Somalia And U.S. Peacekeeping Essay, Research Paper
The desire for an organization that would help the international community ?avoid future
conflicts? and the recognized need for a global body that would ?promote international economic
and social cooperation? led the powerful states emerging from the rubble of WWII to develop
the United Nations. The newly formed United Nations ?represented an expression of hope for the
possibilities of a new global security arrangement and for fostering the social and economic
conditions necessary for peace to prevail? (Mingst and Karns 2). The need for mutual
cooperation amongst the states following the second of the global wars was vital to the
reconstruction of war-torn Europe, and for the development of a new world order. This attempt
at cooperation was not the first of its kind. According to Mingst and Karns, ?The UN?s Charter
built on lessons learned from the failed League of Nations created at the end of World War I and
earlier experiments with international unions, conference diplomacy, and dispute settlements
mechanisms? (2). Despite this ?experience? in mutual cooperation, the founding states still faced
many problems in the security arena due to the advent of the Cold War.
In order to effectively deal with security issues facing the UN, the Security Council turned to
?peaceMulligan 2
keeping? as an alternative to armed aggression. According to the United Nations Department of
Public Information, ?Peacekeeping was pioneered and developed by the United Nations as one of
the means for maintaining international peace and security? (1998), and the UN deals with
particular problems through ?the prevention, containment, and moderation of hostilities between
or within states through the use of multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians? (Mingst
and Karns 3). This was a very different approach to quelling conflicts that had never before been
practiced. Peacekeeping was ?a creative response to the breakdown of great-power unity and the
spread of East-West tensions to regional conflicts? (Mingst and Karns 3). Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, John R. Bolton, Senior Vice President of the
American Enterprise Institute, stated further reasoning for the evolution of peacekeeping. He
notes:
?Traditional? U.N. peacekeeping evolved when it became clear that the broad intentions of the
Framers of the U.N. Charter were rendered largely meaningless by the onset of the Cold War.
U.N. involvement in international crises, far from being the central dispute-resolution
mechanism envisioned by the Framers in Chapters VI and VII, became episodic and incidental to
the main global confrontation between East and West.
Since ?Cold War tensions have subsided, peace has been threatened by resurgent ethnic and
nationalist conflicts in
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many regions. As a result, U.N. peacekeeping operations have grown rapidly in number and
complexity in recent years. While 13 operations were established in the first forty years of U.N.
peacekeeping, 28 new operations have been launched since 1988? (UNDPI 1998). The following
map shows the many regions of the world in which the United Nations has become involved in a
peacekeeping mission:
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Due in part because of the extraordinarily limited dimensions within which U.N. peacekeeping
was feasible, a clear set of principles evolved to describe the elements necessary for successful
U.N. operations. These rules would become the standard from which future U.N. peace-keeping
missions would be drawn.
The first criterion for a U.N. peacekeeping mission was consent. According to Bolton, ?All of
the relevant parties to a dispute had to agree to the participation of U.N. peacekeepers in
monitoring, observing or policing a truce, cease fire, or disengagement of combatants? (2000).
This agreement must not only grant the U.N. the right to intervene in the state?s internal affairs,
but also detail the ?scope of its mission and the operational requirements for carrying out that
mission? (Bolton 2000). A nation-state, at any time, could withdraw its consent at which point
the U.N. forces would withdraw. One example of revoking consent occurred in ?May, 1967,
when Egypt insisted on the withdrawal of the U.N. Expeditionary Force (established after the
Suez Canal Crisis of 1956) from its territory along the border with Israel? (Bolton 2000). U.N.
forces were forced to leave, and as a result, the Six Day War followed.
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A second requirement was the notion that the U.N. forces would not take sides in the conflict.
Bolton states that
?U.N. peacekeepers were [to be] neutral [amongst] the parties to the conflict, not favoring one or
another of them. It was understood to be elemental that the United Nations could not ?take sides?
in a conflict without itself becoming involved in the very situation it was trying to stabilize or
resolve (2000).
Remaining neutral, however, would prove to be difficult as we will witness further along in this
work. To ensure the U.N. forces neutrality, the peacekeepers were ?almost always only lightly
armed, or unarmed, and they frequently depended on the cooperation of the parties to a dispute
for logistical support or cooperation? (Bolton 2000). Lacking the appropriate offensive
capabilities would deter possible outbreaks of aggression on the part of the peacekeeping forces.
According to Mingst and Karns, ?Peacekeepers use military force only as a last resort and in
self-defense. This precedent was a response to the difficulties encountered in the Congo in 1961
when the Security Council authorized the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) to use
force to prevent civil war and to remove foreign mercenaries in that country. The use of force ?
even limited force ? is fraught with political and legal controversy? (79). As a result of the
limited military
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capabilities, the U.N. peacekeepers ?had no right of enforcement, and their missions were
deliberately non-coercive, not intended to compel any party to accept a particular settlement.
U.N. rules of engagement, through long-established practice, provided for the use of force
essentially only in self-defense? (Bolton 2000).
The use of force by a U.N. force would be questioned in future peacekeeping endeavors. U.N.
involvement in Somalia would prove to be one such example of the problems experienced by the
occupying forces. Somalia has been described as the textbook example of a ?collapsed? or
?failed? state. Throughout the period of intervention, those involved in ?restoring hope? ? from
the military and civilian sides ? no doubt understood too little about the sources of state
dissolution and the respective roles of the Somali clan system, colonialism, and Cold War
geopolitics in the horn of Africa.
Prior to British and Italian colonialism, ?there was no common Somali identity or centralized
control over the territory of what became Somalia. Although more homogeneous than other
countries in Africa ? with a common ethnicity, language, culture, and religion (Islam) ?
Somalia?s geographical area was occupied by nomadic
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pastoral groups, organized predominately by paternal kinship? (Weiss 71). The continually
moving population made establishing a centralized governmental body difficult and there was no
recognition of a ?hierarchical system?. This lack of a controlling body led to conflict among the
indigenous peoples. Thomas G. Weiss states that conflict was ?common among lineages,
especially in competition for land and resources necessary for survival. But there were conflict
resolution mechanisms within the lineages, known as the ?xeer,? which prevented the escalation
of conflicts by inhibiting the excessive economic stratification in society? (71+). He goes on to
say that, ?The spread of Islam modified conflict management by adding a mild form of the
Shari?ah Islamic Law. Acts of vengeance were diminished through the concept of the ?dia,? or
the payment of ?blood money? compensation to the victim by the violator? (Weiss 72). Despite
the lack of a governing body to enforce laws, social institutions were there to control behavior.
While the basis of organization was direct lineage, groups were also structured by subclans and
then clan families, each predominantly associated with sometimes overlapping geographical
areas. The six overarching major
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clan families are the Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq, and Rahanwein. Traditionally, lineages
continually created and shifted alliances among other groups and subclans.
The end of colonialism in 1960 further shifted alliances amongst the clans. The transition from a
lineage/clan based society to a centralized state authority posed new problems for the
independent Somali government. However, governmental attempts to rid the political
environment of clan-influence failed when an army coup in 1969 placed Mohammed Siad Barre
in power. Thomas G. Weiss explains the result of Barre?s rise to power. He says,
Rhetorically, Barre?s policy of ?scientific socialism? aimed to eliminate ?clanism,? but the end
result of his twenty-two-year rule was strengthening of clan-based politics. He forbade the use of
clan names; however, his primary method of obtaining and maintaining power was to draw
support from his own clan and those linked by lineage and to pit other clans against one another.
Virginia Lung has described this policy as a form of ?clan clientelism,? in which arms, money,
and land were distributed to clans in order to maintain his power (73).
Thus, the clan-based system was not eliminated; it was reinforced.
The late 1980?s saw the steady decline in Barre?s power. ?The combination of food crises,
economic collapse, and the end of Cold War competition in the horn, along with the resulting
decline in foreign aid, began to erode Barre?s base? (Weiss 75). Further, the rise of clan-based
national movements and their success in challenging Barre?s
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rule led to the multiplication of clan based factions. ?Spurred by the fear that one group?s
assumption of power would be detrimental to another?s own position,? says Weiss, ?clan-based
opposition led to extreme fragmentation of Somali society? (75). In the end, Barre?s own policy
backfired on him. By 1990, his power base was limited to only one clan ? the Marehan.
In 1991 and 1992 ?civil order in Somalia totally collapsed as warring clans seized control of
parts of the country? (Mingst and Karns 92). The fighting that followed, with clans and subclans
constituted in loose alliances without central control, took place at a time of serious drought.
That combination proved disastrous for the population at large. By 1992, ?almost 4.5 million
people, more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe
malnutrition and related diseases? (UNDPI 1997). According to Mingst and Karns, ?Widespread
famine and chaos accompanied the fighting, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to the
brink of starvation. Control of food was a vital political resource for the Somali warlords and a
currency to pay the mercenary gangs who formed their militias? (92). At this time, ?most
government, NGO, and U.N. humanitarian
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organizations evacuated staff and suspended programs? (Weiss 78). A handful of organizations,
however, remained and attempted to counteract overwhelming human suffering. In mid-1992,
?in response to the increased media coverage, the number Of NGOs dramatically increased
temporarily, eventually numbering around fifty? (Weiss 79). However, as Lt. General Manfred
Eisele illustrates in his report to the United Nations following the Somalia crisis it was hard to
make progress without military intervention. He says:
The descent into anarchy, with the concomitant lack of security, was the main reason why a
large-scale and well-coordinated relief operation could not be mounted in Somalia in 1992.
Although notable results were achieved on the humanitarian relief front, including the advocacy
work of NGOs, the mass feeding kitchens operated by the International Committee of the Red
Cross and the opening of Mogadishu port the World Food Programme, far too little was achieved
too late and the lives of countless Somalis, mainly women and young children, were lost. Thus,
adequate security arrangements [were] imperative to safeguard the humanitarian space needed
for successful relief operations.
At this point, ?international pressure [was] building for the secretary-general and the Security
Council to intervene in Somalia in an effort to end months of factional fighting? (San Diego
Union-Tribune 1992). However, some members appeared reluctant to become deeply involved in
what they saw as an increasingly dangerous and chaotic situation. Further, there was also
?widespread reluctance among Security Council members to suggest any peacekeeping role for
the United Nations when the Somali factions were
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still fighting one another and bands of armed irregulars roam the country? (San Diego UnionTribune 1992).
However, in April 1992, the U.N. decided to intervene. Established to monitor the cease-fire in
Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and to provide protection and security for United Nations
personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort
deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its
immediate environs, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) began. 500 Pakistani
troops were deployed in August 1992. However, by November 1992, ?1,000 Somalis [were]
dying every day and three-fourths of Somalia?s children under age five [were] already dead?
(Mingst and Karns 92). The secretary-general of the U.N. felt that ?more forceful measures?
were needed.
In December 1992, the U.N. authorized ?a large U.S.-led military-humanitarian intervention ?
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) ? to secure ports and airfields, protect relief shipments and
workers, and assist humanitarian relief efforts? (Mingst and Karns 92+). Also on UNITAF?s
agenda were the imposition of a ceasefire, and the disarmament of the various factions. In 1993,
however, UNITAF was
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replaced by UNISOM II after few results in peacekeeping were achieved. UNISOM II differed
from previous attempts at intervention in that it was authorized to use force when disarming the
factions. Similarly, the faction leaders were now targets for elimination by the intervention
forces. This converted the U.N.?s role from neutral peacekeeper to active belligerent, putting
UNISOM ?in the worst of all possible worlds which past peacekeepers had scrupulously
avoided?[and] made it one of the players in the conflict? (Mingst and Karns 93).
As the U.S. military pursued a more active role in thwarting the factions, they experienced
casualties. On October 3, 1994, 18 soldiers were killed and 78 wounded during a rescue attempt.
The American public was outraged by the massacre, and did not legitimize the sacrifice made by
the American soldiers nor the current role of its military abroad. U.S. troops were withdrawn
from Somalia in March 1995. When the last of the U.N. troops were withdrawn, the ultimate
result of the military help and humanitarian delivery was unclear. It was a ?non-event,? wrote
Gerard Prunier, and ?life went on pretty much the same way as it had gone on during the late
UNISOM II period? (Weiss 95). Three years and some $4 billion had
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left the warring parties better armed, rested, and posed to resume civil war.
The Somalia crisis can be analyzed by examining the relationship between the IO, namely the
U.N., and the nation-state, Somalia. As we have seen, IO?s do not prevent wars from happening.
They can not prevent them because they do not have the power to do so. Only the nation-state
can prevent the war. In order to understand this better, we must look at this through the
Westphalian System v. Grotian Law perspective. The Westphalian system, based on the Treaty
of Westphalia of 1648, is one that contends that the nation-state has the right to territorial selfdetermination. Essentially, the people within their territory decide want they want, and no other
nation can intervene in their internal affairs. The Somali warlords believed that they had the right
to determine what was best for them within their country?s boundaries. Thus, they rejected the
U.N. presence in their homeland. Grotian Law, however, contends that nation-states must work
together in order to achieve common interests, and that cooperation is paramount. The U.N.
adopted this role when it felt it needed to intercede on Somalia?s behalf in order to alleviate
global concerns for the suffering people in
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Somalia. This is when the two schools of thought are unable to reach decisions, and problems
arise. The IO does not have the authority to force the nation-state to comply with global
concerns. As we have seen in Somalia, the U.N. forces were unable to make great progress in
establishing peace.
Another pattern observed in the Somalia issue is Rhetoric v. Actual Behavior. Many times, a
nation-state will sign treaties and then perform actions completely opposite of this. In this case,
the Somali warlords signed countless ceasefires with envoys to allow humanitarian relief efforts
to gain access to the needy people. However, the fighting never seemed to end despite the
promised calm.
Somalia and U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: Who Has the Right?
Seann T. Mulligan
April 25, 2000
Professor Sterling-Folker
POLS 225
Works Consulted
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Works Cited
Bolton, John R., Congressional Testimony, April 4, 2000.
Eisele, Lt. Gen. Manfred. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. http://www.un.org
Mingst, Karen A. and Margaret P. Karns. The United Nation in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed.
Westview Press, 2000.
San Diego Union-Tribune, The. ?Somalia civil war will test the mettle of new boss at U.N.?
December 12, 1992.
UN Department of Public Information. ?UN Peacekeeping: Some Questions and Answers?,
September 1996.
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Weiss, Thomas G., Military-Civilian Actions. Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
UN Peacekeeping in Somalia
Widespread drought in Somalia brought relief efforts into the country. Starvation and disease are
rampant. The collapse of the political framework led to civil war amongst the various factions.
The relief efforts were being targeted by the Somali warlords and the Somali president petitions
the U.N. for help. U.N. peacekeeping forces are sent in to protect humanitarian relief workers
and to ensure that the food stuffs are being delivered.
Three Phases:
I. UNISOM I (United Nations Operations in Somalia)
– comprised mainly of 500 Pakistani soldiers, lightly armed
II. UNITAF (United Task Force)
– after little is gained by UNISOM I, the U.N. secretary-general calls for more coercive action.
– a large U.S.-led military-humanitarian intervention, known as ?Operation Restore Hope?
– UNITAF was largely successful in achieving its humanitarian objectives, supplying food to
those who need it and imposing de facto ceasefire in areas of deployment
– could not, however, fulfill the larger tasks of peacemaking. The US withdraws from Somalia
and was replaced by UNISOM II
III. UNISOM II
– a larger and more heavily armed force than a traditional peacekeeping contingent but smaller
than UNITAF and lacking much of the heavy equipment and airpower brought by the US.
Result: UN forces have succeeded in relieving much of the starvation but not in helping the
Somalis to reestablish a national government or to end their internal strife.
Relevant Approaches for Analysis:
1. Westphalian System v. Grotian Law
2. Rhetoric v. Actual Behavior
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