice for running labour organisations. Recalling my participant experiences in Taiwan, the existence of so-called ‘informal relationships’, such as kinship and friendship at the workplace, were actually rational and powerful among the participants, especially for people who are striving to build (or rebuild) their own organization with poor institutional resource. Whether these informal relationships might either provide immediate strength or, contrarily, erosion of the direction of the campaign or movement in practice, has been an important factor within the actions undertaken. The effect of these informal relationships, eventually, reflects the tangled combinations of networks and resources of the people involved. (To some extent, it even could be misleading if one simply treated the ‘informal’ aspects of a campaign or movement as a ‘negative’ dimension of the social relations of the community.) Arguably, people refer to these ‘relationships’ as a necessary procedure and the point is to understand the network of mutual relations and to learn how effective the network and the strategy can be in the practice of self-organisation. These experiences of participation impelled me to look at the whole effort and process of interaction between unfavourable conditions and for mobilisation (although what is formal/informal might be very different in different societies). Regarding industrial relations in Taiwan, the scale and degree of development of the labour movement is to some extent some way behind that in Russia (union density was about 6% in 2006 and collective bargaining has only come into effect recently and only in a few state-own enterprises). It would be interesting to note, for example, that the scene of ‘failure’ (of Russian workers’ self-organisation) might be clear for scholars from developed countries; the same scene, however, may appear a big advance for people from societies where the scale of workers’ strikes or the condition of labour rights are even less developed. 18 subjective (unavoidable) acts. Noteworthily, the outsiders were hardly likely to notice the existence and effect of these relationships within the community. Many conflicting but insightful narratives lie behind the obvious outcomes. Inspired by my own experiences, I became convinced that the most critical observation for identifying the pattern of organisational activities of Russian workers would be one which focused on and stretched out from the networks and their corresponding strategies. With such a point of view, I started to set up research contacts for the fieldwork on Russian workers and their organisations. The knowledge of being an insider among Russian workers My later experiences encountering workers and labour activists in St Petersburg generated more critical insights for my investigation. The experience prompted surprise and respect. Many Russian workers I had met were highly literate people, compared to the Taiwanese workers I worked with.3 On various occasions, I met ordinary workers who had learned how to use labour law and then even became legal consultants. Furthermore, I experienced many scenes which the academic 3 Many of them read serious literature, have abundant knowledge of Russian philosophy or Orthodox doctrines. Learning such experiences had enriched my fieldwork time. Most surprisingly, many leaders and activists have the ability to write commentaries and articles for campaign propaganda. This means they can produce their newsletters and propaganda material on their own. Similar occasions in Taiwan are much rarer, many union leaders and activists need to hire staff to write articles on their behalf, and that is one reason how leftwing university students get close access to the trade union campaigns. 19 interpretations did not anticipate, due to the limit of contact while being an outsider. 4 More impressive findings came out during my fieldwork period in St Petersburg. There were dozens of labour organisations ‘existing’ or ‘functioning’ with their own activists around the region. Leaders of primary organisations of the so-called ‘free’ trade unions sat or stood together with leaders of official union organisations (of other enterprises) for common issues. In several campaigns, they supported and coordinated with each other. And just like the group of analysts mentioned earlier, people who are involved in the local labour movement pay a lot of attention to and argue a lot about the problems of union leadership, the coordination and creating solidarity. According to the survey of VTsIOM, Maksimov (2004, p.80) suggests that ‘until the beginning of 2000, quite high level of Russian workers (over 20 percent of worker respondents on average) have shown they were ready to take part in protest actions’. There is a similar result presented by other researches (Bizyukov et al. 2004). Many occasions showed that people established new organisations, but the scene afterward was repeated with little difference: the initiators usually had little faith in recruiting new members to join their organisation and more likely act on their own behalf. Still, it is meaningful for us to note that the people did organise their resistance, while most of 4 The picture of the miners’ action is still very clear in my mind. In the summer of 1998, while I was in Moscow, I went to visit the miners’ picket outside the building of the Russian Federal government – the Russian White House. Every time I went to their picket carrying big watermelons in both hands and then sat among the ordinary miners, knocking their working helmets on the Gorbatii Bridge, and listened to their stories about how to win the battle not only for them but for their country. That was a interesting shock to me since many materials that I had read emphasised that the Russian miners had been supporters of Yeltsin’s regime and only cared about their own interests. 20 this resistance did not last for long, and a more important point is that these efforts were not even shared or taken as a common lesson to be learned among the activists or the grassroots groups. My personal presence at the pickets, meetings and internal discussions helped me not only by establishing useful contacts with local labour activists but also by ‘collecting’ information which was unfamiliar but very insightful. The first impression was quite different from the remote mining region in the study of Ashwin (1999). To take one example, the participants normally spoke about the need for labour struggles and they were active in ‘discussing’ their perspective, but the connections between these union leaders and activists were normally little more than personal bravery and tenacity. The campaigns or labour disputes seemed to have a common rule, that they have normally been poorly organised and mobilised. Those activists I met are quite capable of conducting the basic functions of daily union activities, but mostly the activities were confined to a limited or individual circle. These scenes provided me with a useful insight about the culture and the pattern of the organisational activities in this society, which also reminded me that the background of the local struggles was very different from what I had imagined. More importantly, a close, direct observation of these activists’ responses and networks in this research revealed more stories behind the claims of the activists or 21 the organisation leaders. While many activists complained that their workers are too passive or too scared to come out, to generalise the patterns of their organisations from the visible campaigns or the leaders’ explanations could easily lead to the neglect of other important factors. If workers are indifferent and show a passive response to the unions’ efforts, why did some of these local union organisations develop themselves into new-style labour organisations, while some others fell into highly individual networks. To understand what are the differences among the union organisations － even those union organisations that have shared similar backgrounds – it is therefore critical to subject the networks of these activists (active workers) to further analysis. Moreover, those non-leader activists at the enterprise level themselves actually provide a direct reference to their workplace conditions since their organisational positions provide them with little more institutional resources than ordinary workers. In most cases, the ‘leaders’ of alternative trade unions could not afford to work as union staff paid by union dues, but have to work as their colleagues do. However, it is still necessary to maintain a careful distinction between the daily response / contact of the ordinary workers, the union activists, and the union strategy, in order to avoid ‘false imagination’ or, on the contrary, loose judgement (whether expecting Russian workers to change their conditions or treating them as fully incompetent to take action). Such an investigation could produce a 22 meaningful insight not only for the local participants but also for sociologists studying Russian labour and society. Lights from methodological reflection This research involved spending 30 months of observing Russian workers closely, trying to get close to the workers’ experiences of making their own organisation. Those valuable contacts established reminded me to be conscious about the researcher role when assessing the current state of the Russian labour movement. The reflection on my methods applied certainly refers to several fundamental concerns in sociological research. A similar concern to that signalled by the concept for sociological criticism / reflection in Bourdieu’s work (1990), where he used the term ‘objectification objectified’, has led me to examine the capacity, the experience, the resource and the social background of the research objects. Doing research into an object where the institution and the formal and informal relations easily tangle with one another often misled a researcher who is gaining and maintaining the access between ‘staying as an outsider’ and ‘exploring workers’ activities’. It has been a great benefit from my ‘participant’ experience in the social movement in both Taiwan and in Russia, which sharpened such insight concern. Back to my experience in the labour movement in Taiwan, I had noticed the inner culture of 23 the organisation was one of the most difficult tasks for the participants to explain. These experiences had made me encountered sensitive occasions such as requests ‘not to reveal the details to outsiders’. As one consequence, it was very likely people did not want to reveal more details and facts about their organisational activities to researchers / outsiders. The situation in the two societies could differ: in Taiwan, the attitude of generally high respect towards intellectuals on the other side also deepened their scepticism after they felt disappointed with the latter; in Russia, most activists did not pay much attention to the ‘showing-up’ of intellectuals.5 These interactions might affect the collecting of narratives for our study, which also can limit the researcher’s ability to develop their further interpretation. These difficulties, however, have not been seriously discussed in industrial relations studies. During my stay and participant experiences with the local activists’ circle in St Petersburg, I have witnessed many ‘disputable’ interpretations and reports over the events or development of the labour conflict. One substantial reason for such problematic interpretations came from the obstacle that we can hardly avoid taking the leaders’ opinions as key information. With such a ‘one-dimensional’ contact, it is therefore very likely that we will ignore many internal scenarios which are meaningful in order to reveal the conflict of the workers’ attempts and efforts. I felt it necessary to adopt a 5 In my experience, some activists finally just saw all visiting researchers with their research projects as a boring burden, unless the latter promised visible feedback for their campaigns. A similar situation has been seen in both countries since I started this research plan. 24 unique design for this research. As discussed in more detail in Chapter One, the case study for this thesis aimed to trace the ground of worker-union contact and the work of the union activists using an ethnographic and participant approach to the research objects On the basis of my initial fieldwork observing trade union activists in St Petersburg, I identified two active groups (both with alternative trade unions) – the dockers and the railway workers – which had been established in the early 1990s, but who were now struggling after the implementation of the new Labour Code, which discriminated strongly against the alternative trade unions, and the withdrawal of AFL-CIO financial support, which had been the main source of funding of alternative unions. These two groups of workers seemed to present meaningful activities as well as an ideal comparison for the research. All of these theoretical and methodological concerns combined together, then, stimulated me to present an alternative study to develop the theorisation of Russian labour relations. The central question I want to address in this thesis is what are the factors encouraging or inhibited the development of independent workers’ organisation? In order to address this question I decided to undertake case studies of two active alternative trade union organisations in St Petersburg, the dockers and the railway workers, in order to identify the factors that explain the relative strength of the former and the relative weakness of the latter. 25 As noted above, some analysts emphasise the fundamental role of union strategy and leadership in determining the prospects for Russian workers’ organisation, it is therefore important to examine the character of the strategy and leadership of the two organisations. On the other hand, my experience in Taiwan and Russia had already indicated to me the importance of social networks in and around the workplace in determining the capacity of workers to organise themselves effectively, and the character of these social networks depends, to a considerable extent, on the character of the work environment and occupational community, so I will compare these factors across various workplaces in the docks and the railways to see to what extent their differences explain differences in the character of worker organisation. The main task in the case studies is to identify the relationship between individualism and collectivism among the workers, and the role of work organisation and the social organisation of the workplace in encouraging or discouraging the formation of a collective identity. This research aims to observe how the union activity is presented in everyday life, then to examine why it is relatively comfortable for Russian workers to establish new representative organisations but difficult to make these organisations well represented and dynamic. The central question I want to address in this thesis is what is the role of the work environment and occupational community in encouraging or inhibiting 26 independent workers’ organisation? With a similar concern, Ashwin’s (1999) ethnographic investigation on miners’ community at Taldym presented insightful observation of the factors which affected the (lack of) self-organisation, but her research, like many others’, focused specifically on miners. So how does her argument stand up when we look at railway workers and dockers? Supported by the reflection of my experiences (in Taiwan and Russia) presented in the previous paragraphs, the basic design for the research hypothesis can develop into three parts through the basic investigation of workers’ interaction at their workplace; the pattern of union activity at the workplace; and the (coordinating) role of union activity. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis comes to argue that it is work organisation and the social relations of the workforce that is decisive, geographical proximity / socialisation does not seem to be sufficient to overcome the fragmentation of the workplace. Representing the force of mobilised Russian workers, the key difference between the railway workers and the dockers (and miners) is in the social organisation of work, where dockers and miners work much more in self-managed collectives, while railway workers are more fragmented and under stricter management control. This case study shows that neither subjective nor objective conditions are sufficient to create an effective workers’ organisation: both the dockers and the railway workers have the subjective conditions (dedicated activists), but the railway workers have 27 unfavourable objective conditions. The limited dynamics of the dockers’ organisation, however, show that even in this case the favourable objective conditions are not sufficient to guarantee a completely successful outcome. We may conceive the consequences of this analysis for the politics of Russian workers as a whole. Even with much active effort, Russian workers’ organisations can easily and repeatedly constitute various organisational forms which share the same limits, which impede their transformation into a strong and genuine organisational force able to defend their own labour rights and change the roots of their labour organisation. It remains to be seen whether the new wave of alternative union organisations, such as the recent struggle of autoworkers at the Ford factory, will repeat the experience of the past, or whether the Ford workers will be able to transcend it. Structure By focusing on the relations between the three aspects – work, union organisation and collective activities – the thesis is composed in this way. The first part of the study presents a comprehensive review of the tendency of the Russian labour movement, the interpretation of the nature and characteristics of the movement and the advantage of conducting an empirical study to identify the contrasting arguments among various interpretative approaches. The first section of Chapter One presents the history of the 28 Russian labour movement since 1989 with critical events and facts to introduce how Russian labour and their organisations responded to the enormous transition period since the collapse of the Soviet system. The understanding of the facts has differed depending on the various analytical views employed. The second section of Chapter One thus aims to review the fundamental differences, especially those unresolved arguments, between the different approaches. I clarify analytic aspects of Russian labour studies to present several key concepts of their progress. The clarification provides a contrasting analysis of the gap between the subjective and objective factors within the development of Russian workers’ organisations. In order to conduct a further investigation to identify the formation and prospects of workers’ collective activities, the final two sections of this chapter provide the methodological framework of the empirical case study, together with a reflection on the themes of privilege and risk during the fieldwork in St Petersburg. The second part of the thesis consists of the case studies of the railway workers, especially train drivers, on the October Railway, and the dockers at the Seaport of St Petersburg. Before introducing the patterns of the two alternative / independent trade unions at the enterprise level, both case studies firstly analyse the general structure of the enterprise and the content of the workers’ work conditions, including the features of career, payment and grievances. Based on interviews and observation, the details of 29 the workplace relations of railway workers on the October Railway are presented in the first section of Chapter Three, in which the reader will soon notice that the railway workers, even the locomotive brigades, adopt highly alienated and individualised solutions to their problems. Against such a general atmosphere, the second section of this chapter moves on to provide a brief introduction of the major trade union in the Russian railway sector. The focus is put on Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades of Railway Workers (RPLBZh), the alternative rival of the very traditional Russian Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Construction Workers (ROSPROFZhEL), so that the study is able to link the formation of RPLBZh to the local coordination for collective organisation. Chapter Three is therefore designed to explain what the local RPLBZh activists have made in terms of uniting the interests of railway workers on October Railway. The analysis in the conclusion of the chapter reveals the once active primary organisations, together with other non-RPLBZh free trade unions, perform as a highly individualised labour agency with the form of ‘one-depot-one-union’. Following the same approach, Chapter Four firstly reveals the substantial changes of managerial structure of Russian seaport transportation and the current composition of the ownership and the administration of the Open Joint Stock Company of the Seaport of St Petersburg. The investigation of the dockers at the five 30 major stevedore companies provides the characteristics of their work organisation and their growing grievance over the payment standard. The relatively brigade-based collectivism in the docks therefore leads this chapter to focus on the well-organised port union organisation of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers to reveal the achievements and weaknesses of the dockers’ collective-union operation. The coincident meeting with the latest strike action taking place by dockers in three of the five companies in 2004 and 2005 impelled me to collect details and the participants’ opinions to constitute the first two sections of Chapter Five. The analysis of the unreported coordination basis behind the union’s mobilisation and solidarity making for strike action in the third section, on the one hand, shows the capacity of local RPD (Russian Trade Union of Dockers) activists; and provides a contrasting account for the critical insight in the concluding section, on the other hand. The main point developed in the last section suggests that the type of the dockers’ workplace unionism reflects the workplace fragmentation and has confined the strength of the dockers’ collective-union relations. Finally, the integrated conclusion extracted from the comparison of the two case studies comprises three arguments in Chapter Six. In the first and second section, the conclusion asserts that, despite the occurrence of self-organisation of the two groups of workers, the formation of the pattern of their self-organisation is defined more by 31 the character of work organisation and its social organisation than by the activists’ subjective realisation. In fact, the case study shows that neither subjective nor objective conditions are sufficient to create an effective workers’ organisation: both the dockers and the railway workers have their dedicated activists, but the railway workers face rather unfavourable objective conditions. The limitations of the dockers’ organisation, however, present a critical reflection that even in this case the favourable objective conditions did not guarantee a completely successful outcome. Thus it appears that a substantial understanding must get through a reflexive combination of both conditions, but under the current climate of Russian trade unionism it is rather likely to see Russian workers embracing limited dynamics of favourable practice for the unity of active trade unions. Referring to such understanding, in the third section I suggest that the contribution of this research is its ability to associate with the analytic approach which emphasises the role of the soviet type of social relations of production in contemporary Russian labour relations, and the two approaches together should generate a potent pattern for the sociological investigation of the transformation of post-soviet societies. 32 Part One Russian Labour Studies and the Research Design Chapter 1 Post-Soviet Labour Relations in Russia: history, review and the research approach 1.1 The development of the new Russian labour movement 1.1.1 Labour organisation in the former Soviet Union Historically, Russian trade unions were heavily involved in the wave of the Russian revolutionary movement. Union organisations developed quickly, together with revolutionary organisations, during the late Tsarist era at the beginning of the twentieth century (1905 saw the most rapid development of the labour movement). On the eve of the 1917 Revolution, several union organisations, such as the railwaymen’s unions, had held strike actions and political struggles to demonstrate their appeal against the chaotic situation during Russia’s involvement in the First World War. Despite their varied political orientations, the leaders of the Russian trade unions tried to establish a powerful unity. In June 1917, the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions was established with the aim of coordinating the union movement, although it immediately faced difficulties, both internally and externally, 33 of balancing the different political forces (Bolshevik, Menshevik, and the Social Revolutionaries). Over the period of the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks finally gained political power following the overthrow of the Tsar’s regime and the later Provisional Government. The whole situation was, however, still very severe for the new Bolshevik regime (Shapiro 1981, pp.2-3). Especially, the representatives of the Bolsheviks did not fully dominate power in either the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets or the Trade Union Conferences. Changes occurred with the repression against union organisations (especially those in which the Mensheviks and their supporters had won a majority) during 1921, and workers who protested in strikes and demonstrations faced mass arrests. The situation then changed again under the programme of the New Economic Policy. In 1922, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) replaced the previous All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, and at the same time the regime confirmed its monopoly status as the only representative of union organisations and organised labour in the Soviet Union. This event has been seen as a critical reflection of the fact that the Bolshevik regime had won control over union organs (Sorenson 1969). The union structure in Soviet times since then was concentrated in the hands of VTsSPS. Nevertheless, within the Party itself, union leaders and activists still raised several disputes confronting the party line over the role of trade unions in the socialist 34 state. There might be some arguments about the interpretation of Lenin’s order on the role of trade unions, but it was clearly ruled out that the union should take direct control of enterprise production. From 1928, the leadership of VTsSPS faced serious suppression within the party. Stalin reinterpreted Lenin’s line on the control of trade unions, and most militant Bolshevik unionists were replaced by those who were more loyal to Stalin. After the full control of the Party, the VTsSPS had totally become the ‘transmission belt’ of the Party-state but no longer an independent organisation to defend workers’ interests. Since then, serious independent labour organisations or movements no longer existed. In addition, despite all the rhetorical assertion of its leadership on improving the role and function of trade union organisations, the Soviet trade union organisation received merely symbolic reforms to its structure. The principles and functions of trade unions during the Soviet time also underwent little change. According to the CPSU’s conception of the role of the trade union in a ‘socialist’ society, Soviet workers employ themselves as the working class, participating in production without the existence of antagonistic classes. Following such a definition, soviet workers were all undifferentiated in the relations of production, and their task was to improve production forces to construct the historic future for humankind in the communist society. Therefore, whether directors, managers, skilled engineers, or cleaners, people who worked at the same enterprise 35 were all enrolled in the same trade union organisation. The trade union structure was constructed according to the industrial principle, which was a parallel design of the managerial structure of the Soviet economic system. For example, as the Soviet railway project and service were managed and directed by the specific Ministry of Railway Transport, workers from enterprises of railway transport construction belonged to the Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Workers together with workers in railway transport services. Under such a principle, each industrial union had its own regional and primary organisations, and all these industry-based trade union organisations also needed to establish unity on different regional levels. The functions of the Soviet trade union could be generalised with three aspects. Economically, the trade union in the soviet system was designed to participate in management and the fulfilment of the production plan. In which context, sometimes the trade union could be in charge of the employment plan of the enterprise. In most cases, Soviet unions performed state functions to promote productivity and labour discipline, which means that the union had the right to monitor cases in which workers were threatened with dismissal or demotion by the administration (Ruble 1981). Many analysts from the West had argued that Soviet trade unions at the enterprise level did not really stand for the workers’ interest but for the enterprise administration (Godson 1981; Connor 1991). Socially, the trade union organisations 36 were to carry out the distribution of social benefits. From granting permission for visits to the hospital or sanatorium to the tickets provided for workers to send their children to summer (pioneer) camp, workers expected their membership of the trade union to provide them with such essential benefits. Politically, the union was controlled as an integral part of the Party-state, so that union leaders also needed to carry out the tasks of delivering political education to ordinary workers as well as to those selected as model workers. Moreover, the rule for union personnel generally confirmed such a function, as Ruble (1979, pp.72-73) pointed out, ‘Union officials at an enterprise of national significance are selected by their union’s central committee and receive Communist Party endorsement prior to the actual election… In all cases, the future career of a factory union chairman depends more upon the evaluation of his union superior than upon the evaluation of the workers’. According to all these factors, it is understandable that the Soviet trade union functionary was commonly seen as a part of the ‘nomenklatura’. The commonly accepted role of the Soviet trade union encountered a critical moment of change when Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985. The country’s long-term economic stagnation moved him to consider carrying out more ‘reform’ polices. The original concern of his regime was to 37 stimulate Soviet workers’ motivation in production. Gorbachev and his advisers asserted that to reach this goal the soviet system needed further ‘reform’ of production management. Generally, the grounds of his reform polices were around the conception of the implementation of ‘socialist self-government’. The idea was to release the power and responsibility of the central government to local or enterprise level, so that the enterprise was supposed to take more responsibility for raising production, while the improvement of the ‘bonus’ calculation system was also expected to support the motives of enterprise production. The reform was expected to link with the idea of providing workers more incentives to reach the target of the annual production plan. According to the changes of Gorbachev’s reform idea and process, several new polices were introduced, which included ‘Reform of Payment System’ (1986), ‘Law on Co-operatives’ (1988) and ‘Law on State Enterprises (Organisation)’ (1988). Although these new polices aimed to stimulate soviet workers’ labour motivation by assigning freedom and rights of expressing their concern over their living and working conditions, the poor economic performance was not really improved. The reform then actually stimulated the launch of the new Russian labour movement, resulted from his new policies seemed more likely to meet contradictory situations as the immediate outcome. One group of arguments (Ticktin 1989; Walker 1993) believed that the immediate impact of Gorbachev’s economic reform, ironically, 38 stimulated more unrest among workers, due to the fact that the very limited liberalization of the production of means of consumption started to cause disorder in the retail market. The economic and social conditions of ordinary workers had worsened, and most workers were concerned that their wages and benefits were no longer secure. The chaotic social atmosphere very soon provoked an upsurge of strikes and protests. At the beginning, the dissatisfaction and grievances among workers appeared in the use of traditional methods: sending letters to newspapers to publicise their demands; appeals to local Party organs to intervene in their problems. Nevertheless, the bureaucrats of the Party-state at the time did not yet realise the gravity of the situation and their responses turned out to be insufficient, which sharpened grievances among workers. The ongoing social unrest therefore showed that traditional methods of handling social-labour issues could no longer provide a solution. Beginning from 1987, individual strikes started to arise. Following similar steps, spontaneous strike actions around the Soviet Union’s coalmining areas started to appear. According to the reports of Friedgut & Siegelbaum (1990), in March 1989, miners in the Donetsk coalmines refused to recognise the content of the collective agreement, and a short strike action was called immediately. Later on, the intense atmosphere between the workers and their administration started to spread into other 39 coalmining areas. In July the same year, more and more miners from various coalmines called for strike action so that they could deliver a serious message for their demands to be heard by the government and the administration of the coal industry. During the strike actions, strike committees or workers’ committees were also established outside the traditional union organisations. In addition, it is important to note that the social and labour unrest had also developed alongside the democratic and nationalist movements at the time, and these forces immediately shook the authority of Gorbachev’s central government. More concretely, the leaders of the strike force in the Russian coalmine regions started to keep close contact with Boris Yeltsin’s political movement, in which they shared the common interest of taking apart the legitimacy of both the sovereignty and property of Gorbachev’s Soviet government. As part of the constituents of the CPSU and the Soviet government, VTsSPS had also become a central target of the new ‘independent’ movement. One of the great legacies of the 1989 strike was the reform pressure on the Soviet trade union. However, it only meant an organisational change of the soviet trade union structure. Following the wave of miners’ strike and other labour unrest, the legitimacy of the official soviet trade union was shaken, and the VTsSPS trade union organisations faced various challenges to their own structures. Just like the term ‘perestroika’ for the society in Gorbachev’s era, this was the period of ‘reforming’ old 40 union structures and also the formation of new unions. The reform of the VTsSPS union organisations started from the structural reconstitution, but very soon the power struggles and the rows over union property ownership among its regional and branch union organisations were also involved, together with ideological struggles which related to political positions. In September 1989, at the Sixth session of the Congress, VTsSPS decided to establish a republican union organisation based on the territory of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR). The founding congress was held in Moscow on 21-23 March 1990 to complete the establishment of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR). Igor Klochkov, who had been a secretary of the Communist Party for years and had personal contact with Yeltsin during this period of his career, was elected as the president of FNPR. Meanwhile, more and more republican and branch union leaders were eager to transfer more power, as well as stronger legitimacy, from the central union organs into their own hands. Some VTsSPS leaders, like the president Vladimir Shcherbakov, wanted to maintain union structures under the framework of the Soviet Union, while recognising the new principle of greater autonomy for branch and republican union organisations. Following such an idea, at the 18th session of Congress, October 1990, VTsSPS adopted its new name of General Confederation of Trade Unions (VKP), which was designated as the successor of VTsSPS. Nevertheless, like what had been 41 happening on the political stage, the dynamic of disintegration had grown even stronger. Union leaders, especially those from union branches at republican level, had lost real interest in sharing their potential power (resources) under the united framework of VKP. The uneasy atmosphere between the VKP leadership and the leaders of branch and republican union organisations decided the fate of VKP. In reality, although VKP retained considerable property, the Confederation has functioned little more than as a platform for leaders of the former republican unions to exchange information about labour conditions and labour strategies. All these changes determined that the union power in Russia had only transferred into the hands of FNPR (Connor 1996, p.24). Apart from the change within the old soviet trade union structure, which was partly a result of the leadership’s political opportunism, the atmosphere of the strike wave brought even stronger energy to workers who no longer put their faith into the VTsSPS union organisation. As for the development of new alternative trade unions, similar initiatives such as building up new labour groups started to spread over the territory of the Soviet Union. The scene in the coalmine areas seemed to present the most extraordinary story. The strike committees at coalmines had soon become workers’ committees and continued to function. In October 1990, at the second Congress of Coal miners of the USSR, after a chaotic split, an initiative presented by 42 the leaders of the Kuzbass workers’ committee was adopted by those delegates who left the NRPUP-held meeting and held their own Congress. The resolution decided to establish a new trade union outside the official miners’ union, with the name of ‘Independent Miners’ Union’ (NPG). Following this resolution, the Russian miners held their own national congress in South-Sakhalinsk to form the Russian Independent Miners’ Union (NPGR). Alexander Sergeev, an electrician from Mezhdurechensk, was elected as president of the new trade union. The establishment of the Independent Miners’ Union of Russia (NPGR) has been seen as the landmark (milestone) of the new Russian labour movement. The activities of the new organisation also came to be seen as an indicator of labour activism in Russian society. Actually, new trade union organisations had emerged even earlier. On 1 April 1989, about 30 activists from 10 regions and cities met in Moscow. The meeting decided to register as a public organisation and the first independent trade union association was establish. The Association took the name of ‘Association of Socialist Trade Unions SOTsPROF’. 6 Notwithstanding the loose connection among its member trade unions, SOTsPROF had registered as the first trans-sector union 6 Following its establishment, SOTsPROF was soon involved in several internal conflicts between activists with different political orientations. Those activists whose positions were closer to socialism or anarchism were finally excluded; and at its second congress, the delegates decided to take off ‘Socialist’ from its title and changed its status from SOTsPROF USSR to SOTsPROF Russia. The very nature of the new organisation was soon dominated by its ambitious leader, Sergei Khramov, and it only behaves like an umbrella protection for the convenience of the registration of new union organisations. (Clarke et al. 1995, pp.209-217). 43 confederation outside VTsSPS. With the atmosphere of ‘decentralism’, more and more new ‘free’ labour organisations outside the traditional structure started to be established. Apart from the energy sectors, these new unions mostly appeared in the transport sectors, such as aviation, railways, sea transport. There were many individual ‘free’ trade unions formed in manufacturing enterprises. Their initiators might form an informal group as the primary step and if the negotiation with the administration and official trade unions did not go successfully, they would establish a new union organisation or the whole group would separate from the official one as the only favourable solution. It is important to note (Cook 1997), many leaders of these new trade unions adopted a new principle for their membership, which should only recruit members on a professional basis; they insisted that the old industrial principle of the FNPR membership can not really distinguish the interests of different groups of workers, not to mention could learn how to defend the interests of the workers. 1.1.2 Confrontation between old trade unions and alternative unions With all the new, unfamiliar but almost chaotic situation in the face of Russian society, the formation or reformation of trade unions over the period of 1989-1991 had also been deeply involved with the political movements and power struggles. For example, it was reported that the miners’ leaders and Yeltsin’s political struggle had very 44 ambiguous and close links. In 1991, the miners’ organisations called another strike with the support of Yeltsin, who associated it with his political struggle with Gorbachev’s Soviet government. NPGR was even accused of being financed by a new nomenklatura of the Russian regime and American unions (Levchik 2003, pp. 36-37). The union leadership participated in political struggles as a means of securing their own resources. The relations between the new trade unions and the old trade unions had divided over their positions towards economic reform, as well as by the struggle for the resources and capacity of the trade unions (Clarke et al. 1995). In general, these confrontations were indeed a reflection of the transition period in which the various labour organisations endeavoured to establish or re-build the legitimacy of their existence and status in the face of the new state. Yeltsin’s agenda of economic reform brought a further gap between the alternative and the FNPR trade unions. The alternative unions identified themselves with Yeltsin’s campaign. They had played a major role in supporting Yeltsin’s rise to power and gained comfortable connections to Yeltsin and his followers. Although FNPR’s president was on the side of Yeltsin in the August coup of 1991, the radical price liberalisation at the end of the year led to a sharp fall of living standards and threatened increased unemployment. Under the pressure of its branch organisations and also associated with the demands of their traditional partners – the industrialists 45 of the state-owned sectors – FNPR defined itself as a ‘Constructive Opposition’, normally issuing warnings in opposition to Yeltsin’s polices. From the end of 1991 the leadership of FNPR gradually moved away from Yeltsin’s government. Further anxious reaction arose in September 1992 when Yeltsin agreed to sign a decree to nationalise FNPR’s control of the state social insurance fund. In the confrontation between Yeltsin and the Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1993, the trade unions divided and clashed alongside political positions again. The alternative trade unions were generally on the side of Yeltsin, while FNPR stood aside calling for simultaneous elections for both parliament and president. The situation very soon led the FNPR leadership into confrontation with Yeltsin. The end of the parliamentary conflict in which Yeltsin emerged as the winner had an immediate impact on FNPR. After the defeat of the White House, the leaders of FNPR were in fear of revenge from Yeltsin’s team. Such a factor made the FNPR Executive Council try to keep a distance from the Union’s previous position. Moreover, the opposition to Klochkov within FNPR took the chance to demand his resignation. Klochkov’s seat was soon replaced by the chairperson of the Moscow Federation, Mikhail Shmakov. Shmakov was formally elected on 28 October at the Second (Extraordinary) Congress of FNPR. Since then, the new leadership of FNPR has been committed to keeping the union in a 46 stable position as well as emphasising the recognition of ‘social partnership’. The ideas of social partnership had been introduced in the Gorbachev era, and the official trade unions thought that ‘social partnership’ defined the task of trade unions as the traditional control of the government over production was liberalised. As early as the 1990 Founding Congress of FNPR, the union had adopted a resolution defining the basic method of the trade unions involving the negotiation of general, tariff and collective agreements. Departing from his populist-style promises, Yeltsin also welcomed the conception and mechanism of social partnership, especially after his success in making the power of the Russian President the new political centre. The slogan of ‘social partnership’ would help him to redefine the role of government in socio-labour relations, as well as using the new mechanism to handle potential labour conflicts (Connor 1996; Ashwin and Clarke 2002). On 15 November 1991, he issued Presidential Decree No. 212 in which the primary framework for the establishment of ‘social partnership’ was provided. The core institution for the application of social partnership was the Russian Tripartite Commission, which was formed on 24 January 1992. The composition of the seats on the labour side also caused a row between the alternative trade unions and the FNPR organisations. FNPR demanded that labour’s seats should be distributed on the basis of the unions’ memberships, by such way their enormous official membership number would allow them to take over almost all the 47 labour seats; the alternative trade unions strongly opposed such a suggestion while insisting on the ‘one- union-one-seat’ principle. Apart from the row over labour’s seats, the settlement in the later years has given FNPR dominant status to be the main voice. The formation and consensus of ‘social partnership’ as the institution regulating social-labour relations has retained formal recognition across Russia, but its practice has been widely criticised for the lack of effective mechanism to transform the labour relations in post-soviet Russia (Tyurina 2001). 1.1.3 Chaotic reform: the aftermath of parliamentary conflict After the 1993 conflict between the parliament and the president, Yeltsin’s government tried to stabilise the post-conflict environment, and senior officials expressed their expectation of achieving reconciliation with all social forces, including trade unions. The appeal was soon formalised with the presentation of the Social Accord Pact. After the resignation of Klochkov, FNPR was given the opportunity of engaging in ‘social partnership’ in exchange for its commitment to the Pact. The moves of both the government and the FNPR therefore opened another period of re-institutionalisation, in which the change of union status was more critical for its future development. Since the interactions of the involved parties over 1993-1994, FNPR re-ensured the monopoly status of its trade union legitimacy. On 48 the other side, the harmony period between the alternative trade unions and the government had almost come to an end. The change of allocation of union seats on the Russian Tripartite Commission (RTK) proved such a tendency. By the same time, the worsening economic situation such as cash crisis and wage arrears started a new labour unrest at the enterprise level. Miners of Vorkuta went on strike action and even called on Yeltsin to resign. The alternative trade unions tried to regain their political weight by forming broader confederations - VKT (All-Russian Confederation of Labour) and KTR (Russian Confederation of Labour) - in 1995. The newly established confederations can only support very limited functioning organs and still relied heavily on a few union organisations, such as the unions of dockers (RPD), train operators (RPLBZh), and air-traffic controllers and pilots (FPAD and FPALS), as well as NPGR. The alternative trade unions are limited by their small membership and narrow sectoral interest from the expansion of their union organisations. In practice, the only function of such a coalition is for the alternative trade unions to construct a formally united representative body at the federal level. The fall of living standards and the mounting wage arrears to some extent pushed the trade unions to show some reaction, whether the leaders were really willing to take serious actions or not. The FNPR resumed the All-Russian collective action on Oct 27 1994. The form of the collective action, nevertheless, was rather symbolic, for 49 it only seemed to show that the union leaders perceived the worsening situation as a basis for the union’s campaign of looking for a vague solution for the national unrest without putting forward any concrete projects. The miners and workers in the budget sectors were the main force among the strike actions. After 1991, an increasing number of strike actions took place in the education sector, and there was an increasing tendency for more strikers to turn to the hunger strike as their method; the miners’ union organisations, interestingly, did not play a leading critical role in the strike movement until 1996. Noteworthily, apart from the general bitterness of the Russian workers, there was another sort of strike action which was rather like internal conflict over the ownership of the enterprise. The application of privatisation at state-owned enterprise generated the fear of workers whose enterprises were facing the transfer of ownership. Interestingly, in many cases these individual strikes were exploited by the directors, who promoted strike action under the name of the labour collective in order to capture the control of ownership against external buyers. The continuous fall of industrial production and real wages made a weak economic situation which, combined with large scale wage arrears, brought further political instability. By December 1997, one in four enterprises faced difficulties of fulfilling payments. The common outrage of the public and the anger of workers had 50 burst over most sectors of the country’s economy. According to Katsva (2002), in 1997 alone, 16,639 of the total 17,007 recorded conflict cases were caused by wage arrears. The peak of strike or collective actions was in 1997-1998. The majority of strike actions took place in the sectors of energy, education and health care. The common dissatisfaction with the government was widely spread among Russian people so that for the first time the FNPR and alternative trade unions set up a coordinated action in 27 March 1997 when KTR and VKT gave support to the action day initiated by FNPR. In the summer of 1998, the miners, again, conducted their picket beside the government which lasted for four months, claiming they would fight until the government changed its economic policy, but the protest itself then ended dramatically. During this wave of social and labour unrest, the protesters and strikers usually called for Yeltsin and his government to step down and to change the course of economic reform, but no real change occurred in response to these demands, following the up-and-down of the appointed prime ministers. (In a way, the real change was that the old soviet apparatchiks came back to the political centre.) In most cases, the strike actions were against the state, not the enterprise owners. Most trade union leaders were standing together with the enterprise management to resist the hostile environment ‘caused’ by the central government. In some cases, it could also be a strike with the administration against the local authority (Ashwin and Clarke 51 2002). Despite the progress in the Russian trade unions’ struggles for legitimacy, the events and experiences did not bring enough effective methods to support the life struggles of ordinary workers and union members. It was revealed (Katsva 1999; Borisov 2000) that the workers’ frustration arose at the lack of initiative of the official trade unions, thus radical actions emerged more and more often and became more common among the desperate workers whose wages had been delayed for several months. According to Katsva (ibid, p.162), among the workers who suffered there were the most desperate category of workers who had not received wages for 26 months, and that was the precondition for taking extreme actions when there was even such a case. Apart from the miners’ actions, there was also a hunger strike in Ivanovo city which lasted for 25 days (Anisimova 2004, p.65). Similar activities arose in various regions. Over 1998-1999, struggles took place by angry workers in Urals, Siberia and South Russia who blocked the railways to force the local administration or enterprise to resolve the difficulties they were facing. Such a special phenomenon was widely called the ‘rails war’, but after this the dynamic of similar actions started to fall. These radical scenes of workers struggles were very impressive; however, most of these spontaneous actions normally ended up without giving serious grassroots 52 dynamics to either the official or alternative trade unions. Instead of generating fresh challenges to the stabilised union-government relations, the strike committee or the temporary organisations themselves simply vanished. Take the remarkable event of workers’ resistance to the new company conditions at the Vyborg Pulp and Paper Mill (end of 1999-2000) as an example. For some observers like Maksimov (2001b), the event showed the great potential of Russian workers’ collective action, and the militant spirit spread so that even a local solidarity organisation was established. Nonetheless, the Vyborg event lasted for a couple of months but ended up with the government’s intervention with special forces, and the once militant labour collective became so passive that even the trade union committee almost dissolved.7 In general, the aftermath of this period is demonstrated by the fall of confidence in the effect of strike action in resolving labour problems. According to Anisimova’s study (2004), the poll of VTsIOM, the All-Russia Public Opinion Research Centre had shown clearly ‘The lack of positive result of strikes means low effectiveness and the impact can be seen by the fact that for Russian people strike action cannot make any positive result (from 5 % in 1989 to 33 % in 2001)’ (p.71).8 7 In January 2003 and March 2004 I was invited to visit the town Sovetskii where the factory is located. At the solidarity meeting, the workers in the meeting had expressed the view that the collective has now become powerless and with the confusion of the uncertain future. Interestingly, Pulaeva and Clarke (2001) had pointed out that, though the event was supported by the workers, the nature of the conflict was rather a struggle between different forces over the factory ownership, in which one of the groups provoked the workers who suffered to organise collective resistance. 8 The data of same survey also conducted by VTsIMO in March 2003 makes Anisimova’s conclusion more interesting hence the low expectation attitude decreased when number of strikes has fallen rapidly compared to that in 1998. 53 1.1.4 The new Labour Code: cooperation between the Government and FNPR Since 1994, relations between the state, the FNPR organisations, and the alternative unions gradually achieved a specific kind of rigid balance (unbalance), in which FNPR’s lobbying capacity in the State Duma had a considerable impact on the power struggle with the alternative trade unions. One of the most notable events as evidence of this was the adoption of the new Labour Code in 2001. The Russian federal government’s initiative was to replace the former Soviet labour laws to meet the further needs of Russia’s ‘economic liberalisation’ (marketisation). Nevertheless, the original proposal was so unpopular even the FNPR leadership was in opposition to the government version. By conducting oppositional campaigns, the FNPR and the alternative trade unions promoted their alternative versions, in order to replace the government’s proposal. There were even coordinated actions against the government’s proposal joined by the FNPR and the alternative unions. The fact that even the pro-government ‘Unity’ parliamentary faction did not support the anti-worker draft of the new Labour Code, forced the federal government to find another solution. On December 21, 2000, the government of the Russian Federation was forced to withdraw its draft Labour Code from consideration in the State Duma. The former 54 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’yanov took this decision to avoid the defeat of the government-proposed draft by a parliamentary vote. The vote, as the organisers believed, could be seen as the direct result of trade-union protest actions that struck Russia in December as well as the avalanche of indignant resolutions and telegrams expressing worldwide support for the opposition campaigns. Protests against the government’s draft were held in different regions around the country. For example, on the day of All-Russian protest action, the demonstrators in St Petersburg (up to 1,000 people) took to the streets of the city centre, and ended the rally at the building where President Putin’s regional representative in the North-West of Russia, Viktor Cherkesov, as well as the Federal Security Service General, is based. The protest campaign argued that ‘The government’s Labour Code is a gift to the bosses, the government’s Labour Code is a noose for workers!’ Dealing with the strong opposition, the federal government and the State Duma leadership agreed to form a Conciliation Commission to prepare a compromise version of the Labour Code, based on the government’s draft. The government, together with FNPR later on, intended to introduce a compromise bill to the State Duma in March-April 2001. The oppositional campaign of the alternative trade unions lost momentum after the adoption of the FNPR-supported Labour Code by 2001. The final adoption of the new Labour Code, which was closer to FNPR’s vision, struck an 55 enormous blow against the alternative trade unions. When the new Labour Code went into effect in February 2002, many observers believed it spelled the end of the alternative trade unions (Klimova and Clément 2004). In effect, the new Labour Code stipulated that only one union could fully represent the employees of any given enterprise. According to Articles 29, 30, 31, 37 of the new Labour Code, only the trade union which organises the majority of workers at the enterprise can be authorised as the representative agent of the employees’ interests. An elected joint organ can become the representative organ only when there is no union organisation that can claim a majority in the enterprise. Consequently, the new Labour Code has granted most FNPR organisations the monopoly of workers’ representation under the current circumstance of the Russian trade union movement; in other words, since many alternative union organisations were established on professional / occupational principles, they can easily be ignored lawfully for their minor membership. The new Labour Code also narrows the category of union organisations in terms of their right to participate in the negotiation of a collective agreement. The right is now only given to the ‘primary organisation’ of a national trade union, so that those non-FNPR, independent trade union organisations have to seek a new ‘host’ in order not to be excluded from the possibility of sitting at the negotiation table. The qualification, nonetheless, does not automatically guarantee the negotiation seat. According to 56 regulative conditions of the new Code, if the various primary organisations cannot compose a joint team within 5 days then the right will only go to the majority organisation. The proportional participation in the collective agreement therefore considerably depends on the will of the leadership of the union committee of the majority organisation (again, these are FNPR ones in most cases). The realities of such conditions on the ground show that there have been few cases where the consent or coordination between the FNPR and the alternative organisations has been achieved. On the contrary, primary organisations of FNPR trade unions are more likely to play the role of oppressing (or opposing) their counterpart from the alternative trade unions (Bizyukov 2005). In short, the authority and status of alternative trade unions have deliberately been weakened. While being a close ally of the Party of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya), as Kargarlitsky (2006) commented, ‘the FNPR leaders certainly hailed the new Labour Code as an historic victory.’ Moreover, the whole event, by exploiting its political position to achieve the privileged status of representing labour’s seat in collective bargaining, has allowed the FNPR union organisations to enjoy a more institutionalised condition with a symbolic reform of their traditional activities. The new Labour Code therefore represents a serious blow to the transition of Russian industrial relations. The impact, however, was not only on the rights of 57 alternative labour organizations, but on any attempt to stand up for workers’ rights. The right to organise a strike, for example, has become much harder to exercise. The right for workers to leave their production duty was included in the new Code, but the conditions for a strike require very complex procedures for the initiators (see Article 399). Firstly, a majority of all employees have to vote for a strike, it has become impossible to organise a legal strike on a professional basis, which is the typical form of organisation of the alternative trade unions. Secondly, the union organisation has to successfully go through the procedure of a ‘collective labour dispute’ then to receive legal status for a legal strike to take place. Such conditions might not cause serious concern to the FNPR leadership, since in any case most of them are used to the duty of distributing social benefits for employees instead of fighting for the rights of their members. Over the four years since the new Labour Code was introduced, however, there have been a number of cases which reveal that damage has been done to the FNPR just as much as to the alternative unions. If a local FNPR official decides not to act as a corrupt opportunist, embezzling membership dues and running a business for the sale and lease of union buildings, and tries to do something else, he or she might also get hit with the full force of the repressive Labour Code. Therefore, infighting has increased within the FNPR, and unions have opted to leave. One widely noticed case was the trade union representing the employees of the Ford Motor Company 58 plant in Leningrad Oblast. As they pulled off two successful strikes, labour activists at the plant discovered that their own union was more concerned about collecting dues than supporting their initiatives. By contrast, alternative unions were extremely supportive, despite their shortage of resources and political weight (Ilyin 2006).9 The trade union committee finally decided to leave FNPR and joined SOTsPROF and later VKT. The impact of the enforcement of the new Labour Code on the Russian labour movement is obvious. The core group of alternative trade union activists held together under the assault, although many labour organizations went under. Their previous advantage, by which they could put the weak union capacity aside with the sponsorship of AFL-CIO funds and their legal status in the previous (Soviet) Labour Code, has all withered. One of the alternative union organizations, the All-Russia Confederation of Labour (VKT), has survived in a somewhat depleted form, along with the radical left-wing ‘Defence of Labour’ organization. Nevertheless, membership of alternative unions has fallen off dramatically. Union leaders left over from the 1990s have proved incapable of meeting the new challenges facing their members. Some have been removed from their posts, while others have lost the support of union activists. Certainly, we might have seen a new generation of leaders For more information see Vladimir Ilyin, ‘The Primary Trade-union Organization of the Factory «FORD MOTOR KOMPANI» in Vsevolozhsk (Leningrad Region), INTAS Project Second Annual Workshop, 3-5 April 2006. [Online]. Available from http://www.warwick.ac.uk/russia/Intas/FORD.doc [ Accessed 01 Jan 2007]. 9 59 which has begun to emerge, including Pyotr Zolotaryov at AvtoVAZ and Alexei Etmanov at Ford. Together with the change at VKT in 2005, its member organisations elected a new leader, Boris Kravchenko. In face of the difficulties of union organisations’ survival and the fading of union impacts at enterprise level, the alternative trade union organisations have also started to try, or at least to look for, new forms of organisational work in order to keep the organisations alive. With little doubt, the situation shows the marginalisation faced by alternative trade union organisations in post-soviet Russia, with their weak representation among workers, and the activists somehow have to re-constitute the unions into another social organisation or association with limited resources (Bizyukov 2005). 1.1.5 The characteristics of the Russian trade union movement since 1989 The protest actions and the formation of new labour organisations since 1989 fairly revealed the fact that bitter feelings among Russian workers towards their living and working conditions in the post-soviet era did raise common dissatisfactions. Alongside the development of the conflicts and protest actions, the Russian trade unions to some extent carried specific characteristics under these circumstances. Despite the enormous membership basis, however, the basic problem facing the 60 traditional Russian trade unions, as we have seen in previous sections, indicated the fact that they did not succeed in offering effective resistance to the massive job loss and failed to resist the sharp fall of workers’ living standards. Their goals were mostly defensive, focusing on not losing the enormous property and position inherited from soviet times. One who looks through the short history of post-soviet Russian labour relations might immediately get an impression of failure, but as Clarke et al. (1995, p.399) clarify, ‘The story of the workers’ movement in Russia can easily be interpreted as a story of failure. However, it is important to situate the story in its context’. Certainly, one may argue that what Russian trade unions have faced is comparable to what the trade unions in the advanced capitalist societies have faced. The view reminds us of the nature of trade union which refers to the ‘dual character’ within trade unionism, in which the solidarity goal is practiced with the pursuit of immediate economic interest as the priority of its activity. One may refer to the fact that the division of labour has made schism a substantial part of the collective identity of organised labour and that has been a constant issue in Western society.10 Yet, since 10 To take one concrete example, in his study on the miners’ strike (1984-85) in Britain, Andrew Richards (1996) presented details of the division and split of the NUM struggle, as miners presented a divided commitment to community solidarity. Hyman (2006) has constantly written of that in recent decades. Both theoretically and empirically, Marxist sociologists have been forced to search for explanations for the limits of collective resistance. Among those efforts, some writers have interpreted the systematic suppression of human capacities as a major source of divisions among different categories of workers, regarding for example sexism and racism. The work of Nichols and Armstrong (1976), Workers Divided: A Study of Shop Floor Politics, encapsulates such an analysis of division within their social life. For others, like Edwards (1979), the workplace can be seen as a ‘contested 61 the Russian trade unions face a universal problem within the development of global trade union movement, the argument would suggest the matter is to work out a project out of the union’s dual principles. Nonetheless, Russian labour certainly faces a different environment because there is so far little support for independent organised labour to act and constitute itself in at least a regional or professional presence. The alternative trade unions did not achieve a broader mutual support with institutional strength as did their Western counterparts. Another major difference is that, though there is division or schism among trade union positions in the West, it does not take the same form as in Russia where the traditional trade unions function as an arm of the administration of the enterprise, as can be seen in the train drivers’ case of this thesis and many other published case studies. Not to mention to a great extent those traditional unions remain the legacy of a collective identity in post-Soviet period which includes the role of directors and management. In general, there are two specific characteristics of the development described earlier which can be outlined as the concern of this research, which present specific questions facing the Russian trade union organisations, and these are addressed in the following sections. terrain’. Workers’ motivation and capacity to resist managerial control depends in part on the strength of workplace cultures that reflect their class, occupational, gender and ethnic identities (Trice 1993; Strangleman and Roberts 1999). In details of another interesting account, Sennett and Cobb (1972, p.83) write of ‘male solidarity’, and Cockburn (1983) and Pollert (1981) provide investigations of gendered-based solidarity. Pollert (1996) provided a clear conception that the trade union has to face the necessity of reforming itself in order to transcend the division of workers’ categories: women, people of colour, the young, part-time, temporary workers and other workers. 62 Antagonistic development between ‘traditional’ and ‘alternative’ trade unions As mentioned in the previous sections, many of the labour issues in post-soviet Russia revealed scenes of confrontational politics among Russian trade unions. The conflicts between FNPR and the alternative trade unions through their campaigns often appeared from the national level down to the individual issues of union duties. The two sides have criticised each other since 1988 over their position toward the regime, and engaged in struggles over union legitimacy and resources regarding the management of labour issues. Fundamentally, those conflicts reflected the demands over the enormous institutional resources as well as their different positions towards the administration. Though there has been cooperation or coordination between the FNPR and non-FNPR trade unions from time to time, the general relations between them are still deeply divided.11 It is the case that serious divisions within trade union movements are quite common in many advanced countries. The confrontation between the two sides in Russia, however, was not between two commensurate forces. For the leaders of the alternative trade union organisations, their relatively easy access to the new ruling 11 It is noteworthy that, in their official names, Russian trade unions usually include the word ‘independent’. For example, both of the opposite trade unions, FNPR and NPG use this word, but they still attack each other for the dependence of their activities. 63 elites in the early 1990s did not last for long. Since the end of the 1993 conflict, the leaders of FNPR were offered new chances to recover their traditional ‘tie’ with the governing power. Yet, since then the priority strategy has been to take the chance to keep favour with Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Federal governments. The FNPR leadership and Yeltsin and his followers all learned the potential value and benefits for each side under the framework of a commitment to social partnership, and left the cries of the alternative unions aside. Under the new context, labour grievances nevertheless provided a strong basis for the development of trade union activities. The official trade unions, however, exploited that energy as a resource for their own re-institutionalisation in the transition period. As for the non-FNPR organisations, the consequence is apparent that even at the regional or national level, the position and the role of alternative trade unions have been greatly marginalised (especially local or primary union organisations are more likely to become primary victims). In addition, the political backgrounds have provided an even worse space: the available vacant space, the basis of its development, derives from the interest struggle among ruling elites. Later on, the leaders of the movement, person by person, started to enter into state institutions. It seems only the dominant FNPR organisations can take the lead on the workers’ side in the transformation of Russian labour relations. The events around the campaign over the new Labour Code provide a clear picture of the divided 64 organisations. Nevertheless, on the side of alternative trade union organisations, several unions (like the dockers’ and the pilots’ unions) still hold a very critical force in demonstrating a future perspective for the demands of organised labour. There have certainly been some cases of the formation of new trade unions on the basis of self-organisation. Notwithstanding the continuous emergence of a number of active and effective primary trade union organisations over the 90s and after, we still find that there are formidable barriers to the development of more active forms of trade unionism in the workplace. Alternative trade unions are rather active but keep a very small number of members. For them the worst problem is that they are unable to expand membership further. All trade unions have certainly been discredited and that becomes clearer in workers’ individualistic responses in tackling their problems. Even the alternative trade unions have failed to provide a serious channel for ordinary workers to represent their interests. Thus it is necessary to understand the critical facts behind the (immature) transformation of Russian trade unionism. The lack of effective activities for trade unions Alongside the moves of the Russian trade unions over the 90s, the development also reveals the conditions of weak interaction between members and union functionaries 65 － involving insubstantial union membership. Whether through lack of trust in their unions or the radicalisation of workers’ spontaneous actions since 1989, there has clearly been only slow progress in the interaction (integration) between the union’s competence and the workers’ difficult conditions (Hoffer 1997). Table 1.1 shows the low trust in trade unions among workers, as well as showing there is gap between such mistrust and the need for actions. The tendency of the decline of union density presents another familiar picture to us. Ironically, most Russian workers did not bother to go and require cancellation of their membership voluntarily. The insubstantial union membership retained in many Russian trade unions reveals the weak interaction between the trade unions and their members. This fact embraces two points. Firstly, the definition of membership in many FNPR organisations has not changed. The recognition of management’s membership within official trade union organisations and labour collectives may arguably cause an interruption within the identification process. Secondly, such ambiguous features do not attract much attention from ordinary workers. The primary FNPR union organisations could even just exist on official paper. Even the union leadership admitted that the great ignorance about the meaning of union membership by both union leaders and the workers reflects the further fact of mistrust between the two sides. 66 TABLE 1.1：VTSIOM’s survey on workers’ trust in trade union Time of Percentage of attitudes about trade union Percentage ready to Survey Fully deserve Do not fully Do not deserve take part in protest trust deserve trust any trust at all actions when living standards worsen (partial trust) Workers Specialists All Specialists Workers All Specialists Workers All Specialists Workers All 1994 8 9 3 17 17 27 45 48 39 21 29 19 May 1995 6 4 3 22 37 34 43 44 42 24 28 19 March 1996 8 10 9 21 27 18 41 43 45 23 32 18 March 1997 11 8 11 26 24 35 33 42 35 31 38 33 March 1998 11 10 11 22 20 27 36 47 44 26 34 29 March 1999 10 14 10 28 37 37 37 39 40 28 35 30 March 2000 10 9 12 27 28 29 31 37 40 15 22 15 June Source: (Gordon and Klopov 2000, p. 219) Actually, on the ground the alienation between the two parts has been retained on many occasions as it was in soviet times. Trade unions, especially those belonging to FNPR, are formally big but highly bureaucratic and institutionalised. Whether in real practice or in the field of Russian labour studies, the FNPR trade unions are still widely noted as failing to genuinely function as organisations defending the members’ 67 demands with their own strength (Sherbakov 2000). Despite their rhetorical claims of being independent and looking after their members’ interests, most leaders of union organisations are still used to keeping their role in the enterprise and follow their soviet-era predecessors in fulfilling their duty of distributing social benefits for the enterprise administration. As the popular day-to-day duty, many trade union functionaries and leaders still hold the belief that the most important and priority work for them is to offer every possible social benefit to their members. 12 On the other hand, we also understand most Russian workers see themselves as qualified recipients within the system of distribution of social benefits of the enterprise. The Russian mode is characterised by the incomplete achievements of soviet trade unions and their successors in the face of the call to defend the interests of their members. Such a characteristic is described by the Russian scholars Gordon and Klopov (2000, p.184) as ‘pseudo-trade unionism’, while taking the mode of Western trade unionism as the basic comparison. Comparing the similarity to the Japanese model, Clarke and Ashwin (2002) define the current character of Russian industrial relations: the collaborative relations between unions and management at enterprise level; the unions’ lack of involvement in controlling the shop floor, the tradition of enterprise paternalism, and the confinement of protest to symbolic ‘offensives’. As one conclusion often heard, ‘While looking at the Russian labour movement, the trade union development did not make much progress’ (Maksimov 2004, p.131). 12 68 The weak interaction can be explained from both sides. On the one hand, union members pay little attention to their union leaders at every level; on the other hand, trade union leaders, likewise, have little confidence in members’ concerns and participation. For the union leaders, the crucial energy would not come from the independent activities of the members, at least until that really became widespread; the strength of their organisations is more likely to derive from upholding the traditional paternalist pattern in their workplace. As Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov (Clarke et al. 1995) have investigated, the character of leadership within official trade unions is that it still contains their traditional role of associating with management at enterprise level. For example, the real purpose of those activities led by the reformed ROSUGLEPROF (Russian Independent Coal Miners’ Union) was to coordinate individual struggles as the instrument of the trade union bosses so that they could stand together with mine directors to put pressure on the government. Even though since 1994 the mine subsidy policy of the government has directly transferred to the mine administration, ROSUGLEPROF has still kept up the same route (Borisov 2000). Meanwhile, such an environment provided space for the bureaucratisation of the union structure (an undemocratic tendency). It is not difficult to see this in the case of the top level of trade union leaders, whose concern is to create their authority or keep their leadership within the existing institution. In addition, the frequent 69 conflicts within the leadership of the main alternative trade unions, and frequent cases of corruption and scandals, show the problem of the leaders’ individual ambitions, although they continuously appeal to workers to look at their non-traditional but real defensive functions (see the study on alternative trade unions in Clarke et al. 1995). The limits of their narrow occupational base, associated with the conditions mentioned above, put the alternative trade unions in an awkward situation in trying to gain support among the majority of workers. By acknowledging the fact that the Russian trade unions in the post-soviet period have not been able to produce a fundamental change / transformation of the current framework, various estimations and analytic aspects have been underlined. Among the analyses, some emphasise the way in which the substantial impact of ‘solitary individualism’ and the legacy of ‘alienated collectivism’ in the workplace have determined the moves of both the official, FNPR, trade unions and the alternative, free, trade unions. A number of observers (Mandel 2000; Katsva 2002; Maksimov 2004) therefore suggest that the incomplete reform of the union strategy, and especially the absence of a fundamental change among union personnel, is one of the most critical factors weakening the Russian trade unions in the transformation of labour relations in Russia. In their analyses, many cases or individuals involved in labour conflicts have demonstrated the possibility of changing the dimension of 70 organised labour; or, on the other hand, at least have shown how and why a more progressive, active labour force has not appeared. The history of the trade union movement in Western societies and their institutional achievements are seen as the creation of an organised workforce which can play an important role for social peace or social changes, which make these observers believe that an immediate agent must emerge to articulate the response of social discontent. This research will move on to provide a further examination of such arguments. The shared analyses and the relevant factors will be further discussed in the next section. 1.2 Studies on Russian workers and their union organisations To explain the fact that there has been neither the ‘social explosion’ nor the fundamental transformation of Russian labour organisations that were widely expected to appear under the depressed economy during the 90s, observers have conducted various analytic projects and surveys of the characteristics of social structure, domestic economic relations, and labour relations of Russian society.13 Many studies from a sociological point of view focus on various factors derived from the strong impact of the socio-economic system in the former Soviet Union and 13 Such kinds of account can be found, for example, in Gill and Markwick (2000); Mandel (2000); Crowley and Ost (2001). 71 Russia. Such analyses suggest that the transformation of Russian labour relations has been deeply determined by the effects of the characteristic soviet relations of production. The development of Russian trade unionism, especially the interaction between the union activities and the workers, has also been investigated within similar frameworks. In this section the review firstly presents several basic arguments of these different interpretations of the character of post-soviet labour relations and the new Russian trade union organisations. Apart from those generally shared points, varied estimations were in particular presented about the perspectives of the Russian trade union movement. Secondly, the review is to move forward to present a clear theoretical framework for investigating workers and their contacts with their organisations. 1.2.1 The soviet-type social relations of production at the workplace Either impressed by the original assumption of ‘soviet socialism’ or simply by the official slogans of CPSU propaganda, the former soviet societies were commonly assumed, whether by people inside or outside the societies, to be constituted on the basis of carrying out collective values instead of the core value of seeking profits for individuals in a capitalist market economy. The performance of collective farms and state enterprises, as well as the functioning of the centralised economic system, had 72 made the factor of private incentives irrelevant within the process of production. Although it is still debatable, the nature of the Soviet enterprise activities was characterised as a non-capitalist mode of production, as Clarke (1992, p.5) described, ‘Capital did not exist in Russia, and played no role in the soviet system of production’. And more concretely: ‘The Soviet system was based on a form of wage labour, but it was not based on social relations of capitalist production….Soviet enterprises most certainly were not subjected to the law of value, and so to the production and appropriation of surplus value’. Nevertheless, under such a system, the former soviet regime established a strong labour control associated with the goal of achieving the target of the production plan. Arnot (1988) therefore points out the life content, the value of an ordinary soviet worker, was greatly bound to the performance of production, which was also emphasised as the achievement of the ‘labour collective’. Had such a societal space ever formed any kind of collectivism / collectivity around enterprise production among everyday relationships between soviet workers and enterprise administration (including the function of the primary trade union organisation)? The answer was not easy, but most experts have raised great doubt about it. Even before Gorbachev’s reform (perestroika) took place, scholars like Filtzer (1986, p.21) had defined the nature of the soviet system as follows: 73 ‘The Stalinist industrialization (1928-41) led to a breakdown of the working class as a historical collective force (a class-for-itself) and to its eventual atomization. The shop-floor relations that thus emerged were neither capitalist nor socialist in character, but specific to a historically unique and perpetually crisis-ridden system of production’. Similar to Filtzer’s interpretation of the unique form of soviet-type social relations of production, Clarke (1996a) argued that the character of workers at soviet enterprises was not purely an atomised model but comprised a more paradoxical situation. He conectualises this as ‘alienated collectivism’I,defined as a condition ‘in which Soviet workers lived: to the extent that Soviet workers formed a collectivity, this collectivity expressed a commonality of interest with their immediate exploiters. To the extent that Soviet workers constituted a class, as objects of exploitation, they were systemically individualised and fragmented.’ (ibid, p.6) Similar arguments were also presented by a number of scholars but supported by their own definitions. For example, Gordon and Klopov (2000) used ‘pseudo-collectivism’ in their works to describe the general atmosphere in Russian enterprises. By and large, despite the analysts’ different references, the non-existence of genuine collectivism – which is often referred to in the field of the study of the early labour movement in the West – at Russian enterprise level has been commonly recognised as a critical constituent of the 74 social relations at the soviet enterprise level. One of the most significant elements of ‘symbolic’ / ‘alienated’ collectivism in the field of the social relations of soviet people in their workplace is, as most observations have highlighted, the obvious paternalistic impact on Russian workers’ self-representation. The conception of ‘Soviet / Russian paternalism’ has also been widely employed to describe the inherent characteristic of soviet-type relationships of production within the enterprise. Based on such clarification, Clarke’s theoretical analysis mentioned above also underlined the dominance of enterprise paternalism, which was a form and permanent phenomenon of alienated collectivism. He also pointed out: ‘Paternalism within the Soviet enterprise was much more than a management practice, a means of intensifying the labour of the working class, as in the case in a capitalist enterprise, but was embedded in a wider paternalistic structure under the domination of the state, just as the labour collective of the enterprise was only a part of the working class in whose name the state ruled (Clarke 1996b, p.32). Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the definitions through which this idea is introduced into Russian labour studies are varied. According to Mandel (1996, pp. 39-40), the role of paternalism ‘was based upon a number of factors: management’s 75 own subordinate status vis-à-vis the ministry and higher party apparatus, the relative absence of market pressures (‘‘hard budget constraints’’), the labour shortage, worker job security, the relatively lax enforcement of labour discipline, the guaranteed wage and a growing ‘social wage’’. Gorbachev’s economic reform and the radical introduction of privatisation under Yeltsin were both set up to change the traditional mode of enterprise activities. The designed transformation was expected to resolve the problem of the stagnant planned economy. Clarke, however, argued that the real nature of the Russian reformists’ attempt at economic transition is to change: ‘a system based on production at the expense of surplus-appropriation [which] was transformed into a system based on surplus-appropriation at the expense of production’ (1996a, p.4). The argument presents a critical understanding of the further development of labour relations in new Russia’s emerging system, by which Clarke insisted that the transition of new Russia’s socio-economic relations in the early 90s was not necessarily developing towards capitalism. If the production relations were still far from those of the capitalist mode of production, as Clarke then argued, how could we justify interpreting developments in the labour movement as elements of a process of class formation in the new Russia? With little doubt, such structural factors dominated the course of many further 76 changes. It is unlikely for observers to ignore the fact that although privatisation since 1991 had gradually changed the position of enterprise management, the traditional exercise of paternalistic worker-management relations on the enterprise level still widely existed and Russian workers’ commitment to their collective has enabled their paternalism to retain its status within the enterprise. Consequently, as the main factor in the workplace, while the reform process, such as privatisation, reached enterprise level, the management of most enterprises could easily capture opportunities to exploit the commitment to the ‘labour collective’ as a shell to resist outside investors and therefore their own interests were re-installed. This therefore let many strikes and labour conflicts, as we have seen in the previous sections, arise while they were initiated or exploited by the management’s efforts (the miners’ strikes in 1994 and Vyborg conflict in 2000). As a consequence, Russian workers are more likely to associate with the ambition of their managers and directors, to ‘voice’ their vital demands (under the name of a strategy for the enterprise’s survival). For many observers, labour conflicts did appear from time to time, the critical point is that such: ‘Resistance takes a form which can be characterised as one of “solidaristic individualism”, which is a powerful force, but one which does not necessarily have a collective nor an unambiguously class character. This can be clearly seen in the case of collective action even in the most 77 militant branch of industry, coal-mining…. Even in coal-mining there are still no established institutional channels through which workers can press their grievances, even six years after the great miners’ strike of 1989, and four years after the formation of the Independent Miners’ Union’ (Clarke 1996a, p.13).14 The strength of recognising the need for strong mutual ties between the interest of workers and the interest of management can even extend to the national or political level. The establishment of the ‘Russian Assembly of Social Partnership’, for example, formed by the leadership of the official trade unions and the industrial elite in July 1992, is a clear signal of how broad was the cooperation (Clarke 1992). With such an argument about class formation in post-soviet Russia, Clarke’s analyses present a fundamental contrast to the works of other observers. More discussion around the distinct estimations about the prospects of the new Russian labour movement will be presented in the next section. Non-monetary society and informal relations Another key factor commonly noted and treated as an essential one in studies of the transition of Russian labour relations is the application of individual-informal And Clarke wrote, ‘even among the militant miners class formation has developed to only a limited degree, the miners tending to blame their fate on the personal deficiencies of managers and politicians, demanding their dismissal and replacement, …, and even a paternalistic “owner”, to represent their interests and ensure the realisation of “justice”’. (ibid, p.40) 14 78 methods in workplaces – which is still often seen as the ‘labour collective’ in most workers’ eyes – especially those in daily contacts between workers and their management. In her ethnographic case study at a Siberian coal mine, Ashwin (1999) developed Clarke’s theoretical framework, concentrated on the various forms of appearance of social relations of production to re-examine the contradictory ‘collectivity / collectivism’ of Russian workers at their enterprise, and then demonstrated the derivative characteristics of the Russian labour movement. As the author emphasised, ‘In contrast, this book will argue that what has structured workers’ response to transition is not their dependence per se, but the alienated form of collectivism which characterises workers’ relationship to the labour collective and defines their individual dependence’ (ibid, p.15). For the investigation, the researcher paid great attention to the role of informal relations at Russian coal-industry enterprises as well as inside the local miners’ community, in which she found that such factors dominate the relations between the management, the union and the workers. Together with the influence of symbolic collectivism, these interaction dynamics between individuals rely on immediate goods but not money (where actually there had continuously been a crisis of cash-shortage, at least as often claimed by the enterprises’ directors). According to her study, the informal relations comprise two aspects: within the enterprise, there are variant means 79 of expressing them, e.g. paying a bribe, blat,15 and so on; outside the enterprise it appears as the individual strategy of seeking support or protection from family-centred relationships: ‘Survival outside a labour collective was almost impossible’.16 Ashwin took these relations as an expressional form of the exercise of individual survival strategies. In such a circumstance, thereby, informal relations take on a heavy role within the community / collective. The features of the social relations of the labour collective in her case studies also presented an explanation of why Soviet workers have been seen as both ‘incorporated’ and ‘atomised’. Based on her investigations, she concludes that the lack of independent workers’ organization for the Russian labour movement has been heavily related to such a background of a ‘non-monetary society’ and the shifting nature of collective identification. Similar studies provide more support to her conclusion. Many Russian experts in the field of Russian labour relations, like researchers participating in the ISITO (Institute for Comparative Labour Relations Research) projects, have widely reported such an ‘individual-informal approach’. 17 Various examples have been explored by 15 A Russian term which refers to a profitable connection or corruption. One basic factor we need to note is the interpretation draws on the conception that Soviet society could be considered as a ‘non-monetary’ society; and such a characteristic has been retained in many respects in post-soviet society. It seems ‘money’, in terms of a common recognition for the exchange of labour power between workers and their management, played a weak role in the ‘collective’, i.e. in the individual bargaining between workers and their management. 17 The research projects participated in by experts from different countries, especially countries of the former union republics of Soviet Union (mainly organised by ISITO) have produced over 800 papers and research reports on: labour relations; management restructuring; Russian coal mining; employment; trade unionism; gender in transition; poverty and survival strategies; non-payment of wages; innovation. See the website of Centre for Comparative Labour Studies, Department of Sociology, the University of Warwick [Online] Available from: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/complabstuds/russia/index.html 16 80 researchers who want to capture how strong the individual strategy has appeared as the most dominant solution for Russian workers in the face of job-related issues. More importantly, the individual-informal relationships are believed to exist in the daily life of the society (e.g. the relationship between the workers and the management, among workers’ personal connections), and therefore restrain the dynamics for trade union transformation during Russia’s post-soviet transition. As a Russian scholar presented his finding of individual strategies and the adaptation of individualism among the workers’ responses, the workers expressed their views frankly, ‘We ourselves are a trade union. If we encounter conflict, we, maybe three or four persons, will go to the chief of the brigade to find a solution. So we don’t need a trade union’ (Klopov 1995, p.23). These detailed accounts about individual survival strategies provide us with a more profound basis for a structural explanation. Almost all the previous reviewed studies in this sense shared the basic comment that the present performance of Russian trade unions has not been really transformed, and the critical problem for the Russian labour movement is the lack of a challenge from below, i.e. workers’ self-representation. For the most comprehensive analysis we may remember Clarke’s argument: ‘Workers were almost universally dissatisfied with their condition, but [Accessed 02 January 2002] 81 without any institutional channels through which they could articulate and express that dissatisfaction, and without any easily identifiable agents of their exploitation and oppression, they tended to accept their condition with a fatalistic resignation’ (Clarke 1995, p. 399). Nonetheless, it seems there is a certain limit (contradiction) to the structural-cultural influences. When the management itself involved in corrupt affairs, and that had undermined workers’ original collective interest, workers stood against them as a priority. However, when the importance of enterprise subsistence has reduced, the desire to organise themselves on an enterprise basis might reduce correspondingly. The two explanations in all accounts can be linked together; such factors have eroded the incentive for self-organisation. As a result, the attitudes and actions of Russian workers in the field of self-organization apparently were bounded by such a pro-structural limitation. Such a factor also becomes another reason why union organisations in Russia did not attract workers to participate. Interestingly, the publicising of such facts has captured the attention of other observers, who believe that changes of union strategy and leadership – through ‘reform from below’ - would lead them to form a radical force within the trade union movement. Borisov’s study of the Russian miners’ strike movement (2000) presents another insightful study of the collective-union-management dynamics within the structural 82 dominance of Russian workers’ rational-individual choice. The structural factors considered should not be taken as having established a totally conflict-free mechanism. As he revealed, ‘In the strikes that I have studied the strikes were preceded by a period of increasing social tension but in a situation in which there was a certain “contentment-discontentment” or “discontentment-compensatory” balance in relations between the workers and management.…The workers immediately respond to worsening working and safety conditions at work and to wage arrears by reducing their labour intensity and productivity, theft at the enterprise and an increasing lack of discipline. A certain balance is established: enterprise management do not pay wages on time, but weaken control over the workers at the work-place (much research shows that top management do not visit the coal seams for months on end, although they are supposed to do so on a regular basis), ignoring cases of violations of labour discipline and health and safety regulations. Such a “strengthening” of the workers' position accompanied by a corresponding “weakening” of the managers’ authority acts as compensation in conditions of wages delays and allows for the “peaceful” continuation of production activities’ (Borisov 2000, p.211). 83 In addition to those investigations mentioned above, several case studies of industrial relations in Russian coalmines have provided other interesting points on the background for the development of workers’ collective actions and the settlement of the conflicts, in which the combination of macro structural background with local / community characteristics were presented. As we can see in Ilyin’s account (1998), the aftermath of radicalisation of the coal miners’ movement in Vorkuta presented a quite clear insight: after the spontaneous strike and/or the formation of a radical strike committee, there was little subsequent result. Firstly, for the position of trade unions, neither NPRUP (Independent Trade Union of Workers in the Coal-mining Industry) nor NPGR (the first within FNPR and the second was established in the early 90s) which were reformed or established at the beginning of the 90s, was challenged by the new militant organisations; secondly, the radical, spontaneous action or strike group did not form a strong base in the aftermath. Such studies clearly pointed out that the institutionalisation of the miners’ strikes they studied did not lead to the strengthening of workers’ organisation. Instead of that, over the institutionalisation of these industrial conflicts the events was either used by political figures or by the mine management for their own concerns. These studies provide an important review of the relations between the problems facing the collective, collective action and the union. 84 1.2.2 Distinct explanations Despite the wide recognition of the impact of structural constraints on the transition of Russian labour relations, the various estimations of those factors present a critical challenge to the arguments of the relevant studies. Clarke’s early works raised a very significant argument by rejecting the popular prediction that Russia had anyway begun the transition to capitalism, although capitalist elements have undoubtedly emerged. He suggests that the understanding of Russian labour relations should not focus on juridical and political changes without careful reference to the development of the social relations of production On the contrary, he believes that the transition in the 90s was driven by the restructuring of the soviet-system-from-below, subordinating capital and the commodity to the reproduction of the existing social relations of production (Clarke et al. 1993). To develop his analysis, he conducted (coordinated) a considerable number of case-study projects at enterprise level in order to demonstrate the fundamental force within the transition period of Russian labour relations. From these cases, he focuses on the impact of Russian workers’ ‘alienated collectivism’ on their own reaction in the face of the transformation from the soviet system to a capitalist system. Clarke and his colleagues note that Russian workers are still under the constraint of the soviet social relations of production, and, consequently, actively look for a proper management or administration as the ‘carrier’ of their 85 interests. Behind workers’ anger and action the intention is not to break with the ‘rules of game’ but to change its main player. People now get used to asking for someone who has the capacity and will to keep good order to run their enterprise, but not simultaneously to introduce their own protective ability. Because of such characteristics, although we have seen sharp labour conflicts in the past years, ‘the workers’ militias were seeking to defend a management which had been installed with their support and which paid their wages, against the imposition of new owners supported by the regional administration.’ As he then concluded, ‘Russian workers are still embedded in the “alienated collectivism” that had prevented them from developing an independent perspective and playing an independent role since the soviet period’ (2000). Consequently, when the social relations of production at the enterprise play a determinative role in the transition of Russian labour relations, the internal dynamic for the reform of trade union activities would certainly be weaker: instead of representing workers’ collective interests or providing a channel for its members, most Russian trade unions closely cooperate with enterprise management. More importantly, this is a force which might be addressed by keeping the official trade unions in place and by incorporating those so-called alternative trade unions or marginalising them. Furthermore, together with this weak representative mechanism, 86 the idea of social tripartism has offered a space to reinstate the trade union’s traditional function. Now, the official trade unions have restored their institutional legitimacy in relation to state office, by that they are able to, also glad to, define themselves as a stable force of Russian society. Resting on all the above arguments, Clarke puts his analysis forward. About the current and future nature of the transitional Russian social structure in which the Russian labour movement is embedded, he argued, ‘Russia is still a long way from capitalism, and the Russian working class still presents a formidable barrier to the capitalist transformation of production. If Russia is in transition to capitalism, that transition will prove to be long-drawn-out, and marked by often acute conflict’ (1996, p.40). Other analysts, though they made similar recognition of the previously mentioned factors in the development of Russian industrial relations, have an estimation of the role and meaning of these factors which differs from Clarke’s conclusion. Indeed, most studies of Russian scholars gave relatively positive accounts of those changes from a general viewpoint. 1.2.3 Parallel and positive move in historical sense Unlike those who have expressed a rather sceptical tone about the state of the Russian workers’ movement (Clarke et al. 1995), Gordon and Klopov (2000), explain how the 87 positive perspective for the future development of Russian labour relations originated. As one of the earliest Russian researchers who presented analyses of the changes in Russian industrial relations and the development of the labour movement, the authors suggest that in Russia’s socio-labour sphere of the 90s there are two parallel responses of workers in different positions. Workers with better conditions would be more likely to take an individual strategy, while workers who are marginalised in the labour market have little alternative but to rely on paternalistic relationships to provide them with resources for minimum survival standards. These two fundamental factors determined the character of new Russia’s socio-labour relations. Also as a consequence of such a weak dynamic, Russian trade union organisations have not yet undergone a further transformation to serve as genuine representatives in defence of their members’ interests. Nonetheless, despite their own confirmation of the facts related to individualism, pseudo-collectivism and a paternalist-authoritarian orientation at the workplace as factors which have undermined the development of the Russian trade union movement, the researchers embrace little doubt that the future of Russian socio-labour relations as well as the trade union movement will still follow a progressive track (2000, pp.251-283). Finally, by setting the changes in Russian trade union organisation against the general background, they conclude that the trade union is undergoing a process of positive evolution. 88 Gordon and Klopov’s arguments are based on an evolutionary-analytic view in interpreting social transition. The reason for their optimistic estimation can be considered as a popular interpretation of the time, identifying social-psychological factors at either enterprises level or societal level which are the legacies of the Soviet system, and arguing that massive change is possible with the participation of the ‘awakening of the Russian People’. The history of the real labour movement for post-soviet Russia has been only 15 years long, and that means the movement itself was still in an immature stage. Over these 15 years, some serious progress, especially organisational, has been made (at least alternative trade unions have emerged). Secondly, the Russian experience has involved little development of collective self-organization, but it would be incorrect to focus on such experience without a historical vision. The formation of collective action, its organisation in the early 90s and the decline after that are understandable according to Gordon and Klopov – they appear as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ tendencies within their definition. Therefore, with this ‘historical’ comparison, the general tendency of the Russian labour movement during the 90s for the majority of people is still positive. Moreover, if we compare it to the early stages of the labour movement and trade union movement in the West, the development was not slow and a reasonable development in Russian society can be expected. 89 1.2.4 The improvement of strategy and leadership In the works of Yadov and his colleagues (1998), they investigate many occasions where Russian workers stood up and disconnected themselves from paternalistic relationships. They suggest that at enterprise level, while paternalism did undermine the orientation of workers’ resistance, it did not always successfully suppress Russian workers’ struggles. On the contrary, from the detailed case studies, one aftermath of such a mode of collective action was the repeated gap between the promised image and its final practice. This suggests that the limit of management paternalism somehow created the starting point of workers’ action (anger). Researcher like Katsva (1999) then emphasise the radicalised tendency pointing out a critical change in the miners’ strike actions, against the background of the ineffectiveness of the action in 1994, 1995 and 1996. With his specific background in conducting sociological investigation, the Saint-Petersburg-based researcher Maksimov (1996, 2001a, 2004) contributed various observations about the character of Russian workers and specific tendencies of their actions. Not surprisingly, his observations find that Russian trade unions are weak in representing their workers and their members; most of them depend on the employer 90 (management); union leaders are alienated from their members, although they think that they are always committed to arranging social benefits to meet the requirements of their members. Nevertheless, his estimation of the trade union movement in the post-soviet period presents a view similar to the previous point of view, as he argues that ‘the evolution of trade unions is slow, but, apparently, firm’ (Maksimov 2001a, p.80). He then suggests that the development of the trade union movement depends on the evolution of the ‘traditional’ trade unions, the expansion of alternative trade unions, the rapprochement of union organisations, workers’ higher understanding about the trade union’s role, and the recognition of the union’s role by employers (ibid., p.136). The problem of FNPR organisations is their reluctance to undertake the organisational work required to reform the union’s capacity. His overview of the tendency of Russian workers’ collective actions, interestingly, led him to a rather particular ‘prospect’. Firstly, concluding from his survey source, he claims that Russian workers are ready to take part in collective actions, which might be very formal ones, and therefore the Russian labour movement is formed in such a way that subjective mood matters. Secondly, the difference between the Russian workers’ movement and its Western counterparts is that the former are more likely to act under universal demands but not simply economic ones. Apart from such an argument, a part of his conclusion then put forward is that the weakness of the labour movement 91 derives from ‘practical’ factors, which are mainly derived from a lack of coordination and the deficiency of solidarity (2005, p.139). Finally, he suggests the potential solution for the Russian trade union movement is the capacity to develop into a form towards ‘political trade unionism’, and that is why the method of ‘collective protest’ would be able to provide a more effective role rather than taking industrial action in current Russian circumstances. Unlike the positive estimation in Gordon and Klopov’s analysis, another group of scholars (Mandel 2000a; Buzgalin and Churakov 2003) recognise that the main problems that face the Russian labour movement are partly caused by the ‘reform’ which threw the movement into serious frustration and confusion. Due to a variety of factors, from the passive attitude of workers to the lack of experience among union leaders and activists, they generally locate the lack of strategy, ideology and leadership skills as the central problems of the Russian labour movement.18 These scholars put more emphasis on the fatal challenges of Russian workers’ resistance to market-orientated reform. Mandel’s studies on Russian labour contain not only his personal research interpretation but also a number of interviews and observations. Derived from those interviews and encountered impressions, his arguments identify the limitations of Russian labour relations related to two aspects: the external and the 18 Apart from the studies, a short list incorporating the most common responses of union leaders can be found in the work of Bulavka (2003), which is based on the conclusion of seminars for militant union leaders. 92 internal factors. The internal factors include the betrayal of leadership, the absence of a tradition of struggle, and the absence of coordination; and the external factors are the hostile state power (‘soft’ dictatorship), first stage of economic recovery and a clear turn away from neo-liberalism in North America and Western Europe (Mandel 2000a). Despite the absence of a theoretical framework to support his long-term studies of Russian workers, it is still clear that Mandel believes critical reflections on the supposed ‘efficient change’ of Russian trade unions and trade union / labour politics can explain how and why Russian workers are unable to create an independent, militant, and effective labour movement. As the most important conclusion of his account, Mandel argues that the presence of organisational reform of unions as well as factors such as a struggle tradition are key elements for Russian workers to make a successful mobilisation.19 As part of his argument, the recognition of social partnership then, for example, has appeared as evidence of the problematic strategy of the Russian trade unions. It seems for such a point of view, that the weakness of Russian workers still arises from the influence of those general conditions such as enterprise paternalist relations and the lack of struggle experience, while the conditions of those relatively successful cases have highlighted the scene and supported his analysis. According to 19 A similar point of view has also been expressed as one of the most important facts and conceptions to explain the underdeveloped situation of the Taiwanese labour movement since ‘democratisation’. 93 his consideration, for example, in the case of Edinstvo, a union at the VAZ auto plant in Togliatti, the positive elements are: firstly, the independent trade union is quite experienced in taking actions and attracts active members; secondly, the plant has relatively good economic conditions in the market; and finally the effective leadership of the trade union was added (Mandel 2000a, pp.189-191). Interestingly, like the result of the analysis of Maksimov, Mandel believes the solution for the immature Russian trade unionism will come from rather subjective changes among union activists, as he concludes that the fundamental element within the Russian labour movement is that ‘effective resistance in Russia today has to be political’ (2000b, p.660). Similar accounts are also found in a group of Russian scholars’ reports (Buzgalin et al. 2000; Churakov 2004), based on the results of a series of seminars and conferences involving academic researchers and struggle-experienced union leaders. The most important fact was that workers had started to show their reaction to the imposed management; and more importantly, they started to take action to change the bad consequences of privatisation imposed on their own enterprise. They claim a new phase of workers’ protest has come to the Russian labour movement since 1997, and in spite of those external and internal problems, during ‘the last two years of the twentieth century in Russia the basis for cautious optimism has appeared: the workers’ 94 movement has become more organised, decisive and solidaristic’ (Buzgalin et al. 2000). What have convinced them are the facts shared by other observers. For they believe that the radicalisation of Russian workers’ resistance across the Russian Federation marks a distinction within the development of the post-soviet workers’ movement in Russia. As a critical matter, the (small-scale) radicalisation, whether of Russian workers’ spontaneous action or the strategy of alternative trade union organisations, appears as critical evidence for such kinds of interpretations. Strikers who took the forms of protest from normal strikes to underground strikes and even hunger strikes clearly were considered as they knew whom to blame, which disconnected them from the traditional collectivism. More importantly, an immediate solidarity had even expanded from that among strikers, their families to the local community (Bizyukov 1996). All the details of the later conflicts in such accounts, as in those of Katsva’s works (1999; 2002), found the nature of workers’ responses – their radicalisation – has developed out of an important change in the form of demands or actions. This estimation differs from those studies that had emphasised more that radicalisation was still restrained by the soviet-type social relations at enterprise level during the transition of Russian labour relations in the 90s. As Clarke (1996, p. 40) wrote, ‘Even among the most militant miners class formation has 95 developed to only a limited degree’ because ‘the miners [are still] tending to blame their fate on the personal deficiencies of managers and politicians, demanding their dismissal and replacement… looking to a good manger, and even a paternalistic ‘owner’, to represent their interests and ensure the realisation of “justice”’. From these arguments, we see those analyses present a different prospect: there is a way for Russian workers to move beyond the structural barriers. More importantly, here one can pose the confrontation and interaction between the forces of institutionalisation and representing their interests. Take the instance of how Mandel (2000a, p.193) explained the three successful but exceptional cases: he concluded, ‘in each case one can point to special conditions that favour them: a “culture of struggle”, a relatively good economic situation, an unusual concentration of plants in the same sub-sector in a relatively small town where “there is nowhere else to go”. And the main problem they all faced is isolation’. Similar points of view, which emphasise the role of the influence of union leadership and strategy, can be seen through case studies or articles of Russian scholars (Katsva 2002; Maksimov 2002). Moreover, seeing the damage of the new Russian Labour Code to the strength of trade union capacities, another opinion appeared and suggested that subjective effort should be the strategy for trade union activity. Not only analysts but also some Russian union leaders have started to believe that, to some extent, FNPR officials have failed to recruit union 96 members from new enterprises, and these enterprises provide optimal conditions for trade union activities. Unlike the old, often desperate plants left over from the Soviet era, the new enterprises are largely running along with their Western partners. Individual trade unions may gain better organisational conditions to operate effectively in this environment, and the leaders of alternative unions see little point in working together with the FNPR. As the current VKT president, Boris Kravchenko, expressed it, ‘the only way out of the current systemic crisis is to organize workers in new sectors of the economy that are not already unionized. An aggressive policy of expansion, coupled with greater democracy within unions themselves, could make the difference.’ (Kagarlitsky 2006) 1.2.5 Unresolved questions All the literature of Russian labour studies reviewed in the previous sections represents the main explanations, with variant approaches, over the characteristics and difficulties of the transformation of industrial relations in post-soviet Russia. Most researchers agree that the unique social relations of production at the enterprise level – which were inherited from the Soviet economic system – have created a critical contradiction for such a transformation. Russian labour organisations, as a part of the elements within the society’s transition, also encounter difficulties in 97 transforming themselves into a new type of labour organisation. Russian workers, either those who took part in actions or those who did not, project a stage in which social subjects finally subjectively subordinated themselves to the paternalist melody. It is clear, however, that the differences among the estimations of the reviewed studies leave an uneasy task to clarify. The analyses like Clarke presented reveal the nature of immature activism among Russian workers – even those most militant workers – as well as revealing the myth of ‘collectivity’. Such an interpretation reminds us of the potential background to a mature stage of subjective actions, as it concentrated on the weakness of workers’ organisation; the interpretation contributes a rather fundamental, structural analytic understanding to the study of workers’ reactions and future perspectives in post-soviet society. As a contrast, those who hold rather positive estimations of the progress of the Russian workers’ movement, at the same time suggest that all the progress could have the potential to develop further. Within such a kind of explanation, the social and enterprise conditions do form a structural obstacle to the progress of the labour movement, but the strength of subjective force, which involves the reform of union leadership and strategy in the face of a passive attitude among the rank and file, is able to overcome the obstacles. Another group, standing on a pluralist approach, not only suggests the co-existent social relations of production, but also the co-existent, parallel tendencies of collective action. To meet 98 the question of why do some workers organise in alternative unions and others do not, the arguments seem to encounter a tangled scene. Those works suggested the reform of union activity, such as strike effect, leaders’ experience, treating the union organisation as an instrument, would strengthen Russian workers’ resistance. The emergence of alternative trade union organisations in the late 80s and early 90s or the radicalisation of labour struggles since the mid-90s, as appeared in a group of case-study works (Bizyukov 1996; Ilyin 1998; Katsva 2002) was only concentrated in a few sectors, and more critically these occasions barely affected workers in other sectors. Even in those ‘unrest’ sectors, radicalisation was also limited. That is why the dominant dynamics of labour relations suggest little change. The argument seems to identify the leadership or strategy as critical because workers here have already united as a whole. According to such an explanation, the gap between the grievances and the organised resistance within the Russian labour movement simply needs to be covered by a ‘bridge’, constituted by a mature ‘subject’. This implies a mature strategy or a mature civil society, and sometimes the former fosters the latter. Such expectations were not based on a full investigation of the difficulties of the survival of the radical organisation and its activists. Nevertheless, even if a leadership with an effective strategy can indeed play a major role within an individual enterprise, the question would be why even the individual cases of 99 successful union leadership have been accompanied by unsuccessful coordination among the union leaders. It is worth examining the above concern by focusing on the level of the trade union’s primary organisation. According to the above analyses, the central question raised by the differences mentioned fairly reflects a primary difficulty of defining the course of the Russian labour movement: what will be the dynamic of the current and future state of Russian labour relations? Certainly, from a sociological point of view, the response of ‘social actors’ to the environment they live in has never been as simple as the constraints of behaviourism. The parallel scenes of all the accounts on Russian workers’ activities show the diversity of its dynamic and potential. As we believe that Russian workers get used to expecting a saviour or a khozyain (master), that does not mean they treat themselves as nikto (nobody) in everyday life. The exploration of the meaning of the differences between the interpretations as mentioned above has been the main task for social science, as Giddens (1979) tried to resolve by presenting the conception of ‘duality of structure’, related to the typical debate over the interaction between ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’ in the interaction relations of society in the field of social science. The answer requires a more specific analysis to investigate the process of the articulation of the relation between workers’ workplace response and the involvement of union activity. 100 The concern over the role of Russian union organisation and its performance in the development of industrial relations is understandable, for this factor has been constantly raised in the field of industrial relations in the West. On the one side, there has been constant doubt over the role of those elements gathering individual experience into collective consciousness because, as Kerr and Siegel have argued, examination of communication and interpersonal relations cannot explain why whole industries are more strike-prone than others (1954 cited Hyman 2001, p.59). In the discussion of work and identity, Leidner (2006) argued: ‘The conceptualization of identity as rooted in interaction and as an object of ongoing contestation undermines the assumptions that the self has a stable core, unitary and consistent over time. Rather, it problematizes identity, taking for granted that selves are social constructions and that identities are multiple, situational, fluid, and discursive’ (2006, p.439). Conversely, the absence of mobilizing leadership has been pointed to as one factor explaining the absence of collective identification and action. On this side, through his detailed case study, Gouldner (1954) suggested that the life experience of workers’ community directly affected the emergence, the formation and the aims of their collective action. Out of this two-sided debate, Cronin stressed the community element for European labour history in this way: ‘The complex web of union 101 organization, community life, and institutions can be seen as products of working-class activity and as institutions creating social and political space within a hostile society’ (1983, p.12). Therefore, the central question here is how effective and how fundamental the community element is in the making of their collective presence? As we are concerned about the individualist attitude of Russian workers as a whole and the paternalistic style of industrial relations at the enterprise level, the immediate perspective that comes to us is the weak, limited, community and identity. ‘Community’ as a common expression derived from cognitive identity, embraces the following processes of potential division: inside / outside, ego / alter, and ‘opposition’ / ‘enemy’. Or, as Kelly (1997), drawing on Tilly’s (1978) conception, suggested, we need to consider the roles played by injustice, agency, identity, and attribution in shaping the ways people define their interests. It is therefore worth revisiting the community / identity factor to clarify the role of work organisation and the social organisation of the workplace in encouraging or discouraging the formation of a collective identity as well as the role of the work environment and occupational community in encouraging or inhibiting independent workers’ organisation. By locating the question of the lack of self-organisation and prospects of ‘reform from below’ for trade unionism at the mining collective, Ashwin (1999) underlines the state of the ‘community’ to examine the connection of several factors. Firstly, 102 ‘Workers at Taldym mine express their attachment to the collective at every turn, at the same time the precise focus of their identification is difficult to pin down... It soon becomes clear, however, that the workforce is deeply divided between the blatnye and neblatnye. But the neblatnye do not stick together when it counts’ (p. 138). It was clear through her observation that the identities of collective members are shifting and thus contested. As part of the consequence, the basis for collectivism is limited, and ‘all-mine collectivism takes an alienated form in which all expectations are directed at the figure of the director’ (ibid.). Instead of working things out with their trade union organisation, informal relationships and individualised solutions, which I mentioned earlier, dominate the social and working life of the collective members. Moreover, the trade union to some extent was active but still rather acted in a traditional way and workers did not put much trust in the union. Her account contributes a very clear connection between the problem of the union organisation’s lack of possibility and the community / identity factors. Nonetheless, the process of identification among collective members comprises its own specific social environment, and therefore the lack of self-organisation or the lack of ‘reform from below’ for its shop-floor union organisation explains how the ‘traditional’ trade union model only slowly, or even not at all, develops alternative representations among the workers. In other words, these factors may have had a significant impact since such factors also embrace strong local 103 features, and the subjective response – union’s strategy or leadership role – was just part of the local features. For example, Ilyin’s study (1998) on the movement of Vorkuta’s coalminers highlighted how those factors in a specific context facilitated the formation of the massive support for the protest as well as the alternative union organisation. In his analysis, the structural (economic), geographic and cultural (societal) features of the local industry determined the effect on its situation of industrial relations; and these were the damage to the miners’ interest (the fall of living standards), the social and technical organisation of the mines and the common memory of the Gulag, which provided energy to the protest (p.266-268). With their detailed accounts, surprisingly, the investigation of the union activities focused rather on the traditional interaction with management as well as members. Is such a conclusion still accurate when the scenes move to where the collective members have not shared such strong ‘identification’ features? And what about if there is a group of active workers who have tried to overcome the traditional connection between union organisation and the members? In addition, such an approach soon faced obstacles to further investigation to clarify what the effect on collective identity would be if the trade union can present alternative, not traditional, functions. Since these analyses mainly focused on miners and their community, once the ‘structural reform’ of the mining industry – the 104 dominant factor of objective interest as Ilyin defined it – came to an end, we no longer have a chance to abserve its union activism to make a comparison with other energetic and emerging sectors. Noteworthily, these studies provided few explanations of how the reform-induced differences, the establishment of new trade unions within the development of patterns of local union movement organisation, in terms of the interrelationship between leaders and the ordinary workers, were determined. The observation can also be approached from another point of view which focuses on the subjective reform of the union and the potential for activism or self-organisation stimulated by other specific social factors. More optimistic analyses, as mentioned earlier, though they share the basic explanation about the strong impact of the legacy of the soviet system, present very different perspectives on the transition period of Russian trade unionism. In these studies we had no chance to make comparisons. To set up an analytic approach to comprehend the whole process from dissatisfaction to collective action is equally required, as said ‘it is important to distinguish between interests, organization, mobilization and forms of action because changes in these four aspects of collectivism do not necessarily coincide’ (Kelly 1998, p.64). 105 1.2.6 The theoretical approach of this study To explain the role of work organisation and the social organisation of the workplace in encouraging or discouraging the formation of a collective identity, the brief review presented in the previous sections shows that, while analysing the effective connections between the force of the subject and its objective conditions, the investigations face a typical problem from both perspectives. The fact that a serious dialogue among different interpretations has not been fully engaged highlights the research motive for this thesis. For doing so, the study can try to integrate the empirical achievement and methodologies to demonstrate the dynamic of Russian workers as a whole, in face of the vast social transformation. Perhaps, the analyses would have been able to comprehend the underlying process of the social relations of production (and its boundary). Inspired by assuming a meaningful dialogue between different academic interpretations, this research would like to present a fresh approach to the field of Russian labour studies. With the aim of developing a serious account of workplace relations and the pattern of trade union activities, as well as the leadership effect, this research set out to investigate the development of leading trade unions and their interactions with the workers. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate in the section on how the fieldwork started, without a careful distinction of information from research objects, a misunderstanding 106 of the role of trade union organisations may easily come about, while some useful types of investigation, such as the networks of the union activists, are neglected. The question, would union activists in their everyday work strengthen, or on the contrary, depress the capacity / development of the solidarity of their members – ordinary workers – stimulated another concern over the fieldwork period. A comparative study of the process of such interaction by investigating the character of different occupations, organisational histories and union survival strategies ought to answer the expectation of those who believe the union leadership could have changed the fate of the Russian labour movement. From that we could clarify in more detail how the existing social and workplace conditions may obstruct the fundamental transformation of various sectors, and how the reproduction of current Russian trade unionism and industrial relations occurs. Correspondingly, the study aimed to clarify how much (or how little) the direction or the practice of union strategy, as those observers emphasise, can have an impact on such societal weakness. The first concern of the research is to study the environment and the characters within the formation of workers’ immediate response at their workplaces. That is to learn the nature of the work content characteristic of workers’ professions and occupations, and to investigate the basic environment in which their interaction is embedded. As many studies have revealed, individualist solutions (formal and 107 informal) are the most frequent choice, and therefore determinant of the lack of Russian workers’ self-organisation. There are also several details we should distinguish within their (individual) approaches while facing job-related problems. To take one example, arising from the work of Russian scholars Gordon and Klopov (2000), it is bit confusing whether the application of an individualist response means nobody needs help or rather nobody can provide help? Corresponding to such a solution, the observation may compare what kind of workplace culture, such as one primarily expressing the grievance outlet or one indicating management strength, is formed? Furthermore, what do ordinary workers expect from their trade unions in terms of union intervention? The basis of such expectations certainly relates to the current nature of Russian trade unions. The immediate response of workers when they find that the trade union committee at their workplace simply stands on the side of the administration (management) is therefore related to the role and nature of Russian trade unions. The second part of the research investigation, as most industrial relation studies have to cover, is the role and activity of the trade union. Various literatures have revealed how Russian trade unions run their organisations. To answer how the evolution of Russian trade unionism may develop so that workers might have sufficiently representative organisations in face of the difficulties at work and life, this 108 research will focus on the union’s daily activities to present an in-depth study of the organisation. The research will investigate how trade union functionaries or activists define their activity, as well as the way, the method they use to tackle such job threats as they face. Another interesting aspect rarely discussed in most literatures is the role of the union office at shop-floor level in workers’ workplace interaction. It is therefore also relevant to learn the function of the trade union office. To articulate with the first concern above, another primary task of this case study is to explore the daily contact and interactions between members and trade union activists. Furthermore, the establishment of a cross-workplace or cross-profession labour organisation, such as a confederation or regional union organisation, provides a broader picture to contest the strength and character of the union’s development strategy. The investigation will then move forward to find out what, where and how the formation of the communicative channel within the circle of trade union functionaries is assigned? From this aspect we will also explore the effect of coordination / (dis-)continuity within the member trade unions of trans-professional confederations. The selected case studies, as presented in the following chapters, are applied to explore sufficient aspects to clarify the effect of transforming union organisation, and then we could go back to address the fundamental argument of the reproduction of soviet-type labour relations in post-soviet Russian society. 109 Finally, through the selected case studies the thesis seeks to explain the formation and transformation of Russian trade unionism regarding the effect of union strategy. Most studies mentioned earlier are of the 1990s, but my case study can be employed to investigate how the situation has changed, especially for alternative unions after the new Labour Code and the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO’s sponsorship. Here the primary aim is to clarify, among the selected organisations, what has really changed on the ground from the beginning of the transition period to the current time; and to analyse the role of the professional in unions’ organisational activity. Furthermore, by explaining why and how different labour organisations follow a similar course, this thesis is able to give an evaluation of the potential impact of union strategy while locating it against the background of current Russian labour relations. Apart from the differences in their analytic perspectives, another practical problem within many of the studies reviewed in previous sections is the ‘key objects’ of their observation. These studies used their interview findings in a way that assumed the trade unions leaders’ opinion fairly reflected the movement of the members’ attitudes. Based on interviews with union leaders and relying on stories they gave, while the understandings of ordinary workers’ attitudes were illustrated with questionnaires and surveys, those research findings might have ignored the complexity of the underlying information. As another example, observers (Mandel 110 1996) suggest that grassroots’ struggle action is the only way to change or at least to balance the current problems of the Russian trade union movement. Such an argument, though close to classical points of view about the dynamics of the trade union movement in the West, neglects to examine how these union leaders reflect upon their own union activities.20 In the next section I will present a practical experience of accessing the active workers to demonstrate why the methods of field work also matter for conducting a study on trade union organisations. In general, this research will focus on the relations between trade union strategy and workplace social relations, in which the observation of trade union organisation is designed to follow their everyday functions as a basis to re-examine the progress of current Russian labour studies. To achieve such an aim, the research started from contact with a circle of local activists in St Petersburg. The experiences of the fieldwork provided useful insights for the understanding of the style of trade union activities. The methodological reflections will be included with the brief description of the background of labour organisations in St Petersburg. 20 It may be arguable that grassroots’ action, or wildcat strikes, enabled British trade unions to balance their institutional interest and their authority among members. Such an argument can be seen in Richard Hyman (1972). 111 1.3 Methodology 1.3.1 The research object To answer questions about the interaction between trade union activity and workplace relations at enterprise level the research aimed to focus on and investigate trade union organisations which are active in terms of working to defend the demands and labour rights of their members. The ineffectiveness of FNPR union organisations, however, made me look at alternative trade unions, especially their situation after the implementation of the new Labour Code and the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO’s financial support. Among the various analytical works published after the miners’ strike in 1989, there is still a great lack of detailed analyses and sociological reflection on labour relations in Russian labour studies – whether at the enterprise level or at broader ones. Interestingly, apart from the studies on Russian miners and their union organisation NPGR or NPRUP, there is little literature published about Russian alternative trade unions.21 Many arguments among the studies mentioned in the last section were conducted on the basis of interviews and surveys. While doing labour study, we might go to factories, to assembly lines, to observe people who work there; and study the trade union activities as an outcome of a series of social acts, which are 21 For these literatures, one can find useful and detailed analyses in works of Ashwin (1999), Ilyin (1998), and Katsva (2002). Mandel’s study (1994) is basically based on the information of his interviews with leaders of the miners’ union. Bizyukov (2001; 2005) has published several reports on the general observation of alternative trade unions; Shershukov (1997) and Gorn (2003) provide information with a documentary basis. 112 essentially embedded in the character of the social and labour relations in the workplace and wider society. Interviews with individuals, however, encounter the challenge of capturing sophisticated connections behind the claims of union leaders. In other words, their day-to-day contact could easily be simplified when relying on trade union leaders to capture the capacity of their organisational work, as could details of everyday contact between the workers and their organisations. The central consideration of various methodological approaches reflects how researchers estimate the privileges of establishing contact and collecting information about the object can be reached with the chosen methods.22 In my view, labour organisation exists not only as an economic actor, but also a cultural, societal subject together with its labour-economic function. Moreover, the problem of studying ‘Russian union organisation’, as Ilyin (2001) indicated, arises from the characteristic of the limited membership basis underpinning the development of Russian trade unions. He therefore emphasised ‘the researches about Russian trade unions as an investigation of the union apparatus’ (ibid., p.127). More importantly, a critical perspective of study on union’s internal networks should be able to develop an understanding of the immediate reactions to labour grievances in the workplace. Following such an idea, my prime aim was to meet ordinary workers, who at the same time are active or at 22 My experience in the Taiwan social movement (trade union and grassroots environmental movement) also suggested that I should make a close observation of unions’ everyday networks to discover their role during the research period. 113 least enthusiastic in trade union activity, to constitute my research work. The advantage of focusing on this intermediate group of workers is to receive immediate information about the interrelation between positions of union leadership and ordinary workers. Among all the relatively active Russian trade union organisations, the Russian transport workers, benefiting from their special occupations, have played a leading role within the Russian trade unions since the beginning of the new Russian labour movement. Most academic studies outside Russia, however, focus on Russian miners and other manufacturing enterprises. The Warwick Russian research programme and its Russian fellow teams have produced broad-scale studies based on various case-study analyses, several collections of the reports had been published (Clarke et al.1995; Clarke 1996a; Borisov and Clarke 2001). These materials provide extensive and interesting details and analyses about the formation of several non-FNPR trade unions, yet only a few case studies were about the famous alternative trade unions of transport workers.23 Apart from the fact that Russian labour studies is still at the developing stage, the investigation of labour relations in the Russian transport sectors encounters two more difficult conditions: the sensitivity related to the concern of the There is a case study of the Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Unions, based on the events accout of its formation and activities in the early 1990s (Clarke et al. 1995, pp.313-398). There are two reports on the tram-trolleybus depots in Yekaterinburg city and Voronezh city. (See [Online] Available from: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/complabstuds/russia/trade.html [Accessed 01 January 2003]. Very recently a short report of Vinokurova (2006) on railways workers at one depot of the Moscow Railway gives accounts of the general character of the RPLBZh primary organisation at the depot. 23 114 Russian government over national security; and the practical challenge due to the broadly distributed workplaces. The general difficulty for the research on the Russian transport sector and its workers is the lack of secondary materials, especially those with analytic investigation. Since there were few resources even for establishing reliable contact, to fill the gap of existing information and to avoid the weak observation points as mentioned earlier, the research methodology of this thesis chose to follow a qualitative design. Furthermore, the case study can hardly be conducted through either secondary materials or breakthrough interviews if it is to gain the research advantage of ‘hidden features revealed’ (Whipp 1998, p.52). The precondition for this research therefore has been case study research methods employing direct observation of the process from entering the setting to investigating unions themselves. Certainly, there were two critical challenges to be considered for the research plan. First, as an outsider, how and what to do to make the first contact regarding the access to the ‘circle’ / ‘community’ of the research object. Second, the fact that labour movement activity in post-soviet Russia can somehow (still) develop into a sensitive field. 24 To reach its objectives, the methods must consider a practical 24 Fortunately, the conditions for the research were not as risky as we imagined before leaving for this three-year-long research work. I did not have to worry about the ‘violation of national security’, but needed to be aware of the abuse of human rights from Russian police during meetings or pickets. In addition, one major reason I chose St Petersburg related to my personal experience of being attacked twice in Moscow; and ‘politely’ warned by local police in the south Ural region when I was visiting miners for my MA dissertation study in 1998; St Petersburg was a relatively peaceful place in the eyes 115 risk-ridden setting and secure a reliable access. I thus designed a long-term observation fieldwork staying in St Petersburg, the second city, the so-called northern capital of Russia, to study interrelationships of workers and their union organisations. The conception of how to produce a proper and efficient methodological framework for this thesis is thereby presented in more detail below. At the beginning of the fieldwork observation, every opportunity to secure access could be useful to facilitate the investigation. When the thesis idea was first presented, the immediate contact I had was with ‘activists’ in St Petersburg who were enthusiastic about labour issues but did not really participate in any enterprise union organisations, although they had set up their own labour organisation. Another resource I had before leaving for Russia was a former trade union activist whom I did not know personally, but he had left the local union circle when I arrived in St Petersburg in 2001. Therefore I decided to take it from a very basic ground – the local labour activist circle of my already-known informant. The solution was simple and unique: go to the picket action and find people there. When people asked me later on, ‘How did you find your interviewees?’ or ‘Where did you get your Russian worker friends?’ I could probably say it all started from standing beside protest actions in the first place. I found these potential informants when I went to several local pickets and of most Taiwanese students at the time. 116 meetings, while they were also surprised that a ‘foreigner-researcher’ came and even showed some sympathy to their activities. This first step has credited me with their basic trust in many ways. That also somehow made them not to be bothered when they were helping me. By keeping them as basic informants, I could then build up basic contacts and ask them if it is possible to meet their colleagues at the workplace. Such access had opened many useful images and expanded further access to reach the people who did not come out: the ordinary, silent or passive workers, as well as those formal and informal leaders. For the direct and participant observation on the local trade union activists, Touraine’s (1987) conception of ‘sociological intervention / researcher as actor’ reminded me to keep a reflexive position in the field as well as to expose my sociological knowledge to the object/social actor. The exposure of my research concern was also to establish their basic trust in me, as well as to encourage them to inform me of any new local meeting events.25 During the first year, I met and talked to many local activists (some should be called ‘former participants’). Coincidently, during my stay there was the emergence of a very short oppositional campaign over 25 The first people I met thought I was a foreign activist, as the information I tried to share with them to introduce myself involved my own participation in Taiwan labour movement. Such mutual understanding soon became a disadvantage because such an approach had also occasionally led people to a mistaken basic impression of me, as ordinary workers would soon label me as being a close friend of their workplace ‘activists’. More concretely, the other workers might easily put a label on me linked to their impression of the political orientation or personal manners of my informants. Several months later, I changed my tactic, and asked my informants to introduce me as a sociological researcher who had participated in trade union activities in Taiwan. I also needed to clarify that my research concern was about labour relations but not simply about the workers’ movement (this terminology very often confuses ordinary Russian workers because they did not feel ‘such a thing’ exists in their Russia). 117 railway transport privatisation. There I started to meet railway workers and activists from local free trade unions (they are not worker leaders in the real sense). By entering into their circle, I got various opportunities of access to observe, to talk to the ‘working people (masses)’. In the first year of going to various meetings, I could then ask for help from local activists to arrange appointments with the port committee of dockers of St Petersburg sea port. The contact with them, however, turned out to be much more challenging, since the union organisation is quite powerful at the port, their resource conditions made their presence more like being behind the ‘walls’. In addition, the security guard of their building and access to the port was very restricted, and the observation of the dockers’ environment was not really as free as it was with railway workers. Such a situation provided limited opportunity to observe more about the everyday work of both dockers and their organisations. At the end, the contact with the subjects of the two case studies, the active workers, had different conditions: with railway workers I could attend their meetings freely and meet the members, while with the dockers it turned out all the meetings needed to be arranged more carefully. 1.3.2 The case study methods There were three major methods employed in this case study: in-depth interviews, 118 participant observation and documentary analysis. Each will now be discussed in turn. Interview, in-depth interview As described earlier, this is a study conducted in the way that I spent over two years participating in various pickets, meetings, conferences; listening to labour activists’ internal debates and quarrels; visiting the workplaces; as well as chatting, joking, drinking, and dining in or out with these ‘interviewees’. All these occasions helped me to observe their relations and even to conduct interviews right after the meeting events. The aim of the interviews was twofold: firstly, to explore information which could be useful for understanding the connections among the subjects; secondly, the interview was supposed to establish further contact with the interviewees for the close observation in the next phase. The interviewees included the union leaders, their activists, their colleagues, and the legal consultants of the trade union. Most of these interviews took place at the corner of their workplaces, in their union offices and several in interviewees’ houses. Some of these occasions were impressive and even unique, in which my interviews were conducted in a more relevant context.26 I also received special access to observe their internal meetings. After the close observation 26 Some of the places were quite challenging. The location of depot TCh-8, for example, can only be reached either from the platform of the main Railway Station of St Petersburg or a tiny opening between roadside walls. The railwaymen showed me how to walk along the rail track and across them. For getting into the union office sometimes I had to walk with the moving train but I was always unsure if that was the right thing to do. And it is difficult to know if the management will easily find that I am a foreigner and then I am of course not an employee. 119 and conversations at their work posts, several group interviews were organised.27 The interviews focused on workers’ career history, responses to their working life and their opinions about the management and the trade unions. The questions were to clarify the immediate stories over collective and individual conditions at a Russian enterprise. The interview questions were specifically focused on the practices of the organisational activities, which were usually hidden behind the very visible scene, especially those which may involve conflicting issues. To analyse the impact of their internal tensions over relevant topics I had to conduct most interviews over a longer period and with more arrangements, so that I could trace and examine the reliability of many sources. Participant observation Most of the interviews worked out successfully, and did expand my contact with the Russian workers into close participation. The research contact was also very helpful for getting access to go to demonstrations or public meetings, and the situations easily made me close to the organisers (I had a camcorder to record what I had seen and heard). After seeing each other’s presence at the action and introducing each other, it was always easier to ask to visit their (union) offices and see how they discussed the relevant issues. Under a deliberate arrangement, they gradually got used to my 27 Most were in the union offices, workplaces and cafeterias. There were twice meetings in my apartment where I organised a labour-film event so we could have discussion after watching a documentary of the Taiwan labour movement and ‘The Navigators’ of British director Ken Loach. 120 presence at their meetings and in their offices. Through such a step, I received many precious chances to observe their discussions, their reactions, and the atmosphere of their interaction. And from my presence at meetings, my subjects also gradually came to understand my genuine request to them: please show me their workplace, their social life and the working problems they have met. All of these were not as easy to arrange as just conducting an interview, and their basic trust in me granted me more access to visit their workplace, family, the internal seminars and the conferences of the union organisation to make my further observations. Documentary analysis Through the fieldwork period and personal contacts with local activists, I received ample documentary material such as unions’ newspapers, bulletins, and press-releases so that I can compare the personal stories with their official accounts. Moreover, the resource of the official website became available and useful for basic understanding of their organisation’s activities and persons’ characters. There are plenty of documentary resources about both the official and the alternative trade unions of railway workers on the internet. The official web pages of the trade union organisations (ROSPROFZhEL and RPLBZh) release numerous articles covering the history of the organisation and the struggle events of their member organisations across the Russian Federation. There was much less opportunity to obtain literature 121 about dockers, however. Not to mention the fact that these documentary resources still lack accounts showing the relationship between the union and the members. Noteworthily, the fieldwork afterward did not finish with the access for observation. Regarding the basic ethics of doing qualitative research with participant observation, I tried to establish mutual relations with most of my interviewees. The basic procedure included two elements together: contact and interactive communication. Together with collecting information and establishing contact with various organisations and trade unions, I introduced myself, my background and answered questions related to their interest about me. My intention was to open the approach for the interviewee. During most of my interviews, I always tried to expose my research motive in the first place and provided information about my research work; I also suggested to them that they have a right to raise any question for mutual communication.28 By arranging mutual personal relationships, I was able to keep From time to time, the Russian workers I met asked, ‘Who is this guy?’ or ‘From where has he got the money to do this?’ Basically, most of my interviewees were quite interested in my position (identity). Very quickly they also developed their own interpretation of my appearance. They were also interested in my research motive not only because this is a fresh experience for them, sometimes it is also important to know if they can trust this stranger. Here ‘trust’ does not just mean whether you are a friend or you are an enemy, but rather why they should tell you their whole serious and sensitive story. During the fieldwork period, it also happened that some people were not happy with my presence; they even asked me to leave their discussion or simply called me CIA (an Asian-face CIA agent?) or Chinese spy on other occasions (maybe they were just joking!). Although on another occasion I realized a friendly informant always thought I was sponsored by a workers’ party, with some special mission to establish a network with Russian workers. The interaction between my interviewees and me was living in this way. Words like ‘Russia is a special country!’ or ‘We are Russian...’, were commonly heard when the activists or the ordinary workers were explaining the situation of labour relations in the country, many Russian labour activists like to give their explanation with such emphasis. This is another often-heard expression. As my response to their words, after several years staying and living in Russia, I started to ask them, ‘But all countries and societies are special in their ways, aren’t they?’ The conversation usually stuck here as an end. 28 122 myself more often in their circle. Such a position brought a certain convenience for conducting research. The other part of this fieldwork approach is the effect of interaction. As I have mentioned earlier, my previous experiences in the Taiwanese social movement suggested to me to establish a proper individual relationship with the people I intended to observe. Such mutual communication under its specific circumstance was an essential condition of effective research. Such a mutual practice granted me even more privileges of knowledge of the case studies. Several times my interviewees invited me to the courts together to witness what they were fighting for; sometimes I followed them to see how they confronted their administration. The long-term close observation with participation had embraced elements of an ethnographical approach to case study work. Since I have been a frequent ‘attendee’, the information I gathered came from multiple events, and this allowed me to assess its significance more readily. There was an additional factor under the consideration of research methods and research ethics in relation to feedback and mutual communication. I tried to persuade my observation subjects that I would not be an ‘ask-and-leave’ outsider, by ‘keeping space’ for my interviewees so that they were able to ask me what they wanted to know. I also tried to prove that I could provide at least something as immediate feedback. Corresponding to such an attempt, therefore, in this case study I had to 123 establish participant access and compel myself to act as a participant researcher. Such a position granted me many useful experiences, but several serious dilemmas also occurred which may affect the research work. Gradually and practically, I learned one of the appropriate solutions for my visible feedback was to provide them with relevant information: discussing the working conditions in the West or in Taiwan; giving interview recordings, films or digital pictures. This solution at least made them happy to see me again. By keeping such a principle, the interviewees and key informants maintained more mutual access with me. They provided their writings, articles about the actions or situations, their comments on the academic works that studied their actions and we could share moreover our opinions. There was even once a mutual cooperation for both sides of us. They asked me to lend them my camcorder so that they could film the awful working conditions at their section, where the administration denied their accusation. That was an occasion of official labour inspection and I became unwelcome to the administration after their first round meeting, although I did not speak a single word. Sometimes workers’ requests were rather difficult to give a positive response to, but still showed the establishment of mutual interaction through my participation.29 29 To take one example, a young railway worker, Leonid, once asked me if it was possible to establish a joint programme for railway workers in Taiwan and Russia. He would like to work in the Taiwanese Railways, even just for one month, to know the working conditions there. In this case I did contact my network in Taiwan and also referred his request back to these workers’ union organisation. After a joint discussion, they finally decided not to take it seriously, due to the practical difficulty of finance. 124 1.3.3 The advantages of my fieldwork It was only after the whole case-study work that I realised how participant observation requires sophisticated experience to support the research motive. The fieldwork approach for this study met various challenges, but provided me with many insightful and valuable stories and materials. The mutual access allowed me to trace the changes of the information I had taken from interviews, and to avoid the one-dimensional source of individual union leaders. As a researcher with the experience of involvement in union campaigns in Taiwan, I realised the different idea about the way of organizing people which is formed by social-cultural inertia. The methods and the strategies Russian workers have employed for winning their struggles often surprised me, and this surprise provided me with a comparative view in the study which facilitated my own case-study comparisons.30 In most cases, the participant observation method made most of my interviewees unafraid to disclose their genuine, even awkward life stories. By employing such a method, great benefit has enriched this research by providing in-depth insight into 30 If we compare their paths of organisation strategy while in face of the need to reform trade union activities, the attitudes towards a ‘reform-from-below’ or ‘reform-from-inside’ strategy are rather different. Independent labour activists in Russia did not answer if it is possible, or how it is possible, to change the official trade union; while in similar battles in Taiwan since the re-start of the labour movement in the late 80s the unionists had always put the priority on controlling the once not-functional, party-controlled union leadership. Certainly we can say the situation makes the tactics varied. One reason is the restriction on the number of trade unions at one workplace written into the Taiwanese Trade Union Law. After stayed in Russia for more than two years, I had also realized it is very unrealistic to expect changes from FNPR unions, due to their deeply embedded dominant nature. 125 variant materials. In short, the methods provided me with more chances to track the process of how the individual decision or their collective discussion was formed or destroyed. To take one example, Alexander, a local labour movement ‘hero’, as he was called by the local newspaper, was actually an inexperienced new union activist who was forced to leave the routine depot meeting under the order of the depot chief, when I witnessed the event. The ‘hero’, as a new union campaigner at the time, actually made no resistance but simply obeyed the brutal order. I myself can therefore have a more complex understanding of how the ‘hero’ at the workplace faced his dilemma in daily struggles. More importantly, the frequent contact with local activists had supported my observation to discover the great prejudice behind many literatures. For example, the political spectrum of those so-called free trade unions was found often oversimplified, which dismissed them as blind supporters of liberal politicians in the post-Soviet era. In fact, one should sonly note that many union activists and leaders have different political ideologies. Some of those who campaign together are ultra-left (in the Russian context), some of them believe in liberal (bourgeois) democracy. More specifically, in the face of the lack of union resources, whether Stalinist communists, liberal unionists, political apathy unionists or even anti-globalisation activists, they could actually sit side by side or attend the same actions even when they might be very sceptical of each other. 126 Most importantly, it is for sure that in completing my field work I am grateful to the circle of trade union activists in St Petersburg. And the experience of the St Petersburg labour circle indeed supported me to have close access and to choose the most active union organisations, railway workers and dockers, which later on became the two comparative case studies in this research. In other words, the character of the local trade union organisations also highlights the distinctiveness of my two case study objects. 1.3.4 The challenges in the case-study field As a foreign researcher, a ‘genuine’ outsider, to conduct a case study of Russian labour organisation I faced considerable but also meaningful challenges. From the understanding of Russian people’s life style, their forms of expression, to the organisational culture, a number of differences / difficulties came out during the period of conducting this two-year-long participant research. The methods I applied in this research to some extent generate conditions when becoming involved in the research objects. I had to manage my access while realising there were considerable effects on the events and the information (knowledge) which I aimed to explore. Some of the situations were even unlikely to be fully avoided. To establish regular contact, for example, to enter into the trade union circle is not as easy as think-and-go. The idea of establishing interactive relationships is fairly challenging at any point. 127 Considering the methods applied in the case of industrial relations, Kitay and Callus (1998) point out that the failure to identify key informants in the account of the analysis poses a serious danger to the validity and reliability of case studies. These challenges in the practice of this research not only show the problematic dimension of the accounts of several analysts mentioned earlier but also reveal an important aspect in terms of sociological reflection. Therefore, I present three critical situations the research methods had met during the fieldwork period. The first dilemma to face was the situation in the face of conflicting informants. At the first stage of my participant observation, I realised how key informants could produce effects on the information. For a sociological researcher, to overcome conflicting information we may apply triangulation or cross-check methods to examine the reliability of the received information; the difficulties in my early fieldwork experiences were rather about how I could keep my contact with them equal and reflexive. In order to gain all possible lines of access for the case-study observation, this research tried to focus on the practical strategies or the conditions of the interactions among union activists and union members. Understandably, only the researcher knows the best what kind of information is needed in the field. The dilemma over the communication priority when in the field of research observation, however, often came out. My request to observe their action, for example, is a request 128 to them to remember and inform me about their actions during the preparatory period, not only on the day of their action. However, when on the occasion the research subjects were not keen to conduct mobilisation or coordination, the request itself became a ‘problematic’ conception. As for my investigation, the preparatory work can reveal more details of their organisational and coordination work. Such observational access normally depended on how much I was involved in the local activists’ circle. The situation was even more complicated. When an interest conflict appeared, in terms of the ‘sensitivity issue’, should they treat me as an outsider and ask me not to involve myself in their situation? Or treat me as an insider so that they should try hard to defend my right to participate in meetings? The challenges were very impressive, and such situations could arise very concretely and suddenly. At the time of my first case study, for example, two railway workers once invited me to participate in the labour inspection meeting, together with the depot administration, official inspector and representative of the pro-administration trade union. My presence was not welcomed by the depot chief, he then refused my presence in their repair section, and I was then forced to leave the depot by the security guard. The challenge, nevertheless, was not about should I stay but about the mutual relations between the activist (insider and my informant who insisted ‘transparency of labour inspection’) and me (an outsider who wanted to witness their interaction): shall we insist on my presence 129 together? Or should they leave me alone?31 The field observation therefore could only gradually match a certain mutual interest. After experiencing several events, I realized, firstly, that it was better not to make more problems for them while they are dealing with their administration. Secondly, the balance is really necessary for stabilising the conditions of my observation work. Besides the above factor, another difficulty within the participant observation derived from the fact that sometimes the ‘events’ of the subjects (such as discussion, seminars, meetings and so on), quite often ended up in fierce arguments with personal topics or emotional words. (The circle of St Petersburg labour activists comprises liberals, unionists, Stalinists, Trotskyists and those embracing mixed beliefs.) Through the meetings (whether formal or informal) in which I have participated, from time to time, there have been awkward situations arising from my presence. Sometimes the union activists started to attack each other personally; and even asked me not to listen to what the ‘targeted person’ said. There had always been a dilemma between my position and their basic trust of me; while the accuracy / objectivity of the information I got from them concerned me the most. On several occasions I learned that to work out a proper balance for my presence was necessary. It was important to draw a line for myself, as well as for my research subjects that ‘this 31 That was really a difficult moment to make such a decision. Similar occasions had different solutions, people frankly suggested that I should pretend to have a different identity so that I can successfully stay with them in their workplace, and this is another accommodation. 130 person’ (the researcher) would participate but not intervene in it. 32 Still, the challenges on other sorts of occasions could not always be fundamentally resolved. There were situations in which I had to take immediate and efficient action. A safe line was to expose clearly what is my focus, while leaving all participants to take a free decision in the meantime. After all, it is a tough task to make a proper balance: remind yourself to reflect the short-comings in the fieldwork and thus to be cautious of primary findings; and to deal with the dilemmas and to avoid compromising the relationships with informants. Nonetheless, through close participation, I have understood more the ways in which local union activists discuss their internal tactics for trade union activities. The second difficulty was the accurate understanding under cultural difference. For a foreign researcher, the fact of not being a Russian worker, not even a Russian, means that the researcher could easily be attracted to the perception of seeing unique information by taking the societal background as a ‘meaningful’ part of the study. Looking through all my interactive stages or the interviews, there were frequent occasions which showed how the cultural factor related to the ‘language’ formed an obstacle to mutual communication. The difficulty of distinguishing linguistic factors 32 Once at a session the activists of alternative trade unions were arguing about whether they should continue to co-publish the work of their own ‘bulletin’. One activist who was against made his reason with an argument as follows: ‘Don’t we understand we are wasting this money? Nobody reads these kinds of papers… oh, maybe except one, Shihao (the researcher) who sitting here is probably the only one who really reads them.’ On other occasions, most of my informants made their expression frankly, they told me that they did encounter several experiences of feeling unpleasant before, that some foreigners seemed so arrogant as if they believe they can teach the locals what to do. 131 while interacting with my subjects had constantly been the most critical challenge. ‘Language’, as a necessary but also a ‘problematic’ medium between the involved parties in the fieldwork, presented a not only interesting but also critical aspect to sense the ‘perception’, which was the boundary of cultural backgrounds. If I missed the interpretation of Russian slang, or the context of the received narratives, the subjects’ words could cause me confusion. For example, the definition of their formal income and informal income (levye dengi) from Russian workers’ immediate expression has a few variations. Similarly, to understand the work content and workers’ evaluation of that, to a certain extent, has taught me a great lesson of the need to distinguish their ‘implications’. Back to the concrete context, as regards the difference that I do not work as they do in their workplace, sometimes I was not sure that the description they provided was the thing I have really understood within our mutual communication. The gap, however, was created rather by the difference in our social backgrounds rather than simply cultural differences. For example, while focusing on workers’ experiences at the workplace, one permanent factor which had always confused me was how to distinguish the ‘virtue’ of their making cynical judgement about others, whether the target is their chief or their colleague. Those judgements have always been an awkward matter I could hardly understand. The other difficulty derived from things like arranging the environment for 132 ‘meeting people’. One of the permanent challenges to an outsider researcher who wanted to investigate the networks of Russian trade union activists was the difficulty of creating access to the rank and file through union leaders. For each society or community, the people may have their own social customs. The unfamiliar cultural experiences posed challenges in my interviews in order to manage the talk in ways that suited the locals or to perceive what they really mean. For example, how was I to find out if I had persuaded them to ‘adopt me’, to allow me to observe their day-to-day work? 33 Generally to say, at first, and indeed for quite a while, the different backgrounds presented a primary difficulty for my participant observation. The differences between me and the local activist circle always implied risks to the access. Noteworthily, the cultural issue to some extent had discouraged me from developing questions about gender issues during the fieldwork on these two male-dominated professions. 34 Nonetheless, the cultivation of deepening understanding of the subjects’ environments would not have arisen without these challenges. 33 It is easier for me to measure the mutual relationships of people in Taiwan, with their greetings such as a union leader inviting you to have lunch or dinner together right after the meeting. Being familiar to such social customs did not help me out in Russia, although my interviewees might have their way. 34 At the beginning, I tried to bring up the issue of how these male union activists might conduct organisational work among female colleagues for membership expansion, but I found it difficult to interpret their responses in relation to my expectation. Words like ‘Here is Russia, women don’t know what to follow, they just listen to man’. Or, when I was asking drivers’ activist about their attitude toward to those low-paid female conductors. The response was guided to they feel pity for poor young girls to take conductor job. I was quite confused how to properly deal with such words. It was because the dockers and train drivers are purely male-dominated professions in Russia that the research did not develop much work on gender issues in their workplace. 133 The third difficulty faced was how to note the individualised features of the research subjects. The difficulty of extending contact resources can be understood as a cultural difference but indeed was a factor deeply related to the character of the interaction between Russian union leaders and their members. When I started to have contact with local unionists, the first trade union activist I found, driver M, was from the Free Trade Union of St Petersburg Tram Drivers. This active person was well-known because of his successful media-oriented campaign. In addition, he seemed to be one of the very rare local activists who kept in mind any chances of getting international contact. Probably because he knew that I was also an activist for union campaigns before, he tried very hard to help me to get the information I needed. But he repeatedly said that he did not expect to mobilise his colleagues or persuade them to participate in collective action, he rather relied on other left activists to make a joint campaign. He would help me to meet other local unionists but not his members. After several times of close observation, I decided to give up this potential subject because of the narrow perspective of such a source. This was because he is more like an individual fighter in his workplace and, most importantly, he has decided not to make more efforts at internal organisational work. The critical matter is that driver M was not a single exception, many local trade unionists and labour activists I have met were acting on an individualistic basis. Some 134 of them were not even seen as relevant to their own members. There was a certain period during which I was so confused with the question ‘Do they really have “their organisation”’ or ‘Can I find any genuine union organisation with a genuine member base’? Certainly, such a characteristic can also be seen as a kind of cultural difference. As related to my research work the concern is that many leaders did not enjoy authority among workers – even among their own handful of members. That is very different from the trade union culture in Taiwan I was used to. On many occasions, I have seen the contradictory features: on the one hand that union leaders hardly could mobilise their members (as ‘fear’ has became a dominant mentality in current Russian society although workers in general have lots of complaints at work); but on the other hand the leaders did not take the mobilisation issue seriously. For both the leaders and the members, their consent and solutions are rather individualistic. This is partly due to the fact that collective action has not proved to be very effective; partly due to the fact that trade unions for them do not have a real capacity to engage in collective bargaining for wages. A further concern is that although people who are more active would not frankly suppress the contact between the researcher and those ‘passive workers’, a potential conflict about the ‘value’ of members’ opinions always existed. Such a factor derived 135 from a very common response among leaders and activists: after so many exhausting efforts, their lonely feelings lead them to believe that only they really care about the advancement, the progress of their trade union activities. Once my investigation was under way, this research also provided a challenge to the task of how a researcher can reach those passive and hidden people. 1.4 Labour organisations in St Petersburg Once the design of applying the method of participant observation for this research was set up, I started to establish access and contacts with the local labour activists’ circle in St Petersburg. The experiences and the approaching process not only helped me to learn the solution to understanding the local labour network, but also confirmed the earlier consideration of the weakness of information based on interviewing union leaders or analysing second-hand materials. Among all the contact individuals and groups, the similar reputation of both alternative organisations of the local railway workers and dockers turned out to contain interesting and comparable aspects for the case study, granted by the situation of the local labour movement in St Petersburg. The two union organisations both act as alternative trade union organisations in the transport sector, and also had been member organisations of the Confederation of Labour. In this section I present a brief introduction on the recent state of the labour 136 movement in St Petersburg during the past decade. This short description helps to capture the scene and character of the local labour activity network, and thereby to incorporate my methodological review to confirm the value of observing the two selected case-studies of this study. The resources of this introduction are partly based on secondary materials, partly based on my own interviews conducted with a number of well-known labour activists who had participated in strike events or organizational affairs during the past decade. 1.4.1 Who are the trade union activists? My first visit to St Petersburg was in the summer of 1997, which was the time of a wave of strikes and protests across Russia as the worsening situation of the national economy and industries was widely reported. Before visiting the country, I had in my mind some naïve illusions about the society of the former Soviet Union, in which some primitive, simple pictures about local workers’ activities had come earlier from studying the literature of the early 1990s. According to the report of the Russian scholar Temkina (1992), the early 90s was a peak time for establishing labour organisations, and the atmosphere of the labour movement had gained a high perspective. On this first visit, I saw a dozen elderly people standing in front of Gostiny Dvor (the city’s best-known shopping complex) with the ‘sickle and hammer’ 137 flags. As a citizen from the strongly anti-communist Formosa island, I was quite impressed by such a scenario, and soon imagined that some Russian people ‘still’ retain a tradition of calling for a ‘workers’ state’. I talked to one of the meeting participants, Professor Popov, a well-known figure from the local left-wing circle, who introduced himself and agreed to talk more about the situation of the workers’ movement in Russia. The message from his holding a ‘workers’ academy’ showed me the first clue about the local labour movement. The next summer I went to Piter again and arranged a longer stay. This was a time full of political rumours and fears for economical chaos to follow. On 7 October 1998, the Day of All-Russian Action called by the FNPR-led organisations, I went to observe the demonstration and then believed that, though a bit boring, it was quite a big and meaningful event within the Russian labour movement. At the end of the demonstration, I met one left-wing group; one of these protesters told me he was from a local labour organisation – ‘Nezavisimost’’ (The Independence) – a trade union organisation I had read about in the literatures about the new Russian labour movement mentioned earlier. Meeting this person was my first contact with a local labour activist, and since then I received more possibilities to make regular contact with local activists and union functionaries. I was confident that this was a successful beginning to catch the development of the local labour movement for this thesis. Only later on, I gradually realised that the real 138 situation of the ever gloomy labour movement in Piter has changed much more even than many observers may expect. When I came to St Petersburg at the end of 2001 with the aim of collecting case-study information, I realised the previous contact provided little support. After the meetings and interviews with local union activists, I felt that I met many heroic individuals but did not receive information about where the ‘active labour organisations’ were. The first active labour (social) organisation I received access to observe was the Committee of United Action for Social and Labour Rights (KED). With the aim of action coordination in the city, the KED was formed to present a new labour organisation for conducting resistance campaigns at local level. The initiative to set up this Organizing Committee appeared in the solidarity conference with the struggle of workers of the Vyborg Pulp and Paper Mill (VTsBK), which took place on November 26-27, 1999. The Organizing Committee included representatives of trade unions and public organizations and deputies of local parliaments of the St Petersburg city and Leningrad region. All the parties and unions represented stood on different ideological and political positions and often feuded with each other. Leaders of several alternative trade unions and FNPR trade unions were also among the participants. What kept the movement together was the resistance to the government draft of the new Labour Code and the focus of united actions, such as the all-Russia 139 protest action held on May 17 of 2000 against the first attempt by the Putin-Kas’yanov government to force the new Labour Code through Parliament. Despite the continuous attempts to divide this campaign, the Organizing Committee as a whole and all its co-chairmen (Artyukhin, Vedernikova, and Kozlov) made efforts to unite all opponents of the government’s draft Labour Code and to make agitation with materials understandable to the broad masses. 35 Its members produced and distributed leaflets and newspapers explaining the threat of the government’s draft Labour Code to workers and their unions. During their campaign, the committee carried out dozens of picket lines and several meetings were held in St Petersburg. One of their three chairpersons, Таmаrа Vedernikova, an active member of the Russian Communist Workers’ Party (RKRP), who was the chairperson of the trade union committee of the Leningrad Colour Printing Complex (KTsP) at the time. She participated in the solidarity group with the famous Vyborg strike event of 1999-2000 and decided to form the KED.36 The way of for the Committee work to require participants to present issues for the meeting to share and discuss. The discussions of the committee rarely covered trade union work. Apart from the attendance of trade This line was expressed in three main slogans: ‘No to the government's draft Code!’, ‘Defend the Soviet Labour Code!’, ‘Prevent any worsening of the labour legislation, whoever its initiators may be!’. Instead of exhausting organisational work, the Committee and other alternative labour organisations chose to send their appeals to every State Duma deputy representing St Petersburg. In most of the appeals, the reasons for the negative attitude to the government’s draft Labour Code were explained, and it was proposed to the parliamentarian to explain his / her position in the upcoming vote. 36 As president of a trade union committee whose struggle experiences grew up with her first action in her factory, her thinking is rather different from that of the Western trade unionist: she believed that workers’ rights rely on a strong party more than a trade union. 35 140 union leaders, the Organizing Committee concentrated on conducting public campaigns rather than making efforts at union agitation or mobilisation of the union members. The organisers did try to make meetings with trade union activists though, and they also expected to agitate more ordinary workers to join the Organizing Committee. Nevertheless, most of the meetings only had a low level of participation. The activists who worked within the Organizing Committee tried to provide good, friendly teamwork, but there was rarely any cooperation with other local alternative labour organisations. With their 20 or more regular individual participants, the Committee was more a loose labour-social forum than an organised labour organization.37 Nevertheless, since its establishment, the organisation did have a coordinating role among left-oriented trade unionists; and its regular participants were active in participating in pickets and labour protests. 1.4.2 Free / alternative union organisations The fact that KED was the first active grouping I could find can be seen as a consequence of the situation facing the local labour movement, which I realised only afterwards. Surprisingly, many early-established labour organisations gained no basic support for their survival. It seemed to me that many of these labour organisations had 37 Despite its activism and non-political title, local activists who are distant from KED believe this is rather a place for political ambition. The co-chairperson of KED, Evgenii Kozlov, a senior lecturer in history, is also a leader of the Regional Communist Party. 141 withered away. Those formed in the early 90s, such as ‘Spravedlivost’’ (Justice), had not been heard of for 3-5 years by 2002; and another one, the tiny labour organisation ‘Nezavisimost’’, barely existed but only kept the function of giving legal consultation to individuals and had not ever been able to associate with enterprise trade unions since 1993. ‘Sotsprof’ and ‘Defence’, the other two organisations which also appeared under the heat wave of democratization, have never established a strong union base across the region. It was rare to see any of their public actions or organisational activities except individual correspondents or their ‘occasional’ pamphlets. Moreover, even the most important unity of local free trade unions, the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Confederation of Labour (KT SPb i LO), founded on 8 July 1995 by a cluster of local free trade union organisations, which had grown up to 24 member organisations with about 10 thousand union members by 1998, was in a fierce struggle for survival. After a serious internal conflict over control of the leadership in the autumn of 1998, the regional branch had almost ceased all activities lately. Over its limited period of activism, the organisation helped to establish several new trade unions across the region; and provided a ‘Round Table’ forum for initiators and organisers from free trade unions to exchange information and experiences since February 1997. The subsequent fate of KT SPb, nonetheless, shared the same fortune of acting for only a short time as did other local labour organisations. According to the 142 assessment of local trade-union activists, despite its formal presence the Confederation only played an active role for a very limited period. The reason why it has almost disappeared over recent years is quite controversial; it seems that both internal conflicts and insufficient support from its member trade union organisations were the main factors. For example, the relatively strong alternative trade union organisations such as the unions of aviation workers (FPAD) or seamen (RPSM) rarely participated in local solidarity actions or networks. The development of KT SPb activities, as well as the history of the senior level of the Russian alternative trade unions, revealed the problem of the weak ability of local / primary trade union organisations. To capture the dynamic of local alternative union organisations, one probably needs to note the role of fund and resource providers – the representative centre of the American trade unions. From the early 90s until the end of 2002, the American trade union association, AFL-CIO, had provided the main sponsorship to local union activists and organisations by providing funds for a few well-paid posts (compared to Russian workers’ average wages). The fund supported the free Russian trade unions to have full-time staff, together with activity funds and information materials (such as publication of relevant materials over Russian labour laws). The aim was to establish ties with the activities of local free trade unions. The sponsorship did achieve 143 something by setting up coordinators at local level. Nevertheless, the sponsorship also caused some of these coordinators to become distant from their members and be authoritarian in conducting union activities. When the American side decided to reduce funding in the late 90s, the funding for the alternative unions was withdrawn, but the local legal consultation centre Egida (the St Petersburg branch of AFL-CIO sponsored Solidarinost’ until the end of 2003), still received material support from it. The ‘Round Table’ forum was therefore held by the Centre to retain the basic link among activists from the free trade unions. The fund was totally abolished in 2002, and the Centre arranged to receive material support from local FNPR organisations (LFP) for its routine functions. The ‘Round Table’ meeting and the legal consultation service are still maintained for free trade unions. Key organisers of the meeting had also convinced the director of Egida to transform its ‘Round Table’ meeting into preparation for future solidarity organisation and campaigns (Round Table meeting October 10, 2004). 1.4.3 The FNPR member organisations As the regional organisation of FNPR in St Petersburg and Leningrad Region, Federation of St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Trade Unions (LFP) embraces 43 member union organisations (including territorial-industrial and individual enterprise 144 ones), claiming a membership of about 1 million (in 2001). The centre of the Federation has 44 paid staff, but most of them are economists and legal consultants. As Ashwin and Clarke (2002, p.189) have revealed, ‘Individual cases take up a great deal of the time of the regional trade union organisations’ lawyers’. The organisational structure and the staff structure provide little opportunity to assign specific activists to represent LFP in any concrete labour dispute. Apart from simply depending on the chairperson of the primary organisation (such as the union committee or shop committee) to deal with the campaign, the consultation and the estimation of strategy for their own workplace actions, the territorial organisation of FNPR provided little support. As a female chairperson of a trade union committee affiliated with LFP expressed, ‘The conference meeting issued sharp criticism of the economic and social policy. But, it never had a concrete plan and action to tackle the problems’ (TamaraB, January 28, 2003). In those exceptional cases of local labour disputes at enterprise level (such as the dispute of Vyborg Pulp and Paper Mill Faction in 1999 or the strike of Ford workers) where the Federation had been involved, the Federation normally just held a press conference to show their moral position and left its member organisations to take their own stand. According to its official declaration, the Federation gives positive recognition to the application of social partnership, and that merely means the conclusion of sectoral 145 tariff agreements, territorial agreements, and collective agreements. The Federation claims to have concluded the first tripartite agreement in Russia, together with local government and the local employers’ association, back in 1991. Regarding LFP’s activities toward the difficulties of their members’ social and working standards, it is easy to understand that the organisation relies on holding ceremonial-type demonstrations or voicing their concern about the implementation of regional social programmes. According to its released information, in the face of conditions of conflict with employers or the authorities, the Federation organizes protest actions, pickets, will carry out demonstrations and meetings, using a wide set of means of pressure upon the social partners within the framework of the legislation and the Charter. The largest protest actions, like All-Russian Days of Action, have taken place almost every year. Apart from these mass actions, the Federation has always been the main organiser of the traditional Mayday demonstration and rallies, when they did mobilise their members, but without serious demands. Thereby, their participants just need to show up at the rally or meeting. Apart from these kinds of demonstrations, it is difficult to find their activists participating in any kind of industrial dispute around the city. The most decisive feature for assessing such a demonstration is to register the routine of listening to the speeches, passing the resolution, so logically and finally the participants can go home. 146 Apart from the traditional Mayday parade, LFP did organise a few special actions in the city. One of these few events was the campaign against the Labour Code draft of the Kas’yanov government. The Council of LFP demanded that member organisations should mobilise and be ready for union propaganda actions. Leaflets were handed out for one hour at nine city Metro stations. The mass protest action was set for 14 December 2000. According to local analysts, the meeting turned out to be a relatively successful mobilisation for the first time in the history of LFP. About 10 thousand workers attended the protest. Many of them were called by their own enterprise union organisations but not by the territorial committees of the trade unions. Despite those few and unique occasions where we see the potential of the FNPR union organisations to participate in actions, as regarding its positions toward these events we see little more than rhetoric and symbolic activism from LFP. As mentioned earlier, the Federation does not have a specific section or activists to take part in the resolution of local labour disputes or industrial actions. At the enterprise level, however, if a new-style or militant president of the union committee who is determined to defend and serve its members’ interest is elected, these union leaders are more active in participating in the circle of local labour struggles. Interestingly, these union leaders quite often turned out to keep close contact with local militant 147 communists and leftists (just like the case in the formation of KED) while staying with the LFP. These people chose to keep their union organisation under the FNPR structure while openly denouncing the incompetence of their senior FNPR leadership at the same time. In addition, these activists do not mind having contacts or even coordinating their activity with alternative trade union activists. 1.4.4 Individual-based coordination and solidarity Since my first contact with a local labour group in 2002, I spent almost all the first year observing the general conditions of local labour organisation and checking what I had heard previously. Through realising the situation of local trade union networks, one important fact emerged to note: there were few channels for local activists to meet and coordinate their activities. The scenario is not difficult to define: those relatively famous and well-resourced trade union organisations, such as the St Petersburg organisations of FPAD or RPD, seemed to have little interest in extending their own organisational base.38 Although these unions did support the idea of forming new confederations, so did participate in several nationwide actions, these local organisations paid little attention to the campaigns of other local union organisations. Most solidarity campaigns are deeply embedded on an individual basis, which means 38 In fact, during these years participating in numerous meetings, discussions and conferences, I had never met the leaders or activists from the trade union of air-traffic controllers (FPAD) nor seafarers (RPSM). 148 trade union leaders were not able to mobilise their members to attend the campaign. Ordinary workers knew little or nothing about such solidarity support as did occur. Union leaders usually claimed that the members were not interested in taking part in any concrete struggles, and the campaigns very often made their appeals to the ‘public’ instead of to their own members. We can easily find out that most appeals of these pioneer organisations were eventually ignored by the mass they wanted to appeal to. Such facts indicate how much these relatively stronger organisations were interested in making coordinating and solidaristic campaigns with their ‘minor brothers’. From ‘Kirovskii zavod’, ‘Arsenal’, ‘Leningradskii metall zavod (LMZ)’ to TEK (Fuel-Energy Complex of St Petersburg), all have their own interesting struggle stories and traditions, but again, most of them are simply active on their own. Those rarely seen solidarity campaigns, like the agreement of the trade union committees of VTsBK, LMZ, KTsP (Kombinat Tsvetnoi Pechati, Leningrad Colour Printing Complex) for solidarity action in 1999, did take place though. The miserable history of KT SPb reveals their strength had never provoked great moves to form or empower any influential organisation. During my observation period, the only exception was their support to Egida - the local-based legal consultation centre. Normally, the invitation to a round-table meeting or seminar which were to share their experiences and to monitor the critical changes in Russian labour law, so that had attracted local 149 activist to such kind of local networks of union groups. Corresponding to these conditions, for those ‘alternative’ union organisations outside the huge but inactive LFP, the only dynamic of the union movement around the region has constantly fallen on the circulation of reforming loose, forum-style union connections, composed of clusters of union activists. One of the important observations is that we cannot simply divide the free trade unions and the FNPR member organisations into two sides. Their trade unionists did sometimes coordinate to reach some common perspectives, although they still employ those general estimations of rich-but-inactive FNPR and active-but-tiny free trade unions; and the free trade unions actually differed in their positions on the political spectrum, so that we have to consider their cooperation was never taken for granted. The capacity of most so-called free trade unions is still weak but the leaders are rather reluctant to mobilise their own members to participate in their activities. Most of their plans for collective actions did not take place in the form of industrial actions. One of the most frequent things heard from them is their feeling of disappointment at their own fellow workers. Yet, instead of making an effort to strengthen their influence on the majority of their workers and members, most of their activities were set up directly to appeal to the public. The scenario of the upper level of the trade unions not only reflected the ability of various local primary trade union organisations, but also 150 revealed their problematic strategy. Quite interestingly, those practical issues such as the way they act, the forms of their coordination, or their rare experiences of how to make a successful campaign or organisation were rarely discussed. Apart from that, the meetings were frequently attended by people who carelessly declared that they are trade union activists or labour activists, while some others simply participated to present their opinions about the problem of Russian trade unions. There is another impressive finding: in various analyses, the passivity of ordinary workers in the face of potential conflict at work or their subordination to enterprise paternalism is often mentioned; such a factor is then connected to the reluctance of Russian workers to change the methods of their trade union organisations which simply stand on the side of the administration (management). Nevertheless, such a precondition seems hardly to be a general case during my primary observations. In many cases workers did accuse those union bodies which did not carry out their duties to protect the interest of their members; then decided to support the appeal of a new organisation. Another fact within such a dynamic is that these cases are always either isolated or frail; and local trade union organizations are so ineffective whether in reaching their activities or the practice of their strategies. This initial fieldwork generated three questions: firstly, how the union activists of my case studies dealt with the immediate request from their members; secondly, how local activists 151 coordinated their duties; thirdly, in what ways did those confederations and federations matter and why did these initiators decided to make a solidarity network? Finally, there is a most serious question to answer: why at this stage of the Russian labour movement did a discontinuity always appear between the senior trade union leaders and their member trade unions? 1.4.5 Into the case study stage Over the first year, the relatively complete experiences of meeting local unionists finally presented a clearer picture. 39 Alongside the poor coordination, variant individuals and weak unions, there were actually two groups of active people who attracted my attention: the railway workers of October Railway and dockers of St Petersburg Seaport. Having benefited from my previous efforts in the local labour circle, I had established convenient access to contact their activists. During the first step of collecting information for the background understanding I noticed that among those activist I had met, a handful of railway workers, members of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of October Railway (KSP OZhD), were relatively more active than other local union activists. Many other local unions were normally represented by only one person－the chairperson of the union committee. 39 Until that moment, I almost got the feeling that probably most of those labour and union organisations which had ever been active in the early 90s, had ceased their activities; and there were only union offices with their limited functions to observe. Later on, I realized that the early impression was due to the rare public attention and the poor coordination among local union activities. 152 Fortunately, I met these railway union activists at the period when they were heading the campaign against privatisation. Compared to other Russian railway routes, where workers might only have the traditional ROSPROFZhEL organisation or occasionally an organisation of the Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades of Railway Workers (RPLBZh), the presence of these activists made October Railway unique; in October Railway there were several trade union organisations, which makes the features of labour relations in October Railway possibly different. For my research investigation, this case provides me with the opportunity to set up observation of the members and activists of KSP OZhD, the Territorial Organisation of RPLBZh of October Railway (TO RPLBZh OZhD) and the Trade Union of the Electricians of October Railway (PSE OZhD). More importantly, I could deliberately study how the coordination among these organisations had been applied. That was why the October railway workers and their organisations (KSP OZhD) were taken as the subject of my first set of case studies. Once I had reached participant access to them, many materials were rapidly collected. The first case reminded me of the gulf between the ‘original imagination’ and the reality. The union organisations in my first case study were always full of quarrels, but there was no detailed discussion of improving organisational skills or how to develop their basic mobilisation ability. Different trade unions did not respect each other. Many activists were sacked or constantly faced the 153 threat of sacking. While the field work on the local railway workers almost came to an end in 2003, the labour disputes at St Petersburg Seaport had attracted more attention among local labour activists. Again, benefiting from my established access to the local union circle, the activists from St Petersburg Port Committee of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers finally agreed to receive my regular visits.40 The barriers to conducting observation in the port were much more than expected, especially compared to that of the first railway worker case study. Firstly, it has always been difficult to enter into their buildings, due to the tight security checking system. Secondly, the trade union organisation is very stable, holding basic resources and full-time union staff; most of them enjoy high support from their members. The activists were therefore not as eager to attract attention from outsiders as were the activists of the (independent) railway union organisations. Within the Russian trade union movement, the FNPR trade union would attract a minor role in this study. It is not difficult to realise that ROSPROFZhEL has been a typical FNPR-style trade union. Except for those traditional events of soviet-time union functions, there is no real connection between the members and the union organisations. Therefore I have to put alternative union 40 The specific process was as follows: we met each other on the street; contacted individuals from different trade unions; participated in their meetings; helped to make some progress; tried to follow their work. In addition, I got access to the dockers’ trade union through one of my key informants who helped me to establish contact. They suggested that I should have something as feedback. Quite surprisingly, though they have met and have some common work, these people did not exchange information very often. 154 organisations as the main object of my investigation. For the research design, the two local alternative union organisations, railway workers and dockers’, embrace meaningful aspects to make a comparison. Firstly, both organisations aim to represent certain categories of workers from the Russian transport sector, embracing an emphasis on brigade work. Secondly, both organisations have their common connection in the local trade union movement in St Petersburg. The conditions of the two trade unions, however, have encountered critical differences, and the patterns of the organisations, found to develop their own specific practice, differ. By and large, both the similarity and common background and the division and characteristics of the relations between the union and the members have provided more detailed insight for our study of the transformation of the Russian labour movement. 155 Part Two Labour Relations in the Transport Enterprise: Two Case Studies in St Petersburg Chapter 2 Railway workers and their organisations ‘RZhD is a monster, people from above easily get lost with the various sources of receiving informal money, at the same time people working on the railways have great fear. We have little power to change such a fact!’ (Leonid Petrov, former train electrician, the president of PSE OZhD, September 14, 2005). Following the review in Chapter One, the first object of this study focuses on the workplace relations – characterised by individualism and collectivism - among railway workers. The observation aimed to indicate the role of work organisation and the social organisation of the workplace in encouraging or discouraging the formation of a collective identity. The analysis then moves to introduce the development and position of two railway trade unions. The traditional trade union on the Russian Railways has been found normally to stand on the side of the railway administration, 156 showing little strength in defending the workers’ problems at the workplace; the active alternative trade union, however, has not succeeded in presenting an efficient competition with the traditional one. By integrating the investigation of these two sections, the further analysis is able to clarify the background when only train drivers more or less moved actively and established their own trade union, but explains why they failed to encourage other professions to join or to act on their own. The case study presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is based on a two-year participant observation (December 2002 - April 2004), in which interviews were conducted continuously because most interviewees had got to know me well so that there were various chances just to chat or share hot beverages around the depots. After the first presence at their picket against Russian railway privatisation, I was soon invited to attend the regular meetings of the ‘free’ railway trade unions. In addition, several group meetings were organised under my invitation to watch Taiwan labour documentary films as well as watching Ken Loach’s ‘The Navigators’. These occasions helped me to raise issues about the ‘models’ of objective interests and the subjective responses in different societies. There was also observation and conversations with railway workers inside their workplace and workplace meetings (even inside the locomotives). Some of the meeting occasions, however, may be seen as a breach of the security rules of the depots, therefore some descriptions about their 157 work conditions in this chapter are not given exact names; surnames of my interviewees (except the union leaders) retain only the first letter. 2.1 Work in the Russian railway system 2.1.1 General background The history of the Russian railways started with the establishment of the experimental railroad between St Petersburg and Tsarskoe selo in 1837. The first major railroad between St Petersburg and Moscow was completed in 1851. Since then the role of Russian railway transport developed rapidly. At least by the end of the 19th century it had exceeded the traditional river transport and had become the most important means of transportation for the country’s domestic and international economic activities. The rank of both its volume of passengers carried for regional transport and volume of cargos were always the highest among all Russian means of transportation. The important role of the Russian railway also brought it into history and society as the key force in some critical events. The fact, for example, that there are even several children’s railways operating (in summer) for Russian children to practice the most basic procedures of railway work reflects its irreplaceable role within Russian society. The Russian railway system during Soviet times was integrated into the Unified Transport System of the Soviet Union (ETS SSSR). Its management was heavily 158 centralised between the two world wars for the full control and deployment over both political and power struggles. It was at that time that a special code of conduct, military discipline, and even military-style uniforms were introduced into the sector, which have persisted until today. Despite the collapse of the former Soviet regime, the ETS still operated according to its united mission. The new Russian Federation took over about 59 % of the former USSR railway system, which currently embraces 17 interregional railways. As a strategic object within the Russian national economy, the whole rail industry still performs the most active role in the middle or long-distance transportation of both passengers and cargos after the de-integration of the huge soviet railway system. The economic depression, however, had an enormous impact on railroad transportation: the level of which has never fully recovered compared to the level of 1991. This is mirrored in the productivity figures, which show a steady decline in labour productivity from 1991 to 1998 as the economy sank into ever deeper recession, and a steady improvement with the economic recovery from 1998, so that productivity had regained the 1991 level by 2003, although real wages, which had collapsed immediately after the liberalisation of prices at the end of 1991, had still not reached 60% of their former level (see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, the average wage in the Russia railway sector has always been seen as one of the best among the main economic sectors. Generally, railway workers like 159 to emphasise that their average wage in the past was in 5th-8th place within all soviet industries until the introduction of perestroika. The official statistics showed that the average wage of railway workers was about 7662 roubles in 2003, falling slightly to ninth place (see Figure 2.2).41 Nevertheless, now the railway workers complain that their wage level has fallen to 15th-18th place in the wage league table. The Russian Railway authority, though it did not deny the decline in railway workers’ wages, preferred to emphasise that the standard since 2002 had got better and that was exactly because of higher production outcomes; while the official trade union has admitted that the average wage of railway workers was too low, which was why so many workers had left the sector.42 Despite the privatisation programme introduced into most Russian industries and enterprises since the early 1990s, the railway industry and its function still directly belonged to the Russian federal government as a state organ until 2004. Before the railway reform, the whole industry was assigned under the control of the Ministry of Railway Transport (MPS). In October 2003, the Open Joint-stock Company Russian Railways (JSC Russian Railways) was formed to replace the previous structure, 41 According to several data sources, the average wage of railway workers was 6,100 roubles in 2002, and stood in sixth place among all the basic industrial sectors; this was an increase from 3870 in Jan 2001. The statistics of the Ministry of Railway Transport are quite suspicious, due to the fact that the data for 2002 did not include air transport and sea transport workers. According to the interview of Mandel (1994, p.212) with an engine driver on the Moscow Railway, the average wage of engine drivers is 10% higher than that of ordinary factory workers. 42 According to the president of ROSPROFZhEL, Anatoly Vasil’ev, a total of 150 thousand railway workers left the sector in 2000 alone (Tuchkova 2001). 160 marking the second step of the Russian railway reform programme, while the original team of the Ministry now became the heads of the new state-owned company. Apart from the pressure from international financial organisations such as the OECD and the World Bank, the other reason for undertaking the reform was that the administration was not satisfied with the low performance of the current railway workforce. Therefore, the MPS set up the reform programme while emphasizing that the prior task was to increase the work motivation of railway workers. 161 Figure 2.1: Tendency of real wage and labour productivity of the Russian railway sector from 1992 to 2003 and projection to 200543 Upper line: change of real wage (December compared to December 1991); Lower line: Change of labour productivity (compared to 1991) h Data source: Statistics of JSC Russian Railways, Dinamika real’noi zarabotnoi platy i proizvoditel’nost’ truda za period 1992-2002 gg., i prognoz na period do 2005 g. (% k urovnyu 1991g.), 2003. 43 Russian Railways Company, Statistics of Russian Railways Company [online]. Available from: http://www.rzd.ru/images/u_img.html?st_id=15242&he_id=374 [Accessed 01 January 2005]. 162 Figure 2.2: Average wage of the basic sectors in Russia Federation (April 2003) Gas industry 21250 Oil producing industry 17771 Pipeline transportion 14280 Sea transport 12023 Petroleum-refining 11643 Non-ferrous metallurgy 10960 Air transport 10941 Railway transport 7662 Coal industry 7523 Ferrous metallurgy 7384 Engineering industry 5336 Inland waterway transport 5141 Motor transport 5081 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 Source: Statistics of JSC Russian Railways, Srednemesyachnaya zarabotnaya plata v bazovykh otraslyakh Rossiiskoi federatsii i na vidakh transporta, rub. April, 2003 (Original in Russian, author translated). 163 2.1.2 The organisational and management structure of Russian Railways As previously mentioned, the current Russian railway network system has 17 interregional routes. All of these routes until October 2003 were subordinated to the MPS, and are now under the control of the JSC Russian Railways - Russian Railways Company. For all the relevant operative works in the railway sector, there are more than 150 professions. These basically include train driving, engineer, station supervisor, electrician, mechanic, track repair worker, conductor, construction worker, station service clerk and so on. In 2001, the total employment within the Russian railway system was about 1 million 590 thousand workers, which included 54 thousand workers for capital repair (kapital’nii remont) and 20 thousand construction workers. To manage such a huge industrial organisation, there were indeed complicated administrative organs established within the network system as well as part of the governmental organs. The basic work organisations related to the productive operation of the rail industry were distributed as follows: 1) Department of transportation management 2) Department of locomotive facilities 3) Department of cargo and commercial works 4) Department of carload facilities 5) Department of passenger communication / services 6) Department of tracks and construction 7) Department of signal system, centralisation and blocking 8) 164 Department of electrification and power supply.44 All of these departments were integrated into units structured by three levels: ministerial; railroad; regional branches.45 Therefore, even at the headquarters of the Ministry we can still see a pile of swollen establishments. They were divided into production and economic management parts. Corresponding to these establishments there was enormous bureaucratic personnel: the minister and a dozen of his deputies controlled about 20 departments. For the central ministerial level, the prior and the most important function of the Russian railway industry was to guarantee the unity of the enormous networks of the Russian railway system. It was also then to be responsible for the general performance of the railways in the country, as well as the budget balance, construction projects and communication with the national railways of its neighbouring countries. It is also interesting to note, according to the ‘Law on Railway Transport’, that in the field of employees’ working conditions the central administration had responsibility for negotiating and signing the Sectoral Tariff Agreement (OTS). Below the administration of the former MPS, to deal with such an enormous interregional railway system the practical management of the operation of each 44 All Russian railway units have their own specific abbreviation of Russian letters, which was a legacy of the military discipline system introduced during the Second World War. 45 This means the former MPS, now head office of Russian Railways. This research began in 2002, here I firstly use MPS instead of the Russian Railways, although the MPS has disappeared now. Within the Russian federal government, the Ministry of Transport is in charge of the development of railway transport together with the state-owned JSC Russian Railways. In place other else I use JSC Russian Railways when referring to the superior administration of current Russian railway operator. 165 railroad actually relies on the railroad administration. The administrations do not have to meet any competition among them; their responsibilities are rather to decrease the difficulty of controlling such enormous, complicated networks. The road administrations still face dealing with huge territories of their railroad network, and of managing its considerable quantity of various properties which are located in different regions (such as cultural palaces, hospitals, museums and publications etc.). In practice, the administrative unit of the railroad level, formally established as a state unitary enterprise (Gosudarstvennoe unitarnoe predpriyatie, GUP), was left to take charge of the general dimensions of the service and policies for the transport productivity of each railroad, and of coordination with the regional organisations. They are also responsible for the railroad employment and the material benefits of their railroad employees. Formally, their decisions should be subordinated to the general guidance of the former MPS. Most of these functions have now been taken over by the new Russian Railway Company. Under the railway authority, there are again a set of regional branches distributed by the consideration of (sub) routes and geographic conditions. Within these regional branches, almost each depot or shop has its own buildings, its own facilities. And almost each category of professional duties has its own administration and head (Nachal’nik). These primary heads have the power of defining their workers’ jobs, 166 duties, holidays and wages, as well as the control of those state properties. The arrangements of various related units or even fiscal spaces are very different. And the reality of railroad management is very different from what is required in the various instructions, laws and regulations. In matters such as the location of the employees’ refectory or the condition of rest places, it seems there is no clear obligation to follow any particular workplace arrangement. That eventually allows each unit to generate its own specific culture (environment). Such a factor reflects one essential character: in everyday railroad works, the real managerial power is also in the hands of each depot or shop chief. Take the organisational structure of the October Railway as an example: on the administrative board, there were in total 11 chiefs, and six (or seven) of them are in charge of the work of transport operations. Generally, their duties follow the original assignment as at the Ministerial level except for a few differences for field practice. The post of general engineer, for example, was assigned to the Railway. The October Railway has six regional branches: Moscow, St Petersburg, Murmansk, St Petersburg-Petrozavod, St Petersburg-Viteb and Volkhovstroev. These branches are distributed by different executive regions, except that two of them are in the stations of St Petersburg city. Each regional branch still covers a huge territory and has a great number of scattered units. Employees from the same branch with different 167 professions though carry out their duties around the same area and do not come into contact with their fellow colleagues in other units. There may be geographical reasons: some depots are located in the city and have access to city roads; others are isolated in remote areas where a handful of security guards can easily see people who come or go. In other situations, some units are more sensitive over the consideration of ‘being a state strategic resource’, some are not. More importantly, the authority of real managerial power varies in different units. Workplace discipline is not only imposed by the headquarters but also by the heads of branches or immediate work management (depots, shops). Workers face different atmospheres in different units depending on the attitudes of the immediate management, although most of the time they only deal with or confront the heads of their units. For example, in locomotive depots TCh-8 and TCh-12, one gives the ‘free’ trade union the right to keep the trade union office by using the Railroad’s resources; the other does not. By and large, most workplace problems or disputes are directed toward the management of the depot or shop heads. (Such factors even affect workplace observation. Some depots or shops may be open for outsiders while other depots may not be). 168 Figure 2.3: The average wages in different Russian railways (2003) Upon-Volga 6419 North-Caucasian 6519 Gorky 6703 Kaliningrad 6823 South-Eastern 7227 Kuibyshev 7600 West-Siberian 7930 Moscow 7989 October 8744 South-Ural 8909 Krasnoyarsk 9763 Sverdlovsk 9896 East-Siberian 10433 Northern 10659 Far-Eastern 10978 Transbaikal 11860 Sakhalin 13817 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 Data source: JSC Russian Railways (Author selected) 169 Figure 2.4: The railway structure of October Railway* *Source: October Railway, JSC Russian Railways. 170 2.2 Workers and their working conditions on October Railway Within the basic character of the Russian railway system, the most impressive one is the huge wage differential amongst the 17 railways (see Figure 2.3). To give a more vivid picture of it, we can look at the status of October Railway. Among all 17 state-owned railway routes, the St Petersburg-Moscow route carries the largest volume of passenger traffic in the country, which makes October Railway the most important railroad by share of total passenger volume. With its 117 thousand workers, the average wage on October Railway, however, stands at the relatively low level (in ninth place) of about 8,744 roubles in 2003. According to Pavel Markov, the president of the railway committee of ROSPROFZhEL of October Railway, the average wage of workers on October Railway in 2002 was 6,179 roubles, and it was even 4.3% higher than that specified in the branch tariff agreement.46 Among all the categories of ordinary railway workers’ the monthly payments of the personnel of the locomotive brigades, engine driver (Mashinist) and assistant, normally enjoy the superior place. Nevertheless, the enormous Russian railway infrastructure made an apparent wage differential of their standard wages among regions / railways. A driver’s highest monthly wage in 2003 was about 20,000 roubles For the former data see the official website of ‘Russian Railways Company’ The author of this thesis has combined the data into a single figure; the latter one can be found in ‘Oktyabr’skaya magistral’’ 07 September 2002 46 171 (Moscow area), but in remote areas like the North Ural region it was as low as 8,000 roubles. In addition, we have to note there are big differences in working conditions between varied regions and railway routes. The fact is that, despite the whole Russian Railway structure having always been under the single control of the state, workers working conditions and payments differ alongside the management of the 17 Russian railways. Moreover, even on October Railway, at different railway stations, workers in the same profession may receive different wages rates. For example, the average wage of workers working at the Moscow Station is the highest of all, at the other stations workers earn less. Workers in those stations may earn more if they are assigned to work on foreign trips. According to the official statistics of Russian Railways, October Railway had about 117,000 employees in total in 2003 (107,000 in 2004; 124,000 in 2001). The average wage on October Railway in 2003 was 8,744 roubles. In addition, workers’ benefits here are also guaranteed by the Sectoral Tariff Agreement which has always asserted that the Russian railway sector should provide better social guarantees, housing, and chances of education and so on for all railway employees. Furthermore, such things as the right to receive healthcare or receive legal consultation from the trade union over cases of discipline violation are all written into the annual OTS. The reality of Russian railway workers’ well-known benefits, however, seems not to be so 172 close to the official agreement. Just like most public service sectors in the world, the locations of the workplaces for the railway workers are broadly distributed. There are six local branches within the territory of October Railway. Such a condition certainly constitutes a geographical factor in the formation of the characteristics of Russian railway work. Just like the differences within the nationwide railway networks in Russia mentioned above, there might be different working environments or managerial regulations in different sections. First of all, we should note that even at one workplace, different groups of workers are actually separated from each other. If we look at depots VCh-8 and TCh-8, two units which are right next to each other; each has its own restaurant, its own conference hall and so on.47 These differences derive from the fact, as described earlier, that at the branch level there might be several different depots and shops put together while each of the depots or shops has its own head of administration. Secondly, we also need to note that the working conditions for workers in the same profession may differ, which is directly related not only to the types of their duties (passenger or cargo transportation) but also to who is in charge of their sections. By and large, from the culture to the specific norms of work, almost all concrete working conditions vary, but one response is very common among railway workers: that 47 The origin of both titles, TCh, VCh, is inherited since they were used during the second war as military units. TCh is an abbreviation of Tyagovaya chast’(Towing Section). 173 emphasising the hardship of duty and the workplace discipline. To understand the characteristics of the so-called ‘united’ Russian railway work, this research needs to classify the contents of their ‘variant’ working conditions. The following sections, therefore, present pictures of the work of various groups at their workplaces. The information in these descriptions is mainly derived from interviews during my fieldwork on the ground of several selected workplaces. Through these descriptions we will then perceive the practical pattern of workers’ interactions. 2.2.1 Train (Engine) driver Among all the railway professions, train drivers not only have a high self-expectation of their role, but their duties are also commonly seen as the most skilled and complicated ones. Indeed, their average wages are usually double the average wage in the Russian railway industry. And if we understand their duties and the procedure of their recruitment, it will not be difficult to perceive why the previous value is so permanent. Take the ‘‘Regulation on Russian Railway Workers’’ as an example, in which there is a special article only to control drivers on Russian railway work, this also reveals their unique status amongst all professions in the sector. As an engine operator and driver, their duty is more than just driving the train. They also need to 174 keep physical concentration on lots of signals and the dashboard at the same time and to learn the knowledge of machinery, as well as memorizing masses of rules about the technical operation of the locomotive, rules on traffic, signals, safety, and so on. Career path After general training in the knowledge and practice of engine machinery, workers can receive a licence (certificate) and take the decision to drive different sorts of train. There are several different sorts of locomotives and trains: electric locomotive (elektrovoz), diesel locomotive (teplovoz), electric train (electropoezd) and diesel train (teplopoezd). Generally all these sorts of locomotives and trains are employed for passenger and cargo transport. According to the assignment or recruitment of the Railways, drivers’ knowledge of different types of engine distribute them into different sorts of depots. Then, according to their work experience and skills all engine drivers can be divided into three classes. According to the class, the wages might be different. A simple career path such as the following shows the ordinary career process since entering into this field. Firstly, to be a machinist for at least 6 months; then to enter into the engineers’ school to get a license; to work for at least one year then has to pass an exam; so that in about one year he may become a third-class driver; then after another two years he may be promoted to a second-class driver; finally, if he has worked as long as ten years, he may receive the first class. In 175 most cases, it may take 10-15 years for Russian drivers to get the first class certification. All of these elements, the experience, the type of locomotive and the sort of depot, are relevant to their wages. As mentioned earlier, the wages are different according to the class, the contents of duties and the location as well. However, drivers expressed an attitude that the wage differentials corresponding to the three classes do not really concern them. One of the reasons may derive from the fact that for such a raise, in practice, drivers really have to wait for years to upgrade into first class so that it turns out not really necessary to keep that in mind. Of more concern are the differentials between their posts: between engine drivers and assistant drivers, normally the difference was about 3,000-5,000 roubles in 2002-2003. Duties and wages Generally, each driver or locomotive brigade works on a monthly schedule (grafik). For their routine work, drivers come to their depots to pick up the number of the train or the locomotive stated on the monthly schedule. They may drive a long or short distance. For a long distance, a two-man brigade must be present in the driving cabin. In most cases, the same driver and the same assistant always stick with each other. Usually, to start the duty they have to be present an hour and ten minutes before the departure time. They also need to pass a medical test and then to authorise their working document, so that they can take the locomotive and then get into their 176 cabin.48 If they have to drive a long distance, like the St Petersburg-Moscow route, then they will have a rest at the station of the destination and return the next day. On the route, they always have to pay attention and follow the sharp sound of signals with also the virtual signals in the small and sometimes very uncomfortable cabin. For the regulation of the train riving work control there are three warning cards - green, yellow and red cards - to warn how badly the mistake was made by the driver on duty. Once the driver has received a red one he would have to take the exam again. Unpleasant conditions: investigation at Depot TCh-8 OZhD Depot TCh-8 is a locomotive depot located within the Moscow Station in the centre of St Petersburg. This depot once belonged to a compound depot (1,200 workers) then was divided into two. The other part, TCh-10, is now a motor coach depot (motorvagonnoe depo). The full name of depot TCh-8 is St Petersburg-passenger-Moscow locomotive depot of October Railway, and it is the depot of the locomotives of the most important intercity / interregional route across the country. The depot has two entrances: the main entrance is to follow the platform to the end and then go further following the tracks. From the main building of the Station to the depot takes about 15 minutes on foot. Passing through the depot and going further for another 10 minutes (across a road bridge), workers can also reach 48 In the Russian railways system, there are special psychological laboratories installed near the locomotive depot to carry out the test. 177 the wagon section and the wagon depot VCh-8. In TCh-8, there is a railway museum and an open exhibition of old train engines. Drivers from this depot usually take their routes from St Petersburg either to the far north city of Murmansk or Moscow. In total there are about 750 workers, including 246 drivers and assistants, at this depot. The average wage for drivers at this depot was about 15,000 roubles in 2003, and that for assistants was about 11,000 roubles. The open access to this depot provided me with a lot of advantages in investigating the details of locomotive drivers’ work. The content and schedule of drivers’ duties mean that each of them work under isolated conditions. A train driver (Vitali, 44-year-old) who also works as an examiner of less-experienced drivers has his duty to drive an elektrovoz from St Petersburg to Moscow and then return. This is a route usually operated during the night, for the sake of passengers’ comfort. A rough timetable for such a working procedure is therefore as follows: outward departure (evening); approach destination station (next morning); take rest at destination station; return departure (next evening). According to such an assignment, the time (frequency) of their day off is also different. Drivers on the St Petersburg-Moscow route work every two journeys (poezdki) and then get a day off; for the other routes they have a day off for every three journeys. Due to their working schedule, they are very unlikely even to meet with their colleagues on duty. When I changed the topic of my interview onto the contact between drivers, like others of my 178 interviewees, most of them expressed they did not understand why I have such a question. Their reply was simple and similar: ‘I might say we probably can meet each other on the street by chance’. The reason for such situations, he explained, comes from both the Ministry’s and the depot administration’s failing in their responsibilities to count for how long or for how many days drivers should have days off. ‘Anyway, the obligation is constantly violated. Because… it is impossible to combine the employer’s norm and the official rest arrangement’ (VitaliZ, diesel locomotive driver, April 25, 2003). Noteworthily, when talking about the new conditions about one year later, he said the official information of a higher wage was simply a false figure. ‘Our condition is even worse now. Compared to the extent of inflation in the city, the slightly higher wage the government just introduced doesn’t make me more money but less’ (VitaliZ, diesel locomotive driver, May 05, 2004). The lonely and hard-pressure trip raises great concern about the condition of the driver’s cabin. Driver Andrei (43-years-old), also from this depot, works as an assistant driver on an electric locomotive. His usual journey is from St Petersburg to Murmansk. With a wage of 11,000 roubles in 2003, he seemed not very eager to be upgraded to a driver; instead of that, he was more concerned about the work security, working conditions and health. He tried very hard to convince me that the standards of working conditions for Russian railway drivers have never been met. Despite the 179 fact that their administrations have their responsibilities written in various documents; on the contrary, these responsibilities sometimes just benefit the depot chiefs. Even the equipment installed in the locomotives, such as a fridge or mirror, the interviewee acused, was always taken away by the depot chiefs, probably for their own private use. He said: ‘From clean water, working seat to normal-working rain brush, we lack them all in our cabin… We don’t even have a proper toilet, so that drivers usually ‘do it’ on newspapers then throw it out of the window.’ ‘You know such poor arrangements may have a bad effect on our biological conditions (organism)’ (AndreiP, diesel locomotive assistant, June 09, 2003). In addition, the other fundamental problem is now most of these locomotives have been used for about 30 years, all the conditions such as making a huge noise are also damaging drivers’ health and cause security problem for the train’s operation. Despite their relatively high wages, drivers actually suffer from longer working hours. According to the interesting interview narrative of Mandel (1994), even before perestroika engine drivers might have to put in 220-230 hours a month for their duty, compared with the 173 hours of other workers. In addition, in practice, they did not even have a day off, though there were good bonuses as a kind of compensation. 180 Drivers work 2 or 3 weeks without a day off. The conditions of drivers’ harsh working hours have improved little after more than ten years of economic reform across the country. Volodya, 43 years old, a diesel engine driver, belongs to the depot TCh-12 which is within the Finland Station. Unlike those previously mentioned drivers, he drives a short distance route and works alone, without any assistant. For that he usually works as long as 12.5 hours, and about 180 hours a month, though usually it will be even more. That was the cost of his relatively high wage of about 15,000 roubles per month in 2003. When he stopped checking the locomotive and talked about his work in his cabin, the very first thing he wanted to talk about was the workload of drivers like him. Referring to his workload, the wages were actually quite embarrassing. For such a kind of duty, due to the heavy pressure of taking sole responsibility, drivers will be required to pass a more stringent health examination. With their ‘relatively’ high wage, the basic equipment of their small ‘territory’ was rather old or even quite tattered, which made drivers complain about its potential harm to their health. By and large, such a condition is just another typical story of these drivers. From all kinds of drivers’ expressions, the most often mentioned difficulty with drivers’ current working situations is overtime working. The hardship of long working hours not only put them under immediate pressure. Under such working conditions, 181 they are unlikely to have enough rest. Drivers often complained in this way: ‘Think about when you go home you still have a lot of domestic work to do. This is why we call it “accumulated tiredness”. Compared to previous times, we have to take more duty but less economic advantage’(AlekseiF, diesel locomotive driver, April 29, 2003). Besides, drivers may have little time to meet, to talk to their colleagues over their work time, due to the moving, isolated condition of their work and also because everyone has an individual work schedule. The arrangement of their work schedule makes them not able to meet with other colleagues except when they have long-distance duty, in which case they may meet in the rest place of the destination. But even on such occasions, real communication is still rare. If they do not come to visit the trade union office then they might meet their colleagues only once in 2 or 3 months, or even half a year. As a logical but ironical consequence, we should learn that the so-called locomotive brigade, unlike others, means only the driver and his assistant. Money or family? A story at cargo transport depot TCh-9 As mentioned earlier, there are two basic categories of railway transport: passenger and cargo. In terms of distinguishing their general working conditions, there is little difference between the two categories, although the duties are rather 182 different. The life story of a young assistant driver Yury reveals more detail of the hardship of being a driver in the current railway environment. Yury was 27 years old when we met in 2002. At the time he had just been sacked from depot TCh-12 within the Finland Station, and spent most of his time working for the trade union. His wife, O, was a medical student and received only a 250-rouble studentship per month. He started to work at his first depot when he was still studying in the Institute. He found the conditions in the depot were very bad, so he had to move to another depot. When he started his first permanent job, again, he found the working conditions were too bad. His description told : ‘The workload, the temperature of the depot, the place was not as promised in the agreement. Then everyday I just went to the depot but sat there doing nothing…. I refused to carry out the duty, although I could get 8,000 roubles a month (as a machinist)’ (YuryE, assistant of locomotive driver, May 5, 2003). He was finally sacked for not complying sufficiently with his duty. After several months of getting no new job and only doing informal work (levaya rabota), he finally decided to hide his record of being a trade union activist, as advised by a senior trade union activist, and tried to find a new job at another depot at another city train station. After re-examination at the end of 2003, he finally received an assistant 183 driver post. Currently he works on depot TCh-9, depot Petersburg-Sortirovochnyi-Vitebskyi, with a cargo train driven by a diesel locomotive. This is a depot only for cargo transport. The new post requires him to take business trips and to drive abroad more often. His wage was then as high as between 15,000-20,000 roubles per month (April 2004). The job immediately changed his consumption capacity and stabilized his family life. The impact of his new career was so visible that it even surprised me. He said workers’ income at Finland Station was lower; mainly due to the fact that in that depot there were low volumes of cargo transport. A couple of months later, however, from his words I realized the previous content had changed. He told me: ‘I decided not to take the abroad journeys any more,’ He said. ‘When I took it, I did earn more. Nevertheless, I negotiated with the administration. I wanted to balance the money and the rest time staying at home’ (September 21, 2004).49 From June 2004 his wage decreased to only about 12,000 roubles. In addition, his union activities had been heard in the ears of depot chief. Job insecurity again appeared in his life, he chose not to attend union meetings often, at least not to do 49 The conversation was rather about private life. Since the interview meeting started, Yury has become a close friend of mine. We visited each other often, and through him I met his family and colleagues. He loves his young wife very much and does not want to sacrifice his private life. He and his wife once had serious sickness in separate periods of 2004. For that he wanted to have more time at home for his wife. 184 anything at his depot. All drivers need to prove their health and take a general examination of their health condition every two years. In the view of the railway administration, this is simply a method to guarantee the safety of railway transport. Nevertheless, drivers believe that is also a good tool for their administration to manipulate them and take the opportunity to force people to leave their jobs; and that is a way, again, to establish management authority. Especially at the period of railway reform, this is done to increase the labour efficiency to fit into the demands of the reform programme. Discipline in power Finally, it is also important to review another main job-related difficulty derived from the performance / discipline and the obligations of their duty. The pressures from disciplinary rules and procedures are always more complicated when they are combined with the exercise of managerial power. Firstly, the ‘Law on Railway Transport’ has given the former MPS particularly strong legitimacy in subordinating railway workers to the Railway’s demands. There are several more practical regulations which grant space for the depot administration to control drivers’ discipline. These include «Regulations about discipline of workers of railway transportation», «Regulations about the order of application of precautionary coupons 185 to drivers, assistant drivers of locomotives, motor-coach rolling stock, special self-propelled rolling stock and drivers, assistants to drivers of section cars», and «Rules of technical operation of railways of the Russian Federation». Many labour disputes on the Russian railways were over the definitions and the strength of these pro-administration regulations. Within a drivers’ career life, whatever the high advantages they may enjoy, the risk of disobeying discipline is to be demoted to a lower grade. And that has become a very common general perception among drivers. Apart from representation by a proper consultant, there is no clear protection to defend the right of an individual worker over the performance of his duties. The presence or intervention of the trade union is therefore immediately called for at this moment. Despite the poor record of their labour protection organisations, such protection has proved to be increasingly powerless. As early as 1994, the depression of the Russian economy and the fall of the inter-state transportation between the former Soviet republics had led the Railway authority to close several locomotive depots. Drivers from TCh-12 (Finland Station) were the first to face massive job-cuts. Under the policy of ‘re-organisation’, they resisted with the independent trade union but finally lost their jobs. Another newly emerged threat comes from the reform programme. An immediate result of the reform programme is actually to force more people to leave their jobs. For such purposes the 186 management has started to ask drivers to take retirement before they are 55 years old. As well as the daily practice of spreading job insecurity, the other way used by the management for the ongoing reform programme is to, again, ‘manipulate’ the result of the every-two-year health examination to force drivers voluntarily to leave their jobs. These perspectives have brought more uncertainty and more silence to Russian train drivers over the past three years. 2.2.2 Locomotive mechanics At each locomotive depot, there are also locomotive repair workers who work closely with drivers to check and repair locomotives. For this reason, these workers are seen as an expanded part of the locomotive brigade. At the depot the mechanics teams work at the locomotive check station (PTOL). Drivers should bring the locomotive into the station and report to the mechanics’ office to fix or maintain the instruments. These workers have the knowledge of locomotive instruments, some of them also have had experience of working as train drivers or assistants. Despite their knowledge of operating locomotives, these workers expressed the view that, compared to the duty of engine drivers, their work here at least allows them not to have to bear such a huge pressure as drivers do. A common monthly wage for the mechanics was about 8,000 roubles in 2003. Interestingly, we may find a ‘managerial’ connection between the 187 two professions. A locomotive mechanic described and explained his career path: ‘I came to the railway work in 1983, so till now that has been almost 20 years. I worked as an assistant driver from 1984 to 1993, and then I became a driver. In 1993, I was caught violating labour discipline by having a misdemeanour, after the event I was demoted to the repairman position’ (AndreiR, May 27, 2003). According to him, the reason he was ‘demoted’ essentially related to the sharp fall in the need for railway transport. He believes that since the country had to reduce the number of trains operating, so the administration wiped him out without further consideration. He had made the same disciplinary mistake in the past (in soviet times), but might just get a finger pointed at him and blamed but still keep his post. For most locomotive mechanics the working environment of these check stations can hardly be seen as comfortable. These stations are usually not properly lit and workers still use outdated equipment to check locomotives. Workers from a check station inside Finland Station firstly passed me a stronger negative experience with their current situation, as one of them said, ‘Look at our workplace, nobody organised it. You see the waste materials left everywhere, and the depot is so dark and cold, the temperature indoors was actually little higher than outdoors. How can we work at a 188 depot like this during the winter?’ (LeonidP, former train electrician, February 15, 2003) However, it seemed the concern about the violation of labour inspection did not provoke mass discontent. To take the check station ‘Ruch’i’ as an example, it is located on the outskirts of St Petersburg, in charge of the locomotives from TCh-12 (Finland Station), here there were 60 workers in total. All workers were divided into four shifts to keep the station on a full-day standby. And as a result of the assignment, although this is a small and isolated check station, the workers do not often meet colleagues from other shifts, it was almost impossible to meet the whole labour collective. Although their working timetable is not very predictable, people working here, like Andrei & Sergei, showed they were satisfied with the general working character, except for the level of their wages, at least they can arrange their own working schedules easily, and one should find such conditions are not that bad for people who do not expect much of materials. When we talked about why Andrei did not try to apply to return to his post after the event, he said, ‘You want to know the reason why I did not apply but decided to stay as a repairman, because I have anyway felt the work of being a driver was too complicated, too many instructions, too many demands!’ Unlike the PTOL at depot TCh-8, which was apparently assigned as a model check station, the working environment was not really comfortable in his depot. 189 It is sure at least, corresponding to the design and the location, the station has less pressure of arguing or arranging things with their chief.50 Talking about how the work content had changed since he started such a job, he then has another view: ‘Nothing has changed in the working conditions of drivers and repairman. Only the serial of the locomotive has changed!’ In addition, he also insists that the situation can be blamed on the great impact of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the whole economy. Nevertheless, compared to other occupations, the general atmosphere for locomotive repair workers in their workplace seems fairly peaceful and less stressful than that of others. 2.2.3 Train conductors For most train passengers, the duty of train conductors provides one of the few face-to-face contacts within the whole train transport service. The definition of train conductor in Russia refers only to those who are on long-journey or foreign routes.51 With the chief of train, they are the so-called ‘train brigade’, normally working together within a big group (normally about 20-25 conductors), whose constitution is The difference was obvious, and that even made PTOL Ruch’i the only one I could freely visit, with the conditional requirement of keeping a low profile. When I tried to visit check stations close to locomotive depots or railway stations I encountered difficulties from the station chief. 51 According to the terminology of the Russian railways, there are two categories of workers who work on the train and whose duty is to check passengers’ tickets. The first, who serve on suburban trains, just like in the rest of the world, work on short-journey duties, collecting and checking tickets as well as looking after the condition of the carriages. These workers are called ‘controler’ (ticket collector), although those with a similar duty on a tram or bus are called ‘conductor’. For this work, there are usually one or two ticket collectors working together. 50 190 normally based on each individual’s working schedule. The contents of a conductor’s duty have three categories. Firstly, before departure, they have to make all the carriage equipment and service facilities ready. Secondly, at boarding time, they have to check the tickets and identification of the ticket holders on board. Thirdly, during the journey, conductors working on sleeper carriage also need to collect linen and a cleaning fee; besides, all the conductors have to provide a basic service for the journey which includes tea and snacks to meet passengers’ demands. If they are on an overnight shift they also need to do linen collecting and knocking passengers up in the early morning. Fourthly, after arrival, they have to check and clean all the carriage facilities. Due to the variant assignments of their duties, conductors usually meet for the schedule before getting on board. The meetings, called planerka, are usually held by the chief of the train, at which the conductors should get the basic information about the journey and the form of service distribution. They are also supposed to make a report to cooperate with the train electric mechanics. In their daily practices, however, conductors do not really have access to make any complaints. It is so obvious that the full function of the plan meeting is simply to follow the official document. According to conductors’ descriptions of the practice of planerka, the train chiefs do not hesitate to say that if ordinary workers do not like the content of their duties, they should just quit the job instead of raising doubts. 191 Low pay, hard work Carriage Section (vagonnii uchastok) VCh-8 of October Railway is the main object of this research observation. The Section is located at the far end of the Moscow Station territory. It is connected to the main station building through road bridges, the locomotive depot TCh-8 and finally the platforms; it has another direct outlet to the city road. There are in total 2,000 conductors working at this section. In part of this section, conductors have their own café, several small kiosks and a quiet ‘functional’ square for having a break. Interestingly, compared to that of the administration of locomotive depot TCh-8, the building of the carriage administration VCh-8 provides more utilities that are convenient for the employees. For example, conductors can easily meet and use the conference hall, whether for the plan meeting or personal discussion. Outside the building, there are seats on the square for workers to chat or wait for their colleagues. According to such circumstances, the place of their administration is normally a busy place with the comings and goings of the workers, which is quite unusual for the whole working area of the Moscow Station territory. The conductor’s job has been widely perceived as low skilled with miscellaneous duties and strict regulations. Workers’ monthly wages were about 3000-4000 roubles in 2003. Sitting in the small cabinet in each carriage, most conductors of the October 192 Railway I met during the fieldwork period were not satisfied with either their wages or their working conditions. For example, Marina, a young conductor I talked with on the journey from St Petersburg to Moscow, immediately complained about her low wages and that the job is so boring and exhausting. In relation to the discontent over wages, some workers expressed the view that at least double their current wages would be more reasonable. Besides that, conductors are quite often required by the train chief to pay for the necessary stuff for the on-board service in advance. Such an odd requirement is just a reflection of how the tough arrangements within the paternalist environment act in conductors’ daily work. (As mentioned earlier, the rule is simple: if you don’t like the way things are done here, then you should go.). The chief of train and the administration together represent the real order of the whole route collective. The following cases provide us with a vivid picture of conductors’ conditions. The dispute case of female conductor S from railway carriage section VCh-8 of October Railway, shows the intensity of their duties and the strength of the administration: ‘I was commanded to take an overtime schedule alone without shift or break for 11 days. During this work, I got an occupational injury. The administration did not offer any medical service at our workplace so I 193 went to the medical station near my home (she lives in Kronstadt town.[S.K.]). The next day I rang them and said I have to stay in the medical station but they did not accept it. I was then accused of not taking responsibility for the carriage property. They decided not to pay for the medical expenses and three-month payment was withheld immediately as a punishment. After that I was anyway sacked’ (SvetaM, May 12, 2003).52 Another conductor explained why they have to bear the intensive but lowpayment work conditions: ‘I think the reason is due to the fact that the company doesn’t provide enough personnel. The administration benefits from the low cost of the wage fund. And they will not change the ways they have got used to unless there is a huge pressure on them’ (OlgaM, June 9, 2003). I work I pay A young male ex-conductor L, 30 years old, took this job until 2002 and since then has changed his profession and worked as a carriage technician. He explained the reason why he changed his job. ‘Because I realized that work as a conductor actually “cost” me a lot. I had to pay for seeing doctors, for instruments, for various stuff. Sometimes Quoted from Newsletter ‘ProfsoyuzSE’. [Online] Available from: http://pseojd.front.ru/ [Accessed 05 June 2004]. One can also find similar cases from Anon., ‘Pis’mo obizhennykh provodnikov’ (‘A Letter from Offended Conductors’) [Online]. Available from: http://butcher.newmail.ru/provodniki.htm [Accessed 05 June 2004] 52 194 the chief even asked us to prepare the tea and snacks (provided on the train for passengers) in the first place by spending our own money. They just wrote a note to us and said you “should” follow this and you will get money back when you finish the trips. I was not paid, I did not have a shower, I did not sleep, why do I have to carry out the duty simply because of the “I should” of their commands? I did not agree with that. Therefore, I quit and found a job working as a carriage technician. Now at least I receive 6,000 roubles and I can use my free time to take a second job’ (LeonidM, carriage mechanic, June 12,2003). The other reason for their miscellaneous workload comes from the fact that, since the duty is a highly face-to- (customer) face service, they would always easily get involved in many customer disputes. Some other cases of work disputes derived from the confusion of the defined responsibility. Take the case of a female worker Olega as an example, she had a problem with a suspicious passenger and ‘failed’ to report immediately. She was blamed with full responsibility for the event without a proper channel to defend herself against the accusation of wrong-doing. According to the Regulation she needs to file a proper statement and then negotiate with her chiefs, which is a fairly frightening situation in Russian society. Both of the two cases can be seen as simply over the discipline of a train employee, but that rather clearly indicates 195 the fact that most conductors bear with the hardship of work regulation while suffering the high uncertainty of their job. More significant to describe, the environment has generated an immediate ‘paternalistic’ attitude of the management at each depot, firstly by the team leader and then the section head. At the same time, they are also facing more pressure from the consequence of the lack of workers. Workers expressed their observation of the tendency of the recruitment policy of their administration. Currently, the employer only recruits conductors who are from rural regions instead of recruiting those who are Piter residents. That is because then the boss can pay less but command them to carry even more duties. So the mobility among conductors is always high, and male workers usually work for a couple of years then transfer their jobs to a close post such as electric mechanic. As a consequence, conductors said that the labour mobility among conductors is normally higher than that of others. Duty with little respect Apart from all the work environment of conductors there is one more relevant inner-culture to note: the negative impression from non-conductor railway workers and the low self-estimation of conductors. While recognising that a conductor has to bear boring low-paid conditions, railway workers with other professions such as train engineers or mechanics often expressed a deprecatory impression of the character of 196 conductors’ work. There are many different rumours about how conductors could take advantage from their duties, which normally comes from the individual commercial activities on the train after the collapse of the soviet system. A foreigner who takes a Russian train might be surprised by the ‘various selling activities’ on the train. Such activities provide opportunities for several occupations within the Russian railway sector, like conductors, ticket officers and directors of stations with ‘chances’ to receive ‘extra’ income. These ‘chances’ may come from the services for passengers or even some tiny commercial activities on trains. Such a fact makes other railway workers feel the conductors have another circle, though these workers do not really know how much conductors can earn. Moreover, apart from the ‘informal extra income’, there are also widely spread rumours over drugs and sexual abuse among conductors. Such an impression has been widely spread so that conductors themselves recognise it, as a young worker recalled, ‘I became a conductor in 1990, at that time many of our colleagues were well-mannered, well-educated people. I know nowadays other people say we conductors are usually drunkards, druggies or some other negative things’(LeonidM, electrician, June 09, 2003). It is important to note that with such a particular character of informal activities, the whole workplace culture has also provided a particular space for the employment of the traditional features of paternalistic relations under the new opportunities within the conductors’ circle. 197 2.2.4 Train electricians Closely working with conductors, there is a special group assigned to be in charge of the repair and maintenance of the electric equipment of the carriage part of a train. These workers are called ‘PEM’, which means train electricians because their duty also requires them to be on board and to follow the movement of trains. For the work, they firstly go to the administration to receive a specific order then get on the train. Each of them has to work alone on a train and to receive requests or to coordinate with the chief of the train to repair electrical equipment of the train. And they are also called ‘deputy chief of the train’, although they enjoy much less authority and are not comparable with the train chief. One of the unique and important characteristics of their duty is that they do not work with a settled schedule but only follow individual orders. Sometimes they may even receive additional work of checking the stopping or off-duty carriages. As a consequence of such an arrangement, while there is only a single electrician working on the train, they always have to follow the demands of the train chief at any time. That causes difficulties of the separation of rest and work. And such conditions can continue for a whole week in which they have no chance of taking a shower, having normal food or comfortable rest on the moving train.53 53 Since the administration provides no free food, the only possibility to get a proper meal is to eat in the Restaurant Car. However, they all have to pay for it themselves, and the prices in the Car are so high that, during the whole trip, whether for 1 day or 10 days, workers may only eat simple foodstuff 198 The shop of train electro-mechanics No 25 of St Petersburg-passenger-Moscow VChD-8 is one of the separated administrations of the train-electricians on the October Railway. At the carriage section VCh-8 of the Moscow Station there are about 100 mechanics doing the job for this shop. Workers’ monthly wages at this shop were about 6,000-10,000 roubles in 2002 to 2004. It is interesting to note that, although its location is just opposite VCh-8, its atmosphere, reflecting its individual working schedule, is much cooler than at its counterpart. A young ‘PEM’ (VladK, 32-years-old) from the Section had worked at October Railway for 11 years. Not long after he finished military service he found a job on the railroad as a conductor. (Finally, he left the October Railway in 2004, one year after our interview.) In his view, he took the job because the wage of a railway worker in 1992 was good enough compared to others. When he was about to quit the job, he might receive about 10,000 roubles. He did not appreciate this job and simply said over here he sees no benefit at all. For example, the putevka (voucher) has never been his concern and that was because, as he finally said, he had only once received a pass for a holiday during the past ten years. Work was much better in the past Workers here reviewed and explained the changes of train electricians’ working they prepared and brought from home. 199 status and conditions. The memory of a senior mechanic is different from their current life status. The experience of Leonid, the initiator of the electricians’ union of the October Railway, reveals how senior mechanics perceive their profession. He had worked on the railway for more than thirty years, when he was sacked following the initiation of organisational changes. His parents were both railway workers. ‘Before, we had to graduate from ‘PTU’ (professional training college), then you could start to work on the railroad. But many people, just like me, we had started even earlier, when we were in school. That is because we have the Junior October Railway (Malaya octyabrskaya doroga) which is for kids and teenagers to have real practice of being railway workers.’ Unlike his young colleagues, he is still very proud of his past and his post despite the fact that he had been sacked. With his professional pride, he even frankly told me, ‘Shihao, you should know, that I was even richer than your current financial situation at that time.’ The situation has changed for him and his fellows. The new situation of this job is that people work with great fear, poor faith and low wages. With his memory of the old style of soviet working life, he insists people should respect themselves, including at their workplace. To prove that he even revealed that he feels no shame in claiming that he had realized how to respect his life since going to jail for being a thief. Another mechanic, who was in his middle age, also has his understanding of how 200 the conditions have got worse: ‘Before, we worked with the conditions of fewer networks but more trains, and now it is just on the contrary. Who made this? How did they make this? The administration did it!’ He believed that someone should stand up to resist such a policy, but, ‘There is no trade union to protect our rights, to provide our benefits. They (staff of the union committee) always reject your request. When my friend went to the union office to ask for the putevka for his kids, they directly refused him and said they have nothing, no more putevka. That is their responsibility, so the money definitely has already gone to somewhere we don’t know. Though the boss always said they should provide us better conditions, more benefits’. (Group conversation, June 12, 2003).54 Working overtime has also become common and very frequent for train electricians. ‘The main problem in my workplace is the lack of enough rest.’ ‘No shift for taking a rest for us! When the employer commanded us to be on duty, we might receive only one hour for rest then continue the work then get another one hour. I really don’t like such a kind of work arrangement. And this can last for six days, day and night (sutok) or even longer. Nevertheless, the money we earn is only enough for 54 Though some people said that the putevka it is no longer relevant; the workers mention of material support varies related to the environment of the residence. It was still needed for workers in those remote or single-factory towns. 201 survival.’ An electrician angrily said that working over 200 hours has become more and more regular in his job. And he believes that is due to the administration never being bothered by their violation of labour legislation and they know workers will not refuse to serve for such kind of work with little money (VladK, May 18, 2003). Do ordinary railway workers exaggerate their unhappy working conditions? We can see how widespread such opinions are shared. A train chief (VCh-8, Carriage Section of St Petersburg-Passenger-Moscow) described it with little differences. As a train chief his condition does not naturally get better; he is seen as the leader of conductors and train mechanics on the one hand, but actually receives lower payment than train drivers do55. When the train is moving, he also needs to stay in his own roomettes; except that there is neither staff toilet, nor staff food (they prepare food for themselves). He received about 12,000 roubles as monthly payment in 2004. The first expression of the chief in the face of the current Russian railway works, can be put as the general conclusion of my investigation. ‘The further time goes the worse payment we get’ (Anatoly, train chief, December 23, 2004). 2.2.5 Weak collective identity In the previous section I presented observations on the features of the working 55 Actually, the average wage of the chief of train (Nachal'nik poezda, which used to be called mechanic-brigader poezda) is always lower than drivers. 202 conditions of railway workers on the October Railway. To understand the workplace relations in the Russian railway sector we may raise another investigation into the interaction among workers. As we have seen, workers on October Railway from different professions all confront harsh working time and rigorous control of the management. Yet, how did workers perceive and respond to such an atmosphere amongst the whole group? Or, we may put the question in another way: do railway workers treat these conditions as their own private lives? In this section I would like to focus on exploring the ‘space’ of their communication and the social relationships among the railway workers. Getting through my research field work, time after time I realized that, except for engine drivers, most railway workers do have opportunities to work with a small group (brigade) in their job. Apart from teamwork in their workplaces, another relevant occasion for workers to meet is their participation in the ‘planning meeting’ (planerka) in their own workplaces, where the chief of each shop or department will give a report and workers can raise their specific questions. More than that, the planning meeting can be held in the conference hall so workers usually use such an occasion to talk, to chat with their colleagues, and to spare their time. Thus, an investigation on these occasions provided useful insight to capture more workplace interactions. 203 Let us firstly look at train drivers. Do train drivers really work with little contact out of their small circle? As described earlier, except for seeing other brigades occasionally at the final destinations, they are very rarely able to meet with their colleagues. Certainly, the character of their job allows drivers to see themselves in an isolated status. A regular exception from that is to attend their own planerka, this is though more of a whole depot collective meeting than conductors’ (conductors have their planerka held by the train chief). The average participants of the drivers’ planerka are from 30 to hundreds of people. To some extent, the planerka is a very interesting occasion for workplace participation. Drivers are able to share their opinions, raise their concerns and sometimes they may challenge the chief of their depot. Nevertheless, drivers very rarely recognise this opportunity for them to communicate or to meet with each other, and the nature of such a meeting is still very much a managerial stage. While the drivers say their pieces, the chief might listen, but the fact is more that at anytime he may also take control so as not to let the discussion go further. Therefore, we may find that although an independent union organisation of drivers was created and gave them a chance to promote an alternative resolution in the history of the 1992 strike and in other events, opportunities to form common demands are rare. The other interesting character of train drivers is their narrow definition of their 204 self-identification. The ‘isolationist view’ among train drivers even appears among those who work on different types of locomotives or at different depots. In an interview with driver Anton, he showed the typical attitude that driving an elektrovoz (electric locomotive) seems to give the most pride. During our talks, quite often, I was confused by their ignorance of the importance of their counterparts working on different types of locomotive or train; these drivers are more concerned about their superior status. In a conversation over the wage difference between driving two different types of locomotives, driver AntonP asserted his wage (11,000) was not less than the other one’s (15,000) in terms of responsibility. ‘You see these drivers, they work alone. But their wages are not double. So I won’t say they earn more than me, I even think theirs are too little.’ In a further talk, I asked if their demands on electric locomotives are so important, what about the demands of drivers on other sorts of locomotives or trains at other depots on their eyes. The response was polite but chilly: ‘The point is other drivers have not understood how to care yet.’ (AntonP, diesel locomotive assistant, June 09, 2003) Moving to the immediate colleagueship of mechanics, conductors and train mechanics, compared to engine drivers, which is generated from their relative cooperation in a team we can easily see a much more collective atmosphere. The 205 work of mechanics or electricians is usually based at an independent depot or department, where they work on two or three shifts. At these immediate workplaces, there are about 20 workers for each shift. Workers there do embrace more opportunities to develop a collective atmosphere, due to the arrangement of work, cleaning room, rest room, whether the condition of that is good or bad. Nevertheless, the concrete duty is, normally, not well coordinated, so that workers very often only work alone or with one or two other colleagues. This links to the way Russian workers arrange their cooperation within the work process. Therefore, such opportunities in general are still subordinated to the management of the work. There is another place to observe railway workers’ communication. Here we take the conditions of material subsistence into account: the conditions in the work place for workers’ social meeting are different: there are places where workers can meet and chat with tea, coffee or snacks, sometimes even drinking vodka. Nevertheless, such spaces have very strong individuality. As we mentioned earlier, the culture and the character of the administration in each depot is varied. All the depots in my field work had their own characteristics. Within the buildings of the administration, some have security guards, but some do not. Take the branch VCh-8 as an example, workers such as conductors may see each other either in their workplace (where it is rather inactive) or in front of the administration building (quite often). The territory of 206 the carriage depot VCh-8 is always busy and open, while the nearest locomotive depot TCh-8 is open but chill; locomotive depot TCh-12 is not open to outsiders but the two competitive unions’ information is richer than at TCh-8. And if we look at the small depot ‘Ruchy’, we have seen in such a marginal depot workers enjoy more of an atmosphere of ‘self-management’. In some depots, such as VCh-8 and Ruchy, they do have a more common atmosphere, but such environments and conditions, however, did not bring different patterns of workers’ interaction. Although the workers use these places, further colleagueship did not seem to result from this. In many ways, we can see that they are more subordinated to their immediate master or chief despite their relatively convenient communication. The traditional assumption that a close community environment may make workers embrace more collective consciousness does not seem to be confirmed by my investigation. Whether the workers are working collectively or individually, they are well aware of the expanding power of their administration. Apart from the interaction among workers of the same profession, interaction among different professional groups has a similar but even poorer capacity. The previous investigation also reveals the relationships among workers of the four occupations: driver, conductor, mechanic and the combined role of train chief. During the route, drivers are usually alone or with their assistants (two together), but they also 207 have to pass or receive signals from the station or controlling centre. And they may also have contact with the locomotive mechanics in the depot when they report and ask them to fix problems with the locomotive. In addition, conductors are obliged to associate with drivers to observe and complete the secure conditions while trains are approaching and departing platforms. Furthermore, from the narratives above there are several characteristics of the working conditions of both conductors and train mechanics to note. Firstly, though these workers work on the isolated moving train, whether collectively or individually, people are still very loosely connected. Train electricians only participate in their own planning meeting, neither with drivers nor with conductors, although they work together on the train with drivers and especially with conductors. Train mechanics and conductors seem not to have space to perceive colleagueship with each other, even though they work in a very closed environment and follow the same demands from the train chief. The outlet for the hardships of working conditions was mainly in relation to their immediate senior manager. And that is eventually resolved by way of informal individual bargaining. Do railway workers recognise the fact that they are fairly distanced from either their occupations or individual lives? The interviews focused on workers’ responses to their working life to clarify the immediate features of collectivism and/or individualism. The group interview below was held sitting in the rest room of the 208 small depot ‘Ruchy’, located in the outskirts of St Petersburg. S.K.(researcher): ‘So, Dima, as a driver of a depot employees’ transport vehicle, what do you think about your job? Do you think you are one of the railway workers? Or, do you feel your professional occupation is actually closer to a bus driver’ Dima: ‘Surely, I am (a railway worker)’. S.K.: ‘But why and how? Do you work with these mechanics? I mean here is a check station for locomotives but your work does not directly relate to what they do and your work problems are probably different from theirs, isn’t it?’ Dima: ‘…’ (He kept quiet and swallowed up his sandwich.) Sergei: ‘You see, that was why I say each of us should just face his own problems!’ S.K.: ‘So, what do you think about Dima’s position, does he belong to your collective here? Andrei and Sergei?’ Andrei and Sergei: ‘He is, there is no doubt of that’. S.K.: ‘Even if he does not have the knowledge of railway work that you have?’ 209 Andrei: ‘You should consider his duty naturally helps us to finish the repair, so that the locomotive can run for the transportation and receive money from people. That money becomes our wages. So Dima is definitely a railway worker’ (The conversation continued and moved to another topic in 10 minutes.) S.K.: ‘Anyway, I have another question to you. Do you usually go out with your colleagues? For example, our workers may organise a car team and drive to the mountains during their free time.’ Andrei: ‘No, we don’t. I don’t really understand your question though. We don’t usually visit our colleagues. Take Sergei and me as an example, we haven’t visited each other’s homes since we have known each other in this depot. If I go out I will go with my friends, which is the way I do’ (Participation in a group gathering, June 2, 2003). The first response here shows an immediate recognition of a common identity; the second part, however, shows there is little concrete meaning behind the recognition. It seems that in this relatively remote depot, the formation of occupational identity does not develop in relation to their professions or specialities, 210 but is rather benefited by the characteristics of the location, the general environment (a simply organised depot, a loose management).56 By contrast, when we continued our talk and moved to how workers can help each other in face of work difficulties, people started to insist on personal abilities or personalities. Asked what help they expected the unions to provide, workers who were neither ROSPROFZhEL nor RPLBZh members suddenly became cautious or just laughed at such ideas. Or in other cases they also had another typical answer: ‘As for me, I am len’ (lazy).’ Or ‘Laziness is the mother!’57 In various interviews, similar expressions, not surprisingly, also came out from other interviewees. This may refer to what Clarke (1996a) called ‘alienated collectivism’; which embraces the idea that a vague collective identification may be commonly shared but is only very weakly implemented, as the collective is identified in abstract terms, identified with ‘the railway’ personified by the management, rather than being the expression of any self-organisation of the workers. This collectivism is even very often contradictory, especially in the context that collective reactions to the discrimination of management were rarely mentioned. The first impression during my fieldwork period was similar to the description of Ashwin’s (1999) ethnographic 56 This is a depot where we can even find the information board of RPLBZh, although here there is only one member of RPLBZh. And there is no sign of sympathy to ROSPROFZhEL. 57 Such an expression normally came out at the beginning of our conversation, the workers I talked to like worker Konstantin (September 28, 2002) and Sergei (June 2, 2003) were not yet ready to open the conversation. My personal impression was such an expression was rather a method for them to escape the explanation of their passive attitude towards any institutional protection. 211 study of miners. Nevertheless, over all the contacts I established, neither in the honour of any past collectivity nor in the rhetoric of solidarity, was a collective spirit mentioned in any concrete perspective. The only exception among my interviews was a small ceremony of the engine drivers who had participated in the 1998 strike. Strikers who immediately lost their jobs tried to organise a network for mutual support. After the 1998 strike, some of the participants decided to have an annual gathering to remember the historical event. For that they identified a few places to spend their day off. But even such events were only held a few times.58 These features represent a typical sample of our observations of the barrier to the evolution from individual problems to collective identification. From the sociological perspective, the gap is clear: the boundary between the potential vague collectivism and individual identification implying individual resolution is the first part; but in practice workers are rather reluctant to proceed from individual resolution in the face of a work problem to an expectation of seeking a collective or broader recognition with colleagues. Russian workers have their own answers to such a fact. A train mechanic suggested that the current ‘mentality’ should be attributed to the situation of changes of life values; for him, it is clear that those good, collective virtues have all 58 This came out in the response of one of my informants. The response was actually after a long talk during which I tried to collect any information about collective life / working experience, and he finally could remembered such a ‘collective experience’ they can have at or after work. Before he found this event to pick up, he was fairly confused about why I needed to ask such a weird question which barely existed. 212 gone. As he put the feeling in his own words, ‘Ha! Unfortunately, the old saying ‘‘One for all, all for one!’’ has no longer existed in our workplace’ (SergeiK, May 18, 2003). Another young carriage mechanic gave his own commentary, calling this a ‘Russian pathology’. ‘You see what these members have done to our (union) president. They joined for immediate, temporary reasons, once they got what they wanted then they left. Although we can say they will continue their moral support.’ He then confirmed the words again. ‘Basically to say, people only want to get their own advantages. Due to such a reason you can see why those who ever joined Leonid’s trade union – our trade union – then immediately left it when they had got what they needed’ (LeonidM, Carriage mechanic, June 14, 2003).59 The general picture of the railway workers’ interaction described in this section is the idea of feelings of comradeship that have found no practical realisation, and are simply left as a memory. 2.2.6 Grievances and conflicts If we look at the special articles of the ‘Regulation on discipline for Workers of 59 He is not active in union activities, but adored the leader of his union as a respectable brother. He said these words when nobody from the union showed up at a meeting (participant observation of trade union meeting of PSE). 213 Railway Transport of the Russian Federation’ and the ‘Sectoral Tariff Agreement of Russian Railways’ (2001-2003), we may have an impression that, benefiting from the consideration of transport safety, Russian railway workers do enjoy a relatively high standard of working conditions and labour rights. However, if that is the case why have so many workers left the railways and why did even the president of the traditional trade union reveal that in 2000 alone, 150,000 workers left their jobs in the Russian Railways. Indeed, most of my interviewees had so many negative opinions about their situation. Obviously, if management always forgot even the indexation of wages, as workers argued, it is easier to understand why railway workers are struggling with the very basic issues which were already supposedly guaranteed within those official documents. By generalising the basic grievances of railway workers on the October Railway, we see that the issue of overtime working occupies the first place, while health concerns and the low wages stand in the next places. As one of the consequences most individual demands (disputes) of drivers mainly concern the arrangement of working time and rest. Through an alternative union campaign over the additional leave (dopolnitelnye otpuski) for locomotive brigades in 1996, the campaigners accused that the officials of MPS had misinterpreted the laws and ‘stolen’ their additional leave (RPLBZh, 2002, p.54). Similar accounts show the fundamental, constant problem of reaching rational working schedules between the 214 depot administration and their drivers. All the concerns are actually two-fold. For railway workers these are daily hardships, on the one hand; and also understandable outcomes of the problem due to their ‘corrupt and incompetent’ administration, on the other. Just as the workers often expressed it, the so-called work rules actually contradict each other in practice. During the interviews I conducted, a particular message over the mess of managerial organisation of work constantly appeared, which had always impressed me during my fieldwork period. In some cases, workers were sent to carry out assigned duties without a practical work schedule. They might get the final information and know if they have work to do only after they had arrived at their workplaces; some of them even had to make a phone call every time to check if they really had to go to work. Once they started work, the heavy load may require them to have no rest. One of my interviewees, a mechanic, let me make a close observation of these features in a train waiting in the depot. He very soon found out he had no clue what he should do and he did not know where to complain. (He had worked here for more than 10 years). Only while we were leaving did he then decide to turn back to his section and wait for further instructions. When I was visiting the so-called ‘what a mess’ workplace during his shift, I followed him to check all the carriages; but finally, he found out no one could tell him what needed to be done and what he should fix, despite the fact that he 215 had been told to complete the ‘work’. We then had about 30 minutes to talk in the carriage of the train. He said he would need to ask the boss exactly what they wanted him to do. ‘There is no proper graphic for workers here!!’ he complained. ‘And I really don’t understand why a company like mine that has existed for more than 100 years still can’t develop proper management. I tell you, for this reason I may think we need private ownership to run this company, maybe the new management will do it better’(VladK, PEM, May 18, 2003). Workers complained that nowadays their employers only use all the possibilities to make workers work harder and cheat on workers. And in the case of Vlad, that was the reason he decided to join the alternative trade union. ‘I can’t understand why our lives have become like this. I feel like we are living in prison.’ Compared to before, the scale of the chiefs (management) has grown up maybe even ten times more. ‘Before we could work with an easy atmosphere, and that was good. Now we don’t know whom we should follow and that really disturbs our work’ (VladK, PEM, October 11, 2004). Relevant complaints can be heard over the basic environment of workers’ workplaces. Workers often mentioned how dirty or how messy their sections are. The poor water supplies, dirty bathrooms, broken heaters, all of these have made workers 216 have little trust in their management. To take one example, according to the ‘Law and the Regulations on the Russian Railways’, the fire fighting conditions have to be seriously guaranteed. But on the day of the joint inspection of work security, we went to one depot where most fire-fighting equipment was empty and most water pipes were broken. Furthermore, the disorder of the workplace opened a broader possibility for various kinds of corruption. There were different corruption scandals and possibilities around each workplace. From the repair shop to the individual food service on the moving train, various sandals and rumours also eroded workers’ trust in the railway authority.60 Nonetheless, most people just showed themselves to feel that no one can really improve the conditions, so that there is no sense in raising conflicts. When I followed an alternative union leader to visit a mechanic repair shop, his old colleagues just teased and said ‘our boss’. Compared to engine drivers’ relatively high advantages on the Russian labour market, within the sector there have been serious threats of the low wage and the job insecurity of conductors and electricians, as well as track repair 60 The most surprising words for me were when it was said that some female conductors were taking money for prostitution. When I argued with people who said such things that I took trains often but cannot believe it can be possible (I thought that was a typical chauvinist expression among Russian men), they said I was a naïve foreigner, because the car type decided the level and it only happened in green colour (cheaper seats) but not the red colour car I took. Another time, when travelling on a train with RPLBZh activists to their seminar, they again warned me that if I go to the ‘restaurant car’ to have lunch I might get cheated on the price, because this type of restaurant car provided ‘special service’ (waitress are hired by the owner of the restaurant car for ‘those’ services). I asked how come if the railway service is still a state-owned business. They just laughed at me. For the reason I was really starving, one of the activists decided to help me with a meal order. It was also said that whether or not all these ‘commercial activities’ are allowed depended on whether or not the chief of the train service would take a bribe. 217 workers. Especially, for railway workers who are local residents, they have felt the administration now keen to recruit people who are from rural areas, for the administration can load off most of the cost of meeting employees’ requirements for material support. ‘The administration now uses new tricks of recruiting people who are from the countryside but not local residents. These people face much more life problems needed to resolve personally. They have to be obedient to the administration. In my workplace, you can even find a person who was a lecturer in university who taught history but now works as a coach conductor’ (LeonidM, electrician, June 08 2003). Meanwhile, the whole situation for railway workers was getting harder. In face of the depression of the national economy, and then the reform programme (the privatisation of the railway system as the core of that), even engine drivers have been considered with employment reduction. The massive scale of imposed or future redundancy had made the official trade unions to admit the potential problem constantly. The grievances are indeed multitudinous; workers have also felt that the hardship of their working conditions is a result of the management imposing their power in the name of the long-existent work regulations. Nevertheless, whatever the 218 workers may complain about privately, most of them keep a clear attitude of fearing to resist. It is never easy for us outsiders to understand what caused their ‘fear’. (To some extent, people cannot really tell outsiders the very truth because they have to wonder if they will get into more trouble.) That is a constant reaction deeply rooted in their minds. Indeed, the poor arrangements of their duties had caused workers’ negative response. The workers are obedient to these regulations, with their subordination to the strongly authoritarian atmosphere in railway work. The reason, as they explained, a depot chief can easily demote even a first-class engine driver to assistant in half a year whether they violated the work rule or simply spoke out to defend their own rights. Apart from their immediate fear of losing job, the other expression of their fear is referred to the strength of administrative power. A young driver assistant described such: ‘Our managers are so powerful when they order us to meet their demands; but they suddenly have very little role when they face the need to resolve our problems.’ To talk about the relations between workers and the employer, he continued his judgement: ‘They hold meetings, give various promises, but do nothing. They should be thankful that people here are very passive. They only worry about the immediate pressure from above.’ (VadimK, May 18, 2003 and October 11, 2004) 219 All these experiences the workers perceived can refer to the letter of a group of conductors mentioned earlier, who have come to a common consensus of ‘Don’t like it, then quit now!’ In relation to such fear, the most popular option to deal with difficulties is therefore to take an extremely individual approach or seek personal solutions. They might need to find another job in other depots, or to learn how to apply favourable articles in the regulations or laws on railway operation to defend their personal position in the face of their immediate head of management. During my fieldwork observation, I got several chances to follow the long process of how workers resolve individual disputes / disciplinary cases with their administration. The process is indicative of the extent of the use of individual negotiation to the end as the only possibility within the employment relationship of the Russian railway system. There were no cases of collective resistance that ever came up. Sometimes people were cheered up by the outcome of individual cases. One active member of the union believed that female workers are more active than male. He made a comparison between conductors and his own colleagues, and thought female conductors are more ready to defend their own rights while most of his colleagues still take a wait-and-see attitude. His optimistic point of view did not last for long. In six months, especially after he had participated in two cases of female conductors’ disputes, he gave up his 220 original belief in the union’s potential. 61 And this seems to be the fate of the development of the trade union movement for Russian railway workers. The case of the assistant driver Yury mentioned in the previous section showed that even workers who had committed themselves to the union role still have to rely on a personal solution, as he had when he had settled his previous workplace problem. Many workers who had complained about the working conditions said that they got used to resolving the problem alone but finally realized that they needed more help. Following this, their main concern was to find out how the guarantees from various laws had been violated by the employers, so that the aim of their actions (reactions) was to win back the protective functions which could be found within these laws. We have seen that most workers look for individual consultation rather then relying on the union’s strength to improve the general conditions. Generally to say, while facing discipline problems workers showed that what they really prefer is a union lawyer rather than the union as a whole. The other dimension to note is that many people fought while at the same time trying to find another job for survival. Since there is no effective institution to offer support, workers can only rely on help from their personal network. To take one example, driver Anton of Depot TCh-22 was sacked in 1999, he was still struggling 61 The two conductors abandoned their ‘solidarity spirit’ and disappeared at the end of their contact. 221 with his case in the court in 2004. During these years he had to earn his money by being a causal mobile phone seller. When he came to St Petersburg he contacted his union network not only for legal support but also for his mobile selling business. In another case, assistant driver Aleksandr from Depot TCh-8 was a victim of the August 1998 strike and was laid off for 20 months after the event. During this time some of the sacked workers organised themselves to find and share job information. Such informal networks were, to some extent, a kind of life solidarity in their eyes, as he said, ‘We (drivers of diesel locomotives) resisted indeed, we did not soon give up, we really were aware of our rights, but we anyway still need to survive, so we support each other for taking and sharing part-time jobs’ (AleksandrP, locomotive assistant, June 05, 2003). Certainly, by looking at the immediate labour relations of the Russian Railways in recent years we can see a very contrasting picture: there were indeed vast grievances while very few collective actions or demands have taken place. Apart from the several short disputes in the early 1990s, the general state of industrial relations on the Russian railways has been quite peaceful. The workers, as the above described, indeed had many complaints about their treatment and about the management; but most solutions for serious disputes relied on raising the cases in the courts. In this 222 section we have mainly focused on the working conditions and those individual cases, but this does not mean that there have not been collective actions on the Russian railways, although there have been no massive industrial actions. Besides, most of these conflicts arose only on the initiative of the independent RPLBZh. The first stoppage in the period of the newly reborn Russian trade union movement was on December 26th and 27th 1991, at the locomotive depot ‘Moskva-2’. Train drivers demanded higher wages, free food during working time, increased holidays up to 45 days and a 36 hours working week (KAS-KOR Information Bulletin 1-2, 1992 (85-6)). And so did locomotive drivers on the October Railway in June 1992 (a warning strike and strike committee had been established at depot TCh-12, and the administration soon agreed to negotiate a collective agreement with the alternative union).62 The stories presented above were full of frustration, anger and powerless passivity. Do workers in the railway sector have any channel to defend, or simply to express their grievances? The next section will introduce the two railway workers’ trade unions to understand the prospects for the social organisation of Russian railway workers. To ask what had changed since the appearance of the alternative railway trade unions we One of the rare cases not led by RPLBZh was the transport builders’ strike threat in January 1996. The two-thousand strong workforce of the joint company ‘Bamtonnel’stroi’ were suffering from a five-month-long wage arrears. The union apparatus of ROSPROFZhEL, unusually, appealed to the government to resolve the problem, otherwise the construction workers would be forced to take stoppage action. But this was an event that appeared in the remote East Siberian area of Russia, due to the wage arrears to the railway construction workers. For the detail one can refer to Peotrovskii, A. 06 January 1996, Zabastovka stroitelei mozhet zatopit’ Severo-Muiskii tonnel’ [Online]. Available from: http://parovoz.com/library/izvestia.06.01.96.html [Accessed 01 January 2004]. 62 223 may firstly think of why so little has changed even as locomotive drivers took their lead to show the possibility of change. As for a further understanding of the collective demands (disputes) of Russian railway workers, I will present more details of the actions which have taken place and the development of Russian railway workers’ trade union organisations in the next sections. 2.3 Railway workers’ organisations 2.3.1 The history of Russian railway unions before the collapse of the Soviet Union Railway workers have a long and controversial history of trade union organisations, which once played a critical role in Russian history during the early years of the Twentieth century. The primary epoch of the Russian railway workers coming on to the stage of the trade union movement was full of dramatic scenes. In April 1905, at a conference in Moscow in which representatives of railway workers from ten state railways participated, the All-Russian Railway Union (Vserossiskii zheleznodorozhnii soyuz) was formed. The union immediately made serious moves by calling strike actions and delivering political demands in the same year. The two general strikes in 1905 (firstly in October, then in December), were partly powerful but finally ended up with serious suppression from the Government. Based on both the special status of 224 railway transport and the working conditions of railway workers within the national economy, the Railway Union was seriously involved in the struggle between the Bolshevik and the Menshevik groups. After the bloody suppression of the revolt and strike events, the Bolsheviks lost influence in the organisation. Such a change, according to Westwood (1964), seemed to allow the organised railwaymen to recover their organisational development, so that ‘Subsequently the Railway Union became the largest of the pre-revolutionary workers’ organisations, and was notable in that it embraced not only manual workers, but also clerical and administrative’ (Westwood, 1964, p.165). Under Russia’s boiling and unstable situation before the two revolutions in 1917, the cooperation of railway workers with either the Government army or the rebel’s moves had been extremely critical for all political parties. Therefore, in the face of the revolutionary wave in the final years of Imperial Russia, almost all political forces tried to take control of the railway workers’ organisations. When the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Railway Trade Union (VIKZhEL) was formed on August 25 1917, most of its members were Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. With its difficult position, VIKZhEL had always been involved and tried to survive in the struggles of political factions and managerial strategies. After the October Revolution, the pro-Bolshevik VIKZhEDOR (All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers, formed in December 1917) replaced the role and 225 function of VIKZhEL and cooperated with the regime. The policy of the railway management, however, delivered another blow to the union leadership. Firstly, on 26 March 1918 the resolution ‘On the Centralisation of Management, Protection of Railways and the Rise of Their Capacity’ was issued and the union was requested to cooperate with the newly constituted NKPS (People’s Commissariat of Ways and Communication), with which it essentially gave up its own demand of self-management. Later on, the imposition of ‘War Communism’ was adopted and, according to the new line, martial law was declared in November 1918 and railway workers were treated as a military service, the leadership completely subordinated to the authority of the new Bolshevik regime. At least in 1920, under the order of new Commissar of Ways and Communication Trotsky (who was appointed in March 1920), the management of the Russian railways was controlled by military men. The central organ of the Union VIKZhEDOR was also replaced by a new organisational body, and the Union was restructured as the Trade Union of Transport Workers (Profsoyuz rabochikh i sluzhashikh transporta). Since then the Russian railway workers’ union had totally lost its independence and was transformed into a great and loyal unit of the semi-military management system of the Soviet Union. The railway union received no different fate from all other Soviet trade unions, Westwood thus concluded, they ‘no longer represented the workers against the Government but rather served as a link, 226 transmitting and interpreting official policy to its members, and in case of dispute supporting the former against the latter’ (Westwood, 1964, p.188 ).63 2.3.2 ROSPROFZhEL - Russian Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Construction Workers Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the official name of the Union changed several times corresponding to the adjustment of the reconstruction of the Soviet economic system. After the symbolic reform during 1991-1992, the union added the fashionable term ‘independent’ into its official name as ‘The Independent Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Builders’ (NPZhiTC).64 Such a change did not mean to represent any reform of the union itself. Its leadership decided to keep their relationships with the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR) at arms’ length, only cooperating on general agreement issues but not joining the latter as a member organisation. This relation only changed in 2004, when at its Presidium meeting ROSPROFZhEL passed a motion to join FNPR. 63 Interestingly, the latest publication of MPS of the Russian Federation did not change much the official view of the Soviet regime even after the collapse of Soviet Union. The change of the governing body of the railway union in the early 1920s was seen as a necessary and stabilising move. For the details with another viewpoint, one may be interested to refer to Istoriya zhelenodorozhenogo transporta rossii i sovetskogo soyuza (1997). 64 In Feb1997, the Union decided to take off the word ‘Independent’ from its title, renamed as ‘Russian Trade Union of Railway and Transport Construction Workers’, and adopted its abbreviation as ‘ROSPROFZhEL’. 227 With its declaration of a massive membership which embraces 2 million 400 thousand members, or 93% of all Russian railway workers, the real membership of ROSPROFZhEL has frequently been doubted. One should firstly note that its membership comprises not only railway workers but also workers from transport construction and the municipal Metro system, transport police officers and railway levies. Secondly, it maintains the policy, as many traditional Russian unions do, that administrative personnel are allowed to join the union. 65 Since ROSPROFZhEL embraces workers from several different sectors, the organizational structure of ROSPROFZhEL is therefore based on the territorial or production-territorial principle, which is eventually a parallel of the managerial structure. They are basically designed as follows: Trade-union group; Shop trade-union organization; Primary, incorporated trade-union organization; Regional, territorial trade-union organization; Railways trade-union organization (dorozhnii komitet), trade-union organization of Metro workers, territorial trade-union organization of transport construction workers. 65 Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, Westwood has pointed out that when the All-Russian trade union of Railway Workers was founded, it had allowed clerical and administrative personnel to join (see Westwood, 1964, p.165). 228 On the top of ROSPROFZhEL is its huge presidium, which embraces 30 members who are mostly the presidents of the railroad committees of the seventeen Railways. The current president is Nikolai Alexsiivich Nikiforov, the former president of the Railroad Committee of the West-Siberia Railways, elected at the 5th session in March 2004 to replace the retiring former president Anatoly Borisovich Vasil’ev. Corresponding to the replacement, several changes were introduced in the units within the central committee. There are currently 10 sections established for the central committee organ: the section of socio-economic protection, which had been divided into two, one for railway workers, and the other one for transport workers, are now combined into a unified department. For the union leadership of ROSPROFZhEL, the most important activity is to prepare and to sign the General Agreement with JSC Russian Railways (before 2003, it was to work on the Sectoral Tariff Agreement (OTS)), as well as revealing the general situation of railway employment and the wages standard. Most of the activities are to sit in meetings or reform seminars, alongside the administration, where they have to address their function of improving railway workers’ social situation, concretely to say, the social benefits for railway workers. On most occasions concerning Russian railway conditions or operations, the president of ROSPROFZhEL always puts his signature alongside that of the minister of MPS or 229 the president of JSC Russian Railways. From the pro-soviet-style point of view, people can say that this shows what an important role the trade union may play in the field of the railway transport system and especially the field of the employment of railway workers.66 From another side, the trade union organisations could hardly separate their activities from the management work of the administration. If one reads the former president Vasil’ev’s presentation on ‘Globalisation and the Russian Trade Union movement’, one surely will be confused that there were no words about what concerns the trade union but instead he stressed that Russia’s transport sectors were losing ground and the hard conditions of Russia’s railway system relations with its neighbouring countries. As he concluded, ‘it can be explained by the lack of united international transportation standards’ (Vasil’ev 2002, p.103). It is clear the position of ROSPROFZhEL has been integrated into the management structure. When we look through the composition of the railroad committees of ROSPROFZhEL, one might be even more surprised by the fact that there are quite a few depot chiefs or directors of administrations of railways units standing as members of the union committee. ROSPROFZhEL still keeps a very soviet-style approach to its activities. The trade union relies heavily on its closeness to the administration to obtain promises on the employment situation. As the trade union rights have been 66 A typical display of such an activity style can be seen from the congratulation for students of railway universities on the celebration of the national day of railway workers. We can see the president of the central committee signed the messages together with the Minister or the head of the company JSC Russian Railways. 230 ensured in the OTS, ROSPROFZhEL believes in social partnership as the principle acting on the relationships with the Railway administration (while some administrative heads are the chairpersons of union committees). As regards other methods to pressure the administration, certainly, the union has generally been far away from considering a strike as a method of the organisation’s collective action.67 Eventually, the duty of the trade union is to work with the administration to stabilize the workforce on the Russian railway networks. The main duty and the style of the railway committee, as assigned by their railway administration, are to observe the dynamic and general conditions of railway workers. Sometimes the tone of their reports is really indistinguishable from that of the railway administration. For example, when asked how the trade union was able to improve the payment level of their railway workers, the president of the railway committee of Moscow Railway made a reply with an interesting aspect. He had actually been the chief of the Moscow-Yaroslavl Branch of Moscow Railway before he became the union president, and had been the Railway chief in one USSR Republic. So in an interview by a Solidarnost’ (the FNPR newspaper) journalist, he firstly gave the figures of workers’ wages on Moscow Railway, and finally concluded like a chief of the Personnel Department, saying, ‘to raise workers’ wages is the natural mission Practically, a railway strike is not allowed in the Russian Federation, according to the ‘Law on Russian Railway Transport’, and the leadership of ROSPROFZhEL has acknowledged this rule. 67 231 of the union, but to fulfil such a mission only depends on the economic ability [of the railways]’ (RPLBZh, 2002, p.87). Regardless of the union’s constant claim of ensuring the guarantee of stable employment in the Russian railway sector, most railway workers’ sole expectation of ROSPROFZhEL is its ‘satisfactory’ offer to distribute material support and social welfare. Here again, putevki (tour tickets) or other material benefits are the things workers usually mentioned if they talked about their impression of their trade union. Apart from such disputable functions, a minor and always happy duty for trade union staff is to arrange celebrations or celebration parties for national holidays, and to post and decorate phrases for those memorable model workers. With their boss-like-outlook, however, compared to their RPLBZh counterpart, ROSPROFZhEL can hardly attract young workers’ attention or loyalty.68 Interestingly, in my interview cases, most young railway workers simply despise the little offer from ROSPROFZhEL primary organisations, and this is one of the main reasons railway workers decided to contact RPLBZh or other free trade unions. Even middle-aged workers have their own complaints about the performance of the official trade union. Ordinary workers normally believe there is nothing they can expect from their trade union organisation. A typical example of conversation follows, which presents an 68 My own impressions of the trade union functionaries at trade union committee level is, without exception, that every chairperson I met, wherever it was, wore a fine suit. That is really a sharp contrast to most RPLBZh activists. 232 interesting picture of their complaints. On the train I travelled with the RPLBZh president back to Moscow, Valentina, a senior female conductor who was serving on our carriage, reflected an immediate response on hearing a trade union presentation: when she heard the self-introduction of the RPLBZh activists, her first reaction was ‘What? You are trade unionists? No, thanks, I am even thinking about writing an application to leave the union’. After she finally understood these ‘trade unionists’ she was talking with were from another trade union (RPLBZh, which she had never heard of before), the lady changed her tone during the conversation. She started to say, ‘Actually, I do need help, and some of my colleagues need help, but they (ROSPROFZhEL unionists) do nothing for us nowadays…But why have I never heard that there is any other union organisation of railway workers? Have you guys got support from any member of Gosduma? ’69 Indeed, regarding the union committee’s role in the field of monitoring or guaranteeing what has been written in the OTS or railroad collective agreement, it seems they do not play a strong role in defending members’ jobs in most individual cases. According to their report, in 2003 the official union organisations on October Railway only helped 5 workers to return to their posts, and the rest of the total 118 69 The conversation began from my request to the RPLBZh president to know how much they knew about the working conditions of conductors when we were sitting in our ‘kupe’ (sleeping compartment). She firstly misunderstood these people as functionaries of ROSPROFZhEL. Her wage at that time was about 5,500 roubles per month, which was a bit higher than I had heard before, but such payment was from a duty which required her to serve the far-distance train from Tomsk to Moscow. The lady was concerned about the strength of RPLBZh, she was surprised that RPLBZh claimed only 3,000 members. Following a similar concern she also asked if RPLBZh received any support from political figures. 233 cases were only casually mentioned without further explanation.70 As regards wage indexation, the union committee should monitor how the measure was carried out. But in practice, the president of the ROSPROFZhEL union committee usually played a very passive role towards their administrations. In some cases, as with the one in the depot Ryazan’, the chairperson of the union committee even stood at the side of the administration in the court, and declared that the administration had indeed carried out the measure, while workers there accused the administration of not distributing the additional amount. ROSPROFZhEL is still a traditional bureaucratic organisation which workers see not as their trade union but as a part of management. For this reason active workers began to work towards creating a new independent trade union. A railway worker said that the union could still exist because Russian workers do not think much about getting themselves a better agency. ‘I am still a member of ROSPROFZhEL, but soon I will leave. I had realized that there is no reason to still stay a member. If our workers all together refused to pay them the trade-union dues, those union bosses won’t get money as their payments, but until now such a method won’t take place, because our workers will only complain a bit, then wait but Reference: Anno. 2004, Materialy po narusheneyam trudovogo zakonodatel’stva na OZhD peredany v prokuraturu. 26 February [Online] Available from: http://www.lenizdat.ru/a0/ru/pm1/c.thtml?i=1017706&p=0 [Accessed 01 January 2005]. 70 234 still subscribe their dues’ (VadimM, January 01, 2004). The union position over the reform and privatisation The Russian federal government has carried out its Railway reform programme gradually since 2001. The leadership of ROSPROFZhEL publicly gave its support to this programme, and the former president Vasil’ev was one of the members of an assigned commission to complete the draft of the programme. Nevertheless, the ROSPROFZhEL leadership kept an ambiguous tone by avoiding a response to the question of whether the reform programme should necessarily take privatisation as the final step. In general, the personnel of ROSPROFZhEL organs had also avoided voicing their position over the privatisation of the railway sector. But massive redundancy had already arrived (150 thousand railway workers left the sector). In the face of the potential of the huge impact on railway workers’ employment, ROSPROFZhEL has also declared that its priority task was to keep the employment of railway workers. As the union leadership put it, they will bring the social dimension in to the Russian railway reform. Like their European counterparts, one of the union’s policies is to implement the principle of social partnership. To achieve the implementation of employment levels, according to local ROSPROFZhEL activists, they insist that the unions’ activities should, again, follow and strengthen the principle 235 of social partnership. For them, this means that the administration would have to maintain a reasonable level of good will, but not to force workers to make compromises for the work of modernisation. Moreover, the methods of retraining, inter-production transfer and the temporary compelled transition to a shorter working day are necessary; only thus was it possible to avoid mass lay-offs to prevent an accentuation of social tension in the branch, to keep the personnel structure. Although the union promises to keep the level of employment within the railway sector, the staff avoid saying that they are against privatisation. Although ROSPROFZhEL presents a totally ambiguous position over the privatisation project, we have to note that such a position did not lead to any huge provocation, in contrast to the Ukrainian trade union, in which the president of the trade union openly threatened to call a national strike against privatisation. 2.3.3 RPLBZh - Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades of Railway Workers On February 6 1991, 243 railway workers, mostly from the locomotive brigades of the Il’ich depot of the Moscow Railway, held a meeting to decide what should be done for their demands. Reflecting concern for railway workers’ social and economic status, these workers had earlier sent an open letter with their concern and demands to 236 the Russian Railways’ newspaper ‘Gudok’. This primitive action got no response from the MPS. At the meeting, participants elected several members with the establishment of the Moscow Coordinating Council for the Socio-economic Defence of Railway Workers (MKS). At the beginning, the initiators still thought that the official union NPZhiTC would support or help, so they also expected some action from the official union. The idea of establishing a new union came in May, after they had seen workers from other sectors starting to organise various independent unions, so the Coordinating Council decided to set up a group to prepare for the formation of a free trade union outside the official trade union. Due to the no-result negotiation, the Committee decided to set up a strike committee and called a strike action on December 27 1991. The warning strike took place firstly from 22:00 December 26 till 05:00 the next day at locomotive depot ‘Moskva-2’ which affected the Yaroslavl route of the Moscow Railway. Their demands were to increase wages; the provision of free food during working time; an increase in vacations to 45 days; a 36-hour working week; provision of housing for those in need; and making safe working conditions on electro trains. In addition, drivers also emphasised that the traditional tariff agreement should be made on the principle of profession but not across the sector as a whole. The negotiations continued, but the committee warned if the agreement was not carried out, they would wage another new strike. The result afterwards did not release 237 the tension. The strikers were angry at the fact that the MPS did not sincerely listen to their voice; on the contrary, the MPS authority tried to move the real representation into the hands of the official trade union. With great disappointment at such a development, the strikers complained that none of the articles of the agreement had been delivered. The MKS therefore determined to take more action. Firstly, the strikers established their permanent organisation. On January 27 1992, the Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades of Railway Workers was formed as the successor to the duties and authority of the Moscow Coordinating Council and the Strike Committee, and to cut off their last dependence on the official trade union. At the founding conference, 35 delegates representing 12 depots came to Moscow and participated in the establishment of the organisation. The new trade union decided to take a direct democratic principle: the central organ of RPLBZh should be formed from representatives of each primary organisation. The first president of RPLBZh, Varelii Kurochkin, at the time was also the chairperson of the previously mentioned Strike Committee. In a month, two more strike actions took place at two depots, firstly on 1-3 March at Moscow-passenger-Kursk, then at Moscow-passenger-Kiev on 5-6 March. The administration of the Moscow Railway hit back this time with the method of sacking leaders and demoting the drivers. Such a move, however, did not stop the general mood of the strikers and the new organisation 238 survived the fierce pressure. Not surprisingly, just like other new Russian trade unions at that special time, the new trade union had a similar background – formed during or after a historical action. That was the period of ‘making an effort to establish any kind of democratic organisation, including trade unions’ (RPLBZh, 2002, p.115). With such an atmosphere, branches in five of the total nine depots of the Moscow-Kiev route of Moscow Railway were established immediately, because the chief of their administration did not impose strong pressure on them. However, its most active members and bases came from three depots: Moscow-passenger-Kursk, Moscow-passenger-Kiev, and the Motorcoach Depot Moscow-2. The principle of the union’s membership followed the then fashionable professional type across the new Russia in the early 90s. The new union allowed only drivers and assistants of metropolitan trains, diesel and electro locomotives, and students taking professional railway courses to join their organisation. The goal of RPLBZh mainly focused on achieving the collective agreement negotiation based on profession.71 The membership of RPLBZh has remained at about 3,000 for a long time, coming from about 35 locomotive depots across the nation. These included Moscow, Moscow region, Rostov-on-Don and Bataisk. St 72 Petersburg, Tula, Vladivostok, Kaliningrad, Based on the distribution of these primary Such a principle, to some extent, reflects drivers’ self-estimation of their traditional high status within the railway sector. 72 RPLBZh was almost exclusively a ‘male-dominated’ trade union. Because of its special status and 71 239 organisations there are three territorial organisations. Yet, the member organisations of RPLBZh emerged at different times. For example, the union organisation at the Moscow-passenger-Kursk depot was formed on November 21 1991. The original base for drivers to make this call used two methods: the route and depot connection, and the individual relationships generated in their railway institute. For example, the initial group of the first St Petersburg trade union committee who contacted Moscow’s initial group in 1992 were from the depot on Finland Rail Station TCh-12 where the people had personal contact with the Moscow initiators. By and large, the most well-developed primary organisations are from the Moscow Railway. Since the culture at each depot, as we have seen in the previous section, is rather different, such a dimension does not mean that these union organisations have shared a common status. According to their organisational history, the primary organisations from the same railway did not gain similar strength. That is a clear sign of the difficult capacity of the new union. The leadership has been quite stable since the union was formed. Valerii Kurochkin was the union’s president until his retirement from railway duty in 1999. His deputy, Aleksandr Veprev, the chairperson of another active union committee from the Pushkino depot, was elected as the new leader at a special convention in working conditions, women are not allowed to take this job and such ‘protection’ is written in the law. Yury explained why there are no women working as train drivers: due to the risks of locomotive operation and accidents. But he had heard that there were female drivers 20 years ago. 240 October 1999. At the meeting the leadership was expanded by receiving four deputy presidents with the Russian committee being renamed as the executive committee. Nevertheless, Vladimir Veprev retired from railway duty shortly after. In 2001, Evgenii Kulikov, the former chairperson of the trade union committee of the locomotive depot Moscow-passenger-Kursk of Moscow Railway was elected as the new president of RPLBZh. Kulikov was once a KOMSOMOL secretary before he became an engine driver. He worked at the Movskovskaya – passenger – Kurskaya depot when the 1992 strike action took place, and was one of the strike front leaders. Such an action immediately meant he became the first victim under administration pressure; he was sacked by the depot administration right after his activism and only returned to his post when he won a court case one and half years later. Kulikov has actively participated in RPLBZh since then. He also led the 1998 strike on Moscow Railway. In addition, Kulikov has also been the vice-president of the Confederation of Labour of Russia (KTR). Structure and membership When RPLBZh was formed, the macro situation and atmosphere in Russia led the new organisation to set up the Russian Committee as the central organ within the union structure. The design was not changed until the amendment of the union charter 241 in 1999. According to the RPLBZh Charter, the trade union is constructed on the production-territorial principle. At the national level of RPLBZh, there are two governing bodies – the central committee and the executive committee. The members of these two committees are elected at the union convention (held every three years). The central committee is the governing representative body composed of the president and the deputy presidents of the union, presidents of territorial organisations and the representatives of primary organisations, which are based on the principle of one-organisation-one-representative. The executive committee includes the union president and his deputy (-ies) which is designed as the permanent governing organ to represent the union as a legal entity. A special regulation requires the president not to be a trade union committee member of a primary organisation or the representative of a primary organisation on the central committee. The weak financial position since RPLBZh was formed has meant that the union could only afford its president along with office staff to conduct its national activity. The deputies usually stay at their own depot offices. Under the national trade union organisation, there are territorial organisations (TO) to represent railway workers on different Russian railways. The superior organ of the territorial organisation is the conference (konferentsiya), which should be held not less than once every two years. The TO then has its territorial or railway 242 committee (DK / TK) as the non-permanent active body, conducting the functions between the two congresses, in which the plenary meeting should meet not less than once every half-year. The presidium of the railway committee (PDK / PTK TO), which actually means the president and the deputy, is the permanent executive organ of the TO. Above the PDK is its Central Committee, as the superior body within the whole RPLBZh structure. According to the RPLBZh Regulation on Territorial Organisation, the president of the TO cannot stand as one of the railway committee members at the same time. According to RPLBZh’s chapter for primary unions, the superior organ of a primary organisation is the general meeting. Unlike the design at the upper levels, the trade union committee is designed as its permanent executive organ which represents the legal entity between two general meetings. The superior organ of the primary organisation is the general meeting, which is required not less than once every six months, while earlier it was required to meet not less than once every three months. Although there is a design and establishment of the Committee of Audit Commission (KRK) as the revision organ, in practice, union activity is dominated by the union committee or simply the president. Even if there are internal problems, usually they still rely on the union committee to resolve the conflict. In addition, primary organisations have a right to establish union groups under certain considerations. The 243 leaders at any level should not be leaders in any political or non-union organisations. The percentage of members’ union dues shows RPLBZh heavily needs the contributions of its members. As ROSPROFZhEL asks members to pay not less than one percent of their monthly salary, RPLBZh requests each member who is a normal railway worker to pay not less than 2 percent of the monthly salary as their union due. Members who are pensioners or students are required to pay not less than 10 percent of the minimum wage (monthly) (MROT). Actually, RPLBZh adopts a flexible policy on collecting union fees. Members can pay their monthly fee either by the check-off through the administrative accounting department in their workplace or by personal hand-in to the cashier at any level of the RPLBZh organisation. The Charter also gives primary organisations the right to increase the rate of union fee for their members. In some primary trade union organisations, the union due is two percent or even up to four percent of the member’s monthly salary, while the charge for unemployed, students and pensioners is only one rouble. The dual options of payment certainly requires each primary organisation to open its own bank account which allows the members to choose the way they prefer. The primary organisation should also control its own property. While in practice several RPLBZh primary organisations are not able to gain the status of legal entity, the Charter has noted that members of these organisations should make their cash accounting to other 244 organisations which have received the legal entity status. In these payments, the proportion of union fee paid to the higher organisation has also been clearly required in the union regulation. The old Model Regulation on Primary Organisations requested each primary organisation to transfer 10% to the central organisation and an appropriate percent to the territorial organisation if the latter was established in the area of the primary organisation. Since April 2003, the turnover of member fees to the central committee even increased from 10% to 20%. Such a sensitive issue is challenging the loyalty of territorial organisations towards the national organisation. The earlier principle of internal power balance was to leave primary organisations strong independence. The change came as Kulikov is determined to strengthen the role of the headquarters in making active propaganda for the expansion of the union. It will take time to review the real impact of such a change. Under the impact of the new Russian Labour Code, the profession-based RPLBZh had taken a historical shift from the foregoing membership principle. On February 28 – March 2 2003, a motion on the organisational character was addressed to the delegates of the RPLBZh fifth convention. The motion suggested that it is time to make a critical change to the fundamental requirement of the trade union charter. According to this motion, the new charter will allow RPLBZh to change the principle 245 of its membership base, by which RPLBZh would allow its organisations to recruit railway workers of various professions. And this change would transform the original profession-base trade union into an industrial (sectoral) one, representing the interests of all railway workers. The main reason for the RPLBZh leadership to propose such a change has two backgrounds: firstly, many profession-principle trade unions which appeared in the early 90s came to realize that they had to unite more workers; secondly, considering the potential impact of the coming railway privatisation, they needed a broader front to protect their rights. For both reasons, the fact that locomotive brigades only represent a very small proportion within the whole railway workforce will prevent them from ever reaching that status.73 Such a consideration certainly reflects another critical fact that, unless they adjusted the union character to fit the new Labour Law, RPLBZh would have no chance to get rid of their marginal status in the field of the collective agreement, because the new Labour Code has narrowed the qualification on trade union status in negotiating a collective agreement. According to the new regulation, in the workplace only the trade union organisation which represents the majority of the whole labour force has the right to represent workers in negotiating the collective agreement with the employer. The change of the It was told, ‘The union needs to unite different professions. Many professional unions now are united. Our union will do the same. The specific reason is: firstly, the locomotive brigades embrace a very small proportion within the whole railway workforce. If we don’t change then we will have no power to sign the agreement; secondly, the upcoming privatisation. We need to put more pressure on the management otherwise we can’t defend our rights.’ (Andrei Gavrilov, diesel locomotive driver, chairperson of union committee TCh-8 , May 06, 2003) 73 246 charter, however, confronted serious opposition; some delegates rejected the amendment of the original charter and blocked this motion at the congress. The unity of RPLBZh was seriously damaged. The new charter was finally confirmed and adopted after an emergency convention held on April 17, 18 2003. Although it had actually started to take this way even earlier, and the new charter has been adopted so that RPLBZh can now expand its membership to all railroad workers, the problem has not really finished yet. Such a move firstly left RPLBZh itself in an ambiguous position, while the juridical registration and the future name of the union do not fully correspond to it. As a local activist explained, the name of their trade union will not change immediately. They will change the name of RPLBZh when the new basis of composition of the trade union organisation is ready. In addition, the new charter does not allow members to have dual membership. That means that until a new union title is adopted, workers from other occupations or professions will have to adopt an ‘unfamiliar / unsuitable’ title as their representative. The change also raised confusion for its friend organisations in St Petersburg. Insisting the change still contains a problematic difference in union practice, the president of the Free Trade Union of the Electricians of the October Railway said their members and trade union organisation will not join RPLBZh. More details of such problems will be presented in the next section. Interestingly, the change has caused ambiguous tension, at least on the 247 October Railway, among RPLBZh and other ‘free’ trade union organisations. Organisational activities To extend the union’s ability, the union organisations at each level have the right to form various commissions or inspection agencies so that they can carry out the functions required in the Charter. Such commissions, however, are hardly to be seen since so far only the presidents or a few activists carry out most union organisational activities. For internal communication, the organisation has had its own newspaper ‘Lokomotivsoyuz’ since 1996, usually circulated among drivers who are already members. Due to financial concerns, the circulation is quite limited since the official print run has been only 990 copies since it has been published. Probably due to the financial concerns, RPLBZh only very rarely publishes pamphlets or papers in workplaces. The content of Lokomotivsoyuz usually covers court cases over RPLBZh activities, references or analyses of legal consultation and editorial comments on various crude moves of the MPS or ROSPROFZhEL. At the regional or primary organisation level, some union committees also issue their own bulletins. But these bulletins are not issued regularly. Also it should be noted, these communication hardly mention the concrete features of primary organisations such as membership, characteristics, working conditions or introduction of people, which indicates a 248 weakness in sharing knowledge about working conditions and union life. For primary organisations, the common method is to spread its message by using an information board near the union office. This channel focuses on activists providing help or consultation for workers and members who are angry or disappointed with the performance of their traditional trade union. Certainly, the activists also provide basic consultation to those workers who stay with ROSPROFZhEL since many workers – their colleagues – still believe that they should gain benefits or privileges from staying in the official trade union. When these workers gradually realize that they gain very little from the official trade union they start to think of leaving it. If they have also heard RPLBZh activists’ explanations that those social benefits are not necessarily distributed by ROSPROFZhEL, they would be more likely to consider joining the alternative union. The office of the union committee therefore provides the atmosphere for workers to receive useful help and the space for interacting about their work difficulties. Formally, the RPLBZh membership relies on the grievances of workers rather than promoting the union message. Saying that their trade union is still very young is a common expression among activists. With a sigh, they also try to convince people to understand that until now, Russian trade unions cannot be like trade unions in the West. ‘They have ability, but we don’t!’ is one of the constant messages they want to 249 send. The relation from experience to intention seems mixed up when they present such arguments. The change of RPLBZh membership principle shows another apparent weakness of the union’s organisational activities. As mentioned in the previous section, the character of the coordination of train driving, however, raises huge uncertainty about their duties, and that logically generates a strong mood of alienation for train drivers from line engineers, car engineers, traffic engineers and traction engineers. Such a kind of alienated consciousness in their specific working conditions, as well as the feeling of unreasonable responsibility in their duties can be seen as one of the factors which caused the train drivers to establish a profession-based new union. In addition, drivers on many occasions also show little respect for rail workers with other professions. Though they do not openly despise low-status or less-skilled workers, train drivers in general are proud of the level of their education against which they might doubt that the majority of the other workers are ready to learn and defend their own rights. If that is an existing fact, the challenge is exactly how RPLBZh activists and leaders can bring the change in the union charter into practice. I tried to ask trade union activists about any resolution after the new union charter had been adopted, and RPLBZh has become a trade union for all railway workers. The following conversation with Vitali Zhyutikov, the deputy president of 250 TO RPLBZh OZhD, occurred in 2003. The topic was around concerns like, ‘Have you started to recruit new members?’ ‘What do you usually do to attract members’ attention to the message you want them to receive?’ ‘Vitali, have you done anything to try to attract new members?’ (S.K., researcher) ‘Oh, we just got two new people who seem to be interested in our trade union’ (the deputy president). ‘But I am talking about other workers, not drivers, for example, how about those who are now working on the railway tracks just outside this building? They recently even sleep in the hall of this building, don’t they? ’ (Originally, I expected he might say ‘No, Sasha - the leader of the tiny organisation of track workers - should take charge of them, they are track workers and so is Sasha.’) ‘No, it will only be a waste of time. They care nothing about their own rights. These are immigrant workers, all they can care about at the moment is just that very little amount of money’ (the deputy president) ‘OK, I understand’. (S.K.) About one month later, I raised a similar topic with Andrei Gavrilov, the deputy president of RPLBZh, who was also the chairperson of the union committee of TCh-8: ‘Andrei, have you started to discuss any new strategy aiming to recruit new 251 members?’ (S.K.) The chairperson gave me a strange glance first, but did not answer. ‘You know, now you have to face people you do not know very well’. I tried to explain my question. He then told me, ‘How am I able to answer your question? You know, here every one of us has his own strategy. You have to understand, most people now do not know what they should stand for. We do not have the possibility and resources to do what we have seen in European countries, like in Germany. There they can make uniform for members and stand on the street to recruit people, here in Russia, we don’t get such things’ (The chairperson of the union committee of TCh-8, June 05, 2003). The interview again finished with his words emphasising they can only expect workers to stand up themselves, because Russian people and the society are different from the West, there is no way to think of ‘from campaign to mobilisation’. For the improvement of their organisational skills and knowledge of the labour law, RPLBZh organizations do hold several seminars. I asked activists and RPLBZh members, did they conduct any seminars to improve their internal organisational skill, or to learn how to implement labour actions? Quite surprisingly the immediate responses were somehow different and confusing. Gradually, I realized that they did sometimes hold seminars, but who really arranged these seminars is quite ambiguous. 252 In general, the AFL-CIO-funded juridical consultation centre for trade unions – Solidarinost’ – was the main sponsor of these seminars. From reference books of labour law, to the seminar contents and even participants’ access to the seminars, all involved the sponsorship of Soridarnost’. (It is though not clear since when the American organisation started to play an important role in RPLBZh’s organisational work.) Solidarnost’ had always sponsored RPLBZh with various resources. These include funds for specific uses (for paying personnel as legal consultants); reference books on relevant labour laws; skills in organising union activities; analyses or strategies for the Russian trade union movement. 74 Even the local RPLBZh organisations in St Petersburg had held several seminars in Repino town which were also sponsored by Egida. Nevertheless, the estimation of the effect of these seminars differed. Some activists simply ignored them as pure ‘Americans’ stuff’; while others thought the real issue was that they should be able to keep the professional and practical help from Egida. It seems that RPLBZh activists have a limited capacity to conduct their own training courses, since few activists were interested in learning union practice, and their main direction is to show their ability in legal cases, so the practice of organisational work usually took second place to the legal consultation 74 The sponsorship of AFL-CIO has been a sensitive topic officially. Many times ROSPROFZhEL and the Russian railway authority had denounced the relationship and argued that the sponsorship of the Americans proved that RPLBZh was specifically set up to destabilise Russian transport. RPLBZh has always denied the effect of sponsorship and that it has had serious communication with ‘the Americans’. 253 centre. The coordination work within RPLBZh reveals more of its organisational weakness. The current president of RPLBZh, Evgenii Kulikov, has been much more active in union activities than his predecessors were. His personality makes him able to express himself well and promote his trade union effectively. Kulikov also knows pretty well how to use labour law and interpret it. As a leading agitator, he even took the chance of meeting with local ROSPROFZhEL staff to demonstrate what his union can do and ROSPROFZhEL can follow. As the president of RPLBZh, he does not enjoy very high status, since the financial condition of the union can afford only two full-time staff: a legal consultant and the president. So the president has to be in charge of a lot of duties, from being a seminar tutor to updating information on their official website. The busy duties actually bring RPLBZh to a less coordinated situation. To take one example, the president had only a very unsure idea about the membership of their primary organisations (he guessed that there were not more than 40 members in the two depots in Perm). When he heard the real number of this new local primary organisation, he said, ‘This is not good, we need more!’ Another union activist said that they actually thought Kulikov himself did not have to come to the local seminar, but the reality of the union’s organisational ability pushed him to work in this way. These related to the lack of seminar lecturers or skilled activists, so they 254 mostly relied on activists who had been sent to the USA to take special training courses on conducting union seminars. In total, there were only about five people who were chosen and sent to the USA, and Kulikov was one of them. In general, the union structure is simple, and the leaders have little authority while the not-so-big union has always relied heavily on the capacity of its individual leadership. Over my research period, I was quite confused by how they might give me more positive clues about the methods of more aggressive contact and mobilisation among ordinary workers in order to stimulate union participation. After asking the question several times in my way, I realized there is something quite important to note: they would not be bothered with this sort of question; the words with which they responded reflected something deep, within their beliefs about their life philosophy over social relations. If we take this aspect, it will be more useful for us to understand the way they think of being a trade unionist. For example, according to the leader of the RPLBZh territorial organisation on the October Railway, a big problem in their organisational affairs is that they do not have enough serious trade unionists (his implication was about the leaders from the other free trade unions of OZhD). With such a weak union presence, it is not easy to identify what factors undermined their organisational work among the railway workers. When I came to start the fieldwork and visited the first depot (Moscow Station, St Petersburg) at the primary organisation 255 level, I did see that a certain group of workers visited the union office, most of them were young or middle aged, they came to the office and preferred an easy chat, or helped with tiny things, but few were involved in regular meetings. The union’s help is more like personal advice, whether or not they mention the issue related to joining the trade union. A young worker expressed it in this way, ‘They are nice fellows, I don’t really expect their help, the union committee is weak, we all know that, but it is fine just to come and chat with them, they are nice guys, that is good enough for me’ (DimaM, young locomotive assistant, June 5, 2003). Certainly, the union president was fully aware of such a fact, they even showed me there was no problem in using union funds to serve those who went into the ‘enemy’s arms’, though they more or less felt offended. More importantly, such a scene has been seen more and more often, but most RPLBZh primary organisations responded to such a fact on their own, dealing with their members’ demands and sticking with these at each depot. In the next chapter, I will present more details about the attitude of the members to the union and the union activists, to see the factors which lead to absence of effective organisation and solidarity, and discuss how much this is a failure of the activists to organise, and how much a failure of members / workers to respond. Noteworthily, to look at the political position of the union leadership we might identify two main political streams of ideology within the circle of RPLBZh activists, 256 and such a factor also raises some distrust among the main activists. The first one is more or less close to liberalism. Generally speaking, these people have more faith in contacting Russian liberal politicians; these people are also the wings who like to keep support from the AFL-CIO partnership and use the agitation methods of American unionists. The people on the other wing are closer to various left-wing political activities; the activists are rather interested to have contact with European left-wing trade unionists, but show little respect for the American style of seminar skills. Such a difference had kept a peaceful balance until 2004, as for the time being their common enemy certainly provided these activists with the biggest threat opposite them first. To take or not to take radical actions did not divide these activists. The other reason probably came from that neither the right wing nor the left wing are really active in having external contact with foreign union organisations. Such ideological differences, however, exist and had a bigger impact and presented a challenge to the relationships between RPLBZh activists and non-RPLBZh free trade union organisations. 2.3.4 Collective actions of RPLBZh Since its formation, RPLBZh has continuously confronted different kinds of discrimination and pressure from the railway administration. Their union leaders or activists spent a lot of time on legal struggles for the recognition of the union 257 organisation in their own railways, which include the legitimacy of union activity and granting the union an office. During the period 1993-1998, RPLBZh organisations were engaged in two basic categories of issues. Firstly, they were to defend members’ individual rights as well as the trade union’s right and status against the hostility of the administration. The issues related to workers’ individual rights were normally handled at primary organisation level by pursuing court cases. For events related to the union’s rights and status, primary or territorial organisation made their decision about what kind of action to take, and the central organ (i.e. the Russian committee or the executive committee) has taken either lobbying the ‘government’ or picketing at the MPS head office as the main methods to achieve their demands. Unlike its primary or territorial organisations, the union headquarters does not have to bear the pressure from the workplace administration, the task of the central office has always been to obtain recognition for negotiating, in their terms, a Professional Tariff Agreement. And that has always been rejected by the MPS authority. Secondly, RPLBZh tries to mobilise workers struggling to resist worsening working conditions. These actions, again, are normally undertaken by primary organisations without serious support either from the central office or from their brother organisations. That means there has been very little joint action targeting payment or working time, although such concerns were the reason why RPLBZh was formed. From 1992 258 forwards there have only been a few joint actions, and these were considered as interregional events. During the past ten years, the members went on several strikes, as well as numerous pickets and litigation. Most of these actions, nevertheless, were conducted separately by local organisations. Each depot organisation is usually only involved in actions targeting their own problems. Although the leaders knew, and called the frequent discrimination of the administration ‘systemic violations’ of Russian laws concerning union rights and the virtue of collective agreement regulation, outsiders were not expected to participate in their local actions. The background of these actions will indicate the evolution of the union’s concerns. The 1998 August strike: falling apart from early militancy The 1998 strike is probably one of the most notable events among all RPLBZh collective actions. Its significance arises from two facts: firstly, one should note that RPLBZh was actually a ‘national’ trade union which essentially acted on the Moscow and the October Railway; secondly, the strike experience for drivers on both the Moscow and the October Railway had a very strong effect on RPLBZh activity and its further development, as well as on the memory of its members. In total, there were 1,300 train drivers from eight depots (TO RPLBZh OZhD had eight primary organisations at that time) who participated in the strike action during 4-14 August 1998, about 10 % of the total brigade workforce of October Railway. The strike action 259 certainly made an impact on the October Railway: long-distance passenger routes, cargo services and especially commuter services all saw cancellations. The reason for the strike was firstly derived from the OZhD administration’s rejection of the draft collective agreement produced by TO RPLBZh OZhD at the end of 1997. The case was then put to an arbitration commission from March 1998. However, the two sides still failed to complete the negotiation. Thus TO RPLBZh OZhD threatened to call a strike. The administration insisted this was a dispute over the collective agreement and collective rights, and according to the law, a work stoppage over the collective agreement is not allowed in the railway sector. RPLBZh activists carefully considered the defence of their own position and the action taking place. The strategy was to take action on the basis of the violation of individual labour rights. So that during the strike period, RPLBZh leaders asserted the action was initiated by wage arrears and related to the hard working conditions of train drivers. According to one of the leaders, the reason for this action was the non-observance of workers’ rights, with their monthly wages paid with long delays, some of the wages and allowances systematically not paid and other violations. They put the slogan for the strike as ‘In defence of the labour rights of individual workers’. The decision to take strike action was coordinated with their colleagues on the Moscow Railway. In fact, the strike action was called with a parallel development on 260 both Moscow and October Railways. In June, the Territorial Organization of RPLBZh Moscow Railway had informed TO RPLBZh OZhD that they would take coordinated collective action at the same time as the October Railway drivers were taking collective action. On August 4 these train drivers of Moscow Railway also went on strike. The local action started at midnight with the demand ‘Against the violation of the rights of employees of the Moscow Railway’. The strike began at the engine depot in Uzlovaya, Tula Region. It was joined by three other depots in Moscow and the near environs. The strikers declared the action will continue, ‘until talks begin between the union and the Moscow Railway department’. The response of the MPS to the strikers was negative, declaring the strikers’ demands were nonsense. According to the press-release of MPS, the railway administration accused these strikers of wanting to have a microwave, ice-box, and air-conditioner which MPS was not able to provide because of lower labour and economic performance. The strike was ruled illegal and the strike action stopped together with their October Railway colleagues. The key initiators and organisers were members of the presidium of TO RPLBZh OZhD. Boris Kharitonov, Aleksandr Zamyatin and Vitali Zhyutikov were the main organisers, while no strike committee was established. The message was published in the organisational newspaper ‘Gudosha’, with a module for members to make a formal statement to the administration. All the leaders of primary organisations met 261 and confirmed their action would take place at the same time when the agreed date came. Participants said, ‘We used the method learned from Italy; we did not really refuse to work’, thus there is no necessity to form an easy-targeted strike committee. During this strike, they did not encourage workers from other professions to join the engine drivers’ strike. The strike took place more actively at two of the depots which were outside St Petersburg city, where Kharistonov worked. After the public prosecutor judged the strike was illegal, the strike was immediately crushed by the administration. The administration successfully imposed a ‘stick and carrot’ policy: on the one hand, they kept a tough position in relation to the strike with the backing of the transport prosecutor; and on the other hand they told drivers that if they came back to work, or left RPLBZh and rejoined ROSPROFZhEL, they would still have their accrued social benefits and even more chance to get promotion of their driver class. The primary organisations immediately suffered from the defeat of the strike action. In both of the two depots trade union activists said that the real aftermath of the strike was that they suffered from a sharp fall in their membership. For example, there were 102 RPLBZh members before the strike at depot TCh-8 (in total there were 264 drivers and their assistants there), but after the strike the number sharply fell to about 35. Furthermore, the leader of the union committee of TCh-12 was sacked and did not win his suit to resist the order, while other members were also sacked but won 262 their cases to return to their original posts. Not surprisingly, it is not easy to say how much the strike experience frustrated RPLBZh and its future strategy. The bad result, however, persuaded RPLBZh to try not to emphasise the event in more detail. Although participants reviewed it, ‘There were of course mistakes during the strike. Although we got though this strike, we also realized the strike act had to be fully prepared for a successful outcome’ (YuryE, active member of TCh-9, May 28, 2003). Yet through the practice of these means of industrial action, there has been confusion among the union activists over the most effective means of putting pressure on the administration.75 The confusion also derived from many leaders or members being immediately sacked or demoted to lower posts by the depot chiefs and even its weak membership was shaken by such an attack. Normally, the strongest attack of the administration was against the primary organisations where the membership was weak, so that also caused different estimations and considerations among RPLBZh activists. The leader of TO RPLBZh OZhD believes they should find a new method of putting pressure instead of going on strike or protests. As he argued, the reasons were 75 On April 29 2002 at least 60 workers of locomotive depots in Moscow and the suburban towns of Zheleznodorozhny, Orekhovo-Zuevo, Petushki and several others joined a strike called by the RPLBZh organisations on the Moscow Railway. All Moscow commuter trains bound for Gorky were suspended from 4 am to 2 pm. The strikers put forward three key demands, to wit, better pay, better working conditions, and additional payment for extra work. According to Kulikov, there were also about a dozen minor demands. The railway management and the trade union held negotiations. Later in the day the Moscow regional court interrupted the strike until May 29. The strike action was still relatively more successful than the 1998 strike on OZhD. Kulikov even said that the trade union had intentionally opted for the unauthorized strike, announcing it just half an hour before it started instead of the ten days required by the law, because strikers feared a court order to stop the strike could have come well before they had had a chance to voice their protest. And at this time the territorial organisation of RPLBZh did not rule out a possibility of similar strikes on other railways. It seemed that the militant spirit they had had in the early 90s still remained, at least for primary organisations on Moscow Railway. 263 simple: firstly, most workers did not commit themselves to radical actions; secondly, normal people are not interested in why they conduct such actions; thirdly, they would not be effective unless the activists are ready to spend a long time preparing such actions. Nevertheless, unlike the cautious attitude of RPLBZh activists of OZhD, in his interview with journalists, Kulikov insisted that for his trade union ‘work to rule and strike are still the most effective means’ (Gorn, 2003, p.256). Campaign against the reform programme From 2001, the Ministry of Railway Transport started to introduce the reform programme of the Russian railway system. As we have seen, the whole railway sector in Russia is enormous, and there is no private company running the railway so far, although some service and repair works has already been taken apart for private companies. RPLBZh, though it considers that reform is necessary, believes that the real attempt of the Russian government is to privatise the Russian railway system. At least as early as 1997, RPLBZh had noticed the government’s structural reform programme, and criticised the future privatisation of the Russian railway system. The union has been concerned that railway privatisation will make their working conditions even worse and there will also be a massive redundancy for railway workers, even locomotive drivers will no longer enjoy their relatively high status, and 264 that of course will more likely weaken their bargaining position with the administration. The latest issue for RPLBZh has been that of what kind of action they should take to prevent the ongoing project of the privatization of railroad operation. Since 2001, RPLBZh has tried to call several protests and pickets to start its new search for a practical strategy.76 They also conducted several local and international conferences to voice their opposition to the potential railway privatisation. In November 2001, European delegations met in St Petersburg to share their experience of railway privatisation, and RPLBZh also attended the meeting. Several activists were elected onto the International committee ‘Against railway privatisation’. In October 2003, another international conference was held in Moscow region. The conference, however, was not as successful as RPLBZh expected, due to the internal conflict between RPLBZh and KSP OZhD. And their contact with the European organisation of railway workers was also affected by the same conflict. More details about the reasons for this conflict will be presented in the next chapter. These actions, anyhow, did not attract much attention from the public, not even their ordinary members. Most of their actions were more like lonely pickets in a form in which the RPLBZh activists were declaring their final opposition to the inevitable result of the government’s reform programme. Take the example of the picket on 76 These campaigns provided me great access to conduct observations on their campaign and then the working of the union. 265 October 10 2002, which was eventually a joint action of RPLBZh that took place not only in Moscow but also in other cities nationwide. About 30-40 railway workers and local left-wing activists participated in the picket in St Petersburg. The aim of this action was put on their website but the concrete demands of the appeal in practice were not very clear. The preparation for the action, again, was simple, without any serious mobilisation. According to the organisers of this meeting, they wanted to set up a ‘message’ in the first place, a message to deliver to the city government and members of the city legislature to show workers’ objections to railway privatisation. Two city deputies passed by and took the action appeal, one of them also put his signature on the list; the other one refused. The deputy promised to come out later but the promise just became a bubble in the air. Since then, RPLBZh shifted their effort mainly to holding a conference in 2004. 2.4 ROSPROFZhEL vs. RPLBZh It seems difficult to find an appropriate comparison between the two trade unions since the formal membership of ROSPROFZhEL is much bigger than that of RPLBZh, and for this reason we can hardly recognise any serious competition in the field of recruiting members. The relationship between ROSPROFZhEL and RPLBZh, however, has always been full of great discord and acute criticism from both sides. 266 Just like the relationship between most Russian traditional and alternative trade unions, the constant distant relations between ROSPROFZhEL and RPLBZh have mostly come from their opposition position but not from differences of activism strategy. From their daily activities to their own publications, there have been numerous events from which one can easily find how they try to attack or discredit the other side or to defend themselves from the other side’s attack. In addition, although at the shop level ROSPROFZhEL organisations may peacefully, silently, settle their ‘competition’ with RPLBZh, the ROSPROFZhEL organisations, in general, still try hard to diminish the visibility of RPLBZh. The Russian Railways’ newspaper ‘Gudok’ criticises the character and actions of RPLBZh. Furthermore, ROSRPOFZheL has even successfully blocked the membership of RPLBZh in the International Transport Workers’ Federation. A typical attack from the ROSPROFZhEL side on the RPLBZh organisation firstly points to the tiny membership of RPLBZh, so that they despise RPLBZh as not even relevant in the field of the Russian railway sector’s labour relations. Sometimes, ROSPROFZhEL even makes more concrete accusations, such as that even the tiny membership of RPLBZh is fake, because their members do not have to hand in an official application; or saying that no workers from their branch have ever heard or seen RPLBZh activists. According to such reports, the conclusion of ROSPROFZhEL 267 is to say that the RPLBZh organisation does not really exist, and logically how can the public even believe such a trade union really represents railway workers to receive better conditions. Apart from despising the marginal membership of RPLBZH, ROSPROFZhEL also criticises the pattern of RPLBZh’s activities. Emphasising their smooth achievement on the side of negotiating either OTS or various collective agreements with the administration, their activists assert that what RPLBZh presents are irresponsible demands. Moreover, ROSPROFZhEL believes that taking strike action is illegal according to the ‘Law on Railway Transport of the Russian Federation’, and so far there has been no reason to take such action. Sharing the same point of view with the administration, many ROSPROFZhEL leaders and activists simply believe the existence of RPLBZh merely destabilises the security of Russian railway transport. In the official newspaper of October Railway, the president of the Regional union organisation compared their differences and gave his comment on RPLBZh, ‘In fact, I can just go to the chiefs and tell them what should be done, and they listen…But how about RPLBZh? They are scandalists. They know nothing except going to court for nonsense, but they actually provide nothing’ (Gudosha, 1997, p. 4). From the RPLBZh side, as alternative trade unions in Russia have done from the 268 very beginning of the independent labour movement, they tease ROSPROFZhEL that it should know that its own massive membership is problematic and meaningless, and that it is clear for everybody that ROSPROFZhEL still relies on check-off or simply on the funds of the administration. From the point of view of the daily performance of ROSPROFZhEL, RPLBZh activists also often criticise that they usually do nothing but are just an organisation in the pocket of the employers. This happened in the recent conflict on Sverdlivskaya Railway in February 2004, where the depot chief communicated with the president of the Railway committee by telegram, insisting that the existence of an RPLBZh primary organisation will destabilise the depot’s work. Therefore, they dispatched the president of the ROSPROFZhEL trade union committee to associate with the chief of the personnel section of the depot administration to have a conversation with each worker who had attended the founding meeting of the RPLBZh primary organisation. The aim was obviously to dissolve the establishment of the RPLBZh primary organisation. RPLBZh believes, in most cases where their own organisation is active, ROSPROFZhEL activists even cooperate with the administrations in trying to destroy the primary organisations by threatening members or victimising leaders and activists. Their exact position over the privatisation of the Russian railways also led to a row between the two union organisations. Although neither of the two organisations 269 gives full commitment to the privatisation, RPLBZh argues that the Programme of Structural Reform of the Federal Railway Transport, produced by OZhD and ROSPROFZhEL, actually shows that various sections of the Russian Railways are going to be transferred to private owners. More than this, RPLBZh also accuses ROSPROFZhEL of having given the green light to the introduction of a massive reduction of the labour force. Due to all the above elements, there is no possibility for the two trade unions to work together. RPLBZh thinks that the nature of ROSPROFZhEL proves that this is not a reformable organisation; and the latter never considered RPLBZh as a respectable competitor. According to their own estimation, RPLBZh at least has persuaded many workers that it is useless to have any hope in and keep their ROSPROFZhEL membership. 2.5 Conclusion The review in this chapter has revealed the conditions of the railway workforce on the October Railway, the branch which has the longest tradition within the Russian Railways Company. The case study found that the railway workforce is generally alienated, from the division of professions to the individualisation of workers within the same profession. These characteristics are caused by the work organisation and managerial abuse. And that has been reinforced, differently though, by the relevance 270 of their unique status of being an important and strictly controlled transportation source for the government, legitimised with federal laws on railways and the ‘MPS-RZhD’ operation regulations. Workers have had various criticisms over the poor work organisation and the worsening working conditions. But there were few conflicts after the first wave of labour unrest in the early 90s, when the alternative trade union, RPLBZh, was formed. Though the old ROSPROFZhEL union and the new RPLBZh union are supposed to provide channels through which to express the widespread grievances, the evidence is that this has not happened. The enormous ROSPROFZhEL did not depart from its traditional function, mostly focusing on monitoring the overall employment and wage scale. The ironic matter comes from that the trade union has always been close to the position of the administration. The composition of the railway union committee even includes some administrative heads. How could the heads firstly work out their company running programme then sit in the union committee and say there is a serious lack of employment guarantees in the company’s programme or to initiate demands to increase workers’ wages? Individually, workers who faced job-related problems at the workplace did not really receive full support from the union. Understandably, such a contradictory role is therefore a basis for the headquarters of the traditional union to adopt ‘social partnership’ and most likely perform their best 271 by ‘warning’ that the management should pay attention to the ‘social sphere’ of railway labour relations. The alternative trade union – RPLBZH – or maybe to say the alternative professional labour union, was formed with an original aim of protecting the interests of locomotive brigades, although they insisted they would like to cooperate with other railway professional union organisations. It seems Russian railway workers have little choice but only to expect their own solutions. But there were almost no conflicts, no strikes called by workers from other professions. Instead of collective actions taking place, there are great fears and hard working time which attract the labour force to more individualistic solutions. More evidently, although RPLBZh has removed the professional principle on membership, such a change did not make its membership grow. Through the investigation in this chapter, it seems that work organisation and the social stratification of the workforce played a decisive role, geographical proximity does not seem to be sufficient to overcome the fragmentation of the workplace. Then the key difference with the dockers (and miners) is in the social organisation of work, where dockers and miners work much more in self-managed collectives, while railway workers are more fragmented and under stricter management control. In the next chapter, I will present the organisational work of RPLBZh on the October 272 Railway and its attempt to establish and exercise broader coordination with other railway professions, to clarify the impact of individualised attitudes and weak collective identity on the development of local trade unionism. 273 Chapter 3 Exploring workplace resistance: TO RPLBZh and KSP OZhD ‘Each of our primary organisations is just like a small kingdom, and each of us is just like a petty tsar’ (Andrei Gavrilov, chairperson of the trade union committee RPLBZh TCh-8, October Railway, May 12, 2003) The review in the previous chapter has shown that generally there was no ‘community’ feeling among the railway workers, even among train drivers, and RPLBZh has not been successful at expanding its membership. Why is RPLBZh so weak? As an original concern of this thesis, the observation of its grassroots activities presented in this chapter provides more insights to help to provide an explanation. The design of RPLBZh territorial organisation corresponds to the structure of the Russian railways. Such an organisational design has been adopted so as to coordinate the common interests of the primary organisations on the same Railway. That is why the territorial committee, the governing body of the organisation, is in charge of the branch organisations across the region and is more often known as the railway committee (dorozhnii komitet). It will be very helpful to review both its internal development and external relations in order to illustrate the character of the development of labour’s side within the employment relations on the October 274 Railway as a whole. The information present in this chapter is based on my observation of activists, participation in union meetings, and many individual and group interviews. The analysis is also based on documentary analysis of secondary materials which were mainly found from union newspapers. The court judgements of many labour disputes, which can be found on the internet, also provide useful support for the attempt to learn about the relations between the railway administration and workers. 3.1 Territorial Organisation RPLBZh OZhD 3.1.1 Formation As described earlier, when RPLBZh was formed in 1992, there was only one primary union organisation on the October Railway - the trade union organisation of the St Petersburg Branch of the October Railway - established in November 1991, based in both the depots TCh-12 and TCh-20 in the Finland Station. Other branch organisations of RPLBZh then started to be established and to recruit members at other depots. According to its self-introduction in its organisational newspaper, the TO RPLBZh OZhD organisation was formed in 1995. By the August strike of 1998, the number of union primary organisations had grown to eight, located in various depots, train stations and regions throughout the territory of the October Railway. 275 These primary union organisation were located at Depot TCh-5 (Vitebskii Station), TCh-7 (marshalling yard, Moscow Station), TCh-8 (locomotive depot, Moscow Station), TCh-10 (locomotive maintenance shop, Moscow Station), TCh-12 (locomotive depot, Finland Station), TCh-19 (Novgorod Station), TCh-20 (locomotive motor-carriage depot, Finland Station), TCh-21 (‘Volkhovstroi’, Leningrad Region), TCh-22 (‘Babaevo’, Vologod Region). 77 In addition, there were also individual members distributed in the area of the Republic of Karelia and the Murmansk, Novgorod, Pskov and Tver Regions. The formation or initiation of these primary organisations did not come directly from local RPLBZh activists. As in TCh-21, TCh-8 and TCh-10, the initiators firstly suggested that they form an independent trade union out of the ROSPROFZhEL control and after the organisations had been formed, the leaders later decided to join RPLBZh. Almost with no exception, all the primary organisations have constantly suffered from discrimination on the part of the administration. Each trade union organisation and its union committee are forced to constantly struggle for its survival. Furthermore, once the active members lose their militant spirit, the primary organisation soon starts to stagnate. The impact of the 1998 strike, however, brought both the number of primary organisations and membership down to its lowest level. In 2004, the territorial organisation formally had 77 Gudosha, No 1 (2), August 1997. According to the current vice-president of TO RPLBZh, TCh-5 was in Vitebskii Station, but disappeared in 1999; Depot TCh-19 disappeared in 2001. Available from: http://www.parovoz.com/spravka/depots/index.php?RLY=%EF%EB%F4&MAKE=*&LANG=1 [Accessed 14 March 2005]. 276 only six primary organisations which were the trade union committees TCh-8, TCh-10, TCh-12, TCh-20, TCh-21 and TCh-22. The territorial organisation then claimed its membership as about 400 workers (mainly train drivers and assistants) by 2004. The first main organiser of the territorial organisation, Aleksandr Zamyatin, at that time was a train driver and people supported the idea that he should free himself from his train-driving duties to be their full-time trade union officer, so he filled the post of president from the establishment of the territorial body. With his talent for union activity, the local member organisations established a basic circle. His successor, Boris Kharitonov, was the chairperson of RPLBZh union committee of TCh-21, simply because the RPLBZh membership on the October Railway once reached its highest level (more than 400) at his depot, which was much more than any of the other RPLBZh primary organisations. He was also a full-time union staffer during his term as TO RPLBZh leader. Unlike Zamyatin, he did not show a strong ambition to raise the profile of the territorial organisation; for most of the time he just stayed in his own union committee. This inefficient leadership led others to discuss and consider how to peacefully replace him. (He actually left the RPLBZh post and his primary organisation was cancelled from the RPLBZh branch list by 2005). According to the RPLBZh Charter, the basic function of the territorial 277 organisation is firstly to serve the members by handling and guaranteeing various sorts of social benefit at the corresponding level of governmental institutions, such as covering medical costs or insurance for its members; secondly, to gain the status of participating in negotiations for the collective agreement with the October Railway administration. Nevertheless, in practice since the territorial organisation has been established, the organisation has not gained recognition for the negotiation of the collective agreement. Despite its failure to achieve this ambition, the most visible existence of the TO RPLBZh OZhD was its role in the strike of August 1998, when about 1,400 drivers joined the action which lasted for about a week. In addition, while Aleksandr Zamyatin was the president, there was a newspaper of the TO RPLBZh OZhD, called ‘Gudosha’ (which means hooters), issued to exchange information between the depots. More importantly, instead of preparing for collective bargaining, the territorial organisation played the central function of providing general legal consultation and experience for their members and member organisations. This is important because the ability of each depot union committee and the specific pressure to which it is subjected is not the same. For weak primary organisations, the union committee has always had to fight against discrimination from the administration, in which the most frequent conflicts are over the check-off and turnover of members’ union dues. Corresponding to such a condition, the TO leadership is normally 278 expected to provide rich legal knowledge over labour issues or introduce a reliable legal consultant. Therefore, the coordination capacity of the union has been most evident in the field of court cases, while internal coordination has proved difficult to achieve.78 In the following section I present the basic issues that the TO RPLBZh OZhD has faced in its attempts to coordinate its member organisations. The nature of this coordination, as we will see, is largely based on the willingness and the strength of these primary organisations, while the territorial organisation itself has rarely had any permanent staff working and focusing on its organisational function. 3.1.2 Daily activities of the primary organisations As mentioned in Chapter Two, railway workers at different workplaces with their specific occupations and assigned duties have varied environments and cultures. Even drivers who work on the same railway also have different management policies, different working conditions and work and social environments. Under the TO RPLBZh OZhD, the primary organisations and their trade union committees embrace 78 Ashwin and Clarke have provided an overview of the post-soviet changes to the legal framework over trade union and labour conflict issues, in which they asserted that partly because the framework of new Russia’s soviet laws and inconsistent President decrees ‘had proved its worth as a means of defusing conflict and regulating labour relations, was deeply embedded in the practice and expectations of trade unionist and workers. Thus the new alternative trade unions which emerged after 1987 continue to work within the traditional framework, seeking to achieve their aim not by building a membership-based organisation, but by employing lawyers and appealing individual case to the courts, taking disputes out of the workplace...’(2002, p.103) 279 members from various routes and services, which eventually produced different capacities for the union organisations and their union activity. As we will see in the following descriptions, the stories of the representative organisations of the October Railway workers also reflect such predominant characteristics as the relationships existing among the widely distributed workplaces. In addition, until the new Labour Code was imposed in 2002, these RPLBZh union committees still had a chance of achieving recognition to negotiate a collective agreement with the administration, regardless of their marginal membership. The way to do this was to collect workers’ authorisation within the labour collective so that they could represent these workers to sit at the negotiation table. That was another dynamic for these newborn union organisations to survive. Primary organisation RPLBZh TCh-8 According to the initiators, the organisation was firstly established as a new and free trade union in the depot in 1994, which immediately gained the support of the majority of the depot workers. One year later, in 1995, the trade union passed a motion to join RPLBZh and only then did they become one of the RPLBZh local organisations. The union committee is located at Moscow Station, St Petersburg. Most members work on the passenger routes to different destinations. Quite impressively, there are quite a high proportion of young members at this depot. The average age of 280 the members was quite young, the majority of them were in their forties, and many of them were just in their thirties or even younger. The number of its members was seriously affected by two events. The first shock came during and after the 1998 strike, when the primary organisation lost more than half of its original members. It had 102 members before the strike action, but more than half left afterwards. The second shock came in 1999, when the depot was divided into two separate parts, and the workers of the maintenance section were relocated to another administrative unit. The primary organisation has been striving gradually to recover from its low point (continuous fall down to 44 in 2003); depot TCh-8 in 2004 had about 60 members (out of about 350 workers). The membership due is flexible, it cannot be less than 1% of their wages, but is usually 2%. Usually their members choose to pay personally by hand, although here it is also possible to collect dues by check-off. Their experience has taught them that such an approach can easily be used as a threat by the administration. Although the activists are confident of the loyalty of their members to the independent union, it was still regularly seen that most members did not pay much attention to the formal union meetings. The general meeting of the union organisation provides a clear sign of the members’ passive attitude to common issues, since it is not possible to hold the meeting regularly because the union has rarely been successful in mobilising the 281 attendance of its members. The weakness of conducting meetings, anyhow, did not really bother the activists. They are confident that if there is a serious issue they can still match the quorum required by the union charter. One way of securing that is to arrange for members to pay their union dues on the date of the meeting. The primary organisation at depot TCh-8 does not have any full-time staff. The union committee depends on the chairperson and his deputy to conduct the activity of the organisation. They together are also in charge of the labour inspection and have the authority of conducting the examination process which qualifies drivers to fulfil their duties. Most of the time, it is the deputy who sits in the office and is available for their members’ consultations. The current chairperson of the union committee, Andrei Gavrilov, has worked on the October Railway for almost 30 years and has the qualification of train driver first class. He joined RPLBZh in 1998, and was elected chairperson shortly after. In October 1999, he was elected to the Executive Committee of RPLBZh and has been deputy president since then. According to Gavrilov, the reason he did not think about joining RPLBZh before 1998 was that he did not really like the union’s political position (he was rather close to the left wing). When he saw that RPLBZh was no longer so close to the so-called ‘democratic’ or ‘liberal’ politicians, he finally decided to join it. In August 1998, he participated in the strike, just like many others, but he was suspended without pay (prostoi) by the 282 administration for about a year after the strike ended as a punishment. As soon as he was restored to his original post as an electric locomotive driver in July 1999, he was elected chairperson of the union committee. Most organisational work relies on the chairperson his deputy, especially the deputy. They usually cooperate with other RPLBZh committees and Egida. The condition and environment of the union committee’s office have several interesting features to note. The trade union committee of TCh-8 occupies one corner of the building of a conference hall within the depot territory, some distance from the ROSPROFZhEL office and the administration building. The building is located in an open square and beside the most important access which many railway workers must pass by day to day. The window of the office of the union committee opens on to the access, and performs an effective function of assisting their social communication (they even post the union mark on this window).79 Such a location allows most workers, especially RPLBZh members, to visit the office and have a short talk without being seen by administration staff. Young members often visit this union office. They visit for a chat, for relevant requests, or to take a piece of buterbrod (Russian sandwich) with vodka to have fun with the lads. At least ten people come and go every day, which gives the committee an active atmosphere. The office of the 79 At the very beginning, I even thought that it was the window, not the door, that was the point of access for communication between activists and workers. Several days latter, nevertheless, I realized that this observation needed some correction: only female railway workers prefer not to come into the office. 283 union committee therefore provides not only for union activity but also serves as a basic space for engine drivers’ social life. Such a condition became one of the main methods for the activists to spread new union information, and that is even the easiest way since the activists always believe that the workers, especially non-members, do not care what they put on the list to negotiate with the management. For all these reasons, including its location convenience most TO RPLBZh meetings are held here. However, such function can be provided only when one of the two activists is off work and come to ‘open’ the normally lucked office. Primary organisation RPLBZh TCh-12 This organisation embraces most members working at the Finland Station, St Petersburg. The union organisation was formed in 1992 together with the formation of RPLBZh. It has the oldest tradition of the local RPLBZh primary organisations as well as in local union movement circles. Based on such a history, the office of its union committee was also the centre and the office of the territorial committee until 2000. Under the influence of Zamyatin, the union committee still keeps a decently organised office. Under its relatively strong tradition which was handed down by the previous TO president, the primary organisation once embraced 90 % of the depot work force. However, the primary organisation also suffered after the 1998 strike and 284 has never recovered since. The organisation had about 10 % members (40) out of the 350 drivers at this depot in 2003. The chairperson explained the minor membership and is that under the influence of ROSPROFZhEL activity as such, ‘Actually, most workers did not care about joining or not joining the trade union at all; those who join ROSPROFZhEL are those who simply need to show the administration they are on their side. In addition, the administration and ROSPROFZhEL cooperate with each other to take advantage of new driver recruitment, they just give the newcomers a registration form to fill for joining ROSPROFZhEL right away’.(Arkardi Komissarov, March 23, 2007) Just like the condition in TCh-8, the union committee does not have any full-time staff. The current chairperson, Komissarov, has worked as a driver’s assistant since 1980. He had constantly struggled with the administration over the order to sack him after the strike action and was once officially sacked in 2000. During the court process many union events therefore were shared and carried out together with his deputy who participated in most external activities. The first deputy chairperson, Rorgankov, is not a train driver or assistant currently, but has joined the union long ago. Although he was more active in participating in union activities, he did not have a very positive faith in the relations between the committee and their members. He 285 argued that all the difficulties that Russian society has faced derive from their cultural and also religious traditions. This attitude was not agreed to by Komissarov who, on the contrary, believed that the only task of a union activist is to make all efforts to explain the union’s work well so that the workers can be attracted to it. Anyhow, when discussing how to attract members at least to show up at their meeting, this activist said there are of course some simple ways. For example, when it was time to call a general meeting, they had tried several times to inform members that there will be beer after the meeting in order to encourage them to attend the meeting so that they can ensure that the meeting achieves a quorum. Unlike the union committee of TCh-8 that benefits from an office located on an open square, the condition of the RPLBZh union committee of Depot TCh-12 was quite different. Its office was located within the building of the depot administration, and right next to the office of the ROSPROFZhEL union committee. This makes them more cautious in questions like how to communicate with their ‘big competitor’ and how to arrange their particular relations with the depot administration as well. The relationship between the activists of the two competing organisations was described as tense but peaceful. There was merely personal greeting among them. Their members or non-members would face more pressure when visiting the committee office. For such considerations, at TCh-12, union information or bulletins rather rely 286 on an information board in the hall, side by side with that of ROSPROFZhEL. With its relatively close atmosphere, the office is bigger and better furnished than those of their counterparts. In the union office there are television and radio, with clear information about the union’s current affairs on the wall. While the union committee is no longer as active as before, the place seems to serve as a rest space for activists and visitors. Interestingly, despite their similar functional settings, the union committee did not have such computer equipment as at the TCh-8 office. The TCh-12 union committee only replaced its rather old computer equipment very recently. Things here looked really quite different from at TCh-8. It was easy to feel which organisation was the more active. To compare the style of daily work with that of the union committee of Depot TCh-8, I asked about their differences. During several open conversations, the deputy chairperson gave a typical response about why they have actually become tired of encouraging their colleagues to join their union. ‘You asked me why I said I feel tired. Nowadays I have got tired of appealing to our workers to defend their own rights. What I want is to respect myself, and this is the way I hope everyone would behave. If they respect themselves then our union of course will be able to make more changes’ (AndreiR, May 27, 2003). 287 Another time, he commented when his close colleague had just said that he does not need ‘a union’. ‘Our workers don’t understand what concretely they can receive from joining the union. They just get used to setting their troubles aside. But I do know what is good since I joined the union, now I can think, read and use the articles of the labour law; I have learned how to protect my own job. This is good enough for me!’(AndreiR, June 02, 2003) One another occasion, he gave a more passive opinion while we were discussing whether it is true that the majority of workers still belong to ROSPROFZhEL because they think at least they can receive a ‘putevka.’ ‘I don’t think the need for a putevka matters, and there is no big competition between our organisation and ROSPROFZhEL… Because our workers are going nowhere. Most people go neither to our union nor to ROSPROFZhEL. They are not ready for it. And they are just waiting.’ (AndreiR, June 27, 2003) Primary organisation RPLBZh TCh-20 This primary organisation was established in 1994 at the motor-car depot TCh-20. The depot is near to TCh-12, both within the Finland Station, and at the beginning the 288 two union committees had been closely associated with each other. Recently, the primary organisation has had only seven members out of the total 600-700 workers at the depot. Again, that was a decline, from 20 to the current number, as an aftermath of the 1998 strike. The current chairperson, Teryushkov, has worked as a driving assistant since 1981. Similar to what has happened to the activists in TCh-12, he has been involved in RPLBZh circles for quite a long time, but lately expressed no will to be as active as he was in the past. The daily work of the union committee relied on the chairperson who acts like an elder brother to take care of this primary organisation. Apart from the chairperson, there was once a young organiser active at this depot, but he was soon sacked and went to another depot. Despite the close association with the TCh-12 union committee, the RPLBZh union committee at this depot faced a more hostile attitude of the depot administration, which refused to provide an office and equipment and would not recognise the legitimacy of the union committee. The union committee finally received its office only in October 2002 after they won the case on the court.80 Nevertheless, the lately received office for the union committee did not represent a meaningful role. As activists complained, the place was inconvenient, due to the fact that it was actually a place painters used as a workshop, so members did not like to use it. 80 For detailed descriptions refer to the reports of http://www.egida-piter.ru/CourtCr5.htm [Accessed 01 http://www.egida-piter.ru/CourtCr1.htm [Accessed: 27 April 2004] EGIDA. April Available 2004] from: and 289 Primary organisation RPLBZh TCh-21 Apart from the four core cells of the RPLBZh primary union organisations on the October Railway, the primary organisation of RPLBZh at depot TCh-21, located in Volkhov city, Leningrad Region, has the strongest membership with about 200 members out of a total of 687 workers at this depot in 2005, although the number was double this before the 1998 strike. The primary organisation was formally founded in February 1997, during the time when the wage arrears problem had caused grievances in the city (railway employment was one of the main local employment providers), and almost half the drivers joined the RPLBZh union. The RPLBZh union committee here was immediately recognised to negotiate with the depot administration for the collective agreement during 1997-1998. The primary organisation also got an office and a working phone. Its good fortune, however, did not last long, since the administration has always been trying to eliminate its trade union committee. The union committee actively participated and successfully mobilised all its fellow workers to join the strike, together with the members, in August 1998. Although the aftermath of the strike also had a great impact on the union organisation, the union committee survived and its office and all facilities have luckily not been removed by the depot administration. 290 The chairperson, Kharitonov, was a senior assistant driver. He has been elected as one of the deputy presidents of RPLBZh since 1999. For its strong membership base, the chairperson was able to become a full-time union activist. Nevertheless, his style of running union activity is quite different from that of his comrades. That is partly because the depot is isolated and remotely located, far away from St Petersburg; and partly because he quite enjoyed his authority at the depot, rather than being active in promoting or coordinating his activity with other primary organisations. The same reason has left his committee rather isolated from their St Petersburg counterparts. One should note that the resource of employing legal consultation is not as available as it is in the City, which means that for the style of an activist’s daily work to be the same as at its counterparts is unlikely. More than this, his late political interest and activity made him more distant from the RPLBZh headquarters.81 The rest of the primary organisations, not presented in detail above, faced a more difficult situation at their depots. At these depots the union activists simply acknowledged that it was difficult to survive as a normal union organisation, and they could only keep a low profile (individual member contact). Some of them were eliminated or simply disappeared. To take one example, the story of the union committee at TCh-22 presents a most dramatic scene. The union organisation was 81 Towards the end of his term, Kharitonov became more and more alienated from his territorial organisation colleagues. Lately, he also participated in the founding work of the Russian Labour Party and became its regional leader. 291 formed just before the 1998 strike, and in total 120 out of the 170 drivers joined the organisation and also participated in the later strike action. After the strike, most participants were punished by the administration which put them on administrative leave so that they received very little payment. Such a punishment was more powerful to the local drivers because the economic and employment character of the local town meant that workers subjected to such pressure could not easily find a temporary income while they waited for a court decision as others did in a big city like St Petersburg, and most union members finally left the depot in the next years. Seeing the life difficulties of union members, even the chairperson, Anton Serov, suggested that the members should take any chance to leave the depot. As in his words, he said ‘In fact, that was me told our members, our colleagues to run, run away from the mess as soon as possible’(September 9, 2003). For himself, the case has been appealed and appealed again for 5 years, but finally he still lost the case. During this period he could only try to earn money by different methods. The long-running court procedure, certainly, reinforced the members’ fear as well as their lack of confidence in the protection from RPLBZh. The aftermath was then understandable to activists: the primary organisation had more or less disappeared and the chairperson, even though he resisted the fact for a while, finally gave up his militant spirit and returned to a normal life. The financial difficulty of his family pushed him to leave the union 292 behind. According to the most recent information, he has started to work as a fire fighter in his local town. 3.1.3 The resource variation: relation with the administration and workers As mentioned in the previous chapter, the work schedule makes it difficult for drivers to meet or socialize, and there is no customary culture for them to make social contact after work. The communication among train drivers seems very casual, since their work schedules are so tight. And just like other ordinary drivers, the current wage level means that these people can hardly afford to go to a café or bistro so that their lives are kept in touch. Such a living precondition made difficulties for union activists to spread their message. For these activists, a lack of union office means no work telephone, no copy machine so that it is very inconvenient (and costly) just to rely on personal contact. As one activist explained, the only way he could do it was by walking around the depots and chatting to people he met casually. Furthermore, making distant phone calls to reach remote depots has been a quite problematic expense for them. A union office at least can provide basic resources to meet these functions, not only because it can make efficient (free) connection but also be the place where the workers have some chat or keep social life either before or off the 293 duty. Furthermore, they are able to discuss their solutions to work problems, to discuss the progress of court cases. That is in total for activists to receive various enquiries from members and workers. However, since there is no full-time union staff, and the entrance key can only be kept by the very core activists, most union committee offices could keep open to receive members only when their individual activists come in. The relative convenience of using the union office at TCh-8 doubtlessly indicates one reason why it is now the ‘core’ organisation. Despite the primary organisation TCh-21 having the biggest membership basis among all RPD primary organisations, and the union committee having received certain resources and authority, its geographic inconvenience allowed the weaker TCh-8 union committee (Moscow Station is located in the very centre of the city of St Petersburg) to provide the central coordination role. This fact reflects the practical challenge to their internal organisational work. It is also noteworthy that, although the credit of each organisation and the proportion of RPLBZh membership can give them relative authority, personal relationships with the administration are somewhat decisive, partly due to the tradition of interaction with the administration, and partly due to the various forms of committee activity. By that we can see the union organisations are treated differently. Take the environment of the union committee office as an example, which shows how 294 the conditions were individualised and thus the primary organisation has to deal with the power balance in their relations with the depot administration and their access to members or workers. Such a balance sometimes does not depend on the size of the union membership. For example, the first deputy chairperson of the union committee at TCh-12, a locomotive mechanic, is the only member of RPLBZh in his small, isolated depot, but a visible information board of RPLBZh is allowed by the administration to hang on the wall of the workplace. The reason for this might be the fact that he is sometimes in charge of the management of shift work. In short, the environment eventually reflects the relations of the primary organisation with both the administration and the members. If we did not know that the regional public prosecutor for transport had once tried to ban the existence of an RPLBZh organisation on the October Railway, we might think that RPLBZh has a monopoly at such a depot. The history of non-RPLBZh unions which did not receive an office for their activities (the detail is presented in the next section) simply shows that such rare cases were very fortuitous and might happen only when the administration (or ROSPROFZhEL organisation) closes one eye to their activity. 3.1.4 Organisational work of TO RPLBZh OZhD According to the official document of TO RPLBZh, ‘when the primary organisations 295 were established in the early 1990s, RPLBZh activists could take advantage of the administration’s inexperience on court affairs’ (Gudosha’, No.1 (2), 1997, pp.1-2). The union organisation therefore has spent an enormous amount of time taking conflicts with their administrations to court. Three basic categories of these cases include: the union’s status and funds; violation of individual worker’s rights; and victimisation of leaders and activists. By and large, the activity of taking legal cases to defend members’ interests or resolve their conflict with the administration has formally become the greatest achievement of the RPLBZh organisations, although many of these cases were quite time-consuming; most cases took 2-3 years to gain what they wanted. In face of the daily difficulties created by the pressure and the discrimination of the railway administration, the RPLBZh organisation allows workers from one depot to join the primary organisation of another depot. Nevertheless, such a solution does not mean that the destination union committee can subsequently protect these members more easily and with less effort. Theoretically, the union committee is able to issue an official document on behalf of any member to the administration at that member’s workplace. In real practice, however, members actually think such a kind of action may subject them to more victimization. In other words, they still may need to confront the administration personally and so they have to be quite ready to bear the 296 hardship anyway. Such a dilemma has remained as a critical weakness in the daily work of the union, since the real function of the union can be little more than providing legal consultation. Except for the very loyal members, workers staying with those weak organisations sooner or later have to give up their support for RPLBZh organisations. As time went on, the core RPLBZh union activists were enlightened or empowered by learning labour laws and practicing their skills in the courts. This has become the most frequently mentioned achievement of union work. The first lesson an activist would like to show and teach new members is how to defend their rights by quoting relevant labour laws. These activists firstly help and explain to the person how to write a ‘meaningful’ document (such as an application, personal statement and so on) in support of the person’s position regarding the events. Or, in a case which the activists do not know how to deal with, especially related to legal interpretation, then they bring the case to the union’s legal consultation agency (Egida). Nonetheless, the TO did not have any full-time staff to take charge of these cases (at least over the research observation period from 2002 to 2004), and it was said that the situation had been like this for several years. These daily routines still rely on the same people who were originally inspired to take up this duty and to undertake it voluntarily. The whole union daily routine and organisational work therefore relies either on those who can 297 come into the office before or after their own working shift or even those who have been sacked (like the worker mentioned in the last chapter who had once lost his railway job in TCh-20) to take such unpaid duties. Without a real stable environment and access to mass support, such well-learned activists sometimes ended up working on their own, while ignoring others who were not as experienced as them. In the past, the TO RPLBZh did once have a full-time staff member. As mentioned above, the former president, Zamyatin, no longer worked as a driver once he became the full-time president of the organisation. During his term in office, he made a lot of progress for the organisation. Nevertheless, while the primary organisations and activists grew up, other activists found the experience of union meetings unpleasant. According to other activists, Zamyatin was indeed talented, but he became too authoritarian as time went on; his non-respectful attitude to other peoples’ opinions then caused internal scandals. The situation and their relationships got worse after he started to receive a high salary (compared to the drivers’ level at the time) from the financial support of the American trade unions. Since then he behaved more like a lawyer and a commander than a union leader until he finally left the RPLBZh circle and moved to Murmansk city.82 This unhappy experience led other activists to reject the idea of arranging any joint fund or using a joint fund to maintain paid trade union 82 Zamyatin was a former engine driver from depot TCh-12, and was elected as chair of the TCh-12 union committee. In 2000, he finally left TO RPLBZh OZhD and since then has worked for the Murmansk trade union organisation of dockers. 298 staff to carry out the organisational work. Since his departure, the TO RPLBZh OZhD and its primary organisations had no full-time trade union staff. The reason is partly due to their financial incapacity, and partly related to their past bad experience. Apart from training in labour law, the territorial organisation is constantly committed to conducting union seminars to teach active members more specific knowledge and skills. Many organisational skills and knowledge were taught through cooperation with Egida, and received a certain influence from the seminar style of the AFL-CIO-supported Solidarity Centre. The skills they were taught have so far had a serious effect, but sometimes even activists feel that this knowledge is doubtful (calling those skills the ‘American way’ or ‘Western way’) While talking about how to promote the union’s activity, the chairperson of the most active union committee tried to assert that their experience is also positive. It is interesting to cite the words with which he responded to my question here. He argued that, ‘Every country has its own way, and we Russians have our way. The way we do it currently is to send union newspapers to different depots… The ways of showing our existence can be very different. Those methods which are interesting for active young people can be difficult for us elders. The experience of those big, FNPR unions may be a lot, and we are just like kids. I also dream that one day our trade union can be very big. But this 299 won’t be now ’ He then also gave his own estimation of their pressure on ROSPROFZhEL: ‘Our union at least made many workers leave that union (ROSPROFZhEL), even if they did not join ours. They know ROSPROFZhEL did nothing. Their power is only from being in the pocket of the employer’ (Andrei Gavrilov, July 14 2003) In general, it is quite common for the active members of these primary organisations to take a rather passive attitude to their definition of organisational work which is due, in their words, to the fact that most of their colleagues are passive regarding their own rights and conditions. Nevertheless, the whole scene can be reviewed elaborately: what is the force which makes them stick to these activities when they see no prospects for their organisation’s potential. Indeed, there has been and there is still a very high risk of getting sacked for carrying out union activity, especially in an environment with weak sympathy from their colleagues. People like the ex-chairperson of TCh-12 were given no duty or payment for a couple of years and were then finally sacked after the 1998 strike; and several activists have relied on or still rely on finding themselves ‘levaya rabota’ (‘work on the side’). These people certainly have been deprived of their capacity to help members due to the fact that they were not officially employees. 300 These people, on the one hand, are not union officers like those we usually see at the top of a developed (institutionalised) union structure; they receive little material benefit for running a primary union body, but still come to the union office and attend the union meetings. They are the people, on the other hand, shaping the real exercise of union functions while being reluctant to take active steps to develop the organisational activities of the union. Coordination work－personal contact From the previous description, we may capture an illustration of the organisational activity of RPLBZh, which provides more understanding of the union’s development and their current capacity. Importantly, coordination among the TO RPLBZh OZhD member organisations embraces an interesting geographical or workplace characteristic. Firstly, just as the two depot union committees TCh-10 and TCh-8 rely on the latter to carry out their supposed function of protecting members’ interests, such a situation also happens with the union committees at TCh-12 and TCh-20 at the Finland Station. Secondly, although the union committee of TCh-21 has the strongest membership, the inconvenience of its communications means that the territorial organisation still has its centre at TCh-8. The result is that the union committee of TCh-8 plays the critical role for the local development of RPLBZh union activities. 301 The interrelationship and communication among RPLBZh territorial organisations reflects another ambiguous development. Firstly, the financial affairs of each primary organisation are kept separate rather than being coordinated with one another. Understandably, every primary organisation finally has managed to obtain its own office and the necessary equipment, though what is evident is the visible gap in capacity among these organisations. Each primary organisation, normally, only works on its own; therefore, they have to count on their varying amount of membership fees to make their own decisions on buying basic office facilities and equipment. Secondly, the real practice of the territorial organisation does not provide significant support to its trade union committees. The work of each union office is therefore not collectively endeavoured. Even the resources of TO RPLBZh itself are quite limited; since the work of each union committee is also unevenly distributed, consequently the organ of the TO itself eventually relies on its richest primary organisation to provide for its basic operation. The situation has got worse since Zamyatin, the former president of TO RPLBZh OZhD, left the circle. Despite taking the unpleasant experience away with him, the territorial organ has found it more difficult to associate or integrate their local organisations without his presence. Such a fact shows that the capacity of the TO RPLBZh OZhD relies heavily on individual ambition and ability, while even a very authoritative activist (leader) still sticks to his most familiar workplace. 302 The next president (until 2005), Boris Kharitonov, was the chairperson of the trade union committee of TCh-21 at the same time, who once owned high authority among members in his own depot; he was also a strong figure in conducting the August 1998 strike. However, under his leadership TO RPLBZh OZHD did not formally meet for the whole of 2003. The fact was that he was not very keen to call regular meetings of the territorial organisation or even to attend the meetings. It was said that he would rather dream about how members should react to hit the administration hard than get stuck in to the routine work of the trade union. Therefore, several activists were confused about whether they should replace him (since he just concentrated on his post as the chairperson of his own trade union committee) or keep him in post. During his presidency, most TO organisational work fell on his deputy Zhyutikov. Apart from his communicative personality, his experience and skill were developed in training by the AFL-CIO union centre in Washington D.C. His activity presented an obvious role model for the presence of the local RPLBZh activity.83 My observational research soon noticed the role of individual figures in weak organisations such as the RPLBZh organisations. The whole character of the coordination work seems to derive not only from one leader but from the whole 83 Nevertheless, it seemed that his political ideology (rather close to liberalist position) had made him distant from other union activists. While other activists support left-wing parties and still take part in the Mayday demonstration, he is the only one who openly expressed his opposition to such participation. When talking about Zhyutikov, those activists usually emphasised that he is a ‘right winger’, and that meant his position for union was not reliable. Such low trust had also become an excuse to raise a row over the union’s issues. 303 activist networks within the organisations. More critically, over the interviews, most respondents tried to avoid such sorts of questions or topics. In interviews about how to resolve internal organisational problems, the core activists directly admitted that was a big problem but there would be more problems if they talked about it. The answer of the chairperson of union committee TCh-8 presents a typical and interesting image. He believed that he cannot resolve this problem by using his union post, despite the fact that he was the deputy president of RPLBZh at the same time. Our dialogue ran as follows: ‘Andrei, Vitali just said that your TO president did not call the regular meeting…, but members could ask him to call the meeting, right? Or, could you use your position in the trade union? You are the deputy president of RPLBZh, to tell him to call the meeting, can’t you? ’ (S.K.) ‘(smile first) Yeah, I do have some more titles (laugh), but I can not do it.’ (the chairperson). ‘What do you mean by that…?’ (S.K) ‘See…Try to understand this, here the matter is － once we talked about organisational work we would have even created more organisational problems’. (Andrei Gavrilov, May 13, 2003) At the end, he stressed that at least they have learned how to tolerate different 304 attitudes or even political ideologies. As one of the consequences, very often these RPLBZh activists on the October Railway can only recognise the chairperson of each union committee; which means active members or the deputy of each committee hardly have a chance to get to know each other very well. In the interviews, the activists did not hesitate to admit that the operation of their primary organisations is highly separated. Just as the chairperson of the trade union committee TCh-8 expressed it, in the above talk, he continued, ‘Each of our primary organisations is just like a small kingdom, and each of us is just like a petty tsar’ (Andrei Gavrilov, May 13, 2003). With such a character of the RPLBZh organisation on the October Railway, it is not difficult to conclude that the territorial organisation does not embrace a broader base to represent its members as a whole. In daily practice it exists as a small circle for improving leaders’ court experiences with individual or local (depot-based) cases. 3.2 Non-RPLBZh free trade unions Apart from the RPLBZh and the ROSPROFZhEL, there is a number of other trade unions, which mostly formed based on their specific workplaces (though under the name of profession identity). Most of them also define themselves as free trade unions, and constantly accuse ROSPROFZhEL of being a ‘pocket trade union (of the 305 employer)’. The leaders of these free trade unions did not choose to join RPLBZh. Generally, these are even more marginal than RPLBZh, but could be quite strong on the basis of their authority in certain depots or stations. A common characteristic of these scattered, marginal trade unions is that their leaders were all suppressed by their administrations. Such a situation pushes them to embrace sympathy with each other, and that generates an incentive for these organisations to form a loose confederation. The description of these marginal union organisations is valuable for understanding the role of workplace interests for railway workers and the potential obstacles facing coordinating different occupations. 3.2.1 Interregional Trade Union ‘Zheleznodorozhnik’ (MPS ‘Zheleznodorozhnik’ ) Formally established on June 22 1998, 30 track workers from Baltic Station (PCh-11) and Gatchinskaya Division attended the constitutional conference of their new trade union – Trade Union of Track Facility Workers of October Railway (PSRP OZhD). After the new organisation was formed, its leadership and members immediately faced serious oppression directly from the administration and the ROSPROFZhEL unionists. Their members received threatening calls from their management, and six union activists, including the leaders, were sacked by the administration. The trade 306 union, however, still survived after a series of barriers to union activities. It overcame a fall in its membership from the highest level of 117 down to 19 between January and July 1999. PSRP OZhD also joined and became a member organisation of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions on the October Railway in 1998. Nevertheless, since members and activists had left, corresponding to its new and real status, there was anyway the necessity to restrict the organisation. On October 22 2000, the leadership (some had got their jobs back but the rest had not) of PSRP OZhD initiated a reform of the union and adopted the current name – Interregional Trade Union ‘Zheleznodorozhnik’, shortly named as ‘MPS Zheleznodorozhnik’. 84 The organisation declares its current membership as about 250, with nine primary organisations, to which they recruit members not only from track workers, but also from different railway occupations (‘Zheleznodorozhnik’ Za robochee delo No. 6(128), 2003) Nevertheless, neither the trade union nor its union committee has its own facilities such as an office, union information board, telephone and computers. That is due to the continuing discrimination by the administration. The running of union activity relies on either using the personal energy of its highly dedicated leader or through other local labour organisations. The external support, however, was still an expansion of the personal contacts of the leader. The Russian word ‘Zheleznodorozhnik’ means railway worker. The union leader smartly created the new name of the Union as ‘Mezhregional’nii professional’nii soyuz ‘zheleznodorozhnik’ ’ so that it can get the same abbreviation MPS as the former Ministry of Railway Communications. 84 307 According to the documentary material of ‘MPS Zheleznodorozhnik’, the union in 2003 had five active activists in total. As an unusual case, the union has one female activist, a boiler-house operator in the St Petersburg-Vitebsk Division of the October Railway. Like the union activists from RPLBZh, in their daily work the MPS activists have to provide legal consultation for workers, or represent their members in court over working conditions disputes (Mironov 2002). Such functions require a rich experience and specific knowledge. For example, the only female activist mentioned earlier; due to her profession and recent union membership, did not really get involved in organisational work or in the circle of KSP OZhD activity. Two other activists had been deliberately discriminated against by the administration; the depot chief firstly ordered them to transfer their duty to other depots and then delayed receiving them for months. Finally, they were both told that because the depots do not allow workers from other unions, they had lost their jobs. Such odd events somehow exhausted the young activists’ energy. Since most of these active members are quite new to this kind of union daily work, this work can only rely on the union president. The president of ‘MPS Zheleznodorozhnik’, Aleksandr Argunov, one of the most active leaders within the KSP OZhD circle, is also the president of its railway committee and the primary organisation of Gatchinskaya Division. With his Kuzbass background, Argunov had worked as a construction worker, docker, and sinker in 308 coalmines; in 1990, he started to work on the railway track PCh-24. He had worked hard for the trade union movement, as well as for the political movement. The local RPLBZh activists therefore treat him with fair respect for his endless energy on the one hand; but keep a cautious attitude towards to him, on the other hand. According to his opinion, his trade union as well as the KSP OZhD needs to recruit more people to get involved in their work, and he sent his members to be present at almost every seminar and picket. Obviously, the union activity is strongly sustained by Argunov. Compared to his co-activists, Argunov strongly believes in taking direct action; he actively participated, and brought his members, to almost all of the transport-related pickets and KSP OZhD actions. The ‘MPS Zheleznodorozhnik’ conducted its own picket actions, although local unionists and RPLBZh activists had been reluctant to take such actions. Compared to the attitude of its counterparts within KSP OZhD, the union recognised the influence of press propaganda and union seminars, despite its relatively poor resources. Argunov is the very rare respondent in my research who believes that the trade union does need to tell railway workers about how trade unions should recruit members and to consider the general attitude of members towards the union organisation. For that he required local labour activists to learn how to run union seminars. Since 2002, Argunov started to participate in the founding of the Russian Labour Party (RPT), and became the chairperson of the party organisation in 309 the Leningrad Region. The next year he also ran as the party’s candidate in the parliamentary election in the region. Mixed with the union’s relatively short experience and the strong personality and capacity of Argunov in conducting union activities, this organisation has played an active role in the circle of the local union movement. Its relations with RPLBZh, however, have always been difficult. The president, though he expects RPLBZh to be a real and serious trade union, very much dislikes the political orientation of the RPLBZh leadership. That is probably the main reason why Argunov did not want his trade union to fully cooperate with RPLBZh. Instead of joining RPLBZh, he had considered ‘MPS Zheleznodorozhnik’ joining ‘Zashchita truda’, the more left-wing Russian labour union. He soon had left the local labour movement circle and his activism for personal condition in the latest time. 3.2.2 The Trade Union of the Electricians of October Railway The Trade Union of the Electricians of October Railway (PSE) was established in 1998, and joined the KSP OZhD immediately. The union officially registered, but was not really recognised by the depot administration. Direct pressure on this organisation meant that the union was constantly stuck in the problem of a struggle for survival. Due to such hardship the membership of PES has always been unstable, the president 310 giving an ambiguous number of about 60 members. The ‘trade union’ had been obviously a workplace-based organisation. Most of its members work at depot VCh-8, including various sorts of mechanics and conductors. The president of the trade union, Petrov, was sacked from his railway job in 1998 and since then he has always been taking temporary jobs. He claimed to have been involved in trade union activity since 1993. Despite that, the president has endlessly helped railway workers who have come to him asking for various kinds of support. The membership of his organisation, however, did not increase correspondingly. As a strategy for the union’s survival, he allows union members to keep dual membership. Except for some loyal active members and himself, most of his members still keep dual membership. The other strategy he has insisted on is to keep the real membership information secret so that the administration cannot threaten their members. The people who decided to join his union were attracted either by his personality or his personal service. In most cases, however, workers treat the union as a sort of consulting agency and treat the membership due more like a consultant’s fee. He insists that the trade union organisation should help his members to find a new job if they are sacked. The reason he thinks this is important, as he explained, is that there are so many workers being made redundant from their jobs. Therefore that is a necessary way for free trade unions to enable their organisation to survive; he 311 asserts, the problem is only one of their will to do this, not one of access to help redundant members find jobs. We also have to note that, due to his personality, the organization has not reached something that would fall under the normal definition of a trade union. One of the reasons for his union approach, as the president continuously insisted in an indignant manner, is his doubt about workers’ solidarity. In our first interview, he finally concluded with these words: ‘There is not and there will not be a so-called workers’ movement. The workers’ movement as you thought of it, workers get together, recognise another worker as a friend, the capitalist is our enemy… there will not be such a thing. Because every worker dreams that one day he or she will become a capitalist’ (Leonid Petrov, February 04, 2003). More than once, he liked to argue that most Western leftists or trade unionists do not really aspire to make an effort to establish international solidarity. Thus, he was always sceptical about foreign trade unions. His effort to participate in international campaigns seemed to be only because he could thereby see how foreigners work and organise. The other activist of PSE was a young carriage electrician, who joined the free trade union in 2003. He is the worker that the president Petrov most appreciates. 312 Through a friend who once received help from the PSE president, he contacted the union and came with his own awareness of labour rights. He said: ‘I became a trade union activist because over the past 11 years I have kept my mouth shut,… our wages are so low, life is just like in a prison… but finally I realized without joining a trade union you couldn’t even defend your own rights. Nevertheless, the official trade union would not provide any help for resolving your problems or your requests. They are just corrupted people…. But most of our workers are still very passive’ (VladK Carriage Electrician, May 18, 2003). Since then he has started to learn very actively, thinking about how to act and how to perform as a trade union activist without being able to share the views of others, but mainly by his own reflection. When we first met in May 2003, he was more or less optimistic about the prospects of this union, he thought that they could learn from other successful trade unions like RPLBZh. He felt that because drivers are more educated, their union is stronger; therefore they need time to educate their members. After several meetings, however, he started to show a disappointed mood about those workers who had got in trouble at their jobs and joined his trade union. Quite quickly (after about a year), the fresh activist became less optimistic than at our first talk. Although he still attended seminars or union meetings, the presence was to 313 keep his own earlier belief: to educate himself, so that he can defend himself better.85 The change of their mood was not difficult to catch. When following their regular but unsuccessful union meetings, the moments waiting for members to come were always quite embarrassing. Normally only a few members would show up. The preparation was also poor. There is no room to share; there are no resources for the organisation. All these conditions made this union more like a union group (profgrupa) but not a complete trade union. The fact that the union can still actively exist simply reflects the fact that many railway workers are looking for someone who is more experienced so that they can help them better to negotiate with administration staff. 3.2.3 The Free Trade Union of Refrigerator Workers on Refrigerator Depot ‘Predportovaya’ This trade union organisation is unique because the refrigerator depot itself is the only one on the October Railway. The depot is directly managed by another unit ‘Refservice’. For that reason workers here decided to establish their own trade union to defend their specific working conditions. According to its deputy president, Anatoly Trifanovskii, the trade union was established in May 1994 but officially 85 I met VladK many times on many different occasions in St Petersburg, such as pickets, round table meetings, union meetings, or even just on the road around his workplace. I also several times spent tea breaks and home visits with him. Certainly we talked a lot more than exchanging general greetings, which is why I can observe the changes in his mind. 314 registered on April 18 1996. The organisation currently has more than 200 members (by 2005). With such a membership, the union has gained and retained its own office and office equipment, and the trade union president was able to provide service with full-paid. In their account, that has made them the biggest among all the member organizations of KSP OZhD.86 Compare to the train drivers, the common condition in face of workers with other professions on the Railway had never been a comfortable one in the labour market, and suffered from a high degree of job insecurity, which encouraged an individualistic orientation to face their work pressure. Workers sought for, and received, individual help from their ‘trade union boss’. The one-way service indeed satisfied workers’ immediate requests, but that left little space to present an alternative image, to develop the aspiration for better work conditions, such as the RPLBZh organisation had. They even have to struggle for the survival of the necessity of the organisation. Individualistic demands and their impact on these trade union activists therefore constantly dominated the form of their trade union development. These non-RPLBZh trade unions almost all have relied on one person － the president to run the whole organisation. The so-called leadership was conducted in a different way. Yet, that has become the only base for the visible leadership among these organisations. On the 86 It may worth noting that when compare to other activists mentioned earlier, my impression of the style of this union is rather calm and it keeps its distance from undertaking collective actions. At the KSP OZhD regular meetings, it seems that their members are always very well disciplined, with strong and calm personalities. 315 other side, from the point of view of activists, while they constantly emphasised this as a Russian philosophy of life: the activities rely on the subjectivity of workers, so there is no immediate necessity for activists and leaders to attract members’ loyalty. The non-RPLBZh unions were doomed to follow the same way as RPLBZh organisations. Nevertheless, they do not have the legacy from which RPLBZh still benefits; and, compared to the central role of the RPLBZH Moscow headquarters, they have no possibility to get more authority from their very isolated workplace to spread their messages to others. Apart from the three union organisations mentioned above, there are several tiny trade union organisations around the territory of October Railway. Their members might amount to just over a dozen, so they are not counted in this study. There is one important point we should note about all these non-RPLBZh / non-ROSPROFZhEL trade unions: the character of these trade unions indicates that they are ultimately ‘workplace’, or to say exactly ‘single depot’, organisations, hence their membership is usually only concentrated in one workplace unit. And that is the only strong resource for their leaders to keep their position. 3.3 Unionism individualised: the Confederation of Free Trade Unions on October Railway As mentioned earlier, the subject of workers’ organisations in the October Railway is 316 unique because only here can we find multiple railway workers’ trade unions established to represent the separate interests of the workers of various professions. Compared to other Russian railways, where railway workers have only the dominant ROSPROFZhEL organisations and occasionally RPLBZh organisations, on the October Railway there has been a very different scene. Moreover, most of these new trade unions have tried to associate with each other to challenge the legitimacy of ROSPROFZhEL, and that is why KSP OZhD was formed. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions of October Railway (KSP OZhD) was established on March 23 1997 and one and a half years later, on December 15 1998, the joint organisation was registered as a legal entity. Apart from delegates of five RPLBZh primary organisations, another two organisations, Trade Union of Repair Workers of October Railway and the Free Trade Union of Refrigerators of the October Railway, attended the founding convention. In 1998, another two trade unions – the Trade Union of Electricians of the October Railway and the Trade Union of Track Facility Workers of October Railway – joined the KSP OZhD. When the KSP OZhD was originally initiated in 1997, the Territorial Organisation of RPLBZh of October Railway (TO RPLBZh OZhD) and its leadership held a key and special role among all the founder trade union organisations. The involvement of its own member organisations indicates some critical conditions of the internal network that we should note. 317 The motivation of establishing KSP OZhD was to form an alternative type of organisation which is different from the fashionable professional principle of the early 90s. Theoretically, the practical benefit for the new organisation is that now its founder organisations can declare that it covers all categories of railway workers across different professions. Following such a declaration, the new organisation was expected to run the joint task of defending workers’ socio-labour rights and gaining the status of signing collective agreements. However, the aim of negotiating and signing a collective agreement had never reached, due to the reluctance of the administration of the Railway to sit and discuss with KSP OZhD. In fact, the administration quite strongly suppressed the KSP OZhD organisation and its influence among workers, and it has succeeded. Two of the union leaders were sacked in 1998, and the administration even published a special guide book denouncing the legitimacy and authority of each founder organisation. KSP OZhD has had little success in improving workers’ general conditions, their main successes being through legal conflict in court. The only participation related to the process of railway work the Confederation has participated was the inspection of working conditions; since activists from KSP OZhD gained positions in the labour inspection commission. That is one of the very few stages on which they can exert pressure and be a serious 318 troublemaker for the administration and the inspector from the Ministry of Labour.87 Since the composition of KSP OZhD includes various union organisations, the rules of representation have been quite a sensitive issue. The regular session of KSP OZhD was constituted of seven representatives in charge of simple division of organisational aspects. The executive position comprises one president, three deputy presidents and one secretary. Representatives from RPLBZh take four seats, but the composition sometimes gives rise to sharp arguments when the participants make decisions. 3.3.1 Activity: weak mobilisation capacity Over the 5 years following the formation of the Confederation several collective actions took place, mainly focusing on the future privatisation of the railways. Apart from their participation and support work within the RPLBZh 1998 strike, most of these actions were 2-hour-long pickets: for example, a meeting against the Government draft of the new Labour Code in 2000 and pickets against the privatisation programme of the Russian railway system on January 16 and October 10 2002. For the same event, the members of KSP OZhD also participated in the 87 Ironically, it seems the inspection of working condition is always the final weapon for a trade union organisation which has actually achieved only a very marginal position in its bargaining with management. In the film of British director Ken Loach, ‘The Navigators’, the only tool of the already marginalised trade union representative against his management is neither workers’ reaction nor trade union legal resources, but the threat of ringing the health and safety inspectorate. 319 European campaign against railway privatisation. They flew to Paris and Berlin to attend international conferences of railway workers’ organisations. In November 2001, a delegation of European railway workers’ unions attended an international conference organised by KSP OZhD. Apart from the common demand to re-nationalise European railways, the conference also reached a decision to form an international anti-railway-privatisation committee. Interestingly, that was KSP OZhD, who took the seat of Russian delegates of the committee, and RPLBZh was presented as part of it. One permanent problem facing KSP OZhD activity is their effective membership base. Most of their actions faced the difficulty of attracting workers’ concern or attention, thus the actions actually became a symbolic move. Such an ineffective form of action raised some doubts and criticisms among activists. After their actions, KSP OZhD would set up a discussion and collect information to prepare their next move. A critical review of the effect of past actions, however, was usually absent. They made their effort by attending an international conference. In face of the popular reluctance to join the trade union, as we have seen earlier, the method of KSP OZhD has not reached any specific conclusion. Some activists were keen to undertake more promotion to increase their membership; some thought that they would just spend their money without any visible result. By and large, the whole confederation left the 320 problem of attracting more railway workers to each organisation; and the form of union activity, as described in previous sections, has still been that they provide help or legal consultation for people who are very angry or disappointed with the traditional trade union. Although the issue of representation gave rise to many internal quarrels, it did not lead to further conflicts; it seems all the representatives reached a way to accommodate themselves to it. The earlier problem, however, was that even though ‘representatives’ were dispatched by their own organisation, their own activists did not get to know other active people from other depots in their own organisation. This indicates that the formation of KSP OZhD was in reality to achieve legitimacy for the negotiation of the collective agreement, but not as the basis of inter-organisational support. Even when the later focus was to form a visible opposition to the potential privatisation of Russian railways, the barrier among member organisations was still felt. As a consequence, the difference in trade-union-owned resources is too obvious; apart from RPLBZh primary organisations, only the Refrigerators’ free trade union has their own office and necessary equipment. Nevertheless, the Refrigerators’ office is far from downtown, the regular meetings therefore are always held in the office of the trade union committee of TCh-8. The monthly meetings were full of shouting and individual quarrels, which sometimes were completely inexplicable. Reaching its fifth 321 year, the Confederation still maintained its original style in spending most of the time discussing and deciding rather abstract problems. By contrast, serious or peaceful discussions of their organisational problems were very rarely brought onto their meeting’s agenda. Though activists gathered very frequently, they usually discussed their external affairs. For example, who should be in charge of contacting publishers; when and where will there be a conference or international action; who is going to represent the confederation? While the method and problem of mobilizing their own people or the possibility of improving their members’ participation were not discussed, it seemed that most representatives had already reached agreement that such topics were not their concern; that kind of issue can go ahead only naturally and gradually, and it depends upon each worker’s awareness. This actually reflects the problem of the interrelationship among these organisations. One indication is that their joint seminars with local groups or organisations rarely get any mutual support from their counterparts. Not surprisingly, they still called some people to come but simply those who were their close friends. Another permanent issue was how to distribute the portion of their spending to each organisation: for example, the cost of their pamphlet publication.88 The example of MPS is worth further description. The president of ‘MPS’, 88 In December 2001, the Confederation decided to publish its own pamphlet-style newspaper, named ‘Zheleznodorozhnik (Railway worker)’, associated with the editorial board of ‘Za rabochee delo’, the formal title of this newspaper. 322 Aleksandr Argunov, one of the most active leaders within the KSP OZhD circle, was also the most disputatious person within the circle, partly due to his frank manner of engaging in discussion at the regular meetings, which always annoyed other activists. The other fact was that despite his own organisational activism, his members were little recognised by RPLBZh and other trade union activists, perhaps deriving from their impression of the professional and educational level of track workers. Compared to the work of the members of the other organisations, the track worker is the only profession which works on the railway but not on the trains. 3.3.2 The difficulties There has been little coordination in the relationship between the TO RPLBZh OZhD and the central organization in Moscow and KSP OZhD to develop broader contact between the organisations. With such an inter-organisational character, the role of TO RPLBZh in its connections with the RPLBZh central office and KSP OZhD has been complicated. The chairperson of TCh-8 was the president of KSP OZhD at the same time as being the deputy president of RPLBZh. The conduct of an international conference on the security and perspectives of the railway industry held in Leningrad Region in November 2001 showed the eventually ambiguous connections. The plan and arrangements for the international conference were made in 323 the name of KSP OZhD, but not RPLBZh, although RPLBZh representatives dominated KSP OZhD. As mentioned earlier, the leader of KSP OZhD, who is also an RPLBZh leader, did not honour the contribution of either TO RPLBZh OZhD or RPLBZh in the first place. Similarly, the RPLBZh head office barely recognised the conference as an achievement of RPLBZh as a whole. Such a triangular cooperation brought more distrust instead of further cooperation. Probably derived from the previous experience, when people started to arrange a new international conference in 2003, an inner, underground, struggle between KSP OZhD and RPLBZh immediately came out, but again, the role of TO RPLBZh was put aside. The fact is that to keep the internal power balance, their decision was to reduce the original senior status of the Territorial organisation over its primary organisations. The conflicting views toward the authority and strategy of a broader coordination seemed to cause further problems for the running of KSP OZhD. Poor internal coordination The second problem is around the coordination function of KSP OZhD. Firstly, it is obvious that the current leadership of TO RPLBZh OZhD did not pay much respect to the value and authority of KSP OZhD. The Confederation is unique in the organisational life of all RPLBZh routines, but the assigned functions of the Confederation did not bring more immediate feedback to their own primary 324 organisations. In their view, most of the meetings and questions discussed are rarely constructive. Moreover, most RPLBZh members do not recognise the KSP OZhD as one of their senior organisations. They started to complain that the latter has been a useless body for quite a while. An RPLBZh activist gave his estimation of the future of KSP OZhD, ‘The point is in this organisation, no one has enough capacity to stand up and to take more responsibility; everyone just wants to pretend they are some kind of leader’ (VitaliZh, June 05, 2003). He then denounced those leaders who simply desired to occupy the post of being a leader, however tiny their trade union is. In his view, the future depends on RPLBZh making the effort to establish a united trade union, but ‘they (non-RPLBZh union leaders and activists, since he did not use ‘comrade’) would not support the formation of a real united trade union’ (Conversation on the train June 20, 2003).89 From the other side, those non-RPLBZh leaders also complained that the real attempt of RPLBZh was always to maintain their dominant power within the KSP OZhD. The first deputy president of KSP OZhD, the PSE leader (Petrov) also frankly admitted that he does not have good relationships with other trade unionists. Apart from their differences over ideology, there is another quite impressive reason. 89 I took this conversation seriously because it was on a trip when I just joined them to visit Perm (an industrial city locates near south of Ural Mountains), to see how they tutor the seminar onr organisational skill to a newly established trade union committee. He said a lot about not making a one-leader atmosphere in the organisation, activists should learn how to create a mutual dialogue. That inspired me to raise the discussion topic with him. 325 Activists from other union organisations may despise the scale of his trade union, or, in other words, the result of his personal work. Indeed, not only the president of RPLBZh but also members from RPLBZh frankly showed their despising attitude against these ‘not-serious union persons’. Moreover, these activists do not believe the others can understand their organisation’s difficulties, not to mention to give up their own control of their ‘union’ activities. As a consequence, whether these activists admited it privately or openly, the idea of building further cross-occupational unity, integrated ideology and union strategy for these relatively friendly organisation was unlikely to take hold. The history of KSP OZhD might have led one to doubt that it is a serious unity. The fact is the answer might have a very different perspective from insiders and outsiders. As a participant observer, I have firstly seen so many quarrels, but after that repeated yelling, stubborn speaking and even cursing, they could still reach a kind of consent. Many times the moment they finished the meeting was strangely touching for me. Asked for their own estimations, some of the participants said that they do believe that the style of KSP OZhD really shows a model for unity of the trade unions on the October Railway. The visible dilemma, however, expresses the organisational or internal structural difficulties. 326 3.3.3 The sign of doom Such unity confronted more challenges. The first and most fundamental challenge was related to the position of RPLBZh, and the superior position of drivers within the circle. The adoption of the new RPLBZh charter, which allows the union to recruit members from other occupations, has now given them more reasons to get rid of KSP OZhD. Certainly, for RPLBZh activists the perspectives of the new period had immediately demonstrated a key option to challenge the so-called unity as well as the real ambition of RPLBZh’s change in their charter. As their response, none of the non-RPLBZh trade union leaders has considered their trade union’s joining RPLBZh as an option. Such a reaction did not surprise TO RPLBZh leaders, one of the RPLBZh members believed, because the leaders of those trade unions are afraid of losing their leader position if they join RPLBZh. In addition, both Argunov and Petrov had accused the current president of KSP OZhD of having a real position rather close to the position of RPLBZh’s Moscow head office, and that he will repeat the critical mistake of the RPLBZh Moscow office: they actually obey the direction of the Americans (the AFL-CIO sponsored Solidarity Centre), and that is also because they rely heavily on American financial support. Petrov further emphasised that to take the American’s money can be one thing but to keep independence is another. Unlike RPLBZh activists, in an informal dinner meeting the non-RPLBZh 327 activists stressed their difficult conditions: ‘Some of us have to spend our own money to keep our trade unions running, Argunov did this, so did I. Although I do not like the personality of guys like Argunov, at least they not only work very hard but also keep to their own position’ (Group meeting with activists at an invited dinner event May 20, 2003). The row around the leadership and its real position in the face of privatisation was finally exposed at the end of 2003. The preparation work for the international conference in Moscow led to huge scandal-style attacks among RPLBZh and the other trade unions. The free trade unions did not want to see KSP OZhD give up their control of this conference, while the local RPLBZh tried to persuade them that only the RPLBZh head office could find the sponsorship money to conduct such a conference, and that will be the only realistic way considering the union’s penurious financial condition. The other fact was that the current RPLBZh president, Kulikov, had criticised KSP OZhD as an ineffective organisation with too many heads. However, the balance could be kept because the president of KSP OZhD, Gavrilov, was holding a dual position; as president of an RPLBZh organisation, he kept some distance from the Moscow office. For this conference he finally decided to support 328 Kulikov.90 Realising that RPLBZh would take over the post of KSP OZhD as the Russian representative in the European anti-railway privatisation campaign, at the end all non-RPLBZh organisations refused to attend the October conference in Moscow. The PSE leader (who had been in charge of communication with foreign groups since the last conference in 2001) even sent an e-mail to their French counterpart saying that RPLBZh had never sincerely opposed railway privatisation. The message successfully made the European counterpart boycott the RPLBZh conference. The whole process certainly blew up the little remaining trust and balance among the trade union activists. After such a split, combined with the new direction of the RPLBZh membership, KSP OZhD effectively ceased to exist and has not called regular meetings since 2004. 3.4 Conclusion The Russian Railways is a highly disciplined hierarchical organisation and the traditional trade union organisation, ROSPROFZhEL, is more like the personnel and social benefit section of the administration (and the workplace branches are simply controlled by the depot chiefs). In this case study, we have looked at RPLBZh, as one of the most active alternative trade union organisations in Russia, as well as looking at 90 Interestingly, he decided not to attend the conference, by saying he was sick at the time. 329 its active primary organisations. There were a handful of active individuals on the Railway who stood up and became RPLBZh activists since its formation. In addition, it is also important to note the numerous efforts of activists of other union organisations and their attempt to coordinate the organised strength of workers on Russian railways. With all of these organisations representing them, workers on the October Railway should be in a relatively strong position to voice their rights. Their real ability, however, as the case study has also revealed, is quite weak. At best the union organisations have obtained premises and are able to defend individual members in long-running court cases, but nowhere have they achieved recognition for the negotiation of the collective agreement while militant action, most particularly in 1998, has been defeated with the dismissal of activists and large-scale loss of members. The meaning of such a situation is two-fold: on the one hand, across the territory of the October Railway dozens of trade union organisations outside ROSPROFZhEL have appeared since 1991, which demonstrates that many railway workers were not satisfied with the performance of ROSPROFZhEL. Their choice was to try to find an alternative representative agency. On the other hand, these newly established alternative trade union organisations, despite their endless efforts and heroic courage, nonetheless, have not developed themselves into a solid labour representative body with mass support, but have only gained a limited strength, and 330 even that at only two or three depots. The strength of the local alternative organisations as a whole has been so weak that, apart from Aleksandr Zamyatin, the controversial president of TO RPLBZh until 2000, there has not been a single genuine ‘leader’ able to carry out the work of coordination. Instead of becoming a powerful trade union, all these alternative trade unions have been marginalised. In this concluding section we need to consider why the new trade unions have not been able to develop their capacity to a level sufficient to compete with ROSPROFZhEL. At first sight it looks as though all the blame for the failure of the unions to develop can be laid on the union leaders / activists. These activists have not enjoyed any official union authority or institutional resources as a reward for their participation, while they have constantly faced potential victimisation and dismissal from their own job. Nevertheless, despite their courage and commitment, they have rarely taken organising seriously and they make little effort to attract workers and to expand the membership of their unions. Participants in these newly established organisations are not passive but active (and quite well-trained), but their organisational efforts are directed upwards and outwards, supposedly to coordinate the activity of the various organisations, but in reality they do not coordinate and collaborate, they argue endlessly over abstract questions while avoiding any discussion of their real problems, and none will make concessions because they all 331 want to be little tsars. Meanwhile, in their relations with their members, instead of trying to organise them they offer them legal services as a means of resolving their disputes on an individual basis. Many activists believe it is not even worth taking an active appeal to the workers. Many of them do not really believe that they or their organisations should take expanding their membership as their first priority. Under such a circumstance, the development of the workplace-based trade union presents a scene of ‘one depot - one union’ on the basis of a membership of a few dozen, with the chairperson / president of union and perhaps their deputy providing legal advice to individual workers. The core of the problem in taking collective action, according to the view of active members, is of course that people are not ready to fight for themselves; the other side of it, however, is that even the active members are not ready to work together. Thus, at their monthly meetings one could easily notice that they very rarely considered constructive agendas and ideas. It is quite ironic, the skilled lecturers of RPLBZh can explain to their new members and new activists what is a trade union and what does a trade union do as the very first lesson, but they certainly failed to deliver this to their fellow activists and leaders, whether from the KSP OZhD or TO RPLBZh OZhD. The inefficient distribution of their very limited resources, as one specific condition, is another point that reveals the limited progress of their 332 cooperation in real practice. The wide gap between their ability and their definition of trade union activity also reflects their limited resources. But they could hardly expect their members to engage in collective action when the leaders themselves were not able even to discuss, let alone to agree on, concrete questions of organisation and coordination and were not able to achieve anything for their members, except, in some cases and after several years of litigation, securing the reinstatement of members dismissed for union activity. What reason would members have to believe that there is a bigger organisation representing them? But the failure of the activists is only one side of the picture. We have to take into account the dramatic turning point that before the 1998 strike there was relatively strong representation at several depots, although they still had the common character of ‘one depot – one union’, and at that time there were fewer internal conflicts among the TO RPLBZh leaders and activists, while the leadership and activists of the union consisted of more or less the same people with the same attitudes and methods of working as today. This suggests that the weaknesses of the union cannot be explained solely as a result of the weakness or the strategic mistakes of the leadership and the activists. The case studies in this and the previous chapter allow us to identify a number of other factors which can explain the lack of success of the railway unions. Firstly, the 333 professional fragmentation of the labour force – workers in the railway industry has fostered highly alienated relations among most workers; even the immediate workplace culture did not encourage the workers to form any kind of genuine collectivity. Most of their work is carried out in small groups, with a rigid skill and status hierarchy which sets workers against each other rather than encouraging them to identify their common interests. The so-called ‘locomotive brigade’ does not present itself as any genuine collective but consists of only two people, a driver and an assistant. Moreover, the drivers, who are in the most powerful position because of the scarcity of their skills which take many years to obtain, looked down on the other railway occupations, so the RPLBZh activists do not recognise the necessity of attracting other railway occupations, because they believe that less skilled workers are not aware of their own interests, and this just reflects the belief of drivers themselves. According to most of the interviewees presented earlier, the culture of the labour collective existed only in workers’ memories. Secondly, in looking at the social life and different social environments of different professions and depots, we can also note the alienation of workers from their colleagues in their everyday lives, because workers meet only a small number of fellow workers in their working day, because of the shift system and the fragmentation of the work process, and have very little social contact with their 334 colleagues outside work. The occasion of the ‘planerka’ at work does not play any role in inter-worker communication. Such a factor turned out to be a very surprising impression to me. Whether drivers or other professions, railway workers expressed in different ways that there were little contact outside the common identification of occupation. This factor is also a very serious barrier to workers representing themselves as general subjects, which creates very difficult conditions for any trade union organisation to establish close contact. This alienation of workers from one another and from any sense of a collective explains why workers treated the union activists as a personal consultation agency, looking for help but not perceiving a common solution. Thirdly, the factors above are reinforced and integrated by the geographical fragmentation and the particularity of each depot, which means that activists do not come into regular contact with one another and enables activists to believe that only they know best how to deal with problems under their ‘specific conditions’ and only they are able to deal with their own administration. The particularity of remotely located and widely dispersed workplaces has made more difficulties for local primary trade union organisations to build efficient coordination. Without resources to provide support, it is difficult for them to think about coordination. Apart from the hostile competition from ROSPROFZhEL, the geographical fragmentation just strengthened 335 the tendency to turn to individualised solutions. The leaders / activists were aware of the weakness of their organisations and of the fact that they had little idea of what to do about it, which only made them even more sensitive to any implied criticism from ‘outsiders’, so that the leader / activists even started to despise the opinions of one another. Such a factor meant that any ambitious intention to make united activity simply became an ambiguous one, and what was commonly shared was, ironically though not unimportant, not a common experience of collective struggle but the mutual understanding of personalities and their political ideas. Obviously, with very little shared experience of struggle and little interest from the members, the common effort to develop trade union activity was very ineffective. This is an important reason why not only KSP OZhD but also TO RPLBZh were badly coordinated, and both of them based on individual contacts rather than real collaboration and collective action. Fourthly, and most importantly, we also find that repression by the administration has reinforced such fragmentation, especially after the 1998 strike. The fact that all RPLBZh organisations were provided with union offices by the administration, while only one of the non-RPLBZh free trade unions received permission to have a union office at the depot clearly shows the difference in the administration policies towards the different unions. The railway administration may have taken a cautious approach to the alternative union organisations through the 336 1990s, although they generally ignored them and did not give them bargaining status, which meant that they had little legitimacy as representative bodies. But following the defeat of the 1998 strike the administration knew that they could simply put the alternative unions under constant pressure, without any serious risk of having to pay the price of provoking any massive union-led rebellion. As one consequence, the activists, the potential leaders, lost any credibility that they may have had as representatives of their members’ collective strength in the face of management. Subsequently it has been very difficult for the depot-based alternative union organisations on the October Railway to maintain the level of their membership, because the administration has always pressed hard on their activities during the whole process, and many members immediately quit the new organisations under such pressure. People who do not bow to the pressure from the administration soon discover that they have to find another job. This factor is reinforced by the insecurity of the labour force and its vulnerability to management which is most acute for those in the less skilled occupations. The weakness of the unions in the face of management has been further compounded by the impact of the new Russian Labour Code, which means that management can refuse bargaining rights to any union which does not represent a majority of the entire labour force. In the face of such opposition from the administration, the alternative unions have little alternative but to seek to defend their 337 members through legal channels on an individual basis, and it is quite understandable that the union activists should seek to create solidarity networks among themselves, through TO RPLBZh and KSP OZhD. But at the same time, the weakness of their membership and organisational base and the consequent marginalisation of the union activists explain why these higher level bodies, particularly KSP OZhD, were riven by abstract conflicts around tactics and strategy. Although only RPLBZh had a more or less real territorial organisation which went beyond the limits of the workplace, it is still difficult to conclude that the drivers’ union had any obvious organisational advantages. Apart from the organisations at depots TCh-8, TCh-20 and TCh-21, which are more or less stable, the rest of the RPLBZh primary organisations were similar to or even weaker than the non-RPLBZh free trade unions. The fact that every union committee focuses on its own depot, and the territorial organisation has no resources to support even one full-time staff member (even the president of the territorial committee), has meant that territorial coordination involves little more than sharing the experience of court cases and the use of legal resources. The existence of a primary organisation depends essentially on the presence of a ‘leader’, an activist who has the will and the ability to carry out union work, usually in free time before and after work, or even the willingness of a sacked former employee to do this work. In such cases the trade 338 unions are run with an individualised character determined by the activists, and more importantly, functioned to meet demands of individualist solutions for their members; that mostly involves taking cases relating to work regulation and legal protection to court. The role of ‘leaders’ then determined that the coordination of the union was essentially formal. All these factors were then reinforced by geographic conditions, so that an immediate solidarity interest for their profession did not come out clearly. Although the situation was better before 1998, even the RPLBZh activists acknowledge that their relative success in building their capacity in the earlier times was not a reflection of their own strength, or the relative advantages of their profession. Their relative success was partly a result of the fact that they had benefited from the legacy of the wave of establishing new ‘representative’ bodies to replace the notorious old ones in the early 90s; and partly because engine drivers have their ‘train routes’ to connect these isolated depots, but their success was primarily thanks to the existence of a few well-disciplined and competent activists who were able to benefit from the fact that the administrations were not ready to fight court cases. Their relative success in winning such cases in this period meant that engine drivers could quite easily attach their hopes to the ability of their union committee or territorial committee to defend their individual disputes with the administration, even if they did not have any grounds for confidence in their ability to make a better collective 339 agreement. This helps us to understand why train drivers remained in their union and also why some 10% of them were willing to participate in the August 1998 strike which broke out during the general wage arrears crisis. The response of the administration to the strike, however, revealed the organisational weak point of the union. As a consequence, under the sharp, intense discrimination from the railway administration, they have been continuously set aside and not allowed to participate in the negotiation of the collective agreement. Unlike train drivers, workers with other professions on the Railway had never enjoyed good conditions and have suffered from a high degree of job insecurity, which further encouraged an individualistic orientation to survival. Workers sought for, and received, individual help from their ‘trade union boss’. The non-RPLBZh unions were doomed to follow the same way as RPLBZh. Nevertheless, they do not have the legacy from which RPLBZh still benefits; and, compared to the central role of the RPLBZh Moscow headquarters, they have no possibility to get more authority from their very isolated workplace to spread their messages to others. The one-way service indeed satisfied workers’ immediate requests, but that left little space to present an alternative image to create the illusion of better work conditions like the RPLBZh organisation had. They even have to struggle for the very survival of their organisations. Individualistic demands and their impact on these trade union activists 340 therefore have constantly dominated the form of their trade union development. The so-called leadership was conducted in a different way. Yet, that has become the only base for the visible leadership among these organisations. On the other side, from the point of view of activists, they constantly emphasised this as a Russian philosophy of life: the activities rely on the subjectivity of workers, so there is no immediate necessity for activists and leaders to attract members’ loyalty. Logically, the progress and perspective of any coordinated organisation, KSP OZhD as the concrete example we have seen, could only be based on the individual but frail commitment of the leaders. Most leaders consequently failed to persuade ordinary workers to commit themselves to their organisation. Especially after the 1998 strike, legal advice and the representation of individual members in court, particularly those who have been dismissed for union activity, have become the main function of the unions for their members. While it is understandable that weak trade union organisations would come to rely on such methods of struggle, such a strategy has been seen as a problematic one. In a review of his own experience as a shared, similar example, the former president of the Trade Union of the Arsenal Factory (which had more than 13,000 members in 1990) concluded thus: ‘I do feel regret because before I focused too much on the legal struggle for the trade union to challenge our employer… Success in court did not 341 make our union stronger. Though I cannot say that I have found a better alternative either’ (Nikolai Prostov,_May 04, 2003).91 These factors were the critical ones behind the incompetence of the leadership. The lack of conditions which could unite all experienced activists to work with each other is critical under such circumstances. The weakness of the internal network of these unions, as well as the critical undermining of the continuation of the workers’ movement, was conditioned by the lack of any real share of very limited resources; little experience of success being imparted; limited intentions and no tactics for developing a strategy for their campaign. Their coordination therefore did not change their conditions but reproduces the condition of individual solutions. Certainly, what is presented here is the story of real life and real barriers, any further judgement might be an impractical one. It has never been easy to organise a solid and well-coordinated trade union with a widely distributed workforce. The study reveals all the difficult conditions facing any union leadership, and the study of workplace social relations, union activists and union coordination activity shows that the above factors have subordinated the union pattern on the October Railway. The strong individualism and the fragmentation of the labour force weakened union activists and thus the union’s prospects. And these were the critical factors behind the 91 He was forced to leave his post 4 years later, and the administration of his factory successfully established another trade union committee. Since then he found a new post and currently works as the deputy president of the St Petersburg Branch of the Trade Union of Workers in Small and Medium Business ‘Edinenie’. 342 incompetent leadership problem. Their practice can even be seen as ‘solidarity discouraging’. In such a sense, all the union organisations do not really perform as a genuine trade union anymore, and this challenges the claim of Gordon and Klopov (2000), hence the development has been a retreat, rather than just a stage of ‘slowing down of their development’ (ibid., p.209). The analysis from the case study clarifies how an active trade union following its own struggle can develop into such a sad situation, by which we perceive more insight into the Russian labour movement. The fragmentation of the labour force, which makes it especially difficult to develop solidarity, has always been one of the major issues of industrial relations studies of the role of trade unions. As will be shown by the dockers’ case, and by the example of Taiwan below, fragmentation is not a sufficient condition for union weakness, because it is possible to overcome the barrier of fragmentation and individualism through effective organisation and solidarity building. Interestingly, that is the view shared by many local activists. Moiseenko, the president of RPD Port Committee of St Petersburg Seaport, said: ‘The problem of the railway workers (RPLBZh) is complicated but simple, there everyone wants to be the leader, a union can not work if there are so many heads fighting for the decision making!’ (Aleksandr Moiseenko, October 21, 2003) 343 The problem with the Russian railway unions is that the leaders / activists simply accept the barriers and constraints and do not try to overcome them. The concern will be how much can be improved if the union is healthier and well-coordinated? Even if all the member trade unions within the KSP OZhD, the very weak non-RPLBZh organisations as well as RPLBZh, could keep the individual loyalty of their members, and resolve this problem through a mutual, common effort, the question still remains: with their weak belief in the importance of organisational work, could they overcome the distrust of the mass of workers? Coincidently, when I finished the case study in 2003 and went back to Taiwan, I was invited to participate in the mobilisation campaign of the Taiwanese Railway Workers’ Union. The campaign is to resist the Government’s privatisation project. The atmosphere and the rhetoric there was very different from that in the Russian context. In most mobilisation meetings, unionists would say things like ‘If you don’t come out today, tomorrow you will be responsible for the result’ (a senior union officer). And the following response of active members could be heard: ‘We are so ashamed of the inefficient mobilisation; we lost the face of “our station”’ (a local union member). In short, the energy of the Taiwanese labour movement is expressed by exploiting individual relationships in the fate of ‘we the union’. Every element within the two cases looks so different; the hardcore of the characteristics of labour relations in the 344 two countries, however, is less different. The outcome of a labour protest campaign or any visible labour movement event should not simply be perceived as an expression of its social relations of production. In other words, the very different outcome cannot be merely a reflection of the capacity of their collective experience. Nevertheless, while the ‘making’ comes to be visible in the resistance, it, too, continuously develops a critical consciousness within the dynamic of labour relations in its society (Dudchenko and Mytil’ 1998). Therefore, with its virtual-but-anyway-rememberable collective culture and the lack of a developed individualistic network, we can clearly see the reason for the problematic transformation of the current Russian labour movement. In the next chapter I will present the case of the dockers at St Petersburg seaport to make an interesting comparison of their union making. 345 Chapter 4 St Petersburg dockers and their Organisations ‘They forgot the wise folk saying: ‘‘When you spit on the collective －the collective wipes it dry, when the collective spits on you－you drown of it’’. A true brigade leader, group leaders and union leader in the hard moment should stand on the side of the collective and should be the first ready to take responsibility. For those who are on the opposite of the collective, the collective has no space for them!’ (Mamedov, chairperson of the council of brigade leaders of VSK) 92 The case study of railway workers on the October Railway revealed a scene of the dominance of an individualised connection among the workers, as well as among the primary organisations of the alternative trade union. As another active alternative trade union in St Petersburg, the case study of local dockers seems to present a sharp contrast. Focusing on the same research question, the analysis presented in this chapter aims to compare the workplace relations at the seaport and the development of their trade union organisations with the previous conclusion. In the first section, a brief introduction about the development and current status of Russian commercial seaport transportation is presented, to describe the character of the managerial 92 Mamedov, 2005, ‘Doker’, No. 151, 20 June 2005, p.3. 346 structure, and to provide a general characterisation of work organisation and dockers’ duties. The nature of ‘brigade’ work enables the dockers to express a relatively strong collective identity, especially within the single brigade. Even non-docker professions expressed their connection to such ‘brigade’ team work. The dockers commonly expected a stable and well-paid condition should be provided. During the fieldwork period of 2003-2004, the dockers had expressed more concern over the gap between the growth of wages and the inflation rate. The successful combination of the Russian Dockers’ Union’s (RPD) organisational structure and their efforts to win support among brigade leaders provided a convenient channel and terrain for the union activists. In the next chapter, the conflict at the seaport reflecting their increasing insecurity over the prospects of their work will be discussed.93 93 The case study of St Petersburg dockers presented in the coming two chapters is based on the information of interviews and meetings with dockers, union activists and leaders of trade union committees of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers. Following the preparation work for their collective bargaining allowed me to witness their contact networks and the participation in the trade union campaign in the city. Apart from once when I was allowed to visit the internal seaport territory, most interviews and conversations were conducted in the office of the RPD port committee. When the 2004 and 2005 strike action took place I had finished the official fieldwork period, but coincidently I was able to attend their press conference and solidarity campaign meetings during the time when I went back to Piter. The publication of the union newspaper ‘Docker’, as a special issue of ‘Za rabochee gelo’, was more frequently issued after the railway workers’ KSP OZhD collapsed, also because the collective labour dispute had entered into a sharp situation. The RPD port committee organised their activists and members to post their own articles and opinions which provided me with many useful secondary materials. Apart from these two sources, the official webpage of the Seaport Company also provided much information with contrasting views. One needs to note, the ownership of the stevedore companies has changed twice since 2004, so that much original company information I used has changed. 347 Figure 4.1: The share of total volume of cargo carried in the Russian transport system (2002) 81.0 9.0 Railway Motor 5.6 Sea 4.3 River 0.1 Aviation Source: JSC Russian Railways, Statistics of Russian Railways Company [Online]. Available from: http://www.rzd.ru/images/u_img.html?st_id=11575&he_id=374 [Accessed 01 January 2005] (Original in Russian, author translated). 4.1 Russian seaport transportation 4.1.1 General background Compared with Russian railway transportation, the Russian seaport sector reflects another type of role in the Russian transport system. This is a sector mostly serving export and import cargoes for foreign trade, with minor requirements for domestic trade, particularly providing the coastal regions in the North and East of Russia. The total tonnage of the Russian mercantile marine took seventh place in the world in 348 2003. Sea transport usually stood in third place in the total volume of cargo carried by all Russian transport sectors (See Figure 4.1). In soviet times, almost two-thirds of the cargoes carried by sea transport were concentrated in the big ports around the Black-Azov and Baltic Sea basins. Since the disintegration of the former USSR, the performance of Russian sea transportation in the period of transition since 1992 has confronted critical changes. For the new Russian state, the loss of several important ports, such as Odessa, Ilichev, Lizh, Hovotallin (mostly in Ukraine and the former Baltic countries of the Soviet Union), together with the economic depression and political instability led to a further decline of the sector. Since then the Far East basin has taken about half of the total tonnage of Russian sea transport. That is a result of the growing need for cargo transfer between Russia and countries around the Japanese sea. The big seaports like Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Vostochnii and Vanino therefore have an important role in cargo transportation demands. Apart from these ports, other main seaports include the ports of Murmansk, Kalingrad and Novorossiisk, which are important for specific purposes such as oil or the timber trade. Over recent years, the role of Russian seaports has increased corresponding to the fade-out of the economic crisis and the growth of foreign trade. Nevertheless, a constant challenge to the further development of Russian sea transportation has for a long time been that most of the vessels and port infrastructures are rather outdated and the port equipment needs 349 further investment to modernise. Organisational and managerial structure Since the crisis of the soviet economic system led to a pro-market model in the early 1990s, the ownership, administration and management of Russian seaports have been developed towards a model similar to those at most European ports. The development of the port managerial structure and the composition of ownership have gone through several changes while the economy and policy of the country have been through a chaotic situation or uncertain power struggles. As happened in other Russian industrial units, the power struggles between the newly emerged companies and the governmental organs at each port have been conducted according to their own scenarios. In general, the ownership of the port territory and basic infrastructure normally belongs to the Russian state, under the control of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian federal government; while the ownership and management of each port has normally been transferred to independent companies (most ports have registered as Open Joint Stock Companies). The Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation assigns several establishments to take charge of the various transport sections. These establishments also underwent the structural reform agenda of Russian governmental organisations since the early 2000s. For the seaport section, the main ruling organ is the Federal Agency of Sea and River Transport, and the juridical ownership was 350 finally integrated into the independent enterprise ‘ROSMORPORT’ in 2002. The Federal State Unitary Enterprise ‘ROSMORPORT’ was established according to the decree ‘On the Development of the State Administration System for Commercial Sea and Specialized Ports’ of the Russian government, issued on 25 September 2002. The enterprise is designed as a department subordinate to the Ministry of Transport but behaves as a commercial organisation with independent status and its own balance. The enterprise currently has 25 branches in various Russian ports. In principle, ROSMOPORT is to perform the executive coordinating role, subordinate to the order and instructions of both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Property Relations (Ministry of Property Relations of the Russian Federation and now Federal Agency for the Management of Federal Property). According to the Charter of ‘ROSMOPORT’, the main aim of the enterprise is to satisfy the public requirements from its activity and profits. In particular, for the creation, maintenance, operation and development of the settled state properties, such as the property complex, the security of navigation, and fulfilment of work in mercantile and specialised seaports, as well as the accomplishment of the federal targeted programme for sea transport all taken charge by the new establishment. The structure of the sub-ministerial establishment ‘Department of Sea and River Activity’ of the Ministry of Transport also owns its managerial division in the Russian 351 seaport industry. The Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Property Relations have the authority to nominate the leadership of ROSMORPORT. The establishment of ROSMOPORT can be seen as an indication of the tendency of the Russian government’s reform direction. And the interest coordination between the state’s activities and the others is still uncertain, since most seaports have established their own juridical ownership by forming various joint stock companies since 1992. To avoid the immediate interest conflict between different governmental bodies or between the state and the private stockholders, the role of the Russian state is carefully assigned as only being in charge of strategic development projects. Apart from the federal-ministerial governing organ, the Association of Commercial Sea Ports (ASOP), another influential organisation, has also endeavoured to play a decisive role during the transformation of the Russian economy, especially to act to maintain port operations against the unstable political background. The role of the Association in resolving a number of problems that have been raised in the marine field has grown during the period of transition to a market economy, as well as over the collapse of the USSR and the associated changes in relationships within the industry and the status of ports. Hence the ASOP was the only body which had an influence on marine business in the economic area of the former USSR, despite the fact that the Association does not officially have any real superior governing power, 352 but presents a special association of ‘employers’. A new tendency derives from the fact that construction companies have started to come into port operative management, bringing further changes to the composition and condition of the organisation of port work. To look at the managerial structure at port level, we need to distinguish the character of the Port authority and main port business investors. The mode of interrelations of port management and ownership authority at each seaport is not only determined by the main characteristics of performance of the seaport but also by the related structure of ownership. For example, when a seaport is connected to inner land by railway transport then the involvement of railway operations also requires a representative from the Russian railway company (RZD) to be part of the port’s board of directors. Moreover, if the main functions of a seaport are more than those simple function ports such as fishing, timber or fuel transferring ports (terminals), main stevedore companies at the port normally can take over ownership of the port operation. Here we can see the relatively ‘ideal’ development of the structure of the St Petersburg Seaport as it has gained a more important role as well as being expected to maintain its great potential within the sea transport industry. 353 Figure 4.2 The scheme of St Petersburg Seaport *1: The Forth Stevedore Company; 2: Timber Company; 3: The First Stevedore Company; 5: The Second Stevedore Company. Source: Open JSC Seaport of St Petersburg, skhema morskogo porta Sankt-Peterburga [Online]. Available from: http://www.seaport.spb.ru/article/21/ [Accessed 01 January 2007]. 4.1.2 Seaport of St Petersburg The first mercantile ship arrived in St Petersburg in 1703, when the port was just a small harbour located on the city’s Vasilevsky Island. The harbour then expanded along the Neva River. The current location and original infrastructure of the seaport was opened in 1885. The port has been developed based on its convenient geographical position – located on the islands of the Neva mouth in the eastern 354 extremity of the Baltic Sea – which gives it an advantage in transportation, transit and other expenses. The Port connects to the sea by the 27-mile Seaway channel. For the management of daily port operation there is a continuous plan-schedule, which provides coordination of the times of delivery and handling of water, railway and road transport. The recent growth of cargo handling at St Petersburg Seaport has developed very rapidly so that the Seaport of St Petersburg has become the largest transportation hub in the North-West region of the Russian Federation and the seaport has become the second biggest port (about 25% of the country’s transfer volume). In addition, a project to establish a new port in Leningrad Region has been carried out for long-term strategic development, expected to finish its construction by 2007. According to official information of the seaport authority (Open JSC Seaport of St Petersburg, 2002), the time of loading and discharge of vessels is accounted on a day-to-day basis and the allocation of the fleet is promptly determined. The basic functions of the Seaport of St Petersburg are: Cargo handling Storage handling for different sorts of cargoes Transport-shipping business Sea towage for vessels and other floating objects Development for designed work of repair of vessels and vessel equipment; 355 development of operational documents for vessels and vessel equipment Vessel repair Property lease agency To understand the port’s daily operation, we should note that there are two governing bodies at the port. They are the St Petersburg Seaport Authority and Open Joint Stock Company (JSC) St Petersburg Seaport. The official title of the seaport authority is Federal State Establishment ‘St Petersburg Seaport Authority’. The Authority, briefly written as ‘AMP SPb’, acts as a non-commercial organisation of the seaport representing the federal power on this state establishment and performing in the framework of its competence for the provision of state services in the field of trade navigation organisation and the provision of navigation security. The current managerial structure of St Petersburg seaport has been through several changes. It was firstly inherited from the former ‘Leningrad Commercial Seaport’ (LMTP) after the Soviet economic system disintegrated. It was soon transformed (privatised) from a state-owned enterprise into a shareholding company (AO) in 1992. The structure of the company was maintained as a single company until 1998. The company then processed a further change of ownership and the current form of the company JSC St Petersburg Seaport was adopted. The real operating body of relevant duties of stevedoring and shipping at the port 356 is the Open Joint-Stock Company St Petersburg Seaport. The Company consists of various stevedore companies as the shareholders and the senior officers from governmental organs. They together form the Board of Directors, which represents the governing body of the Company. By 2005, the stock of the company was basically divided into three parts, the main stockholding company (about 50%), the Municipal Property Committee (KUGI) of St Petersburg City Government (about 30%), and the Ministry of State Property of the Russian Federal Government (about 20%). The company owns the right to lease the port and port operation to mixed-ownership private companies. Some of the companies retained around 20% of their shares in the hands of the Seaport Company as well. According to the Port’s official statement (JSC Seaport of St Petersburg), ‘The Company also has the duty to improve the performance so as to guarantee that the Port continuously increases its cargo flows and improves its internal infrastructure. Over recent years, the constant growth of cargo turnover confirms the efficiency of the pursued tariff, marketing and advertising policy, cooperation with the customs bodies and high professionalism of the Port’s employees. A number of large investment projects have been completed, such as: construction of the first stage of the new container terminal and mineral fertilizers handling complex, which will allow [the port] to attract additional cargo traffic.’94 94 The following information is derived from the official webpage of St Petersburg Seaport. Available from: http://www.seaport.spb.ru/english1/general.htm [Accessed 17 May 2005]. The composition and managerial structure have changed several times since 1998, and cross-holdings make the structure 357 Each of the subsidiary companies of the Open JSC Seaport of St Petersburg has its independent status as a judicial person. These companies occupy their own territory at the port, conduct their own labour recruitment policy and work regulations, and deal with their own business. Different port zones allow the operating companies to provide different services that in general succeed the area and the division of functions of Soviet times. According to the official information of the Company, the seaport operating stevedore companies until the end of 2005 included: ‘‘First Stevedoring Company’’ (PerStiKo)- handling of general and bulk cargoes ‘‘Second Stevedoring Company’’ (VSK) - handling of general and bulk cargoes ‘‘Fourth Stevedoring Company’’ (ChSK)- handling of general cargoes as well as timber cargoes and containers, mostly specialised for coal transportation Company ‘‘First Container Terminal’’ (PKT) - handling of standard containers and refrigerated containers Company “Neva-Metall” - handling of metals Company ‘‘Intehport’’ - handling of fuel and oil Company ‘‘Timber Stevedoring company’’ - handling of timber cargoes Company ‘‘Petersburg Oil Terminal’’- handling of fuel and oil When we talk about the St Petersburg Seaport Company that mostly refers to the quite complicated. The information here might not fit the current situation since after the 2005 strike, the share-holding companies changed again. 358 five stevedore companies. The First Stevedore Company was the biggest one at the port. It employed 1200 workers. The Second Stevedore Company had 700 workers. The Fourth stevedore company has specialised in coal transportation. All these three companies have been bound together and have the same owner (Jysk Staalindustri, a subsidiary of Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine or NLMK), which employs about 2600 workers. Apart from the three similar-function and long-existing stevedore companies, the company ‘First Container Terminal’ (PKT) was formally established in 1998, operating on the territory of the previous PPK 3 of the LMTP. The main service includes handling large-cargo containers, storage services, covered storage, loading cargoes into refrigerated containers and weighing-out for cargoes.95 ‘First Container Terminal’ is owned by the ‘National Container Company’ (NKK). The company is to provide modernisation and operation of the container terminal which is located in the third zone of the Seaport. Its total workforce, in terms of those employed for stevedore service was about 845 workers until the first half of 2004. Its capacity for handling refrigerated containers stands as the third in Europe and fifth in the world. Neva-Metall is a relatively small company which employed 350-400, at least until 2006. The company belonged to the famous ‘Severstal’trans’ Group. Noteworthily, after the re-organisation of the port ownership structure, the main 95 This research focuses on labour relations at the port where RPD member organisations function actively. Therefore the conditions of several separate terminals and harbours like those for handling oil, gas and wood materials are not included in the contents of this chapter. 359 stevedore companies of the St Petersburg Seaport have not yet developed into sharp competition with each other, they present co-existing capacity rather than competing with each other, since their main functions are rather distinct. There were in total 6000 employees working at the seaport, including 3500 dockers, almost one-third of all Russian dockers. 4.1.3 Dockers and their working conditions at St Petersburg Seaport For the operation at the mercantile seaport, one of the most important functions is the accomplishment of various cargo-handling tasks. To meet the needs of transferring various goods, the stevedore companies provide the main service at the seaport. For the clients’ concern, the goods should leave the port as soon as possible, and be as well-handled as possible so that the losses and costs can be kept down to the minimum level. Such requirements mean the work of dockers is determined by the amount of demand from the clients. Apart from the immediate demands of the import and export trade, the achievement of handling efficiency directly affects the competitiveness of the port among regional seaports. Generally, the needs from packing to assembling goods into containers and loading the containers on to cargo ships require a high level of group coordination to complete the whole service. A bad organisation would certainly damage coordination and lead to cargo congestion, 360 which may cause serious losses for the clients. Varied occupations are required nowadays to complete the execution of the heavy and busy work at the seaport. These occupations consist of workers such as the battery attendant, driver of automobiles, driver of loaders (4th-class docker), vulcanizer, repair and service mechanic, machine-operators (milling and turning machines), electricians for repair and service of loading machines, electric welders and so on. In the early time of Russian’s port transportation, a docker was normally called ‘gruzchik’ (stevedore), and nowadays the official title of a docker is ‘docker-machine operator’. Docker-machine operator as a single profession stands as the backbone of the whole process of cargo handling. From manufacturing components to raw natural resources, goods and cargos flood into the port containing very different materials and trade compositions; these various cargoes are also different in the form of packing or storing. The whole procedure requires different groups (brigades) of dockers to coordinate for the completion of the demands. They compose the main actors and force in the port function. Their duties are: Alongside different areas then to receive / deliver containers and cargoes Loading / discharging of vessels Operational handling of containers and cargoes Storage of containers and cargoes 361 Checking and controlling of apparent condition of containers and cargoes Guarding of containers and cargoes Various transport or loading equipment Career path with four grades Officially, people who want to apply for a job as a docker have to provide health certification as the first step of meeting the basic requirements of the company. Then the applicant will normally have to enrol in the recruitment training centre to study theoretical knowledge for six months, which guarantees the trainee has got familiar with the equipments and operations. After passing a paper exam, the trainee may begin to follow the whole group for practice. There is a general instruction guidebook for each docker, and dockers belonging to different companies get their own instructions, apart from the various instrument techniques, the contents of instructions are all more or less the same. Since the port loading work has developed with new modern equipment, the profession of being a docker is no longer to stevedore the products only with their physical body. The contemporary work relies heavily on the association of various mechanical equipments and skills. All dockers, according to their qualifications, knowledge and length of service, are distributed into four grades. These basic 362 categories of docker-machine operator are: driver of loader (voditel’ pogruzchika); driver of electro-auto jack-lift (voditel’ elektro-avtotelezhki); crane operator (machinist krana / kranovshik); machine operator of a multi-skill brigade for cargo-handling works (tekhanizator mеkhanizator (doker-mekhanisator) komleksnoi brigady na pogruzochno-razgruzochnykh abotakh). The differences among the four grades decide the dockers’ daily working duty. For example, a docker with the 4th grade may have know-how to operate a crane, but without permission or qualification he would not be allowed to take that duty. And their part of the duty should be done only manually or by operating an electric loader (Elektropogruzchik). One of the characteristics of their port work is the requirement for dockers to have the ability to use various techniques and machines at the workplace. The dockers therefore stress that they should have learned the knowledge of how to operate different equipment and should always have higher knowledge because their duty depends on the state of the equipment provided by their companies. That is also the reason why nowadays the official title of their profession has become ‘docker-machine operator’. For the upgrade of the skill qualification, a docker needs to have completed the required working period and have the knowledge and also the available amount of the equipment at the workplace. Normally, it will take several years to get higher grades such as the second and the first. Different stevedore companies may have their own 363 requirements for the recruitment of qualified workers. Since the main function of PKT is to handle containers, the dockers of this company have a higher percentage of first or second grades in comparison with the other companies. Noteworthily, by this procedure, dockers I talked to keep a certain confidence in their job stability, like a docker said, ‘It is not beneficial for the employer simply because the employers might want to replace a skilled worker with a non-qualified but cheaper labour force. They anyway have to put these new workers into training and that wastes money anyway’ (EvgeniiA, docker of VSK, April 06, 2004). To complete the cargo-handling work, dockers with different grades all have to learn how to work with a whole team. Even in different companies the requirements from the management are quite similar and dockers’ duties at the port have a common characteristic. A necessary characteristic of the dockers’ job is to work to the schedule so that cargo loading meets the demands of the ordering companies. Therefore, ‘brigade’ coordination (team work) has been highly stressed as it is more important than a single worker’s knowledge / experience operating the various equipment, not only because it makes the whole team perform and complete the task with efficiency, but also because it guarantees safety during the whole process. The need for close coordination formed a quite close feeling of professional community. Thus the 364 president of the RPD union stressed the communication characteristics of the dockers’ profession. ‘The thing is that the dockers’ profession has one characteristic: it is a brigade method of work, people communicate with one another in the course of their work. As distinct from other kinds of work… Pilots stay in a closed space, so do drivers of locomotive brigades. Dockers indeed work in brigades. It is such a consolidated social cell – a complex brigade. Moreover, in soviet times there was a practice of sending dockers from European ports to ports in the North and the Far East. People from Odessa were in Vladivostok and Vanino, southerners were in Tiksi and Anadyr, people went from Piter to Magadan, and they also sent brigades from the Baltic ports – when goods were being shipped to the far northern ports. That was because as a rule navigation was seasonal and cargoes could only be carried when ice conditions allowed. It allowed us all to communicate with each other. There was a lot of communication and contact. Problems existing in the port were discussed and compared’ (Interview with Alexander Shepel’, cited Gorn, 2003, p.236). The coordination of the brigade work actually constitutes the core of all the activities of a stevedore company. As mentioned earlier, around the dockers’ working 365 brigade there are also several individual persons associated with their duty, these are tally-officers and mechanics. An experienced brigade leader may distribute the division of work without the help of tally-officers. Normally a brigade comprises four divisions, and each division has around 10 dockers. In this way, the brigade coordination for cargo-handling tasks should involve 44–50 dockers, associated with a small number of workers with other duties. The specific character of cargo unloading at the port demands almost round-the-clock operation, and that was usually the case with seaport activity. Normally every shift works two days on then has two days off. The standard shift for day shift work is eight hours, and for the night shift is 7.5 hours. A typical and practical shift schedule requires eleven and a half hours working time. For example a docker on his duty works from 9:00(am) to 9:00(pm), then next day from 9:00(pm) to 9:00(am). When asked how the workers can learn the process procedure, a docker replied in this way, ‘Our profession is unique and therefore rare. The work is not like those in any kind of factories. For the process organisation, it more like a live knowledge of the brigade experience’ (ViktorK, crane operator of PKT, February 16, 2004) Following the coordination among brigades, for example, in Neva-Metall the total four brigades in turn fill a two-day working shift. If a personal problem arises during the process the relationships within the brigade provide the immediate solution 366 to the situation. As a brigade leader described it: ‘Our people usually stick together, that is why outsiders may be surprised by our working language. We have our own language atmosphere. If we have a problem with the team coordination, let’s say, if someone did not fulfil his job properly, let’s say he got drunk, we resolve the problem here, I will make him obey the order. That is my job, and with a well-organised team work, we can work on our own, we don’t even need a tally-officer to confirm our handling results’ (Edward, brigade leader at Neva-Metall, August 04, 2005). Similar responses were found in different companies. ‘Among workers in our collective almost everyone has worked here more than 10 years or even about 20 years, and all of us are soon to retire. This means we are the people with rich experience at work, and there is nothing that can replace it. Therefore we should support our organisation. It is our presence and our future’ (AleksandrC, docker of PKT, December 20, 2004) Port workers with other profession expressed the desire that they wanted their role to be improved for they all have to bear the bad climate and ecological conditions at the port. As a female tally-officer asserted, 367 ‘I don’t know whether the payment for working in harmful conditions has disappeared or is paid little. At least we tally-officers and warehouse keepers (smennyi nachal’nik skladov) provide the transhipment of cargoes together with dockers at the same workplace; we should be able to receive the extra payment’ (YulyaA, Tally-officer of VSK, February 05, 2004). However, we need to note that Neva-Metall is a relatively smaller company in terms of the total labour force. There were 350 dockers divided into 4 brigades. Dockers here emphasised the difference of management policy in their company compared to that of the PerStiKo, VSK and ChSK. When talking about the relationship between the labour side and the employer side, a senior docker stressed that we may think their administration is either ‘smart’ or ‘tricky’, which presented an interesting view contrasting with the single brigade’s work relationship mentioned above. The docker said: ‘The management of our company always said if we can raise the performance of work, we will be able to receive better wages. We complained about the wreckage of our instruments constantly. The problem event caused a dispute around our brigade leaders. Some suggested not giving moral motives for raising our productivity, but we need material support. So that way made us separate. Let’s look at PK3 (PKT), they have 368 four brigades too, but they work like a whole family, there is no competition between their brigades’ (ValeriiK, docker of Neva-Metall, June 17, 2005). It was not yet clear to what extent the management’s method affected the workers and the coordination between brigades. Activists expressed that they had just realised that the management policy was changing, ‘the new management and employer has been getting smarter’ or ‘more experienced’ in the field of management control. When I was sitting in the union’s office where several union activists from two different companies were trying to explain the difference between the port in the Soviet time and the current time, a docker gave his own observation: ‘There has been a threat started to appear in my company. The company had faced about one million tones fall in the cargo handling volume last year. At the beginning of the year, when the seaport encountered bad weather then we had very little work to call. The management started to say there was no transportation demand, the company plan was not achieved, and also [there were] too many redundant dockers who ate up our pay. But this was all sly… because the seaport condition faced similar uncertainty, and when the weather condition recovered, we still sat at home without work. It seemed the employer was not really interested in 369 improving the company’s performance. It seemed they got their benefits from other activities’ (OlegD, docker of PerStiKo, June 05, 2004). As mentioned earlier, ChSK specialised in coal transportation. The working environment is considered as the dirtiest and less-skilled, in which the procedure is rather boring. ‘Maybe because our company is smaller and our administration is more out-spoken. Our workers did not feel secure with their jobs anymore. They worry not only about the guarantee of a job, but also the payment of sick pay, holidays and the bonus, the administration just said empty words to make workers imagine dreams about the future. Just like they said they will introduce extra insurance for the employees, but they never fulfilled it. At the same time the administration also had shown that if a collective labour conflict arises they will find other kind of labour force to replace the positions’ (Group interview with brigade leaders of ChSK, April 06, 2004) Apart from their awareness of the ambiguous management tendency, the unpleasant work pressure and the physical burden (dirty and heavy workload) is a common factor in dockers’ descriptions. Due to the nature of stevedore business and the work organisation, the physical burden is the major concern related to dockers’ working procedures, which is due to the fact that dockers are exposed to an open 370 environment without shelter through most of their working time; the pressure also comes from the weight of the goods. Before 1991, the norm for each docker was 40 tones; after negotiation the norm was reduced to 24 tones. Such a norm, however, still has a harmful effect on the health of dockers. The dockers’ union therefore has set itself the aim to make further improvement on this subject. According to the report of the chairperson of the RPD shop committee of PerStiKo, ‘The working norm for each person should be reduced to 18 tones for each 7.5 hours working day shift and to 12 tones during the same working time in the night shift’ (Timofeev, 2004, Doker, No. 143, p.2). As relevant for the companies’ performance and also worker’ job security, a well arranged modernisation of handling techniques has been repeatedly mentioned among local dockers. This means the use of more technological equipment for loading and unloading. The development of port modernisation actually has different meanings for the dockers and for their employers. For the companies, it means more investment and improvement of their competitive ability; for workers, it means work can take place more efficiently and they face less danger at work. To take one example, the condition of their crane means the night shift operators always encounter high pressure. As mentioned earlier, a common situation around the Russian seaports is that much equipment has become outdated and that causes extra danger for dockers. Such a 371 situation has therefore been put into the core of the dockers’ draft collective agreement in order to decrease the accidents and provide more protection for labour. More importantly, all these conditions that dockers believe they have ‘tolerated’ raised more concern about their payment scale which can be seen as a ‘rational’ or ‘relevant’ compensation for their work hardship. And from this major concern / belief we will see that the local dockers and their union organisations have acted frequently in order to guarantee their payment standard. Related to such concern it has been said that in Neva-Metall and PKT the work environment and conditions are slightly different from those of PerStiKo, VSK and ChSK, for the equipment has to be more complicated and the operation is rather delicate. There were 845 workers, divided into 4 brigades in PKT. The territory of the company has the biggest storage for the containers. The dockers here complained about the outdated equipment. ‘For example, four out of six mooring container loaders we use have operated for more than 30 years and despite the fact that these loaders were modernised several times, they are anyway outdated. It is necessary to replace them every 2-3 years. Actually, there is a terrible lack of proper technical systems to provide unharmful conditions of container cabins for us dockers’ (Sarzhin, 2004, Doker, No. 143). 372 ‘With such conditions, not only accidents but also the physical damage to our health really of course makes the job not easy to accept’ (ViktorK, crane operator of PKT, 29 December 2004) Features of payment When one looks at the size of dockers’ salaries one may soon be surprised if compare it to the level of normal Russian factory workers. Their salaries have always been considered the reward for one of those ‘big-money’ occupations that also requires tough commitment to heavy physical pressure to earn a good sum. The dockers at the port are fairly aware of their specific position as ‘well-off’, when they recalled their past times. ‘I came to the port almost 33 years ago, when LMTP was the pride not only of Leningrad, but of the whole country. I remember the time when both the state and the port administration cared about their workers. This care was expressed in the provision of workplace nurseries and kindergartens, a departmental health centre and polyclinic, a departmental holiday centre and pioneer camp, a departmental dental hospital and sanatoria and treatment centre, and the LMTP collective agreement not only protected the workers, but also helped them to feel 373 human. This was the time every worker received a 40% bonus every quarter’ (AleksandrM, brigade-leader of VSK, June 5, 2004). Nowadays, the wages of dockers are quite flexible; apart from the condition of a minimum wage guarantee according to the collective agreement; the monthly wage of a docker largely depends on the handling demand and his overtime hours. So we can firstly see a difference according to the seasons, for the climatic condition is a determining factor of the total volume carried (especially in winter the wages are usually lower). Apart from the general impression of the ‘well-off’ dockers among the public, we should note that for each docker the level of salary differs according to the duties and the service items of their companies. And these conditions in the current case of St Petersburg are basically categorized by the stevedore companies. A docker with a higher grade and working duties such as operating a crane may receive more pay. For a docker, the difference of his standard payment for one class difference may be up to 200 USD per month. And since the port ownership was re-organised, dockers in different parts (companies) of the port receive quite different scales of wages. The payment conditions for all dockers at the port comprise quite a large range. According to the port trade union, the minimum pay of a docker in the city was 12,000 roubles (about 400 USD) in 2003, but each company has its own payment system. For example, while dockers from the port’s main stevedore companies earned at least 850 374 USD in 2003, in the neighbouring timber zone of the port the workers’ average wage was about 500 USD. (Some analysts even suggested the real difference can reach less than half) Moreover, three years before, the ‘First Container Terminal’ agreed a special bonus system with the dockers. As a result the monthly pay of dockers in PKT became several thousand roubles more than that of their colleagues in other companies. To make a general comparison, dockers of PKT normally receive the highest average wages as well as the highest annual income among all port workers, because the container facility allows clients’ demands to maintain a certain level in the winter time, and because a crane operator has to hold 1st class qualification, the highest. According to the official report of PKT, the average wage of workers in PKT in the first half of 2004 was 23,000, while the average wage of their docker-mechanics was generally about 32,000 roubles. One of the reasons for PKT workers’ higher average wage is that the container truck and large container storage conditions allow the operation not to decrease too much in the winter time. Dockers in other companies normally have less demand in that season. The size of dockers’ salaries has always led the public to think that they live in quite well-off conditions.96 And that has been one of the regular declarations from the 96 During the time I stayed in St Petersburg, when I mentioned the case study I have been looking at, people often responded ‘Oh...dockers, their salaries are really high, aren’t they?’ When the media made reports on the labour conflicts at the seaport, the ‘high-wage’ image was often stressed. Although people also recognised that such a kind of job is really heavy and dangerous, not suitable for most people. 375 management of the port companies. Apart from the basic wage mechanism, dockers enjoy several regulated opportunities to increase their salary. In addition to the usual double payment for overtime work, there are additional money benefits for over fulfillment of the rates and for the classification class (10-30%), a standard agreement binds the employer to pay the so-called ‘children’s’ benefits (25-50% of the minimum rate) and earmark funds to cover the costs incurred in buying new year presents, tickets for new year tree festivals, secure an additional sum as compensation for vacationers recovering from health disorders within a year’s time, etc. From the dockers’ side, what matters is not the amount they have got, but to what extent their wages are ‘rational’. According to the general director of the Seaport Company, Krikun, for dockers of the main three companies the salary has always been high. He claimed that the salary by June 2004 was 23,611 roubles (850USD) (compared to 19,652 roubles in June 2003, an increase of 20%). Some individual dockers in June received up to 35,000 roubles.97 The amount consisted of the tariff rate and additional payments for level of qualification, for covering for an absent worker, for working in harmful conditions and for night shift work. As from the dockers’ side, they argue, ‘To reach the amount of 26-28 thousand roubles a month as the press said, a docker must work 11 hours a day, 6 days a week… can such an amount still be called too high?’ 97 As mentioned in Chapter Two, the average wage for the railway sector in 2003 was 7662 roubles. 376 (Aleksandr Moiseenko, July 29, 2004). To support such point of view, the dockers also stressed that about 100 dockers had left the job during 2004-2005 due to industrial disease. 4.1.4 Workers’ grievances In the previous section we have seen dockers had their complaints about the environment of their workplace and the inefficient equipment. Regarding the concern about how much payment they should receive, dockers often put the question what should be the cost of sacrificing their physical condition, because the very intensive and heavy-pressure workload can easily cause workplace accidents or problems for dockers’ health. According to an informal count of the trade union, there were in total 90 workers who suffered from serious occupational injury or illness during the period from 1996 to 2004. One feature of their work regime which puts pressure on the dockers is the norm of their daily manual capacity. The dockers’ local organisation had put this concern as their priority issue, and they had successfully reduced the limit of the norm from 40 tonnes down to 25 tonnes per shift. Nevertheless, as the union leaders argued, such an achievement has not yet met the health standard (which was suggested as 12 tonnes by an independent labour inspector), and a critical challenge to the maintenance of the norm still exists if the administration is reluctant to respect the 377 norm restriction when there is strong demand for cargo handling. The fact that St Petersburg is close to European business has generated the atmosphere that the port business competes with their European neighbour counterparts. The employers have often said that the handling work should be as efficient as the European level, but the workers had their words about this: ‘People should understand our work better. Our work is dirty and heavy. The work we have to take is almost exactly the same as our European counterparts have to take, but the wage is much less. What kind of European standard are they talking about?’ (VladimirK, docker of Neva-Metall, June 05, 2004) During my research, the interviewees often emphasised that for years and years all people thought that a docker can make big money in the port, now people start to say that only in the city centre can people get such a high income. For their ‘fantastic payment’, dockers have to suffer a harmful working environment. Related to the concern above, the issue of work safety and proper equipment has also been mentioned often. A young docker mentioned the lack of sufficient equipment for their duties, especially for work with dangerous materials. A frequent problem was the failure to meet health standards. Moreover, they even expressed a view that, ‘The condition of the equipment has always breached the regulations, 378 according to the work instruction, if we really want to carry out our duties while fulfilling the instructions, then most cargo handling work would have come to a standstill’ (AnatolyK, docker of PerStiKo, 2004). Such complaints were also found among other professions at the port. To take another example, a female tally-officer (VSK) expressed her concern at the neglect of necessary protection under the weather conditions, which includes the lack of proper work clothes. Such conditions can be seen to be a well-recognised factor among many port workers. Following the above concern, in most dockers’ minds the wage they deserve is a kind of exchange for the cost of their health. The logic appears as a simple balance: the dynamics of their wages should have matched their work performance, if they had sacrificed much for their duties, such as getting physical problems and less energy for families, they should at least get an equivalent payback. Demands for higher wages and salaries are not a novelty for the dockworkers. However, they have avoided staging serious actions until 2004. The dockworkers announced strikes, even claimed their legal right to strike in court, but after negotiating with the employers no real actions were undertaken. Similar wars of words normally resulted in the dockworkers’ benefiting from such situations. The fact that cargo handling work mostly relies on the coordination of brigade 379 work makes the workers believe there is no easy way to replace them and their skills, and so that is an obvious outlook among the port workers. The relationship between the management of the port stevedore companies and the workers did involve several conflicts but workers seemed to consider that such a relationship did not mean a harsh confrontation or suppression of the workers until 2004. A senior docker described the relationship between local dockers and their employers until the end of 2003: ‘I would say, serious conflict between employers and employees on the port has never burst till now. We are struggling for a mechanism and so far that has worked out. The number employed has actually risen and there has not been any massive lay-off. On the contrary, we have more dockers working now compared with the level of employment in Soviet times. And the strength of the trade union has also helped us to avoid such pressure’ (AleksandrN, docker of ChSK, January 21, 2004). As mentioned earlier, when I was conducting interviews with the dockers and observing their union activity it was evident that dockers kept their faith that their work skill and the requirement of efficient coordination more or less protected their job stability from the threat of a cheaper labour force. However, the president of RPD, Aleksandr Shepel’, provided another view of the threat in an interview with a journalist. He warned: 380 ‘There has been a problem at the various port union organisations; there the dockers’ duty was carried not by dockers but simply loaders (gruzchiki). That is, firstly, the dumping of cheap labour force’ (Gorn, 2003, p. 235). As a result several national as well as international campaigns were held across the country (I will provide more description in the section on RPD activities). Moreover, the confidence among dockers at St Petersburg seaport was soon to be challenged by their own concern at the prospect of the Russian seaports’ handling volume and its threat to their employment security. Apart from the change of the port employment tendency facing the local dockers, the growing concern over their real wages has become a major grievance. The rapid growth of price inflation in the city caused the fall of the workers’ real income. The dockworkers complained that all the conditions provided have not been enough for them to be able to support their families. The compensation rate over wage indexing therefore has become the most critical issue within the port labour relations since 2000. The workers’ grievances and the disagreement over the issue resulted in the latest labour conflict and strike action at the seaport. In the next Chapter I will present the details of the conflicts and how the local trade union organisation mobilised the workers to participate in the strike action. 381 4.2 Dockworkers and their union organisations In the Russian sea transport sector, many trade unions have been formed since 1992. The official trade union organisation, structured on a whole sectoral basis, was seriously challenged by the events that dockers and seamen had broken away and formed their own professional unions. The official union’s capacity to represent dockers has became more nominal than real. Interestingly, if we only look at dockers as an individual occupation, apart from the seaport transport workers, most Russian dockers belong to the new organisation. In the case of St Petersburg Seaport, there were in total about 6,500 workers; about 2,300 are members of the new Russian Trade Union of Dockers (RPD), while a local Russian Trade Union of Water Transport Workers (PRVT) leader claimed that about 3,000 workers are their members. However, the slightly larger membership of the latter is explained by the fact that their membership includes staff of the head port company, Morport SPb, which does not have a dockers’ organisation. In general, PRVT has membership in small organisations and RPD in large ones, and relations between their organisations are not good. An analysis of the changes and work of the alternative organisations will help to understand the importance of the self-organisation of local dockers. 382 4.2.1 PRVT - Russian Trade Union of Water Transport Workers During Soviet times, all workers in water transport or in related activities, such as seafarers, dockers, scientific marine meteorology researchers and so on, were included as members of the Trade Union of Water Transport Workers of the USSR. In mid-1990, representatives from various Russian basin committees of this sectoral union organisation set up a working committee in charge of the formation of the new Russian Trade Union of Water Transport Workers (PRVT). According to Shershukov (1997), such an action put the relationship between the working committee and the officials of the old union structure into an ambiguous tension. In March 1991, just one day before the congress of the old All-Union Trade Union, PRVT was officially established. At the beginning, only 60% of the original Russian primary organisations joined the newly changed trade union due to the member organisations’ concern at political uncertainty. The new Russian union embraced about 300 thousand workers. The confusion about joining the new union was only reduced after the disintegration of the former USSR had become irreversible. In total, its membership was about 500 thousand workers in 1997. Apart from the re-organisation of PRVT, groups based on professional interests also appeared within the sector of water transport. They soon decided to leave PRVT. At the beginning of the 90s, the Seafarers’ Union of Russia (RPSM) and the Russian 383 Trade Union of Dockers (RPD) were also established. Both of the latter two trade unions were established on the basis of the principle of defending the interests of workers of a single profession, and took over the majority of workers in these professions (seafarers and dockers) from PRVT. One of the reasons that seafarers and dockers decided to break away from PRVT was, as a typical characteristic of the new Russian trade union movement, around PRVT’s position and attitude towards the administration / management. However, it was also reported that the conflicts were rather within the leadership. The formation and re-organisation of the three union organisations involved certainly raised several clashes between the leaderships of the old and the new. Nevertheless, the three union organisations still reached compromises. In 1992, they together signed the first branch tariff agreement (OTS) after the Soviet Union collapsed. Apart from the basic settlement of the OTS, however, workers from several regions were not satisfied with the conditions they had been granted and several strikes still took place in the sector at the beginning of 1992. As a genuine concern of PRVT, the critical problem facing water transport workers was more generally the prospects of the Russian water transport industry. It may not be too surprising that the PRVT functionaries perform like most traditional trade unions in Russia, they prefer to ‘work’ with governmental officials to tackle the strategic problems in the industry, and emphasise their concern with the social sphere 384 of the enterprise. In April 1993, the Union joined the International Transport Federation. At the same time, the leadership also decided not to join the successor body of the former All-Union Trade Union of Water Transport Workers, now the International Confederation of Water Transport Workers. The reason was their disagreement over the consideration of union finances and suspicion about the principle of the new Confederation’s governing policy. At the plenum of the Union’s central committee in December 1994, the committee made a decision to withdraw its earlier recognition of the Social Accord Agreement of the Yeltsin government. The decision was made in protest at the government’s ignoring the collective action appeal of trade unions over the worsening socio-economic condition. The trade union also sought influence in Russian political circles. Until 1993, two of its representatives were People’s Deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and it was represented on the commission of the Supreme Soviet in the drafting of laws on pensions, trade unions and social insurance. The committee decided to support the initiative of the Trade Union Association of Transport Sectors of the Russian Federation to establish an All-Russian Socio-political Movement of Transport Workers for the State Duma election in 1996. At the union congress of March 27th 1996, Gennady Starchenko was elected as 385 the president of the central committee of the union. At this congress, PRVT also recognised that Russia should adopt the ratification of the ILO convention related to workers in the water transport sectors. And again, PRVT appealed to the Russian government to make an effort to revive the Russian mercantile fleet. Interestingly, like the president of ROSPROFZhEL, when talking about the trade union work in response to globalisation Starchenko (2002) made serious complaints about the government’s failure to support the sea transportation sector, which has caused Russia to lose its place in the world competition, and as the expense of such ‘incorrect policy’ workers suffer from wage arrears and unemployment. The union organisations and the leadership of PRVT have so far not picked any big fight with the dockers’ union, although most dockers in the main seaports had left PRVT.98 The practical problem to observe PRVT activities relevant to the case study derived from the fact that they have got minor representation among Russian dockers, and the trade union plays a rather passive role in workplace labour relations. The main function of PRVT at the enterprise level has been little different from most FNPR branch trade unions; setting up the main task of improving working conditions, guarantees of safety, raising wages, but with no specific programme or campaign to 98 The leadership had paid more attention to the inter-union conflict with RPSM. The relationship with the seafarers’ union, in particular the fight between the headquarters of the two trade unions, had involved the two parties for quite a while. On April 25th 1995, the central committee appealed to all its members and primary organisations to be aware of the factious activity of the leadership of the new seafarers’ union, RPSM. They accused RPSM of disrupting the unity of the trade union movement in water transport. 386 target such aims.99 At the Sixth Congress of PRVT in 2006 the leaders criticised many employers for being reluctant to increase workers’ payment from the share of the profit, and the resolution to tackle the problem was to form an acting group together with the Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation. The primary or regional organisations rather work in the way of looking up to the contact and dialogue between the union’s central committee and the government bodies. 4.2.2 RPD - Russian Trade Union of Dockers As has been described in Chapter One, in the Soviet / Russian society under the atmosphere of Gorbachev’s perestroika more and more traditionally tolerated problems within Soviet society were raised. Many of these were criticised openly by people who were affected. Across Russian seaports, a similar atmosphere motivated the dockers’ demands. For many dockers, there were several issues that were raised more and more often, such as concern about the provision of food during the night shift, pay differentials and finally, the security of their jobs while the capacity of sea transport had been falling in the 80s. In addition, the character of dockers’ work provided them with more opportunities to see and compare the arrangements in different ports or different regions. The dockers also expressed their concern at 99 In 2002, the chairperson of trade union committee of Russian Trade Union of Water Transport Workers was also invited to join the Board of Directors. 387 several ‘unfair’ conditions among the unresolved issues. The state of working conditions and the neglect of such problems by the administration also drove dockers to voice their indignation. Although their actions or steps taken at different ports were different, they started to exchange experiences of their local grievances and their demands were gradually integrated. For example, at port meetings of Magadan seaport, almost all dockers signed a statement rejecting the arrangement related to distributing their 13th month wages (new-year bonus). As was usually done during soviet times, the workers then also tried to write letters to the Party organisation, asking it to resolve the problems. At the formal workplace meetings, these problems were not effectively resolved; the regional union organisation also ignored their demands. Therefore, the dockers’ group appealed to the regional organisation of the CPSU, and the Party dispatched representatives to install new regulations. Only then were the demands satisfied. After all, dockers had realised, according to one of the union’s founder members, that ‘they need their own organisation, the ‘old’ trade union can hardly be expected to change their style’ (Gorn, 2003, p.237).100 The situation at Leningrad commercial seaport was also of wide concern for the local port workers. Dockers at the port felt insecure about their future fate; they therefore demanded that more guarantees should be included in the sectoral tariff Interestingly, this activist, the president of KTR Aleksandr Shepel’, was a trade union activist from the old PRVT trade union before he joined the new organisation. He was the one who was convinced the old trade union could hardly take a fundamental reform. 100 388 agreement. In order to provide a basis for their participation in the negotiation of the collective agreement, a dockers’ group was formed at the seaport. The group for a certain time existed as a section within the official trade union, while leaders of the old, official trade union tried to manipulate the influence of dockers. In addition, a similar situation also arose in other seaports. In several seaports, the dockers had established independent organisations but never joined FNPR as its member organisations. To set up a coordinated perspective for dockers’ self-organisation, these new organisations called a congress to decide if the new organisation should stay as an inner but separated group of the official trade union or establish a new trade union. On June 26 1992, union organisations of dockers from the main Russian ports (St Petersburg, Murmansk, Tuapse, Magadan, Novorossiiskii and Vladivostok ports) held the congress and established the dockers’ union. The delegates of each region together composed the Executive Committee. Vladimir Vasil’ev, a docker from the Seaport of St Petersburg, was elected as the trade union president. The aims and tasks of the new organisation were to protect the social and economic interests of dockers, workers from other port professions and also port clerical workers. Over this period, the basic problems also included massive-scale redundancy, which was directly affected by the fall of the performance of the Russian ports and fleet; and the unlawful behaviour of 389 stevedore companies. As a strong and active trade union organisation in Russia, RPD has, since its formation, always been on the side of the so-called free trade unions within the Russian trade union movement. The union is widely seen as one of the most active free / alternative trade union organisations. Among RPD’s primary organisations at Russian seaports, the dockers and their organisations at the St Petersburg Seaport have shown their considerable strength in the formation of local labour relations. Membership and union structure In general, the aim of RPD is to protect dockers’ interests, and its membership is based on the profession of dockers. Nevertheless, despite the earlier motive for the formation of the union and its chosen name, the union nowadays also allows the recruitment of port workers of other professions, which includes tally-officers (accounting of cargos) and facility service workers. The total union membership in 2001 was 8,372, of which 8,172 were male members, only 200 were female. According to a different source, this represents 80% of all dockers in Russia, and about 26% of the whole port workforce. 101 The membership, however, is not 101 The data referred to the web-page of the Coordination Committee of Trade Unions of Russian Transport Workers of Russia [Online]. Available from: http://www.itfglobal.ru/rus/jsapp.htm [Accessed 01 January 2004]. The Coordination Committee is an official Russian affiliate of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and consists of eight Russian trade unions in the transport sector (include FNPR and alternative organisations). 390 distributed evenly across all Russian seaports, but is mostly concentrated at the main Russian seaports. And even the state of the membership distribution at these main seaports differs. In the Seaport of St Petersburg, for example, almost 90% of dockers are members of RPD, but almost none from the nearby timber seaport where the total labour force is relatively low. Overall, RPD does represent dockers at most big Russian seaports. Generally, the union structure has been clearly defined in the constitution. The structure of the union is simple: Congress, Council, Executive Committee, primary port organisation at three levels. There are in total 27 primary (port) organisations: 17 in the far-east region (including Magadan and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii), 2 in south Russia, 5 in north Russia, 4 in northwest Russia (St Petersburg, Vyborg, Vysotsk, Kaliningrad). In addition, the local organisations in the far-east region have established a special regional branch of RPD – Far-east Regional Branch of RPD (DVRO RPD). Chairpersons of all port organisations together with the RPD president and his four deputy presidents comprise the council of RPD. Until recently the union council had 32 members, and each member of the council has one vote. According to the RPD Charter, a meeting of the council requires three-quarters of the total number to be present. The union structure does not really give effective leadership to the national 391 headquarters. The genuine authority of the trade union organisation is separate and is held in the hands of each port committee. Most of the time, it is the port organisations which decide their main activities. The union’s national ‘headquarters’ is located in Moscow with a weak and symbolic status. Since the union was formed, there has been little change within the central leadership circle. The first president, Vladimir Vasil’ev and his deputy Alexander Shepel’ kept these posts until 1998. Vladimir Vasil’ev was a senior docker, who had worked at the Leningrad Commercial Seaport since 1971. At the 1991 meeting of the port dockers, a new union organisation was formed at the port, and he was firstly elected as the chair of the union organisation. In 1992, at the founding congress of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers he was elected as the first president of the new organisation. The current RPD president, Alexander Shepel’, was a docker from Magadan Sea Port. He joined the dockers’ group of the Magadan port in 1978 and retired in November 1996. He had started to work for the official trade union in 1986, until the new trade union was formed. In 1996, at the third congress of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers, he was elected as the deputy president of RPD. He became the president of RPD when Vasil’ev left the post. The president of the union is normally in charge of the external relations with other labour or social organisations as well as the exchange of information with international trade union organisations. The leadership of RPD also actively participated in establishing an 392 alternative confederation of non-FNPR trade unions. In April 1995, the Confederation of Labour of Russia (KTR) was formed. RPD has been one of the most active member organisations within the KTR circle. In 1996, Alexander Shepel’ was also elected as the president of KTR. Union activities According to the principles of the RPD structure, initiatives proposed by the council depend on their local organisations to decide how they would really carry out the resolution. With its rather symbolic status, neither the national council of the union nor the union headquarters could provide effective coordinative roles for the issues or actions involved. At each port, the port union organisation makes its own decision about strikes or collective actions. The coordinated actions of RPD organisations have been about the union’s status and about employment guarantees at Russian seaports. To make the RPD’s voice heard, the council normally demands that their port organisations should have a warning protest or short work stoppage. The first joint action of RPD local organisations took place in 1996. At the third union congress, held on February 22-23 1996 in St Petersburg, the union delegates discussed the new tendency of anti-union struggle appearing in the seaport sector, in which the formation of a Vessel Owners’ Union had shown their hostile attitude towards the dockers’ organisation. Another main appeal adopted on the congress was 393 to the federal government, in which the union raised its concern on the current policy of the government not supporting the domestic sector or the country’s products. RPD also blamed the government for not making state investment into the infrastructure of Russian ports. After the congress, the first joint industrial action of RPD took place on April 9 1996. Across the Russian seaports such as Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, Vladivostok, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, St Petersburg, Novorossiisk and some others, members of RPD held a protest in order to secure the future of their jobs. About 5,000 port workers participated in this one-hour warning strike action.102 In the same year there was another coordinated activity held to prevent the ‘dumping of the work force’. The coordination was better developed in the North-West region. On September 10-12 1996, a Convention of dockers’ unions across the Baltic region was held. Representatives from Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania attended the Convention. The convention raised several appeals, which included: against the imposition of seafarers’ duties onto dockers’ work; against the employment of dockers on vessels sailing under flags of convenience. The participating parties passed a resolution on a joint effort to press their demands on the relevant authorities. On October 2-3 1996, a special council meeting of RPD was held in St 102 Friends & Partners. No. 71, Part I, 10 April 1996,.[Online]. Available from: http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1996/04/960410I.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,ne w) [Accessed: 05 June 2004]. 394 Petersburg. At the meeting, delegates discussed the employment state of Russian seaports. The meeting passed a resolution warning that if the Russian government did not change its policy over the future prospects of seaports across Russian territory, the dockers would call an all-Russian strike. A similar united action was held in September 1999. The action was conducted through a three-minute protest programme without a real work stoppage. And then in December 2004, the Far Eastern, Murmansk, Kaliningrad and St Petersburg dockers launched an initiative under the slogans ‘Russian cargoes – only through Russian ports’ and ‘Taxes on transhipment of Russian cargoes to the federal and local budgets’, claiming that dumping rates for the railways and loading at foreign ports were taking trade away from Russian ports. One collective campaign which involved all local organisations was the picket and warning strike against the new version of the Labour Code in 2001. In April 2001, the union joined the action against the government draft of the new Labour Code. In November in Moscow a meeting organised by the dockers, Sotsprof and other non-FNPR trade unions stood outside the building of the State Duma. Standing together with other non-FNPR trade unions, RPD showed their full disagreement with the original draft Labour Code, which had been offered for consideration by the State Duma, which considerably limited the rights of working people and trade unions. The 395 leaders of RPD expressed their concern that the employer becomes the only ruler of people’s destinies. The dockers were especially indignant because the draft new Labour Code, in their opinion, brings to naught the role of trade unions in distributing the enterprises’ profits and in the social protection of working people. The Council of RPD also passed a resolution in support of the campaign for Oleg Shein’s version of the Labour Code. One of the St Petersburg activists, Konstantin Fedotov, was a co-writer of an alternative version of the draft Labour Code. After the end of the Russian State Duma’s voting, the campaign came to an end. The case of the Kaliningrad union committee indicated that even on a broader ground we find that the fate of the port committees has been varied. This perception was not uncommon as even activists of the port organisations concluded that ‘RPD is just a flag’ (YuryR, April 13, 2005). The real strength relies on the union committees. In concrete terms, the Russian Trade Union of Dockers has relied on its local port organisations to act on their own, and the local port organisations, at least the one in this case study, have relied on the union committees of each company. The dispute at the Kaliningrad seaport clearly showed that the advantages of the dockers’ occupation does not necessarily guarantee the position of an ‘alternative’ union organisation at the workplace, as the RPD organisations had to face their own fates with their local 396 companies.103 This factor has defined the character of port organisations as individual organisations on their own but not their growth together with RPD. 4.2.3 Relations between RPD and PRVT As mentioned earlier, in the late 80s and early 90s the dockers were disappointed by the passive role of the enormous official union. Several activists of their local union committees started to act, and believed that the solution was to restore the activism of the old organisation. Interestingly, although the senior leadership from the official trade union did not like the development of the new unions, their union functionaries did not strongly impede the formation of the new trade union. Since then, RPD rather than PRVT has occupied the dominant place in representing the dockers. After the split in the union organisation had become a permanent fact, the organisations have actually learned to work together on some issues. 103 The case was one of the most famous disputes since the formation of RPD, for it was the dispute over the discrimination of the administration of Kaliningrad seaport against members of RPD. Unlike the favourable conditions for the early primary organisations of RPD, the union organisation at the Kaliningrad Seaport had less support from the local dockers. Firstly, the alternative trade union committee was established at the Kaliningrad seaport by a young docker in 1995. In October 1997, the union called its first strike. Following the strike, members of the union were discriminated against by their employers. Initially, these relatively marginal members were brought to court by the port administration. According to the leader of the union committee, members were subsequently separated from non-members and put in union-only groups, where the dockers who were RPD member were given less duty and lower wages. Later on, in April and May 1998, these workers were told that they had failed the safety test and were to be sacked. One conditional opportunity was offered by the administration, if the dockers chose to quit the RPD organisation. This case became famous internationally when it was appealed by KTR to the international trade union organisations, especially the International Transport Federation. Later on, ITF decided to support the local dockers’ struggle. The case was then successfully brought to the European Court of Human Rights in 2000, and the Court accepted to investigate if the decision of the port administration violated labour rights. In December 2001 the RPD trade union committee of Kaliningrad Commercial Seaport won their court case. 397 Nowadays, the relationship between RPD and PRVT seems to have become more constructive than a mere absence of mutual interaction. Although the two organisations still keep a certain distance from each other, more contact and common actions have also been conducted. At the national level, in May 2003, PRVT invited all trade unions from the river and sea transport industries to attend a Round Table meeting. The central topic was how the union can be associated or united as a stronger force in the circumstances of the new Labour Code. On December 14th 2004 PRVT and RPD together raised an all-Russia protest with the common slogan of ‘Russian freights – through Russian Ports!’ The situation at enterprise level might differ, but there have been no real fights between the two trade unions. In the stevedore companies of St Petersburg Seaport, PRVT union committee, though not as militant as the RPD ones, chose to cooperate with the RPD union committee. For example, since the RPD union committee had weaker representation status, during the period of the labour dispute in PKT in 2004 the PRVT union committee signed their common demand and support for the RPD union committee’s proposal.104 The relationship was not always smooth though. The PRVT leaders are still generally prone to the employer’s position. To take one Just like the formation of the miners’ independent union, there was internal conflict between leading figures during the formation of RPD. The story was interpreted in very different ways by two ex-president of the local RPD organisation. According to the opinion of one interviewee, the local trade union of PRVT did not try hard to oppress RPD, and the leadership of PRVT started a similar direction first for union reform (Konstantin Fedotov, March 29, 2002). Vasi’lev, however, strongly criticised Fedotov’s position during the formation of RPD. 104 398 example, the president of the PRVT territorial organisation refused to join the action of the RPD port organisation at the St Petersburg Seaport, and his suggestion on the regulation of ‘uchet mneniya profsoyuza’ (taking account of union opinion), which replaced the requirement to secure the union’s permission in the new Labour Code, was closer to the port administration’s argument but the opposite of that of local RPD activists’. Both the administration and the PRVT president consider ‘uchet mneniya profsoyuza’ has guaranteed the status of the trade union in regulating the workplace labour relations so that the struggle of RPD for the union’s concrete rights to be written into collective agreement did not get much sympathy. 4.3 The port organisation of RPD at St Petersburg Seaport 4.3.1 History It is noteworthy that, despite the fact that the majority of delegates of Russian dockers at the first national congress decided to establish their own union, a group of local leaders and activists of St Petersburg Seaport dockers did not fully agree with the suggested necessity to form a new trade union breaking away from the old, official PRVT. Only in consideration of keeping solidarity among all Russian dockers though, 399 they chose not to confront their colleagues. 105 Since the appearance of the first dockers’ organisation in April 1991 (the first union group had appeared in 1989) and the formation of a local organisation of RPD, the organisations at St Petersburg Seaport have become the backbone of the RPD. That includes their contribution of membership to the whole trade union, as well as their experiences and achievements in the practice of collective bargaining. More importantly, from their establishment to their strike experience, the port committee has made important contributions to defining a clearer framework for the capacity of dockers’ struggles against the background of changes in the ownership and management of the port. The first historic change for the seaport organisation came at the beginning of the 1990s. Local dockers struggled to protect their professional status and their own interests in the face of the depressed transport industry. The preparation for the first collective action appeared during the formation of the dockers’ group in 1992, when the Leningrad Commercial Seaport changed its name to Seaport of St Petersburg, and the ownership was also transformed from the State’s hands into a shareholding company. Recognition for the new authority has been critical for both sides, both the new administration and the dockers’ organisation. In 1993, a strike threat was called 105 Interpretations about the history of the decision and formation process differ due to the internal conflict among the leadership figures. The interviews conducted separately with both sides involved one who totally denounced the betrayal of the opposite figures, and claimed their opponents are the real danger within the local labour movement; interestingly, the denounced side provided me with a very mild description about the past history, treating it as a scene of various voices. The brief review here does not consider the stories of the past relevant in this chapter due to the fact that the event happened long before the investigation period, and the conflicts were even very personal. 400 by the RPD port committee. The dockers acted to improve the low level of their wages, and they also complained about the general working environment. Following the strike threat, the port administration finally agreed to negotiate with the port workers. In April 1993 the first collective agreement was then signed. By this achievement, the dockers of the St Petersburg Seaport gained a wage increase of 1.6 times, and the norm of the workload for every single docker was guaranteed to be limited to 25 tones per working day. Such an achievement encouraged the dockers to believe that they could guarantee their own lives with proper agency and also with proper actions (Karataev 2003). As will be shown in the following text, since that moment the authority of the union committee of RPD has been widely recognised and confirmed. The actions and activities of the Port committee and its member unions, to some extent, reflected the economic background of the dimensions of the Russian economy. As mentioned earlier, RPD waged a short warning strike across the main Russian seaports in 1996. The port committee supported the action, though the problem had not yet appeared as the main concern at the St Petersburg Seaport. The demand was to push the administration to take the union’s proposals into account. Such an action aimed to push the Russian government to pay more attention and make every possible effort to restore the depressed economy. Dockers knew that if the port is withering, 401 their jobs will not be able to be retained. The action was therefore like a lobby-oriented protest for the future perspective of the sector. Historical change in 1998: reorganisation of the port structure The second historic challenge for the port organisation of dockers was over the structural conditions, in which a strong connection and coordination within the original union organisation was required. On August 21 1998, the port administration made a final decision to re-organise the port structure (a de facto privatisation of port services). With the great fear of their uncertain future and their future working conditions, dockers called a meeting immediately and declared a strike. Later on, a one-minute strike took place. Over this event, dockers did not present serious resistance to privatisation. The crisis and uncertainty for dockers’ jobs came again in 1998-1999, during the reorganisation of the port composition. It was the latest threat of lay-off to workers of the port companies. After another threat of industrial action, dockers won the guarantee of job security and provision of social benefits; even the non-membership companies followed the same policy so that the dockers’ organisation was welcomed by dockers and port workers even where no RPD union committee existed. Their demands were to warn that if the administration did not agree to provide the working conditions and social protection as before, all dockers by then would refuse to be transferred to the new companies. 402 ‘The re-organisation was conducted with a fierce labour conflict. None of the workers signed the statement to allow themselves to transfer until the consensus of a collective agreement in the companies, in which a wide level of social security for workers was attached’ (Karataev, 2004, Doker, No. 135, p.4). Such a position forced a compromise between the two sides. The administration agreed to sit and consider the workers’ demands. After the action, based on the four zones, four companies were formed. The trade union organisation followed the change, and also changed its own structure and union regulations. Having got through its economic crisis, the Russian economy has begun to recover (at least the economic activities are growing again). Domestic demand has gradually recovered, and international trade also started to grow. The main issues among dockers at the St Petersburg seaport were no longer employment or the authority of the union, but the level of their real wages while inflation had rapidly risen in recent years. The first achievement was that wages should follow the rate of exchange of the American dollar against Russian roubles. Corresponding to such a concern, the port committee started to think about the necessity of installing a mechanism for indexing wages in the collective agreement. The implementation of this began in May 2000, but the following year the indexing was not fully carried out. 403 According to the port committee, during 2001-2003, the inflation rate was about 52%, but the wage rise was only up to 31.6%. Therefore, the union organisation decided to take tough action. August 27, 2001 was the first time the port organisation raised a strike threat for the indexing of wages. The union committee of the Fourth Stevedore Company demanded a 12.5 % wage rise from August 1 as indexation for inflation (in the union’s words, this is actually just compensation). The demand was rejected by the port and the company administrations. As their response, the dockers’ union declared that they would call an unlimited strike. Nevertheless, the company successfully brought a case to the city court against the port committee and the trade union committee. The action was banned by the city court on August 24 on the grounds that the strike was illegal.106 Later on, the dockers won the court case in the higher court, and finally, the dockers from the three companies joined to claim the strike action could take place.107 The port committee coordinated another strike action taken by dockers of the Second Stevedore Company. Such a reaction was again confronted with the administration’s legal suit. Nevertheless, the unions won the cases again. As the final outcome, the port 106 The information referred to the court judgement. [Online]. Available from: http://private.peterlink.ru/jca/rez/c7_12.htm [Accessed 05/06/2003]. 107 The real action was though not really conducted. More information can be found in the report. http://www.autotransinfo.ru/tr_news.asp?MsgID=1479601350&q=&Type=0&m=0&p=1 [Accessed: 05/06/2003]. Another source can be found in ‘Verkhovnyi sud prizyvaet k peregovoram s dokerami’, Leningradskaya Pravda, 19 June, 2001 [Online]. Available from: http://www.lenpravda.ru/newsarch.phtml?cat=2&day=10&month=9&year=01 [Accessed 05 June 2005]. 404 administration and the companies agreed to set up special indexing for the time being as a special concession to the dockers’ demand. But the details would need to be reviewed and reconsidered in the future. Such a mutual compromise temporarily eased the tension, but the battle over the relation between inflation and indexing has become an unresolved issue between the employers and the workers. During the first five years of the union’s life, two leaders played a critical role in the foundation of the port organisation of dockers. Before being elected to the national leadership of RPD, Vladimir Vasil’ev had been the main activist and leader of the local dockers’ group since 1988. He was a typical example of a heroic leader (initiator) who appeared against the background of an uncertain atmosphere. According to his opinion, the fact that the dockers could hold their first all-union meeting was simply an accidental incident. The meeting was attended not only by the workers but also many chiefs of Soviet seaports who did not really care what the aim of the meeting was and simply took it as another chance for a free trip held and financed by the Ministry of Water Transport. 108 On April 4th 1991, he was elected as the first president of the port organisation at the conference of dockers of Leningrad Commercial Seaport. Another key activist from the early stage of the local labour movement and dockers’ organisation, Konstantin Fedotov, had worked in the port as a 108 He added that he coincidently had the chance to send the message announcing the meeting in a telegram with the ministerial stamp so that through such a channel the document was received at each seaport and seen as an official ministerial invitation for the meeting. 405 docker for more than 15 years. He was elected chairperson of the trade union committee during 1992-1995 until he was struck down by a heart attack. In 1996, he started to work for the port committee as the chief of the consultant-legal department of the port committee. He was also the vice president of the Fund of the Worker’s Academy. The port committee is represented by the president and one deputy. The current president, Aleksandr Moiseenko, has worked on the port for more than 25 years. He has also been the first deputy president of RPD since 1999. 4.3.2 Structure, member organisations and organisational work When the RPD and the port committee were established, the principle of their membership was to form a professional organisation specifically for dockers. At the beginning, the new organisation embraced two professions: docker and mechanical worker. Such a principle was changed in 1998, so that the proposed new Labour Code did not make fatal damage to the port organisation. Nowadays the dockers’ union embraces workers of all professions, while workers of the original two professions plus workers on facility provision services still compose the majority. Though some activists disagreed, the change did not arouse opposition from the original members. According to Moiseenko, such a change is correct for ‘It was necessary and proved that the founding of the union was a correct decision. Once our union had learned 406 how to organise our workers, and workers realised why they need an active and strong union organisation, it is realistic to think of a real united and big union. Now we would still focus on our dockers’ base, but include other port workers to have equal benefit in the collective agreement’ (October 21, 2003). The membership of the port organisation was about 2,500 in 2003. All members are required to contribute 2% of their salaries as union dues every month. Since 1998, the port organisation has been composed of five permanent member organisations. All these five union committees are from the main stevedore companies of the seaport, and all have their own committee offices at the port territory of the companies. These primary organisations cover the workforce of the main operating stevedore companies at the port, they include: Trade union committee of PerStiKo Membership: 1000 (out of 1200 workers); members of PRVT: 150. This is the biggest primary organisation of the port organisation. Trade union committee of VSK Membership: 610 (out of 790 workers) Trade union committee of ChSK Membership: 301 (out of about 500 workers) Trade union committee of PKT company (since 1998) 407 Membership : 370 (out of 800 workers, but almost all dockers here have joined the union). Trade union committee of Neva-Metall company Membership: 350 (out of 700 workers). There was once a trade union organisation at the Baltic Bulk-Carrier Terminal (BBT), then initiators joined the Port Committee but soon came under pressure and its formation was not successful. The BBT union committee, which was initiated officially, had nearly vanished. The initiation and the first step had occurred, but development of the union organisation in these two companies seemed to have a long way to go.109 It is very impressive that local RPD activists emphasised that the union activists did put an effort into basic communication with their members. The union activists have tried to put more effort into representation at the most primary level. ‘Here, for example, the trade union group in every brigade, every collective, has its deputy. The trade union groups constitute the shop committees, so our trade union works constantly with the collective. The 109 Apart from the efficient method of representation for organisational operation, senior activists gave several pieces of unique information. For example, the port committee adopted one unusual method to retain the strength of the union so that the employer would not able to exploit the weakness of the union’s legal procedure. They have changed the union documents such as the union charter and regulations for primary organisations several times after their conferences. The reason, according to Fedotov, is that they consider if such documents are kept unpredictable or confidential it will cost the administration or employers more time to find the weak points of the union organisation. (So they refused to give me these documents.) ‘Although these documents are to provide regulations for internal democracy, nobody is interested in these documents.’ Under such a ‘strategy’, the charter has been kept clear for core activists. (I personally do not believe this is really the reason! They said that probably because they were not sure how much the researcher, that is me, could be trusted.) 408 task is to work out primary groups established among each profession of workers. Almost 100% of docker-machine operators have their own union groups; the percentage is about 90 % among mechanics or tally-officers. Moreover, the organiser of each union group should be re-elected not less than once a year, they can also be replaced at any time’ (Konstantin Fedotov, Head of Consulting-Legal Department RPD, March 29, 2002). Each union group also has a representative as a member of the shop committee, but the shop committee is designed as a permanent organ, with no election and no fixed structure. The chair of the shop committee is elected at the conference and the conference should be held not less than once every two years. Konstantin Fedotov asserted that the structure of the local organisations is probably more complicated than that of other Russian trade unions, but it is because in this way they can avoid the problem of FNPR union organisations. According to the design, there will be no possibility of the union not functioning. Such a simple rule represents the efforts of trade union activists on organisational tasks. On most occasions, it was the participation of the union group among the dockers’ brigades which determined the capacity of the port organisation. The local RPD organisations rely on the participation of union groups among brigades of dockers, mechanics and tally-officers. These union groups operate individually, embedded in the brigade meeting at their 409 work territory. All the primitive demands or requests are expected to be discussed firstly at the brigade or group meetings; and the union group is designed to ensure that an inactive organiser can be replaced at any time. Through their participation, the composition of the shop committee should be more stable. The chairpersons of several shop committees form the trade union committee. Apart from the executive organs like the union committee and the port committee, the local activists also made efforts to ensure that the ‘conferences’ were held regularly in the practice of their primary organisations at the port. To compare the dockers’ conference with the case study finding in the railway workers chapter, the local RPD activists have been much more confident. According to one of the activists, ‘I can say that with such a design, we had never failed in conducting conferences. Because the design of our organisational structure makes the activities rely not simply on the will of one single person, but on several equally capable activists…. The union activities indeed need to look at the person’s will, but the point is you should make it impossible to be affected by one single person’ (Fedotov, March 29, 2002). In the interviews, leaders or activists of the four main companies were all quite confident at the attendance of their members at the conference. It seems that brigade meetings at each stevedore company indeed provide the fundamental dynamics for the 410 performance of superior organisations; as the organisers indeed relayed their messages during negotiations or labour disputes within their companies. The design and the practice of the structural establishment of RPD primary organisations at the port seem to have reached an efficient balance. Moreover, the design also allows those activists in brigades or shop committee not necessarily to look upon the chairperson of the union committee but to carry out more delicate mobilisation beyond the chairperson of the union committee. For example, by referring to the way in which solidarity was created during the pre-strike period, one brigade leader (also an active union activist) described the first response to the action in the dispute over the scale of wage indexation in late 2004. To present their own opinions, a united meeting was called by 198, 192, 188 and 187 brigades (as he explained these four brigades traditionally belong to one collective, which is PPK-3) from the company ‘First Container Terminal’ In the meeting, members discussed the demands they would like to put into the collective agreement, or discussed the draft presented by their representatives in the working group. Similar brigade meetings were also held in other stevedore companies more or less at the same time. A brigade leader is expected to understand the position on union policy then explain it to members as a union activist. Certainly, not all of them were so active, as one activist expressed it ‘only a few of us did it, but this is still enough, they just need a bit of a push’. These messages or 411 demands are supposed to be presented at the conference of the trade union committee. Ideally, resolutions of both the brigade meetings and the union conferences corresponded, which was exactly to show their united will to take collective action by members of these four organisations, though it depended on the brigade leader and union activists. Some were very active, most of them rather focused on the difficulties of work performance. Nonetheless, as in the cases of BBT and ‘Timber Terminal’ mentioned earlier, such organisational strength still differs according to the union presence in different companies of the port. Certainly, chairperson of union committee is to provide major representation of the primary organisation. Unlike the situation of RPLBZh, here at the seaport all trade union committees have their own offices and facilities in their own territory, though only the president of the port committee is in charge of external contacts. Normally, the chairpersons of union committees work on their own, looking after material support for members and checking practical conditions guaranteed in the collective agreement, and they derive their authority from their status over their ability in dealing with the management. The preparation and disputes over collective agreement issues, however, pull them into a closer position. Unlike that of the port committee, their offices are located inside the port area. Their main duty within the design of the structure of the dockers’ port organisation is to overview the development of working 412 conditions, as well as to produce assessments of the implementation of the collective agreement in their own companies. They respond to the workers’ complaints, local RPD union activists constantly asked their management to provide dockers with proper and necessary technical provision, such as special masks or clothing while dealing with chemical materials, for their work. When there is a labour dispute occurring at the workplace, the chairperson of the union committee has the duty to provide support in the first place. In practice, these leaders usually take such disputes to the state inspector, as the first option, to investigate or to resolve the cases. Unlike the case study finding of RPLBZh activists in the previous chapters, the chairperson of RPD union committees did not get involved in court action that much. According to one of the union leaders, relying on court cases, it would not be easy to get a better solution than relying on direct negotiation with the administration (another characteristic different from the way the railway workers operate). The genuine consideration related to two parts: if the disputes may occur while the collective agreement is activated, it should be treated on such a basis as a priority; personal dispute cases at the seaport mostly relate to the violation of the workload or inefficient equipment at the workplace. For those court cases, the chairperson and the union committee is responsible for supporting / representing the individual member (but more often the brigade) to defend the right of the workers involved in the court. When 413 asked what they thought about the importance of taking the dispute to the court, a chairperson of a union committee said: ‘To bring the case to the court we have to bear the prejudice of judges at the local level and the nonsensical ignorance of the employer in the court case. It normally takes a long time to go through the whole process, but trade union activity can not wait until the decision’ (Vladimir Petrov, chairperson of union committee PerStiKo, November 25, 2003). All in all, such a dimension of the union’s daily activities indicates certain strength of the trade union committee in its interaction with the administration. To compare the conditions for RPD union activists with RPLBZh activists on the October Railway over the past decade of union activities, we rarely can find cases raised by the port administration against individual dockers. Their situation differs from most alternative trade unions in Russia, where the union organisations are normally suppressed by the employers. Certainly, there has been pressure of the administration on union activists and members at St Petersburg Seaport, but the general situation has been much less than that of other ‘independent’ trade unions. Unlike the situation of the railway workers’ organisations, cases of individual victimization of trade union activists or members have been rare. However, on May 5, 2000, when the labour dispute over the index of wages and the maintenance of the 414 terms of collective bargaining occurred, negotiations between the union and the administration took place to settle the dispute. The chairperson of the trade union committee of the Second Stevedore Company was searched on suspicion of holding drugs. After the search he and his wife were arrested. The port committee immediately stood up and defended the union leader. The union believed that this was a deliberate act trying to put extra pressure on the negotiation. Although leaders of PRVT port organisation never agreed to take part in actions held by RPD union organisations, the old trade union PRVT did not raise aggressive acts to disturb or attack the RPD organisations. Whether at the national or local level, the PRVT unions even tried to reach a common interest between the two trade unions. With the RPD organisations’ strength, most labour dispute cases were dealt with directly between the union organisation and the management rather than being raised in court to be resolved by legal enforcement. Therefore, RPD union organisations are quite confident that taking disputes through court procedure is not a better solution. Nevertheless, the condition of less pressure from the administration was not experienced evenly by dockers of all the port companies, particularly those with more marginal positions. The fact that the union committee of Neva-Metall once had difficulty to move into the union office and the failure to establish a union organisation at BBT showed that where there is weak representation of RPD 415 membership, the primary organisation faces the pressure on its own. They have not really been privileged by the strength of the union organisation. It is critical to note that the limit of the port committee’s capacity has not changed much within the current framework. RPD union organisation was firstly established in 1998, Neva-Metall has a different situation. People suggested that this was because their administration was more experienced. In other companies dockers confronted their administration in 1998, when the administration was not that experienced. Workers were freer. Before the establishment of the new union organisation, workers all stayed with the old PRVT organisation. The union section of RPD was established after almost all the promised conditions were ruined after the 1998 crisis. Workers sought for RPD to provide basic protection of their working conditions, so that a union organisation was established. The union committee, however, did not act as those of the other four companies, and was seen as a weak part of the port organisation. Interestingly, an active member, on the contrary, insisted that was actually their union committee has a smarter way to negotiate with their employers so that they did not have to take it to the confrontational stage. By the end of 2005, the primary organisation embraced 100 members out of a total of 400 workers in the company and was still struggling to receive a union office until mid-2004. One of the active members described the 416 relations between its union committee and the port committee as remote. ‘They worked on their own, and we worked on our own, I did not seek help from the port committee. We do not need to apply the joint draft of the collective agreement’ (EdwardM, docker of Neva-Metall, August 04, 2005). And later on, when I had a chance to gather members of the union committee to discuss the situation of the conflict at the port and also to make a comparison with their own union organisation, they started to argue who was rather correct on the estimation of the port committee’s strategy. ‘We have members with a passive attitude, a weak leader, strong union committee, and a relatively progressive employer. We prefer to work on our own. The port committee was not really helpful. …I rarely read the newspaper. ’ (Conversation with the members of Union Committee Neva-Metall, August 04, 2005) It is important to note that the leadership of the five trade union committees are not fully indifferent. More concretely to say, in the case of Neva-Metall or ‘BBT’, or even PKT the conditions derive less benefit from being member organisations, since their companies have different ownership from the traditional stevedore companies. The active port committee played a limited role in the formation or support of other union organisations. Therefore, in these two companies, it was only the chairperson of 417 the union committee or a single activist who kept the primary union organisation running under the port organisation of RPD. Port committee My talk with the leader of the port committee was combined with respect and frustration. The reason for this partly derived from the words and the fact that their explanations made me not sure which part presented more facts in the field of the labour relations of the seaport. The leader had repeated many times that for them the organisational work more likely depended on finding and recruiting activists to carry out organisational tasks. As he pointed out: ‘So the first lesson is – the understanding of people. But only understanding is not enough; it is necessary to have the will and the knowledge that there is no ‘kind uncle’ who will come and do everything for us. After the organisation has been established, when people have been found who understand that it is necessary to change things for the better, then you have to start with small things, with recruiting people for the organisation. The main direction is workers of the main profession. So that even if it does not have a majority, the new union organisation will still be able to achieve many things’ (Moiseenko, 2004).110 110 Cited from Moiseenko, 2004, Pravda truda, No. http://www.rpw.ru/pt/04/naput.html [Accessed 05 June 2006]. 4 [Online]. Available from: 418 In a radio interview in 2005, Moiseenko responded to the suggestion that the trade union system needed to be changed by replying, ‘that is not the issue, because from the point of view of what needs to be changed, we need simply to switch on the consciousness that the trade union is us - people. People fill up the trade union, are members of the trade union. People determine the goals and tasks. To achieve these goals and tasks, again, everything depends on people, on the community spirit of people, on their commitment…. If people dispersed, the trade union would be nothing. To date, unfortunately, we can be confident, particularly over the last six years, that without a collective, without people, you will do nothing. You will resolve nothing with administrative resources. To date, if we had used only the administrative resources of a trade union with ten people on the port committee, that is what I would say. It would have been a soap bubble, a return to the old trade union’ (Moiseenko, 2005).111 The material resources of the port committee also reflect the strength of the organisation. Apart from the offices of the union committees, the dockers’ organisation has a separate office for the port organisation (port committee). The 111 A radio programme transcription. See Moiseenko, Radio Svoboda, Konflikt mezhdu profsoyuznoi organizatsiei dokerov i rukovodstvom morskogo porta Peterburga, July 26 2005[Online]. Available from: http://www.svoboda.org/ll/econ/0705/ll.072605-2.asp [Accessed 05 June 2006]. 419 office of the Port committee is located in one of the buildings of the port authority, out of the port territory, together with two other departments of the port establishments: Department of Protection of Labour and Department of the Technical Director. There is a strict control at reception in the modern building. (To some extent, the whole office environment is even better than that inside the palace of the FNPR trade unions in SPb and Leningrad region.) To compare the port committee’s resources with the office of local RPLBZh organisations, the dockers’ port organisation owns all kinds of communication and office equipment not only from the budget of the union due but mostly provided by the administration of the port companies. The president even owns a laptop. (Surprisingly, there is even a portable storage card reader.) The office is cosy without visible slogans or posters for the union’s struggle (no ‘militant-struggle spirit’ images) but decorated with paintings of Peter the Great. For the function of the port committee body, there are three divisions of the union activities including the president and deputy president, the accounting officers, and economical and legal consultation centres. (Unlike the railway workers where the chairperson has to carry all these functions) All the primary organisations comprise the backbone of the port organisation. And the trade union committee also has the role of mediator between the port committee and their own union organisations. Chairpersons of the union committees 420 normally meet in the office of the port committee at least once a week (Thursday). Such frequent meetings help the internal coordination among the leaders. On such occasions, they exchange information about the development of negotiations or confrontation with their own management, and also listen to the report of the president of the port committee on recent issues or participation in external relationships. Moreover, the meeting also provides a space for asserting mutual solidarity among the union organisations, as the union committee would have more information and has a ‘duty’ to mobilise their members to share solidarity at their own conferences. (See Figure 4.3) Figure 4.3: A solidarity message posted on the port committee’s bulletin board Data source: Doker, No. 129, 15 November 2003, p.2. The title of the resolution: On Solidarity with the docker-mechanics of PerStiKo. Resolution of the conference of the local primary organisation of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers of the ‘First Container Terminal112 The content of the resolution was the following: ‘To express solidarity with the docker-mechanics of ZAO (The full spelling is Zakrytaya aktsionaya obshestvo, means private closed-stock company. S.K.) PerStiKo asserting their right to healthy working conditions. To condemn the actions of the administration of ZAO PerStiKo in persecuting those striving for justice and legality of the workers of the company. To support the steps taken by the Trade Union Committee of Dockers of the ZAO PerStiKo and the port committee of RPD of the St Petersburg seaport for the lawful regulation of the 112 421 The connection between the members and the union organisation has been quite positive. It seems that such making of solidarity has been not so much for individual union struggle as to shape the coordinating capacity of the port committee. When asked about the function and the strength of the port committee, people gave a high evaluation. All these practices have guaranteed the strength and the authority of the port committee. As most activists at the port believe, their members are active enough while they were preparing to put pressure on their administrations. There has been little worry about how to persuade members to participate in industrial action. (Nevertheless, they also know that it is unlikely that they will be able to mobilise members to participate in massive protests.) He further also mentioned the possible direction for the dockers’ union to unite (form a block group) with other independent unions. The president of the port committee even defined those workers who are not members of the trade union as strike-breakers. As he said such, ‘For us it is completely incomprehensible. Well, none of them would refuse the bonus, which is paid according to the collective agreement, which was adopted thanks to the dockers’ union. These are real strike-breakers. Unfortunately, our people will not turn their backs on them, because so conflict, right up to an appeal to international legal bodies’. Adopted unanimously. 11 November 2003. 422 much vodka has been drunk, their families are friends, they pick mushrooms together. Then it will somehow be forgotten that those standing apart benefit from something which they themselves did not strive for’ (Group interview, February 18, 2004) In addition, all the presidents of the port committee since 1991 have been from the First Stevedore Company. Preparation for the collective agreement Since RPD was established, the relations between workers and the seaport administration or employers have been quite regularly organised, and the main battles have been around the content of the collective agreement. We may say that the dockers’ organisations at the Seaport of St Petersburg firstly benefited from the design attached to the organisation of work – the complex brigade or group work. We can also see that the preparation of the collective agreement on the dockers’ side benefits from the relatively efficiency of its organisational structure. The more important matter is the leaders and the activists did pay much attention to the preparatory work of collective bargaining. Outside the structure, there is another panel, the workers’ representative for the collective agreement working panel, which also represents the rank-and-file members. Before forming an official panel to work on the collective agreement, they normally set up a tariff commission to collect and listen to demands 423 or suggestions from their members. It usually takes up to one year to prepare for it. And there are then conferences held to collect members’ general demands. The drafts and progress of both those demands and the preparation work for collective bargaining have normally been published in the port organisation’s newspaper (Doker – za rabochee delo). Each member would receive the full list of various documents – such as proposals, compromise articles – related to their collective bargaining via the circulation of the union’s bulletin. Each member should also receive the whole copy of the agreement once the collective agreement has been authorised. The whole practice presents union members and union activists with intensive contact, so that together also guarantees the dynamics of the union organisation. Since the first collective agreement signed in 1993, dockers of St Petersburg Seaport have been concerned with how to improve the agreement and how to develop more efficient bargaining skills. The matter for the RPD port organisation was such a development has not been easy because they need to represent the concern of ordinary members. For example, since 1996, there have been more than one hundred new articles proposed for new collective agreements. The basic categories and the contents of the collective agreement are: The organisation of production 424 Working time Protection of labour Remuneration of labour Employment Social guarantees and benefits Workers’ right of trade union activity To work out all these requirements, the members of the working team have to look through about 30 documents. Members of the collective bargaining commission from the union’s side have the right to take temporary leave on full pay. When they enter into the negotiation period, according to experience, the two parties – administration and workers - normally meet twice a week (the working group meets for about two hours each time). Moreover, in 2003, the port committee has started to provide a united draft for the trade union committee of each stevedore company to develop its own agreement with the management of the company. Basically all individual agreements would be able to be presented under the common draft. Such attempts, however, did not meet what the leaders expected over the process of 2003-2005. The trade union committees of PKT and Neva-Metall, for both the conditions and equipment and the ownership of these two companies are different from the First, the Second and the Fourth Stevedore Companies, reached their own 425 agreements with their employers. Generally, the dockers’ organisations recognise the necessity of uniting under the representation of the port committee. The trade union committees also recognise the meaning of showing the solidarity message to each other. The coordinating ability of the port committee showed solidarity in the necessity of improving working conditions and the necessity for united actions. The port committee agreed that at the port there should be a single draft of the collective agreement. As an ideal development for the next step, the port committee would be able to require the administrations of the Seaport of St Petersburg to sign a joint collective agreement covering all workers in the port. Nevertheless, in practice, such an agreement would exclude workers belonging to those companies which are not included in the whole managerial structure. More importantly, one of the characteristics of the port committee and their union committees is that the activists are not restrained from mobilising members to form a strong voice in order to put pressure on the administration. There were even joint conferences held in order to unite and strengthen the voice of the workers of the involved companies. A similar character can be found more specifically in their own practice of employing the term ‘social partnership’ for their collective bargaining. The port committee provided the most critical role in coordinating the preparatory work for collective bargaining. The main coordination functions of the 426 port committee have been based on sharing their experiences and skills of how to deal with employers during the process. Here the port committee office provides delegates of different trade union organisations with a ‘space’ to work on it. And the port committee has clearly built its role on this function: to be present and support their delegates in their negotiations with companies operating at the port, as well as to make these negotiations based on a unified, common draft. According to the acquired authority of both trade union committees and the port organisation, these delegates have been able to load off their work duties and work on the average wage while preparing for the collective agreement bargaining. So that for the preparation work delegates can be fully incorporated as a working group. The port committee owns its office, its staff, and its own facilities. All union activists have access to the equipment of the port committee and its services. (Although each trade union committee also has basic communications equipment.) However, we would need to distinguish the character of the solidarity action of dockers at the St Petersburg seaport. Sometimes, there was doubt from rank-and-file dockers too. For example, a docker-machine operator from the Second Stevedoring Company complained about the poor solidarity when he and his colleagues first went on warning action during the conflict between dockers and the administration, though the chairperson of the union committee of PerStiKo promised to carry out all possible 427 support to the acting collective, ‘In actual fact we received only ‘‘choke’’ (polki v koleca). And the employers even sensed our weak solidarity; they simply transferred the cargo handling capacity to the company PerStiKo. Those cargoes were even soon disembarked. And where is the solidarity yet?’ (Zakharov, 2004, Doker, No. 135, p.3) From the participation in the dockers’ organisational work and strike action, we can note that the strongest solidarity network is based on the traditional network of companies, and that was deliberately conducted by the port committee. More details will be given when we move to the conflicts in 2004 and 2005 in the next chapter. 4.3.3 External relations Apart from the coordination role for internal work, another designed work for the port committee is to handle their external relations. Their regular cooperation with external organisations includes their work with the legal consultation centre Egida, previously operated as the St Petersburg branch of the AFL-CIO sponsored Solidarnost’, and also the Fund of Workers’ Academy, organised by the local left-wing scholar and political activist, Professor Popov. In addition, contacts with external trade union organisations are required to go through the Port committee. 428 The port committee’s contact with Egida has been merely for the practical resources. Apart from attendance at the round table meetings of Egida to share the experience of collective bargaining in the port, the dockers’ leaders have had little interest in building external contacts with other local trade unions. The contact with the legal centre, which is basically between the chief of the port committee’s legal consultant section and the director of Egida, has given the union access to labour law experts. As for the internal organisational work, the port committee used to invite the local legal consultation centre Egida, to conduct local seminars for their members to learn the new Russian Labour Code. The cooperation with the Fund of Workers’ Academy firstly comes from several leaders’ ideological connection with the ‘Workers’ Academy’. Secondly, it is useful for their activists to learn the skills and the practice of collective bargaining offered by experts of the Workers’ Academy. Such cooperation is based more on practical needs than any intention to create a solidarity network. Since the dockers’ unions do not have their own newspaper or bulletin, the connection with the Workers’ Academy gives them access to the port committee’s newspaper ‘Doker’ for publication. The newspaper, just like that of the local railway workers, uses its own title when it is the dockers’ turn for their union, under the general, common name of ‘Za rabochee delo’. As mentioned earlier, the newspaper is widely used to inform members of 429 achievements, analysis and information about collective bargaining, and also to pass messages of solidarity among member organisations. One of the few exceptions when they have mobilised their members for further action for a broader campaign was when they joined the picket against the new Labour Code in 2001. As I described in Chapter One, the active RPD organisations did not come out to present massive support to those weak alternative organisations in St Petersburg. The port committee joined the nationwide protests and warning strikes to show their opposition to the new Labour Code. Moiseenko, as the president of the port committee and the deputy president of RPD, participated in the joint appeal to support the draft of Oleg Shein. On 17 March, dockers at the seaport stopped their work for five minutes from 10pm and gave signals to show their support for ‘United Action against the Adoption of the government’s version of the new Russian Labour Code’. The port organisation did not belong to any political party, and the leaders did not stand for major Russian political parties. Interestingly, if one were to judge by the party’s own propaganda, it would look as though the leadership of the port committee actively participated in the formation of the Russian Party of Labour in 2004. Nevertheless, the leaders did not see much reason for docker activists to participate in party work. There were two considerations for them to be involved in the 430 establishment of the party. Firstly, the leaders were introduced via their relations with the Fund of Workers’ Academy, since the leader of the ‘Workers’ Academy’ had decided to form a stronger coalition with broader militant labour organisations. There were few problems for the dockers’ leaders to re-use their original link to be part of the tiny left-wing party. Secondly, this could be a way to keep a certain political weight by benefiting from the political coverage during the election campaign. In practice, these activists rarely made much effort to participate in the party. The above activities certainly rely on the ability of the leadership of the port committee. The president of the port committee enjoys a highly respected role and is independent from all trade union committees. In interviews with the union’s active members most people expressed their respectful attitude toward the president of the port committee. And the president of the port committee, Aleksandr Moiseenko, asserted that the reasons why any union organisation might fall into factional struggles were all down to the personal factor. But so far within the dockers’ organisations, they have not experienced or confronted this problem. He compared the characteristics of their profession with those of railway workers. For the explanation of how to conduct their external relations, his opinion showed the port organisation’s attitude when they were called to participate in those issues not direct related to them. The leaders have clearly shown that they care more about what kind of result they can 431 receive within the broader framework of the organisation. When I caught a chance to raise a conversation with a local activist (Vadim Bol’shakov) and the president of port committee over public protest, he replied as follows: ‘It is a great pity that our workers will not go to show their support for other organisations or others’ struggles. According to my own memory, I worked for 24 years on the port. I haven’t seen a single action carried out by workers’ (Moiseenko, October 21, 2003). In addition, there is one interesting finding to note. In their regular meetings, the general atmosphere was very different from that in the RPLBZh meetings. It seemed that activists of RPD had avoided fierce internal conflict. Quarrels did happen, but it seemed mostly that they were not out of control. Personal denunciations between each other were rarely seen either. When asked how was the internal relationship among leaders of trade union committees, few mentioned that the most famous was the personal conflict between the two founders of the local organisation, and others would rather keep distant from standing on either side. There are still personal problems among the leaders, which mostly involved political ideology and personal characteristics, but they chose rather to ignore it than to raise it.113 Currently, the level 113 During the 2005 collective labour conflict at the port, one trade union committee president even asked me if I will have a chance to talk to the president of the port committee in the near future. He would like me to explain to Moiseenko that the strategy should change, which he had suggested but Moiseenko did not take his idea, the trade union committee president believed I had a similar opinion as he had, so he would like to see if Moiseenko would reconsider the suggestion again. (Conversation with Vladimir Karataev, chairperson of trade union committee Neva-Metall, August 2, 2005) 432 of authority among the workers is obvious. When the president (Moiseenko) was present, he was the only person who could interrupt other people talking. When he was speaking, others would usually keep very quiet and not add their own opinions at the same time. When asked for details, the deputy presidents were quite cautious about not exposing more than the president might have said. 4.3.4 The commitment to social partnership Interestingly, while sometimes even regional FNPR trade union leaders and free trade union leaders have criticised the framework and the principle of social partnership from time to time, the RPD port organisation have consistently and openly adopted the ‘principle of social partnership’. The union’s commitment to social partnership looks as though not surprising, as Ashwin (2004, p.42) pointed out ‘In Russia there is no room for doubt about the meaning of partnership’. Nonetheless, the activists of port organisations did not simply take the ‘principle’ as an abstract term in their official claims or documents, but actively developed their own approach. For dockers at the St Petersburg Seaport, the idea of social partnership was born out of their concern over the future of the seaport operation in the early 1990s. The local dockers struggled to gain guarantees from the re-structuring port authorities. They fought to receive guarantees over wages and working conditions during the 433 transition of the whole sector and also changes affecting the local seaport operation. The union organisation was officially recognised following these struggles. As a principle within the port labour relations, the idea and term of social partnership has been generally recognised by the port administrations and the dockers’ organisations. In the internal documents used between the employers and the union organisations, the term ‘social partnership’ has been often applied to define their moves. More importantly, in their daily activities, not only did the union leaders define the dimension of the common policy of the dockers’ trade union organisations, many activists also referred to the conception of social partnership. There are several varieties of use of the term which must be reviewed within their associated contexts. To distinguish the pattern of the dockers’ application of ‘social partnership’, the next section will demonstrate basic references in the activities of the dockers’ organisation at the workplace. Firstly, social partnership develops towards raising competitive ability. By taking the term as a principle of mutual relations, one of the basic arguments over social partnership local dockers used to define is that it provides the base for expanding the competitive ability of the company. Like most supporters of social partnership in the field of industrial relations, the dockers’ union leaders have expressed and repeated their belief in winning the port’s or the terminal’s competitiveness among the ports 434 around the Baltic region by improving the efficiency of work through the realisation of social partnership. The definition that for both sides of employers and their workers, following the principle of social partnership will definitely have a positive effect on the companies’ performance has been widely propagated (Doker, No 135, No 145, and No 147). Yet, what is to be done when considering the practice of social partnership in the general sense? In his analytical article published in the union newspaper, the chairperson of PKT union committee presented several basic elements for working out social partnership at the port. Firstly, he called on the employer to modernise the port equipment so that the workers would be able to serve their duties with more efficiency and less insecurity. Secondly, to make workers feel positive for their future life, which means they should be satisfied with the labour conditions at the port. Finally, these provisions should all be incorporated in their collective agreements. According to him, he concluded that once such a kind of collective agreement has been arrived at, ‘non-conflictual social partnership would then be available, so that the company would be able to reach higher productivity’ (Sarzhin, 2004, Doker, No 135, p.4). It is interesting to note that such kinds of reference to social partnership by the union activists normally came up when the employers and the workers were about to enter into the official collective bargaining period. Secondly, social partnership involves reaching a proper (better) collective 435 agreement. Following the general argument around the term ‘social partnership’, the activists and leaders did have such a belief: the collective agreement is the basis and the instrument of social partnership. The necessity of having an effective collective agreement was considered as the ‘solution’ to the changes in the external environment. The president of the RPD port committee insisted that while the new Labour Code eroded the base of the union’s status, reaching a better collective agreement has been the best solution to guarantee the working conditions for the port workers. It is important to note that the dockers’ support for social partnership has always been linked to the necessity of not only reaching a collective agreement, but also reaching a ‘better’ collective agreement. It is obvious that when the union activists say they are fighting for a ‘better’ agreement, they mean they are fighting for an ‘advanced’ (progressive) content of the agreement that will guarantee higher wages and better benefits than the previous ones. According to the official statement of the port committee, ‘The workers have a right to receive not simply maintenance of the present condition, but a preferable one. Only with that [a better collective agreement S.K.] can we confirm social partnership, because that can stimulate workers’ production motive and raise competitive strength’ (Port Committee of St Petersburg Seaport, RPD, 2005, Docker, No 155, p.1). 436 In other words, according to the union’s declaration as well, a worse version of the collective agreement not only ‘conflicts’ with the law but also ‘conflicts’ with the principle of social partnership. By addressing their general aspiration to the concrete context of the 2004 collective bargaining campaign, the dockers wanted the employers to resolve the gap between their real wages and inflationary pressure. The RPD union activists asserted that in response to the development of the collective agreements at the St Petersburg Seaport, a better version of the new collective agreement for dockers would have to include wage indexation and a mechanism for raising real wages in the agreement. For this new goal, the dockers have tried hard to legitimise these demands by stressing the principle of social partnership in recent years. Their logic can be presented as the following: what is good for the workers is also good for the company; and maintaining such a balance can prove that the principle of social partnership is still observed in the relations between the employers and the workers. Thirdly, social partnership involves definite social guarantees and social benefits for the workers. Here it means social partnership is no longer just an abstract principle to guide the interaction between the partners. In the case study we found that it was even used to authorise certain demands of workers. For example, the dockers stressed that the provision of social guarantees (sotsgarantiya) should be treated as the basis of 437 social partnership. A similar expression for delivering ‘social security’ (sotsial’naya zashchishchennost’) also appeared among their aspirations. A docker who participated in bargaining for the 2003 collective agreement gave his own interpretation of the term as follows, ‘In striving to win social guarantees and social benefits for the dockers, it will lead to a rise in workers’ responsibility and their growing concern for the results of the company’s activity (a higher responsibility and better performance of the company), and the principles of social partnership will be realised more fully’ (Nefedov, 2002, Doker, No 121, pp.2-3). Following their arguments, we can even find that the dockers have a more detailed listing to define what kind of role social partnership should perform in their working life at the port. It is interesting to note, in the sense of linking the necessity of various social benefits and the value of social partnership, that the exercise of social partnership has been used more than as a simple principle; it has become a specific object that reflects the demands of the workers’ side. Most interestingly and importantly, although both employers and the union at the port have recognised the value of social partnership, the activists were not fully convinced that their employers would take a proper direction. If the previous points reflect the positive expectation of the dockers in terms of implementing social 438 partnership, the following point shows a sort of militant attitude corresponding to the conditions in practice. Most local RPD activists did realise that social partnership is always accompanied by confrontation. As a docker wrote, ‘In my opinion, the partnership between the administration and the union committees has a kind of lopsided character. If the trade union had not put serious pressure on the administration or rejected the position of the administration then the administration would have decided to take advantage of it. It seems that the process never took a proper step without going to the arbitration commission or on the brink of a strike’ (Karetnikov, 2002, Doker, No 121, 10 November 2002, p.3). Even during the negotiation such expressions could also appear. The dockers see the result of the collective agreement as a test of the nature of the existing partnership. When the negotiation entered a blocked stage, the workers started to show their frustration, which simultaneously gave a warning sign that the employers have moved away from the good practice of social partnership. An article contributed to their newspaper by a worker who participated in the preparation work in 2003 provides a typical example. In his article under the title of ‘Characteristic of Partnership’, he stressed that the nature of the two sides has always been that the representatives of the workers try hard to make a better collective agreement; but the representatives of the 439 administration only want to truncate workers’ rights to a minimum standard. He then started to wonder whether it was worth continuing to sit in the negotiation meeting. As a representative of the workers’ side, he also implied that the employers’ side should ‘take the opportunity of a breakdown of negotiations to change this situation’ (Artemov, 2003, Doker, No 129, 10 June 2003, p.2). It is important to note that such messages were delivered by union representatives in order to give a signal that they were very disappointed with the negotiations. All the above expressions may not demonstrate much to distinguish them from the general or ideal definitions of other Russian trade unions. As mentioned earlier, most social partnership supporters, even FNPR organisations, officially declare that the whole dialog process certainly includes negotiation, confrontation and compromise. The most relevant concern here, as was mentioned earlier, is that the lack of enforcement mechanisms generally presents the most critical problem for the practice of social partnership in Russia. The dockers’ union organisations have kept a very active position in the period of collective bargaining. They have expressed the will to achieve a mutually acceptable solution, while they have mobilised their members to be ready for further collective action. Obviously, the purpose of the move presented by union activists was to legitimise the reason why labour conflict occurred despite their commitment to ‘social partnership’. 440 Such concerns are often seen in leader’s opinions or comments on the organisation of cargo handling. The occasions that dockers’ leaders often deliver their belief in the improvement of social partnership to strengthen the port or the terminal’s efficiency among the ports of the Baltic region, have revealed a reference to the security of their current jobs. More interestingly, the pattern of raising social partnership in practice is totally not the same as among most FNPR trade unions – hence the St Petersburg port committee did more than only adopt ‘social partnership’ as a means to secure their survival. On many occasions, we can see union leaders like Moiseenko or Sarzhin applying the term social partnership in the context that dockers are ready to fight for their working conditions because they think they should be equally treated. Actions such as calling strikes for better wages (indexing of wages as another example) is an approach to reach a ‘reasonable condition’ as a precondition so that dockers can feel that they would like to work without troubles and together with the management to stabilize or strengthen the performance of the seaport. As my primary conclusion of this case-study, the fact that local union activists rely on mobilizing and strengthening union organisations to shape their perception of social partnership is clear. Such an approach, as distinguishable from the passive adoption within FNPR’s strategy, we can call the type of practice of social partnership as an aggressive pattern of exploiting partnership or social partnership in the making of 441 labour relations. 4.4 Conclusion In comparison with the position of FNPR unions, we see the position of the dockers’ unions at St Petersburg Seaport presents an interesting and quite contrasting scene. Indeed, a kind of collective identity based on specific working condition such as payment-health balance and brigade coordination did to some extent become evident among the port workers. Among the port workers, the docker profession plays the major part, and other professions expected their role should be considered as part of the collective. Although some activists themselves reveal that individualistic or passive attitudes as general features do exist, they also believe a strong trade union organisation can compensate for such weakness, while insisting that workers’ consciousness must be a critical element for the union. And such an identity was even embraced by the union organisation. The strength of making decisions on brigade leader candidates together with the management made the role of the brigade and brigade leader critical to the mobilisation and coordination of union capacity. Interestingly, the study of dockers at St Petersburg seaport provides similarities with the specific definition of the team system of work in a group of work organisation case studies in the West. ‘Structurally, team systems appear to foster patterns of solidarity and 442 mutual support that enable workers to contest or recast managerial initiatives. Finally, and in more cultural or discursive terms, by introducing the language of participation into the workplace, team systems provide workers with a legitimate rhetorical framework with which to claim decision-making powers they have previously been denied’(Vallas 2003, p.220) The brigades / union groups firstly associated as strong cells have enabled the union to retain a real ability to mobilise its members to take industrial action. Thus the making of a broader ‘community’ proved possible at the St Petersburg Seaport. Their words, their suggestions show the union activists did have clear audiences to appeal to – the members, the union activists, and the brigade and brigade leaders. The union organisation provided a platform for its members from different companies to share similar support. Such collective identity is most concretised at the brigade work level (inward), for within the labour process different brigades might be encouraged by management policy to compete with each other; and/or at the level of the specific division of labour – the specialisation of the company (outward). Therefore, we have seen that the types of union position are not really indifferent. The local RPD union organisations at the port comprise the majority workforce of the main stevedore companies (mostly dockers), and therefore have gained 443 legitimacy for collective bargaining. The traditional union organisation did not represent another arm of the administration to oppress the local RPD organisation. Moreover, with its dominant status of worker representation, the primary organisations and their local unity organ, the Port Organisation (Committee) of RPD of St Petersburg Seaport, have been quite active in waging collective actions to defend the interests of the port workers. And the organisation did maintain its strength in a constant state of power balance with the port administration and the various companies. In comparison with the stories of the October Railway workers we have seen in the previous chapters, the fact that there have been only a few cases of individual victimisation shows the strength of RPD port organisations. The power balance between the union and the employer has been quite active. More importantly, the way that the port committee worked for the collective agreement showed the authority of the union organisations, which is reflected in the way members embrace a highly disciplined idea of union participation. While facing labour disputes, the union conferences had then provided the fundamental grass roots base for the decisions of the union leadership. Therefore, although the daily activity of the union organisation can only be made by leaders or key activists, the port committee of RPD at the St Petersburg Seaport has remained a grass-roots orientated union organisation. It is noteworthy that, as we have seen in the political conflicts that followed the 444 replacement of the CPSU regime in the early 1990s, Russian trade union organisations were forced to find a safe position against the threats of the new regime. The general priority for most trade unions was to retain the union’s status, which meant accommodating to the new political realities and collaborating with the employer within the workplace. Unlike these trade union organisations, the newborn dockers’ union was not preoccupied with securing the union’s survival but rather with advancing its members’ interests. Such characteristics distinguish the port organisations from the enormous but inactive FNPR trade unions. From RPD union organisations’ struggles at the port, we should firstly note that the development of the past conflicts, though related to the whole administration of Joint Stock Company St Petersburg as a whole and with the Russian state, was based on the workers’ strength conducted by the organisation in individual companies. In the first phase, during the insecure transitional period of the port management, the dockers’ organisations had always sought to find a solution within the framework of accepting the changes in port ownership. For the dockers the struggle in 1998 was not to act against privatisation, but to maintain benefits they had gained before the re-organisation of the port management. Even the state has some share in the Open JSC Seaport of St Petersburg, but the local RPD organisations rarely orient their direct strategy towards the responsibility of the Russian government. Moreover, the second phase of their 445 struggle began once international trade started to recover around the region. The dockers wanted to see the real level of their wages protected by setting up a new mechanism for the wage system in the collective agreement. To achieve such goals, the local RPD union organisations have engaged in various struggle events to strengthen the union’s ability in collective bargaining. However, the strength of the RPD port organisation at Seaport of St Petersburg has been a case on its own, since RPD did not really play any specific role in the empowerment of the local port organisations’ struggle. The pattern of the port organisation, it seems, can be defined as one result of workplace unionism. We can also take such a characteristic into account to understand the basis of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers – this is probably why the local RPD activists themselves said that RPD means little more than a ‘flag’ for them. Generally, the dockers’ primary organisations do recognise the necessity of uniting under the representation of the port committee. The trade union committees also recognise the meaning of showing the solidarity message to each other. The coordinating ability of the port committee showed the activists’ making of a ‘broader’ collectivism in perceiving shared working conditions and the necessity for united actions. Benefiting from the active and well-disciplined participation of its members, the port committee and its union committees have been able to coordinate their 446 actions and to make collective decisions. Nonetheless, there are three levels of organisational participation within the whole RPD port organisation. Firstly, those remaining in the centre are the union organisations of the three companies; slightly distant from the centre are the organisations at PKT and at Neva-Metall; then those vanished or failed groups. The connection among union organisations of different companies actually reflects the organisation network basis of workplace relations. Some of them simply prefer their own strategy with their own management policy. The PKT president highlights the necessity of investment in equipment modernisation which means that the PKT union committee mostly brings up the positive role of social partnership. Workers from Neva-Metall showed a rather distant relationship to the port organisation for it seemed their ‘progressive / tricky’ management needed their own response but not that suggested by the other three companies. Furthermore, if we generate an overview on activists’ presence in each company, it would show another fact, that we cannot find a strong organisational presence in every company. It seems the differences among RPD primary organisations reflect the difference of the immediate managements, and it is quite obvious the port committee did not yet extend its capacity over such differences as shown by the failure of organising new union organisations out of their own workplace, like the timber terminal workers who were not able to be organised (as they also failed to form new primary organisations in 447 other areas within the port territory). However, the fragmentation of the workforce has been a regular issue for the trade union movement in every society. Even though the differences, or to say the weaknesses, do appear in the RPD port organisation, we still could note the benefit from the union and workplace combination. The interactions between members and the trade union committee at each company are not really distant since the chairperson of the shop committee is usually their brigade leader. It seems that the strength of the dockers at St Petersburg Seaport rather reflects the union’s efforts of internal coordination, and it somewhat depends on the balance sheet of the interactions between separate brigade collectives and the broader ‘port community’ created under the efforts of the union’s strategy. In this context an important feature is how people involved perceive their own development. The RPD activists’ optimism was a big surprise for me when I talked to them in the period of my fieldwork, at the time they believed a well-organised-and-coordinated port organisation will prevent any enormous blow to their work. Their confidence started to fade when facing the uncertain change of port ownership. When the collective action was taking place, the well-coordinated campaign and well-organised strike proved the port organisation was really powerful, on the one hand, but the fact that the capacity centred on the energy of workers of core companies exposed more the limits of active organisation and strategy, on the other hand. As we will see in more detail in 448 the strike event presented in the next chapter, I will present more details about the impact of workplace relations on the practice of their mobilisation, their coordination and their definition of social partnership during the collective labour dispute. 449 Chapter 5 St Petersburg dockers in 2004 and 2005: the union’s mobilisation for strike actions ‘All of us know, that the Piter dockers represent a pioneer of the free trade union movement, and for today they are an example of active, determined trade unions, not only for other workers but also for employers’ (The director of Legal Consultation Centre of Labour Affairs ‘EGIDA’)114 The dispute in 2001 indicated the growing concern about real wages among dockworkers at the St Petersburg Seaport. The local RPD organisations had achieved temporary agreements with the employers. However, the fact the new Russian Federation Labour Code was coming into effect made local union activists believe their union had lost the privilege to affect their working conditions as they did before. The fight for a full guarantee of a collective agreement became the very method to maintain their conditions, their rights and their power. Realising the weakness of separate collective bargaining, the port committee believed that it was necessary to bring all primary organisations to work within a joint collective agreement project when facing their own employers. The unsuccessful bargaining conditions in PerStiKo, VSK, ChSK and PKT resulted in labour conflicts. The differential 114 Newsletter of Committee for Solidarity Actions, 16 August 2005. p.2. 450 settlement provided opportunities for further analysis of the mobilisation, the networks, and more importantly, the development of these factors under the condition of port ‘collectives’. The understanding of the development will help to clarify the strength and prospect of the dockers’ collectivity, while the port organisation might have presented itself as a counter force to the original fragmentation of the workforce. The investigation of the disputes found that, although the fragmentation was less visible as a result of the efforts of the union’s successful mobilisation and solidarity making, it still existed and played a critical role in the pre-conflict situation. In concrete, in the docker-predominant workplaces, a professional ‘community’ was associated with strong union coordination. Still, the active united port organisation, though able to make a strong solidarity campaign based on the community, received little extension but operated on the basis of the main collectives. Brief review of the 2004-2005 strike Despite the fact that the last collective agreement was signed in 2002, dockers at the St Petersburg Seaport started to complain that their real wages did not grow but were even lower than the standard in 2000. The port union organisations believed that was because the inflation compensation for their wages was not sufficient to cover the gap. The grievances among the workers grew stronger when they compared the wage level 451 to the port performance since the growth of the cargo handling had increased and that meant that more intensive work had been carried out. According to the RPD port committee, the rate of their working norm was not calculated corresponding to their higher productive performance. In April 2004, the official negotiation round of the collective agreement for 2005-2008 was due to begin. The main demand from the workers’ side was to raise their wages by 40%, and this demand was expected to be added into several tariff-mechanism articles in the new collective agreement. The report of the RPD port committee stressed that since the new Russian Labour Code had come into effect, the strength of union organisation had been weakened and for the best protection for workers’ labour conditions they would now have to mainly rely on the content of the collective agreement. The dockers supported the port committee of RPD and believed it was the right time to make serious progress for better conditions for their duties. From the employers’ side, dockers at St Petersburg Seaport had received very good payment and there was no reason to introduce an extra pay rise. The trade union committees of the four stevedore companies all met difficulties during the period of collective bargaining, as workers’ demands were immediately rejected by the administrations of the stevedore companies. At the end, in four of the five main stevedore service companies, the RPD union committees and the companies failed to reach an agreement in the first instance. As a consequence of the failed 452 negotiation, collective labour disputes started to arise. The first action from the dockers’ side was taken from June to September 2004. The labour dispute and the ‘strike’ action lasted for almost two months. The administration then agreed to reopen talks. Finally, a temporary compromise for both sides was reached. The compromise, however, only provided minor satisfaction of the dockers’ original demands. The main concern about the indexation of their wages was held over until a new negotiation took place the next year. In June 2005, a labour dispute, following similar demands to the 2004 dispute, once again occurred at the port after the failure of a new round of negotiations started in April. The disagreement between the two sides was still over the mechanism of wage indexation, but the union organisation’s status also came to be a new factor in the struggle between the two sides. Despite the confrontation and settlement the previous year, the dispute developed into a fiercer state. Both sides revealed tougher attitudes and preparations toward the solution of the critical conflict. The new port management, handling labour relations with the dockers for the first time, decided to go through the conflict with an uncompromising position. The general director of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg then made efforts to remove the leadership function of the RPD port committee. As a consequence, the dockers had for the first time to undertake a real indefinite strike at the port in the battle for a progressive collective 453 agreement and union rights. More importantly, this was also the first time they had called an official strike since the new Russian Labour Code had come into force. In addition, local labour activists were stirred by the strike event, since such an event has not often been seen in the region. The local press described the situation that had developed as the very first time the dockers were not only using strike threats but were determined to carry out strike action to reach their demands. Following several dramatic events during the dispute period, the dispute officially ended with a guarantee to reach a comprise agreement. Noteworthily, the labour disputes in 2004 and 2005 should be seen as one single event with a long but linked process. The entire development of the 2004 dispute can firstly be seen as a test for both sides. Neither the employers nor the RPD union made crucial moves over the event which might provoke further conflict. Nonetheless, their restraint and the 2004 settlement only postponed the dispute, and the port committee had realised that they would be unlikely to avoid more serious industrial actions. Under the mild dispute atmosphere, the actions taken by both sides actually became the basis of the necessary understanding for their later action in the next year. The RPD activists also realised that any industrial action would be a decisive test of their practical coordination of union organisation-brigade relations. That was the main reason why more serious confrontation as well as more organised forms within the 454 dockers’ industrial action developed. The analysis in this chapter is therefore to focus on the forms of RPD organisation and the participation among their members following the development of the strike events in 2005. 5.1 The labour dispute in 2004: a prelude On 29 January 2004, at the 22nd Conference of RPD St Petersburg Seaport organisation, workers brought up concrete complaints that their real wages were actually below the wage standard of 2000. The conference then set up several aims for the progress of the upcoming collective bargaining. In addition, the port committee presented a joint draft collective agreement which was drawn up according to their earlier consensus with the JSC Seaport of St Petersburg. The joint draft was assigned to cover port workers of all the stevedore companies, to be applied in the stevedore companies PerStiKo, VSK, ChSK and PKT (the situation in Neva-Metall was different because the employers and union committee agreed simply to extend their previous collective agreement). At the conference, the union leaders were quite optimistic about these goals to take place together. The president of the RPD port committee also expressed the view that for the workers to embrace solidarity and be united, the best way will be for all companies to raise collective bargaining at the same time. In April 2004, the collective agreement for 2005-2008 was due to enter 455 into the official negotiation stage. The main demand from the workers’ side was for a 40% pay increase to cover the indexing of their wages, and this demand was expected to be added into several tariff-mechanism articles in the new collective agreement. The trade union committees of the four stevedore companies all met difficulties in convincing the representatives of their owners to adopt their demands. More difficulties occurred later which gave the period of negotiation a more uncertain atmosphere. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the ownership of the seaport companies has undergone several changes. At the end of June 2004, Jysk Staalindustri, a Danish-registered company and a subsidiary of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, bought 51% of the shares of Joint-stock Company St Petersburg Seaport from the original shareholder - the Lichtenstein-registered company Nasdor Anstaldt. The new owner-oriented company also took over 81% of the PerStiKo, VSK and ChSK. The rest of the shares were in the hands of St Petersburg city government and also the Russian federal government (28.8% of the stock in the hands of the Committee for City Properties (KUGI) of St Petersburg and 20.2% of the stock in the hands of the Russian federal government. The process of collective bargaining was soon halted due to an internal struggle of the port management. An acting general director, Sergei Vishnyakov, had been named but the executive team was not fully authorised by the Board of Directors of 456 JSC Seaport of St Petersburg, and the dockers were confused about whom the demands should appeal to. In the end, these four companies all faced the development towards the stage of a collective labour dispute. Despite also standing on the edge of a collective labour dispute, the trade union committee of PKT, however, reached a deal separately with their administration (subordinated to another ownership, different from that of the other three stevedore companies) later on, and finally concluded an agreement by the end of 2004. Receiving an unfamiliar expectation to meet and negotiate with the new owner, the port committee addressed their demands for the content of the new collective agreement 2005-2008. The port committee and the primary organisations of the companies PSK, VSK and ChSK proposed their demands focusing on raising workers’ real wages and the installation of an indexing mechanism. According to the port committee of RPD, the workers at the port raised two demands for the new collective agreement: making a compensatory rise in the nominal list of tariff rates and pay for all employees; and drawing-up a common mechanism of introducing indexation of wages corresponding to inflation for all employees. Firstly, the local union organisation stressed that over the past three years, while inflation had kept going on, the employees had seen little increase in their wages, and therefore their real income had actually fallen. Having considered all 457 reasonable factors, the union organisation suggested that compensation should be paid for wages amounting to 40 %. As the analysis presented in the previous chapter showed, the focus on real wage standard has been a constant concern and grievance among local dockers. The dockers believed that they deserved a real wage rise as well as better working conditions. These demands were proposed by representatives of each union committee to their own companies under the joint draft proposed by the port committee. The new administrative team, however, rejected all the main demands of the dockers’ union. The entangled gap between the two sides was clear. The management did not welcome the port committee’s idea of compensating workers’ wages by a more expensive mechanism of accounting for inflation; they insisted that their own mechanism of accounting for wages was enough. The representatives of the administration asserted that the port committee’s demand for increased wages was 6 times higher than the companies could offer. According to his explanation to journalists, Boris Oslan (general director of the First Stevedore Company) suggested the disagreement was only caused by union leaders but not ordinary workers. And, ‘Workers of the Open Joint Stock Company St Petersburg Seaport and its stevedore companies are satisfied with their working conditions. Therefore there is no reason for a strike to take place’ (Birger 2004). With their more specific argument, the administration showed that they believed the wages 458 for most dockers were good enough as their pay had risen. At a press conference, the head of the press department of Open JSC Seaport of St Petersburg (Irina Krinkun) provided more details: ‘The average wage of the docker-operators of the companies in July 2004 was 23,611 roubles, that was 20% higher than the average wage of 19,652 in July 2003…for some dockers, their wages have even been up to 35,000 roubles. Only the port committee of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers can give the answer to the question why the dockers refused to do extra work’. 115 Actually, the administration of the three companies claimed that the nature of this conflict was only a conflict with a ‘union boss’. The port committee, on the contrary, listed their explanations that their wages had lagged behind inflation. The average amount of lag between the increase of tariff rates and consumer price was 32.1% (compared to January 2001). The lag in the index between the increase of wages and consumer prices in the First Stevedore Company was 23.9%, 25% in the Second and 16% in the Fourth. Therefore they had insisted a fair solution can be reached only by the installation of an index mechanism included in the new collective agreement. The disagreement on the raise in the rate of payment thus started a long-term labour dispute. RZhD-Partner, ‘Chto proiskhodit v portu Sankt - Peterburg’, 06 September 2004. [Online]. Available from: http://www.rzd-partner.ru/news/index.php?action=view&st=1094451604&id=4. [Accessed 05 June 2005]. 115 459 5.1.1 Taking collective action: ‘working to rule’ Since the administration refused to agree to the conditions regarding wages which the dockers insisted should be put into the new collective agreement, a decision, and so the new collective agreement, was delayed for three months. Without a compromise from either side the situation at the port entered into the first phase of a labour dispute. On 20 July of 2004, talks between the trade union organisations and the port administration over the collective agreement protocol were officially abandoned. As the frustration of the failed negotiation grew, the port organisations held another conference and dockers of the three companies decided to take action all together. The method of their action was to mobilise the dockers to ‘work to rule’ and refuse overtime work, as local analysts called it, as an ‘Italian strike’. The port committee immediately made their response to the situation. Since the adoption of the new Russian Labour Code, for a legal strike to take place it has to go through very complicated procedures. Drawing on their past experience, the leaders of the union committee expected that the method of an ‘Italian strike’ could put enough pressure on the administration without officially going on strike. More importantly, the dockers responded to their union’s initiative. A brigade leader who is also a militant activist described the atmosphere at his collective as such: 460 ‘We dockers decided to act. Around all brigades there were meetings to organise the launch of collective action. That was in this way: to fulfil only the exact quota of our working norm, strictly follow instructions on labour safety, and refuse to take extra work, nor work during days-off… At the beginning, the administration resisted any compromises, the general director even claimed that he doesn’t need these dockers, said he will be happy to see the dockers get out of the gates,… but his words could not stop the collective actions…The situation lasted for two months. Then a sudden change came up. One Sunday all the crane-operators suddenly left their duties by applying for sick leave, and due to such an event the port halted the whole day long.’ (YuryR, March 21, 2005) The special method of industrial action indeed made an impact on the operation of the railway cargo transport, because the specific character of cargo unloading at the port demands almost round-the-clock operation, and that was usually the case with seaport activity. According to the local news sources, many cargo wagons were left in the railway station near the port. On 19 July, the striking dockers reduced the unloading volume of metal and fertilizer wagons by up to three times. On the first day of the strike there were 400 wagons waiting for unloading, and the number had grown up to 800 wagons on 16 August. Due to the unloading block, the OZhD administration 461 at first condemned the decision of the dockers publicly. The railway administration published an article, quoting the opinion of the Port administration and criticising the demands of the dockers. In August, while the ‘Italian strike’ was still underway, the union suggested holding a new round of negotiation to reach a solution and move out from the labour dispute. The administration insisted that the port was not seriously affected by the strike threat, but tried to force the workers to keep distance from the union’s decision and go back to their duties at the same time. The administration also decided to hire temporary workers to fulfil the work that the striking dockers refused to take. The union leaders realised the critical challenge in front of them and their members, so that they kept up great efforts to maintain connections with their brigades. As Moiseenko explained its importance, ‘Difficulties in carrying out a strike may arise when there is no mutual connection between the union activists and the workers. At some moment the administration also “went to the people”, trying to agitate (workers) during the lunch break. Strengthening such a network appears to be the main task of union activists’ (Aleksandr Moiseenko, July 25, 2005). The local RPD organization though believed that for obvious reasons, not much enthusiasm was sparked among the dockers by these steps. The management had to 462 employ the old-style-and-well-proven technique of brigade leaders: the dockers were summoned one by one and given a pretty good dressing down. The confrontation at the workplace was more like: the least steadfast ones took their time off, those who were more sound snarled back. While the time had been passing away and there was still no sign of a change in the employers’ position, the administration started to take the move of recruiting temporary workers (directly called ‘strike-breakers’ by the union activists) to take the duties at port. RPD activists believed they (the collectives) were not yet to go on serious strike. The port committee started to seek more public support and therefore made an appeal to the public and other trade unions. Interestingly, there has been practically no support from those from the FNPR affiliated Trade Union of Water Transport Workers, which is entitled to sign the sectoral agreement directly. On September 3rd, the port committee issued an appeal to trade unions across Russia to support their struggle. The union’s expectation of support was mild and simple. With the open appeal a form letter of concern and the contact details of the port administration were enclosed. Response from outside came quickly. The member organisations of RPD firstly decided to hold a mild, symbolic action in support of the St Petersburg dockers. The council of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers passed a motion to hold a nationwide 463 action (five-minute work stoppage) over all Russian seaports at 10 am on 8 September, in solidarity with the striking St Petersburg dockers. The slogan would be ‘Recompense the drop in real wages without reduction of work!’ The executive committee of RPD also declared that if the employers failed to meet the dockers’ demands, the solidarity action would be extended to an international scale. In particular, further solidarity action of the RPD member trade unions will depend on how much the ‘Italian way’ can have an effect in Russia. The situation then received a new turning point. On 10 September, an agreement was finally reached and signed in PerStiKo and VSK. The basic content of the agreement was that the employer should set the average monthly wage of the dockers and other port workers at the level corresponding to the rate of over-fulfilment of the cargo handling norm which is agreed by both sides. Yet, the validity of the 2002-2005 collective agreement was extended for one more year. Nevertheless, the real mechanism of wage setting would wait for further discussion, and the indexation of their wages was not agreed. More than that, both sides confirmed that during the season when there is a great growth and demand for cargo handling, over-time work will provide an interest for all participants in the transport process.116 It seems that the dockers achieved few of their original demands, and the settlement achieved no The information referred to Press-release of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg. ‘Zaversheeny peregovory rukovodstva stividornykh kompanii gruppy ‘‘Morskoi port Sankt-Peterburg’’ i profsoyuza dokerov’, [Online]. Available from: http://www.seaport.spb.ru/new/release/2004/1009.htm [Accessed 10 September 2004]. 116 464 more than to postpone the confrontation to the following year. 5.1.2 The situation in PKT The situation in PKT had a different type of progress. In July, the representatives of the employers refused to sign the presented draft ‘‘Summary Protocol’’, which was firstly produced by the joint working group and reviewed by the working group of PKT itself. The representatives of the employers scrapped the earlier Protocol and attempted to discuss their own draft. An official re-negotiation process of collective bargaining for the 2005-2007 collective agreement was set up from 1 November 2004 and continued to the end of January 2005. The negotiation was participated in by both RPD and PRVT primary organisations (2 RPD representatives and 1 PRVT representative), who claimed the two organisations stood for one position (RPD’s proposal). Seeing the reluctant position in discussing the dockers’ proposal, the RPD union leader started to warn that a labour dispute may occur if the representatives on the employers’ side continue their passive attitude and cause further delay of the negotiation. Activists of the RPD union committee at PKT started to agitate their demands among their workers. On the newspaper ‘Doker’, a comparison list of the different contents of the current collective agreement, the employers’ proposal and the RPD union’s proposal for a new collective agreement was published. At the same time 465 (in November), dockers were organised to voice their disappointment about the administration’s position as well as to show the necessity of taking collective action. As the trade union committee was ready to claim they had the workers’ support for collective action, the chairperson of the union committee invited the general director to attend the union’s conference in which they might vote to carry out collective action. During the conference on 17 December 2004, Evgenii Yuzhilin, the general direction of PKT agreed to accept the union’s draft for re-negotiation, so that the negotiation finally entered into a relatively smooth stage. Over a continuous hard bargaining time, the collective agreement was signed on 1 February. Negotiations though continued for another three months over the further alteration of the collective agreement. The content of the mechanism for determining real wages comprises two parts. The first part is wage indexing. It retraces back to autumn of 2004 but comes into effect by the end of 2005. According to the Agreement, from 1 January of every year the total sum will be reviewed. The second part, tariff rate of payments, will also be increased by up to 20 percent. According to the chairperson of the PKT union committee (Aleksandr Sarzhin), such a settlement was a concession of the dockers.117 The final settlement was cheered by activities of all port organisations. Local RPD activists believed that the positions of their employers could be distinguished and used 117 Indeed, several members even told me and emphasised the union president made too much compromise in the content of the mechanism for the inflation compensation rate. They said Sarzhin simply was not able to move from his comfortable armchair and to fight for a reasonable raise of the payment scale. 466 to strengthen the union’s demands. In the later section we will see the case became the major argument for the activists of the other three companies. 5.2 The strike action in 2005 The temporary settlement between the workers of the three port stevedore companies and their employers in September 2004 had indeed brought several months of peace into the port’s labour relations. The activists and the leaders of the RPD port committee, however, were not optimistic about the administration’s real orientation to consensus. The period of official negotiation was re-scheduled to begin from 1 April to 30 June 2005 for the three companies — VSK, PerStiKo and ChSK. For them, the new ownership and the new administration had created conditions unfamiliar from the union’s previous experience. The activists felt great confusion about what would happen next but were sure it was necessary to convince and mobilise their members to be ready for further action, though they said that they were not yet clear how far it should go. At their regular meetings, the port committee and the union committees had started to prepare for both the negotiation of the collective agreement and the mobilisation of their further moves at the same time. 5.2.1 The course of the dispute Since 1 April, the new round of negotiation for the 2005-2008 Collective Agreement 467 was held, in which the employers and the workers were supposed to discuss the proposals following the failed agreement of the previous year. Very soon, the representatives from the workers’ side once again found great disappointment by feeling that little had really changed on the employers’ side. Unlike the atmosphere of port management-labour relations in the past time, the representatives of the employers’ side started to question the authority of the port committee, preferring to deal with a single union committee for each company. In response to the employers’ attempt, the port committee acted immediately. During 25-27 April, union conferences (first-stage) were held separately at the three companies, and the draft of the port committee’s version was approved again to show dockers were still in favour of the port union organisation. But the negotiation itself did not make any progress. Seeing that the schedule for the official negotiation round was soon to reach its end by June, the port committee of RPD decided to hold a second-stage conference to discuss their further action in response to the failure of the negotiations with the port administrations. A young docker, who was elected as the deputy chairperson of a shop committee of RPD at PerStiKo, revealed the union had it in mind to take collective action as the next development. ‘We started preparation for the second-stage conferences of the workers of the three companies, and it is likely to make the decision of taking joint 468 collective actions’ (Belyaev, 2005, Doker, No. 150, 26 May 2005, p.1). At the same time, the activists started to provoke their members to prepare the battle for defending their labour rights. Another activist made his appeal, ‘Therefore, the whole worker collective should be aware that [we] workers are organised with [our] trade union, we will be able to and should protect and stand up for our own legal rights. If we are afraid to demand a labour contract for work arrangements we will be in a completely powerless condition. If we are afraid to speak out, we will receive an empty wallet and a starving family. If we are afraid of being a union member, we will become unprotected from the arbitrariness of the administration’ (Galushko, 2005, Doker, No. 150, 26 May 2005, p.4). At the conferences on 30 May, the port committee appealed for a decision to enter into a period of labour dispute with the companies over the 2005-2008 collective agreement. Consideration of holding industrial actions was discussed at the conferences. It is important to note that activists normally were confident that their members would follow and support the union’s initiative. On the other hand, the activists successfully mobilised the members to authorise their initiatives at the conferences. 469 5.2.2 Moving on to an ‘Italian strike’ In the middle of June, the dockers started to launch their first pressure action: ‘work without enthusiasm’ or ‘Italian strike’, as they had done the previous year. The union’s tactic relied on the cooperation and support of the brigades, and therefore such a tactical method could take place deliberately without breaching the legal regulations. The dockers imposed this method flexibly, and the act was fully conducted by the union organisations following the process of negotiation. For example, from 24 June to 30 June, the union representatives thought there might be a chance of reaching agreement with the administration, so the work-slow-down was soon suspended. The suspension did not last a long time. On 30 June, the union activists again realised that the employers did not want to have further negotiation on the disagreed programme, the representatives refused to sign the draft documents. Corresponding to such an outcome, statements of disagreement were formally drawn up, and the stage of collective bargaining with the three involved stevedore companies, officially, entered into the period of collective labour dispute. The consequence was that the previous method of industrial action was re-launched. A docker expressed his support like this: ‘Workers of our company – they are people who have a high level of professional training, possessing all civil rights, which include rights of their 470 professions. To present and stand up for our own interests, to create favourable labour conditions … these are their specific business that is carried out with the help of our union organisation, mainly through the Collective Agreement. The necessity of retaining the stability of the company, by reaching a collective agreement between the workers and the employers has been clearly seen. And we will struggle for this goal by all possible means’ (AlekseiK, docker-machine operator of VSK, June 05, 2005). On July 1, the local newspaper ‘Metro’ published an article denouncing the decision of the port committee. The union activists were strongly outraged. They believed such an attack was deliberate propaganda of the employer and it had been evident that their administration was reluctant to negotiate with the union so that they had bought off the media to discredit the workers’ demands in front of the public. The port committee fought back against the media campaign. Following the start of the labour dispute at the port, the union organisations took the initiative to form a conciliation commission from 6 – 20 July, and tried once more to change the employers’ position, in which several points of compromise were offered. The process, however, was paralyzed despite the workers’ representatives offering a softer proposal; in their words, a compromise, and the commission soon appeared to have been in vain. The ineffective commission therefore existed for only 471 two weeks. By realising that there was little hope of negotiation with the administration, the dockers’ union organisation decided to hold initiative conferences at the three companies to decide their further action. By 20 July, the union committee officially recognised that the task of the commission had failed. 5.2.3 Moving on to a warning strike The conferences held on 15 July authorised the initiative of the union activists. It was important for the port committee to re-confirm and demonstrate (to the port administration) that the activities and actions of the union organisation had won strong workers’ support. These conferences were successful – well organised and conducted by the union activists. There the procedure was firstly to approve the work and tasks set up by the port committee and union committees, and according to the ideas of the port committee to set up subsequent actions. The conferences passed a motion to carry out a three-day warning (token) strike, one hour at each on-duty shift. To carry out the strike under the legal framework of the Russian labour dispute law, a strike committee at each stevedore company involved was established. The three strike committees were also authorised for their future capacity and duties. Each strike committee was designed to take over the authority and the responsibility of making decisions during the strike period. Impressively, the conferences were well organised. 472 One specific factor was that the conferences of RPD members at the three companies received a common conference agenda, to produce a common result for the future coordination of the port committee. The conference of the union organisation at PerStiKo was set to be a model for all involved parties. The content of the conference of PerStiKo workers was as follows:118 1. Listened to the work report of the president of the port committee. Approved the work the port committee and the union committee had done for the new collective agreement as well as their direction of the recent collective labour dispute. 2. Officially condemned the administration’s rejection of signing the collective agreement for a new term. Accused the administration’s position of worsening workers’ conditions, and that had damaged the prospects of the company’s development and damaged relations of social partnership. 3. Authorised the situation that due to the disagreement over the content of the new collective agreement, workers decide to carry out one-hour warning strikes, which is a right in accordance with Article 37 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 410 of the Russian Labour Code and Article 14 of the Russian Federation Law of ‘On the Resolution of Collective Labour Disputes’. The warning strike will take The list of information basically followed the original form of the union document ‘Resolution of the Convention of PerStiKo workers’, July 15, 2005. 118 473 place on 25, 26 and 27 July 2005. For the warning strike, each conference provided their estimation of how many workers will be mobilised (for example, about 1,000 dockers in PerStiKo) to participate in the action (together a detailed strike timetable was also released). 4. Elected a strike committee comprising five members in each company. The strike committee was formed as the controlling body, directing and monitoring the strike action at workplaces. The strike committee at PerStiKo comprised in total five workers, even a mechanic worker was included. All of them were either formal leaders or activists of the primary union organisations of RPD. 5. The strike committee proposed to the administration a list of selected works as minimum duty during the period of the strike. The strikers would also keep a clear policy regarding self-restriction of the effects of the stoppage on production. 6. Called the employer to dismiss the general director of the company, for he had failed to promote the growth of freight turnover volume, failed to promote employees’ work incentives, had broken social partnership relations and caused social tension among the collectives of the company, which is damaging the prospects of the company. 7. The port committee, as the authorised representative of the workers, is expected to organise a second-phase meeting of the current conference in one-month’s time. 474 On 18 July a press release announced that the management of the companies of the group JSC Seaport of St Petersburg was working to explain its position so that the dockers could independently assess the validity of their proposed variant of the collective agreement. Following the formation of the strike committees, the roles of all levels of the union organisation had seen some changes, while the port committee still carried the most important coordinating role. It was clear that the port committee still operated as the head, while the new establishment corresponded to the legal strike procedure. For example, each strike committee presented a common proposal of ‘Agreement ‘‘On the Positive Resolution of the Collective Labour Dispute’’, prepared by the port committee, to notify their administration that it would be possible to call off the strike action if the administration would seriously consider the new proposal and be ready to make some concessions. The tension between the two sides, however, was not reduced, but the response from the employers’ side was beyond the dockers’ expectation. The employers did not choose to confront a single member of the strike committees or a single strike committee; instead of that, the administration seemed to believe it would be more powerful to put direct and fierce pressure on the port committee. On 21 July, the general director of JSC St Petersburg Seaport, Vishnyakov, issued an order commanding the port committee to move out of its current office by 475 21 August. Following the order, communications of the office were soon cut off. Seeing the position of the employers’ side, the rank-and-file were organised to provide more concrete support for the RPD port committee. The dockers tried to defend the union’s position with such words, ‘The employers shouldn’t treat our demands as the personal opinions of our union leaders. The demands present what we want and what we decided to do. And these demands were just confirmed once again at the recent conference of our collectives. Besides, I was a conference delegate, and can ensure all the demands as I mentioned – they are our joint and collective demands, and we will not give them up’ (Savel’ev, 2005, Doker, No. 155, 25 July 2005, p.2). Notwithstanding the fact that the union leadership was still under pressure from the administration, the one-hour warning strike was carried out at the seaport by the dockers of the three companies on 25, 26 and 27 July, as planned earlier. Seeing the strike had become unavoidable, a militant atmosphere started to develop. A group of workers from PerStiKo (one was a member of the strike committee) posted their opinion in which they asserted that the union, the representatives of the bargaining commission and the dockers should grant the employers no more chance to make a compromise. They argued that over the past negotiation process, the workers’ representatives had been too quick to compromise by allowing the employers’ 476 representatives to present their own proposal. Such an easy-to-grant attitude, ‘We consider that has been a mistake’, according to these workers, ‘The development afterward demonstrated that their employers were always reluctant to make any compromise. Instead of seriously considering the union’s original demands, the employer’s side was just taking advantage of the workers, and constantly thrown new proposals onto the negotiation table. Therefore, over the process of negotiation for a new collective agreement, the workers’ side has always exhaustively discussed whether or not to consider the proposals from the other side, but on the employers’ side, they never step back from their position’ (Barsykov et al., 2005, Doker, No. 155, 25 July 2005, p.1). These grassroots members strongly suggested that further negotiation should only focus on the workers’ proposals, and put all their effort into it. Another opinion for the solution of the current dispute, however, seemed to win majority support. The compromise, which became a new strategy of the union, was to push the port administration to sign a collective agreement based on the previous collective agreement (2002-2005). As a member who participated in both the collective agreement commission and the conciliation commission revealed, ‘I believed there is one solution to be reached – in the case we demand 477 better conditions for workers, but the employer demands worse ones, then in order to get out of the dead-end situation there is only one way left – to renegotiate the current collective agreement, which unfortunately does not improve the workers’ conditions, but at least does not make their conditions worse either’ (AleksandrN, docker of ChSK July 20, 2005). Such a compromise did not receive a positive response from the employers’ side though. The docker thus expressed his question later on as following: ‘If we still can’t reach agreement on such a ‘per se’ compromised proposal, it will just be due to the representative of the employer who does not want to resolve the conflict but rather to aggravate and inflame it. Workers don’t need a worsening of the conflict. But why and for whose interest are the representatives of the employer stirring it up?’ (Nefedov, 2005, Doker, No. 155, 25 July 2005, p.3) Despite the warning strike having taken place, the employers did not call the union organisations to hold new negotiations or to resolve the dispute. On the first day of the warning strikes, the general director of JSC St Petersburg Seaport issued an open letter, while also dispatching the management of the three stevedore companies to arrange direct meetings with dockers at brigade meetings. The representatives of the employer claimed they would definitely take the union’s opinion into account as a 478 precondition for future labour relations and promised the port workers will still retain their rights. The union leaders and strike committees asserted that there was no concrete promise from the claim and the employers were still opposed to concluding a fair collective agreement. According to such an analysis, the union decided to set up a second-phase conference on 12 August and to discuss further industrial action. At the end of July, officials of St Petersburg city government had met both parties to the dispute. The dockers claimed under the current complicated situation, the conflict cannot be resolved without the intervention of a third party – the authorities. The city mayor, Valentina Matvienko, dispatched the president of the committee for transport policy, Andrei Karpov, to help to form a tripartite commission to work out a solution of the current dispute. After the 3-day warning strike, both sides agreed to form such a commission. The administration of the stevedore companies supported the former chairperson of the Committee for St Petersburg Transport, Aleksei Chumak, to chair the commission. The trade union preferred other candidates, revealed their hope that the mediator should be ‘a most independent person’, but also claimed they were waiting for the administration’s official document about the confirmation of their favourable candidate. The initiative then came to a halt due to the disagreement over the independent candidates. The port committee therefore came back to preparing a second-phase conference. 479 On 29 July, the general director of PerStiKo contacted a Russian labour activist personally and explained that he and his management did follow the principle of social partnership; furthermore, the dockers actually had got their wage rise. Another letter under the name of the general director of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg was sent off to the ProfTsenter, stressing similar ideas.119 5.2.4 Moving on to an indefinite strike On 12 August, the workers of the three companies held their conferences. The conferences firstly listened to the report of the president of the port committee. Moiseenko made his conclusion with 12 points in the report adopted by the port committee on 10 August. The report argued that the strike action should be considered as workers’ ‘collective action with a constructive character’, and the aim of the strike was to save the port production activity. Furthermore, the union committee also demanded that the workers should not destroy the port production; any person who caused damage to the production system will be seen as a strike-breaker. After the report, a strike ballot was held, and a motion for indefinite strike action was adopted. The strike action at the three stevedore companies would start from 30 August until 30 The information source was from a posted image of the original document ‘Otvet PROFTsENTRu gendirektora morskogo porta Sankt-Peterburga [Online]. Available from: http://www.profzentr.ru/index.php?mp=news.php&sec=62 [Accessed 05 June 2006]. On 1 August, the general director of JSC St Petersburg Seaport was invited to give an interview by a local radio station. He accused the dockers’ of damaging the interests of St Petersburg city. 119 480 September as its first phase. According to the participants, they have to consider not letting the strike action be exploited by the employers to damage the interests of the port. Therefore, it is necessary to keep production going still. The union activists chose a specific form of strike action. To conduct and monitor the strike, two committees were elected in each company. Firstly, to conduct the strike action, every company established its own strike committee, composed of seven members; secondly, a conciliation committee was also formed in each company, composed of five members. The members of the two committees were different. Leaders of the union committee were elected onto both committees. Taking the members of the two committees of PerStiKo as an example, the strike committee included dockers and mechanics, and the deputy chair of the union committee was one of the members. The conciliation committee included the president of the port committee and dockers who had been members of the strike committee during the warning strike on 25-27 July. The conferences also decided the general scale, agenda, and principles of the strike action. The strike was planned to start from 8:00 am, 30 August, the stoppage time can be up to 90 % of the working time, and in total about 1,600 workers (not only dockers) would be mobilised to participate in the strike action. The conference resolution emphasised that the stoppage will specially target the loading of cargoes from the company’s share-holders. Each strike committee was authorised to be in 481 charge of producing a concrete, detailed strike agenda for the working shifts, as soon as the conference resolution was adopted. The content demonstrated the support from their brigades. The chairpersons of union committees were also elected as members of strike committees. These strike committees, however, were not simply formed to be a shell of union leadership. For carrying out their duties, the strike committee was required to meet not less than twice a week. After the conference, on 16 August, all members of the three strike committees held a joint meeting in the office of the port committee, to discuss the concrete rights and duties of the strike committees. After the meeting, the chairpersons of the strike committees explained the scale and content of their action to the employers. Several points were listed: a) Workers will complete the minimum work of their required duty and the extra norm which workers have agreed to take; b) The strike committee also made it clear that they would not allow strike-breakers to take over their duties. Actually, consideration of whether the management really would hire temporary workers to replace the striking dockers was one of the reasons why the strike committee chose a part-time stoppage as their first method. Furthermore, they also warned that such temporary workers would easily cause damage to the operational instruments. The response of the administration toward the port workers’ decision was very 482 acute. They accused that the local RPD organisations were trying to bring about a revolution. On 15 August, the heads of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg and the stevedore companies described the strike action as provocative and argued that it could not promote either the development of social partnership or better conditions for workers in these companies.120 Apart from their criticism, the administration did not give up defending its position. Apparently, the administration expected the pressure on the union organisations and the attempt to alienate the union apparatus from their members would make the union call off the strike. Therefore, the administration and the employers were using every possible media access to show their understanding of the dispute. The general director of the Seaport, Chlyadin, replied to the Moscow-based ProfTsenter, insisting that the workers’ conditions according to the employers’ draft of the collective agreement would get better not worse; all the proposals of the administration of the company followed the direction of developing social partnership; that dockers’ pay had already increased by 21-24% in the first quarter of 2005 against the previous year; the employers were also proposing a further 1% addition to pay which workers could choose either to transfer to the trade union, as before, or to their personal accounts, which would give them the right to decide for NewSpb.RU, ‘Rukovodstvo peterburgskogo porta ctremitsya k nedopusheniyu zabastovki’ 15 August 2005 [Online]. Available from: http://consider.gips-s.ru/economic/gr141.shtml [Accessed 29 January 2007]. 120 483 themselves what should be done with this money.121 At the same time, the scenario had developed further. On 17 August, Aleksei Chichkanov, the first deputy chairperson of the Committee of Municipal Properties of St Petersburg (KUGI) announced that KUGI, as the holder of the city-owned shares of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg, will not interfere in the labour dispute. He also stressed that the dispute at the seaport was totally normal and often seen in the West; and the most effective method of expressing KUGI’s concern was to sell its 28% holding in the shares of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg. On the same day, the port committee held a press conference in the ‘House of Journalists’. The press conference was to reveal their future action from 30 August and to explain why the dockers had decided to go on strike. The main speakers at the press conference included the chairpersons of the three strike committees, Deputy president of the port committee (Vladimir Petrov), Consultant of the port committee (Mikhail Popov, Professor of Economic Department of SPbGU), and also with the presence of the chairpersons of the RPD union committees of PKT (Aleksandr. Sarzhin) and of Neva-Metall (Vladimir Karataev). Petrov revealed that the final method of their strike action would be discussed on 121 The content was from the original letter which was a response from the port administration to the PROFTsENTER (Centre for Union and Civil Initiative) and its solidarity campaign for the dockers. ‘Otvet PROFTsENTRu gendirektora morskogo porta Sankt-Peterburga’ [Online] Available from http://www.profzentr.ru/index.php?mp=news.php&sec=62 posted on the website of ProaTsenter [Accessed 06 June 2006]. 484 19 August by members of the strike committees. In general, the strike action will mobilise all RPD members of the three involved companies, which was approximately 1,600-1,700 out of the total work force of 2,600 workers. The union also expected that some non-RPD membership port workers would also participate in their action. By distinguishing the port ownership we can divide it into three major ownership groups: Group Mordoshev (Neva-Metall); Group Yuzhilin (PKT); Group Lisin (PerStiKo, VSK and ChSK). The two chairpersons of the union committees at PKT and Neva-Metall both confirmed that in their companies, they had reached their own collective agreement for 2005-2008 with their employers, in which their employers had made their compromise, and committed themselves to provide better conditions than the previous time. Especially, the mechanism of real wage increases is included in the new agreement of PKT Company. According to the speakers, that such a compromise could be made was eventually associated with the fact that their employers were willing to develop the production and business at the St Petersburg Seaport; on the contrary, the owner of the other three companies, Mr Lisin, was more oriented to developing his business at other Baltic seaports, such as Liga, Ventspils and Lispaya seaports. And since he and his followers were more interested in developing his enterprise interests with his Baltic partners, he would not hesitate to 485 undermine the future of the St Petersburg Seaport as a means of removing his real opponents – the port dockers. In addition, Petrov delivered his own opinion that one could wonder whether the employers would like to serve the interest of other countries. The union argued that the strike would not bring great damage to the port function, not only because of the scale of the work stoppage but also because the demand for cargo transfer is lower during this season. The main speaker emphasised that the strike will be carried out with a constructive character – because the workers’ aim is to maintain port performance. Petrov also condemned the order of the administration in which the port committee was forced to move out from its current office, and the communications had been cut off since the order was issued. Professor Popov made his appeal to the city government to come out and stand on the side of the struggling dockers, although he had criticised the city authority’s position. He also concluded that, ‘It had been clear that the deputy president (and former president) of the City Committee for Transportation, Chumak, stood on the side of the employers’ (Press conference recording, August 2005). On 19 August, the three strike committees made their final regulation of their strike actions and informed the employers with an official statement. Again, the form of their official message to the employers was highly united, only some details of the strike schedules for their working shifts were different, in which the concern of the 486 different characters of the shift management in each company had been taken into account. The three documents were put together and published in the dockers’ newspaper. The technique of the strike demonstrated the ability of the strike committees in coordinating the strike action among their members. Each strike committee was assigned adequately to react to the pressure of the management, and to protect the labour rights of striking workers at the workplace. The so-called ‘indefinite strike’ was clear as an idea that came out from the conferences. Its content in practice, however, was a bit different for workers. Even the understandings of the members of the strike committees of the coming strike showed ambiguous interpretations among the workers. For example, a member of the strike committee at VSK, revealed what can be done for their workers during the strike: ‘During the time of the work stoppage, workers will use the chance to conduct collective discussion over the current problem and its solutions, to study advanced experiences of their comrades, including foreign experiences, to learn a higher professional and educational level and study for younger dockers’ He also added that even the strike will go with constructive contents, ‘All of our plan can be considered as that we only called a strike, but that it was the employer who created the basis 487 for its happening’ (Galushko, 2005, Doker, No. 160, August 19, 2005, p.3) Understandably, the pressure of conducting the strike raised great inner pressure on the activists. Their caution at maintaining the strike under the legal framework somehow caused some confusion in the implementation of the action. For example, the chairperson of the strike committee at VSK explained his idea about the strike: ‘According to the information published in the mass media, the administration has planned to cut the production capacity, to reduce the freight flow, to arrange transfer of cargoes to other sea ports, including the ports in the Baltic countries. For this concern, we (the strike committee) do not plan a full stoppage of uploading and offloading work. We will undertake a contrasting stoppage of work on the basis of “working to rule”’ (Zakharov, 2005, Doker, No. 160, 19 August 2005, p.3). While preparing the strike action, a new negotiation also started. At a meeting on 18 and 19 August, the union representatives tried to present a new proposal to convince the employers to re-launch negotiations. The administration then recalled their earlier order which compelled the port committee to move out of their office in the administration building by 21 August. The strike committee suggested that the 488 administrations of the three companies should maintain workers’ wages from 20 August to 20 September at the same level as the pre-strike time, and in return for that, workers would promise to fulfil all handling work. According to such an arrangement, both sides would then have time to try to overcome their disagreement over the collective agreement. However, the administration did not respond immediately. On 24 August the port administration held a conference and claimed that the administration and the dockers had almost reached consent on all disagreements. So, ‘hopefully, before 30 August, the collective agreement could be signed’, said the general director of JSC St Petersburg, Sergei Chelyadin. The president of the port committee, Moiseenko, also informed journalists that the conflict may finish soon, once the employers confirmed that they were ready to make concessions. The further negotiation meeting on 26 August, however, stuck in deadlock again. Chelyadin declared that the conflict was with the trade union bosses, who were struggling for power. Before the strike could take place, the port committee reviewed their strategy and checked the latest information they had received. Convinced by the analysis of Professor Popov, the consultant of the port committee, the union leaders expressed their belief that the owner seemed to ignore the seriousness of the dispute for their own purposes. In other words, the dockers were convinced that the group of Lisin 489 would like to exploit the conflict underway at the port for their own advantage, and to subordinate the whole event to serve as a part of the enterprise’s business tricks. Due to such a fear, the port committee issued an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. The union leaders accused the port administration of damaging faith in social partnership, and the fundamental intention of their employers could damage the interest of the strategic industry of the country. Later on, the port committee also delivered an open appeal to the St Petersburg city government. Despite an estimation released by the port administration which claimed that the impact of the strike would impose losses of about one million dollars every month, the port committee on the other side defended the action as being ‘constructive for keeping the port’, and argued that they would not make an enormous loss on the port function. As the previous strike agenda planned earlier, the port was peaceful; and as the strike committees guaranteed, the strike did not lead to a full stoppage on the territory of these three companies. The three strike committees set up a joint schedule for their strike action. From 30 August until 30 September would be the first phase of the strike. During this first phase only docker-operators but not all employees would be despatched to participate in the strike action. The participant strikers carried out only a one-hour stoppage on their shifts. The dockers of these three companies faced a similar ownership background, and 490 therefore they could present similar demands. The conditions of strike preparation at each company did not prevent the strikers from being subject to similar pressure from their own management. A member of the strike committee of ChSK, for example, complained that their administration tried to conduct a ‘survey’ to put psychological pressure on their workers. The administration asked workers to hand over a personal statement to reveal their attitudes about participation in the strike action. ‘This is not the first time the employer put pressure aiming to force workers not to use their legal right. We will need a stronger campaign to protect workers in our company’ (AleksandrN, docker of ChSK, July 5 2005). On 2 September the first talk between the two parties was held since the strike action started. The representatives of the employer, however, did not make any compromise. The union’s representatives also rejected reconsideration of other suggestions from the employer’s side that were not included in the earlier disagreement protocol. The union leaders revealed that their representatives would insist on focusing on proposals that were related to their original disagreement with the employers. Ahead to the second-phase strike While the negotiation with the employers was re-launched, there was still no sign that 491 the employers were willing to discuss the union’s proposals. The labour collective supported the union’s decision; some dockers voiced their indignation to the trade union that it is time to consider stronger strike action. The options included from extending the current one-hour / one-and-half-hour stoppage to a three-hour / four-and-half-hour work stoppage. The news released showed that some major clients of port cargo handling had started (or started to consider) to stop delivering their products through the Seaport of St Petersburg. Rusal’ company (an aluminium producing company), for example, declared that the company will deliver their export goods through other Russian or Ukrainian seaports if the situation at St Petersburg seaport has not stabilised. The port administration admitted the port faced a big loss of business. In July-August, the volume of cargo handling fell 50 thousand tonnes, and expected another 150 thousand tonnes loss for September. On 9 September, the union leadership revealed that the dockers were preparing for a full-stoppage strike. The strike was suspended on 12 September, corresponding to the plan of the strike committees. The strike committees decided to strengthen the current 1-1.5 hour stoppage for each shift into a 4-5 hour one, which means a half-shift-working scheme; and the new method would begin from 14 or 16 September. The port committee released such a decision to the public on 13th, but one day later the port committee came to claim that the situation had changed and the earlier declaration of the strike 492 committee may change. After the new round of negotiation with the employers, agreement between the port administration and the union representatives was soon reached. The agreement recognised that the union would make concessions and the employers would make moves too. Only the articles about the mechanism of indexing dockers’ wages were not included. On the workers’ side, agreement should be officially confirmed by the conferences later on. The strike committees declared that the strike action would be suspended from September 16 until 21, when the conference would officially decide the state of the strike. The port committee also made their request for a future agreement, which is to reconsider the negotiation with three original programmes as follows. They are, ‘On the Form of Raising Real Wages for Workers at St Petersburg Seaport’; ‘On Workers’ Bonus according to the Basic Organisational Performance’; ‘On the Provision of the Activities of the Workers’ Representative-Port Organisation of Russian Dockers’ Union, St Petersburg Seaport’. The union leaders warned the real harmony will come about only if the collective agreement met a satisfactory result. At 9 am on 21 September, conferences of the three union organisations were held; the agreement signed on 14 September was officially adopted by the conferences of workers of the three companies. At 3 pm the dockers officially declared the strike 493 action suspended. The workers would return to work according to their normal regime. From 3 October to 7 November, an official period for the receipt of all applications to buy the state-held shares in JSC Seaport of St Petersburg began. On 10 November the Russian Federal Property Fund (RFFI) conducted a public auction to sell the state-held shares (48.79 %) in the ОАО St Petersburg Sea Port. Chupit Limited, a Cyprus registered company acting on behalf of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, which already controlled the port, became the final buyer, paying an initial 802.5 million roubles for the state shares.122 In addition, we may also find that the activists chose to make clearer the responsibility of employers while calling the government’s attention. During the conflict or the strike period, the union’s strategy rarely appealed to the state power or local governmental bodies to intervene as a third party. Such facts reveal the lack of the union’s interest in the state’s regulatory ability. For defending their specific interest, the dockers ignored any of the other ETS or branch agreements which are normally signed by FNPR trade unions as the representative of labour. The only relevance of the state’s role they would have to apply is the reference to the Labour Code or the report of the labour inspectorate. Over recent years, no dispute or Sheglov, 2005, ‘Bastuyushii port prodan’ [Online]. Available http://www.strana.ru/stories/02/02/01/2448/264617.html [Accessed: 10 November 2005]. 122 from: 494 industrial action at the St Petersburg Seaport ever suggested forming a tripartite structure for a comprehensive dialogue. In fact, the latest situation appeared over the 2005 labour dispute, when the internal argument about whether the union should finally appeal to the city government for intervention clearly showed the fact again that, in referring to methods of resolving the conflict, the dockers did not seriously expect any role for local government establishments.123 The development of the 2005 labour dispute revealed the dockers’ limited expectation of the involvement of the state. The worst situation occurred, in which the administration was not really bothered by the warning strike, and the dockers for the first time found the port administration very tough at offering no compromise. As mentioned in the previous section, rumours about the owners’ intentions also started to spread. Workers started to believe that the Danish-background administration intended to exploit the conflict and was ready to ruin the port performance of the Russian Federation in their own investment interests. The port committee started to make a new appeal to the federal government and asked President Putin to consider whether it might be possible to put the port under state control or some form of public ownership. The new and serious appeal, however, did not really become the main issue over the strike period. In addition, despite the worsened situation between the The information was obtained from the author’s interview with the port committee members (August 04, 2005). For the reason why the dockers’ union is so reluctant to seek the state’s power, we may need to consider the union’s history and other local backgrounds. For that we should leave the discussion to another place, here the analysis is just to point out the fact as receiving a general picture. 123 495 union and the administration, this appeal was actually more like a flash reflection of the influence of left-wing figures acting in the campaign.124 More importantly, the response of the RPD union organisation was not to call for a solution through three-party negotiation. The idea was to replace the ‘untrustworthy’ owners with a ‘respectable’ state owner under the framework of the worker-employer relationship, rather than to create a compatible institution for reconciling the interest conflict. Noteworthily, when the union leaders were convinced by the analysis and press reports that the owner may discard the function of St Petersburg seaport by moving the business to other Baltic seaports, the determination of the union leaders was seriously shaken and the further strategy was seriously confused among the activists. The weak point of the union activities derived from the lack of experience when in face of uncertain ownership conditions.125 124 Professor Mikhail Popov and the member of State Duma Oleg Shein were both involved in the dockers’ struggle via their contact with the leaders of the port committee. They were both the founders of left-wing groups and parties. According to them, the port’s tension was a result of the tendency that the owners of the seaport operation put their benefit as their priority over the fate of the seaport. Shein sent off his own appeal to the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin asking for the consideration of the re-nationalisation of the seaport. Such idea came up in the dockers’ main campaign 1-2 times only. 125 A serious internal conflict then came up at the end of 2005. The event involved personal conflict among figures of the port committee. When the event occurred, the fieldwork had finished. And according to the latest information about it, the effect was controlled by the replacement of a new chairperson of the trade union committee of Neva-Metall. 496 5.3 The characteristics of the dockers’ coordinated workplace unionism 5.3.1 Deliberate mobilisation The whole process of the labour dispute at the St Petersburg Seaport in 2004 and 2005 revealed several dynamic characteristics of labour relations at the port, especially that between the employer and the union, over the recent time. Regarding the members’ concern for their real wages, the RPD union organisations at St Petersburg seaport had been cautiously exercising their strength. The initiative of taking industrial action to put pressure on the administration did not come from workers’ spontaneous resistance but was planned and organised by the port committee with practical consideration of the required legal procedures. Impressively, these plans and strategy were widely exercised by the activists. With the review of the process of the entire dispute in 2005 we can find it comprised several events as below: Official re-negotiation (1 April to 30 June) Dockers’ first-stage conference (30 May) First-step action of the dockers: ‘Work without enthusiasm’ (from June) Conference decision for a warning strike (15 July) Pressure on the port committee was directly conducted by the administration; allegation of a negative campaign from local media – (August) 497 Conference decision for indefinite strike action (12 August) Negotiation over the agreement with the employers failed again Solidarity action from local trade unions acted Appeal to the city government / appeal to President Putin (30 August) Indefinite strike (30 Aug -12 Sep) More importantly, the strength of the port organisations came from the cooperation between union activists in the brigades and the brigade leaders. The methods of their industrial actions show that the port organisations have found their own balance of the subjective and objective factors that union organisations have to consider. Firstly, after the new Russian Labour Code took effect, the more complicated procedure of calling a strike has made it more difficult as it requires good organisational preparation of the union organisation. The union therefore preferred using an ‘Italian strike’ for their first warning message to the management. The characteristic of dockers’ work, which relies heavily on brigade coordination, allows dockers to control their whole team timetable relatively easily. As the union leaders emphasised, they have union activists in each brigade and can control the cooperation of the brigades. Union activists (some are themselves brigade leaders) took the brigade meeting to raise issues related to their working condition and the analysis of the port organisations. The channel for workers to contact the union is either through 498 the shop committee or the brigade. Such a practice enables activists to gain the support of their collective, and to be active for the union in their brigades too. Certainly, not all of the brigade leaders strictly obey the union’s decisions. The fact that local RPD activists warned the company should not employ temporary works reflected the fact that there were indeed some brigade leaders who put aside the conflict condition but accepted those workers to cover the loss of the strikers’ handling capacity. One of the most important conclusions arrived at by the trade union activists in summing up the strike action is that the new collective agreement (the old one expires in December) should comprise a principle of elected positions for group leaders and brigade leaders. This means that the port organisations can always keep a dozen activists at a time and do not have to worry too much if these activists are inactive among their colleagues. Such tight networks, on the other hand, ensure that any situation from the grassroots can be transmitted back to the union committee or port committee efficiently. To take one example, when the warning strike had taken place both the general directors of JSC Seaport of St Petersburg and PerStiKo started to visit dockers face to face, they explained their position and methods of improving the working conditions. As is often the case, the battle line between the workers and administration was the bitterest at the middle level – the one of brigade-leaders and group leaders that had found themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea. An 499 atmosphere started to spread, workers were even given a hint in the brigades: “should you want to get back to your brigade your comrades might not welcome you back”. The RPD activists immediately organised an open letter to appeal to all dockers to be aware of the beautiful lie of the administration, under the name of ordinary dockers, brigade leader and chairperson of the union committee. As a result of the dockers’ organisational practice, the union attracted enough dockers who are active among workers to form the necessary commissioned bodies such as a strike committee or negotiating groups. In other words, such an exercise established the basis for an efficient mobilisation. Still, it is also apparent that the port committee realises the importance of broad participation – a well-prepared conference. When the administration tried to wipe out the status of the port committee, the decision of the conference had supported their decision and their resistance to the administration. In other words, conference resolutions were produced to associate the union activities and so to authorise their decisions. The port committee published details of the draft to the workers so their workers had clear information about the demands of their union and the difference between the union and the employers. Noteworthily, it is insightful to note the publication and circulation of the specially edited union newspaper ‘Doker’ that reveals more of the port committee’s 500 concern at efficient agitation among their members. The publication of their newspaper provided a clear function of union propaganda especially to provide explanations or make mobilisation appeals to the workers. In order to educate their members about the content of the united draft of the collective agreement for all stevedore companies, the port committee ordered 4,000 copies of the draft. 5.3.2 Social partnership in action In Chapter Four I presented the general character of how the local RPD activists embrace the principle of social partnership with their own interpretation for the interaction with their employers. During the conflict of 2004-2005, the practice of social partnership was revealed. The RPD union activists expressed the view that, in response to the development of the collective agreements at the St Petersburg Seaport, a better version of the new collective agreement for dockers has raised the necessity of putting indexation and a mechanism for raising real wages into the agreement. For this new goal, the dockers have tried hard to legitimise these demands by stressing the principle of social partnership in recent years. Their logic can be presented clearly as follows: what is good for the workers is simultaneously also good for the company; and maintaining such a balance can prove that the principle of social partnership is still delivered in the relations between the employers and the workers. The interesting 501 aspect for our observation would be to look at the use of the term ‘social partnership’ together with the arrangement and changes in the union’s action strategy. Thus we may find out more about the ability of the dockers’ labour organisation, especially how they present themselves in their action mobilisation. The above expressions may not demonstrate a clear difference to distinguish it from the general or ideal definitions of other Russian trade unions. As mentioned earlier, most social partnership supporters, even FNPR organisations, officially declare that the whole process certainly includes negotiation, confrontation and compromise. The most meaningful character in this case study comes out because the dockers’ union organisations have kept a very active position in the period of collective bargaining. They delivered the will of a mutually acceptable solution, and also mobilised the members to be ready for further collective action. From conference resolutions, union appeals, to explanations of their industrial actions, the union has always emphasised their will as a complement to social partnership. The resolutions of the union conferences held on 15 July 2005, for example, revealed that the activists’ definition of social partnership and their interpretation of the conflicting events created a ground to attribute the failure to achieve social partnership to the employers’ irresponsibility in relation to the company’s development. Such a use directly helped the dockers to legitimise the work stoppage as well as the way the 502 labour conflict occurred with respect to ‘social partnership’. Such a strong logic had been revealed in these recent struggles over the prospect of reaching a new collective agreement with the employers. A docker thus asserted, ‘The response received from the representatives of the administration, however, does not deliver the employers’ attempt at social partnership, but mostly causes social tensions in the collectives’ (Nefedov, 2005, Doker, No 151, 30 June 2005, p.3). The dockers also point out that the problem was due to their partners’ attitude. They accused the representative on the employers’ side of ignoring the issue of social partnership, instead of which, these representatives always asserted that to fulfil clients’ demands is the priority in the face of all ‘collectives’ and that is their major line for resolution. Such a priority could easily make dockers complain that what condition can social partnership still be in if the workers have nowhere to step back. Social partnership as an organisational platform for a strategic response The 2004 dispute case of PKT provided a typical demonstration of how to use social partnership for the workers’ position. When the negotiation for the new collective agreement was just about to start (pre-negotiation period), the chairperson of the union committee firstly explained what are the foundations of social partnership and what should be considered in the new agreement. The dockers’ original reference to 503 social partnership, as described in Chapter Four, came up at the early stage in 2004, and that was to justify their later demands and actions. The dockers, however, did not only stick with the expectation of the prospects of the companies and the principle of social partnership. They had exercised a more reflexive strategy for the negotiation. During the negotiation period, another context of employing social partnership started to come out. When the negotiation reached the period that the administration showed reluctance to meet the union’s proposal, the harmony atmosphere immediately changed. The union committee at PKT very soon responded to the situation and revealed the possible scene of raising a labour dispute; in late 2004, the union committee had issued their new message accusing the employer of losing the ground of being partners. By questioning the trust and social partnership relationships between the labour collective and the management, the message was critical of the company administration. The chairperson often projected the warning as ‘Why is this (dispute) necessary for us, and who should take responsibility?’(Sarzhin, 2004, Doker, No. 145, 14 November 2004, p.1) Only later on, the appearing labour dispute ended when the message and the pressure of the employees had reached the employer, and a satisfactory collective agreement for 2005-2008 had been signed. The case of the 2005 labour dispute at three port companies showed more about the typical response from the union’s side. This time, their message was even stronger 504 since the bargaining had actually failed in the first negotiation round but both sides agreed to restart it from April 2005. One of the messages was ‘Social partnership or collective labour dispute?’ which implied that if the employers intend to choose social partnership then they should sign the collective agreement including the workers’ demands; otherwise a collective labour dispute would occur. In the conclusion of the article, the author gave a ‘tougher message’: at the conference it is ‘possible’ to adopt the resolution for collective action (Belyaev, 2005, Doker, No. 150, 26 May 2005, p.1). Following the further developments over the 2005 labour dispute, the relationship between the administration of the three stevedore companies and the dockers had become full of tensions. The unions had held the strike action. A member of the strike committees presented another tone of employing the term social partnership as the administration was on the opposite of the principle. His claim was the following: ‘As for the support of the strike committee, we may consider it as preparing a solution, aimed at attracting cargoes and the progress of production. Those actions aimed at disrupting production will be blocked. We hope that the employers will realise their attempt to break up the social partnership system, which has existed at the port for years, has no 505 prospects’ (Press conference recording, August 17, 2005). Such a tone revealed that ‘social partnership’ was also used as a sort of defensive weapon for carrying out industrial action. There are varieties of attaching the term to compatible contexts. Again, observation found that the dockers’ port committee tried to get back to peaceful labour relations under the direction of ‘social partnership’. And still, the term is a principle in the field of resolving labour disputes. The port committee presented a proposal to the port administration before they finally took the strike action. While this term was used in this proposal, the dockers did not mention a specific plan or mechanism of resolving the dispute. Apparently, their main idea was not to address a new framework for resolving the problem but simply to restore a dialogue with the employers. Coordinated tactic for broader moral pressure More interestingly, the further event shows more that the port committee even learned to coordinate all their experiences in order to accumulate more credit for their interpretation of social partnership. The approach was to raise the case of their counterparts, where a better collective agreement had been signed, to put the employers under moral pressure for the latter’s stubborn refusal. The previous dispute at PKT in 2004 had ended with the final achievement of the union’s proposal being 506 accepted. From mid 2005, the union organisations of the other three companies acted together with the coordination of the port committee. They referred to the experience of PKT and stressed the visible growth of the company’s performance at the port, to show that that is the way to realise social partnership. Similarly, the union’s success in two companies was used to stress their definition. ‘In the two port companies, Neva-Metall and PKT, the employers and the workers act constructively, which is in compliance with the principle of social partnership’ (Petrov, 2005, Doker, No. 153, 08 July 2005, p.1). Understandably, that had become another advantage enabling the activists to point at the employers of the three companies when the question arose as to who should take responsibility for breaking up the relations of social partnership. Moreover, the dockers’ union organisation was determined to conduct the whole strike campaign with the same pattern. The port activists were even able to coordinate not only their comrade union organisations but also concerned politicians. In that way, they could use those individual influences to form a simple and unified tone, and be able to blame the employers for their failure to carry out social partnership. Through such a solidarity campaign, the moral pressure of the dockers’ side was actively unified and strengthened. Apart from the brief review of the use of the term ‘social partnership’ at the St Petersburg Seaport, one more important fact should be taken into account: there have 507 been strike threats or warning strikes at the port almost every year since 1998. The scenario at the port has been more similar to the traditional model of conflict between the workforce and capital. The dockers used the term ‘social partnership’ more often at times when the working group on the collective agreement met with stubborn rejection from the side of the employers. For many activists, ‘social partnership’ means a reflection of civilised relations, which is particularly applied critically to the position of the employers. If one looks at the words the union uses in its bulletins, one finds that, instead of referring the conflict to any existing Russian institution of social partnership, the union activists are more likely to take ‘principle’ or ‘in the spirit’ of social partnership (‘v dukhe sotsal’novo partnerstva’); and normally linked with words like ‘civilised’, ‘progressive’ or ‘constructive’ to define the value of the term. By firstly declaring that they would like to work without troubles and together with the management to stabilize or strengthen the performance of the seaport, the effect of such an expression was to strengthen their moral and reasonable pressure on the employers. Also quite obviously, the dockers emphasised the real meaning of social partnership to point at the employers’ reluctance to obey its principles as determining the legitimacy of decisions to take collective action. 508 5.3.3 Internal and external coordination In was obvious that the port committee and its union committees tried to clarify who was to be blamed for the conflict. The official procedure requires the collective agreement to be signed only by the primary union organisation and the administration of each company, the strikers and the union firstly point at the general director of each stevedore company. There were indeed minor campaigns of confrontation with the individual administrations of the companies. Later on, the port committee coordinated all its strength to blame one object – the group of the main owners. The union activists named the three stevedore companies as Lisin’s Group, and it was the representatives of this group who caused the conflict. The union activists only brought this administration into the centre of responsibility. According to such a definition, the port committee successfully brought its union committees and its members to act together. As described earlier, before the occurrence of the 2004 conflict, all the union committees adopted a common proposal for the collective agreement and presented common demands. They then held joint or coordinated conferences, produced common documents, and carried out joint actions. The local RPD organisation embraced in total about 20-30 people (included leaders and workplace activists) to carry the union performance and activism. Moreover, the port committee functioned as the highest coordinator and authority of the collective (workers of the three 509 companies as a whole). In addition, during the period of the dispute, the two trade union committees from PKT and Neva-Metall though had settled agreements with their own administrations, contributed at least a minor part in the struggle. The chairpersons of the union committees of PKT and Neva-Metall from time to time showed their solidarity message to the strikers through the newspaper, saying their union committees are ready to take further solidarity action to support the struggle. Apart from the chairperson of the union committee’s participation in the campaign, three representatives of PKT dockers also expressed their support for the dockers of the three companies. They conducted a one-minute warning strike by their dockers at each shift to show a signal of their operating equipment, such as loaders, container lifters and port cranes for one minute when they started work on each shift. After all, the activists tried to establish a scene in which they could be ready to call for further support action. A limit of the coordination of the port committee, however, existed (but was often ignored by observers). One may find that the union organisation of ChSK seemed much weaker than that of PerStiKo and VSK. The scenario that the activists exposed their members to face more harassment during the strike action showed the weak strength of the union organisation and workers there are more vulnerable to 510 their management. More critically, members from other companies such as Neva-Metall were less enthusiastic towards the striking dockers. If solidarity was shown then it was primarily arranged by the union committees, and there were very few messages directly from dockers from the other two companies. Actually, that was the union activists trying to bring more of a solidarity atmosphere. It is hard to say that dockers from other companies really kept their eyes on the event. In an interview with active RPD members from Neva-Metall, a brigade leader (also RPD union activist) said frankly that the union’s newspaper did not provide much useful information so he barely read it; he believed the port committee and the union committees of PerStiKo, VSK and ChSK had made tactical mistakes in their collective bargaining. In his own opinion, even the idea of a united draft of the collective agreement was not necessary since their employer is more ‘progressive’ and it is possible to open their own collective agreement with him. The scene revealed the weakness of the union propaganda: we can do our best only on our own. The chairperson of the Neva-Metall union committee actually admitted in an interview that it would be very unlikely that they will conduct any serious strike action or even solidarity campaign, and indeed there were no solidarity message nor associated action from his members. The fact was that actually only the chairperson of the union committee at Neva-Metall ever voiced his support but no grassroots RPD members 511 expressed support. Their opinions to some extent provide an explanation of why there were no solidarity words directly from the members of Neva-Metall. After all, the condition of solidarity mobilisation reflects the boundary of the capacity of the union core. In other words, the port committee had a certain authority to ‘conduct’ the strength of solidarity but not yet to bring broader support from the ground of the port workers as a whole. It was even critical to note that when the port committee made their appeal to the public and other Russian trade unions for a solidarity campaign in 2004, they could not even convince their own members to make an appeal. More concretely, through the whole mobilisation and solidarity making, we could note that the ‘community’ support from other dockers was varied. External coordination In Chapter Four we have seen the port committee was the only representative in the field of external contact. The port committee was in charge of negotiation and organised external contacts during the conflict. As mentioned earlier, the port committee carried the role of internal and external coordination during the dispute. From 6 July 2005, a nationwide campaign to support local dockers’ demands was launched by the port committee. Since then, dozens of support letters flew in to the port committee. Interestingly, most letters or messages were from local union 512 organisations or militant labour organisation like Zashchita truda or alternative trade unions like FPAD and SOTsPROF; from other seaport organisations all they received was a support letter from the dockers of Murmansk port. Moreover, over the dispute period, the local dockers’ organisation produced a formal protest letter several times for those friendly union organisations to use. During the period of the warning strike, the council of RPD sent off their solidarity letter. The port committee also received solidarity letters from a dozen primary union organisations from different sectors. Interestingly, neither other RPD port organisations nor their friendly unions such as RPSM had shown a strong voice providing solidarity. On 1 September, the RPD president Alexander Shepel’ made a public comment on the dispute at the St Petersburg Seaport. He also claimed he was ready to provide his support for the port committee’s action. Formally, the intervention of the RPD president was not obligatory. And the general secretary of ITF stated that the intervention of ITF would be possible only if RPD made a formal request to the Federation. The dockers’ struggle also attracted a great deal of attention from labour organisations in St Petersburg. Even before their final strike action, the port committee had informed local activists of the situation regarding their collective bargaining through Round Table Meetings, which were organised by EGIDA. Despite the cautious attitude of the leaders of the port committee, other St Petersburg labour 513 activists finally agreed to establish a solidarity campaign. On 3 August, the members of the Port committee of RPD met local labour activists to discuss how the solidarity action could be launched. The local labour activist participants decided to form a Solidarity Committee for the Dockers’ Struggle. Interestingly, the tactic of the RPD port committee, or more exactly to say, the intercourse between the port committee and other labour organisations, was that the dockers’ leaders preferred a protest letter to the administration but not direct action such as meetings or pickets. The reason that the docker activists were reluctant of conducting their own pickets to some extent reflects the fact that the dockers’ activism was rather well conducted by union leaders but not a strong collective self-mobilisation. The activists had explained they might lead members to carry less work but were not able or willing to ask the members to really put down the work and go onto public protest. On 19 August, activists of several local unions organised a solidarity meeting in order to show their support for the dockers’ action. The meeting firstly took place at the city metro station Baltiskaya, where they distributed newspapers of the dockers’ union and other solidarity union newspapers. The participants later on moved to a place near the location of the port committee’s office. About 50 people in total participated in the meeting, included RPLBZh, Trade union of Workers of ‘TEK’, Trade Union of Workers of ‘Vodokanal’, Trade Union of Employees of Airport 514 ‘Pulkovo’. Activists of several left-wing political organisations also participated. The president of the port committee showed up and gave a short speech to the participants. The dockers then left for the office of the port administration to attend another round of negotiation with the representatives of the employers. At the occasion of a solidarity campaign on 16 August, Aleksandr Moiseenko requested local labour activists to restrain the campaign from disturbing the progress of their negotiations. The situation showed that the leadership of the port committee would like to conduct the campaign on their own rather than develop the situation into broader protests. 5.4 Conclusion To analyse the meaning of the connected collective disputes and the union response, there are several key factors as below: Common recognition of the necessity to raise real wages among workers Successful mobilisation 1: union conferences to authorise the decision of union activists Successful mobilisation 2: functional strike committees established Industrial actions step-by-step: from ‘Work without Enthusiasm’, via ‘Warning Strike’, to ‘Indefinite Strike’ Coordinated and practical solidarity messages organised by the port committee 515 Interpreting social partnership as a shell and weapon to strengthen the legitimacy of workers’ industrial action According to these factors, we may conclude that the local RPD organisation has, though relatively, gained themselves several meaningful achievements. Firstly, the port union organisation and its primary organisations are fairly aware of presenting and fighting for their demands related to pay rises. Secondly, this is an organisation which is neither held by one or two militant but isolated union leaders, nor by the passive ‘leaders’ as we often find in various cases in the development of Russian trade unionism. The unpleasant battle in 2004 also made the leaders of the port committee determined to plan a more comprehensive agenda to set up their industrial actions step-by-step. From ‘Work without Enthusiasm’, via ‘Warning Strike’, to ‘Indefinite Strike’, their experiences told them to prepare for the final method in advance. Regarding all the factors we have seen in the development of the St Petersburg dockers’ struggle, there is little wonder why they have been widely seen as the pioneer of local labour struggles. The well-disciplined union strategy has impressed labour analysts. A French labour activist who observed the strike event gave the organisational work of the port committee a high valuation. She wrote, ‘The trade union acted very well and tactically, and their ideas in the confrontation have been growing. The dockers started from a ‘Work to 516 rule’ / ‘Italian strike’. Later on, they organised a one-hour warning strike for three days. Finally, they started to conduct an indefinite strike only from 30 August, while they still have not called for a full strike….The point is every time before taking a new phase of struggle, they held union meetings, consulting with their members and workers. So that here is the result: one-hundred-percent solidarity and discipline, and fully militant atmosphere in their collective’ (Karine Clément, 20 September 2005).126 Noteworthily, the interesting strategy of creating their own ground by using the conception of social partnership as an aggressive method for their struggle presents another important feature. The dockers’ pattern of pursuing the practice of social partnership is very different from that of FNPR trade unions. The appearance of such a specific pattern has a broader background. Benefits from the economic situation of the port are better than at many other industrial enterprises, and the perspective of the dockers’ collective agreement has been very different from the branch or regional, or national agreements normally dominated by the budget sectors. The local RPD organisation did more than use ‘social partnership’ to secure the survival of the union’s status. The leaders, like the president of the port committee or the chairpersons of union committees, referred to social partnership within the context Karine Clément ‘Zabastovka dokerov – primer dlya podrazhaniya’, Available online: http://www.vpered.org.ru/labour1.html [Accessed 19 January 2007]. 126 517 that dockers are ready to fight for improving their working conditions rather than just emphasising that they should be treated equally. Furthermore, to reach their goal, the union activists and leaders applied the term ‘social partnership’ with strategic flexibility. The most important fact is to note that the strength of employing such a pattern is not only found in the declaration from union leaders but also from the union activists. My analysis of social partnership during their labour dispute event shows the ample expressions and varieties of social partnership among the workers, and that also demonstrates the union’s capacity is not made by the leaders alone but together with almost all their activists. That the local RPD organisations managed to apply social partnership and its solidarity message as the common expression of the active members demonstrates how central and established the union’s role has become and how well informed the activists are. The practice of the port dockers all together presented an interpretation of social partnership as a concrete moral pressure. It has therefore been quite clear that the dockers and their organisation learned well how to transform the conception and legitimacy of social partnership into a ‘warning (aggressive)’ weapon during the negotiation stage, and then into a defensive weapon for their actions.127 127 The local dockers’ practice of social partnership shows a clear discontinuity from Ashwin’s conclusion of Russian social partnership. In the analysis she examined 33 case studies, and her conclusion suggested, ‘Practice and understanding of partnership is shaped by the Soviet legacy, in particular the unions’ inherited structure dependence on management and the state, and the dispositions towards conflict avoidance nurtured within the paternalist framework of the past’ (2004, p.42). However, my later argument will be that, despite the discontinuity from the dominant model Ashwin 518 Most importantly, we have seen the strong presence of their activists. Unlike many other labour struggles across Russia, the dockers’ strike committees of the 2004-2005 strike events at the port were functional and embraced more activists to participate. The local RPD organisation has recruited dozens of union activists from different companies acting together which keeps the union structure functioning as a whole. These activists are those who have acted in not only the union offices but even more at their working grounds – their brigades. This is a meaningful outcome as the dockers’ port organisation has successfully established the union networks together with the brigades, as described in the previous chapter. An important feature was that the union did not only perceive the lesson to be learned after the 2004 dispute, but also remembered to combine the idea with the mobilisation among the workers and the members, installed into their union-collective as a balanced combination. Moreover, the activists within the close union circle, though they occupy positions in different union or representation bodies, somehow act with each other in coordinated activities. The process of conducting strike action supported the practice of the established coordination – from the port committee to union committees and strike committees, the established structure for coordinating the actions had developed in a deliberate way. A very disciplined atmosphere can also be found as most activists claims, the specific conditions of the dockers’ practice have also proved its limited strength in challenging the dominant institution and practice. 519 build their opinions around the union’s decisions. In addition, whether there have been internal conflicts or quarrels over further strategy or not, these activists still kept adequate respect for each other. During the 2004-2005 strike events, each union committee retained its own activists, and all the coordinated local groups operated smoothly. Therefore, it is really unlikely to find this is a one-person trade union or a trade union run by a few union militants; on the contrary, it is a union organisation based on team work. After all, the case study demonstrates how the local dockers improved their preparation work in 2005, a lesson they had learned from the struggle in 2004 and even their experience since the port committee was established in the early 90s. The aim of making out a satisfactory agreement and the collective action confirm the observation finding in Chapter Four: a collective identity did exist among the whole collective (comprising brigade-formed collectives) and the individualised response was to some extent compensated by the brigade and union structure. The issue ‘fight for a better collective agreement’ has become a common point of recognition among the dockers. And the activists did remember their duties among the working brigades. Such an emphasis has long been exercised in their union structure since the formation of the union organisation. Nevertheless, the weakness of the coordination revealed the critical boundary of 520 their collective action associated with a strong union mobilisation and clear strategy. Alongside the acknowledgement that the union organisation at the port had demonstrated the ability of well-organised strike actions to influence port labour relations, we should not ignore the difficulties and the limits of its strength. Firstly, the failed attempt to go through the collective bargaining with their joint collective agreement proposal revealed the gap between the idea of representing the whole of the port workers and the reality. In other words, the identification of a core port workforce – the dockers – did not yet develop over the strength of workplace fragmentation. Despite the commonly recognised demand among the workers and members, the method of pursuing such a goal in practice is still greatly determined by the conditions (both managerial and union committee strength) of each company. This was true even though these dockers all belonged to the same enterprise before 1998, and the dock operation is concentrated on a single and quite close port territory. Another fact is that the coordination and mobilisation capacity has mainly been carried by the core union activists’ circle, especially those of the three stevedore companies. The critical or passive position (of the non-striking dockers) towards the port committee and the strikers exposed the real state beneath the port committee’s efforts of ‘collective / solidarity presentation’. The arranged solidarity messages from the other two union committees did not imply a serious potential for a broader 521 solidarity among the members. Even the activists of PKT showed their solidarity to striking companies, but the union organisation (RPD membership) itself was relatively weak so that they had to cooperate with the PRVT organisation. There were even weaker union organisations like in Neva-Metall and ChSK and also those failed-to-establish organisations mentioned in the previous chapter. We may also need to note the boundary of their struggle demands mostly related to the recognised overtime work and the recent uncertain ownership, together with their ‘concern for the enterprise’s prospects’. Therefore, however radical was their original slogan, the struggle had been strongly focused into fighting for better working conditions corresponding to the performance of the port (terminal). In short, even with the advantage of their work process for collective identification, and the deliberate mobilisation of active union activities, especially the well-organised experiences aiming to cover the weakness of fragmentation and to present a community image, the fragmentation of their strength was not yet fully challenged. The state of such a union pattern seems unlikely to provide a leading force to stimulate labour relations – especially the aspect of union strategy – in other Russian seaports. On the contrary, the pattern of the solid and active RPD organisations of St Petersburg Seaport is more likely to remain a unique but isolated influence.128 128 When I asked the union activists why they barely mentioned the struggle experiences of their trade union in other seaports, for example those in Kaliningrad Seaport and Vladivostok, the responses were similar to the response when I talked about interrelations among railway union activists of RPLBZh: 522 Chapter 6 Conclusion: theorising the transition of Russian organised labour 6.1 The workers came to self-organisation The comparative study examined two groups of Russian transport workers and their local alternative union organisations, revealed contrasting views for a rarely touched but important field of Russian society. The research followed a unique approach, focused on the networks of these workers, to re-examine the intermediary space between ‘active’ union leader and the ‘passive’ ordinary workers which has long been the major concern in various case-study accounts.129 The life stories and working experience of these research subjects were generously shared in this research. Their contribution played a major role in reviewing a range of analytic assumptions. The relatively privileged status in the Russian transport sector and the labour market provides the workers with a general background which to some extent eased their worst pressure of job insecurity – the complete shutdown or going idle of the enterprises. Such a general privileged background, however, was not a substantial each seaport and each port organisation can only deal on their own. The president of the port committee then inserted, unfortunately, this is the fact! The activists then concluded that the experience at St Petersburg Seaport may encourage other RPD port organisations but it is hard really to share their successful experience. (Conversation on Round Table meeting, November 20 2006) 129 In her ethnographic study, Ashwin (1999) aimed to present an analysis of why the active miners failed to present an effective self-organisation. There were several impressive characters among her observation subjects, but she found the shop-floor unionism was not able to present a ‘reform-from-below’ force in the collective labour relations. The president of the trade union committee assumed their workers were too passive in general but then they might lead to social explosion. 523 factor in defining the labour relations of the sector, for the workers have also endured various harsh working conditions. Interestingly, the lack of Russian workers’ self-organisation, as commonly noted, was not found to be a sufficient characterisation to describe the situation in the two cases (especially in the case of the dockers). To note, the social environment of the two case-study objects comprises a highly urbanised international city where the workers (in the case studies) have a relatively higher sense of their real wages rather than receiving support or in-kind payment. (To some extent, the dependence on the distribution of material support, such as the receiving of ‘putevka’ does not play a significant role, as it does in the remote mining regions.) The various expressions of those active workers studied in previous chapters show that many of the workers did realise it is necessary to confront the administration, and did so to defend the workers’ interest, as well as to establish a effective labour unity. Apart from their profession-related background, whether from an objective or subjective view, the two cases present firstly an impressive scene: there were active individuals who stood up for their rights, and aimed to provide an active defence for themselves and their fellow workers. Even under the worsening environment for alternative trade unions since the new Russian Labour Code came into effect, there were active individuals continually participated in their union activities. More 524 importantly, these grassroots union activists demonstrate such a scene that in face of harsh labour conditions, not only several militant union leaders broke away from the position of the traditional, bureaucratic soviet-type trade unions, but a certain level of individuals did realise the necessity of self-organisation. The research observation witnessed how these workers made their criticism of the working conditions, fought with their nachal’nik, quit from the union struggle (because of exhaustion or victimisation, whether physically or spiritually), or even came back again. It might be also important to note, most of them did not embrace dramatic fantasy (revolution, social explosion etc.) over the prospect of union struggle. It seems that during the transition of labour relations in post-Soviet Russia there has been a possibility of a ‘progressive’ tendency occurring within the trade union movement. Secondly, by analysing the real content of collective identity / community presence of the two selected groups, this research distinguishes an oversimplified assumption which often referred the development of alternative trade union to the status of their occupation or, in other words, to treat such self-organisation solely representing a sort of ‘craft collectivism’. In terms of workplace relations, alienated professional consciousness in the two cases existed in the way the ‘professional interest’ emerged as the most likely symbolic carrier for collective identity, developed in the context of the workplace relationships, and pursued in terms of fairly 525 fragmented workplace interest. Neither the development nor the activity of these two ‘profession-based’ trade unions should be treated as any kind of ‘craft unionism’ in their practice. The collective feeling based on one single profession was not a substantial factor for the presence of collective identity in either case. The case of train drivers of RPLBZh in particular presents a clear scene that the separate managerial structure and conditions of Russian Railways made workers and members of their primary organisations deal on their own with various situations at the depots, rather than perceiving a collective identity on the basis of the whole regional / railway level or the profession. Though it is true that the specific profession has been a dominant concern for these alternative organisations, the concern has never been an actual force in struggles under the call for the workers’ common interests. In fact, under the image of fighting for their professional interests, the workers studied in the two cases only presented delicate and different coordination / solidarity connections despite many efforts that have made under their established territorial organisations. By clarifying that the factor of craft or sectoral advantage is not a sufficient explanation for the workers’ self-organisation, it becomes clear that the daily activities and the networks of the activists of these alternative trade unions therefore present a meaningful disproof to the craft or professional interest assumption, apart from referring them to the early time of the unions’ formation on the formal 526 acknowledgment of the professional principle. Finally, despite the constant contact between the two unions whether at federal or regional level, not to mention the unions’ close positions in the face of the course of new Russia’s ‘reform’ politics, the daily interactions and activities of the two unions’ primary organisations have, through the close observation, been found to be distinctive and different. Embedded in the content and characteristics of a fragmented community, together with the resort to individual solutions, the union organisational work and their organisational ability vary. The two similar-position trade unions were at very different stages, went through different contexts, and sharp contrasts in the forms of the two union organisations emerged. This research moved forward to examine why the two alternative trade unions in St Petersburg, though with similar external contacts and resources, differed in both their strength and their patterns of activity. The sharp contrasts in many aspects locate the two cases as two distinct communities. Their efforts at united action events identified their capacity and their real coordination. In concrete terms, the local RPLBZh union’s unity did not perform as a solid collective actor for common interests but relied on the personal energy of active, committed individuals to lead the organisation work; the local RPD unity, by contrast, did achieve a solid collective actor, in which workers were well-represented and coordination, sustained by an ample number of union activists at the workplace. 527 6.2 Rethinking the distinct forms of workplace trade unionism Encountering such a contrast, there are several often-applied views to interpret the difference of union activity patterns. One might consider it to be explained mainly by individual factors – especially the leadership problem may be blamed for the inconsistency. When discussing my questions over the comparison of the two union organisations, several RPLBZh and KSP OZhD activists insisted that the success of the local dockers’ union benefits from the fact that the dockers’ union has occupied a good position in the industry, and met little pressure from the port administration and the ‘pocket’ trade union. In his analysis of the split of Russian trade unions, Bizukov (2005), from the other side, mainly blamed the oppression exercised by FNPR traditional trade unions over their tiny rivals of the alternative trade unions. While referring to the points of these analytic accounts the case of the railway workers seems to support such arguments. Instead of relying on the ‘assumptive narratives’ of union leaders or the accounts of events in the union’s history, the case studies focused on the interaction of the union’s organisational activities, active members and their workplace environment, and found that the different union strengths strongly related to features within the inherent social relations at the workplace. In the case of the RPLBZh territorial organisation on the October Railway, the form of 528 ‘one-depot-one-union’ in their daily practice exposes the lack of a solid coordination at a united level. Furthermore, the presence of such an isolated form was essentially supported by the actual state of inactive workplace trade unionism - performing like a highly individualised consultation agency among the workers as well as their primary organisations. In the case of the dockers’ RPD port organisation, on the contrary, it rather develops an active and well-coordinated ‘workplace unionism’. The comparative investigation identifies that it is the objective conditions that constructed specific spaces for union activities rather than just the problematic decisions of the union leadership or strategy. 6.2.1 How do the favourable and the unfavourable conditions matter? As highlighted in each chapter of this thesis, the research observation noted several factors which produced varied objective limits to the capacity of the trade union organisations. First, despite their similar profession background in the Russian labour market, the conditions of work organisation for these two groups of workers are critically different. As shown in Chapters Two and Three, it is obvious that the substantial presence of self-identification among the railway workers as a whole has a highly individualised character. Little expression of collective identity was evident. 529 Second, the fact that railway workers are easily charged with violation of security regulations brought about specific difficulties for the RPLBZh’s organisational work among the members. Third, there is a surprising factor for Western observers to note: the primary organisations of RPLBZh faced the pressure not only from the administration but also their rival ROSPROFZhEL. The intensity of these suppressing forces – the opponent trade union organisations in particular – differed between the local railway workers and the local dockers, and these features characterised workplace labour relations as well as inter-trade-union relations. All these factors were further reinforced by the geographical distance so that the fragmentations within the workers’ community have been apparent and decisive. Moreover, the conditions have convinced the trade unionists of following individualised solutions. At the end, the efforts at territorial unity, involving TO RPLBZh OZhD, involve little regular coordination, but merely depend on individual activists (the chairperson of the union committee) working on their own at their own depots. Such a scene again proves that it is only partly true that the strength of the free / alternative trade unions develops in terms of the workers’ craft benefit. As an immediate result of the different factors mentioned above, the impact of the adoption of the new Russian Labour Code then caused further differences between the two union organisations. Klimova and Clément (2004) indicated that the new 530 Labour Code has undermined the rights of minor trade unions in Russia (as these organisations mostly are ‘free’ trade unions), though the TO RPLBZh suffered from their marginal status even before the impact of the new Labour Code. According to this research, we see the fact that the RPLBZh organisation could carry out its activism in the past, like some other alternative trade unions, was more or less a result of the advantages for their earlier position granted by the old Labour Code. With such a condition a weak union organisation at that time was able to rely on one unpaid union staff member to represent and support the union’s daily activities. Since the adoption of the new Labour Code, such status and advantage soon seriously deteriorated. Their exclusion from the status of participating in collective bargaining projects a clear example: losing the organisational right has forced the RPLBZh organisations (as well as KSP OZhD), to survive, primarily, by meeting demands related to individual labour disputes among their members. Against the militant spirit and heroic efforts among activists of the RPLBZh primary organisations and other non-RPLBZh trade unions, their individualised practice hardly could generate further prospect to increase the authority of these active organisations. And such an individualised approach to the membership meant that the leaders were frequently left exhausted. By and large, the individual solutions associated with workplace fragmentation meant that most non-RPLBZh free trade unions on the October 531 Railway only established their fragile membership on a fragile basis. For the RPLBZh primary organisations, their common character appeared to be that each union committee worked on its own, so that a common interest for all train drivers as a whole did not hold serious attraction for the union. The view that better coordination had ever existed was only found once under a controversial leader who was paid with the sponsorship of the American counterpart, AFL-CIO. The sponsorship turned out to be a condition for a flash of TO RPLBZh activism, but only revealed that such a style of leadership was a weak factor in forming an alternative orientation within the social organisation of production, which it simultaneously had little effect on local unionism. The more critical matter is that such vulnerable consent to an individualised pattern of representation has been reinforced by the condition of their isolated collectives. More importantly, the case study also revealed that while recognising the necessity of unity, the local activists set up a ‘confederation’, intending to unite these tiny occupational organisations and to act on a joint basis. Based on the fragile coordination derived from the foregoing ‘solidarity discouraging’ factors, instead of supporting each other to strengthen each union’s authority, the small KSP OZhD confederation finally disappeared together with most affiliated organisations. The rise and fall of KSP OZhD shows embarrassing evidence that the activists’ perception of embracing a broader community never succeeded, which also clearly demonstrates 532 the importance of favourable conditions for their subjective ability. Intellectually and practically, such unique individualised practice can be treated as a problematic dimension of the dynamics of the Russian trade union movement that even goes beyond Gordon and Klopov’s conclusion on the tendency of individualism of workers in a better position as mentioned in Chapter Three. After all, this has become an issue of whether an organisation can still be treated as a union at the workplace while it presents merely heroic energy as collective efforts and means to overcome individual victimisation? As presented in Chapters Four and Five, the structure of RPD primary organisations at St Petersburg Seaport projects one of the most visible differences for this comparative study. The dockers’ union employed the relationship of the brigade organisations, and enjoyed such benefit for union mobilisation. The combination of union organiser activists together with the brigade system provided the RPD port organisations with scope to recruit members and union activists. Such an impressive characteristic did not appear in the case of the railway workers. The content of brigade work processing allowed them to have a more convenient resource to conduct work stoppages. Moreover, apart from the more recent hardship coming from the employers’ managerial pressure, the RPD organisations did not face direct oppression from the rival PRVT organisations. The process of collective bargaining, on the 533 contrary, as we have seen in the case of RPD port organisations at the Seaport of St Petersburg, allowed an active and majority-status trade union to develop its mobilisation capacity. More importantly, the RPD port organisations did successfully retain a dozen activists who were involved in frequent union meetings, conferences and the mobilisation process, so that we have seen that the efforts were carefully carried out not by a single leader but by a handful of union activists. With its successful position, the dockers’ primary union organisation did associate under the coordinating role of the port committee. The relatively successful organisational work even meant that the term ‘social partnership’, commonly used by their activists, was associated with their own interpretations instead of restraining their collective action during the labour conflict. By and large, the strike actions in 2004 and 2005 clearly show their impressive mobilisation capacity. Table 6.1 lists a simple comparison of several key features from the research observation of the two sets of case-studies. The list shows that key solidarity-weakening factors are not seen in the case of the RPD port organisation of St Petersburg Seaport. 534 Table 6.1 The basic organisational features of the two case studies (by 2005) Position / Organisation of Workplace Presence of Union Number of Opposition Trade Work (number distribution collective status local union Union / union of workers) identity activists* relationship (including official leaders) RPLBZh TO Weak; October Brigade Railway (2) Broad Prone to ROSPROFZhEL / Weak individualism 3-5 paid staff: 0 RPD St Petersburg Seaport Often conflicting PRVT / Brigade Concentrated (50) Workplace collectivism Strong 15-25 Non threatening paid staff: 5 6.2.2 Local dockers’ resistance – an advanced model for unions’ strategy and leadership? With little doubt, the struggles of the active, well-organised port organisations of St Petersburg dockers could anyway be seen as a meaningful example for Russian workers’ organisation. Indeed, it seems fairly necessary to maintain united leadership to provide stable coordination in action. It looks as though evident that for any coordination there is a need for a certain union strategy and leadership capacity to create the ‘space’ to develop their approaches to resolving labour or even social conflicts. When reviewing the failure of the miners’ strike movement in Russia, Borisov (2000) suggested that the problem of the miners’ union was its preoccupation 535 with maintaining the interests of the branch, which led to substantial failure in supporting its members in conflict with their management (and that was the reason for more spontaneous strikes and their own management actions in the second half of the 1990s). He then explained it thus: ‘This is not the result of the subjective intentions of the leaders of the trade union, who are quite genuine in their commitment to the well-being of their members, but of the failure of the leaders of the union to adapt their strategy and tactics to changing economic and political conditions…. Beneath the appearance of solidity, the real organisation and solidarity of the coal miners at the level of the mine and the shop was being steadily eroded. The possibility of a renewal of the miners’ trade union depends on the possibility of its renewal from below’ (Ibid. p. 224). The conclusion above stressed the importance of the union organisation’s capacity. It looks as though the case of RPLBZh and KSP OZhD appears as an unsuccessful example which showed that within such an individualised, isolated environment (precondition), a solid union organisation is critically required for either solidarity making or collective action. In contrast to the situation of the RPLBZh territorial organisation, the RPD port organisation at St Petersburg seems to provide a respectable ‘renewal-from-below’ with a solid, well-organised and well-coordinated 536 organisation which has empowered the separate groups of workers. It all seems as though the dockers’ union structure did present a well-conducted collectivism and a grass-rooted union organisation. The further analyses, however, has raised a critical question of whether the dockers’ struggle presents a positive pattern for the transformation of Russian labour relations? Or, how much could we take their workplace unionism model as a sufficient resource to support their ‘not-in-the-same-workplace’ fellow workers so that the union organisation could indeed demonstrate its strength through its representation and expansion? The analyses of the organisational ability of RPD in Chapters Four and Five have practically demonstrated the answer to the meaning of a ‘model’ trade union organisation. It would be misleading to conclude that the dockers’ case shows that the union had overcome the influence of workplace relations. In fact, the conclusion of the case study of the dockers challenged that assumption – one should not ignore the internal weakness of their collective-union relations. 6.2.3 Effective coordination vs. workplace fragmentation The ‘positive’ case of the dockers in this comparative study, essentially, reveals a certain disjuncture of their efforts to integrate the fragmented collectives into a broader ‘unity-as-itself’; their strength as a whole, anyway, did not go beyond their 537 workplace. The uneven strength among their primary organisations (collectives) exposes that the local dockers’ strong union representation and solidarity mainly appeared in one or two companies. Not to mention that these stevedore companies locate in a close and relatively narrow area when we compare the local dockers to local train drivers. The realisation of the idea of the ‘labour collective’ (in the case of local dockers) has been a narrow identification, and their activities exposed the collectivity making that was based on union activists without a reflection of the whole workplace relations. The lack of a genuine professional trade union standing on a broader or closer base reflects the obvious presence of ‘solid’ workplace unionism in this study. Similarly, even if a trade union organisation had embraced all the positive organisational capacity of the dockers, functioning as an active union organisation to form a united organisation representing the interest of the workers as a whole, the community would be more like something ‘represented’ by the great efforts of the port committee. Returning to the train drivers’ case, even if the RPLBZh organisations and activists could have reached the same union status and strength as at the St Petersburg Seaport, in which there was a possibility of the formation of a stronger brigade collectivity (assuming they could take over the control of planerka, the depot meeting so that more favourable conditions resulted), together with less oppression from the administration and FNPR union, and their coordination pattern improved as 538 did the local RPD organisations, the RPLBZh might just sustain several strong primary organisations at their own depots. Regarding the previous clarification it is then meaningful to review the fact that under the very distinct forms of union organisation there are several shared characteristics identifying the immediate boundary of the dockers’ collective self-organisation as well as the meaning of workplace relations for the union organisation as a whole. First, almost all union activists expressed little possibility to mobilise their members themselves, to participate in public action (protest, picket, rally etc.). The scene was not very surprising, for it has been widely described in various research literatures; yet the point raised here to some extent reflects the shared characteristics among the active unions. As mentioned in previous chapters, the union activists in the first case often mentioned the difficulty of mobilising their workers, and did not believe in efforts to strengthen their skills or authority in convincing their members. Whether we consider the leaders or the members, their solutions are rather individualistic, partly due to the fact that collective action has been perceived as ineffective; partly due to the trade unions having poor resources for efficient contact. For the ‘model’ trade union in this study – the dockers’ organisation – we see that the leaders also expressed the difficulty of mobilising their workers, and that was also why their strike actions were rather organised in a very delicate way. 539 Second, we could note the fact that the uneven strength of these primary organisations and the strength of union unity represents merely the capacity of core primary organisations. In the case of the local dockers, the stories behind their solidarity appeal campaigns exposed the embarrassing situation that the port committee was not able to attract actual solidarity from other collectives － their members in other stevedore companies (which were divided by the attitudes of the primary organisations towards their own management policy). The uneven strength even occurred among the units close to each other. Moreover, neither the local RPLBZh organisation nor the local RPD port organisation proved itself as the leading force of the leading trade union in St Petersburg. When reviewing the local organisational networks one soon realises that there is no solid space for further contact, and most active, non-traditional trade unions remain at the stage of forms either like that of train drivers or that of the dockers.130 In addition, we could easily notice that the superior leadership of their trade unions did not provide regular organisational support in either case. In both cases the presidents of the regional (local) union organisations were elected as deputy presidents of their trade unions at the 130 This has been one of the reasons for the poor coordination situation I mentioned in Chapter One. The dockers’ activists do participate in local union meetings regularly but with a rather passive position. Like most local activists, the participants from the dockers’ group rarely took any initiative except in the period when they underwent their own labour conflict. Their ‘self-centred-but-passive’ attitude annoyed other participants who complained the dockers are so closed, they don’t like to share information with people who are concerned, they demanded from others only when they needed solidarity support for themselves. Those complaints might be unfair but at least they expose the dockers’ position in the local trade union movement. 540 national level, but the posts had little meaning within their organisational work. As a consequence, the port committee actually presented itself as the local headquarters, or indeed the only headquarters of the members. It is then clear that either the one-depot-one-union pattern or the well-coordinated pattern of workplace unionism reveal the fact that neither an effective strategy nor leadership play the decisive role; it is rather defined by the character of the social relations of production at the enterprise. If the obstacle to the transformations of Russian labour relations derived from the alienated workplace relations – which Clarke (1996) and Ashwin (1999) described as ‘alienated collectivism’ – not only for those traditional labour-management relations but also for those which have broken with paternalist relations, the answer might have been shown in the case of the once ‘militant’ miners and also that of the St Petersburg dockers. The interrelation between the workers’ collective identity and their trade union organisations reveals the contradiction within the process of self-organisation. Behind all the successful campaigns, the coordination, the reformed leadership, it is fairly questionable that the ‘positive’ case - the dockers – has achieved fundamental change to their union organisational work under their practice of workplace trade unionism. The more critical matter is that even if they were aware of the necessity of uniting beyond the limits of the workplace, their real practice did not go as they 541 perceived. The expectation that these workers would play a pioneer role, not surprisingly, must face meaningful doubt over the prospects of Russian labour relations: the mobilised workers and their organisation present an isolated exception rather than a pioneer model. Noteworthily, so many claims and attempts for a broader unity continually appeared across the region, but most solidarity attempts simply failed or appeared in a symbolic way. The comparative analysis of the formation of these two alternative trade union organisations presents an evident clarification of the inadequacy of an explanation emphasising subjective conditions over organisational forms. As a result this thesis integrates the details and process of Russian workers’ collective self-organisation, and on this basis provides an effective account of the way in which independent trade unions in Russia developed at the enterprise level and made their own achievements. 6.3 Russia’s organised labour under fragile prospect The case studies of the two meaningful Russian workers’ groups provide a useful lesson for us to examine those recently emerged labour conflicts across the country. Initially, it could be seen that when a union’s status has been weakened by the divisions within their workplace, the activities of union organisations would be the only practical force to articulate their fragmented membership. Those arguments 542 (found in the works of Mandel, Buzgalin and Maksimov mentioned in Chapter One, suggesting that Russian workers are ready to take part in actions but lack effective unions for the leading role), would focus on the weakness of FNPR and put forward the reform of union leadership as a solution for weak collective action. However, these arguments could easily come to over-abstract conclusions that ignore the actual relations among collective, union organisation and leadership on the ground. Any overestimation of the content and the role of ‘agency’ in such arguments underpins a critical prejudice in the analyses of collective-union relations. The matter is not simply to expect the workers and their unions to give up their dependent attitude or develop a grassroots-oriented mobilisation method. The obstacle of workplace fragmentation has also substantially confined those organised workers to a ‘stage’ on their own without mutual connections. The gap between recognising the possibility of developing a common interest and perceiving the weakness of that commonality, evidently, characterises the apparent limits of the workers’ capacity for collective empowerment. The individual factors of either union strategy or resources evident in this research help to illustrate that these factors could indeed improve the strength of the union organisation, but their impact would still be greatly restrained by these workplace relations. The case studies clarify that neither subjective nor objective conditions are sufficient to create an effective workers’ organisation. Both the dockers 543 and the railway workers have the subjective workplace conditions (dedicated activists), but the railway workers have unfavourable objective conditions. The limitations of the dockers’ organisation demonstrate that even in this case the favourable objective conditions are not sufficient to guarantee a completely successful outcome. Such a conclusion indicates that the specific origin of such a complex disjuncture within Russian labour relations needs to be taken into account, and we cannot ignore the legacy of alienated collectivism. Still, the fragmentation factors constitute another major obstacle to most Russian trade unions trying to overcome their passive position, or to receive reform-from-below changes. Bringing such an understanding into the thesis, the research can re-confirm the characteristics of Russian trade unionism. This explanation for the weakness of the self-organised Russian workers supports Ashwin’s argument (which she presented in her study of alienated, contested collectivism in the mining enterprise). However, we could find not only one single form of Russian workers’ self-organisation but variant ones with meaningful patterns. This analysis can be related to Ashwin’s conception in which she asserts ‘the social form of the labour collective inhibited workers’ organisation’ (1999, p. 189). According as the present analyses, we may re-constituted her major theme as such: the major force of alienated collectivism embedded in the systematic reproduction of the soviet type of social relations of production at the 544 enterprise level constructs the lack of collectively-organised Russian workers on the one hand; but can also note that mobilised workers are confined within the making of isolated change on the other hand. These weak forms of representation of Russian workers pull together and reproduce the current characteristics of social institutions in the country. All these factors could associate with each other to provide a more comprehensive explanation for the reproduction of the current state of Russian trade unionism. Such an analytical conclusion also provides a critical indication for the practical prospect of the Russian trade unions. Any serious estimation of the prospects of Russian trade unions’ efforts must address the differences of interest / conditions among their forms of collective identity. Any united platform or strategy (whether economic, social or political) for those organised, mobilised Russian workers will inevitably meet a deadend when their self-identification only thrives on their primitive collectives and the union leadership acts on such a logic without recognition of the collectives’ contradictory characteristics. Those workers, like the lately organised auto workers at Ford’s Vsevolozhsk factory, who decided to establish a new autoworkers’ union together with those from other Russian car factories would have to go through similar obstacles - the unavoidable basis for their unity in a process of narrow collective identification. The most critical challenge in front of the workers’ progress 545 remains obvious: the making of a wider unity for all Russian autoworkers as a whole depends on both a continuation of union coordination and a substantial transformation of these isolated workplace relations. The primary breakthrough for such unity needs to tackle the practical obstacles to a broader community within the embedded workplace relations, and this must be prior to any blaming of the failure of union leadership or strategy. In other words, the reform of Russian trade unionism would easily go in vain by assuming the current workplace fragmentation within Russian labour relations could have been transcended through one or several active union campaigns to develop a broad collective identity. 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